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International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
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CITIZEN-CENTRED DESIGN OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING: A
TRANSNATIONAL STUDY IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarish-
vili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo, Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
ABSTRACT
Among the success factors of participatory budgeting (PB), Barbera et al (2016b) discuss
responsiveness, in terms of “continuous attention to citizens’ needs” and the capacity to
address collective needs. To date, there are diverse PB cases, that follow a managerial,
more technocratic (less focused on citizens) logic, whereas others target radical demo-
cratic change or good governance improvement (Bartocci et al. 2019; Cabannes and
Lipietz 2018). This paper aims to identify contingency factors, such as national, local and
individual factors that influence the design of PB. Following the call for more compara-
tive studies (Bartocci et al. 2022), needs of citizens in 17 municipalities in six European
countries along the Baltic Sea region from originally 20,000 persons are analysed via a
joint questionnaire. Relying on non-parametric tests, this analysis aims to identify links
between citizens’ satisfaction, knowledge and expectations of their own involvement in
the PB design and how it should be used from their perspective. The contribution of the
paper is a critical rethinking of the respective stages and content of the PB creation pro-
cess from the citizens’ point of view by highlighting which contingency factors drive citi-
zens’ views on PB design stages and drawing managerial implications.
Keywords - citizen participation, citizen satisfaction, needs’ analysis, participatory budg-
eting, PB design
INTRODUCTION
Participatory budgeting (PB) has evolved as a critical element of public management
movements in order to reshape the relationship between local governments and citizens
and to increase the transparency of public sector finance (Brun-Martos and Lapsley 2017;
Justice and Dülger 2009). It is one of the globally most successful movements in citizen
participation in the 2000s. Since then, many different forms of PB around the world have
been developed (Sintomer et al. 2010). Accordingly, the investigated Baltic Sea region
(BSR) countries have a diverse history of PB as well and different definitions and (legal)
Copyright: © 2022 Schult, Haustein, Lorson, Burbulyte-Tsiskarishvili, Dvorak, Sinervo, Kurkela and
Trutnev. Copyright for this article is retained by the authors, with first publication rights granted to the
International Public Management Review (IPMR). All journal content, except where otherwise noted,
is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
By virtue of their appearance in this open-access journal, articles are free to use, with proper attribution,
in educational and other non-commercial settings.
Corresponding Author: hans-henning.schult2@uni-rostock.de
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
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settings for PB processes and therefore differ in their tendencies for PB design elements
(Table 1 summaries the status quo of all exposed countries below).
Finland: In Finland, PB has been known for around a decade. There is no definition by
law, but The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (AFLRA) defines
PB as a method that makes plans for spending joint municipal resources in close co-op-
eration with inhabitants through joint discussion, planning and decision-making.1 There-
fore, PB is voluntary and, accordingly, there is no PB-specific legal framework. PB is
often used for upgrading specific residential areas, e.g. for topics related to youth (e.g.
Tampere or Espoo).
Germany: With about 80 cases (the first in Mönchweiler in 1998 (Sintomer et al. 2010)),
Germany has some PB processes running.2 Over time, the implemented process designs
and budget sizes differ a lot, due to the fact that PB is voluntary and no uniform guidelines
or legal definitions exist. Today, PB is mostly operated as a citizens’ budget, where a
(fixed) part of the budget is dedicated to the citizens exclusively for proposing projects
and voting on them.
Latvia: PB was introduced in Latvia in recent years. In 2018, the city of Riga imple-
mented the first ever PB process. Today, PB has no legal definition in Latvia and therefore
it is a voluntary process. Regardless of its short history in this country, a definition of PB
will be added to the legal framework in the near future and there is a current discussion
about making PB mandatory from 2023 and beyond. But because of the missing experi-
ences, the government tends to prefer the existing voluntary approach.3
Lithuania: In Lithuania, PB was first tested in a school pilot in 2013 before the first
municipality, namely Alytus, implemented a PB process in 2018. All city residents from
at least 16 years were able to vote for a maximum of five proposals. Other Lithuanian
municipalities started to copy and adapt this process. Since its history is very limited,
there is neither a legal definition nor a legal framework and, as such, PB is voluntary.
Russia: Russia also has a limited history of PB. There is also neither a definition nor a
legal framework and therefore PB is a voluntary participation tool. The PB process design
is mainly driven by the work of the European University of St Petersburg (EUSP). The
process was adapted to the Russian circumstances and is mostly called “Initiative Budg-
eting”. In this design, a committee of citizens is chosen by lot (Examples: Cherepovets,
Sosnovy Bor and two districts of St Petersburg). This committee represents the citizens
in the process. It is not common for all citizens to be eligible to vote.
Poland: In Poland since 2018, PB is mandatory for cities with county status with an
amount of at least 0.5 % of the annual municipal budget.4 PB has no definition in the legal
framework, but it is generally defined by the Sejm (parliament of Poland) as an informal
phrase defining a separate part of the local government budget (usually the city budget),
in which the designated expenditure is allocated to investment initiatives and projects
directly reported by local society (individually or through relevant organizations). The
idea of a participatory budget is one part of the concept of civil society and public over-
sight.5
Citizen-centred design of participatory budgeting: A transnational study in the Baltic Sea Region
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Table 1: Budgeting designs in selected BSR countries
Legal characteristics
Finland
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
Legal framework
Voluntary
Voluntary
Voluntary
Voluntary
Mandatory
Voluntary
Legislation of PB
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Citizens as decision-
making actors possible
No*
No*
No*
No*
Yes
No
Possible PB Approach
Consulta-
tive*
Consulta-
tive*
Consulta-
tive*
Consulta-
tive*
Collabora-
tive
Consulta-
tive
* = Sometimes statutes are issued, that the local government follows the citizens’ vote and therefore
the citizens have de facto decision-making power.
Inevitably, the environment of the municipality shapes the perception of the PB process
and its design. Among the critical success factors of PB, Barbera et al. (2016b, 1095)
discuss responsiveness, in terms of “continuous attention to citizens’ needs” and the ca-
pacity to address collective needs. Depending on the goal of the PB process different
designs exist. Mostly developed and implemented by local governments, often the needs
of citizens are considered different in these processes. Just as, in research, a general refo-
cus is requested (Beckett and King 2002) to introduce citizens’ needs into the budgeting
process, so vice versa citizen-based information might drive a certain PB process design
as well. Following the contingency theory, there is not always a best fit for every PB
process design depending on contingency factors, but these factors like citizens’ needs
might dictate a fitting PB process type for municipalities (Jorge and Mattei 2016). Hence,
we address the citizen needs with respect to the implementation and design of PB. The
paper aims to identify contingency factors, such as national, local and individual factors
that influence the design of PB. To make a contribution to the PB literature on the process
design, this study investigates the interests of citizens in a multinational survey in light of
the Financial Management Reform Process (FMRP) model by Lüder (2002). In addition,
this research aims to support the municipalities and public management in their creation
of effective and efficient PB by providing generalized results of the critical factors and
outcomes analysis. Thus, a comparative approach is sought by analysing the needs of
citizens in 17 municipalities in six European countries along the Baltic Sea region. Usable
data of more than 13,000 persons were collected based on a survey using a joint question-
naire to seek to identify links between citizen satisfaction, topic interests, and involve-
ment in the PB design and use. Our results indicate that the PB process design might be
advanced in a number of ways regarding the composition of the citizenry, their environ-
ment and the vision of the citizens. That contributes to wider participation goals and a
successful PB process implementation by the local council and administration of the mu-
nicipality.
The paper is structured as follows: The second section sets the scene and explains the
background on PB with a brief literature review, an overview on the PB process with its
design variables and an adaptation of the FMRP model by Lüder in the context of PB.
The third section is devoted to the research design and the sample description, also by
explicitly developing the research question and introducing the contingency factors. In
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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fourth section the findings are presented followed by the discussion, which includes the
identified contingency factors and managerial implications, before the final conclusion
and potential limitations.
BACKGROUND ON PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING
PB process and interests of citizens in the PB process
Sintomer et al. (2008, 168) define PB as follows: “participatory budgeting allows the
participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public fi-
nances”. PB has five cumulative characteristics:
• the financial dimension has to be discussed;
• the city level has to be involved;
• the process has to be repeated;
• there has to be some form of public deliberation;
• some accountability is required (Sintomer et al. 2008).
Sintomer et al. (2010) adopted a systematic well-known categorization on six so-called
‘ideal-types’ of PB with a focus on the European PB landscape. Despite this typology,
systematic approaches for categorizing the PB process itself and aiming for a fit for cer-
tain conditions are rare (Krenjova and Raudla 2013). Another way to categorize partici-
patory budgets is to differentiate the actors who are active in the process. For example, a
study by Coleman and Sampaio (2017) found that different stakeholders pursue their
goals through e-participatory budgeting (Kim and Lee 2012). Administrators might want
to involve more people, but politicians deal with political ambitions, whereas the citizens
have their own goals in the participatory budget (He 2011). Unlike the normal budgeting
process, PB requires including citizens in a meaningful way. This inclusion can take place
via various mechanisms (Ebdon and Franklin 2006). Possible influences by citizens could
be made on resource allocation by proposals and referendums that affect incomes and
expenditure in the long run.
We target citizens’ perception and characteristics to obtain information on how they im-
agine a PB process. Since there are numerous design approaches around the world and
the level of information by citizens varies, there is a need to simplify it for the study and
define the investigated variables for the PB process and the citizens.
Role of the citizens: Focusing on the citizens, many PB processes allow them to make
proposals and/or vote on submitted proposals (Grillos 2017; Ruesch and Wagner 2014).
Critics mention that despite the positive image of PB and the potential to have a financial
impact, it is an element of a political game with society, a ritual and a form of superficial
social participation that gives citizens the illusion of participation and decision-making in
real local financial problems. Therefore, the financial impact of decision-making through
participation might not be big enough in some PB processes (Poniatowicz 2014). There
has to be motivation to share the power to a certain degree by the municipality (Siebers
et al. 2021). Thus, regardless of design, citizens are potentially active in two different
phases. First, citizens influence the discussion of what could be included in the budget
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(Cabannes 2004). The possible projects, new sources of income, expenditures, and in-
vestments are proposals for now (therefore: proposal phase). Second, the citizens influ-
ence the pre- or final selection of the proposals. This selection is often organized as a kind
of vote (therefore: voting phase). The decision-making in the voting phase will be fol-
lowed by the implementation phase of the project, regardless of whether citizens or the
administration will be involved in the implementation (Table 2).
Table 2: PB processes by actors’ entitlement
PB-Phases
“Just propose”
“Just vote”
“Propose and vote”
Proposal phase
(Who proposes?)
Citizens
Administration /
Local government
Citizens
Voting phase
(Who votes?)
Local government
Citizens
Citizens
PB topics citizens are interested in / parts of the budget citizens want to influence:
Citizens’ general interest in politics contributes to participation in political contexts
(Mcclurg 2003). In the more specific case of PB, citizens may have different interests
also varying with the steps of the PB process as well. For instance, there might simply be
topics that may attract citizens more than others (Secinaro et al. 2021). Most academic
literature is focused on infrastructure projects, as this is one of the focal points of the
Porto Alegre PB process, the cradle of PB (Souza 2001; Wampler 2007). But there is no
guarantee that this is also the case in a special European context, although environmental
and mobility-related topics most likely are popular around the world (Im et al. 2014;
Secinaro et al. 2021).
PB directions citizens want to influence: In all topics where money will be assigned by
means of PB, the citizens may have different interests in the savings, income and spend-
ing of the municipality. In this respect, citizens’ interest in investments is well researched
(spending money – one direction), whereas their interest in other expenses, savings or
income (other directions) is not (Sintomer et al. 2008).
Selected contingency factors that drive citizens' needs for PB process elements: The
preferences for the mentioned PB process elements might be affected by citizens’ socio-
demographic factors and their satisfaction with their living in the municipality. Previous
studies showed that sociodemographic and environmental determinants on the individual
level influence the introduction of PB and some PB process elements. For the sociodem-
ographic factors, citizens’ preferences differ in general on certain topics by age, gender
and income situation (Im et al. 2014; Klun and Benčina 2021). The education level itself
is mostly positively correlated with the introduction of PB or civic participation (Harrison
and Sayogo 2014; Klun and Benčina 2021; Soguel et al. 2020). This study goes a step
further and investigates, if not just the education level, but the knowledge of PB is a driver
for certain PB process elements. Different age groups (especially younger) have different
preferences for topics (Collins et al. 2018). But this could also correlate with the family
status, as older citizens tend to have children or live in partnerships and therefore have
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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other priorities in life (Soguel et al. 2020). Beside the topics, another PB design element
could depend on the age of citizens. Younger citizens use other forms of civic engagement
(Touchton et al. 2019). These digital natives are more into e-participation, whereas older
citizens may experience barriers in pure online settings (Secinaro et al. 2021).
For the environmental factors, organisational structure (Ewens and van der Voet 2019)
and the financial capability of the municipality is often analysed (Harrison and Sayogo
2014; Ríos et al. 2017; Zhang and Liao 2011) and in some studies has a positive effect on
the introduction of PB. But that relates to the public administration as an organisation
(Ewens and van der Voet 2019), not to tendencies of the citizens in such living conditions.
Thus, living in a low-income municipality or an above average income environment
might lead to other preferences for the PB design.
On the one hand satisfaction of the citizens is one often stated goal of PB (Boulding and
Wampler 2010; Buele et al. 2020; Klun and Benčina 2021). On the other hand, satisfac-
tion is rarely analysed as an impulse for PB. Often satisfaction is researched as an out-
come of PB processes or during introduction in the light of transparency. If citizens got
understandable information, the process was considered as transparent and leads to a
higher satisfaction among citizens (Beuermann and Amelina 2018; Buele et al. 2020).
Based on that, a possible dissatisfaction of citizens with their situation or an inadequate
PB process might drive more than just the presentation of information but some alterna-
tive design elements.
Although a lot of the variables analysed in this study are already part of the literature on
PB, mostly they are related to the likelihood of PB being introduced. The research focus
lies on the public administration, or on a general design aspect of PB process elements
like online vs. offline participation. The focus on citizens’ view on PB process elements
(van der Does and Kantorowicz 2021) and what variables could drive their perception of
PB process elements is not studied enough to contribute to missing cause-effect-relation-
ships (Schneider and Busse 2019).
Financial management reform process model and participatory budgeting
Since the successful case of Porto Alegre in 1989, PB has developed into a global partic-
ipation tool. The literature on PB includes many diverse case descriptions around the
world (Sintomer et al. 2008). As it is a process that was developed in practice, general
definitions are made for PB (Bassoli 2012; Cabannes 2004; Sintomer et al. 2008), but an
overall fitting conceptual definition is problematic regarding process steps, actors entitle-
ment like citizens and administration (Aleksandrov et al. 2018), and implementation
(Goldfrank 2007) including legal restrictions.
While some problems like activation (Lim and Oh 2016; Schneider 2018) are the same
for all process designs, others depend on individual circumstances as designs differ
greatly, from a more citizen-centred approach (Cooper et al. 2006) to more technocratic
designs to improve administrative processes (Bartocci et al. 2019; Cabannes and Lipietz
2018). Based on the plethora of possibilities, the literature often aims for practice guide-
lines for process implementation (Lerner 2011). To evaluate PB processes, enabling fac-
tors need to be identified (Barbera et al. 2016b; Kim and Schachter 2013). But as Rosener
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stated, effective and successful participation must be related to the goal of a participation
process and based on known cause–effect relationships (1978), which are however are
not yet fully discovered (Schneider and Busse 2019). Moreover, there is not even an
agreement in the literature regarding the overarching objective of PB: enhancing satisfac-
tion and trust or understanding the financial budget and the decision-making process or
the like (Franklin et al. 2009).
Regardless of the exact goal, it is safe to say that citizens will get a role in a process,
where they previously had no part. The budgeting process itself will undergo a systematic
change by including citizens to a certain degree through a form of PB. Therefore, PB can
be seen as a potential administrative reform that “is the application of the idea of progress
to one area of human activity in a deliberately selective and therefore artificial way”
(Caiden 1968, 353). The progress lies in the deliberation of the budgeting process at the
local government level, which was not affected by citizens in this way before. Especially
noting the transformation from traditional public governance over new public manage-
ment to new public governance there is a shift for public decision-making from pure reg-
ulation, efficiency and financial results to a more effective and citizen-centred approach
particularly focusing on citizen satisfaction (Wiesel and Modell 2014). Focusing on such
reforms in public financial decision-making, the contingency theory in the Financial Man-
agement Reform Process (FMRP) model of Lüder (2002) takes numerous contingency
factors into account that influence and impact a certain reform (Figure 1). The application
of this model is used to explain, for example, the improvement of financial accounting
and reporting (Haldma and Kenk 2014), internal and external drivers (Upping and Oliver
2011) or was used in the field of e-government (Mchran and Pagalung 2018). Therefore,
it considers mainly non-financial factors and outcomes and as such is suitable to track not
just the financial influence in better resource allocation but changes in public decision-
making and perceptions from stakeholders such as citizens. This model gives a frame-
work to sort contingency factors and to identify links and potential tensions when imple-
menting a reform such as a PB process. The FMRP model by Lüder consists of eight
different clusters (Jorge and Mattei 2016) and is adapted to the topic of PB:
Stimuli for PB: are contextual variables that influence the need for reforms. Weak finan-
cial situations, crisis or movements, maybe even international development programmes
can be considered as stimuli. In the context of PB, a call for more deliberation and an
increasing political disenchantment will impact such a form of participatory budgeting to
include citizens in the financial decision-making. Stimuli have a direct impact on political
reform promoters, e.g. PB might be a trend that local governments take into account to
please citizens and increase their satisfaction and gain proposals for the community on
certain topics. Also, international programmes, like the World Bank, that normally act as
reform drivers might be stimuli, as otherwise no PB processes would be implemented in
many municipalities.
PB reform drivers: are commissions, standard-setting bodies, consulting firms or scholar
networks and international programmes that influence the political reform promoters on
a local and national level. Therefore, EU-funded projects or the project of the World Bank
act as such reform drivers for PB and support local authorities during the implementation
process.
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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Political reform promoters: are members of the government (local council or administra-
tion) or the parliament.
Institutional arrangements: are contextual variables that impact the final reform con-
cept and the implementation before the final outcomes. This could be requirements by the
legal system or state and administrative structure. Maybe legal changes are necessary to
implement a PB process correctly. If PB is already implemented, the experience in it
might be a factor. Also, the culture of the place should be taken into account. Based on
that, the social and urban setting in different municipalities might not just influence the
process design but also the perception of the design by the citizens.
Stakeholders: are affected by the new concept of PB. Different stakeholders have differ-
ent influences on reform promoters and are affected by the reform concept differently. In
this study, the focus is on the citizens’ perception and therefore on the stakeholder group
of citizens, as their perception is crucial for the success of such participative reform of
the budgeting process. Therefore, characteristics of the citizens, such as their satisfaction
with as well as their education or more specific knowledge about the concept of PB in
general, their interest in certain topics and their socio-demographics have to be taken into
account.
Reform concept: is the final formulation of the planned change of an accounting system.
It has a direct impact on the stakeholders and the implementation strategy that follows.
Regarding the surrounding factors, a fitting PB design concept will be created. The role
of the citizens will be defined (e.g., proposing projects or just voting on projects), what
their decision power on the budget will look like and in which topics they will participate
in the budgeting process.
Implementation strategy: determines how the reform will be implemented. This will
result in different attributes of the different PB design variables (PB topics, role of the
citizens, part of the budget and PB directions). For example: if in the reform concept the
citizens will have a proposing role, then this will lead to a process with a proposal phase.
Outcome of the reform or a reform stage: the positive or negative result of the reform.
For PB, a better resource allocation and increased satisfaction of the citizens are possible
goals, or the well-being in general (Campbell et al. 2018). This will depend on the PB
design variables and how the PB design variables and the PB results are perceived by the
citizens. If citizens do not accept or like the process and the results, they will not partici-
pate and there will be no increased satisfaction or a better resource allocation due to the
new perspective from the citizens’ view.
In this study, a special focus lies on links between citizens as stakeholders and their per-
ception of the concept, implementation and outcome of a reform like PB. The result might
be a specific PB process, depending on its contingency factors. The perception of this PB
process by the citizens is crucial for their participation and feedback on the process. In
order to create a successful PB process, the knowledge of citizens’ needs and perception
might be useful too (Pandeya 2015). The contingency model is adapted in that way, so
that it is not applied to compare different developed processes, but to look at the PB pro-
cess design, implementation and outcome through the citizens’ lense. This paper adapts
the FMRP model of contingency theory from a citizen’s view to the topics of PB and
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investigates the influence of certain variables on different design variables in a PB process
(Figure 1 in section 3). Based on the FMRP model, theses for contingency factors are
generated for future research.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEETHODOLOGY
Explorative research model and research question
As outlined, previous PB research lacks cause–effect relationships and different perspec-
tives on the PB process design. There is neither a common model for a systematic cate-
gorization nor a special theory for PB or the process design of PB. Additionally, there is
very little knowledge about citizens’ perceptions of PB design and what influences their
views. Insights on the perception of citizens might raise the information base for the ad-
ministration and municipal local councils. The gained knowledge could lead to improved
(citizen-centred) PB process designs and increase the acceptance of PB and therefore the
participation by citizens in such processes. Therefore, the concept of PB is linked to con-
tingency theory and the following research question (RQ) is addressed:
RQ: Which contingency factors influence citizens’ perceptions of their involvement
in the PB process?
As such, potential factors of the citizens’ environment and personal circumstances are
linked to PB process design elements. As this is an explorative research design no specific
hypothesis can be generated for each potential factor. Nevertheless, we expect that these
factors will have an impact on the identified design elements.
National differences are not part of the testing, as national differences have too many
causes to elaborate and are mostly not the origin of different designs (Baiocchi and Ga-
nuza 2014). The differences take place at the municipal and individual level as these are
the dimensions where PB operates (e.g. national frameworks regarding PB will effec-
tively influence the design at the municipal level).
At the first level are the municipality-related factors, which fit institutional arrangements
in the FMRP model. One is the legal framework, which is considered as voluntary or
mandatory. The mandatory PB in this sample has existed for many years and is therefore
an experienced PB municipality. All voluntary participatory budgets are new adopters of
the concept. Living in a municipality with a mandatory participatory budget might lead
to different perceptions of the design PB variables. The next factor is rural or urban setting
(supplemented by the population density). Living in a more crowded place with a fast
accessibility to different services might influence the citizens in their preferences for cer-
tain topics. Additionally, the financial situation that citizens live in might call for different
design approaches as a municipality with a high net income per citizen in comparison to
the national income per capita6 (“better” financial situation) provides other circumstances
that drives participation.
For the citizen-related factors socio-demographic factors (e.g. age or family status) might
lead to differences in participation preferences due to other interests (e.g. citizens with
children might focus on education). Additionally, the knowledge of the PB concept might
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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produce some awareness for the concept and lead to different perceptions of the PB design
variables (e.g. what topics are good to address via PB, or a better imagination of a role to
influence the process). Satisfaction was previously identified as a potential stimuli and
goal of the PB. According to that, the satisfaction of the citizens might also lead the pref-
erences, as dissatisfied citizens wish for a more influential role than satisfied citizens
(Dowding and John 2008). On the other hand, more satisfied citizens identify themselves
to a higher degree with the municipality and participate more in a co-productive setting
like PB (Mok 2020). Because of the possibly contrarian thesis, no directed hypothesis
will be generated, but therefore a certain PB design might be preferred by satisfied/unsat-
isfied citizens and be more suitable to address the goal of citizen satisfaction.
The identified variables are highlighted in grey in Figure 1 and embedded into the FMRP
model. They are separately linked to the mentioned PB design variables by using different
statistical methods (depending on the variable’s measurement type). The independent and
dependent variables were mostly drawn from discussions among academic experts and a
so-called “PB-type groups’ analysis”, which is one intellectual output of the EmPaci pro-
ject.7 The variables were not tested as a whole model, because of the explorative nature
and therefore are missing existing cause–effect relationships on which to base a reliable
model. In the following, significant (individual) relationships of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables will be discussed to provide potential theses for further research in a
more general setting.
Measurement of certain PB design variables
For the testing the two design variables “parts of the budget” and “role of the citizens”
were operationalised in the following way. For the budget part analysis, the scale was
converted to an ordinal scale from “specific topic” = 1, over “special areas” = 2 and “part
of the budget” = 3 to “full budget” = 4. Therefore, the category “no preference” was
omitted.
The role of citizens is also transformed in an ordinal scale. The three categories are: “Just
propose” = 1, “Just vote” = 2, “Propose and vote” = 3. They are arranged by the entitle-
ment of citizens in the decision-making process, from “Just proposing” influencing the
input but not the final decision, through “Just vote” influencing the final decision (not the
input), to “Propose and vote” influencing the input and the final decision.
For the PB directions dichotomous variables are used, e.g. “Interested in how the munic-
ipalities spend the money: yes or no?”
For the analysis of the model, correlation tests on different variables are conducted to
uncover potential impact factors on PB process design components.
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Figure 1: Adapted FMRP model – citizens’ view on PB
Source: based on Lüder (2002).
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
www.ipmr.net 17
IPMR
Survey design and sample
This study follows a quantitative approach by conducting a survey in order to explore
potential contingency factors of citizens’ perception based on the FMRP model (Figure
1). Given the nature of the PB process design, many of the variables are categorical and
the scale of the items is therefore nominal or ordinal. Jointly, a questionnaire was devel-
oped through several rounds of discussions and tests among the researchers. It was devel-
oped in English and later translated into the six national languages by native-speaking
members of the research team.8 The document consists of four parts: Part I contains
mainly questions about political interest as well as the evaluation of different forms of
political engagements; Part II collects data about the municipality-related satisfaction
with the home municipality and a ranking of several areas of living by importance –
measured by a Likert scale. The measurement was based upon the construct used by
Zenker et al. (2013). This four-factor model covers the dimensions of “urbanity and di-
versity”, “nature and recreation”, “job opportunities” and “cost-efficiency”. Additionally,
the overall satisfaction is surveyed; Part III consists mainly of categorical questions about
PB experience, interest in PB topics, PB process designs and their elements, PB imple-
mentation and information; Part IV includes the demographic data like age, family status,
and education.
In 2019, the survey was conducted in 17 municipalities in six different Baltic Sea region
countries, namely Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia (total sample
size n = 20,276), both as an online and offline questionnaire. To reach as many citizens
as possible, the data collection was adapted to the corresponding municipality after a dou-
ble blind translation. Therefore, the survey process, collection places and time frame dif-
fer as presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Data collection in the BSR sample
Country
Timeframe
Offline
Online
Finland
October 2019
paper sheets were sent to citizens with
random sampling
link on the website of the mu-
nicipality
Germany
September 2019
conducted during information events, in
schools or the city hall
link on the website of the mu-
nicipality
Latvia
November to
December 2019
paper sheets were distributed via librar-
ies, schools and social associations
via the website and social media
accounts of the municipality
Lithuania
November to
December 2019
distributed by sending electronic letters
to the institutions, organizations and
residents of the investigated municipali-
ties
local online platform
Poland
October to
November 2019
-
link on the website of the mu-
nicipality
Russia
December 2019
to February 2020
(multiple munici-
palities)
paper sheets distributed via administra-
tion and local activists or employees
e.g. sellers of shops, employees of post
offices, public utilities personnel
link on the website of the mu-
nicipality
Citizen-centred design of participatory budgeting: A transnational study in the Baltic Sea Region
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
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The sample countries stem from the EU-funded project “Empowering Participatory
Budgeting in the Baltic Sea Region” (EmPaci). The majority of the BSR areas are char-
acterized by a low population density, i.e. a large spatial fragmentation of living areas of
the inhabitants. This leads to challenges for public authorities and councils when it comes
to involving all citizens in joint projects and to discuss relevant issues with all citizen
groups. Instruments are needed here that enable and encourage the entire citizenry to take
part in decisions of their municipality, so that the present analysis is devoted to supporting
the setting up of PB processes that meet the needs of citizens. A description of the sur-
veyed municipalities and some key data of the sample are shown in the Appendix in Table
A and B.
RESULTS
Description of national data
The following sections address national differences and similarities regarding the topics
that citizens would like to influence with the help of PB, which part of the budget and
direction they would like to influence, and which role citizens would like to play.
PB topics citizens are interested in: In the questionnaire, citizens were asked which of
a given list of budget areas/topics they would like to influence and vote about. Multiple
answers were possible. Table C in the Appendix shows that the PB topics that citizens
want to influence are very diverse in terms of the countries. In five of the six BSR coun-
tries (Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia), citizens find health services to be
of high relevance.
For the FMRP model, the legal and historical environment impacts the reform concept
and outcomes of a PB process. Certain topics are limited to a lesser influence by the local
government (cut by the legal framework) and cannot be addressed in a PB to a large extent
(see health or education services). Cultural and social influences might drive citizens to
have different priorities on some topics. The difference between what topics are legally
possible in the reform concept of a participatory budget and what citizens want to influ-
ence due to society triggers tension as the same environment limits the outcomes of PB
processes because of a possibly suboptimal process from the citizens’ perspective.
Role of citizens: With respect to the PB design, i.e. the process steps that are asked for
by citizens, there are significant differences between the countries at the 1% level (χ²(10)
= 611.503, V = 0.148). The relative distribution of the answers to the question whether
citizens should just propose, just vote or propose and vote are shown in Table C in the
Appendix. Whereas in Poland, Russia and Germany, citizens have a tendency to “propose
and vote”, Latvian, Lithuanian and Finnish citizens tend to be more interested in “just
vote” for proposals. In total, the “propose and vote” design is far ahead of the “just vote”
design. The “just propose” design may be the least attractive to the participants.
The results are of interest from the perspective of co-production of public services (Bar-
bera et al. 2016b; Sicilia et al. 2016). Barbera et al. (2016b) revealed that citizens per-
ceived PB most positively when they were involved in both steps, proposing and voting.
Still, one could argue that the opportunity for citizens to design and propose their own
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
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ideas is highest in the proposal phase, so it is interesting that this phase was not ranked
higher (Table D in the Appendix). However, the focus seems to be on the final decision
right for the voting and thus implementation of projects, so that they perceive their influ-
ence (Barbera et al. 2016a).
The reasons for these national differences can be found in manifold explanations. Such
historical, cultural and social circumstances could be stimuli and institutional arrange-
ments regarding the FMRP model, influencing the PB design. Additionally, what applies
to the PB topics also applies to the role of the citizens. Legal restrictions might reduce a
PB process concept and implementation despite citizens’ desires.
Part of the budget citizens want to influence: There are significant large differences in
the preferences between the countries with respect to the part of the budget citizens want
to influence (χ²(15) = 1,603.599, p < 0.001, V = 0.201). As the Table 4 below with the
relative frequencies shows, Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish citizens want the full local
government’s budget to be subject to PB. Instead, in Germany and Russia, citizens only
want the PB process to cover a specific part of the budget and in Latvia only special topics
are asked for. These differences are hard to interpret, as these preferences could be the
result of a variety of understandings of PB. For example, in Poland, PB is mandatory and
bigger Polish municipalities have to spend 0.5% as a participatory budget. That is, the
Polish legislator stipulated that in cities with so-called “powiat rights”9 the implementa-
tion of the participatory budget is obligatory.10 Detailed provisions referring to the pro-
cedures for the participatory budget procedure will be codified based on the resolution of
individual Polish municipalities. Still 0.5% of the budget would be a “part of the budget”,
but it is indeed a very small part. So Polish citizens may express their wish to have a
bigger impact on the budget.
Table 4: BSR sample –- Desired PB budget influence
Part of the
budget
Finland
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
Special topics
13.5%
24.6%
41.5%
11.7%
6.3%
34.8%
Special areas
28.8%
15.0%
28.7%
33.0%
23.8%
13.0%
Part of the budget
27.1%
43.8%
6.3%
17.5%
31.4%
35.3%
Full budget
30.6%
16.7%
23.5%
37.7%
38.4%
16.9%
Depending on the legal systems, different parts of the budget may not be available for a
PB process. The reform concept is determined by the institutional arrangements. None-
theless, citizens’ perceptions differ a lot in the examined countries.
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PB directions citizens want to influence: The different countries have different focuses
on financial resources. In general, citizens in all countries have the highest preference on
what the money is spent on. The exception is Poland, where the participants are highly
interested in the incomes of their municipalities. This is notable because Poland is the
only country with a mandatory PB. Citizens in this country are more familiar with the
concept of PB and, therefore, may be more interested in the financial situations and di-
rections of their municipality. This might translate to the individual level, as citizens with
a certain knowledge of PB might desire to get involved in the decision-making of in-
comes, not just investments (Table 5).
Table 5: BSR sample –- PB directions in the countries
Part of the budget
Finland
Ger-
many
Latvia
Lithua-
nia
Poland
Russia
χ²(5)
V
How to collect
money
39.4%
30.0%
25.7%
37.2%
72.2%
10.4%
3,670.64
0.480***
How to save money
43.9%
34.1%
48.8%
52.8%
30.9%
41.9%
169.32
0.103***
How to spend money
92.5%
94.8%
81.0%
75.6%
47.1%
52.9%
1,156.44
0.269***
Municipality-related factor
Following the overview in Figure 1, in this section the influences of factors related to the
municipalities’ role of the citizens and part of the budget are analysed for differences
regarding the topics of PB.
PB topics citizens are interested in
Rural or urban setting11: The national differences were highly significant, with medium
and large effects in many cases. These differences could have their origin at the munici-
pality level, as cultural differences are contingency factors in the FMRP model. Accord-
ing to that, we identified the rural or urban setting citizens live in. Only “education” (χ²(1)
= 0.188, V = 0.010) and “sport services on a 1% level (χ²(1) = 0.021, V = 0.018) issues
are not significantly influenced, which could mean that these topics are equally (or less)
important for citizens regardless the surroundings of the municipality. Otherwise, the dif-
ferences are significant, but very weak. The biggest effect sizes concern the “Infrastruc-
ture”, the “Central administration” and the “Health services”. “Infrastructure” (χ²(1) =
198.697, V = 0.065) and “Central administration” (χ²(1) = 70.289, V = 0.066) is more of
an issue in rural regions (biggest difference to urban areas). The local administration
might be less available to rural citizens than to their urban counterparts. “Health services”
on the other hand, is prioritized slightly higher in urban regions (χ²(1) = 283.631, V =
0.049). Although these effects of living in a rural or urban municipality are negligible (V
< 0.1 for χ²(1)), they might give some insight into potential factors that influence citizens’
preferences for certain topics. Citizens in rural regions might be more interested in infra-
structure, because it is more critical to get to different facilities and places than in an urban
setting (e.g. public transport and roads) (Table 6).
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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Table 6: BSR sample –- Environmental impact on PB topics
PB topics
Rural vs urban
Countries
Rural
Urban
Sig.
V
Sig.
V
Education
53.1%
54.2%
0.188
0.010
0.000
0.261***
Cultural affairs
34.1%
31.0%
0.000
0.031***
0.000
0.112***
Social affairs
45.3%
42.9%
0.004
0.023***
0.000
0.140***
Youth affairs
35.7%
32.3%
0.000
0.034***
0.000
0.160***
Urban planning
25.1%
22.2%
0.000
0.033***
0.000
0.157***
Health services
54.4%
59.4%
0.000
0.049***
0.000
0.254***
Sport services
19.4%
17.9%
0.021
0.018**
0.000
0.198***
Infrastructure
30.0%
24.0%
0.000
0.065***
0.000
0.107***
Environment
21.6%
24.2%
0.000
0.029***
0.000
0.110***
Ecology
15.9%
13.8%
0.000
0.028***
0.000
0.137***
Tourism
16.8%
14.6%
0.000
0.032***
0.000
0.128***
Central administra-
tion
16.0%
11.4%
0.000
0.066***
0.000
0.148***
Legal framework (mandatory vs voluntary PB): If PB is mandatory, citizens might
have a different view on topics in the participatory budget. Especially if the PB process
has been running for some time (as in this sample), citizens learn what topics can be
addressed in a decent way by the administration and the government. As a consequence,
they might be more interested to address these topics through this participation tool,
whereas citizens in legal systems with no mandatory PB usually have little experience
with PB and therefore desire to influence all topics. The survey results indicate the biggest
differences between a mandatory and a voluntary PB legal system are seen in the two
topics education and health services. These topics are usually the ones citizens wish to
change the most but at the same time these topics are least likely to be influenced at the
local level in most municipalities. There is a chance that citizens in a mandatory system
learn to adapt and focus on other topics in areas that are impacted directly by PB. In
addition, social affairs, youth affairs and urban planning attract significantly lower de-
mands from citizens in a mandatory system. In addition, Ecology, tourism and sport ser-
vices attracted higher interest in the mandatory system, with negligible but significant
effects (Table 7).12
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Table 7: BSR sample –- PB topics in different legal systems
PB topics
Rural vs urban
Voluntary
Mandatory
Sig.
V
Education
53.1%
54.2%
0.000
0.229***
Cultural affairs
34.1%
31.0%
0.000
0.095***
Social affairs
45.3%
42.9%
0.000
0.118***
Youth affairs
35.7%
32.3%
0.000
0.134***
Urban planning
25.1%
22.2%
0.000
0.122***
Health services
54.4%
59.4%
0.000
0.201***
Sport services
19.4%
17.9%
0.000
0.049***
Infrastructure
30.0%
24.0%
0.493
0.005***
Environment
21.6%
24.2%
0.000
0.047***
Ecology
15.9%
13.8%
0.000
0.032***
Tourism
16.8%
14.6%
0.000
0.068***
Central administra-
tion
16.0%
11.4%
0.000
0.037***
Rural or urban setting: Citizens in rural areas have significantly different preferences
than citizens in urban settings (χ²(2) = 497.087, V = 0.188). In rural areas, the preference
tends more to less influential designs. Rural citizens prefer a pure voting process slightly
over a process including proposal and voting. Urban citizens in contrast have a clearer
preference for a process including both. The explanation for this has to be further re-
searched, because financial factors and individual characteristics of the citizens might
influence that perception (Table 8).
Table 8: BSR sample –- Role of citizens in rural or urban setting
Role of citizens
Rural
Urban
Total
Just propose
18.4%
22.0%
20.8%
Just vote
42.7%
24.4%
30.6%
Propose and vote
38.9%
53.6%
48.6%
Total number
4,732
9,268
14,000
Financial situation: Looking at the financial situation13 it is negatively correlated with
the role of the citizens (rs = -0.113, p = 0.001, n = 8,184). This leads to the assumption
that citizens in a surrounding with a weaker financial situation compared to the rest of the
country tend to demand more power in the decision process. That indicates that less than
ideal circumstances push the will of citizens to change the current state and prefer PB
processes with more participation power for themselves in the process.
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
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Part of the budget citizens want to influence
Financial situation: Citizens in a place with a better financial situation want to influence
a greater portion of the budget (rs = 0.138, p = 0.001, n = 7,875). This might because in a
weak financial situation, smaller parts of the budget already have an impact and single
projects will change something, whereas in a better financial environment changes and
improvements of citizens’ lives require discussions about bigger parts of the budget. Fur-
ther tests including such environmental factors like the financial situation of the munici-
pality, supported by citizen-related factors like individual income could add more insight
to these differences as, to the best of our knowledge, the capture of the surrounding of
municipalities has not yet been further empirically researched in the PB literature.
Legal framework (mandatory vs voluntary PB): Living in a mandatory PB framework,
citizens have a slightly significantly higher interest in participatory budgets with a bigger
part of the budget (U = 6,072,904.5, Z = -19.445, p < 0.001). There is less focus on special
topics and more tendency towards the desire to influence the full budget. On the one hand,
once citizens are in a matured mandatory legal system and PB is part of their life, citizens
might wish for more. On the other, in this special case the Polish municipalities are
obliged to provide 0.5% of the full budget. So, this small percentage (although millions
of euros) might push this perception of the citizens to influence the full budget even more
(Table 9).
Table 9: BSR sample –- Part of the budget influenced by legal framework
Part of the budget
Voluntary
Mandatory
Total
Special topics
31.1%
6.3%
28.3%
Special areas
16.6%
23.8%
17.4%
Part of the budget
32.3%
31.4%
32.2%
Full budget
20.1%
38.4%
22.1%
Total number
11,798
1,469
13,367
PB directions citizens want to influence
Legal framework: The PB directions differ for legal frameworks with mandatory partic-
ipatory budgets. The focus on the income of the municipality is what stands out (χ²(1) =
2,681.82, V = 0.410) as the other influences are too weak. This suits the other results on
the mandatory PB in this sample, as this goes back to a longer tradition of providing a PB
process and having rules set. Citizens adapt to that and might learn to set new focal points
and gain interest in new fields (or directions), which contribute to the citizen-related fac-
tors of an increased knowledge of PB. This in the next step might indicate that even for
more matured PB processes new design variables could be introduced, as citizens want
to influence the directions and therefore the implementation strategy in the FMRP model
could be adapted. Nonetheless, this must be interpreted carefully as only one country in
this sample has a mandatory PB (Table 10).
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Table 10: BSR sample - PB directions depending on legal framework
Part of the budget
Voluntary
Mandatory
V
How to collect
money
16.1%
72.2%
0.410***
How to save money
43.0%
30.9%
0.074***
How to spend money
59.7%
47.1%
0.077***
Financial situation: Citizens in a municipality with a higher net income in comparison
to the national net income have significantly higher interest in influencing the collection
(d = -0.678***) and spending (d = +0.191***) of the money of the municipality. The
higher desire to affect the income could be due to higher taxes/levies for these citizens as
they live in better financial situations.14 They might be interested and motivated to under-
stand the model and maybe influence their taxes and levies. In addition, citizens in mu-
nicipalities with a higher net income are more educated (above A-level: χ²(1) = 276.115,
V = 0.146) and therefore might have a better understanding of financial decision-making
in general, which leads to more desire to be involved in the income of the municipality
(not just in the first place where the money goes, but where the money comes from). Often
the influence of the income is limited in the budgeting process due to responsibilities
beyond the remit of the local government. Thus, this is something to address during the
reform concept and at least to inform the citizens about.
For citizens, who live in a weaker financial situation, the interest in spending is slightly
higher than for those citizens in a better financial situation (d = +0.191***). This tendency
is very weak but might indicate that in a less than ideal situation the focus is even more
on any investment and payment made by the local government.
Citizen-related factors
This section turns to the influence of citizens’ individual factors on topics (demographics
as independent variables), parts of the budget (by the knowledge of the concept of PB and
satisfaction), the role of citizens (by the knowledge of the concept of PB) and the direc-
tions citizens want to influence (by demographics, knowledge of the concept of PB and
satisfaction).
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
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PB topics citizens are interested in
Age classes: Some topics are not viewed as that interesting across all age classes like
“Tourism”, “Ecology”, “Central administration” or “Urban planning” with a maximum
of 25%. Sports offers are more interesting for young citizens (under 21 years) and 66–75-
year-old citizens (Table 11).
Table 11: BSR sample –- PB topics by age classes
PB topics
≤ 18
19–20
21–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56–65
66–75
76–85
≥ 86
V
Education
37.5%
29.4%
41.7%
60.3%
53.1%
52.3%
56.8%
38.0%
23.5%
22.7%
0.161***
Cultural affairs
33.9%
26.9%
24.9%
27.0%
30.7%
34.1%
37.6%
28.3%
24.5%
25.0%
0.088***
Social affairs
36.9%
29.0%
26.9%
30.8%
46.3%
47.0%
52.4%
42.9%
52.0%
20.5%
0.177***
Youth affairs
34.7%
32.1%
25.6%
26.1%
35.5%
32.7%
36.3%
25.4%
23.5%
6.8%
0.097***
Urban planning
17.9%
11.3%
14.1%
19.0%
23.7%
26.2%
25.7%
20.1%
16.3%
6.8%
0.100***
Health services
32.5%
34.8%
48.5%
61.9%
51.4%
61.4%
65.6%
52.8%
50.0%
29.5%
0.172***
Sport services
28.9%
24.0%
16.8%
17.3%
17.2%
18.7%
18.5%
27.2%
19.4%
13.6%
0.073***
Infrastructure
20.9%
14.0%
17.1%
19.7%
26.9%
32.3%
29.6%
22.4%
19.4%
20.5%
0.121***
Environment
26.7%
19.4%
27.6%
39.5%
20.8%
20.1%
19.4%
25.2%
20.4%
13.6%
0.174***
Ecology
19.3%
16.3%
14.1%
13.9%
14.1%
15.6%
13.4%
24.2%
14.3%
20.5%
0.063***
Tourism
19.8%
20.8%
19.5%
13.7%
14.1%
16.0%
14.7%
18.1%
18.4%
22.7%
0.058***
Central admin.
11.0%
11.0%
8.2%
10.1%
11.5%
14.8%
12.6%
15.6%
13.3%
4.5%
0.059***
Other
1.4%
0.8%
1.1%
1.1%
1.5%
1.9%
1.6%
1.2%
5.1%
0.0%
-
None of the
above
16.5%
16.7%
10.6%
5.4%
10.4%
7.5%
4.7%
9.4%
17.3%
34.1%
-
Other than that, the topics seem to be more age-dependent. “Health services” are im-
portant for nearly every citizen (but under 50% for citizens of 25 years and younger as
well as those over 86 years). In addition, “Education” looks to be important for 26–65-
year-old citizens, but this seems to depend more on family status, as this is the age range
in which most will raise their children. In a similar manner “Youth affairs” are important
for the young citizens under 21 years, too. But also for citizens over 35 years, as their
own children might be affected by this topic.
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Family status: The family status might further explain the topics that are more dependent
on raising children. “Education” and “Social affairs” are to a larger extent mentioned by
respondents with children. “Infrastructure” is more important for respondents with adult
children. The last significant different subject is the “Health services” which clearly in-
crease over time and peaks in retirement due to age and increasing health concerns (Table
12).
Table 12: BSR sample - PB topics by family status
PB topics
Indepen-
dence
Coupling or
marriage
Parenting
babies
through to
adolescents
Launching
adult chil-
dren (empty
nest)
Retirement
V
Education
37.7%
33.7%
58.2%
55.3%
55.1%
0.174***
Cultural affairs
32.5%
29.0%
28.6%
34.6%
39.7%
0.077***
Social affairs
39.7%
35.5%
40.6%
55.7%
36.3%
0.139***
Youth affairs
32.0%
29.0%
32.2%
38.7%
24.4%
0.084***
Urban planning
22.5%
22.9%
19.7%
30.3%
16.9%
0.107***
Health services
40.4%
42.3%
56.9%
63.9%
76.1%
0.197***
Sport services
23.9%
23.4%
16.7%
20.2%
14.8%
0.077***
Infrastructure
25.0%
29.5%
21.4%
34.9%
21.9%
0.126***
Environment
22.9%
24.1%
28.1%
21.5%
15.3%
0.095***
Ecology
20.1%
20.1%
13.8%
14.4%
11.2%
0.077***
Tourism
19.2%
21.5%
13.6%
15.2%
13.1%
0.074***
Central admin.
14.8%
12.2%
10.5%
14.5%
9.3%
0.062***
Other
1.2%
1.1%
1.5%
1.6%
1.5%
None of the
above
12.6%
12.6%
8.0%
6.1%
4.2%
In conclusion, these socio-demographics deliver different preferences of topics in a PB.
If there is a topic rotation or limitation in a PB process over the years, this will affect
citizens’ perception of the PB process and influence the outcome, as some citizens might
be more attracted than others (possibly fluctuating participation rates). Additionally, these
perceptions deliver insights on citizens’ needs that in a traditional budgeting process
would not be generated. Some of these topics are not addressable in PB anyway, as local
governments do not have the power in most cases to directly impact them, e.g. educational
topics or health services. Knowing those needs, actions can be undertaken to prevent or
mitigate frustration if certain topics cannot be addressed. The information of citizens as a
feedback loop in the FMRP model may lower negative outcomes of PB (less frustration
by understanding the limits).
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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Parts of the budget citizens want to influence
Heard of PB before: There is a weak relationship between the knowledge of PB and the
desired influence on the budget size (U = 17,951,403, Z = -16.832, r = 0.146, p < 0.001).
This could indicate that a different approach for differently informed citizens is needed.
A municipality and a surrounding where PB is already well-known might choose to han-
dle more budget control to incentivize these citizens. Whereas specific topics/projects
could be a focus for citizens that are new to this concept since this makes it easier to
understand PB. Additionally, it prevents a potential overload and sets a narrow focus.
Furthermore, it could open the possibility of introducing a PB process in multiple steps
by raising the part of the budget influenced by PB over time (Table 13).
Table 13: BSR sample –- Desired part of budgets by familiarity with PB
“Heard of PB
before”
Special topics
Special areas
Part of the
budget
Full budget
no
33.6%
17.0%
31.4%
18.0%
yes
21.3%
17.8%
33.4%
27.5%
Satisfaction/Importance: The parts of the budget citizens want to influence might be
influenced by the satisfaction of citizens. Dissatisfaction might stimulate the desire to
have more power in the process and therefore may lead to a wish to influence more parts
of the budget. As a result, a negative correlation with more parts of the budget is expected.
Satisfaction: The overall satisfaction has a moderate negative influence on the desired
budget size (rs = -0.245, p = 0.001, n = 13,008). The more dissatisfied a citizen is, the
more influence this person wishes to have on the budget and the distribution of funds. If
the satisfaction is divided into different dimensions, the most influence is generated by
satisfaction with “Urbanity and diversity” (slightly moderate) (rs = -0.190, p = 0.001, n =
13,053), followed by satisfaction with “Nature and recreation” (rs = -0.153, p = 0.001, n =
13,148). Satisfaction with “Cost-efficiency” (like the housing market) (rs = -0.049, p =
0.001, n = 13,093) and “Job opportunities” (rs = -0.030, p = 0.001, n = 11,993) have just
negligible effects. Therefore, the biggest driver is the quality of living in the municipality
with cultural activities, availability of services and atmosphere as well as the availability
of public green places and the quality of the (clean) environment. Satisfaction with finan-
cial aspects like “Cost-efficiency” and “Job opportunities” are less influential.
Importance: If citizens do not care about the aspects, the satisfaction with these dimen-
sions does not count much. Therefore, the different aspects of life in the municipality
have significant influence on the preferences of the budget as well. The “Importance of
urbanity and diversity” has a slight moderate negative effect (rs = 0.197, p = 0.001, n =
13,124). “Importance of nature and recreation” (rs = 0.152, p = 0.001, n = 13,074) and the
importance of “Job opportunities” (rs = 0.137, p = 0.001, n = 12,051) have significant
weak negative effects. The importance of “Cost-efficiency” is negligible (rs = -0.075, p =
0.001, n = 13,156).
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All four dimensions of importance have a negative correlation with the portion of the
budget citizens want to influence. That means, if these aspects are very important to the
citizens, they want to influence just specific topics and areas of the budget.
Role of citizens
Age: Age has a weak significant effect on the role citizens desire to play in the process
(rs = -0.097, p = 0.001, n = 13,205). Younger citizens prefer a more powerful role much
more clearly than older ones. The relative frequency for “Propose and vote” drops to
under 50% by the age of 36. Simultaneously, the frequency for “just vote” exceeds 30%
at the same age bracket. The third design option “Just vote” is relatively stable at 20%
(exceptions are “above 66-year-olds”). The gap between “Just vote” and “Propose and
vote” gets smaller with increasing age (over 86 years’ bracket are very few and therefore
neglected).
Satisfaction: For satisfaction there is a significant negligible effect (rs = -0.038, p = 0.001,
n = 13,835). As the effect is too weak to be interpreted, the direction indicates that unsat-
isfied citizens have a stronger desire for more participation power.
Heard of PB before: There is a significant, but negligible relationship between the
knowledge of PB and the PB design (U = 22 423 291, Z = -5.488, r = -0.046, p < 0.001).
The relative frequencies are higher for “Just propose” and “Propose and vote” for in-
formed citizens. For uninformed citizens, the relative frequencies are higher for “Just
vote”. However, there is a difference in just voting and proposing in the process, as the
proposals are a more active involvement than the voting. If the role of the citizens is
further simplified to “Just vote” and “Proposing in process”, there is a significant weak
effect (U = 20,762,421, Z = -15.197, r = -0.129, p < 0.001). Informed citizens have a
higher preference for “Just propose” or “Propose and vote” and less informed citizens for
“Just vote”. The act of voting might be less resource-intensive than preparing a proposal
(e.g. gather information and phrasing). Citizens who know about the concept of PB (and
its benefits) might be willing to invest more in such resources. As privileged citizens are
the “Usual suspects” and less participating citizen groups should be targeted (Pape and
Lim, 2019), information looks like another step to reduce the inequality and encourage
citizens not only to vote, but to take on more demanding tasks like proposing (Table 14).
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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Table 14: BSR sample –- Perception of proposing PB process familiarity with PB
“Heard of PB
before”
“Just propose” or
“Propose and vote”
“Just vote”
Total
yes
76.5%
23.5%
100.0%
no
64.5%
35.5%
100.0%
Total
69.4%
30.6%
100.0%
[PB directions citizens want to influence]
Age: The age classes strongly differ in their desire to influence the PB directions. Younger
and older citizens prioritize the collection/income significantly higher than their 26- to
65–year-old counterparts. Arguably, there might be some interdependencies with other
citizen-related factors, such as the knowledge of PB. But even for the group of citizens
that had never heard of PB, the effect stays significant and has a moderate effect size over
the age classes (χ²(9) = 96,037, V = 0.115) (Table 15).
Table 15: BSR sample –- PB directions in age classes
PB directions
≤ 18
19–20
21–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56–65
66–75
76–85
≥ 86
χ²(9)
V
How to collect
money
44.2%
41.7%
31.5%
19.3%
22.5%
25.2%
17.9%
43.7%
40.0%
46.5%
403,026
0.176***
How to save
money
34.4%
36.9%
33.6%
34.9%
41.6%
44.6%
45.7%
43.1%
36.8%
34.9%
102,521
0.089***
How to spend
money
59.7%
52.5%
62.2%
68.1%
55.9%
61.0%
58.8%
68.8%
63.2%
58.1%
121,496
0.097***
For citizens that heard of PB before
How to collect
money
54.9%
53.0%
55.7%
44.7%
41.9%
43.6%
35.7%
50.0%
46.0%
64.4%
172,288
0.114***
Family status: For all five family statuses, the three directions differ significantly. The
desires to influence savings and spendings have weak effect sizes as citizens in retirement
have an above-average interest in spendings and citizens with adult children have an
above average interest in savings. The collection of the money shows greater differences.
Therefore, there is a moderate to strong influence on the desire to influence the income
of the municipality. As outlined before, the knowledge of PB might have an impact on
the socio-demographic factors, but the influence on the income of the municipality is
especially high for independent and coupled citizens (Table 16).
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Table 16: BSR sample –- PB directions in family statuses
PB directions
Independ-
ence
Coupling or
marriage
Parenting
babies
through to
adolescents
Launching
adult chil-
dren
(empty nest)
Retirement
χ²(4)
V
How to collect
money
44.0 %
42.4%
19.9%
21.4%
10.9%
703,751
0.237***
How to save
money
40.7%
42.2%
38.7%
47.0%
34.1%
75,638
0.078***
How to spend
money
60.0%
53.9%
60.3%
58.0%
68.1%
54,403
0.066***
Satisfaction/importance: Citizens that want to influence the municipality’s income have
significantly lower satisfaction (d = 0.746***). The other directions have a negligible
lower score than 0.2. This is very interesting as the dissatisfaction is related to the interest
in influencing the income of the municipality. Further research must be done to see
whether this dissatisfaction can be narrowed down to a certain area (for example, daily
life in terms of pollution (d = 0.478***) or shopping opportunities (d = 0.359***)). Po-
tentially, citizens think the municipality collects money (e.g. taxes) from these narrowed
areas.
Heard of PB before: Citizens that had heard of PB have significantly higher interest in
the income of the municipality χ²(1) = 944,435, V = 0.243). The other directions had
negligible effects. That could mean that knowledge about PB gives citizens another per-
spective of the financial situation of a municipality. However, interdependencies have to
be further researched (see age and family status) (Table 17).
Table 17: BSR sample –- PB directions influenced by the knowledge of the PB con-
cept
“Heard of PB be-
fore”
How to collect
money
How to save money
How to spend money
yes
34.1%
39.2%
55.1%
no
13.6%
43.7%
61.0%
V
0.243***
-0.045***
-0.058***
DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
This study identifies many significant impact factors on the PB process design variables,
but most factors have weak effects on the design. Some facets remaining unconsidered
and expansion could be possible, as the weak effects could speak for complex multi-fac-
torial relations. For example, the country as one factor does not provide enough insight,
as too many factors are involved.
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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At the municipality-related level, the rural or urban setting has an influence on the topics
that citizens are interested in. More important, urban citizens prefer to propose and vote
on proposals whereas rural citizens slightly prefer a “Just vote”. If citizens live in a rela-
tively wealthy environment, they want to influence bigger parts of the budget and focus
significantly higher on the way municipalities collect money. This is debatable, as the net
income differs in different parts of the world and therefore further distinctions (e.g. with
respect to cost of living) have to be made in the future. Living in a municipality with an
already-running mandatory PB scheme changes the perception about certain topics, the
PB directions and the portion of the budget to influence. Firstly, these citizens have sig-
nificantly less interest in topics like education, social/cultural/youth affairs or health ser-
vices than their counterparts in a voluntary fresh-starting PB scheme. This indicates an
adaptation process by the citizens as experienced citizens distribute their interest more
evenly and have less interest in topics that are hard to influence by the local government.
Secondly, these citizens desire a higher influence on the income of the municipality,
which might be due to a learning effects (e.g. influencing taxes). Thirdly, these citizens
desire more influence on the budget than their unexperienced voluntary counterparts. But
this might be due to the regulation in the investigated experienced municipality: Only
0.5% of the municipal budget is designated to PB (about 1.6 million EUR in 2020). These
perceptions might be investigated in a better controlled research design, as citizens in the
urban/rural setting differ in this characteristic additionally.
Managerial implications derive from these municipality-related factors. For urban (“pro-
pose and vote”) and rural (“just vote”) municipalities, a different integration of citizens
might be promising. Another very important implication might be drawn from more PB-
experienced citizens, as their focus and demands on the budget size potentially increases
over time. That means existing PB approaches will have to change and increase the budget
sum, in order to stay attractive for their citizens.
Individual characteristics of the citizens such as age and family status are obvious driv-
ers for certain topics, like health for older citizens and youth affairs for young citizens
and education for citizens with children. But we also addressed knowledge about PB.
Citizens that know the concept demand influence on bigger parts of the budget than citi-
zens without knowledge. If the part of the budget is limited by law, this desire might carry
over to tensions, which damp the goal of satisfied citizens. Additionally, these informed
citizens have a higher perception of processes that include a proposing phase. Through
the lenses of co-production, “Propose and vote” processes are the most positively rated
(Barbera et al. 2016b). Knowing these preferences might avoid the PB process from being
marked down as an illusion and prevent frustration. The satisfaction of citizens tends to
be the most important factor. The more dissatisfied citizens are, the more budget they
want to influence (surprisingly, the demand for more power was significant, but negligi-
bly weak). As previous studies addressed the presentation of information (Buele et al.
2020), this implication this study identifies satisfaction not just as an outcome, but as an
influence factor.
Managerial implications based on individual citizens’ characteristics could more accu-
rately address citizens’ needs. Informing citizens about PB concepts might lead to a desire
for more financial influence and a proposal phase, which should be addressed in later runs
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of the PB process (e.g. starting in a rural area with a “just vote” process that translates
over time to a “propose and vote” process with a higher budget). The more dissatisfied
citizens are the more budget should be available to provide a serious offer to the citizens.
Contrary to this, the budget parts are often capped through institutional prerequisites in
legal frameworks by possible budget size and topics. At least, the municipalities have to
inform citizens about these institutional limits and increase transparency about the imple-
mentation based on citizens’ demands to prevent the PB process from negative effects
(Bezerra and Junqueira 2022). The public decision makers have to be responsive and
adapt the PB process to citizens’ characteristics and corresponding demands over time.
Based on that, administrations can actively build a monitoring system for participation
(Pandeya et al. 2016).
In terms of the contingency model, the mentioned limited institutional arrangement will
hamper the outcomes (frustration and less participation may lead to less satisfaction in
the process). The change of citizens’ demands by knowledge and dissatisfaction might
lead to a new stimulus as stakeholders influence political decision-makers to adapt the
PB process to citizens’ needs. This new link between citizens (as stakeholders) and the
implementation strategy and potential stimulus would expand the FMRP model and cre-
ate a new path for investigating citizen participation, especially for PB processes. Based
on the discussion the following table shows theses we have generated for future research
paths per country (Table 18 and Table 19).
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
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Table 18: BSR sample –- Conclusion of relevant municipality-related factors
Country-related theses of sample
-
True for all countries in the sample: if there are restrictions on certain topics,
especially health services and education, municipalities have to inform about
such limitations.
Finland/Germany: the local government and administration has to offer higher
parts of the budget for PB.
Russia: Start with lower parts of the budget at the beginning.
Polish municipalities with a mandatory PB: increase of the PB over the mini-
mum requirement of 0.5 % (signalling).
-
True for nearly all countries in the sample (except a Russian city): at least in
the beginning, a simplified PB process with just a voting phase might be more
suitable.
Rather municipality- than country-related: municipalities with lower than good
financial situations for their citizens should avoid consultative approaches. Ide-
ally, process designs with decision power for citizens are preferred.
Finland/Germany: use interest to explain spendings. Because of less experience
with PB, think about options to influence the income of the municipality later.
Polish municipalities with a matured mandatory PB: think about discussion
with the citizens regarding the income of the municipality (depending on legal
restrictions). Latvia/Lithuania: Focus on municipality spendings.
Theses
Irrespective of a rural vs urban setting of the municipality,
education is a highly relevant PB topic for citizens, com-
pared to any other PB topic.
In municipalities new to PB with a voluntary framework,
citizens are interested more in Education, Social affairs,
Youth affairs, Cultural affairs, Urban planning and Health
services.
In municipalities with citizens having a high net income,
there is a larger interest to influence larger parts of the
budget compared to those with citizens with a low net in-
come.
In municipalities with a mandatory PB framework, citizens
want to influence a larger part of the budget compared to
those with a voluntary PB framework.
In better financial situations, citizens want to have higher
influence on the budget for improvement
In urban municipalities, citizens prefer more influential PB
designs (Propose and vote) compared to municipalities in
rural settings.
In less ideal financial situations, citizens want to have
higher influence in the decision-making.
In municipalities, with citizens having a high net income,
there is a higher interest to influence how money is spent
and how money is collected, compared to those with citi-
zens with a low net income.
In municipalities with a matured mandatory PB framework,
citizens have a stronger interest in how to collect money
compared to those in a newly voluntary PB framework.
Test Value
not significant as
only PB topic
χ²(1) = 834.965,
V = 0.261***
χ²(1) = 222.530,
V = 0.118***
χ²(1) = 288.325,
V = 0.134***
χ²(1) = 237.449,
V = 0.122***
χ²(1) = 644.926,
V = 0.201***
rs = 0.148***
U = 6,072,904.5,
Z = -19.445***
rs = 0.138***
χ²(2) = 497.087,
V = 0.188***
rs = -0.113***
d = -0.451***
d = -0.489***
χ²(1) = 2,681.82,
V = -0.410***
Factor
Rural or urban
setting
Legal framework
Net income in the
municipality
Legal framework
Financial situation of
the municipality
Rural or urban setting
Financial situation of
the municipality
PB design variable
PB topics
(Education)
PB topics
(Education)
PB topics
(Social affairs)
PB topics
(Youth affairs)
PB topics
(Urban planning)
PB topics
(Health services)
Part of the budget
Role of the citizens
PB directions
(How to collect money)
PB directions
(How to spend money)
PB directions
(How to collect money)
Citizen-centred design of participatory budgeting: A transnational study in the Baltic Sea Region
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
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Table 19: BSR sample –- Conclusion of relevant citizen-related factors
Country-related theses of sample
-
-
Poland: increase of the PB over the minimum requirement of 0.5 % (signal-
ling).
Poland (lowest satisfaction): despite good participation rates, the minimum re-
quirement of 0.5 % should be increased (signalling).7
Poland/ Germany: propose and vote processes should be preferred.
Finland/Latvia/Lithuania/Russia: at least in the beginning, a simplified PB pro-
cess with just a voting phase might be more suitable.
-
-
Poland (lowest satisfaction): think about options to influence the income of the
municipality (watch the legal framework).
Poland/ Germany: think about options to influence the income of the munici-
pality (watch the legal framework).
Theses
Depending on the citizen’ s age, different PB topics are of
relevance.
For citizens who raise children, education is the most im-
portant PB topic. For citizens of any other family status,
health services is the most important PB topic.
Citizens who know the concept of PB want to influence a
larger part of the budget compared to those who never heard
of PB.
The more dissatisfied citizens are, the stronger influence on
the budget and the distribution of funds they seek, especially
if dissatisfied with the dimensions “ Urbanity and diver-
sity” and “ Nature and recreation” .
Citizens that do not know the concept of PB have a stronger
preference for “ Just vote” compared to those that have
heard of PB.
Citizens younger than 25 years and older than 65 years have
a stronger interest in how to collect money compared to those
between 26 and 65 years.
Depending on the citizen’ s family status, different PB di-
rections are of relevance.
The more dissatisfied citizens are, the more interested they
are in influencing how the municipality collects money.
Citizens that know the concept of PB are more interested in
influencing how the municipality collects money compared
to those that never heard of PB.
Test Value
U = 17,951,403,
Z = -16.832***
rs = -0.245***
rs = -0.190***
rs = -0.153***
U = 20,762,421,
Z = -15.197***
χ²(9) = 403,026,
V = 0.176***
χ²(4) = 703,751,
V = 0.237***
d = 0.746***
χ²(1) = 944,435,
V = 0.243***
Factor
Age
Family status
Heard of PB before
Satisfaction overall
Satisfaction with
“ Urbanity and di-
versity”
Satisfaction with
“ Nature and recre-
ation”
Heard of PB before
Age
Family status
Satisfaction
Heard of PB before
PB design variable
PB topics
Part of the budget
Role of the citizens
(just voting or not)
PB directions
(How to collect money)
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
www.ipmr.net 35
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CONCLUSIONS
PB is a trending tool in the participation landscape and aims to provide a way to embed
citizens in financial decision-making processes. This paper contributes to the topic of PB
by highlighting citizens' perceptions on different PB design variables (namely topics, the
role of the citizens, the parts of the budget and spending/saving of financial resources).
The contingency model by Lüder might give a different glance at the design of a PB
process to provide factors that influence the selection of such design elements. In general,
the topics differ a lot between all countries, but voting is the most important aspect of
involvement. On behalf of national tendencies, the citizens favour the “propose and vote”
role, but not as clearly as one would expect. The majority of citizens want to have influ-
ence on the full budget. Upon the general three special findings, there are three results
that might be interesting for future research and managerial implications.
First, if citizens are dissatisfied, a greater influence on the budget must be transferred to
the citizens to meet their expectations (d = 0.746***). A pure consultative approach might
fail in these circumstances, because it is not sufficient, while in a more satisfied environ-
ment a small supporting role for citizens might be sufficient to make small changes. The
dissatisfaction might be a new stimulus in the FMRP model to trigger PB processes and
influence reform drivers (e.g. NGOs and associations that foster PB as an option to satisfy
citizens) not just an indicator for transparency of the process (Buele et al. 2020).
Second, citizens who heard of the concept of PB desire a process where proposals can be
made (significant group differences, V = -0.129***) or the income of the municipality is
discussed (significant group differences, V = 0.243***). Educational level is an often
studied factor (Harrison and Sayogo 2014; Klun and Benčina 2021), but informing citi-
zens about the concept of PB (and its restrictions) might be the more special factor to
educate citizens in PB and increase their positive attitudes (or limit their frustration) to-
wards such PB processes. Municipal councils and administrations should consider the
citizens’ perceptions and their possible changing needs over time, bringing a (new) need
to the local government to be dynamic in the process design. On a higher level, these
inputs might be a stimulus in the FMRP model to make such impacts legally possible
(driver/stimulus for future public sector reforms).
Third, citizens in rural areas tend to be less attracted by a process including proposing
and voting than those in urban areas and prefer processes with just a voting phase (signif-
icant group differences, V = 0.188***). Additionally, citizens in a relatively good finan-
cial environment prefer larger parts of the budget than citizens in lesser conditions
(rs = 0.148***). These results fit with previous research indicating that institutional ar-
rangements, such as legal restrictions, administrative structure by organizational com-
plexity (Ewens and van der Voet 2019) or the financial situation (Zhang and Liao 2011)
in the municipalities, influence the PB process. Administrations in an uncertain environ-
ment prioritize robust processes, whereas in a more stable environment, quality processes
should be established (Hood 1991). Citizens and administrations could be in line. As an
example, rural municipalities with economically not ideal conditions for citizens should
let the citizens vote on given projects with a small part of the municipalities’ budget, as
Citizen-centred design of participatory budgeting: A transnational study in the Baltic Sea Region
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
www.ipmr.net 36
IPMR
the process meets citizens’ preferences and a manageable workload for the administra-
tion.
This study reveals relations between municipality- and citizen-related factors and design
elements of PB. These contingency factors could impact decisions on the PB process de-
signs for first time implementations and subsequent runs, as citizens learn about the pro-
cess and the PB process should be adapted. Future research should investigate further the
preference of citizens and how the public administrations and local governments make
process design decisions based on that to set up successful PB processes.
LIMITATIONS
Given its quantitative nature, this study is subject to several limitations. Survey research
using closed-ended questions might omit some important answers that citizens would
have given or could contain questions that the respondent understands differently from
the authors. Hence, biases can occur in survey research (Babbie 2012). To partly cope
with this issue, most questions also contained a textbox to add further information or a
“other” option. The questionnaires were collected using different methods, namely, pa-
per-and-pencil and online; however, this might have helped to tackle common method
bias, which was not separately tested here. In addition, the data collection in six different
languages required a translation to be made of the questionnaire. This might have implied
some loss of the original meaning of the phrases despite double-blind translations and
back-translations. Additionally, the data collection was conducted at slightly different
time over a time frame of 6 months, due to the communication with administrations and
associations involved in the EmPaci project. Also, the findings of this research project
rely on a cross-sectional study, only representing an observation of the around 13,000
citizens at one point in time; this was because it was not the authors’ intention to prove
the causality between citizens’ preferences and PB design. In addition, errors in the data
could occur during the intensive collection by different institutions.
Hans-Henning Schult is a researcher at the Chair of Accounting, Management Control and Auditing
at the University of Rostock, Rostock, Germany. E-mail: hans-henning.schult2@uni-rostock.de
Ellen Haustein is a postdoctoral lecturer and researcher at the Chair of Accounting, Management
Control and Auditing at the University of Rostock, Rostock, Germany. E-mail: ellen.haustein@uni-
rostock.de
Peter Christoph Lorson holds the Chair of Accounting, Management Control and Auditing and is
Executive Director of the Center of Accounting and Auditing (both at the University of Rostock, Ros-
tock, Germany). Email: peter.lorson@uni-rostock.de
Gabriele Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili is a lecturer at the Klaipeda University, Klaipeda, Lithuania.
Email: gabriele.burbulyte@gmail.com
Jaroslav Dvorak is a professor and the head of the Department of Public Administration and Political
Sciences at Klaipeda University, Klaipeda, Lithuania. Email: Jaroslav.Dvorak@ku.lt
Lotta-Maria Sinervo is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Management and Business at the Tampere
University, Tampere, Finland. Email: lotta-maria.sinervo@tuni.fi
Kaisa Kurkela is a postdoctoral researcher at the School of Management at the University of Vaasa,
Vaasa, Finland. Email: kaisa.kurkela@uwasa.fi
Dmitrii Trutnev is the deputy director of the eGovernance Center at the ITMO University, St. Peters-
burg, Russia. Email: trutnev@egov-center.ru
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
www.ipmr.net 37
IPMR
Also, there is some theoretical possibility that the true relationships are non-linear, which
would need to be addressed in further research. Given the mostly ordinal measurement of
the dependent variables (i.e. the PB process design variables), future studies could de-
velop and test constructs of PB design and set up more comprehensive models, as the
variables were tested separately here. However, this study is, to the best of the authors'
knowledge, the first of its kind to assess citizen preferences on such a large comparative
basis. It contributes to the literature on PB design by providing a rich database of which
factors (might) influence citizens’ preferences regarding PB design. It is of relevance to
both academia and practice to inform about what citizens really want.
ACKNOLEDGEMENTS
This research was funded by the Interreg BSR programme of the European Union in the
project “Empowering Participatory Budgeting in the Baltic Sea Region” (Empaci)
www.empaci.eu.
NOTES
1 Pihlaja, R. 2017. Osallistuva budjetointi kunnissa ja maakunnissa. Kuntaliitto, Hel-
sinki. URL: http://shop.kuntaliitto.fi/product_details.php?p=3356 (Access date:
28.04.2020), p. 4.
2 9. Statusbericht Bürgerhaushalt, 2019, S. 9.
3 Cabinet of Ministers, “Par konceptuālo ziņojumu ‘Par līdzdalības budžeta ieviešanu
Latvijā’" URL: https://likumi.lv/ta/id/314744-par-konceptualo-zinojumu-par-lidzdali-
bas-budzeta-ieviesanu-latvija.
4 Act of 8th March 1990 on self-government municipal (Journal of Laws of 2019, item
506).
5 Based on the budget lexicon posted on the website of the Sejm of the Republic of
Poland.
6 Based on exchange rate of the World Bank in 2019.
7 EmPaci PB-type groups’ analysis is accessible here: http://em-
paci.eu/photo/Files/GoA%202.1%20PB%20type%20groups%20working%20docu-
ment_final%2024112020.pdf
8 The full set of questionnaires in English and the six national languages is accessible
here: http://empaci.eu/photo/Files/EmPaci%20GoA%202.2%20Output%201%20Cit-
izen%20survey_final.pdf
9 It describes cities with county/district rights.
10 Act on Municipal Self-Government of March 8, 1990.
11 For the analysis of the surroundings, citizens in municipalities with more than 25,000
inhabitants were classified as urban citizens, whereas citizens in municipalities with
less than 25,000 were classified as rural citizens. This classification was chosen with
Citizen-centred design of participatory budgeting: A transnational study in the Baltic Sea Region
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
www.ipmr.net 38
IPMR
respect to the data as internationally there are different classifications that differ
clearly.
12 This has to be further researched, as there are only a few countries, where PB is man-
datory yet. In this sample only the Polish municipality has a mandatory PB and there-
fore national preferences might distract further indications.
13 The financial situation is reflected by the net income per citizen of the municipality
and is set in relation to the net income per capita of the country to include the national
context of the municipalities.
14 Here, further research involving the individual income might be interesting.
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APPENDIX
Survey completion and description of the sample
Table A: BSR sample – Overview of the survey
Count-
ries
Municipa-
lity
Inhabi-
tants*
Density
(inhabi-
tants/km2)
Total
respon-
ses**
Mean
Age
N
Female
(freq.)
Female
(n)
Mean No.
Children
per
house-
hold
Total No.
Children
per
house-
hold
Finland
Lahti
120,013
232
1,213
48.67
1,197
74.8
1,209
1.81
927
Germany
Bützow
7,500
196
303
37.78
246
56.4
291
1.20
287
Latvia
Gulbene
8,057
677
540
47.98
534
73.4
534
1.70
518
Lithuania
Rietavas
7,417
13
202
48.10
202
21.3
202
1.82
202
Telsiai
40,000
28
1,205
46.78
1,205
32.9
1,205
1.57
1,205
Poland
Bielsko-
Biala
171,259
1 375
1,613
40.17
1,613
52.5
1,613
1.46
1,613
Russia
Mos-
kovskava
Zastava
54,546
5 451
1,670
44.85
1,664
62.2
1,670
1.45
1,623
Suoyarvi
8,781
976
381
40.73
311
58.3
381
1.58
345
Gatchina
238,018
84
2 631
39.68
2 628
36.8
2 631
1.66
2 631
Amderma
623
7
75
46.66
38
39.5
38
1.26
38
Chagoda
12,823
5
1 539
45.30
410
45.4
410
1.39
410
Demyansk
4,211
560
620
45.44
219
40.6
219
1.40
219
Gdov
5,570
1 150
332
44.31
291
50.5
291
1.36
224
Kola
9,681
930
1 065
46.14
339
44.0
339
1.37
339
Koryazhma
36,607
1 611
3 015
44.25
987
48.4
987
1.42
987
Sosno-
gorsk
31,880
1 275
1 911
44.78
829
47.4
829
1.40
829
Svetlog-
orsk
19,710
938
1 971
44.67
492
47.6
492
1.43
492
Total
20,276
43.71**
13,205
50.3
13,206
1.53
12,889
* = basis for classification of “urban” and “rural”
** = Over 66% of the respondents are married or live in a registered partnership (n = 13,228).
*** = age ranges from 12 to 92 (n=13,205; median=43 years; standard deviation = 14.618).
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Table B: BSR sample – Knowledge of PB
“Heard of PB
before”
Finland
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
Total
yes
34.2%
62.7%
26.1%
29.4%
97.6%
33.6%
39.9%
no
65.8%
37.3%
73.9%
70.6%
2.4%
66.4%
60.1%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Table C: BSR sample – Overview of PB topics
PB topics
Finland
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
Education
48.6%
57.8%
36.8%
46.7%
19.8%
61.0%
Cultural affairs
33.0%
53.7%
34.3%
37.5%
18.9%
32.7%
Social affairs
56.3%
55.1%
33.9%
44.8%
26.3%
45.2%
Youth affairs
37.9%
54.0%
16.9%
34.9%
14.6%
35.9%
Urban planning
37.3%
41.5%
21.2%
27.6%
7.9%
23.2%
Health services
70.8%
28.9%
43.3%
47.3%
28.0%
63.5%
Sport services
37.4%
51.6%
20.1%
22.8%
24.1%
14.4%
Infrastructure
13.1%
47.4%
27.1%
31.8%
25.4%
26.4%
Environment
31.4%
49.1%
25.7%
27.8%
17.4%
22.1%
Ecology
23.4%
30.3%
12.4%
23.8%
17.9%
11.8%
Tourism
18.5%
32.4%
19.2%
22.7%
22.7%
12.5%
Central administration
17.3%
10.5%
17.8%
27.8%
9.2%
11.2%
None of the above
1.9%
1.7%
10.4%
8.4%
19.4%
7.4%
Table D: BSR sample – Desired role of citizens
Countries
Just propose
Just vote
Propose and vote
Total
Finland
33.4%
37.2%
29.5%
100.0%
Germany
20.3%
17.2%
62.5%
100.0%
Latvia
23.4%
41.0%
35.6%
100.0%
Lithuania
26.8%
46.6%
26.7%
100.0%
Poland
27.5%
16.2%
56.3%
100.0%
Russia
18.0%
30.3%
51.8%
100.0%
The role of citizens is surprisingly broadly distributed. The expectation was that citizens
would tend to be much more involved in the process. This is something to investigate in
the future.
Hans-Henning Schult, Ellen Haustein, Peter C. Lorson, Gabrielė Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili, Jaroslav Dvorak, Lotta-Maria Sinervo,
Kaisa Kurkela and Dmitrii Trutnev
International Public Management Review Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2022
www.ipmr.net 45
IPMR
About IPMR
IPMR The International Public Management Review (IPMR) is the electronic journal of the Inter-
national Public Management Network (IPMN). All work published in IPMR is double blind
reviewed according to standard academic journal procedures.
The purpose of the International Public Management Review is to publish manuscripts re-
porting original, creative research in the field of public management. Theoretical, empirical
and applied work including case studies of individual nations and governments, and compar-
ative studies are given equal weight for publication consideration.
IPMN The mission of the International Public Management Network is to provide a forum for shar-
ing ideas, concepts and results of research and practice in the field of public management,
and to stimulate critical thinking about alternative approaches to problem solving and deci-
sion making in the public sector.
IPMN includes over 1300 members representing about one hundred different countries, both
practitioners and scholars, working in all aspects of public management. IPMN is a voluntary
non-profit network and membership is free.
ISSN 1662-1387
