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Who falls for fake news? Psychological and clinical profiling evidence of fake news consumers
Abstract
Awareness of the potential psychological significance of false news increased during the coronavirus pandemic, however, its impact on psychopathology and individual differences remains unclear. Acknowledging this, the authors investigated the psychological and psychopathological profiles that characterize fake news consumption. A total of 1452 volunteers from the general population with no previous psychiatric history participated. They responded to clinical psychopathology assessment tests. Respondents solved a fake news screening test, which allowed them to be allocated to a quasi-experimental condition: group 1 (non-fake news consumers) or group 2 (fake news consumers). Mean comparison, Bayesian inference, and multiple regression analyses were applied. Participants with a schizotypal, paranoid, and histrionic personality were ineffective at detecting fake news. They were also more vulnerable to suffer its negative effects. Specifically, they displayed higher levels of anxiety and committed more cognitive biases based on suggestibility and the Barnum Effect. No significant effects on psychotic symptomatology or affective mood states were observed. Corresponding to these outcomes, two clinical and therapeutic recommendations related to the reduction of the Barnum Effect and the reinterpretation of digital media sensationalism were made. The impact of fake news and possible ways of prevention are discussed.
... News belief involves complex cognitive processing, and it has been mainly explored from two aspects: individual differences in recipients and the characteristics of news. Concerning individual differences, previous research has found that differences in many traits may affect the news belief, such as personality [1,2], thinking style [3,4], and prior attitudes [5,6]. ...
... | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 12 February 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202402.0643.v1 2 processes involved in adopting the psychological perspective of others. AE involves responding emotionally to the experiences observed in others or sharing the feelings of a companion [10]. ...
The belief in online news has become a hot topic. Few studies have explored the effect of empathy on belief in online news. This study investigated the relationships between trait empathy, state empathy, the belief in online news, and the potential moderating effect of the news type. 140 un-dergraduates evaluated 50 online news pieces (25 real, 25 fake) regarding their believability, state empathy, valence, arousal, and familiarity. Trait empathy data were collected using the Chinese version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. State empathy was positively correlated with affective empathy in trait empathy and believability, and affective empathy was positively correlated with believability. The influence of affective empathy on news belief was partially me-diated by state empathy, regulated by the news type. We discussed the influence of empathy on the belief in online news and its internal processes.
... Factcheckers help mitigate the spread of misinformation and hold purveyors of fake news accountable for their deceptive practices by providing transparent and timely corrections. In today's fastpaced world, it is crucial to take a moment to fact-check the news we come across to ensure its authenticity [28,29]. Fake news is often characterized by multiple spelling errors, grammatical mistakes, and improper sentence structure. ...
Digital media has brought about a revolution in communication and information sharing. However, the rise of fake news in the digital age is of major concern. Fake messages, images, news, videos, and different kinds of disinformation are extensively distributed on variety of digital platforms. Deceptive information has always been a persistent issue on the social media platforms, the blowout of fake news on social media now presents a grave threat to all. The impact of fake news can be observed in many areas, including political polarization, bias, and the functioning of social media. The direct and indirect effects of fake news can also be seen in radical divergence and social unrest. This paper is my contribution towards highlighting the rise of fake news and its impact on the individuals.
... Regarding news characteristics, the higher the credibility of the source [6,7] and the greater one's familiarity [3,8] with the news, the more accurately participants perceived its believability. Concerning individual differences, previous research found that differences in personal traits may affect news belief, such as personality [8][9][10][11][12], thinking style [4,[13][14][15], media literacy [16][17][18], and prior attitudes [19][20][21][22]. ...
The belief in online news has become a topical issue. Previous studies demonstrated the role emotion plays in fake news vulnerability. However, few studies have explored the effect of empathy on online news belief. This study investigated the relationship between trait empathy, state empathy, belief in online news, and the potential moderating effect of news type. One hundred and forty undergraduates evaluated 50 online news pieces (25 real, 25 fake) regarding their belief, state empathy, valence, arousal, and familiarity. Trait empathy data were collected using the Chinese version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. State empathy was positively correlated with affective empathy in trait empathy and believability, and affective empathy was positively correlated with believability. The influence of affective empathy on news belief was partially mediated by state empathy and regulated by news type (fake, real). We discuss the influence of empathy on online news belief and its internal processes. This study shares some unique insights for researchers, practitioners, social media users, and social media platform providers.
... Our finding is in line with previous work supporting the relationship between fake news believability and unusual beliefs/magical ideation (Bronstein et al., 2019;Escolà-Gasc on et al., 2023). Delusionprone individuals are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories (Dagnall et al., 2015), believe in paranormal phenomena (Pechey & Halligan, 2011), and consider as real senseless explanations for ambiguous events (Bronstein & Cannon, 2017). ...
What are the factors that influence individuals' belief in fake news? A structured survey was conducted to examine the impact of cognitive, emotional, and personality factors on the perceived accuracy of fake news. This study utilizes certain facets of the Personality Inventory of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (PID‐5‐Adult trait) to investigate the phenomenon of fake news. Using actual fake news headlines encountered on Facebook, the study revealed that individuals with high levels of psychoticism, impulsivity, suspiciousness, and low analytical reasoning abilities are more likely to believe fake news. Furthermore, the study found that fear induced by news content significantly influences by impeding rational, factual analysis. These findings suggest that while social media platforms contribute to the dissemination of fake news, individual vulnerabilities also play a crucial role. These findings could be useful for the development of digital literacy programs.
This article examines the complex relationship between disinformation
activities and the rise of social polarization. The study identifies the main psycho-
logical mechanisms through which disinformation exerts its impact and explores their
connection to factors shaping polarizing social attitudes. The article conceptualizes
the key disinformation factors that contribute to social polarization. By integrating
research perspectives from social psychology and social research on communication,
polarization, and disinformation, cognitive mechanisms are applied to the field of
security sciences.
Suggestibility is an important aspect of the psychedelic experience that merits greater attention in the expanding field of psychedelic research. This article provides a comprehensive road map for exploring the critical questions and issues at the intersection of suggestion, suggestibility, and psychedelics. Suggestibility is linked to the psychedelic experience, and likewise, psychedelics are associated with enhanced suggestibility, possibly due to their apparent ability to amplify openness and associative thinking. This relationship is one that research has not adequately addressed. Key factors related to the psychedelic experience, including expectation, symbolic thinking, and mindset, are additionally important to examine for both users and researchers. This article examines how psychedelic substances contribute to our understanding of suggestibility and therapeutic techniques, ranging from fostering creativity and alleviating depression to provoking distrust and conspiratorial thinking. By discussing the role of suggestion and suggestibility in psychedelic research, we highlight their applications in clinical, social, and cultural contexts. Recasting historical interpretations of psychedelics through these constructive narratives can significantly benefit various social domains.
Neste artigo, revisamos partes da literatura acadêmica sobre a infodemia buscando preencher uma lacuna de estudos que descrevam a sua existência político-econômica, científica, sociotécnica e psicossocial em geral, ao mesmo tempo em que verifiquem como essa imbricação se encontra com a realidade brasileira. Nesse enquadramento, a infodemia emergiu como uma superabundância problemática de informações sobre saúde, capaz de comprometer seus cuidados individuais e coletivos e que integra conflitos sócio-econômicos e culturais relacionados ao capitalismo neoliberal e periférico. Por isso, encontramos distintas e até antagônicas formas de caracterizar e enfrentar a infodemia. Algumas delas contrastam com os princípios do SUS e da reforma sanitária, especialmente com relação à participação política dos sujeitos atingidos pela infodemia enquanto uma forma de enfrentar o fenômeno e os conflitos de que ela faz parte. Concluímos que, enquanto um fenômeno multideterminado, a infodemia deve continuar sendo pesquisada interdisciplinarmente de modo a contribuir com tal participação política.
The aim of the study was to investigate how general personality traits (Big Five) and maladaptive traits (Personality Inventory for DSM-5) predict specific conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19 and the Russian-Ukrainian war. 925 participants from Slovakia, recruited via an online panel of a research agency (50.6% women, mean age 50.9 years), were interviewed in October 2021 with the Big Five Inventory Short (BFI-S) and the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 Brief Form (PID-5-BF). Later (July-August 2022 and April-May 2023), they completed the original scales to measure COVID-19 and Russian-Ukrainian war conspiracies. The results showed that after controlling for demographic variables, belief in specific conspiracies was positively predicted by extraversion and negatively predicted by agreeableness. Of the maladaptive traits, only psychoticism was a positive predictor of specific conspiracies. Since the effects were consistent across all types of conspiracies, the results suggest that personality traits may play a role in how people come to believe in specific conspiracies.
The rise of fake news in the social media era has emerged as a pressing societal challenge, impacting communication, public perception, and democratic processes. This article examines the phenomenon of fake news in the context of social media platforms and explores its implications for individuals and society. Drawing on a review of relevant scientific literature, the article delves into the psychological processes that contribute to the spread and acceptance of misinformation. Additionally, it highlights the consequences of fake news, such as eroding public trust in media and institutions, distorting public opinion, and influencing decision-making. The article critically analyzes three pieces of fake news, aiming to dissect the linguistic and narrative techniques employed to manipulate perceptions around COVID-19. It reveals how such misinformation can influence public trust, exacerbate fears, and distort the discourse on health and politics. It also explores existing strategies to combat fake news, including media literacy education, fact-checking initiatives, and responsible journalism, while emphasizing the need for innovative and collaborative future approaches. By understanding the complexities of fake news and its impact in the social media era, this article aims to provide insights into developing informed interventions to mitigate its negative effects and promote a more trustworthy information environment.
Objectives: The dangers to society and individual persons of believing fake news are becoming more apparent, and it is increasingly important to explore the factors that influence believing fake news. Due to persons developing and having a unique consciousness, personality, and set of behaviors across interconnected ecological risks, we aimed to evaluate the relationship between the cumulative effects of multiple ecological risks and believing fake news. Methods: We conducted a survey over 2 time periods at 4 public universities in Beijing, China. We used cluster sampling and obtained 406 valid samples for each of the 2 time periods. We constructed a reflective formative second-order model using least partial squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) for data analysis and analysed the model type through quadratic term effects. Results: First, there was a bidirectional impact between cumulative ecological risk and believing fake news, ie, not only did it show the importance of the environment in which individuals find themselves in shaping their beliefs about fake news, but it also demonstrated the dangers of fake news; second, cognitive bias mediates the relationship between cumulative ecological risk and believing in fake news, demonstrating the mechanism between cumulative ecological risk and believing in fake news; and third, the cumulative effect of ecological risk affects believing fake news following an exacerbation model. Conclusions: The tendency towards believing in fake news grows exponentially as a person experiences multiple risks from family, school, and peers. This study provides both theoretical and practical knowledge to combat fake news effectively.
The paper examines the impact of disinformation campaigns on national security , underlining the various threats they pose, including the spread of panic, the weakening of trust in institutions, interpersonal trust, and financial losses. In extreme cases, disinformation could fuel riots and conflicts or completely destabilize societies. Disinformation can influence political processes, promote authoritarian ideas to the detriment of democratic ones, and undermine previously accepted values. Using the example of the recent pandemic, it is shown that disinformation can also lead to serious health problems, especially in cases where incorrect information is spread about medical treatments or the alleged dangers of using vaccines. All mentioned threats directly relate to the costs of combating disinformation, whereby these costs can be measured or estimated based on the available literature and published reports. Finally, it is shown that efforts to stop the spread of disinformation require significant resources, but they are nevertheless justified in order to preserve a sound security environment.
Social media has become a powerful conduit for misinformation during major public events. As a result, an extant body of research has emerged on misinformation and its diffusion. However, the research is fragmented and has mainly focused on understanding the content of misinformation messages. Little attention is paid to the production and consumption of misinformation. This study presents the results of a detailed comparative analysis of the production, consumption, and diffusion of misinformation with authentic information. Our findings, based on extensive use of computational linguistic analyses of COVID-19 pandemic-related messages on the Twitter platform, revealed that misinformation and authentic information exhibit very different characteristics in terms of their contents, production, diffusion, and their ultimate consumption. To support our study, we carefully selected a sample of 500 widely propagated messages confirmed by fact-checking websites as misinformation or authentic information about pandemic-related topics from the Twitter platform. Detailed computational linguistic analyses were performed on these messages and their replies ( N = 198,750). Additionally, we analyzed approximately 1.2 million Twitter user accounts responsible for producing, forwarding, or replying to these messages. Our extensive and detailed findings were used to develop and propose a theoretical framework for understanding the diffusion of misinformation on social media. Our study offers insights for social media platforms, researchers, policymakers, and online information consumers about how misinformation spreads over social media platforms.
The increase of the amount of misinformation spread every day online is a huge threat to the society. Organizations and researchers are working to contrast this misinformation plague. In this setting, human assessors are indispensable to correctly identify, assess and/or revise the truthfulness of information items, i.e., to perform the fact-checking activity. Assessors, as humans, are subject to systematic errors that might interfere with their fact-checking activity. Among such errors, cognitive biases are those due to the limits of human cognition. Although biases help to minimize the cost of making mistakes, they skew assessments away from an objective perception of information. Cognitive biases, hence, are particularly frequent and critical, and can cause errors that have a huge potential impact as they propagate not only in the community, but also in the datasets used to train automatic and semi-automatic machine learning models to fight misinformation. In this work, we present a review of the cognitive biases which might occur during the fact-checking process. In more detail, inspired by PRISMA-a methodology used for systematic literature reviews-we manually derive a list of 221 cognitive biases that may affect human assessors. Then, we select the 39 biases that might manifest during the fact-checking process, we group them into categories, and we provide a description. Finally, we present a list of 11 countermeasures that can be adopted by researchers, practitioners, and organizations to limit the effect of the identified cognitive biases on the fact-checking activity.
Celem badania była weryfikacja hipotezy o związku pomiędzy wykorzystywanym urządzeniem informacyjnym (komputer stacjonarny vs. urządzenie mobilne) a wiarą w prawdziwość fałszywych informacji. Badanie zrealizowano w schemacie eksperymentalnym, z manipulacją polegającą na konieczności wykorzystania określonego urządzenia podczas oceny prawdziwości komunikatów dotyczących pandemii COVID-19. Przeprowadzono ilościową analizę statystyczną wykorzystując dane zebrane od 211 osób, zrekrutowanych za pomocą agencji badań rynku i opinii. Udało się potwierdzić hipotezę badawczą — dowodząc, że w porównaniu do ogólnej ufności wobec komunikatów medialnych wiara w fałszywe informacje była wyższa u użytkowników urządzeń mobilnych. Pokazano również, że wiara w fake newsy ma związek z poziomem wykształcenia oraz (na poziomie tendencji) z płcią oraz subiektywnie określonym poziomem wiedzy o COVID-19. Niniejszy artykuł wypełnia niszę w obszarze badań naukowych poświęconych technologicznym uwarunkowaniom wiary w prawdziwe informacje w Internecie.
In the midst of the pervasive disruption caused by the proliferation of rumors, it is unclear how individuals react to such information. Guided by the SOR theory (Stimuli-Organism-Response), our study investigates the association between different information sources (stimuli), emotions experienced by individuals (organism), and resulting rumor behaviors such as sharing and refuting (response). Furthermore, we examine the moderating role of individual critical thinking in this process. Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a study scenario, we collected questionnaire data from 4588 respondents. Our results reveal a large positive association between pandemic-related information and feelings of fear. Additionally, a medium negative correlation between fear and rumor sharing was observed while a moderate positive correlation between fear and rumor refuting was identified. Moreover, we found that individual critical thinking abilities can effectively moderate the relationship between fear and online COVID-19-related information and strengthen the link between fear and rumor sharing while weakening the link between fear and rumor refuting. Additionally, our study indicates that an individual's fear plays a mediating role in the relationship between information sources and rumor behavior. Our findings shed light on the information processing mechanisms underlying rumor behaviors and yield practical and policy implications for managing them.
"Fake news is one of the most discussed topics in the last few years. During the COVID-19 pandemic and during the Ukrainian war, the dangerous nature of this phenomenon became more obvious. More politics and more journalists are using now (fake) news as a weapon. Modern war must be considered in its informational part also. So, a correct evaluation of the news is an important skill for their consumers. Which are the psychological effects of fake news on the audience? Which is the psychological profile of the people that consume fake news? Which people are more vulnerable to suffering its negative effects? Why do people believe and share fake information? How can we explain the failure to distinguish accurate from inaccurate news? We studied the recent research in order to find the answers. This study is a literature review on the argument of fake news, its psychological effects on people and some explanations for this phenomenon. "
General Audience Summary
There has been a proliferation of fabricated news stories that are presented as being from legitimate sources on social media. The present studies made progress toward answering the questions of who is most likely to believe this “fake news” and why. Two studies with over 900 participants suggested that individuals who endorse delusion-like ideas (e.g., thinking that people can communicate telepathically), as well as dogmatic individuals and religious fundamentalists, are more likely to believe fake news. These studies also suggested that two related forms of thinking may protect against belief in fake news: The first, actively open-minded thinking, involves the search for alternative explanations and the use of evidence to revise beliefs. The second, analytic thinking, involves the disposition to initiate deliberate thought processes in order to reflect on intuitions and gut feelings. Reduced engagement in these forms of thinking predicts increased belief in fake news, and may help to explain belief in fake news among individuals who endorse delusion-like ideas, dogmatic individuals, and religious fundamentalists. These results suggest that existing interventions designed to increase actively open-minded and analytic thinking might be leveraged to combat belief in fake news.
Conspiratorial belief is a type of argument that accepts implausible explanations in situations of great uncertainty or mystery. Claiming that the coronavirus is an artificial fabrication of laboratories is an example of conspiracist belief. The aim of this research was to analyze the impact of conspiracist ideation and psychotic-like experiences in patients with schizophrenia, patients with other mental disorders, and participants with no psychiatric history with a 132-day follow-up during the COVID-19 crisis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied and Bayesian inferences were carried out. The results conclude that conspiracist ideation and psychotic-like experiences increased significantly after 132 days of social-health restrictions in the general population. However, psychotic-like experiences did not increase in patients with schizophrenia. Conspiracist ideation has a quantitative degradation similar to the continuum model of psychosis; it is present both in patients with schizophrenia and in those participants with no clinical history. The psychopathological value of conspiracist ideation within the spectrum of psychosis is discussed.
The prevalence of pseudoscientific beliefs and fake news increased during the coronavirus crisis. Misinformation streams such as these potentially pose risks to people's health. Thus, knowing how these pseudoscientific beliefs and fake news impact the community of internists may be useful for improving primary care services. In this research, analyses of stress levels, effectiveness in detecting fake news, use of critical thinking (CP), and attitudes toward pseudosciences in internists during the COVID-19 crisis were performed. A total of 1129 internists participated. Several multiple regression models were applied using the forward stepwise method to determine the weight of CP and physicians' attitudes toward pseudosciences in predicting reductions in stress levels and facilitating the detection of fake news. The use of critical thinking predicted 46.9% of the reduction in stress levels. Similarly, skeptical attitudes and critical thinking predicted 56.1% of the hits on fake news detection tests. The stress levels of physicians during the coronavirus pandemic were clinically significant. The efficacy of fake news detection increases by 30.7% if the individual was a physician. Study outcomes indicate that the use of critical thinking and skeptical attitudes reduce stress levels and allow better detection of fake news. The importance of how to promote critical and skeptical attitudes in the field of medicine is discussed.
This study investigated the degree to which cognitive bias mediated the relationship between thinking style and belief in the paranormal. A sample of 496 participants completed the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS), the Belief in Science Scale (BISS), the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis, and the reality testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT). The BISS and IPO-RT served as proxy indices of preferred thinking style; the BISS assessed rational-analytical (objective) processing, and the IPO-RT intuitive-experiential (subjective) processing. Cognitive biases (Jumping to Conclusions, Intentionalising, Catastrophising, Emotional Reasoning, and dichotomous thinking) correlated positively with belief in the paranormal. Mediation using path analysis indicated that Emotional Reasoning and Catastrophising exerted indirect effects in relation to BISS, IPO-RT and RPBS. Direct relationships existed between IPO-RT and RPBS, and BISS and RPBS. Of the biases, only Emotional Reasoning and Catastrophising predicted RPBS. The contribution of Emotional Reasoning and Catastrophising to belief in the paranormal were consistent with previous research and the cognitive model of psychosis, which asserts that there are strong relationships between defective reality testing, emotional reasoning and delusional beliefs.
This study examined the degree to which within-individual variations in paranormal experience were related to belief in the paranormal, preferential thinking style, and delusion formation. A sample of 956 non-clinical adults completed measures assessing experience-based paranormal indices (i.e., paranormal experience, paranormal practitioner visiting, and paranormal ability), paranormal belief, belief in science, proneness to reality testing deficits, and emotion-based reasoning. Latent profile analysis (LPA) combined the experience-based indices to produce six underlying groups. Inter-class comparison via multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) indicated that both breadth and intensity of experiential factors were associated with higher belief in in the paranormal, increased proneness to reality testing deficits, and greater emotion-based reasoning. Belief in science, however, was less susceptible to experiential variations. Further analysis of reality testing subscales revealed that experiential profiles influenced levels of intrapsychic activity in subtle and intricate ways, especially those indexing Auditory and Visual Hallucinations and Delusional Thinking. Collectively, identification of profiles and inter-class comparisons provided a sophisticated understanding of the relative contribution of experiential factors to differences in paranormal belief, belief in science, proneness to reality testing deficits, and emotion-based reasoning.
Research on belief in conspiracy theories identified many predictors but often failed to investigate them together. In the present study, we tested how the most important predictors of beliefs in conspiracy theories explain endorsing COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality. Apart from these three measures of conspiratorial thinking, participants (N = 354) completed several measures of epistemic, existential, and social psychological motives, as well as cognitive processing variables. While many predictors had significant correlations, only three consistently explained conspiratorial beliefs when included in one model: higher spirituality (specifically eco-awareness factor), higher narcissism, and lower analytical thinking. Compared to the other two conspiratorial measures, predictors less explained belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, but this depended on items’ content. We conclude that the same predictors apply to belief in both COVID and non-COVID conspiracies and identify New Age spirituality as an important contributor to such beliefs.
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In recent years, interest in the psychology of fake news has rapidly increased. We outline the various interventions within psychological science aimed at countering the spread of fake news and misinformation online, focusing primarily on corrective (debunking) and pre-emptive (prebunking) approaches. We also offer a research agenda of open questions within the field of psychological science that relate to how and why fake news spreads and how best to counter it: the longevity of intervention effectiveness; the role of sources and source credibility; whether the sharing of fake news is best explained by the motivated cognition or the inattention accounts; and the complexities of developing psychometrically validated instruments to measure how interventions affect susceptibility to fake news at the individual level.
While COVID-19 spreads aggressively and rapidly across the globe, many societies have also witnessed the spread of other viral phenomena like misinformation, conspiracy theories, and general mass suspicions about what is really going on. This study investigates how exposure to and trust in information sources, and anxiety and depression, are associated with conspiracy and misinformation beliefs in eight countries/regions (Belgium, Canada, England, Philippines, Hong Kong, New Zealand, United States, Switzerland) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Data were collected in an online survey fielded from May 29, 2020 to June 12, 2020, resulting in a multinational representative sample of 8,806 adult respondents. Results indicate that greater exposure to traditional media (television, radio, newspapers) is associated with lower conspiracy and misinformation beliefs, while exposure to politicians and digital media and personal contacts are associated with greater conspiracy and misinformation beliefs. Exposure to health experts is associated with lower conspiracy beliefs only. Higher feelings of depression are also associated with greater conspiracy and misinformation beliefs. We also found relevant group- and country differences. We discuss the implications of these results.
We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share false or highly misleading news online. Contrary to a common narrative whereby politics drives susceptibility to fake news, people are ‘better’ at discerning truth from falsehood (despite greater overall belief) when evaluating politically concordant news. Instead, poor truth discernment is associated with lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge, and the use of heuristics such as familiarity. Furthermore, there is a substantial disconnect between what people believe and what they share on social media. This dissociation is largely driven by inattention, more so than by purposeful sharing of misinformation. Thus, interventions can successfully nudge social media users to focus more on accuracy. Crowdsourced veracity ratings can also be leveraged to improve social media ranking algorithms.
Background
Coronavirus-related conspiracy theories (CT) have been found to be associated with fewer pandemic containment-focused behaviors. It is therefore important to evaluate associated cognitive factors. We aimed to obtain first endorsement rate estimates of coronavirus-related conspiracy beliefs in a German-speaking general population sample and investigate whether delusion-related reasoning biases and paranoid ideation are associated with such beliefs.
Methods
We conducted a cross-sectional non-probability online study, quota-sampled for age and gender, with 1684 adults from Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. We assessed general and specific coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, reasoning biases [jumping-to-conclusions bias (JTC), liberal acceptance bias (LA), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), possibility of being mistaken (PM)], and paranoid ideation, using established experimental paradigms and self-report questionnaires.
Results
Around 10% of our sample endorsed coronavirus-related CT beliefs at least strongly, and another 20% to some degree. Overall endorsement was similar to levels observed in a UK-based study (Freeman et al., 2020b). Higher levels of conspiracy belief endorsement were associated with greater JTC, greater LA, greater BADE, higher PM, and greater paranoid ideation. Associations were mostly small to moderate and best described by non-linear relationships.
Conclusions
A noticeable proportion of our sample recruited in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland endorsed coronavirus conspiracy beliefs strongly or to some degree. These beliefs are associated with reasoning biases studied in delusion research. The non-probability sampling approach limits the generalizability of findings. Future longitudinal and experimental studies investigating conspiracy beliefs along the lines of reasoning are encouraged to validate reasoning aberrations as risk factors.
This opinion piece contributes significantly to the growing body of conspiracy theory research, by examining ways in which communication strategies can enhance the impact of COVID-19 related public health information and reduce the negative effects of misinformation and disinformation. Explicitly, this article considers the conditions under which COVID-19 conspiracies are most likely to arise, flourish and negatively affect social opinions and behaviors. The narrative posits that the provision of coherent counterarguments and active refutation of misleading and erroneous data, facilitates greater adherence to Government guidelines. Overall, this opinion piece deepens understanding of the influence of conspiracy theory on reception of public health information.
The proliferation of fake news on social media is now a matter of considerable public and governmental concern. In 2016, the UK EU referendum and the US Presidential election were both marked by social media misinformation campaigns, which have subsequently reduced trust in democratic processes. More recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the acceptance of fake news has been shown to pose a threat to public health. Research on how to combat the false acceptance of fake news is still in its infancy. However, recent studies have started to focus on the psychological factors which might make some individuals less likely to fall for fake news. Here, we adopt that approach to assess whether individuals who show high levels of ‘emotional intelligence’ (EQ) are less likely to fall for fake news items. That is, are individuals who are better able to disregard the emotionally charged content of such items, better equipped to assess the veracity of the information. Using a sample of UK participants, an established measure of EQ and a novel fake news detection task, we report a significant positive relationship between individual differences in emotional intelligence and fake news detection ability. We also report a similar effect for higher levels of educational attainment, and we report some exploratory qualitative fake news judgement data. Our findings are discussed in terms of their applicability to practical short term (i.e. current Facebook user data) and medium term (i.e. emotional intelligence training) interventions which could enhance fake news detection.
The COVID-19 pandemic has produced many calls for a vaccine. There is growing concern that vaccine hesitancy and anti-vaccination presence will dampen the uptake of a coronavirus vaccine.
There are many cited reasons for vaccine hesitancy. Mercury content, autism association, and vaccine danger have been commonly found in anti-vaccination messages. It is also mused that the reduced disease burden from infectious diseases has paradoxically reduced the perceived requirement for vaccine uptake.
Our analysis using Google Trends has shown that throughout the pandemic the search interest in a coronavirus vaccine has increased and remained high throughout. Peaks are found when public declarations are made, the case number increases significantly, or when vaccine breakthroughs are announced.
Anti-vaccine searches, in the context of COVID-19, have had a continued and growing presence during the pandemic. Contrary to what some may believe, the burden of coronavirus has not been enough to dissuade anti-vaccine searches entirely.
The study aimed to investigate the role of personality, thinking styles, and conspiracy mentality in health-related behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic, i.e., recommended health behaviors according to COVID-19 guidelines and engagement in pseudoscientific practices related to COVID-19. Basic personality space was defined by the HEXACO model complemented by Disintegration, which represents psychotic-like experiences and behaviors reconceptualized as a personality trait. Mediation analyses conducted on a convenient sample from the general population recruited via social media and by snowballing (N=417) showed that engagement in pseudoscientific behaviors was predicted by high Disintegration. However, this relationship was entirely mediated by high experiential and low rational thinking styles. Adherence to health practices recommended by COVID-19 guidelines was predicted by high Honesty traits, while low Disintegration had both direct and indirect effects through conspiracy mentality.
Unidentified Flying Objects (also called UFO) are usually related to the magical beliefs that accept the existence of extraterrestrial beings and alien abductions. Therefore, UFO experiences describe contacts with UFOs, extraterrestrial beings, covert alien visits and abductions. Although science provides enough advances that bet for the existence of life outside the earth, these experiences have been related and equated with paranormal beliefs under an integrative model given the magical content they manifest. The following paper presents a psychosocial study based on the statistical justification of the UFO Experiences Questionnaire (UFO-Q), which examines the underlying dimensions of UFO experiences and beliefs, as well as their social impact on the Spanish-speaking culture. The sample was of non-probabilistic convenience and consisted of 404 subjects selected from the Spanish general population. The Factorial Analyses confirmed that UFO experiences can be represented based on four dimensions: Extraterrestrial Beliefs (C1), Extraterrestrial Experiences (E1), Fearful Extraterrestrial Beliefs (T1) and Form Beliefs (C2). The analysis of items suggested that these beliefs could present two cognitive models: On the one hand, there is the magical-divergent model (irrational thinking), and on the other hand, there is also the critical-divergent (rational thinking). However, the Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis questioned both models because they only allowed the identification of the magical-divergent dimension (factor C2). This result invites us to review the validity of the integrative model that associate paranormal contents with extraterrestrial beliefs. Would it be possible that the relationship between both types of beliefs occurred only in the magical-divergent model?
In times of uncertainty, people often seek out information to help alleviate fear, possibly leaving them vulnerable to false information. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we attended to a viral spread of incorrect and misleading information that compromised collective actions and public health measures to contain the spread of the disease. We investigated the influence of fear of COVID-19 on social and cognitive factors including believing in fake news, bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, and problem-solving—within two of the populations that have been severely hit by COVID-19: Italy and the United States of America. To gain a better understanding of the role of misinformation during the early height of the COVID-19 pandemic, we also investigated whether problem-solving ability and socio-cognitive polarization were associated with believing in fake news. Results showed that fear of COVID-19 is related to seeking out information about the virus and avoiding infection in the Italian and American samples, as well as a willingness to share real news (COVID and non-COVID-related) headlines in the American sample. However, fear positively correlated with bullshit receptivity, suggesting that the pandemic might have contributed to creating a situation where people were pushed toward pseudo-profound existential beliefs. Furthermore, problem-solving ability was associated with correctly discerning real or fake news, whereas socio-cognitive polarization was the strongest predictor of believing in fake news in both samples. From these results, we concluded that a construct reflecting cognitive rigidity, neglecting alternative information, and black-and-white thinking negatively predicts the ability to discern fake from real news. Such a construct extends also to reasoning processes based on thinking outside the box and considering alternative information such as problem-solving.
The pandemic caused by COVID-19 led to the distribution of excessive pseudoscientific information and fake news that has confused the general population. In the field of forensic psychiatry, lie detection is essential to determine if the witness is telling the truth with the purpose of making fair and effective decisions. In this research, we present a new approach that uses the pseudoscientific beliefs related to COVID-19 and 4 psychometric scales of the Multivariable Multiaxial Suggestibility Inventory-2 (MMSI-2) to detect and predict lies. A total of 268 participants were classified into two groups: the control group (n = 132) and the quasi-experimental group (n = 136). The quasi-experimental group participants received instructions to lie as they wished in response to a number of questions on a content exam (called exam 1) based on a short children’s film. The participants had to indicate which and how many questions they had lied on. The quasi-experimental group was only required to lie in exam 1. A second exam (called exam 2) was also administered to assess whether the participants could recognize which news items about COVID-19 were false or true. The control group was not required to lie on any exam. Several multiple regression models were applied. The 4 scales of the MMSI-2 predicted 71.2% of the lies for exam 1 and 41.5% of the lies for exam 2. The control group participants obtained lower average scores on exam 1 than the quasi-experimental group in the “F” and “Si” scales. The theory of signal detection is proposed as a possible explanation of the effectiveness of the MMSI-2 scales in lie detection.
This research aims to analyze the effects of pseudoscientific information (PI) about COVID-19 on the mental well-being of the general population. A total of 782 participants were classified according to the type of municipality in which they lived (rural municipalities and urban municipalities). The participants answered psychometric questionnaires that assessed psychological well-being, pseudoscientific beliefs and the ability to discriminate between scientific and pseudoscientific information about COVID-19. The results indicated the following: the greater the ability to discriminate between false information and true information, the greater the levels of psychological well-being perceived by the participant. The ability to discriminate predicts up to 32% of psychological well-being only for subjects living in rural municipalities. Residents in urban municipalities showed lower levels of well-being than residents in rural municipalities. It is concluded that new social resources are needed to help the general population of urban municipalities discriminate between pseudoscientific and scientific information.
Anomalous phenomena are human experiences that are characterized by challenging the foundations of current scientific ontology (i.e., psi phenomena). The problem lies in the fact that some studies have obtained significant results that support the existential validity of psi phenomena. This fact calls into question the role of psychology-and specifically that of psychological assessment-in scientifically justifying and objectively evaluating this type of behavior. This work examines the construct validity and reliability of the Multivariable Multiaxial Suggestibility Inventory-2 (MMSI-2), a psychometric test that measures both anomalous phenomena and the main psychological predictive variables that could generate them. The study included 804 participants without psychiatric history. The participants were evenly distributed into two groups: participants who believe in the existence of the paranor-mal and participants who are non-believers. Confirmatory factor analysis was applied, factorial invariance between both groups was examined, and Cronbach's alpha and Omega reliability coefficients were calculated. The results allowed accepting the 'strong factorial invariance' for the internal structure of the MMSI-2. In parallel, latent means analysis indicated that believers had higher scores than non-believers in the 4 latent variables of the test. Regression models indicated that the Clinical Personality Tendencies (CPT), Incoherent Manipulations (IMA) and Altered States of Consciousness (ASC) scales predicted 51.2% of anomalous phenomena. It is concluded that the MMSI-2, with its 174 items and 20 scales, is a valid and reliable psychometric instrument. This research is a continuation of the Escolà-Gascón (2020) report, in which the first psychometric properties of the MMSI-2 were published.
What is the role of emotion in susceptibility to believing fake news? Prior work on the psychology of misinformation has focused primarily on the extent to which reason and deliberation hinder versus help the formation of accurate beliefs. Several studies have suggested that people who engage in more reasoning are less likely to fall for fake news. However, the role of reliance on emotion in belief in fake news remains unclear. To shed light on this issue, we explored the relationship between experiencing specific emotions and believing fake news (Study 1; N = 409). We found that across a wide range of specific emotions, heightened emotionality at the outset of the study was predictive of greater belief in fake (but not real) news posts. Then, in Study 2, we measured and manipulated reliance on emotion versus reason across four experiments (total N = 3884). We found both correlational and causal evidence that reliance on emotion increases belief in fake news: self-reported use of emotion was positively associated with belief in fake (but not real) news, and inducing reliance on emotion resulted in greater belief in fake (but not real) news stories compared to a control or to inducing reliance on reason. These results shed light on the unique role that emotional processing may play in susceptibility to fake news.
The outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has been accompanied by a large amount of misleading and false information about the virus, especially on social media. In this article, we explore the coronavirus “infodemic” and how behavioral scientists may seek to address this problem. We detail the scope of the problem and discuss the negative influence that COVID-19 misinformation can have on the widespread adoption of health protective behaviors in the population. In response, we explore how insights from the behavioral sciences can be leveraged to manage an effective societal response to curb the spread of misinformation about the virus. In particular, we discuss the theory of psychological inoculation (or prebunking) as an efficient vehicle for conferring large-scale psychological resistance against fake news.
Background: The health crisis caused by COVID-19 has led many countries to opt for social quarantine of the
population. During this quarantine, communication systems have been characterized by disintermediation, the
acceleration of digitization and an infodemic (excess and saturation of information). The following debate arises: Do
the levels related to the psychotic phenotype and pseudoscientific beliefs related to the interpretation of information
vary before and after social quarantine?
Objectives: This research aims to examine the psychological effects of social quarantine on the psychotic phenotype
and pseudoscientific beliefs-experiences of the general nonclinical population. The following hypothesis was posed:
social quarantine alters the levels of magical thinking, pseudoscientific beliefs and anomalous perceptions due to
quarantine.
Methods: A pre- and posttest analysis design was applied based on the difference in means, and complementary
Bayesian estimation was performed. A total of 174 Spanish subjects responded to different questionnaires that
evaluated psychopathological risks based on psychotic phenotypes, pseudoscientific beliefs and experiences before
and after quarantine.
Results: Significant differences were obtained for the variables positive psychotic symptoms, depressive symptoms, and
certain perceptual alterations (e.g., cenesthetic perceptions), and a significant increase in pseudoscientific beliefs was also
observed. The perceptual disturbances that increased the most after quarantine were those related to derealization and
depersonalization. However, paranoid perceptions showed the highest increase, doubling the initial standard deviation.
These high increases could be related to the delimitation of physical space during social quarantine and distrust
towards information communicated by the government to the population. Is it possible that social alarmism generated
by the excess of information and pseudoscientific information has increased paranoid perceptual alterations?
Conclusions: Measures taken after quarantine indicate that perceptual disturbances, subclinical psychotic symptoms
and beliefs in the pseudoscience have increased.
Anomalous phenomena are unexplained occurrences, such as paranormal experiences, that challenge the ontological bases of current scientific knowledge and are considered scientifically impossible. Problematically, some scientific research yields significant statistical results in favor of the existence of telepathy, precognition, mind-matter interaction, and mediumship. The current study presents and statistically justifies the Multivariable Multiaxial Suggestibility Inventory-2 (MMSI-2), a new psychological instrument to measure and detect the main psychological explanations for anomalous experiences. A nonprobabilistic sample of 3,224 subjects without a psychiatric history were recruited from the general population of Spain. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to examine the internal structure of the MMSI-2's 174 items. Direct oblimin and promax oblique rotations were applied as criteria for axis rotation. Cronbach's alpha coefficients and their ordinal transformation were also calculated, and gender-differentiated scales for the raw MMSI-2 scale scores were developed. The first-order factorial solution yielded a total of 16 factors that explained 92.84% of the variance. Of these, 10 corresponded to the psychological variables cited in the background literature, four classified the anomalous phenomena according to their sensory mode, and two represented prototype control scales for this class of psychometric inventory. The higher-order EFA grouped the MMSI-2 scales into four macrofactors that together explained 97.737% of the variance. Satisfactory reliability rates were obtained (alphas>0.8). The full version of the MMSI-2 with 174 items is a valid and reliable psychometric instrument for evaluating anomalous phenomena and the theoretically concomitant psychological variables. Similarly, the scaling of scores can be used in psychological assessment as a screening tool to identify clinically suspected psychological variables.
Across two studies with more than 1,700 U.S. adults recruited online, we present evidence that people share false claims about COVID-19 partly because they simply fail to think sufficiently about whether or not the content is accurate when deciding what to share. In Study 1, participants were far worse at discerning between true and false content when deciding what they would share on social media relative to when they were asked directly about accuracy. Furthermore, greater cognitive reflection and science knowledge were associated with stronger discernment. In Study 2, we found that a simple accuracy reminder at the beginning of the study (i.e., judging the accuracy of a non-COVID-19-related headline) nearly tripled the level of truth discernment in participants’ subsequent sharing intentions. Our results, which mirror those found previously for political fake news, suggest that nudging people to think about accuracy is a simple way to improve choices about what to share on social media.
This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK‐based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford‐Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O‐Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy‐belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential‐based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy‐conspiracist beliefs relationship.
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Recent research highlights the implications of group dynamics in the acceptance and promotion of misconceptions, particularly in relation to the identity-protective attitudes that boost polarisation over scientific information. In this study, we successfully test a mediational model between right-wing authoritarianism and pseudoscientific beliefs. First, we carry out a comprehensive literature review on the socio-political background of pseudoscientific beliefs. Second, we conduct two studies (n = 1189 and n = 1097) to confirm our working hypotheses: H1 – intercorrelation between pseudoscientific beliefs, authoritarianism and three axioms (reward for application, religiosity and fate control); H2 – authoritarianism and social axioms fully explain rightists’ proneness to pseudoscience; and H3 – the association between pseudoscience and authoritarianism is partially mediated by social axioms. Finally, we discuss our results in relation to their external validity regarding paranormal and conspiracy beliefs, as well as to their implications for group polarisation and science communication.
The digital acceleration has transformed the media, narratives, information consumption, and the configuration of public opinion. The rise of social networks and users’ fascination with participation have precipitated the process of disintermediation. We are living through a shift in opinion-making, with multiplying content, sources and stories that are often contradictory or simply false. The internet has put the world within our reach, but it is a world that is skewed by algorithms. In this disinformation society, the debate over ideas has become fragmented and polarised, which has in turn contributed to eroding democracy. Issue 124 of Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals reflects on disinformation and power, freedom of expression and lies, the influence of electoral hoaxes, the communication strategies of populism, the purported new discursive authorities, and the political and legislative changes undertaken in the EU and in Ukraine to combat disinformation.
Public conversation has been digitalised. The internet offers us a horizontal, decentralised space with superabundant content, while at the same time a process of disintermediation has accelerated, ending the monopoly of the traditional interpreters of reality. Information and opinion are mixed and confused and new content is hybridised. The perception of facts is mediated by emotions and truths are chosen freely. This transformation is explained not only by the crisis in traditional media systems, but also by the new algorithmic order that largely controls the selective predetermination of information. How is the democratic system affected by public debate taking place in privately owned technological spaces? Who controls this digitised space? The true existential challenge posed to democracy by the creation of new power systems and new social inequalities will be settled by datafication and algorithmic governance.
The debate around political misinformation is gaining increasing relevance among the general and academic audience. If a large body of work is devoted to understanding the mechanisms of diffusion of inaccurate/false news contents (especially on social media), few studies have focused on the individual mechanisms by which people believe in those news. We look at the interplay between two mechanisms: partisan motivated reasoning and political sophistication. While previous literature suggests that political sophisticates are more affected by motivated reasoning, we hypothesize that in the case of character-related misinformation the opposite is true. By using an on-line survey experiment administered to a sample of Italian citizens, we compare the perceived plausibility of real and inaccurate news contents consistent with different political leanings. Our results show that people tend to perceive all partisan-consistent news as more plausible, but political sophisticates are better able to tell real from false news. We conclude that while political information is generally affected by motivated reasoning, political sophistication can effectively reduce citizens’ chances to fall for false information.
The World Health Organization has not only signaled the health risks of COVID-19, but also labeled the situation as infodemic, due to the amount of information, true and false, circulating around this topic. Research shows that, in social media, falsehood is shared far more than evidence-based information. However, there is less research analyzing the circulation of false and evidence-based information during health emergencies. Thus, the present study aims at shedding new light on the type of tweets that circulated on Twitter around the COVID-19 outbreak for two days, in order to analyze how false and true information was shared. To that end, 1000 tweets have been analyzed. Results show that false information is tweeted more but retweeted less than science-based evidence or fact-checking tweets, while science-based evidence and fact-checking tweets capture more engagement than mere facts. These findings bring relevant insights to inform public health policies.
Uptake of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) among Black women living in the US is suboptimal. We sought to determine the association between HIV-related medical mistrust (or belief in HIV conspiracy theories) and willingness to use PrEP among Black women. We analyzed data from the 2016 National Survey on HIV in the Black Community (NSHBC), a nationally representative cross-sectional survey. Among NSHBC participants, 522 were women and 347 (69.0%) reported HIV risk factors. Only 14.1% were aware that PrEP exists; 30.8% reported willingness to use PrEP. HIV-related medical mistrust was reported by 60.4% of women. In multivariable analysis, controlling for income, education, marital status and health care engagement, belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with higher willingness to use PrEP. The HIV-Related Medical Mistrust Scale item: “there is a cure for HIV, but the government is withholding it from the poor” was independently associated with higher PrEP willingness. This finding speaks to the need for an improved understanding of the role of HIV-related medical mistrust among Black women to improve uptake of biomedical HIV prevention.
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) is the most widely used measure of general belief in conspiracy theories. The scale comprises five related but distinct factors (Government Malfeasance, Extraterrestrial Cover-up, Malevolent Global Conspiracies, Personal Wellbeing, and Control of Information). Despite this, investigators have typically treated the GCBS as unidimensional by referencing only overall total. Although, the GCBS possesses established psychometric properties, critics question its factorial structure, suggest alternative models, and recommend routine examination of GCBS dimensions as part of analysis. Through two studies, the present paper assessed GCBS factorial structure, internal reliability, convergent validity, and invariance. This involved comparing the original five-factor solution with alternative one, two, and three-factor models. To ensure that the best fitting model was robust, the authors conducted analysis in two independent samples (Study one, N = 794, UK university-based sample; and Study two, N = 418, UK respondents collected via a market research company). Results in both studies indicated superior fit for the correlated five-factor solution. This solution demonstrated invariance across gender, and samples (Study one and two). Furthermore, the total scale and five subfactors evinced good alpha and omega total reliability. Convergent validity testing exhibited associations of an expected strength between conspiracist beliefs, reality testing, and cognitive insight. Large intercorrelations existed among GCBS subfactors, suggesting that the measure reflects a narrow set of interrelated conspiracist assumptions. These findings support the use of overall scale scores as an index of belief in conspiracy theories.
Background:
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is the most widely and frequently used scale to assess positive and negative affect. The PANAS has been validated in several languages, and it has shown excellent psychometric properties in the general population and some clinical samples, such as forensic samples, substance users, and adult women with fibromyalgia. Nevertheless, the psychometric properties of the scale have not yet been examined in clinical samples with anxiety, depressive, and adjustment disorders. In addition, the proliferation of Internet-based treatments has led to the development of a wide range of assessments conducted online with digital versions of pen and paper self-report questionnaires. However, no validations have been carried out to analyze the psychometric properties of the online version of the PANAS. The present study investigates the psychometric properties of the online Spanish version of the PANAS in a clinical sample of individuals with emotional disorders.
Methods:
The sample was composed of 595 Spanish adult volunteers with a diagnosis of depressive disorder (n = 237), anxiety disorder (n = 284), or adjustment disorder (n = 74). Factor structure, construct validity, internal consistency, and sensitivity to change were analyzed.
Results:
Confirmatory factor analysis yielded a latent structure of two independent factors, consistent with previous validations of the instrument. The analyses showed adequate convergent and discriminant validity, good internal consistency as well as sensitivity to change.
Conclusions:
Overall, the results obtained in this study show that the online version of the PANAS has adequate psychometric properties for the assessment of positive and negative affect in a Spanish clinical population.
We argue that because of a long history of intergroup conflict and competition, humans evolved to be tribal creatures. Tribalism is not inherently bad, but it can lead to ideological thinking and sacred values that distort cognitive processing of putatively objective information in ways that affirm and strengthen the views and well-being of one’s ingroup (and that increase one’s own standing within one’s ingroup). Because of this shared evolutionary history of intergroup conflict, liberals and conservatives likely share the same underlying tribal psychology, which creates the potential for ideologically distorted information processing. Over the past several decades, social scientists have sedulously documented various tribal and ideological psychological tendencies on the political right, and more recent work has documented similar tendencies on the political left. We contend that these tribal tendencies and propensities can lead to ideologically distorted information processing in any group. And this ideological epistemology can become especially problematic for the pursuit of the truth when groups are ideologically homogenous and hold sacred values that might be contradicted by empirical inquiry. Evidence suggests that these conditions might hold for modern social science; therefore, we conclude by exploring potential ideologically driven distortions in the social sciences.
What role does deliberation play in susceptibility to political misinformation and "fake news"? The Motivated System 2 Reasoning (MS2R) account posits that deliberation causes people to fall for fake news, because reasoning facilitates identity-protective cognition and is therefore used to rationalize content that is consistent with one's political ideology. The classical account of reasoning instead posits that people ineffectively discern between true and false news headlines when they fail to deliberate (and instead rely on intuition). To distinguish between these competing accounts, we investigated the causal effect of reasoning on media truth discernment using a 2-response paradigm. Participants (N = 1,635 Mechanical Turkers) were presented with a series of headlines. For each, they were first asked to give an initial, intuitive response under time pressure and concurrent working memory load. They were then given an opportunity to rethink their response with no constraints, thereby permitting more deliberation. We also compared these responses to a (deliberative) 1-response baseline condition where participants made a single choice with no constraints. Consistent with the classical account, we found that deliberation corrected intuitive mistakes: Participants believed false headlines (but not true headlines) more in initial responses than in either final responses or the unconstrained 1-response baseline. In contrast-and inconsistent with the Motivated System 2 Reasoning account-we found that political polarization was equivalent across responses. Our data suggest that, in the context of fake news, deliberation facilitates accurate belief formation and not partisan bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
In this paper, we address the question of whether disinforming news spread online possesses the power to change the prevailing political circumstances during an election campaign. We highlight factors for believing disinformation that until now have received little attention, namely trust in news media and trust in politics. A panel survey in the context of the 2017 German parliamentary election (N = 989) shows that believing disinforming news had a specific impact on vote choice by alienating voters from the main governing party (i.e., the CDU/CSU), and driving them into the arms of right-wing populists (i.e., the AfD). Furthermore, we demonstrate that the less one trusts in news media and politics, the more one believes in online disinformation. Hence, we provide empirical evidence for Bennett and Livingston’s notion of a disinformation order, which forms in opposition to the established information system to disrupt democracy.
The spread of online misinformation poses serious challenges to societies worldwide. In a novel attempt to address this issue, we designed a psychological intervention in the form of an online browser game. In the game, players take on the role of a fake news producer and learn to master six documented techniques commonly used in the production of misinformation: polarisation, invoking emotions, spreading conspiracy theories, trolling people online, deflecting blame, and impersonating fake accounts. The game draws on an inoculation metaphor, where preemptively exposing, warning, and familiarising people with the strategies used in the production of fake news helps confer cognitive immunity when exposed to real misinformation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation of the game with N = 15,000 participants in a pre-post gameplay design. We provide initial evidence that people's ability to spot and resist misinformation improves after gameplay, irrespective of education, age, political ideology, and cognitive style.
Background
During the COVID-19 pandemic, an increase in paranoid thinking has been reported internationally. The development of the Pandemic Paranoia Scale (PPS) has provided a reliable assessment of various facets of pandemic paranoia. This study aimed to (i) identify classes of individuals with varying levels of general paranoia and pandemic paranoia, and (ii) examine associations between classification and worry, core beliefs, and pro-health behaviours.
Methods
An international sample of adults (N = 2510) across five sites completed the Revised-Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale and the PPS. Latent class analysis (LCA) was conducted using these two paranoia variables. Classes were compared on trait worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire), beliefs about self/others (Brief Core Schema Scales), and pro-health behaviour.
Results
Three latent classes emerged: Class 1 with low R-GPTS and PPS scores, Class 2 with a high R-GPTS score and a moderate PPS score, and Class 3 with high R-GPTS and PPS scores. Compared to Class 1, Classes 2–3 were associated with more worry and negative self- and other-beliefs. Class 3 was further characterised by greater positive-self beliefs and less engagement in pro-health behaviours. Engagement in pro-health behaviours was positively correlated with interpersonal mistrust and negatively correlated with paranoid conspiracy and persecutory threat.
Conclusions
Individuals with a general paranoia tendency were more likely to respond to the global health threats in a suspicious and distrusting way. Our findings suggested that worry and negative self/other beliefs may contribute to not just general paranoia but also pandemic paranoia. The preliminary finding of a link between pro-health behaviours and interpersonal mistrust warrants further examination.
Amid the flood of fake news on Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19), now referred to as COVID-19 infodemic, it is critical to understand the nature and characteristics of COVID-19 infodemic since it not only results in altered individual perception and behavior shift such as irrational preventative actions but also presents imminent threat to the public safety and health. In this study, we build on First Amendment theory, integrate text and network analytics and deploy a three-pronged approach to develop a deeper understanding of COVID-19 infodemic. The first prong uses Latent Direchlet Allocation (LDA) to identify topics and key themes that emerge in COVID-19 fake and real news. The second prong compares and contrasts different emotions in fake and real news. The third prong uses network analytics to understand various network-oriented characteristics embedded in the COVID-19 real and fake news such as page rank algorithms, betweenness centrality, eccentricity and closeness centrality. This study carries important implications for building next generation trustworthy technology by providing strong guidance for the design and development of fake news detection and recommendation systems for coping with COVID-19 infodemic. Additionally, based on our findings, we provide actionable system focused guidelines for dealing with immediate and long-term threats from COVID-19 infodemic.
This study explored the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and the personality disorders. A sample of 475 British adults, aged around 30 years, completed measures of Belief in Conspiracy Theories (CTs) and the Personality Disorders (PDs), as well as the SAPAS, a short intelligence test and two self-evaluations. Belief in CTs was correlated with nearly all PDs, as well as the three established higher order clusters (A: odd and eccentric; B: dramatic and emotional; C: anxious). A series of stepwise multiple regressions were computed. A final regression showed five of the variables (education, intelligence, Cluster A, B, and C) were significant, which indicated that less well-educated and less intelligent participants, scoring higher on two PD clusters (Cluster A and B) but lower on Cluster C, believed more in the CTs. Implications of the study for understanding the origin of CTs is discussed. Limitations of the study, particularly the sample and measures used, are acknowledged.
The endorsement of epistemically suspect (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific) beliefs is widespread and has negative consequences. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasoning processes – such as lower analytic thinking and susceptibility to cognitive biases – that might lead to the adoption of such beliefs. In two studies, I constructed and tested a novel questionnaire on epistemically suspect beliefs (Study 1, N = 263), and used it to examine probabilistic reasoning biases and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning as predictors of the endorsement of those beliefs, while accounting for analytic thinking and worldview variables (Study 2, N = 397). Probabilistic reasoning biases, analytic thinking, religious faith, and political liberalism consistently predicted various epistemically suspect beliefs, whereas the effect of syllogistic belief bias was largely restricted to pseudoscientific beliefs. Further research will be needed to examine the role the biased evaluation of evidence plays in the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs.
This research was conducted to highlight the utility of considering clinical psychology concepts in judgment and decision research. Our overarching thesis is that the judgments and choices people make may often be influenced by clinically relevant phenomena, and that understanding these relationships can, in a reciprocal fashion, help advance our understanding of judgment and decision making as well as specific clinical diagnoses and proclivities. We focused on histrionic personality disorder and conducted four studies that show that histrionic symptomology predicts preferences and choices that facilitate grabbing others’ attention, even when such choices cost more money, and are at the expense of giving up more tangible features. In addition to demonstrating a new implication of the histrionic personality, we provide insight into the process underlying this tendency and discuss implications for mental health service providers.
Context. High-contrast imaging surveys for exoplanet detection have shown that giant planets at large separations are rare. Thus, it is of paramount importance to push towards detections at smaller separations, which is the part of the parameter space containing the greatest number of planets. The performance of traditional methods for the post-processing of pupil-stabilized observations decreases at smaller separations due to the larger field-rotation required to displace a source on the detector in addition to the intrinsic difficulty of higher stellar contamination.
Aims. Our goal is to develop a method of extracting exoplanet signals, which improves performance at small angular separations.
Methods. A data-driven model of the temporal behavior of the systematics for each pixel can be created using reference pixels at a different positions, on the condition that the underlying causes of the systematics are shared across multiple pixels, which is mostly true for the speckle pattern in high-contrast imaging. In our causal regression model, we simultaneously fit the model of a planet signal “transiting” over detector pixels and non-local reference light curves describing the shared temporal trends of the speckle pattern to find the best-fitting temporal model describing the signal.
Results. With our implementation of a spatially non-local, temporal systematics model, called TRAP, we show that it is possible to gain up to a factor of six in contrast at close separations (<3 λ ∕ D ), as compared to a model based on spatial correlations between images displaced in time. We show that the temporal sampling has a large impact on the achievable contrast, with better temporal sampling resulting in significantly better contrasts. At short integration times, (4 s) for β Pic data, we increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the planet by a factor of four compared to the spatial systematics model. Finally, we show that the temporal model can be used on unaligned data that has only been dark- and flat-corrected, without the need for further pre-processing.
On p. 10 of the 2018 National Academies Exoplanet Science Strategy document (NASEM 2018), ‘Expect the unexpected’ is described as a general principle of the exoplanet field. But for the next 150 pages, this principle is apparently forgotten, as strategy decisions are repeatedly put forward based on our expectations. This paper explores what exactly it might mean to ‘expect the unexpected’, and how this could possibly be achieved by the space science community. An analogy with financial investment strategies is considered, where a balanced portfolio of low/medium/high-risk investments is recommended. Whilst this kind of strategy would certainly be advisable in many scientific contexts (past and present), in certain contexts – especially exploratory science – a significant disanalogy needs to be factored in: financial investors cannot choose low-risk high-reward investments, but sometimes scientists can. The existence of low-risk high-impact projects in cutting-edge space science significantly reduces the warrant for investing in high-risk projects, at least in the short term. However, high-risk proposals need to be fairly judged alongside medium- and low-risk proposals, factoring in both the degree of possible reward and the expected cost of the project. Attitudes towards high-risk high-impact projects within NASA since 2009 are critically analysed.
Background
Due to coronavirus pandemic, governments have ordered a nationwide isolation. In this situation, we hypothesised that people holding conspiracy beliefs are less willing to adhere to medical guidelines. Furthermore, we explored what possible factors may modify relationships between conspiracy, paranoia-like beliefs, and adherence to epidemiological guidelines. Also, we examined the prevalence of different coronavirus conspiracy beliefs.
Methods
Two independent internet studies. Study 1 used a proportional quota sample that was representative of the population of Poles in terms of gender and settlement size (n=507). Study 2 employed a convenience sample (n=840).
Results
Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs are negatively related to safety guidelines. Mixed results suggest that paranoia-like beliefs are related negatively to safety guidelines. Prevalence of firmly held coronavirus conspiracy beliefs is rare. Nevertheless, certain percentage of participants agree with conspiracy beliefs at least partially. Coronavirus related anxiety, trust in media, and internal motivation to isolation moderate the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and adherence to safety guidelines. Paranoia-like beliefs partially mediate between boredom and conspiracy beliefs.
Conclusions
Conspiracy beliefs concerning coronavirus are present in the population and are negatively related to adherence to safety guidelines. Conspiracy beliefs originate partially from boredom and paranoia proneness. Certain factors – trust in media and internal motivation to isolation – are potentially worthwhile to address to enhance adherence to safety guidelines. Non-probabilistic sampling suggests caution in interpretation of the present findings.
Fake news dissemination on COVID-19 has increased in recent months, and the factors that lead to the sharing of this misinformation is less well studied. Therefore, this paper describes the result of a Nigerian sample (n=385) regarding the proliferation of fake news on COVID-19. The fake news phenomenon was studied using the Uses and Gratification framework, which was extended by an “altruism” motivation. The data were analysed with Partial Least Squares (PLS) to determine the effects of six variables on the outcome of fake news sharing. Our results showed that altruism was the most significant factor that predicted fake news sharing of COVID-19. We also found that social media users’ motivations for information sharing, socialisation, information seeking and pass time predicted the sharing of false information about COVID-19. In contrast, no significant association was found for entertainment motivation. We concluded with some theoretical and practical implications.
Introduction
The measurement of personal values is still a great challenge in social psychology due to the complex nature of this concept.
Objective
Based on Schwartz's theory of human values, this study aimed at analysing the relationship between the Values Implicit Association Test (VIAT), a relatively new indirect measure of values, and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), a well-known direct measure of values. Also, it examined whether social desirability moderates this relationship.
Method
Seventy-three participants (64.4% female; M age = 25.46, SD = 4.04) took part to the study in a standardized setting.
Results
Results showed different value priorities depending on the measure used (i.e., indirect vs direct), and although social desirability was related to participants’ responses on PVQ more than on VIAT, it did not moderate the association between direct and indirect measures for any of the examined values.
Conclusions
Implications of the findings for value measurement and future developments are discussed.
Although deception is used by many high-risk occupations, including military leaders, lawyers and politicians, there are currently no selection tests to determine which people have superior lie production abilities for these roles. The lack of selection tests is particularly crucial in the high-risk covert roles of undercover operations and human source management within policing. This paper uses the PRISMA systematic review technique to summarise and synthesis the extant literature examining deception theories and lie production. This paper also examines the relationship between lie production and Emotional Intelligence, and the personality traits of the Dark Triad and the HEXACO, to elucidate the characteristics of good liars. The scant research published within this field has been conducted with a variety of experimental designs and dependent variables. Generally, results indicate that the traits, skills and abilities behind sender demeanour, such as believability and honesty, may be fundamental to lie production ability. These characteristics could be considered in selection testing for to identify people with the ability to deceive effectively.