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Country Risk is Corporate Risk
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Corisk Report Series No 1, 2022
Progress in European-Russian
trade reductions by May, 2022
Erlend Bollman Bjørtvedt
August 22, 2022
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
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Disclaimer
This report is an intellectual property work of the author, published by Corisk AS, an analysis and risk company
registered in Norway under Norwegian Law. The report and its content represent the viewpoints and positions
of the author. The report may have been produced in consultation with others, but the responsibility for the
report’s content, facts, correctness, and positions rests solely with the author.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is for free use by private media, individuals and academic
institutions, provided that any presentation, replication or re-use of data or text is thus credited:
Bollman Bjørtvedt, Erlend (2022): “Progress in European-Russian trade reductions by May, 2022”, Corisk
Report Series, No. 1, August 22, 2022.
Media must credit data and graphics in the following way:
Source: Corisk AS.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is not for free use, distribution, or commercial utilisation by
corporate or other commercial entities including their subdivisions and representatives. Such use of the report
must be cleared with the author, and is otherwise limited by the right of citation regulated by Norwegian Law.
This report is non-commissioned, and no funding or financial support has been provided for its production.
The author is a member of Norsk-ukrainsk venneforening. The author has no commercial interest in the issues
or substances discussed in the report.
© 2022: Corisk AS.
Corisk AS is a country risk analysis and consulting company registered in Norway.
Website: www.corisk.no
E - mail: ebb@corisk.no
Phone: +47 – 9225 9227
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Contents
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 4
Summary Infographics ......................................................................................................................... 7
Background ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Methodology and data selection ...................................................................................................... 10
Exports to Russia before and after the 2022 invasion ................................................................... 11
Imports from Russia before and after the 2022 invasion .............................................................. 14
Detailed trade values per country .................................................................................................... 17
Germany – trade with Russia by commodity class ............................................................................ 19
Netherlands – trade with Russia by commodity class ....................................................................... 20
United Kingdom – trade with Russia by commodity class ................................................................. 21
Ireland – trade with Russia by commodity class ................................................................................ 22
Denmark – trade with Russia by commodity class ............................................................................ 23
Finland – monthly total trade with Russia .......................................................................................... 24
Norway – trade with Russia by commodity class ............................................................................... 25
Sweden – trade with Russia by commodity class .............................................................................. 26
Poland – trade with Russia by commodity class................................................................................ 27
Czechia – trade with Russia by commodity class .............................................................................. 28
Quarterly trade with Russia during 2022 ......................................................................................... 29
Sources ................................................................................................................................................. 30
References ........................................................................................................................................... 31
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Executive summary
This report investigates how European countries are progressing with reducing trade with Russia in
view of the ongoing economic sanctions. According to a study from the Yale University, Western
countries needs to uphold sanctions and “stay unified” in order to have real effect on Russia.
1
A study
by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs concurred that sanctions “effects are
just beginning to unfold”, while pointing out the efforts Russia makes to try reduce the impact.
2
This report analyses progress in trade reductions, irrespectively of the exact liabilities pertaining to
each specific commodity. Notwithstanding the legal liabilities companies have to adhere with binding
sanctions, there is a strong political and moral sentiment connected with isolating and punish Russia
after the country’s attack on Ukraine. While the attack and invasion started on February 24, 2022,
sanctions were rapidly enacted and several countries sharply reduced trade with Russia already
during March. Sanctions involving trade with broad commodity groups were introduced during
February and March, and the United States and United Kingdom had reduced imports substantially
before April. Many trades were banned, and even more trade items were voluntarily withdrawn from
the Russian market. Trade reductions progressed well initially, but have since been partially reverted.
In lieu of this backdrop, the report investigates official trade statistics of 15 European countries.
1. Czechia
2. Denmark
3. Estonia
4. Finland
5. France
6. Germany
7. Hungary
8. Latvia
9. Lithuania
10. Netherlands
11. Norway
12. Poland
13. Serbia
14. Sweden
15. United Kingdom
Exports and imports to and from Russia are examined over three and a half year, to discern whether
or not the political and moral intent to sanction trade with Russia makes progress. Trade is dissected
into detailed commodity classes, but without reference to the exact legal obligations companies have
to reduce or abstain from trade with each group of commodities. National trade data up until May
2022 are analysed, and trade at commodity group level are examined for seven countries.
Identification of trade does not imply any indication or allegation that individual countries or
enterprises violate the economic sanctions. Data are presented solely to observe actual trade.
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The report finds that European countries have substantially reduced exports to Russia after the
invasion, especially the sales of cars, machinery and metals and materials. But there was a noticeable
resumption of some exports during May. As a result, several countries first reduced exports in March,
but thereafter increased exports to Russia. The Netherlands, Norway, Serbia and France are the
countries in the survey that have most clearly increased exports to Russia since March 2022. The
exports of food, fishery products and fish fodder and all kinds of chemicals, continues unabated.
These are commodities with varying degree of sanction connected to them, but may potentially
enable the supply of necessary frontline food rations, and supply chemical components to warfare.
Exports from the 15 countries were 2.75 billion Euros in May 2022, against 6.04 billion in May 2021.
There was a certain reduction of imports from Russia after the invasion, but this decline was partly
reversed by the rapidly increasing prices of natural gas throughout the surveyed period (gas prices
later declined again in June-July). While European imports from Russia clearly declined after the
February attack on Ukraine, that import decline started from a record high level. As a consequence,
imports in May were really just down to the “normal” level for the years 2019-2021. Clear reductions
in imports have taken place in the UK, Denmark and Sweden, and partly in Poland, and Lithuania.
Norway reduced imports in May, but they are back at full levels in July, 2022. Some other countries
have also seen only marginal cuts in imports. Unabated imports of natural gas provide Russia with
funding for the war effort. Total imports from 15 countries were 11.52 billion Euros in May 2022,
against 9.03 billion in May 2021. Thereby, total imports increased over the latest available data year.
As a consequence of the sharper reduction in exports than in imports, Russia has improved its trade
balance with these 15 countries since the attack on Ukraine. Whereas European exports of
armament, military components and other strategic goods have virtually ceased, there is still much
exports of goods that indirectly sustain Russia’s war effort, and the almost unabated imports of
natural gas provides support for Russia’s war effort, macroeconomic performance, and currency.
Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and partly Poland, display a substantial and consistent
decrease in both exports and imports from Russia after sanctions were broadly enacted in March
2022. The UK has delivered a massive decrease in trade, and most especially the imports of crude oil,
petroleum products and chemicals have strongly declined. Denmark has clearly reduced exports and
imports overall after the invasion, even though Denmark’s exports clearly increased again in June –
but to lower-than-normal levels. Denmark has totally ceased to import oil and chemicals, but retains
some chemicals exports to Russia. Danish exports of food and beverages have significantly dropped.
Sweden has massively reduced total imports, and exports of cars and machinery, while the sales of
foods and chemicals to Russia is hardly reduced. Imports of oil, petroleum products and chemicals
had totally ceased by May 2022. Poland has clearly cut its exports of materials, metals, wood and
paper products, and machinery and equipment. However, Polish exports of chemicals to Russia
remains virtually unaltered by sanctions.
A middle group comprising Norway, Czechia and the Baltic states have more marginally changed
exports and variably reduced imports. Norway increased exports to Russia after March 2022, and
especially the exports of food and fishery products including fish fodder, increased after the invasion.
Norwegian exports of chemicals and machinery also continues almost unabated. Imports of fish and
products of metals, wood and paper continue at the same levels as in previous years, but the imports
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of oil, petroleum products and chemicals have significantly decreased under the economic sanctions.
Czechia clearly reduced exports after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but these increased again in
May (and June). Czech imports were never really reduced with the event of war and sanctions, but
instead escalated strongly due to a dramatic increase in purchases of Russian oil and gas.
Key economies like France, Germany and the Netherlands have increased exports to Russia after the
invasion, and only modestly reduced imports. Germany continued to export food and chemicals at a
high level, virtually unaltered by economic sanctions. German exports of cars and machinery clearly
decreased, but increased again in May. The German imports of food and fish, natural gas, chemicals,
metals, paper and other materials, continues virtually unaltered of sanctions. The Netherlands has
similarly upheld exports of food and chemicals, but has more persistently phased out vehicle and
machinery exports. For both countries, many commodity imports have not been visibly reduced.
Dutch imports of oil and petroleum products was still very high in May, and imports of metal and
paper products have continuously increased and imports in May 2022 are above the February level.
A final group of objectors to the economic sanctions includes Hungary and Serbia, and they have
generally increased their trade with Russia after the invasion – both exports and imports.
As a summary, European countries had by May 2022 only modestly progressed with economic
sanctions of Russia, and provide crucial funding of the Russian war effort via imports.
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Summary Infographics
Core economies and Norway increased their
exports to Russia from March to May 2022:
Norway and Serbia increased exports
to Russia in the second quarter:
Core countries reduced imports from Russia in May: Czechia & Serbia increased imports in Q2:
Exports of chemicals continue, imports of oil and gas only moderately reduced:
Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Poland. Germany, Netherlands, UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Poland.
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Background
After the Russian attack and subsequent invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the European
Union enacted a fourth round of economic and trade sanctions against Russian citizens and entities,
starting with sanctions against Russian banks and Russian participation in SWIFT from February 22-
25, and the freezing of Russian overseas reserves and targeted EU sanctions against individuals
enacted during the early days of February 24-28.
Sanctions were triggered by the Russian recognition of independence of the two Donbass counties of
Ukraine, and the illegal military attack on Ukraine. The sanctions intend to punish state-owned and
state-linked individuals and companies from upholding the economic basis for the Russian war effort.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, a large number of European companies voluntarily withdrew from
the Russian market and announced their intent to abstain from trade and transactions.
3
The February 28 sanctions from the EU included a wide range of export controls on IT components,
military and strategic goods, goods for use in oil refining, aerospace and aviation.
4
The regulation also
banned or restricted financial transactions, loans and credits, IPOs and trade in equity instruments –
including to EU subsidiaries of Russian majority-owned companies.
5
On March 17, EU sanctions were
expanded to cover imports of iron and steel, and exports or transactions in the energy and luxury
goods sectors – in addition to specific individual and company sanctions targeting iron and steel,
aviation, machine building, dual-purpose equipment, energy, and banking.
6
The EU sanctions from
March 17 included Gazprom, Rosneft, and the other major energy companies.
7
This first and
comprehensive package of sanctions was enacted as Norwegian Law by March 18.
On March 8, as the USA announced a ban on imports of Russian oil and gas, the EU Commission
stated its intent of reducing European imports of natural gas from Russia by two thirds during 2022.
Even though European countries still import Russian natural gas, the intent to phase out gas war
made clear two weeks after the war started, and from June 3 the EU enacted a partial ban on imports
of oil from Russia, which was enacted as Norwegian Law on June 17.
On March 11, the EU, USA, UK, Canada, and Japan agreed to remove the Most Favoured Nation
(MFN) status of Russia under the WTO framework.
8
This move opened up the legitimate pathway to
imposing tariffs, restrictions ,quotas, and further bans in trade with Russia.
Countries and entities officially imposing sanctions against transactions and trade with Russia include
the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, the USA, Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore. Countries
officially abstaining from taking part in sanctions, include Serbia, China, India, Mexico, and Brazil. The
2022 EU sanctions are an expansion of the post-2014 sanctions, and during the years 2014-2022
there was considerable scepticism towards and critique of the sanctions in Hungary, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, Greece, and partly in France and Germany. After 2022, only Hungary among EU countries
openly questions the process. However, Germany only reluctantly accepted the expulsion of Russia
from SWIFT and the postponement of the North Stream 2 oil pipeline between Russia and Germany.
A detailed overview of the various sanctions of Russia is available from Correctiv (www.correctiv.org)
and Open Sanctions (www.opensanctions.org). A total of 6,906 new sanctions have been approved
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since February 22 by the EU, USA, UK, Switzerland, and Japan – against 5,412 individuals and 1,041
companies.
9
Of these 6,906 sanctions, a total of 1,019 were already introduced by end of February,
and during March another 2,274 were intruded, bringing the total before April up to 3,293, or 48 %
of all current sanctions. Another 848 sanctions were added in April, while an upcoming European oil
ban was approved in May, although many countries and companies had already started abandoning
Russian oil as a consequence of the US ban from March 8.
European countries and their companies first of all follow EU sanctions, even though registration or
activities in the USA will oblige many to follow US regulations as well. The EU has enacted to date
(august 7) a total of 1,101 sanctions, which were officially introduced in the following sequence:
10
EU sanctions
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
New
475
212
62
79
61
0
Cumulative
475
687
961
1,040
1,101
1,101
In force:
Export, banks, energy,
iron, steel, aviation,
luxury goods, luxury
cars
Coal,
ports
Oil
As we see from the above table, notwithstanding the oil ban starting from June 3, the overwhelming
number of European sanctions had already been enacted by April, and half of the sanctions were
enacted before the end of March. Already in March, the writing on the wall was clear and most large
companies including European car makers abandoned the Russian market. The EU started an open
process to ban imports of Russian coal on April 5, and made clear the intent to ban oil imports.
11
European airspace and roads were closed for Russian aircraft and road traffic from March. European
ports were closed off for Russian registered ships from April 16.
12
On May 31, the EU Commission
announced the last major commodity sanction, with the much awaited ban on oil imports.
13
By April it was evident that the EU and other major powers intended on comprehensive and punitive
sanctions of Russia, that that the existing sanctions would be successively expanded, and that the
remaining trade, first of all in natural gas, was to be intentionally phased out in exchange for other
sources. At this time, countries like the UK had also already sharply reduced trade with Russia.
We can regard April 2022 as the time when it was clear to any decision-maker across Europe that the
European Union and individual national governments were enacting ever-expanding sanctions on
trade with Russia, in addition to the moral public pressure on businesses, and the fact that NATO
member states were supplying armament to the Ukraine from February onwards. Accordingly, this
report will evaluate the actual progress on trade reduction and phase-out against the normal trade
volumes of previous years from April onwards.
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Methodology and data selection
Trade between individual countries and Russia are reported both by the central banks via the
Balance of Payments, and by statistical offices as trade in goods and services. This report focuses on
the trade in goods, as these are most easily measured and monitored by authorities. The report
seeks to establish to which degree European countries have actually made progress on sanctions – by
checking how actual trade has developed since 2019 with a focus on the clear sanction regime that
existed from April 2022 onwards. The analysis does not implicate or allege violations of sanctions.
Trade data have been accessed from the national statistical offices, since the central bank of Russia
records and publishes data only with a considerable time lag. By August 22, 2022, all countries had
published trade statistics including May 2022, while some countries had published data including
June. Data have been retrieved manually from national statistical services. Hungary, Poland and
Serbia publish data in Euro which have been utilised here. For Denmark, Norway, Sweden and UK,
local currency units (LCUs) have been converted to Euro at average currency rates from xe.com.
To assess the progress of sanctions and trade reduction, the report focuses on trade with Russia from
March to May 2022, compared to similar periods during 2019, 2020, and 2021. The year 2019 serves
as a reference point for pre-pandemic trade levels, while the development 2021-2022 is a good
reference to check the magnitude of immediate change following proclamations of sanctions.
With the exception of Denmark, exports and imports of goods in the report include also goods that
do not cross the border – which are typically oil and gas products sold to aircraft abroad or ships at
high seas. All data per commodity class use SITC data when available, while use of CN data has been
“translated” into SITC by way of conversion tables. The exception is again Denmark, which issues
data in split SITC classes, and Danish data at commodity level will include slightly other goods. For
example, food trade data for Denmark will also include beverages, beer, tobacco goods, etc.
Imports from Russia are generally measured by country of origin, not country of consignment.
Exports are similarly measured including non-border-crossing sales to Russian entities.
Complete data are compiled from 15 countries: Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. There are detailed trade data reported for Ireland, but the country has not released data
for 2019. Trade data from Belgium and Italy have not been found in monthly time series for Russia.
This means that the study contains complete data for the three largest economies of Europe, and all
the countries bordering Russia. The countries chosen are closely located and have had a substantial
trade with Russia, ranging from 1-10 % of total trade. The countries represent a mixture of large
economies (France, Germany, UK), open economies (Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden), sanction sceptics (Germany, Hungary, Serbia), gas importers (Germany, Hungary, Serbia),
and countries that do not purchase any substantial oil or gas from Russia (Norway, Sweden, UK).
The 15 countries represent a GDP estimated at 13,200 billion USD in 2022, which corresponds to
more than half of Europe’s total GDP of 20,150 billion USD.
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Exports to Russia before and after the 2022 invasion
Figure 1 shows the monthly development of total exports to Russia from the five largest countries,
measured in million Euros (for scale, Germany’s data are here divided by 10). Russia’s attack in late
February is marked by a red dot and arrow. We see how most countries have considerably reduced
their exports to Russia, following the many direct bans and restrictions enacted from March 2022:
This general picture is even more clear in Figure 2, which sums the exports of the 15 countries over
the same three and a half years period, again with Russia’s attack marked with a red dot and arrow:
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Exports to Russia declined sharply early on, from 5,136 million Euros in February to 2,498 million
Euros in March 2022, a drop by 51.4 %, and a decline by 55.5 % compared to March 2021. The
decline continued in April and brought exports down to 1,915 million Euros, a third of the natural
level. In May 2022, total exports from the selected countries increased somewhat to 2,498 million
Euros, a level well below previous years’ levels. Still, some individual countries have increased their
exports more than others after the initial introduction of sanctions, as detailed in Figure 3.
The countries with blue
bars have clearly reduced
exports to Russia since
March 2022, led by
Czechia (down 59 %),
Denmark (- 57 %), the UK (-
47 %), Sweden, Finland,
Poland, Hungary, Latvia,
Estonia, and Lithuania.
Countries with orange bars
increased their exports
from March 2022,
including the Netherlands
(up 52 %), Norway, France,
Serbia, and Germany.
For France, exports bottomed at 121 million Euros in April 2022, and then increased to 224 million
Euros in May, above the March numbers. Even though France has clearly reduced exports compared
to normal levels 2019-2021, there is a noticeable resumption of some exports after April. The
“normal” level of French exports to Russia over the last three years has been 250-700 million Euros.
For Germany, the general decline in exports after March 2022 compared to the earlier years of 2019-
2021, was less marked than in France. Figure 3 reveals that German exports to Russia were “only”
halved compared to their normal levels of 2 billion Euros per month. Exports plummeted to 828
million Euros in April 2022, but increased to 1,123 million Euros in May – which was above the level
in March and about half the “normal” level of monthly German exports to Russia.
For the Netherlands, there was a considerable reduction in exports in March to 184 million Euros,
against a “normal” level of 500-600 million Euros per month. However, there has been a significant
increase in exports in May, up to 279 million Euros which is almost 52 % higher than in March and
already represents half of the “normal” level for Dutch exports to Russia.
For Norway, there was a significant increase in exports in May 2022 over March, second only to the
Dutch increase. Exports to Russia decreased significantly already in January 2022, which at 131
million NOK was the lowest level recorded since before 2019. Since January 2022, Norwegian exports
to Russia have steadily increased to 165 million NOK in March, 202 million NOK in May, and 214
million NOK in June 2022. The “normal” monthly level over the last years was 150 – 500 million NOK.
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For Serbia, which has not been willing to take part in Western sanctions against Russia, exports have
increased steadily, and the May 2022 level represents the highest Serbian exports to Russia on
record since 2019. Current exports are about 50 % above the “normal” level of 60-80 million Euros.
However, if we track total exports from 15 European countries over a full year from May 2021 to
May 2022, there is a clearer reduction in exports from all the countries except Serbia:
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Imports from Russia before and after the 2022 invasion
Figure 4 shows monthly total imports from Russia to the five largest economies surveyed, in million
Euros (Germany’s data divided by 10 for scale). Russia’s attack in February is marked with a red dot
and arrow. We see visibly how most countries increased imports from early 2020, when oil and gas
prices bottomed. Since then, imports increased, and many countries now struggle to reduce imports:
This general picture is clear from Figure 5, which sums the combined imports of 15 selected countries
over the three and a half years period, again with Russia’s attack marked with a red dot and arrow:
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As can be clearly seen, imports witnessed a significant decline from 16.9 billion Euros in March 2022,
down to 11.5 billion Euros in May – representing a drop by 31.8 %. This decline is pronounced,
inasmuch as prices on natural gas actually increased sharply from February through March, April and
May – the later price collapse came first in June-July 2022.
14
The persistent imports of natural gas
weighted heavy in total imports and made it more difficult for countries to fully cut Russian imports.
The change in imports
from Russia March-May
2022 is detailed in Figure
6. We see how most of
the countries have
reduced imports, not least
those that do not import
Russian natural gas
(Sweden, UK, Norway). As
apart from exports, the
decline in imports was
more universal and there
was only an increase in
Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Serbia.
In France, imports from Russia increased steadily from September 2021, along with the increasing
prices on natural gas. A reduction of imports first appeared in May, and continued in June: Imports in
May were 26 % lower than in March, while imports in June were 36 % lower.
In Germany, imports increased steadily since May 2021, and reached a record high level at 4.4 billion
Euros in March 2022. Thereafter, imports have declined by 25 % despite rising prices on natural gas.
In the Netherlands, imports from Russia have increased more or less continuously since January
2021. The rise in imports continued until March 2022, followed by modest declines in April and May.
In Denmark, imports from Russia were already significantly reduced from January 2022, onwards.
The levels in May and June 2022 are only half the level from January, and also below previous levels.
In Norway, which does not import natural gas from Russia, imports were already in decline since
January 2022. There was a spike in imports with a doubling in March, due to a single shipment of
Russian crude oil that month. If we avoid this effect and instead compares imports February-May,
the decline was 22 % by May, and in June the decline from February was 43.7 %.
In Sweden, there was no significant import of oil or gas after the invasion, and imports decreased
strongly from 2,324 million SEK in February to only 138 million SEK in May – a reduction by 94 %.
In the Baltic States and Poland, there were also noteworthy declines in imports from Russia through
the spring of 2022. Least decline was seen in Estonia and Latvia, while Lithuania and Poland more
than halved imports- with the major decline appearing in May rather than April.
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In Czechia (Czech Republic), imports from Russia were stable through the end of 2021 and started to
increase significantly from February 2022, after which the imports have gradually increased.
In Hungary and Serbia, imports had increased steadily through the winter and continued to do so
during the spring months of 2022. The two states reject participation in economic sanctions.
If we track total imports over the last year, there were reduced imports from some countries, but key
countries upheld higher import from Russia compared to a year ago. In Figure 8 we see how most
countries imported more from Russia in May 2022, than one year before, especially gas importers:
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Detailed trade values per country
In this chapter, imports and exports are broken down to specific commodities and groups of goods,
in order to analyse the exact nature of trade development. Product groups data are retrieved based
on the SITC international classification standard, where possible, otherwise applying the European
Union’s Combined Nomenclature (CN). Finland, France, and Serbia do not release monthly trade data
by trade partner at commodity group level. Ten countries are selected: Germany, Netherlands, UK,
Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Poland, and Czechia (the Czech Republic).
Considerable product groups of Russian produce that are imported to Europe, include mineral
products (oil and gas), chemical industry products, base metals and metal products, and agricultural
foodstuffs including grain. There is also occasionally a considerable import of Russian live animals
and animal products including fish, building materials, machinery, transport equipment, and artwork.
The five SITC commodity classes of interest that will be inquired below, are:
0. (CN: 01-11) Food and live animals (incl fishery products)
3. (CN: 25-27) Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (incl oil and gas)
5. (CN: 28-38) Chemicals and related products
6. (CN: 39-83) Manufactured goods, by material (incl iron, metals, wood, pulp, paper)
7. (CN: 84-89) Machinery and transport equipment (including cars, machines, equipment)
The months investigated include all months in 2022 up until the latest available data. In addition,
data for May 2021 is included to serve as a year-on-year reference point.
The Figure 9 below presents the exports of chemicals to Russia from six countries since January 2022.
These are Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Poland. There was a decrease
in chemicals exports in March and April, followed by a resumption of exports in May. Only Denmark
and Sweden reduced their exports of chemicals continuously since the February invasion (red dot).
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In Figure 10 the imports of fuels including oil and gas from Russia to seven countries are presented.
These are Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Poland. The
imports of Russian oil to the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Poland have been significantly
reduced, especially in Sweden and Denmark were such imports totally ceased from May 2022. In
Norway oil imports are occasional, the imports in May were actually exceeding those in February, but
oil imports in June were again clearly reduced. The invasion is marked with a red dot and arrow.
Germany and the Netherlands have not reduced their imports to any noticeable degree. The two
countries’ combined imports of fuel, oil and gas at 4.22 billion Euros in May was below previous
monthly levels in 2022, but vastly exceeded the 2.99 billion Euro imports in May 2021.
In figures 9 and 10 above, the data from Norway and Sweden have been converted to Euros at a flat 0.1 rate, data from
Denmark are converted at an exact 0.134 rate (the DKK is pegged to the EUR), while the British data have been converted at
the annual average rate. Errors from applying constant currency rates for Norway and Sweden, and annual averages for the
UK, should be rather marginal because the time of payment for imports may often deviate from the time of consignment. An
attempt at exact conversion would have limited value unless very detailed shipment and payments data are investigated.
For exact local currency trade data per country, see Tables 1- 8 in the country chapters at the end of this report.
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Germany – trade with Russia by commodity class
Germany imports mainly oil and gas, metals and paper products, and chemical products from Russia.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 1, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, exports were reduced to about half the “Normal” level for the month, and the decline
in exports started immediately in March. The sales of cars, machinery and equipment (SITC Class 7)
to Russia has been sharply reduced, while chemicals exports remain largely unaltered by sanctions.
By May, 2022, all main commodity groups are imported at a magnitude equal to, or above the levels
one year ago. While oil and natural gas (Class 3) imports remains virtually unchanged, so does the
imports of food and fish and machinery, while there is a slight reduction in the imports of chemicals
and metals and paper products. But all in all, the reduction since invasion is only marginal.
Table 1 – Trade with Russia by commodity class - GERMANY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
Total exports
2 434,2
1 481,8
2 288,4
2 137,2
2 120,7
1 019,0
828,2
1 123,3
0. Food, fish, etc
65,5
47,9
55,3
69,6
66,5
60,2
45,2
55,9
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
10,5
5,0
12,3
12,4
14,8
4,2
4,9
7,2
5. Chemical products
495,9
362,2
469,7
522,3
525,0
468,3
313,1
433,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
209,6
144,4
198,6
201,6
209,0
105,9
79,8
110,4
7. Machinery, transp equip
1 376,4
740,9
1 306,9
1 073,1
1 059,6
252,2
274,1
383,2
Total imports
2 534,4
1 142,3
2 497,6
3 998,4
3 701,2
4 416,5
3 704,4
3 316,2
0. Food, fish, etc
18,9
25,2
27,6
25,1
27,9
42,8
26,6
34,1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
2 013,8
809,6
1 793,2
3 192,6
2 922,8
3 292,0
3 062,5
2 599,6
5. Chemical products
47,7
34,0
67,0
97,3
71,6
73,1
65,0
48,1
6. Materials, metals, paper
333,4
193,2
400,7
405,6
472,8
746,3
368,0
362,8
7. Machinery, transp equip
27,9
20,4
32,7
28,1
48,4
33,1
13,3
27,1
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
20
Netherlands – trade with Russia by commodity class
The Netherlands imports first of all oil (SITC Class 3), and substantial amounts of metals and paper
products (Class 6). The imports of natural gas and chemical products are historically marginal
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 2, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
From February to May 2022, exports were reduced towards half the “normal” level for the season,
but there was a marked resumption of exports in the month of May, led by chemicals sales.
It is obvious that the Netherlands had not reduced imports substantially by May 2022, all product
classes were imported at an equal or higher amount than a year before. Especially, the imports of oil
and gas and petroleum products seems to continue more or less unaltered after the invasion.
Table 2 – Trade with Russia by commodity class - NETHERLANDS
Trade, mio EUR
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
Total exports
502,0
465,0
470,0
478,0
508,0
184,0
194,0
279,0
0. Food, fish, etc
51,0
36,0
33,0
39,0
43,0
26,0
28,0
37,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
7,0
4,0
5,0
7,0
6,0
3,0
2,0
2,0
5. Chemical products
128,0
160,0
118,0
119,0
117,0
65,0
75,0
134,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
17,0
20,0
34,0
20,0
27,0
9,0
7,0
10,0
7. Machinery, transp equip
194,0
170,0
178,0
192,0
179,0
25,0
23,0
26,0
Total imports
1 244,0
551,0
1 410,0
2 300,0
1 954,0
2 806,0
2 425,0
1 922,0
0. Food, fish, etc
7,0
11,0
7,0
10,0
10,0
11,0
8,0
9,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
907,0
0,0
1 194,0
1 922,0
1 713,0
2 388,0
2 159,0
1 623,0
5. Chemical products
32,0
12,0
21,0
81,0
25,0
26,0
16,0
11,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
60,0
43,0
140,0
269,0
164,0
328,0
221,0
253,0
7. Machinery, transp equip
4,0
12,0
6,0
3,0
3,0
3,0
1,0
2,0
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
21
United Kingdom – trade with Russia by commodity class
The UK historically imports oil and petroleum products, while other commodity classes are marginal.
The imports from SITC class 3 normally make up 50-70 % of all imports.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 3, below.
Note that the data are presented in million British Pounds (GBP = 1.18 EUR).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
The UK does not publish monthly exports data per commodity group. The largest export goods in
2021 and 2022 were cars (11 %), medical and pharmacy products (10 %), specialised machinery (8 %),
power generators (6 %), and general machinery (5 %).
15
In other words, the exports were very similar
in composition to those of Germany and the Netherlands.
The United Kingdom has strongly reduced both exports and imports from Russia. The transition was
immediate and almost completed by end of March 2022 – already in April import amounts were
down to 15-25 % of the normal historical level.
Table 3 – Trade with Russia by commodity class – UNITED KINGDOM
Trade, mio GBP
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
Total exports
208,0
135,0
230,0
181,0
256,0
108,0
33,0
57,0
Total imports
620,0
263,0
619,0
1 840,0
1 878,0
645,0
244,0
206,0
0. Food, fish, etc
6,12
11,92
3,35
1,02
0,38
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
953,62
632,33
481,88
209,68
164,21
5. Chemical products
24,93
41,33
5,29
7,01
1,24
6. Materials, metals, paper
47,05
54,75
45,95
18,76
8,5
7. Machinery, transp equip
21,93
11,57
100
1,2
28,51
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
22
Ireland – trade with Russia by commodity class
Ireland has not been part of the more generalized analysis in all the preceding chapters of this report,
because they have not published data from 2019.
However, historically Ireland has occasional and variable imports of coal, oil and oil products, and at
times considerable imports of fertilizers, from Russia. Traditional exports to Russia include chemical
products and machinery. Besides, there is occasionally exports of scrap metals which are part of total
exports below, but not visible in the presented SITC sub-classes. The residual difference between
total export values and the sum of group export values in the table below, will normally be almost
fully due to the exports of scrap metals to Russia.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 4, below.
The Central Statistics Office of Ireland (CSO) groups trade data in 89 commodity groups, and in the
table below SITC class 0 includes their groups 00-08, while SITC class 7 in the table below combines
groups 70-79 and 87-89. The other classes are identical to those of other reporting countries.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
The Irish exports and imports both considerably dropped in April 2022, and have since more or less
remained at low levels in May. However, in June there was again a considerable export (metal scraps
and chemicals) and imports (non-ferrous metals).
Table 4 – Trade with Russia by commodity class – IRELAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
46,8
31,3
40,2
61,9
61,8
71,6
44,9
24,1
51,3
0. Food, fish, etc
0,5
0,4
2,1
0,9
1,9
1,2
0,0
0,0
0,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,1
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
17,6
17,8
13,9
21,8
28,2
47,9
2,8
8,1
22,8
6. Materials, metals, paper
0,5
0,1
0,5
0,5
0,3
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
7. Machinery, transp equip
12,4
2,9
15,2
15,9
20,5
4,8
2,1
1,9
0,2
Total imports
27,3
14,5
15,4
130,2
55,8
83,8
7,7
20,3
17,7
0. Food, fish, etc
2,7
1,8
2,2
2,4
5,6
14,6
2,3
8,1
5,9
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
15,0
1,9
5,4
69,7
23,8
40,1
1,8
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
7,8
8,8
3,5
48,9
23,6
27,4
0,2
8,7
0,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
0,5
1,5
2,7
7,7
0,7
1,1
0,5
0,4
8,2
7. Machinery, transp equip
0,2
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,8
0,1
0,4
0,6
1,0
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
23
Denmark – trade with Russia by commodity class
Denmark’s imports from Russia have historically been dominated by imports of oil and petroleum
products, materials like metals and paper products, chemicals, and foodstuff (mostly fish).
Danish exports traditionally include first of all chemicals, and foodstuff (agricultural products,
beverages, etc), and materials (raw and semi-processed metals, wood and paper products, etc).
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 5, below.
Note that numbers are in million DKK (DKK = 0.134 EUR) and include June 2022 (right column).
Note that some data includes several SITC classes with minor deviation from the other countries.
16
Statistics Denmark presents split SITC classes which have been combined by the author.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, exports were significantly reduced compared with previous months and with “normal”
levels. There was a reduction in the sales of food and beverages, materials, metal, wooden and paper
products, and machinery and transport equipment to Russia. Exports of chemicals were also
somewhat reduced, but did then rebound to “normal” levels in June 2022.
Denmark reduced imports after the invasion, and imports were in May and June at roughly half the
“normal” level. Imports are lower than they were in 2019 and 2021, but not lower than under the
Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. The imports of oil and chemical products including fertilizer have been
very strongly reduced, and oil imports have totally stopped. But there has been no clear reduction in
the substantial imports of products of iron, steel, wood and paper.
Table 5 – Trade with Russia by commodity class – DENMARK
Trade, mio DKK
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
688,5
647,2
772,6
601,9
579,8
405,0
216,0
175,3
321,0
0-1. Food, fish, beverage etc
75,2
61,7
94,9
83,4
90,3
71,7
15,3
16,6
23,5
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,4
0,7
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
215,0
205,9
188,4
154,0
155,4
224,9
160,4
104,0
195,4
2, 6. Materials, metals, paper
67,3
62,0
54,8
87,9
65,1
32,0
3,6
4,6
11,6
7. Machinery, transp equip
263,4
284,9
380,4
223,6
214,3
58,4
23,2
25,2
60,4
Total imports
1 208,5
528,0
1 333,7
1 024,4
960,6
964,7
510,5
524,5
595,7
0-1. Food, fish, beverage etc
107,6
68,2
94,6
124,2
190,2
144,7
78,8
58,7
50,1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
821,4
112,2
798,9
298,6
249,9
283,1
32,8
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
16,3
18,8
28,5
79,6
107,2
20,1
24,4
20,9
13,2
2, 6. Materials, metals, paper
258,8
269,9
405,5
516,7
407,9
512,5
373,6
444,8
532,2
7. Machinery, transp equip
0,4
58,1
0,6
1,7
1,7
3,3
0,0
0,0
0,0
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
24
Finland – monthly total trade with Russia
Finland does not release monthly trade by commodity group, but there are monthly trade statistics
available sorted by trade partner. Monthly trade in the last year is detailed in Table 6, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
We see below that Finland has reduced exports during 2022, both in the longer perspective
compared to previous years, and more especially compared to 2021. But in June 2022, exports again
resume towards the “normal” levels from the previous years. Exports to Russia in June 2022 is back
at the same level as it was in June 2019 and June 2020.
Finnish imports from Russia have not dropped quite as much in March and April, but in June there is
a continued decrease in imports compared to April and May, and compared to previous years.
The total quarterly imports during the second quarter of 2022 were 1.2 billion EUR, as compared to
1.35 billion EUR during the second quarter of 2021, and even lower with 1,0 billion EUR in the second
quarter of 2020. Thereby, the quarterly reduction is not very pronounced year-on-year, despite the
considerable reduction from the first quarter of 2022.
Table 6 – Trade with Russia by month – FINLAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Monthly exports
395
198
301
312
324
184
141
171
237
Quarter ending that month
810
709
1 032
890
586
Monthly imports
789
976
404
1015
974
1001
528
453
329
Quarter ending that month
2 023
1 010
1 355
2 652
1 199
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
25
Norway – trade with Russia by commodity class
Norway’s imports from Russia have historically been dominated by imports of raw fish, which is being
re-exported to Europe from Norwegian ports. While there is some import of crude oil, chemical
products including fertilizers, and metal ores and products, count almost equally much as oil and gas.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 7, below.
Note that numbers are in million NOK (NOK = 0.1 EUR) and include June and July (right columns).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, exports were reduced but not very significantly compared with “normal” levels. There
was a reduction in the sales of machinery and transport equipment to Russia, but other commodity
groups remained largely unaltered by the economic sanctions. In June, Norwegian exports to Russia
increased again, and all commodity classes except materials and machinery rose above 2021 levels.
The decline in Norwegian exports of machinery, electrical and digital equipment (Class 7) started
already before 2022, and the low import levels have no connection with the economic sanctions.
Norway first reduced imports to roughly half of the “normal” levels after the invasion, but in July
2022 imports are again up at the levels seen in previous years. The fishery imports have not been
banned (Norway has obtained an exception with the EU), and food and fish exports including fish
fodder is back at “normal” historic levels. Imports of oil and chemicals including fertilizer have been
clearly reduced, but there is no clear reduction in imports of products of iron, steel, wood and paper.
Table 7 – Trade with Russia by commodity class - NORWAY
Trade, mio NOK
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
329,4
334,0
392,4
131,2
199,0
165,2
220,3
202,3
213,9
205,7
0. Food, fish, etc
76,6
109,4
136,7
18,1
39,9
57,9
149,9
135,2
150,3
143,4
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,1
0,0
0,4
0,9
1,3
0,9
0,2
0,5
1,5
0,4
5. Chemical products
20,9
14,2
21,0
26,2
27,1
18,2
10,7
5,6
13,4
6,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
34,2
18,1
36,6
37,3
37,9
40,9
29,2
31,3
31,9
37,4
7. Machinery, transp equip
166,3
170,8
180,9
32,0
74,5
34,4
21,5
16,9
13,5
12,7
Total imports
1 695,8
975,8
1 649,9
2 062,5
1 691,4
3 098,8
1 748,7
1 319,1
951,9
1 679,8
0. Food, fish, etc
215,5
83,2
154,2
237,5
114,1
314,6
105,2
364,6
125,9
275,5
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
694,9
307,3
533,5
678,2
487,8
935,6
453,1
426,1
29,8
935,3
5. Chemical products
157,8
184,8
182,7
196,8
172,5
607,5
205,8
85,1
93,4
8,3
6. Materials, metals, paper
431,7
153,0
566,5
546,2
523,3
884,7
722,9
269,2
430,1
339,9
7. Machinery, transp equip
9,7
12,8
10,3
19,8
14,1
18,0
8,2
430,1
13,9
8,8
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
26
Sweden – trade with Russia by commodity class
Sweden historically imports oil and petroleum products, chemicals and metal and paper and paper
products from Russia. The imports of fuels is not particularly high, equal to Norway’s imports.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 8, below.
Note that numbers are in million SEK (SEK = 0.1 EUR).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, Sweden had sharply reduced exports to Russia, led by a significant decline in the sales
of cars and other machinery and transport equipment. There was also a substantial reduction in the
exports of metals and materials, paper products, and chemical products (from May). Still, the export
of chemicals was higher than in May 2019, and not much lower than in the two years before the war.
Sweden has strongly reduced imports from Russia after the invasion, and all product groups except
metal and paper products and machinery have seen imports radically decline. In May 2022, the
imports of fuels, oil and gas products had totally vanished.
Table 8 – Trade with Russia by commodity class - SWEDEN
Trade, mio SEK
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
Total exports
1 813,0
1 534,0
2 132,0
1,930,0
2,001,0
608,0
893,0
377,0
0. Food, fish, etc
4,8
1,4
1,1
2,9
1,0
3,5
6,0
9,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
14,4
9,7
9,1
6,5
4,3
0,0
0,4
0,0
5. Chemical products
154,2
426,2
386,0
246,5
517,4
418,3
811,1
264,8
6. Materials, metals, paper
302,5
207,1
295,5
343,5
340,2
70,6
17,6
33,4
7. Machinery, transp equip
1 203,7
797,5
1 288,3
1 179,9
2 171,3
89,9
56,6
50,9
Total imports
4 027,7
1 128,5
1 686,6
2 230,5
2 323,5
1 176,7
125,3
137,9
0. Food, fish, etc
0,1
0,1
1,2
6,9
0,1
1,2
1,7
1,2
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
3 629,1
756,5
829,8
1 729,2
1 838,5
658,6
29,8
0,0
5. Chemical products
134,4
129,1
283,1
185,7
190,9
215,2
133,3
3,1
6. Materials, metals, paper
173,9
148,9
269,7
157,7
152,2
186,3
67,3
117,5
7. Machinery, transp equip
16,2
9,4
14,1
21,3
15,6
135,6
6,2
12,7
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
27
Poland – trade with Russia by commodity class
Poland historically has a wide and substantial imports from Russia, including first of all oil and gas,
petroleum products, metal and paper products, and artwork.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 9, below.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Polish Zloty.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, Poland’s exports to Russia were clearly reduced, towards magnitudes half the “normal”
levels for the season. Especially, the exports of metals and materials, machinery, vehicles and
equipment were sharply reduced, while the exports of chemicals largely remained unaltered.
Poland had not by May reduced imports very much, all commodity classes except machinery were
being imported at the same, or higher levels than one year ago. There was a spike in imports during
winter due to the spike in oil and gas prices, but otherwise other commodity and manufacture
imports continued more or less unaltered until May 2022.
Table 9 – Trade with Russia by commodity class - POLAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
578,8
507,3
602,9
631,5
664,4
353,1
209,5
268,6
403,5
0. Food, fish, etc
36,5
27,6
41,1
40,1
46,6
37,5
20,0
18,3
25,9
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
3,5
2,1
3,1
3,8
3,5
2,0
0,4
2,7
1,5
5. Chemical products
118,9
110,4
110,1
123,5
121,7
115,6
70,3
96,3
265,5
6. Materials, metals, paper
113,6
81,5
110,4
101,9
116,8
61,6
42,4
48,2
60,8
7. Machinery, transp equip
234,9
224,3
252,1
257,0
269,1
78,5
41,6
63,3
97,7
Total imports
1 241,7
498,8
1 094,7
1 643,2
2 116,4
2 719,4
2 012,0
1 037,6
1 097,2
0. Food, fish, etc
11,8
14,9
16,6
20,0
25,9
30,6
22,0
23,5
26,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
811,7
236,3
514,3
922,1
989,4
1 462,2
860,3
738,3
796,6
5. Chemical products
85,0
46,9
117,9
160,7
173,3
178,3
122,5
109,1
107,8
6. Materials, metals, paper
94,6
95,4
174,1
170,0
172,4
148,1
151,5
129,4
108,2
7. Machinery, transp equip
15,0
10,2
53,6
15,3
18,8
14,8
12,7
5,6
6,3
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
28
Czechia – trade with Russia by commodity class
Czechia historically has substantial imports from Russia, including first of all oil and gas, petroleum
products, metal and paper products, and artwork. Exports are less substantial, focused on machinery.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 10, below.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Czech koruna.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, Czechia’s exports to Russia were clearly reduced, towards magnitudes at less than a
third of the “normal” levels for the season. Especially, the exports of metals and materials,
machinery, vehicles and equipment were strongly reduced already in March 2022, and the low
export volumes continued with only marginal increase towards May. However, the exports of
chemicals to Russia have largely remained unaltered.
Czechia has continuously increased imports from Russia throughout the latest sanction period and
the war in Ukraine. Only the imports of machinery and vehicles has dropped, whereas all other
imports have either remained stable or increased considerably. Imports of oil and gas (i.e., mainly
natural gas) has grossly increased continuously since the low price bottom in June 2020.
Table 10 – Trade with Russia by commodity class – CZECHIA (CZECH REPUBLIC)
Trade, mio DKK
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
302,78
330,28
360,57
316,08
261,74
85,40
68,37
81,60
118,44
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
7,81
6,63
13,68
4,00
5,46
5,77
5,25
4,53
4,98
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
1,09
0,09
0,03
0,44
0,15
0,03
0,03
0,01
0,05
5. Chemical products
28,17
33,40
30,27
21,68
21,14
17,45
17,74
20,74
34,57
6. Materials, metals, paper
33,15
32,34
41,62
34,82
36,11
13,94
9,47
13,20
15,38
7. Machinery, transp equip
199,72
226,65
236,43
222,86
163,83
40,20
30,37
36,02
54,08
Total imports
414,56
163,27
375,48
491,63
561,55
1045,42
1382,83
1437,84
1107,77
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
1,48
1,27
2,02
4,97
4,27
4,98
2,62
3,37
3,28
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
294,17
54,65
326,22
372,74
436,69
896,22
1277,15
1344,33
999,04
5. Chemical products
29,62
19,93
26,12
29,12
32,20
30,87
30,15
30,38
29,03
6. Materials, metals, paper
39,64
37,60
52,82
58,30
49,75
71,01
48,60
37,92
57,39
7. Machinery, transp equip
37,13
36,81
41,26
8,27
15,01
25,44
9,45
11,01
4,81
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
29
Quarterly trade with Russia during 2022
Denmark, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Czechia, Estonia and
Latvia and Serbia have per 22 August, 2022, released trade statistics which include June 2022. This
implies that these countries have also made available data for the whole of the first and second
quarters, 2022. Below are nine of these countries’ trade with Russia presented by quarterly change in
the second quarter of 2022, compared to the first quarter of 2022.
The quarterly exports to Russia in the second
quarter of April-June 2022, presented in
Figure 11, increased in Norway and Serbia,
when we compare them to exports during
the first quarter of January-March. In all the
other seven countries, exports to Russia
clearly fell from the first to the second
quarter of 2022.
The quarterly imports from Russia in the
second quarter of April-June 2022, is
presented in Figure 12. These quarterly
imports fell most in the United Kingdom and
Finland (note that data for Sweden and the
Netherlands were not ready at the time of
releasing this report).
Imports increased only in the Czech Republic
and in Serbia, when we compare to imports
during the first quarter of January-March.
But reductions were hardly visible in France
and Germany, neither.
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
30
Sources
Trade statistics retrieved from national statistical offices:
Czechia (Czech Republic)
https://apl.czso.cz/pll/stazo/STAZO.STAZO?jazyk=EN
Denmark
https://www.statistikbanken.dk/20029
Estonia
VK16: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS BY COMMODITY (BEC) AND COUNTRY. Statistical database
Finland
https://pxweb2.stat.fi/PxWeb/pxweb/sv/StatFin/StatFin__tpulk/statfin_tpulk_pxt_12gq.px/
France
FOB exports of France incl. overseas departments - To: Russia - All, excluding military equipment - Estimated raw data - NAF
rev. 2 | Insee
CIF imports of France incl. overseas departments - From: Russia - All, excluding military equipment - Estimated raw data -
NAF rev. 2 | Insee
Germany
Federal Statistical Office Germany - GENESIS-Online: Statistics: 51000 (destatis.de)
Hungary
https://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp
Latvia
Foreign trade in goods | Oficiālās statistikas portāls
Lithuania
VK16: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS BY COMMODITY (BEC) AND COUNTRY. Statistical database
Netherlands
StatLine - International trade; import and export value, SITC (3 digits), countries (cbs.nl)
Norway
08806: Utenrikshandel med varer, etter varegruppe (en- og tosifret SITC) og land/handelsområde/verdensdel 1988M01 -
2022M06. Statistikkbanken (ssb.no)
https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/08806/
Poland
http://swaid.stat.gov.pl/en/HandelZagraniczny_dashboards/Raporty_predefiniowane/RAP_SWAID_HZ_3_7.aspx
Serbia
https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/oblasti/spoljna-trgovina/
Sweden
Varuimport och varuexport. Totala värden efter handelspartner, bortfallsjusterat. Månad 1998M01 - 2022M05. PxWeb (scb.se)
https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/sv/ssd/START__HA__HA0201__HA0201B/ExpTotalKNMan/table/tableViewLayout1/
UK
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/datasets/uktradecountrybycommodityimports
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
31
References
1
Richard Connor (2022): «Yale study shows sanctions are crippling Russia’s economy”, Deutsche
Welle, 28 July, 2022.
2
Richard Connor (2022): «Yale study shows sanctions are crippling Russia’s economy”, Deutsche
Welle, 28 July, 2022.
3
Bryan Pietsch: “A list of companies still doing business in Russia circulated. McDonalds, Coca-Cola
and Starbucks soon pulled out”, The Washington Post, March 8, 2022.
4
European Commission (2022): Council Regulation EU 2022/328 of 25 February 2022 amending
Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising
the situation in Ukraine, February 25, 2022.
5
Covington Alert (2022): “EU and UK Adopt Additional Sanctions Against Russia, with Further
International Sanctions Measures Announced”, Covington, February 28, 2022.
6
Olof Koning et al (2022): “EU introduces additional sanctions against Russia”, Baker McKenzie,
March 17, 2022.
7
Olof Koning et al (2022): “EU introduces additional sanctions against Russia”, Baker McKenzie,
March 17, 2022.
8
Philip Blenkinsop and Nick Macfie (2022): “Factbox: What revoking Russia’s ‘most favoured nation’
status means”, Reuters, March 11, 2022.
9
Correctiv.org, total sanctions tracker (senders x targets), as per August 7, 2022.
10
Correctiv.org, total sanctions tracker (senders x targets), as per August 7, 2022.
11
Mark Thompson (2022): «Europe proposes ban on Russian coal imports”, CNN Business, April 5,
2022.
12
Port News (2022): “Ban on Russian ships in EU ports: Everything you need to know”, World Ports,
May 28, 2022.
13
Steve Rosenberg (2022): «Russian oil: EU agrees compromise deal on banning imports”, BBC
News, May 31, 2022.
14
IG Daily FX: Natural Gas Price Chart, futures prices in USD per MMBtu, visited August 8, 2022.
15
UK Government: Trade and Investment Factsheets: Russia, August 1, 2022.
16
Danmarks Statistik: Udenrigshandel med varer, methodology description, visited August 15, 2022