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Corisk Report Series No 2, 2022 Progress in European-Russian trade reductions by June, 2022

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Status of sanctions implementation and monthly trade with Russia of 16 European countries per June, 2022. Detailed data on the development of imports and exports with Russia per country, and per SITC commodity group.
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Corisk Report Series No 2, 2022
Progress in European-Russian
trade reductions by June, 2022
Erlend Bollman Bjørtvedt
August 30, 2022
Revised version September 6, 2022
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Disclaimer
This report is an intellectual property work of the author, published by Corisk AS. The report and its content
represent the viewpoints and positions of the author. The report may have been produced in consultation with
others, but the responsibility for all content, facts and positions rests solely with the author.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is for free use by private media, individuals and academic
institutions, provided that any presentation, replication or re-use of data or text is to be thus credited:
Bollman Bjørtvedt, Erlend (2022): “Progress in European-Russian trade reductions by June, 2022”, Corisk
Report Series, No. 2, September 2022.
Media should credit data and graphics in the following way:
Source: Corisk.
This report is non-commissioned, and no funding or financial support has been provided for its production.
The author has no commercial interest, or conflicts of interest, in the issues discussed in the report.
The author is an experienced economics scientist and analyst with 25 years of experience from international
business and research. He has published corporate R&D papers and peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals.
The Corisk Report Series, including this report, is not for free use, distribution, or commercial utilisation by
corporate or other commercial entities including their subdivisions and representatives. Such use must be
cleared with the author, and is otherwise limited by the right of citation regulated under Norwegian Law.
© 2022: Corisk AS.
Corisk AS is a country risk analysis and consulting company registered in Norway.
Website: www.corisk.no
E - mail: ebb@corisk.no
Phone: +47 9225 9227
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Contents
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 4
Summary Infographics ......................................................................................................................... 7
1. Background ........................................................................................................................................ 8
2. Methodology and data selection .................................................................................................. 10
3. Exports to Russia before and after the 2022 invasion ............................................................... 11
4. Imports from Russia before and after the 2022 invasion .......................................................... 15
5. Detailed trade values per country ................................................................................................ 18
5.1. Quarterly effect of sanctions after the Russian invasion of Ukraine ........................................... 19
5.2. France monthly total trade with Russia .................................................................................... 20
5.3. Germany trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 21
5.4. The Netherlands trade with Russia by commodity class ......................................................... 22
5.5. United Kingdom trade with Russia by commodity class .......................................................... 23
5.6. Ireland trade with Russia by commodity class ......................................................................... 24
5.7. Denmark trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 25
5.8. Finland monthly total trade with Russia ................................................................................... 26
5.9. Norway trade with Russia by commodity class ....................................................................... 27
5.10. Sweden trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 28
5.11. Estonia trade with Russia by commodity class ...................................................................... 29
5.12. Latvia trade with Russia by commodity class ........................................................................ 30
5.13. Poland trade with Russia by commodity class ...................................................................... 31
5.14. Czechia trade with Russia by commodity class ..................................................................... 32
5.15. Hungary trade with Russia by commodity class .................................................................... 33
6. Three phases of decline and recovery of trade .......................................................................... 34
6.1. The first phase - large and immediate reductions in exports ...................................................... 34
6.2. The second phase exports stabilise and imports bottom in May ............................................. 34
6.3. The third phase exports to Russia strongly increase in June .................................................. 34
7. Ranking of countries by changes in trade with Russia ............................................................. 35
Sources ................................................................................................................................................. 36
References ........................................................................................................................................... 37
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Executive summary
By June 2022, sixteen European countries had only variably progressed with economic sanctions of
Russia, and a clear increase in trade was underway. Continued trade provides crucial funding of the
Russian war effort via imports, and improves the Russian balance of trade.
Exports have clearly dropped but are consistently rising again in May and June. All countries except
France increased exports from May to June. This is hardly a seasonal phenomenon, since most
countries reduced trade from May to June 2019, and many did the same in 2020 and 2021. In June
2022 exports were more than 1.1 billion Euros higher than in April, and uniformly increasing.
Imports have been reduced in 2022, but from a record high level due to high oil and gas prices. In
June 2022 total fuel imports fell with the decline in gas prices, but imports of all other goods from
Russia did not further decline. Total imports in June are as high as anytime during 2019 or 2020:
There were only two months in 2019 and 2020 where Russian sales matched the June 2022 level.
This report investigates developments in European trade with Russia, since the release of Corisk
Report Series No 1 Progress in European-Russian trade reductions by May, 2022. The two reports
explore the progress of trade reductions in view of the ongoing economic sanctions of Russia. The
report explores trade reductions irrespectively of the exact liabilities pertaining to each commodity.
Notwithstanding the legal liabilities of companies to adhere with sanctions, there is a strong political
and moral sentiment for isolating and punishing Russia after its attack on Ukraine. Europe needs to
uphold sanctions in order to exert a real economic effect on the war capabilities of Russia.
1
After the attack and invasion started February 24, 2022, sanctions were rapidly enacted and several
countries sharply reduced trade with Russia already during March. The United States, the United
Kingdom, Singapore, and Ireland reduced imports substantially already in March and April. Many
trades were banned, and many companies voluntarily withdrew from the Russian market.
This report investigates trade statistics of 16 European countries. Based on data comparisons
(Chapter 7), the countries are here presented in descending order of sanction performance:
1. United Kingdom. The UK has most consistently reduced all sorts of trade with Russia.
2. Sweden. The Swedish exports and imports have both been consistently reduced.
3. Denmark. Danish trade has been moderately reduced along all the time perspectives.
4. Ireland. Exports are long-term increased, but imports have been strongly cut since April.
5. Lithuania. The best performing of the countries bordering Russia, all trade flows reduced.
6. France. Strong reductions in exports, but more modest long-term changes in imports.
7. Poland. Noteworthy reductions in both exports and imports for another border country.
8. Finland. Modest export cuts and strong import cuts for this country bordering Russia.
9. Norway. Increased exports since April, but clear reductions in imports except fish and oil.
10. Germany. Mostly reduced exports, but long-term increase in imports of gas and materials.
11. Netherlands. Reduced exports, but largely increased or at best stabilised imports.
12. Czechia. Mostly reduced exports but strong increase in imports along time periods.
13. Latvia. Clear increase in exports of food and machinery, but modest reductions in imports.
14. Hungary. Cut exports, but overall and long-term increased imports of gas and chemicals.
15. Estonia. Increased exports and stable or higher imports for this bordering country.
16. Serbia. Refuses to sanction Russia, consistent increases in trade along all time periods.
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As Corisk Report Series No 1 revealed, trade reductions progressed well initially, but were partially
reverted in May. This report investigates trade statistics per June in order to conclude on the further
progress on trade reductions. Because trade varies by month and recorded trends depend on the
time of comparison, the report presents several comparison periods in order to identify progress.
Exports and imports with Russia are examined over three and a half year, to discern whether the
political and moral intent to sanction trade with Russia makes progress. Longer time series make it
possible to compare trade with levels pre-Covid and during Covid-19. Trade is split into commodity
classes (Chapter 5), but without reference to the legal liability companies have to reduce or abstain
from trade in each commodity group. Total trade data until June 2022 exist for all the 16 countries,
and data at commodity group level are available for 13 countries. France, Finland and Lithuania do
not share commodity-level data, while several countries dont share any data (Chapter 2).
Identification of trade does not imply any indication or allegation that individual countries or
enterprises violate the economic sanctions. Data are presented solely to observe actual trade.
This report finds that European countries rapidly and substantially reduced exports to Russia after
the invasion (Chapter 3), especially the sales of cars, machinery, metals and other materials. Several
countries reduced total exports already in March, but thereafter followed increase in many exports.
From April or May, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Czechia, and Serbia increased exports to Russia. Exports of fish products and chemicals continued
unabated. Exports from 16 countries were 3.4 billion Euros in June 2022, a reduction from 5.27 bn in
June 2021. But the exports in June 2022 were 1.1 billion Euros higher than in April. All countries
except France increased exports in June, and this is not seasonal, as 13 out of 16 countries rather
decreased exports in June 2019, six countries in June 2020, and seven countries in June 2021. This
indicates that exports are now seeing a particular increase, contrary to political intent.
There was a certain reduction of imports from Russia after the invasion (Chapter 4), but the decline
was partly reversed by the increasing prices of natural gas , even though gas prices again declined
from June 2022. If oil and gas is excluded, the imports of all other (non-fuel) Russian goods were still
hardly reduced after the invasion, and increased in June after having hit a bottom level in May. Total
imports from Russia have universally declined after the invasion, but from a very high level. Thereby,
imports in May and June were simply down to the “normal” levels seen 2019-2021. Clear reductions
in imports have taken place in the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Imports to Norway fell
in May, but were back at full levels in June and July. Most other countries saw only marginal cuts in
imports. Unabated imports of natural gas provide Russia with funding for the war effort. Total
imports from 16 countries were 10.57 billion Euros in June 2022, against 9.49 billion in June 2021, a
clear increase year-by-year. However, imports from Russia to the 16 countries in June 2022 were still
well below the 13.99 billion Euros of imports recorded in April.
Due to the long-term sharper reduction in exports than in imports, Russia has improved its trade
balance with 16 European countries since the attack on Ukraine, compared to the “normal” balance
during 2019-2021. True to say, Russia’s sales to Europe dropped more than its purchases from
Europe in 2022, but from a record-high level leaving Russian earnings long-term unaltered. European
exports to Russia are more fundamentally reduced. The combination of below-normal European
exports and at-normal imports from Russia, in total fuels the Russian war capability financially.
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The 16 studied countries fall into three groups of performance with regard to economic sanctions:
The United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, and Lithuania have substantially decreased both
exports and imports from Russia from March. The UK delivered massive decrease in trade, especially
in the imports of petroleum and chemicals. The only exception are exports of chemicals, while other
sales are either abandoned or strongly reduced. Ireland has reduced exports and strongly cut imports
dafter the invasion, even though the relatively marginal exports of chemicals and scrap metals
continue unevenly. Sweden strongly cut imports of oil and exports of cars and machinery after the
Russian invasion, though it has increased the exports of chemicals. Denmark has also clearly reduced
trade, despite exports increasing again in June but to lower-than-normal levels. Denmark has totally
ceased to import oil and chemicals, but retains chemicals exports. However, exports of Danish food
and beverages have clearly dropped. Lithuania presents only marginal reductions in exports to
Russia, but experienced a more consistent and continuous drop in imports from March onwards.
A middle group comprising France, Poland, Finland, Norway and Germany have very variably
reduced either exports or imports, and increased other parts of trade with Russia after the invasion.
Poland has clearly cut exports of materials, metals, wood and paper products, machinery and
equipment, but Polish exports of chemicals remain virtually unaltered by sanctions. Imports have just
marginally changed. Norway never reduced its exports of fish fodder, metals and machinery after the
invasion, but reduced imports of petroleum and chemicals from April. Imports of fish and materials
continued almost unabated. By July, total imports back at normal levels for 2019-2021. Germany has
cut exports of vehicles and machinery, but continued to export chemicals at high levels, and
increased total exports in May and June. German imports of natural gas, chemicals, metals and
materials have continued virtually unabated.
A final group of countries that have hardly or not at all reduced trade with Russia, includes the
Netherlands, Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia and Serbia. The Netherlands has upheld
exports of food and chemicals, but more consistently phased out vehicle and machinery exports.
Dutch imports of oil and petroleum products was still very high in May, and imports of metal and
paper products have continuously increased so that total imports in May 2022 were equal to the
February level. Czechia clearly reduced exports after the invasion, but these started to increase again
in June. Czech imports were never really reduced during the sanctions, but instead escalated due to a
strong increase in purchases of Russian oil and gas. Both Estonia and Latvia have increased their
exports of chemicals and machinery to Russia after the various sanctions were enacted in March,
including an unabated exports of Estonian telecom and digital equipment. The magnitude of two
countries’ imports are also unaltered by sanctions. Hungary imports oil and gas from Russia, and
these imports were reduced from March 2022. But exports have continued unabated, at levels
almost double as high as the “normal” historic level from 2019-2022.
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Summary Infographics
Compared to the last three years, countries
closer to Russia have seen less cuts in exports:
Norway and Serbia increased
exports after the war started:
Compared to the last three years, less than half of Czechia, Serbia and Hungary import
the countries have clearly cut imports from Russia: more since after the war started:
Imports have not been reduced below the normal levels, and natural gas import alone is not to blame:
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1. Background
After the Russian attack and subsequent invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the European
Union enacted a fourth round of economic and trade sanctions against Russian citizens and entities,
starting with sanctions against Russian banks and Russian participation in SWIFT from February 22-
25. This was followed by the freezing of Russian overseas reserves and targeted EU sanctions against
individuals enacted during the early days of February 24-28.
Sanctions were triggered by the Russian recognition of independence of the two Donbass counties of
Ukraine, and the illegal military attack on Ukraine. The sanctions intend to punish state-owned and
state-linked individuals and companies from upholding the economic basis for the Russian war effort.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, a large number of European companies voluntarily withdrew from
the Russian market and announced their intent to abstain from trade and transactions.
2
The February 28 sanctions from the EU included a wide range of export controls on IT components,
military and strategic goods, goods for use in oil refining, aerospace and aviation.
3
The regulation also
banned or restricted financial transactions, loans and credits, IPOs and trade in equity instruments
including to EU subsidiaries of Russian majority-owned companies.
4
On March 17, EU sanctions were
expanded to cover imports of iron and steel, and exports or transactions in the energy and luxury
goods sectors in addition to specific individual and company sanctions targeting iron and steel,
aviation, machine building, dual-purpose equipment, energy, and banking.
5
The EU sanctions from
March 17 included Gazprom, Rosneft, and the other major energy companies.
6
This first and
comprehensive package of sanctions was enacted as Norwegian Law by March 18.
On March 8, as the USA announced a ban on imports of Russian oil and gas, the EU Commission
stated its intent of reducing European imports of natural gas from Russia by two thirds during 2022.
Even though European countries still import Russian natural gas, the intent to phase out gas war
made clear two weeks after the war started, and from June 3 the EU enacted a partial ban on imports
of oil from Russia, which was enacted as Norwegian Law on June 17.
On March 11, the EU, USA, UK, Canada, and Japan agreed to remove the Most Favoured Nation
(MFN) status of Russia under the WTO framework.
7
This move opened up the legitimate pathway to
imposing tariffs, restrictions, quotas, and further bans in trade with Russia.
Countries and entities officially imposing sanctions against transactions and trade with Russia include
the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, the USA, Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore. Countries
officially abstaining from taking part in sanctions, include Serbia, China, India, Mexico, and Brazil. The
2022 EU sanctions are an expansion of the post-2014 sanctions, and during the years 2014-2022
there was considerable scepticism towards and critique of the sanctions in Hungary, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, Greece, and partly in France and Germany. After 2022, only Hungary among EU countries
openly questions the process. However, Germany only reluctantly accepted the expulsion of Russia
from SWIFT and the postponement of the North Stream 2 oil pipeline between Russia and Germany.
A detailed overview of the various sanctions of Russia is available from Correctiv (www.correctiv.org)
and Open Sanctions (www.opensanctions.org). A total of 6,906 new sanctions have been approved
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since February 22 by the EU, USA, UK, Switzerland, and Japan against 5,412 individuals and 1,041
companies.
8
Of these 6,906 sanctions, a total of 1,019 were already introduced by end of February,
and during March another 2,274 were intruded, bringing the total before April up to 3,293, or 48 %
of all current sanctions. Another 848 sanctions were added in April, while an upcoming European oil
ban was approved in May, although many countries and companies had already started abandoning
Russian oil as a consequence of the US ban from March 8.
European countries and their companies first of all follow EU sanctions, even though registration or
activities in the USA will oblige many to follow US regulations as well. The EU has enacted to date
(august 7) a total of 1,101 sanctions, which were officially introduced in the following sequence:
9
Table 1
EU sanctions
February
March
April
May
June
August
New
475
212
62
79
0
Cumulative
475
687
961
1,040
1,101
In force:
Export, banks, energy,
iron, steel, aviation,
luxury goods, luxury
cars
Coal,
ports
Oil
As seen from the above table, notwithstanding the oil ban starting from June 3, the overwhelming
number of European sanctions had already been enacted by April, and half of the sanctions were
enacted before the end of March. Already in March, the writing on the wall was clear and most large
companies including European car makers abandoned the Russian market. The EU started an open
process to ban imports of Russian coal on April 5, and made clear the intent to ban oil imports.
10
European airspace and roads were closed for Russian aircraft and road traffic from March. European
ports were closed off for Russian registered ships from April 16.
11
On May 31, the EU Commission
announced the last major commodity sanction, with the much-awaited ban on oil imports.
12
By April it was evident that the EU and other major powers intended on comprehensive and punitive
sanctions of Russia, that that the existing sanctions would be successively expanded, and that the
remaining trade, first of all in natural gas, was to be intentionally phased out in exchange for other
sources. At this time, countries like the UK had also already sharply reduced trade with Russia.
April 2022 can be regarded as the time when it was clear to any decision-maker that the European
Union and individual national governments were enacting ever-expanding sanctions on trade with
Russia. At this time there already existed a shared moral, public pressure on businesses, and NATO
member states were supplying armament to the Ukraine from February onwards. Accordingly, this
report will evaluate the actual progress on trade reduction and phase-out against the normal trade
volumes of previous years from April onwards.
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2. Methodology and data selection
This report focuses on trade in goods, as these are most easily measured and monitored by public
authorities. The report seeks to establish to which degree European countries have made progress
on sanctions by checking how actual trade has developed since 2019, with a focus on the sanction
regime period from April 2022. The analysis does not implicate or allege violations of sanctions.
To assess the progress of sanctions and trade reduction, the report focuses on trade with Russia from
March to June 2022, compared to similar periods during 2019, 2020, and 2021. The year 2019 serves
as a reference point for pre-pandemic trade levels, while the development 2021-2022 is a good
reference to check the magnitude of immediate change following proclamations of sanctions.
Import data are sought by country of origin (not consignment) where that exists, and export data
including non-border-crossing sales, whenever available. Data have been accessed from the national
statistical offices. Data have been retrieved manually from national statistical services and databases.
Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Serbia publish data in Euro, which have been utilised here. For
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and UK, data reported in local currency units (LUCs) have been converted
to Euro at currency rates from xe.com.
Data including June 2022 exist for all 16 countries: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. The 16 countries represent a GDP of 13 200 billion USD in 2022, more than
half of Europe’s total GDP of 20 150 billion USD.
This means that the study contains complete data for the three largest economies of Europe, and all
the Western and EU countries bordering Russia. The countries chosen are closely located and
economically integrated, and have had a substantial trade with Russia, ranging from 1-10 percent of
total trade. The countries represent a mixture of large economies (France, Germany, UK), open
economies (Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Sweden), sanction sceptics (Germany, Hungary, Serbia), gas
importers (Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Poland), and countries that purchase very little oil or gas
from Russia (Norway, Sweden, UK).
Belgium, Italy and Spain do not provide usable trade data on a monthly or quarterly basis. France
provides trade data but not at commodity level. As the only country explored, Austria charges
payment for trade data, and is not included in this study.
With the exception of Denmark, exports and imports of goods in the report include also goods that
do not cross the border which are typically oil and gas products sold to aircraft abroad or ships at
high seas. All data per commodity class use SITC data when available, while use of CN data has been
“translated” into SITC by use of conversion tables. The exception is again Denmark, which issues data
in split SITC classes, and Danish data at commodity level will include slightly other goods. For
example, food trade data for Denmark will also include beverages, beer, tobacco goods, etc.
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3. Exports to Russia before and after the 2022 invasion
Figure 1 shows the monthly development of total exports to Russia from the five largest reporting
countries, measured in million Euros (for scale, Germany’s data are here divided by 10). Russia’s
attack on Ukraine in late February is marked with a red dot and arrow. Visibly, all countries clearly
reduced exports to Russia in March and April 2022, but increased exports again in May and June:
Th general exports picture is presented in Figure 2, which sums the exports over the same three and
a half years until June 2022 from the 16 surveyed European countries. Again, the Russian invasion in
late February is marked with a red dot and arrow:
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Exports to Russia from the 16 countries declined sharply early on, from 5.79 billion Euros in February
to 2.87 billion Euros in March 2022, a drop by 50.4 %, and a decline by 55.2 % compared to March
2021. The decline continued in April with exports falling to 2.17 billion Euros, a third of the “natural”
level. In May 2022, total exports from the selected countries increased somewhat to 2.78 billion
Euros, still well below previous years’ levels. But in June, the exports rose to 3.39 billion Euros, which
is more than 1.1 billion Euros above April. Thereby, the total increase April-June was 56.3 %.
All countries except France increased exports in June, and this is not seasonal, as 13 out of the 16
countries decreased exports in June 2019, six countries did the same in June 2020, and seven
countries in June 2021. It indicates that exports see a particular increase, contrary to political intent.
The same picture is evident in the Nordics, where Figure 3 reveals that there is a clear recovery of
exports in May and June. Exports to Russia from all the Nordic countries except Norway are clearly
starting to increase from May 2022 onwards, and the Baltics are already back to “normal” levels:
Several countries have increased their exports more than others after the introduction of sanctions,
as detailed in Figure 4. It shows the change in exports to Russia from February to June 2022 (the
exact same percentage change for Lithuania and Hungary are not an error):
The countries with blue bars have clearly
reduced exports to Russia since February,
headed by United Kingdom (down 68 %),
France (- 65 %), Czech Republic (- 55 %),
Sweden (- 51 %), and Denmark (- 45 %).
Countries with orange bars had by June
increased exports from February 2022. Total
exports had the strongest increase for Latvia
(up 67 %), Serbia (+ 35 %), Estonia (+ 27 %),
and Norway (+ 7.5 %).
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For France, exports were 596 million Euros in February 2022, and fell to 196 million in March 2022
and 121 million in April. French exports to Russia then increased to 224 million Euros in May and
stabilised at 210 mio in June. France has clearly cut exports compared to normal levels 2019-2021,
but there is a noticeable recovery of some exports after April. The “normal” recent level of French
exports to Russia has been 250-700 million Euros per month.
For Germany, the general decline in exports after February 2022 compared to the earlier years of
2019-2021 was less marked than in France, as German exports have “only” been halved compared to
their normal levels of 2 billion Euros per month. Exports was 2,121 million Euros in February and was
rapidly halved to 1,019 million in March, bottoming at 828 million Euros in April 2022. Thereafter,
German exports to Russia increased to 1,123 million Euros in May and 1,285 million Euros in June
which was above the level in March and about half the “normal” monthly level.
For the United Kingdom, there was a swift and strong reduction in exports already in March 2022,
from 256 mio Pounds in February to only 108 mio Pounds in March. Exports then further dropped to
33 mio Pounds in April, before resuming to 55 mio Pounds in May and 83 mio Pounds in June. Still,
the reduction since February is significant, and there is also reduction compared to March 2022.
For the Netherlands, there was a clear reduction in exports from 508 million Euros in February to
only 184 million in March, seen against a “normal” level of 500-600 million per month. But there has
been a significant increase in exports in May and June up to 279 million and 285 million Euros - more
than 50 pct higher than in March and already reaching back to half of the “normal” monthly level.
For Poland, which is historically closely integrated with Russia, exports gradually increased from a
monthly level of 500-600 million Euros in 2019, to 600-750 million through 2020 and 2021. Exports to
Russia at 664 million Euros in February 2022, dropped to 353 million in March, and bottomed at 210
million in April. But in May the exports increased again to 269 million Euros, and then rapidly jumped
to 404 million in June. This means that exports to Russia are almost back at “normal” historic levels.
For Sweden, exports fell from 2,001 mio SEK in February down to 608 mio SEK in March, and reached
as low as 377 mio SEK in May, before rocketing to 986 mio SEK in June half the “normal level”. The
trade with Russia is relatively small for Sweden’s economy, despite the geographical closeness, which
means that rather minor changes can make substantial impact when measured as percent of trade.
For Denmark, exports to Russia rapidly and consistently dropped in the wake of the attack on
Ukraine. Exports were 580 million DKK in February, dropping swiftly to 405 million in March, 216
million in April, and 175 million in May. However, in June the Danish exports to Russia saw a strong
increase to 321 million DKK, coming already halfway up to the “normal” monthly level of 600 million
DKK. As for Sweden, the trade is still rather small and minor changes can have high relative impact.
For Norway, there was a significant increase in exports already by May 2022, second only to the
Dutch increase. Exports to Russia decreased significantly already in January 2022, which at 131
million NOK was the lowest level recorded since before 2019. Since January 2022, Norwegian exports
to Russia have steadily increased to 199 million NOK in February and 165 million in March, then
rapidly increasing to 220 million NOK in April, 202 million in May, and 214 million NOK in June. The
“normal” monthly level over the last years was 150 500 million NOK. The exports are very small and
even minor changes in trade can have large impact when measured in percent of total trade.
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For Finland, which has the longest border with Russia of all the 16 nations, exports have been
normally 200-400 million Euros per month, with an increasing trend towards the higher end of the
spectrum into 2021. In February 2022, exports to Russia stood at 324 million Euros, and rapidly
dropped in March down to 184 million, further bottoming at 141 million in April. But in May, exports
again recovered to reach 171 million Euros by May and 237 million in June.
For Latvia, there is a unique pattern for Western countries whereas exports to Russia fell robustly
during the last quarter of 2021, but then increased steadily since February 2022. Exports to Russia
has expanded during the new sanctions period and is record high in June with 134 mio Euros.
For Serbia, which does not take part in sanctions against Russia, exports have increased steadily. The
June 2022 level at 102 mio Euros represents the highest exports to Russia. Current exports are c. 60
% above the “normal” level of 60-80 mio Euros.
In Figure 5 (below), the total exports are presented for the 16 countries against exports in June last
year. The biggest exporters are at the top of the figure, with export values descending downwards
from Germany with the largest export values, to Norway having the smallest exports. There was a fall
in exports over the last year in all countries except Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, and Serbia.
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4. Imports from Russia before and after the 2022 invasion
Figure 6 shows the monthly total imports to Russia to the five largest of the economies, in million
Euros (Germany’s data divided by 10). Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February is marked with a red
dot and arrow. We see these large economies increased imports from early 2020, when oil and gas
prices reached a historic low. Since then, imports have risen with the oil and gas prices, and in spite
of cuts after the war started many countries visibly struggle to reduce historic high imports:
This general picture is clear from Figure 7, summing the total imports to 16 countries during a three
and a half years period until June 2022, again with Russia’s attack marked with a red dot and arrow:
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Total imports saw significant decline from 15.67 billion Euros in February 2022, and 16.99 billion in
March, down to 11.56 billion in May and 10.57 billion in June. The drop from March to June was thus
37.8 %, and is impressive in light of the gas prices actually being higher in June than in March.
13
But
still, the total imports from Russia of 16 European countries at 10.57 bn EUR in June, are as high as
imports were anytime during 2019 or 2020.
The change in imports
from Russia in February-
June 2022 is presented
in Figure 8. We see how
most countries have
clearly reduced imports,
not least countries that
do not import Russian
gas (UK, Sweden). As
apart from exports, the
decline in imports has
been more universal
and there were only
increases in Czechia,
Serbia, and Estonia.
If Figure 4 had applied March as the base year instead of February, it would have made little change
and it would only have (very marginally) altered the trend direction for Estonia and Hungary.
In France, imports increased already from October 2021 with the rising prices on natural gas. Imports
declined first in May to levels 26% lower than February, and in June to a level 36 % below February.
In Germany, imports increased steadily from May 2021, and reached a record high level at 4.4 billion
Euros in March 2022. Thereafter, imports have declined by 21 % despite rising prices on natural gas.
In the Netherlands, imports from Russia have increased more or less continuously since January
2021. The rise in imports continued until March 2022, followed by modest declines since April.
In Denmark, imports from Russia were already significantly reduced from January 2022, onwards.
The levels in May and June 2022 are only half the level from January, and also below historic levels.
In Norway, imports were already in decline since January 2022. There was a spike in imports with a
doubling in March, due to a single shipment of Russian crude oil that month. There was a decline in
May over February by 22 %, and in June the decline was 44 % from February and 69 % from March.
In Sweden, there have been only occasional imports of oil after the invasion, and total imports fell
strongly from 2,324 million SEK in February to only 204 million SEK in June a reduction by 91 %.
In the Baltic States and Poland, there were noteworthy declines in imports from Russia through the
spring of 2022. Least decline was seen in Estonia and Latvia, while Lithuania and Poland more than
halved imports- with the decisive decline appearing in May, and stabilisation in June.
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In Czechia and Serbia, imports had increased through the winter and continued to do so during the
spring months of 2022. Serbia rejects participation in economic sanctions, while Czechia supports.
In Figure 9 the
imports to 16
countries are
presented over
the latest year,
from June 2021
to June 2022.
Imports were
reduced to some
countries, but
key countries
such as France
and Germany
upheld higher
imports from
Russia compared
to a year ago.
Is the relatively modest reduction in imports caused by the continued dependence on Russian gas?
To answer this, Figure 10 separates coal, gas and petroleum products from the imports data of seven
countries - Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, Denmark, Czech Republic, and
Ireland. It shows how non-fuel imports (black) fell after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but not very
significantly. Non-fuel imports were reduced only to “normal” levels, and stabilised in June:
The modest reduction of imports from Russia after the invasion, and the relative increase of such
imports compared to 2019-2021, cannot be explained only by reliance on Russian oil and gas. The
imports of other goods reveal the same trend with relative continuity and low effect of sanctions.
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5. Detailed trade values per country
In this chapter, imports and exports are broken down to groups of goods, to analyse the exact nature
of trade development. Product group data are retrieved based on the SITC international classification
standard where possible, alternatively the European Union’s Combined Nomenclature (CN). Finland,
France, and Serbia do not release monthly trade data on trade partner and commodity group level.
Eight countries provide data: Germany, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Czechia, and Poland.
Considerable imported Russian goods include fuels (oil and gas), fertilizers, metal products, and
foodstuffs including grain. There is also occasionally a considerable import of Russian fish, building
materials, machinery, transport equipment, and artwork.
The five SITC commodity classes of interest that will be inquired below, are:
0. (CN: 01-11) Food and live animals (including grain, cereals, fish, fishery products)
3. (CN: 25-27) Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (including coal, coke, oil and gas)
5. (CN: 28-38) Chemicals and related products
6. (CN: 39-83) Manufactured goods, by material (including of iron, metals, wood, paper)
7. (CN: 84-89) Machinery and transport equipment (including cars, machines, equipment)
The months investigated include all months in 2022 up until the latest available data. In addition,
data for May 2021 is included to serve as a year-on-year reference point.
Figure 11* presents the exports of chemicals to
Russia from 9 countries since January 2022. The
countries are Germany, the Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
the Czech Republic, and Poland. There was a fall
in the exports in March and April, followed by
strong resumption in May and June. Denmark
and Sweden reduced their exports until May,
but they too strongly increased it again in June.
In Figure 12* the imports of fuels including coal,
oil and gas from Russia to 9 countries are
presented (coal is only marginal in the figures).
These countries are Germany, the Netherlands,
United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Poland. The
imports are significantly reduced, and totally
ceased in the UK, Ireland and Denmark. In
Sweden and Norway, oil imports are occasional.
There were apparently shipments of oil to
Sweden in April and June, and to Norway each
month from January to May.
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* In figures 11 and 12 above, data for Norway and Sweden are converted to Euros at a flat 0.1 and 0.096 rate,
respectively. Data from Denmark are converted at the 0.134 rate (the DKK is pegged to the EUR), while British
data have been converted at a flat rate 1.18. Errors from applying constant currency rates will be marginal
because the time of payment for imports will often deviate from the time of consignment. Exact conversion
would have limited value unless very detailed shipment and payments data are investigated. For exact local
currency trade data per country, see Tables 1- 8 in the country chapters at the end of this report.
Imports of Russian fuel, oil and gas to Germany was 2.17 billion Euros in June, an increase from May
and in line with levels before the war. Last year, imports of Russian oil and gas to Germany in June
was 1.87 billion Euros, which implies that imports have indeed increased.
The Netherlands purchases oil unabated, total imports in the oil & gas category were 1.71 billion
Euros in June, about the same as in December and February. In addition, the Netherlands started to
import small quantities of coal from Russia in January, a trade which continues through June.
The imports of oil and gas to Czechia is also very high and has continuously increased in 2022. That
import was 373 million Euros in January, increasing to 437 million in February, and 896 million in
March. Thereafter fuel imports started to increase even stronger to 1,277 million Euros in April and
1,344 million in May, followed by a reduction to 999 million Euros in June, in line with that month’s
reduction in prices on natural gas.
5.1. Quarterly effect of sanctions after the Russian invasion of Ukraine
In chapters 3 and 4, development of trade by June 2022 were discussed. But single months can have
variable trade and for a more certain picture of developments, quarterly data will smooth out
coincidental monthly movements. Looking at development from the first quarter of 2022 to the
second quarter, will both capture the effects of sanctions, and reduce the impact of random monthly
changes. The unison reduction in trade with Russia between the first quarter (before the war) and
the second quarter of 2022 (with sanctions) is seen for exports (Figure 13) and imports (Figure 14):
In the further part of this chapter, detailed trade data per country and group of goods are presented.
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5.2. France monthly total trade with Russia
France does not release monthly trade statistics by commodity groups, but there are monthly trade
statistics available sorted by trade partner.
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 2, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
We see below that France has reduced exports during 2022, both in the longer perspective from
previous years, and compared to 2021. But in May 2022, exports again resume towards “normal”
levels from the previous years. Exports to Russia in June 2022 is about half the level it was in June
2019 and June 2020, but clearly below levels from June 2021.
French imports from Russia have not been reduced similarly, on the contrary this trade has been
increasing during 2021 in line with higher prices on oil and gas, and the imports have dropped less
than exports have. In June 2022 there is a continued decrease in imports compared to April and May,
but the imports are still much higher than in previous years.
The total quarterly imports during the second quarter of 2022 were 4.2 billion EUR, much higher than
the 2.46 billion EUR of imports during the second quarter of 2021. Year-on-year, thereby, France
struggles to cut trade and instead seems to long-term uphold economic reliance on Russia.
Table 2 Trade with Russia by month FRANCE
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Monthly exports
399
350
675
506
596
196
121
224
210
Quarter ending that month
1 313
888
1 977
1 298
555
Monthly imports
645
450
755
1 521
1 809
1 816
1 703
1 344
1 162
Quarter ending that month
2 224
976
2 460
5 146
4 209
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5.3. Germany trade with Russia by commodity class
Germany imports mainly oil and gas, metals and paper products, and chemical products from Russia.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 3, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By June 2022, exports were reduced to about half the normal” level from previous years, and the
drop in exports started already in March. The sales of cars, machinery and equipment (SITC Class 7)
to Russia has been sharply reduced, while chemicals exports remain largely unaltered by sanctions.
By June 2022, all main commodity groups are imported at a magnitude equal to, or above the levels
one year ago. While oil and natural gas (Class 3) imports remains virtually unchanged, so does the
imports of food and fish and machinery, while there is a slight reduction in the imports of chemicals
and metals and paper products. But all in all, the reduction since invasion is only marginal.
Table 3 Trade with Russia by commodity class - GERMANY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
2 064,5
1 932,9
2 077,8
2 137,2
2 120,7
1 019,0
828,2
1 123,3
1 184,9
0. Food, fish, etc
52,1
69,6
66,5
60,2
45,2
55,9
57,1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
12,3
12,4
14,8
4,2
4,9
7,2
9,1
5. Chemical products
470,7
522,3
525,0
468,3
313,1
433,0
423,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
213,9
201,6
209,0
105,9
79,8
110,4
112,8
7. Machinery, transp equip
1 064,9
1 073,1
1 059,6
252,2
274,1
383,2
435,8
Total imports
2 234,2
1 318,5
2 520,6
3 998,4
3 701,2
4 416,5
3 704,4
3 316,2
3 475,7
0. Food, fish, etc
24,1
20,9
41,0
25,1
27,9
42,8
26,6
34,1
35,6
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
1 707,7
949,8
1 869,9
3 192,6
2 922,8
3 292,0
3 062,5
2 599,6
2 712,4
5. Chemical products
50,8
27,1
46,7
97,3
71,6
73,1
65,0
48,1
54,4
6. Materials, metals, paper
334,4
216,3
388,7
405,6
472,8
746,3
368,0
362,8
468,3
7. Machinery, transp equip
31,2
39,0
32,7
28,1
48,4
33,1
13,3
27,1
22,1
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5.4. The Netherlands trade with Russia by commodity class
The Netherlands released trade data for June on September 2nd, 2022, after the first version of this
report was released.
The Netherlands imports first of all oil (SITC Class 3), and substantial amounts of metals and other
semi-finished products (Class 6). The Netherlands has not traditionally purchased Russian fertilizers.
The imports of natural gas and chemical products are historically only marginal. The Netherlands
have traditionally imported small quantities of coal, but abandoned this import in June, 2020.
However, importers in the Netherlands started to buy Russian coal again in January, and the imports
have rapidly increased through 2022.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 4, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
From February to June 2022, exports were reduced towards half the “normal” level for the season,
but there was a marked resumption of exports in the month of May and June, led by chemicals sales.
It is obvious that the Netherlands had not reduced imports substantially by June 2022, all product
classes were imported at an equal or higher amount than a year before. Especially, the imports of oil
and gas and petroleum products seems to continue more or less unaltered after the invasion.
Table 4 Trade with Russia by commodity class NETHERLANDS
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
468
573
519 .
478
508
184
194
279
285
0. Food, fish, etc
41
42
37 .
39
43
26
28
37
31
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
9
4
6 .
7
6
3
2
2
2
5. Chemical products
124
155
132 .
119
117
65
75
134
114
6. Materials, metals, paper
15
23
29 .
20
27
9
7
10
7
7. Machinery, transp equip
174
253
215 .
192
179
25
23
26
42
Total imports
1 063
675
1 475 .
2 300
1 954
2 806
2 465
1 939
1 711
0. Food, fish, etc
7
9 .
10
10
11
8
9
8
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
962
568
1 307 .
1 922
1 713
2 388
2 159
1 623
1 554
321. Coal (sanctioned)
12
0
0 .
90
68
119
92
126
98
5. Chemical products
31
38
22 .
81
25
26
16
11
22
6. Materials, metals, paper
36
33
104 .
269
164
328
221
253
115
7. Machinery, transp equip
10
6
6 .
3
3
3
1
2
3
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5.5. United Kingdom trade with Russia by commodity class
The UK historically imports oil and petroleum products from Russia, while other commodity classes
are marginal. The imports from SITC class 3 normally make up 50-70 % of all imports. Traditional
exports to Russia are totally dominated by chemicals and machinery.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 5, below.
Note that the data are presented in million British Pounds (GBP = 1.18 EUR).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
The United Kingdom exports first of all chemicals, machinery and vehicles to Russia, and these
exports have radically dropped during 2022. But exports of chemicals still increase gradually.
The United Kingdom has strongly reduced both exports and imports from Russia. The transition was
immediate and almost complete by end of March 2022 already in April import amounts were down
to 15-25 % of the normal historical level. Imports in June were again strongly reduced. First of all, the
reduction came as a result of totally abandoning oil imports that month.
Table 5 Trade with Russia by commodity class UNITED KINGDOM
Trade, mio GBP
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
274,0
166,0
205,0
181,0
256,0
108,0
33,0
55,0
83,0
0. Food, fish, etc
7,9
6,7
12,4
4,5
11,8
8,3
3,2
4,7
4,4
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
1,2
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,7
0,1
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
56,9
50,0
54,9
44,0
76,1
52,6
21,3
39,7
61,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
13,3
7,5
10,5
10,3
10,0
3,3
1,4
0,9
1,6
7. Machinery, transp equip
123,8
81,2
96,9
96,3
112,3
26,8
2,1
4,3
11,2
Total imports
562,0
476,0
757,0
1 840,0
1 878,0
645,0
245,0
201,0
33,0
0. Food, fish, etc
8,5
12,8
2,8
6,1
11,9
3,4
1,0
0,4
0,3
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
402,6
155,0
430,7
953,6
632,3
481,9
210,3
160,5
0,0
5. Chemical products
7,2
9,3
24,5
24,9
41,3
5,3
7,0
1,2
0,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
109,8
259,9
196,2
47,1
54,8
45,9
18,8
8,3
13,4
7. Machinery, transp equip
16,6
20,3
7,8
21,9
11,6
100,0
1,2
27,7
16,0
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5.6. Ireland trade with Russia by commodity class
Ireland historically imports include occasional and variable imports of coke, oil and oil products, and
at times considerable imports of fertilizers. Traditional exports to Russia include chemical products
and machinery. Besides, there is occasionally exports of scrap metal which is part of total exports
below, but not visible in the presented SITC sub-classes. The residual difference between total
export values and the sum of group export values in the table below, will normally be almost fully
due to the exports of scrap metals to Russia.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 6, below.
The Central Statistics Office of Ireland (CSO) groups trade data in 89 commodity groups, and in the
table below SITC class 0 includes their groups 00-08, while SITC class 7 in the table below combines
groups 70-79 and 87-89. The other classes are identical to those of other reporting countries.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
The Irish exports and imports both considerably dropped in April 2022, but rebound somewhat in
May and June. In June 2022, exports were back on higher levels than the historical normal, while
imports were almost back on the same levels as in June 2019-2021.
Table 6 Trade with Russia by commodity class IRELAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
46,8
31,3
40,2
61,9
61,8
71,6
44,9
24,1
51,3
0. Food, fish, etc
0,5
0,4
2,1
0,9
1,9
1,2
0,0
0,0
0,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,1
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
17,6
17,8
13,9
21,8
28,2
47,9
2,8
8,1
22,8
6. Materials, metals, paper
0,5
0,1
0,5
0,5
0,3
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
7. Machinery, transp equip
12,4
2,9
15,2
15,9
20,5
4,8
2,1
1,9
0,2
Total imports
27,3
14,5
15,4
130,2
55,8
83,8
7,7
20,3
17,7
0. Food, fish, etc
2,7
1,8
2,2
2,4
5,6
14,6
2,3
8,1
5,9
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
15,0
1,9
5,4
69,7
23,8
40,1
1,8
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
7,8
8,8
3,5
48,9
23,6
27,4
0,2
8,7
0,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
0,5
1,5
2,7
7,7
0,7
1,1
0,5
0,4
8,2
7. Machinery, transp equip
0,2
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,8
0,1
0,4
0,6
1,0
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5.7. Denmark trade with Russia by commodity class
Statistics Denmark presents split SITC classes which have here been combined by the author.
14
The
group “Food, fish, beverage etc” includes goods from SITC groups 0, 1, and 4, and these cannot be
further split for comparison with the other countries. Other groups are more directly comparable.
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 7, below.
Note that numbers are in million DKK (DKK = 0.134 EUR).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Denmark’s imports from Russia have historically been dominated by imports of oil and petroleum
products, materials like metals and paper products, chemicals, and foodstuff (mostly fish). Danish
exports traditionally include first of all chemicals, and foodstuff (agricultural products, beverages,
etc), and materials (raw and semi-processed metals, wood and paper products, etc).
By May 2022, exports were significantly reduced compared with previous months and with “normal”
levels. There was a reduction in the sales of food and beverages, materials, metal, wooden and paper
products, and machinery and transport equipment to Russia. Exports of chemicals were also
somewhat reduced, but did then rebound to “normal” levels in June 2022. There was also an
increase in the exports of machinery and technical equipment in June.
Denmark reduced imports after the invasion, and imports were in May and June at roughly half the
“normal” level. Imports are lower than they were in 2019 and 2021, but not lower than under the
Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 when oil and gas prices were low. Danish imports of oil, chemicals and
fertilizer have been very strongly reduced, and oil imports have totally stopped. But there has been
no clear reduction in the substantial imports of products made of metals, wood and paper.
Table 7 Trade with Russia by commodity class DENMARK
Trade, mio DKK
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
557,6
582,2
695,1
601,9
579,8
405,0
216,0
175,3
321,0
0-1. Food, fish, beverage etc
102,8
88,8
121,7
83,4
90,3
71,7
15,3
16,6
23,5
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,0
0,1
0,0
0,4
0,7
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
169,8
174,2
194,8
154,0
155,4
224,9
160,4
104,0
195,4
2, 6. Materials, metals, paper
67,3
51,4
51,8
87,9
65,1
32,0
3,6
4,6
11,6
7. Machinery, transp equip
189,8
223,2
263,1
223,6
214,3
58,4
23,2
25,2
60,4
Total imports
860,2
572,8
1 151,5
1 024,4
960,6
964,7
510,5
524,5
595,7
0-1. Food, fish, beverage etc
94,0
87,6
116,2
124,2
190,2
144,7
78,8
58,7
50,1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
437,3
204,4
400,1
298,6
249,9
283,1
32,8
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
36,1
77,5
48,6
79,6
107,2
20,1
24,4
20,9
13,2
2, 6. Materials, metals, paper
258,8
196,9
582,8
516,7
407,9
512,5
373,6
444,8
532,2
7. Machinery, transp equip
0,4
0,9
2,1
1,7
1,7
3,3
0,0
0,0
0,0
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5.8. Finland monthly total trade with Russia
Finland does not release monthly trade statistics by commodity groups, but there are monthly trade
statistics available sorted by country.
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 8, below.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
We see below that Finland has reduced exports during 2022, both in the longer perspective
compared to previous years, and more especially compared to 2021. But in June 2022, exports again
resume towards the “normal” levels from the previous years. Exports to Russia in June 2022 is back
at the same level as it was in June 2019 and June 2020.
Finnish imports from Russia have not dropped quite as much in March and April, but in June there is
a continued decrease in imports compared to April and May, and compared to previous years.
The total quarterly imports during the second quarter of 2022 were 1.2 billion EUR, as compared to
1.35 billion EUR during the second quarter of 2021, and even lower with 1,0 billion EUR in the second
quarter of 2020. Thereby, the quarterly reduction is not very pronounced year-on-year, despite the
considerable reduction from the first quarter of 2022.
Table 8 Trade with Russia by month FINLAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Monthly exports
295
248
330
312
324
184
141
171
237
Quarter ending that month
810
709
1 032
890
586
Monthly imports
651
949
581
1015
974
1001
528
453
329
Quarter ending that month
2 023
1 010
1 355
2 652
1 199
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5.9. Norway trade with Russia by commodity class
Norway’s imports from Russia have historically been dominated by imports of raw fish, which is being
re-exported to Europe from Norwegian ports. While there is some import of crude oil, chemical
products including fertilizers, and metal ores and products, count almost equally much as oil and gas.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 9, below.
Note that numbers are in million NOK (NOK = 0.1 EUR) and include July (right columns).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
Norway was slow to enact sanctions and the last of the 16 countries to reduce trade. By May 2022,
exports were reduced but not very significantly compared with “normal” levels. There was a
reduction in the sales of machinery and transport equipment to Russia, but other commodity groups
remained largely unaltered by the economic sanctions. In June, Norwegian exports to Russia
increased again, and all commodity classes except materials and machinery rose above 2021 levels.
The decline in Norwegian exports of machinery, electrical and digital equipment (Class 7) started
already before 2022, and the low import levels have no connection with the economic sanctions.
Norway first reduced imports to roughly half of the “normal” levels after the invasion, but in July
2022 imports are again up at the levels seen in previous years. The fishery imports have not been
banned (Norway has obtained an exception with the EU), and food and fish exports including fish
fodder is back at “normal” historic levels. Imports of oil and chemicals including fertilizer have been
clearly reduced, but there is no clear reduction in imports of products of iron, steel, wood and paper.
Table 9 Trade with Russia by commodity class NORWAY
Trade, mio NOK
2019-5
2020-5
2021-5
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
329,4
334,0
392,4
131,2
199,0
165,2
220,3
202,3
213,9
205,7
0. Food, fish, etc
76,6
109,4
136,7
18,1
39,9
57,9
149,9
135,2
150,3
143,4
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,1
0,0
0,4
0,9
1,3
0,9
0,2
0,5
1,5
0,4
5. Chemical products
20,9
14,2
21,0
26,2
27,1
18,2
10,7
5,6
13,4
6,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
34,2
18,1
36,6
37,3
37,9
40,9
29,2
31,3
31,9
37,4
7. Machinery, transp equip
166,3
170,8
180,9
32,0
74,5
34,4
21,5
16,9
13,5
12,7
Total imports
1 695,8
975,8
1 649,9
2 062,5
1 691,4
3 098,8
1 748,7
1 319,1
951,9
1 679,8
0. Food, fish, etc
215,5
83,2
154,2
237,5
114,1
314,6
105,2
364,6
125,9
275,5
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
694,9
307,3
533,5
678,2
487,8
935,6
453,1
426,1
29,8
935,3
5. Chemical products
157,8
184,8
182,7
196,8
172,5
607,5
205,8
85,1
93,4
8,3
6. Materials, metals, paper
431,7
153,0
566,5
546,2
523,3
884,7
722,9
269,2
430,1
339,9
7. Machinery, transp equip
9,7
12,8
10,3
19,8
14,1
18,0
8,2
430,1
13,9
8,8
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5.10. Sweden trade with Russia by commodity class
Sweden historically imports oil and petroleum products, chemicals and metal and paper and paper
products from Russia. The imports of fuels are not particularly high, equal to Norway’s imports.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 10, below.
Note that numbers are in million SEK (SEK = 0.096 EUR).
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, Sweden had sharply reduced exports to Russia, led by a significant decline in the sales
of cars and other machinery and transport equipment. There was also a substantial reduction in the
exports of metals and materials, paper products, and chemical products (from May). Still, the export
of chemicals was higher than in May 2019, and not much lower than in the two years before the war.
Then in June 2022, exports of chemicals trebled from May, reaching all-time-high for 2022 with a
very strong increase of 440 million SEK in exports of organic chemicals (CN Group 29) which includes
hydrocarbons, aldehydes, alcohols, phenols, ethers, ketones, carboxylic acids, etc.
Sweden has strongly reduced imports from Russia after the invasion, and all product groups except
metal and paper products and machinery have seen imports radically decline. In May 2022, the
imports of fuels, oil and gas products had totally vanished. But in June, imports again increased
considerably but to a level still far below “normal” volumes during the last three years.
Table 10 Trade with Russia by commodity class SWEDEN
Trade, mio SEK
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
1 746,5
1 585,4
2 159,4
1 930,0
2 001,0
608,0
893,0
377,0
986,4
0. Food, fish, etc
2,8
2,2
1,5
2,9
1,0
3,5
6,0
9,0
4,3
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
9,8
7,1
9,1
6,5
4,3
0,0
0,4
0,0
0,0
5. Chemical products
266,4
189,3
315,0
246,5
517,4
418,3
811,1
264,8
762,2
6. Materials, metals, paper
284,8
238,5
352,0
343,5
340,2
70,6
17,6
33,4
33,0
7. Machinery, transp equip
1 407,8
1 046,1
1 302,4
1 179,9
2 171,3
89,9
56,6
50,9
130,0
Total imports
4 169,4
750,4
1 445,3
2 230,5
2 323,5
1 176,7
125,3
137,9
203,8
0. Food, fish, etc
0,1
6,6
1,1
6,9
0,1
1,2
1,7
1,2
0,6
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
3 486,1
334,8
909,3
1 729,2
1 838,5
658,6
29,8
3,1
39,7
5. Chemical products
339,1
201,2
145,6
185,7
190,9
215,2
133,3
3,1
1,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
232,7
127,5
279,7
157,7
152,2
186,3
67,3
114,5
169,5
7. Machinery, transp equip
11,4
22,4
14,2
21,3
15,6
135,6
6,2
12,7
10,8
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5.11. Estonia trade with Russia by commodity class
Estonia is especially an exporter of oil, wood and wooden products, metals, industrial and metal-
working machinery, and electrical equipment. Imports consist first of all of petroleum products,
fertilizers, food and fish, metals, raw materials, and various manufactured products.
The monthly trade with Russia over the last year is detailed in Table 11, below.
Estonia’s Statistical Office provides detailed trade data under the SITC and BEC systems, and under 3-
digit CN groupings. This allows the identification of very detailed trade patterns.
Note that imports data concern imports by country of consignment, not country of origin.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
In June 2022, Estonia’s exports to Russia increased substantially along all commodity groups, and
exceeded the normal levels from before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, Estonia further
reduced imports from Russia and Belarus.
15
Still, the imports of fuels (based on oil or gas) continued
more or less unabated, and the imports of semi-processed materials increased significantly.
Table 11 Trade with Russia by commodity class - ESTONIA
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
63,8
69,9
67,2
54,1
61,5
59,0
50,3
51,0
78,0
0-1. Food, all groups
3,3
3,5
4,5
4,0
3,9
3,5
5,5
4,5
6,3
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
2,9
3,3
2,9
3,5
3,6
3,4
5,4
4,4
6,3
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,1
0,1
0,0
1,3
0,1
0,2
0,7
1,2
1,3
5. Chemical products
9,6
9,9
11,0
9,6
11,1
10,9
13,5
13,0
14,8
6. Materials, metals, paper
7,2
8,5
7,9
7,0
6,3
5,9
6,7
7,5
10,2
7. Machinery, transp equip
26,2
41,3
35,7
23,8
31,3
29,3
18,2
19,7
36,0
76. Telecom & digital eqp
1,6
0,3
0,3
0,4
0,4
0,4
0,1
0,1
0,3
Total imports
107,9
102,2
213,8
222,2
174,9
216,9
208,4
189,3
187,0
0. Food, fish, animals. etc
1,0
1,1
1,3
1,7
1,6
2,4
2,4
1,5
1,2
CN 030 Fish and seafood
0,9
0,3
0,6
0,3
0,6
0,7
0,3
0,8
0,4
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
59,2
50,0
127,8
117,5
89,1
110,9
124,2
119,5
111,9
5. Chemical products
13,3
12,9
20,1
41,2
33,1
34,8
16,1
7,6
8,1
56. Fertilizers
8,7
7,3
11,9
30,3
25,6
18,4
2,5
0,0
1,0
6. Materials, metals, paper
13,7
14,8
24,7
36,6
18,6
29,0
26,0
26,5
39,7
7. Machinery, transp equip
4,4
7,5
4,0
2,7
3,5
2,4
3,5
2,5
2,9
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5.12. Latvia trade with Russia by commodity class
Latvia imports. Exports consists first of all of boilers and other industrial appliances, electrical
machinery, chemical products, and various manufactures made of paper and metals.
Norway’s imports from Russia have historically been dominated by imports of raw fish, which is being
re-exported to Europe from Norwegian ports. While there is some import of crude oil, chemical
products including fertilizers, and metal ores and products, count almost equally much as oil and gas.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 12, below.
Latvia’s statistical agency releases trade data per country broken down into CN commodity groups,
where this report combines SITC class 0 from groups 0-10, class 3 from groups 25-27, class 5 from
groups 28-39, class 6 from groups 48-83, and class 7 from groups 84-93.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By June 2022, Latvia had not reduced overall exports, all commodity groups saw exports continue
more or less as before the Spring 2022 sanctions. However, non-petroleum imports were reduced,
especially imports of food and fish, salt and stone, fertilizers and pharmaceutical products. But many
imports have continued unabated, resulting in more or less stable imports from Russia in the period.
The trade volumes are at par with, or exceed, pre-Covid19 levels.
Table 12 Trade with Russia by commodity class - LATVIA
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
2022-7
Total exports
83,4
85,1
84,7
91,6
78,3
89,4
63,3
69, 8
133,6
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
0,7
1,2
1,6
2,1
4,6
2,2
3,0
5,0
5,8
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,0
0,1
0,2
3,4
1,5
0,1
0,3
0,2
0,0
5. Chemical products
14,1
20,2
17,2
14,4
12,6
19,1
16,8
16,6
22,2
6. Materials, metals, paper
10,1
8,7
17,1
17,9
16,1
19,4
18,4
10,6
12,6
7. Machinery, transp equip
30,2
29,0
26,7
24,2
22,7
23,9
14,7
18,0
64,8
Total imports
100,7
76,2
182,9
192,8
139,4
167,8
173,2
107,8
116,4
0. Food, fish, animals. etc
4,5
1,2
3,3
3,1
12,3
32,6
8,8
10,0
1,1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
43,8
19,8
87,0
47,0
52,6
61,1
94,8
32,7
54,3
5. Chemical products
14,0
16,5
19,6
27,3
17,3
13,5
5,7
6,0
7,6
6. Materials, metals, paper
17,2
22,9
48,9
88,5
27,5
14,2
17,8
10,9
10,6
7. Machinery, transp equip
3,5
1,8
3,1
2,8
2,9
4,9
2,4
2,1
2,6
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5.13. Poland trade with Russia by commodity class
Poland historically has a wide and substantial imports from Russia, including first of all oil and gas,
petroleum products, metal and paper products, and artwork.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 13, below.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Polish Zloty.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By May 2022, Poland’s exports to Russia were clearly reduced, towards magnitudes half the “normal”
levels for the season. Especially, the exports of metals and materials, machinery, vehicles and
equipment were sharply reduced, while the exports of chemicals largely remained unaltered.
Poland had not by May reduced imports very much, all commodity classes except machinery were
being imported at the same, or higher levels than one year ago. There was a spike in imports during
winter due to the spike in oil and gas prices, but otherwise other commodity and manufacture
imports continued more or less unaltered until May 2022.
Table 13 Trade with Russia by commodity class POLAND
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
598,3
563,8
652,1
631,5
664,4
353,1
209,5
268,6
403,5
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
31,5
29,3
42,9
40,1
46,6
37,5
20,0
18,3
25,9
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
3,1
1,1
3,8
3,8
3,5
2,0
0,4
2,7
1,5
5. Chemical products
123,9
125,4
131,6
123,5
121,7
115,6
70,3
96,3
165,5
6. Materials, metals, paper
106,3
89,8
114,3
101,9
116,8
61,6
42,4
48,2
60,8
7. Machinery, transp equip
254,0
247,1
271,4
257,0
269,1
78,5
41,6
63,3
97,7
Total imports
1 000,0
702,9
1 279,3
1 643,2
2 116,4
2 719,4
2 012,0
1 037,6
1 097,2
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
10,1
20,0
19,7
20,0
25,9
30,6
22,0
23,5
26,0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
620,3
426,7
670,8
922,1
989,4
1 462,2
860,3
738,3
796,6
5. Chemical products
78,8
56,2
122,4
160,7
173,3
178,3
122,5
109,1
107,8
6. Materials, metals, paper
107,4
103,2
195,7
170,0
172,4
148,1
151,5
129,4
108,2
7. Machinery, transp equip
11,4
13,4
17,4
15,3
18,8
14,8
12,7
5,6
6,3
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5.14. Czechia trade with Russia by commodity class
Czechia historically has substantial imports from Russia, including first of all oil and gas, petroleum
products, metal and paper products, and artwork. Exports are less substantial, focused on machinery.
The monthly trade based on SITC commodity class over the last year is detailed in Table 14, below.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Czech koruna.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
By June 2022, Czechia’s exports to Russia were clearly reduced, towards magnitudes at a third of the
“normal” levels for the season. Especially, the exports of metals and materials, machinery, vehicles
and equipment were strongly reduced already in March 2022, and the low export volumes continued
with only marginal increase towards June. However, the exports of chemicals to Russia have largely
remained unaltered.
Czechia has continuously increased imports from Russia throughout the latest sanction period and
the war in Ukraine. Only the imports of machinery and vehicles has dropped, whereas all other
imports have either remained stable or increased considerably. Imports of oil and gas (i.e., mainly
natural gas) has grossly increased continuously since the low price bottom in June 2020.
Table 14 Trade with Russia by commodity class CZECHIA (CZECH REPUBLIC)
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Total exports
302,78
330,28
360,57
316,08
261,74
85,40
68,37
81,60
118,44
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
7,81
6,63
13,68
4,00
5,46
5,77
5,25
4,53
4,98
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
1,09
0,09
0,03
0,44
0,15
0,03
0,03
0,01
0,05
5. Chemical products
28,17
33,40
30,27
21,68
21,14
17,45
17,74
20,74
34,57
6. Materials, metals, paper
33,15
32,34
41,62
34,82
36,11
13,94
9,47
13,20
15,38
7. Machinery, transp equip
199,72
226,65
236,43
222,86
163,83
40,20
30,37
36,02
54,08
Total imports
414,56
163,27
375,48
491,63
561,55
1045,42
1382,83
1437,84
1107,77
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
1,48
1,27
2,02
4,97
4,27
4,98
2,62
3,37
3,28
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
294,17
54,65
326,22
372,74
436,69
896,22
1277,15
1344,33
999,04
5. Chemical products
29,62
19,93
26,12
29,12
32,20
30,87
30,15
30,38
29,03
6. Materials, metals, paper
39,64
37,60
52,82
58,30
49,75
71,01
48,60
37,92
57,39
7. Machinery, transp equip
37,13
36,81
41,26
8,27
15,01
25,44
9,45
11,01
4,81
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5.15. Hungary trade with Russia by commodity class
Hungary traditionally exports chemicals, machinery and materials to Russia, and imports gas, oil and
chemicals. A Russian pipeline enters Hungary via the Ukraine.
The monthly trade over the last year is detailed in Table 15, below.
Note that the data are presented in Euros (EUR), and not in Hungarian Forints.
Note that this analysis does not imply or indicate any violations of economic sanctions.
We see below that Hungary has reduced exports during 2022, both in the longer perspective
compared to previous years, and during the first five months of 2022. All exports except chemicals
were clearly reduced after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but Hungarian exports of food and
machinery have since rebounded.
The imports from Russia to Hungary have increased in 2022, and are also much higher than previous
years. Hungary receives fuels for heating and electricity generation from Russia.
It is noteworthy that the main land transportation route between Hungary and Russia runs via
Ukraine, which may potentially create difficulties with organising directly routed trade in goods.
Table 15 Trade with Russia by commodity class HUNGARY
Trade, mio EUR
2019-6
2020-6
2021-6
2022-1
2022-2
2022-3
2022-4
2022-5
2022-6
Monthly exports
164,0
125,4
151,5
152,0
145,1
91,3
54,4
69,5
107,9
Quarter ending that month
423,9
376,2
458,8
388,4
231,8
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
6,8
5,5
9,1
27,1
15,5
22,8
7,7
6,6
9,1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
0,8
0,4
0,4
0,7
0,7
0,1
0,3
0,4
0,8
5. Chemical products (28-40)
56,2
49,6
44,8
42,4
44,5
41,1
26,5
41,0
57,4
6. Materials, metals, paper
21,0
17,4
17,3
20,1
16,6
9,3
5,2
6,4
12,6
7. Machinery, transp equip
79,6
53,2
71,3
44,0
55,8
6,4
7,5
11,6
18,1
76. Telecom and dig equipm
2,8
6,0
2,5
2,2
2,5
0,3
0,1
0,1
0,2
Monthly imports
392,2
184.5
248.7
275,4
746,3
681,3
614,4
798,3
706,3
Quarter ending that month
1043,6
408,8
735,7
1702,9
2118,9
0. Food, fish, animals, etc
0,1
0,1
0,1
0,4
0,1
0,2
0,0
0,1
0,2
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants
352,8
163,8
216,5
225,3
698,8
645,0
555,8
775,8
674,4
33. Natural and refined gas
43,6
127,7
22,0
467,8
330,4
324,8
508,9
412,1
5. Chemical products (28-40)
29,7
7,7
18,6
32,1
27,6
22,9
21,9
16,1
22,4
6. Materials, metals, paper
3,8
8,4
4,1
5,4
7,5
4,1
3,7
2,8
3,8
7. Machinery, transp equip
4,2
2,9
5,1
9,0
8,0
5,0
31,3
0,7
1,7
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6. Three phases of decline and recovery of trade
6.1. The first phase - large and immediate reductions in exports
Sanctions announced by March 2022 initiated strong reductions in exports to Russia, and many
withdrawals from the Russian market. From February 2022 (before sanctions) to April 2022 (with
sanctions) there was a strong drop in exports (Figure 15) but more variably in imports (Figure 16):
6.2. The second phase exports stabilise and imports bottom in May
The second phase occurred when a strong decline in trade in April came to an end and stabilised at
lower levels in May. Comparing trade in March 2022 with May 2022, illustrates how many core
economies by now stabilised exports (Figure 17), while still reducing imports (Figure 18):
6.3. The third phase exports to Russia strongly increase in June
In the third phase several countries started to see increased exports to Russia from May or June,
while stabilising imports. Trade in May versus June 2022 is illustrated in Figure 19 and Figure 20:
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
35
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7. Ranking of countries by changes in trade with Russia
Trade sanctions are not a “competition”, each country experiences unique contexts and may be
dependent on Russian goods for essential services. As an example, several European countries rely
on Russian gas for heating and electricity generation, while other receive critical grain or fertilizer
supplies from Russia. Trade can be replaced, but not over-night.
Still, there are clear political intents to maximum reduce trade with Russia under the current sanction
regime. Table 15 below scores the change in each country’s trade with Russia, under 3 alternative
time comparison periods, where lower score (“notch”) means better progress with sanctions.
Countries are first scored by the simple average of the rankings in trade change ranks over six
different time periods (“Sum of six ranks”).
Then the countries are measured by the sum of the percentage changes in trade over six different
time periods (“Sum of six % changes”). This sum of percent changes is assigned an adjustment where
each started, cumulative 50 %p change is translated into a 1 point notch adjustment.
Lastly, the final ranking score is computed from the “Sum of six ranks” altered by the “Notch
adjustment” towards a “Total notch stated in the right column:
Table 15 Ranking by the average of six ranks and sums of trade reductions, along three time periods
Country
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
SUM
of six
ranks
SUM of
six %
changes
Notch
adjust-
ment %
changes
TOTAL
NOTCH
March-
June
Q1
Q2
June
2022 vs
2019-21
March-
June
Q1
Q2
June
2022 vs
2019-21
1
UK
2
1
2
1
2
1
9
-431.6
- 9
0
2
Sweden
16
5
5
2
1
2
31
-415.6
- 9
22
3
Denmark
3
4
4
10
7
6
34
-237.2
- 5
29
4
Ireland
1
9
14
3
3
7
37
-205.7
- 5
32
5
Lithuania
4
12
10
5
4
3
38
-228.2
- 5
33
6
France
5
3
3
8
10
13
42
-71.7
- 2
40
7
Poland
6
6
9
7
8
9
45
-150.8
- 4
41
8
Finland
9
11
12
6
5
4
47
-181.9
- 4
43
9
Norway
10
16
7
4
6
5
48
-125.8
- 3
45
10
Germany
7
8
6
12
12
12
57
-28.8
- 1
56
11
Netherlands
15
9
8
9
11
11
63
-18.1
- 1
62
12
Czechia
12
2
1
16
16
16
63
+223.6
+ 5
68
13
Latvia
13
14
16
11
9
8
71
+64.7
+ 2
73
14
Hungary
8
7
11
15
14
15
70
136.0
+3
73
15
Estonia
11
13
13
13
13
10
73
+49.1
+ 1
74
16
Serbia
14
15
15
14
15
14
87
+319.1
+ 7
94
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
36
www.corisk.no NO 926 378 538
Sources
Trade statistics retrieved from national statistical offices:
Denmark
https://www.statistikbanken.dk/20029
Estonia
VK16: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS BY COMMODITY (BEC) AND COUNTRY. Statistical database
https://andmebaas.stat.ee/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=787bac34-87db-4319-9f0b-30ba691f317f&themetreeid=3
Finland
https://pxweb2.stat.fi/PxWeb/pxweb/sv/StatFin/StatFin__tpulk/statfin_tpulk_pxt_12gq.px/
France
FOB exports of France incl. overseas departments - To: Russia - All, excluding military equipment - Estimated raw data - NAF
rev. 2 | Insee
CIF imports of France incl. overseas departments - From: Russia - All, excluding military equipment - Estimated raw data -
NAF rev. 2 | Insee
Germany
Federal Statistical Office Germany - GENESIS-Online: Statistics: 51000 (destatis.de)
Hungary
https://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp
Latvia
Foreign trade in goods | Oficiālās statistikas portāls
Lithuania
TRADE | LR ekonomika home EN (arcgis.com)
Netherlands
StatLine - International trade; import and export value, SITC (3 digits), countries (cbs.nl)
Norway
08806: Utenrikshandel med varer, etter varegruppe (en- og tosifret SITC) og land/handelsområde/verdensdel 1988M01 -
2022M06. Statistikkbanken (ssb.no)
https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/08806/
Poland
http://swaid.stat.gov.pl/en/HandelZagraniczny_dashboards/Raporty_predefiniowane/RAP_SWAID_HZ_3_7.aspx
Serbia
https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/oblasti/spoljna-trgovina/
Sweden
Varuimport och varuexport. Totala värden efter handelspartner, bortfallsjusterat. Månad 1998M01 - 2022M05. PxWeb
(scb.se)
https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/sv/ssd/START__HA__HA0201__HA0201B/ExpTotalKNMan/table/tableViewL
ayout1/
UK
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/datasets/uktradecountrybycommodityimports
Country Risk is Corporate Risk
37
www.corisk.no NO 926 378 538
References
1
Richard Connor (2022): «Yale study shows sanctions are crippling Russia’s economy”, Deutsche
Welle, 28 July, 2022.
2
Bryan Pietsch: “A list of companies still doing business in Russia circulated. McDonalds, Coca-Cola
and Starbucks soon pulled out”, The Washington Post, March 8, 2022.
3
European Commission (2022): Council Regulation EU 2022/328 of 25 February 2022 amending
Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising
the situation in Ukraine, February 25, 2022.
4
Covington Alert (2022): “EU and UK Adopt Additional Sanctions Against Russia, with Further
International Sanctions Measures Announced”, Covington, February 28, 2022.
5
Olof Koning et al (2022): “EU introduces additional sanctions against Russia”, Baker McKenzie,
March 17, 2022.
6
Olof Koning et al (2022): “EU introduces additional sanctions against Russia”, Baker McKenzie,
March 17, 2022.
7
Philip Blenkinsop and Nick Macfie (2022): “Factbox: What revoking Russia’s ‘most favoured nation’
status means”, Reuters, March 11, 2022.
8
Correctiv.org, total sanctions tracker (senders x targets), as per August 7, 2022.
9
Correctiv.org, total sanctions tracker (senders x targets), as per August 7, 2022.
10
Mark Thompson (2022): «Europe proposes ban on Russian coal imports”, CNN Business, April 5,
2022.
11
Port News (2022): “Ban on Russian ships in EU ports: Everything you need to know”, World Ports,
May 28, 2022.
12
Steve Rosenberg (2022): «Russian oil: EU agrees compromise deal on banning imports”, BBC
News, May 31, 2022.
13
IG Daily FX: Natural Gas Price Chart, futures prices in USD per MMBtu, visited August 8, 2022.
14
Danmarks Statistik: Udenrigshandel med varer, methodology description, visited August 15, 2022
15
Statistics Estonia (2022): Trade up in June, imports from Russia and Belarus down, press release, 9
August 2022.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
The Swedish exports and imports have both been consistently reduced
  • Sweden
Sweden. The Swedish exports and imports have both been consistently reduced.
Danish trade has been moderately reduced along all the time perspectives
  • Denmark
Denmark. Danish trade has been moderately reduced along all the time perspectives.
Exports are long-term increased, but imports have been strongly cut since
  • Ireland
Ireland. Exports are long-term increased, but imports have been strongly cut since April.
The best performing of the countries bordering Russia, all trade flows reduced
  • Lithuania
Lithuania. The best performing of the countries bordering Russia, all trade flows reduced.
Strong reductions in exports, but more modest long-term changes in imports
  • France
France. Strong reductions in exports, but more modest long-term changes in imports.
Noteworthy reductions in both exports and imports for another border country
  • Poland
Poland. Noteworthy reductions in both exports and imports for another border country.
Modest export cuts and strong import cuts for this country bordering Russia
  • Finland
Finland. Modest export cuts and strong import cuts for this country bordering Russia.
Increased exports since April, but clear reductions in imports except fish and oil
  • Norway
Norway. Increased exports since April, but clear reductions in imports except fish and oil.
Mostly reduced exports, but long-term increase in imports of gas and materials
  • Germany
Germany. Mostly reduced exports, but long-term increase in imports of gas and materials.
Reduced exports, but largely increased or at best stabilised imports
  • Netherlands
Netherlands. Reduced exports, but largely increased or at best stabilised imports.