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Liverpool Law Review (2022) 43:203–235
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-022-09308-4
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative
Analysis intotheValidity ofContracts withMinors
intheSport andEntertainment Industry
ShaunStar1,2 · DivyanganaDhankar1
Accepted: 29 April 2022 / Published online: 27 August 2022
© The Author(s) 2022
Abstract
In Australia and the UK, contracts with minors in sports and entertainment are not
uncommon. Generally, such contracts are voidable at the option of the minor. How-
ever, when contracts fall within the category of beneficial service, as is the case with
most professional sports or entertainment contracts, they will be enforceable against
the minor. Indian courts do not prescribe to this view holding contracts with minors,
void ab initio and unenforceable against contractual parties, with few exceptions.
The policy rationale is embedded in protecting minors from their own rash decisions
and preventing unscrupulous parties from taking advantage of a minor’s nascent
mental capacity. By analysing divergent approaches on the validity of minors’ con-
tracts in three common law jurisdictions—Australia, India and the UK—the authors
highlight inadequacies in legal pronouncements by Indian courts. In India, the legal
non-existence and unenforceability of service contracts with minors renders it futile
for them or their representatives from negotiating favourable contractual terms
beyond welfare measures provided by law as these are unlikely to be upheld. This
paper argues that India’s narrow approach fails to acknowledge practical realities of
minors’ participation in the increasingly commercialised sports and entertainment
industry. In light of more practical approaches in other common law jurisdictions,
the authors set out policy recommendations and suggest reforms to the legal position
on minors’ capacity to contract in India.
Keywords Minors· Contract· UK· Australia· India· Sports· Entertainment
* Shaun Star
sstar@jgu.edu.in
Divyangana Dhankar
ddhankar@jgu.edu.in
1 Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India
2 University ofQueensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
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S.Star, D.Dhankar
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Introduction
World renowned heptathlon athlete, Jacqueline Joyner-Kersee, believed, “Age is no
barrier. It’s a limitation you put on your mind” (Chang 2006: 46)—however, it would
appear that age is a barrier for minors in sports and entertainment in some jurisdic-
tions. Minors are no strangers to professional and elite sport. At age sixteen, Sachin
Tendulkar became one of India’s youngest international test cricketers (The Editors
of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2021). Leading football player, Cristiano Ronaldo was
signed by professional football team, Sporting CP, at age twelve (Porterfield 2019:
11). Fifteen-year-old Michael Phelps made history by becoming the youngest Amer-
ican swimmer to qualify for the 2000 Summer Olympics in almost 68 years (See
e.g., Phelps & Abrahamson 2008; Phelps & Cazeneuve 2016). The same is true for
young movie stars entering the limelight as children. Emma Watson was ten and
Daniel Radcliffe was eleven years when they starred in the first Harry Potter movie
(See e.g., Lyons & Shakhnazarova 2021; The Wall Street Journal 2011). Drew Bar-
rymore was six years old when she acted in E.T (Nankervis 2017). The youngest
member of the Backstreet Boys, Nick Carter, was twelve when he joined the band
(Press Trust of India 2015). Evidently, minors are regular participants in sports and
entertainment.
Consequently, minors seem to have obligations on movie sets, with professional
sporting organisations, and companies they endorse. Common law has sought to find
a balance between protecting minors and commercial interests of the other party.
Despite participation in sports and entertainment, the jurisprudence on capacity of
minors to enter contracts differs across jurisdictions. For instance, Indian contract
law does not, generally, recognise contracts with minors as valid, binding or enforce-
able. Whereas, in Australia and the UK, such contracts may be valid, binding and
legally enforceable against the minor in certain instances. The purpose of this paper
is first, to examine general contractual principles involving minors in Australia,
India and the UK, second, to explain the application of these identified principles in
sports and entertainment, and third, to undertake a comparative critical analysis on
the practicality of India’s contractual framework, given the widespread participation
of minors in the sport and entertainment industry.
The paper concludes by suggesting two potential areas of reform for India. First,
a judicial reinterpretation from the apex court declaring contracts with minors void-
able at their option and considering beneficial contracts with minors as binding
and enforceable. The advantages of such a reinterpretation are manyfold; namely:
(i) the ability of minors or their representatives to enter enforceable service con-
tracts on mutually beneficial terms; (ii) the alignment of Indian contract law with
other common law jurisdictions such as Australia and the UK on voidable contracts;
(iii) the elimination of inconsistencies between Indian contract law and employment
law; and (iv) providing minors with effective dispute resolution mechanisms with
an option of claiming breach of contract before a civil court, rather than the cur-
rent practice of invoking the writ jurisdiction under constitutional law for fundamen-
tal right violations by contending sporting rules as arbitrary or harsh. The second
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
possible area of reform is by amending the ICA,1 and adopting a position similar to
the USA. Specific statutory provisions can be incorporated in the ICA for sports and
entertainment contracts with minors where Indian courts decide whether a minor
can or cannot disaffirm a contract depending on facts and circumstances of the case.
Minors andContractual Capacity inAustralia andtheUK
The General Rule
Australia and the UK have developed similar jurisprudence on capacity of minors
to contract. The age of majority to contract was 21years2 under common law but it
was changed to 18years by statute in both jurisdictions.3 A person attains the age
of majority on their 18th birthday. Anyone who has not attained the age of majority
is considered a minor. Generally, in both jurisdictions, such contracts are voidable
at the option of the minor4 and not void ab initio, but they are binding on the other
party. This means, minors have the freedom to choose whether to repudiate or be
bound by the contract. However, a contract for the minor’s benefit is binding on the
minor. In contrast, the law holds that very young children lack the mental capacity
to enter contracts, that is, minors too young to understand the nature and context of
contracts are deemed to lack capacity for binding either party. Such contracts will be
considered void.5
Contracts by minors can be ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority. At
that time, the contract is binding on both parties.6 In some jurisdictions, ratification
must be in writing,7 while in others, ratification can be either express or implied,
taking into consideration the minor’s conduct who has since reached the age of
majority (Beale 2015: 862). However, in certain Australian states, the common law
position on ratification of minors’ contracts has been abolished (Heydon 2019: para
1 Indian Contract Act 1872 (India) (‘ICA’).
2 See e.g., Prowse v McIntyre (1961) 111 CLR 264 (Australia).
3 In the UK, see sect.1, Family Law Reform Act 1969 (UK). In Australia, all states have set an age of
majority at 18 under their respective legislation. See e.g., sect.8–9, Minors (Property and Contracts) Act
1970 (NSW) (‘Minors Property Act’); sect.17, Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld); sect.3, Age of Majority Act
1977 (Vic); sect.5, Age of Majority Act 1972 (WA).
4 See Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd [2007] Bus. L.R. 93(UK)
(‘Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd’).
5 R. v Oldham Metropolitan BC Ex p. Garlick [1993] 1 FLR 645 (UK), p. 662; Johnson v Clark [1908]
1 Ch 303 (UK), p. 312. In New South Wales, see sect.18 and sect.19of the Minors Property Act which
provide that contracts are enforceable against minors provided they are able to understand the nature of
their contractual obligations at the time of contract formation. However, for beneficial contracts there is a
presumption that contractual terms are enforceable against that minor.
6 Williams v Moor (1843) 152 ER 798 (UK): In this case, a minor had incurred a debt and upon reach-
ing the age of majority at twenty-one years, signed a declaration in writing accepting the debt as due and
payable. The acceptance of debt by a minor upon reaching the age of majority is called ratification. Rati-
fying a debt makes it binding and enforceable against such person.
7 See e.g., sect. 15, Mercantile Law Act, 1962 (ACT); sect.4 Minors Contracts (Miscellaneous Provi-
sions) Act 1979 (SA).
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1.590).8 For instance, in Victoria no proceeding can be brought against a person on
the basis of a promise or contract made while such a person was a minor which has
subsequently been ratified upon reaching the age of majority.9
Generally, contracts with minors are voidable and cannot be enforced against
them but there are exceptions binding minors to contractual terms.
Exceptions totheRule
A contract may be enforceable against a minor in case it is:
1. An agreement to provide necessaries,10 or
2. A beneficial agreement of service (such as an apprenticeship, education, or
employment).11 Such contracts are often considered under the head of “neces-
saries” in the UK but under a separate category in Australia.
While a contract will only be binding on a minor if it falls within one of the above
categories, a contract that does not fall within either of these categories can still be
ratified by a minor when he/she attains the age of majority making it binding on
both parties.12
Contracts forNecessaries
Contracts for goods or services that are “necessary” for a minor may be considered
binding and enforceable against the minor. Necessaries include goods or services
fundamental to a minor’s reasonable existence,13 such as food and drink, clothing,
accommodation and medicine (Beale 2015: 862). To enforce a “contract for neces-
saries” against a minor, it needs to be shown:
(i) the contract is for goods or services capable of being classified as necessaries.
Not all contracts beneficial to minors are categorised as a necessary.14 This is
a question of law.
12 Corpe v Overton (1833) 131 ER 901 (UK).
13 Chapple v Cooper (1884) 3M & W 252 (UK).
14 Bojczuk v Gregorcewicz [1961] SASR 128 (Australia) where money paid for the purpose of interna-
tional travel was not considered a necessity.
8 Note also that the Minors’ Contracts Act 1987 (UK) repealed the Infants Relief Act 1874 (UK)
(‘Infants Act’, now repealed) which did not permit ratification of certain categories of contracts by a
minor. As such, some contracts were previously declared void without recourse to ratification.
9 See e.g., sect. 50, Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), which states that legal proceedings cannot be
brought against a person who has agreed to repay a debt undertaken as a minor nor can legal proceedings
be commenced against a person who has ratified a promise or contract entered as a minor upon reaching
the age of majority.
10 Wharton v Mackenzie (1884) 5 QB 606 (UK).
11 Roberts v Gray [1913] 1KB 520 (UK) (‘Roberts v Gray’).
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
(ii) the contract is necessary for the minor in the particular circumstances. This is
a question of fact.
Beneficial Contracts ofService
Courts have carved a separate exception for agreements where minors are engaged
to perform a specific service and the contract is for the minor’s benefit. The con-
tractual exception exists for educational instruction, apprenticeships and certain
employment relationships. For the contract to be enforceable against the minor, the
contract, when read as a whole, must be beneficial to the minor.15
The High Court of Australia, in Hamilton v Lethbridge,16 set out that under con-
tracts beneficial for the minor, the court should weigh any inconvenience endured
by the minor in performing the contract against the benefit gained by him/her. If the
overall benefit outweighs the inconvenience, the contract is enforceable against the
minor. In Hamilton v Lethbridge, a minor (Lethbridge) entered a contract for clerk-
ship with a lawyer (Hamilton), binding himself to serve the lawyer as an articled
clerk for a period of 5 years. In return for training and remuneration, Lethbridge
agreed not to practise as a solicitor, within 50 miles of the town that Hamilton prac-
tised after his admission. However, Lethbridge breached this restrictive covenant
shortly after being admitted to practise. The High Court considered whether the
contract was overall beneficial to the minor, and consequently, whether the restric-
tive covenant was enforceable.
The High Court noted that “[a] contract made by an infant cannot be enforced
against him during infancy unless it is held to be for his benefit,”17 and the contract
was overall beneficial to the minor since, Hamilton would not have likely agreed
to contract Lethbridge as his clerk without a restrictive covenant. Applying the
legal principle of balancing contractual terms as a whole, the benefit to the minor
outweighed any unfavourable terms of the contract, and therefore the contract was
enforceable against the minor. This precedent has been applied in subsequent cases
on apprenticeships, clerkships and employment contracts in an Australian context.18
Similarly, in the UK, for a contract to be considered beneficial and binding on a
minor, two conditions need to be satisfied. First, the contract falls within the class of
contracts which are analogous to contracts for necessaries and contracts of employ-
ment, apprenticeships or education; and second, the contract is, in fact, beneficial.19
Like Australia, the contract should be considered as a whole when determining
whether it is beneficial to the minor.20 Within this exception, a number of cases have
been applied to minors in sports and entertainment.
15 See e.g., De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430 (UK) (‘De Francesco v Barnum’).
16 Hamilton v Lethbridge (1912) 14 CLR 236 (‘Hamilton v Lethbridge’).
17 Hamilton v Lethbridge, p. 241 (Australia) (per Griffith CJ).
18 See Sultman v Bond, Supreme Court of Queensland, 30 ALJ 93 (Australia).
19 Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd, para 36.
20 De Francesco v Barnum.
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Contracts Concluded withaMinor intheSport andEntertainment Industry
Professional entertainment or sporting contracts entered by minors falling under the
category of beneficial services have been deemed to be valid and enforceable against
the minor. For instance, in Doyle v White City Stadium,21 a minor entered a contract
with the British Boxing Board of Control (‘Board’), under which he was entitled to
receive a license to box on the condition of agreeing to follow the rules prescribed
by the Board. In one particular bout, Doyle was disqualified for hitting his opponent
below the belt. According to the rules prescribed by the Board, due to the disquali-
fication, Doyle had to forgo the payment of £3000 which he would have otherwise
received from participating in the bout. Doyle argued that these rules were disadvan-
tageous (not beneficial to him) and should not be enforceable. However, the court
clarified that the contract was beneficial overall. Doyle could not have made a living
from boxing without a license from the Board (a condition for grating the license
was to abide by Board rules, including the unfavourable ones).22
In Roberts v Gray, Gray, a minor, contracted to learn billiards from Roberts, a
reputable billiards player, while traveling with him on tour. However, Gray breached
the terms of the contract and did not travel with Roberts. The court considered the
agreement as educational and falling under the ambit of a contract of necessaries,
rather than, a beneficial contract for professional services. Damages were payable by
the minor to Roberts for cost incurred in organising the tour for Gray.
Similar examples exist in the entertainment industry, such as Denmark Produc-
tions Limited v Boscobel Productions Limited,23 where a group of minors formed
a band called “The Kinks” and in doing so entered a contract with an agent. This
agreement was held to be binding as it was akin to an employment agreement that
was beneficial to the minors.
However, there are numerous cases where service contracts with minors do not
to fall under this exception and could not be enforced against the minor. Such cases
might arise when (i) the contract is not considered beneficial,24 or (ii) even if the
contract is beneficial to the minor, the contract is not necessary for the minor to
make a living.25
The court in De Francesco v Barnum held that if the contract is not considered
beneficial, it will not be legally binding on the minor. Here, a fourteen-year-old girl
entered into a seven-year contract for an apprenticeship in choreography and dance.
There were a number of onerous provisions within the contract, including not having
to pay the dancer unless she was eventually employed, prohibiting her from accept-
ing any professional contracts without prior consent, and forbidding her from getting
married during the apprenticeship. The court balanced the benefits received by the
21 Doyle v White City Stadium [1935] 1KB 110 (UK) (‘Doyle v White City Stadium’).
22 Ibid.
23 Denmark Productions Limited v Boscobel Productions Limited [1969] 1 QB 699 (UK) (‘Denmark
Productions Limited v Boscobel Productions Limited’).
24 De Francesco v Barnum.
25 Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd.
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
minor against any inconveniences and declared, the contract was not beneficial to
the minor and could not be enforced against her.
Courts have held, even though, contracts with minors are beneficial to them such
contracts are not legally enforceable against minors unless, necessary for them to
make a living. This has been applied in Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proac-
tive Sports Management Ltd involving famous English footballer, Wayne Rooney’s
contract with his agent. Proform had entered into an exclusive management and
agency agreement with Rooney for a term of two years when he was fifteen years
old. After a period of time, Rooney terminated the contract as he intended to con-
tract with Proactive for representation. Rooney’s counsel advised him that he could
essentially repudiate the Proform contract by virtue of his minority. However, Pro-
form argued that he was not permitted to appoint any other agents during the term of
his contract, and they sued for the tort of interference of contractual relations. The
court considered whether the representation agreement between Rooney and Pro-
form was enforceable against the minor. To determine whether Rooney was bound
to the terms of the contract, the court considered whether (i) the contract was similar
to apprenticeship and employment contracts, and (ii) whether it was beneficial to
Rooney. It was ultimately held that Rooney’s contract with his agent was not analo-
gous to a contract for necessary services as it was simply a representation agreement
and Rooney had already registered with Everton Football Club prior to contracting
with Proform. In any event, the court reasoned that such intermediary agreements
are not analogous to employment or apprenticeship contracts because:
“Players’ representatives do not undertake matters that are essential to the
player’s livelihood. They do not enable the minor to earn a living or to advance
his skills as a professional footballer...”26
Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd can be dis-
tinguished from Denmark Productions Limited v Boscobel Productions Limited on
the basis that representation agreements for athletes with agents and intermediaries
are significantly different to agreements with music group managers responsible for
matters essential to the business of artists. It was further clarified that “… merely
because a contract is beneficial to a minor, if such is the case, it is not binding on
him unless it falls within a particular category.”27 A representation agreement, rather
than, a contract that earns a living is not binding on the minor.
26 Ibid, 40.
27 Ibid.
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Minors andContractual Capacity inIndia
The General Rule
The ICA regulates disputes arising from contractual obligations in India, including
contracts with minors.28 According to the statute, minors lack legal ‘competence’, or
‘capacity’, to enter a valid contract.29 Persons are competent to contract on reaching
the age of majority.30 The age of majority is 18years and below this age, a person is
considered a minor.31
While the ICA clearly states that minors lack competence to contract, it is silent
on whether contracts with minors are- voidable, void or void ab initio. However, the
Privy Council in Mohori Bibee32 held that contracts with minors are void ab initio.
It considered the phraseology of select provisions in the ICA to depart from estab-
lished principles in Australia and the UK where contracts with minors are voidable
at their option, even though, these principles applied consistently in India prior to
this case (Vardhan 2019: para 11.5).33
The Privy Council noted that ‘competence’ was made an essential element of a
valid contract by the ICA.34 Minors by virtue of infancy were incompetent to con-
tract which meant they could not form contracts at all, let alone contracts void or
voidable at their option. Support was garnered from the language of sect.68 ICA
where minors were included in the category of persons incapable of contracting.
Minors were neither personally liable to reimburse for supply of necessaries nor
could such a demand be made against them. Similarly, minors could not employ
agents or be one themselves35 nor could they be held personally liable for obliga-
tions of partnerships.36 A cumulative reading of these provisions caused the Privy
Council to conclude that contracts with minors could not exist.37 Consequently, a
contract could not be enforced against a minor for repayment of mortgage. This
28 In certain common law jurisdictions such as Myanmar (Myanmar Contract Act 1872) and Malaysia
(Contracts Act 1950), statutes on general principles of contract have been enacted. Codification of con-
tractual principles through statutes makes these jurisdictions different from Australia and the UK that
rely on common law embodied in commentaries and precedents. The blueprint and inspiration for stat-
utes in contract law has been the ICA, the first legislation of its kind. For example, the Contracts Act
1950 (Malaysia) has been held pari materia with the ICA by the Federal Court of Malaysia in Leha Binte
Jusoh v Awang Johari Bin Hashim [1978] 1 MLJ 202 (Malaysia) (‘Leha Binte Jusoh v Awang’).
29 Section10, ICA.
30 Provided by the Indian Majority Act 1875 (India) (‘IMA’). It should be noted that sect. 11, ICA
requires a person to (i) have reached the age of majority, (ii) be of sound mind, and (iii) not be disquali-
fied by any other applicable law.
31 Section3, IMA.
32 Mohori Bibee vDharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 ILR Cal. 539 (India) (‘Mohori Bibee’).
33 See Sashi Bhusan Dutt, Minor v Jadu Nath Dutt (1885) 11 ILR Cal. 552 (India); Raj Coomary Dassee
v Preo Madhub Nundy (1897) 1 CWN 453 (India).
34 Sections10-11, ICA.
35 Sections183–184, ICA.
36 Sections247–248, ICA. These sections have been repealed from the ICA by sect.73 and Schedule II,
Indian Partnership Act 1932 (India) (‘Partnership Act’).
37 Mohori Bibee, p. 548.
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
position was followed in Mathai Mathaiv Joseph Mary38 where a mortgage entered
by a minor was considered void unless undertaken by a guardian.
The concern is that Mohori Bibee relied on select statutory provisions of the ICA,
none of which expressly point to the non-existence of contracts with minors. This
decision, made more than a century ago, has been widely criticised by scholars (See
e.g., Swaminathan & Surana 2018: 1–15). The Privy Council could have, just as
easily, interpreted provisions of the ICA consistently with the position in Australia
and the UK. Rather, it stretched statutory interpretation, considerably. For instance,
the phrase “incapable of entering into a contract” under sect. 68 or “competent to
contract” under ss. 10 and 11 have led to a conclusion that contracts with minors do
not exist and are void ab initio, while these phrases or provisions could merely be
an express reiteration of the infancy law doctrine indicating the ‘inherent inability’
(Krieg 2004: 430) of a minor to understand legal nuances of a contract. These pro-
visions donot ipso facto suggest the intent of legislature to declare contracts with
minors as void ab initio. A more logical interpretation of the phrases “incapable of
entering into a contract” and “competent to contract” relied by the Privy Council,
could be that a minor is unable to understand the legal nuances of a contract, an
interpretation supported by the infancy doctrine in Australia and the UK.
Arrangements entered by guardians for minors under personal law,39 partner-
ship40 or involving property41 and goods could be specifically enforced as though
they were valid contracts. However, the Cine Star case42 provides that service con-
tracts with minors are void and unenforceable despite being beneficial to the minor,
whether entered by the guardian or minors themselves.43 There are primarily two
reasons for this: first, due to lack of competence, a minor’s promise to provide ser-
vice does not provide good consideration to form a valid contract. By extension,
consideration is absent in a guardian’s promise assuring the other party of the
38 Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary (2015) 5 SCC 622 (India) (‘Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary’).
39 See e.g., Manik Chand v Ramachandra son of Chawriraj (1980) 3 SCR 1104 (India), where a natu-
ral guardian was empowered under Hindu law to enter a valid and enforceable contract for purchase of
property provided it was for the minor’s benefit but subject to the limitations of sect.29 of the Guardians
and Wards Act 1890 (India), a provision prohibiting guardians from undertaking certain property related
transactions without permission from the court.
40 Under sect. 30, Partnership Act, a minor can be admitted to the benefits of a partnership but cannot
be a partner or share liability with other partners. In Commissioner of Income Tax v Shah Mohandas
Sadhuram AIR 1966 SC 15 (India), it was held that a guardian can have the power to accept terms of the
partnership and do all that is necessary for a minor to obtain requisite benefit.
41 See e.g., Sri Kakulam Subrahmanyam v Kurra Subba Rao AIR 1948 PC 95 (India) where it was held
that specific performance was available by or against a minor for a contract entered by the guardian if
two conditions were satisfied (i) the contract was within the competence of the guardian to enter for the
minor (ii) the contract was for the minor’s benefit.
42 Raj Rani v Prem Adib (1949) 51 Bom. LR. 256 (India) (henceforth, ‘Cine Star’ case for the purpose of
this paper.).
43 Ibid., p. 260–261.
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minor’s obligation to serve.44 Second, a guardian cannot contract ‘on behalf’ of a
minor due to the law of agency.45
The High Court of Bombay treated the guardian as a minor’s agent and under
the ICA, a minor was incapable of employing an agent.46 Consequently, a ben-
eficial arrangement (except for necessaries) with a minor was not binding on the
other party, the guardian, or the minor. In contrast, a beneficial contract entered
by a guardian is binding on the minor in Australia and theUK.47 The entitlement
of minors to sue for compensation is premised on whether their performance is
executed or executory. Where performance has been completed (executed) for the
minors and the other party is unjustly enriched, the other party is required to restore
any benefit received or pay compensation.48 Where minors are yet to perform or
have partly performed (executory),49 say, under an arrangement where the other
party agrees to pay the minor after completing a film, tournament or any other per-
formance, the minor has no scope of suing for relief unless the case falls within lim-
ited exceptions discussed below.50
The Indian courts’ refusal to recognise validity of beneficial service contracts
is such a stringent approach that even equity cannot assist.51 By holding beneficial
contracts as void, courts felt that minors received an opportunity to walk away from
an obligation despite unfulfillment of the contract if they could obtain service at
more favourable terms with another party at a future date.52 The non-existence of a
legal contract with a minor in India extended to all service contracts. It was believed
that these benefits were not available to minors under common law (Australia and
the UK) as a minor could not repudiate a beneficial contract if better terms were
available.53
44 The authors hypothesise that the underlying rationale for unenforceability of service contracts entered
by guardians could be a non-delegable performance required from a minor in sports and entertainment.
The other party may seek more than a mere assurance from the minor’s guardian on performance given,
the minor carries a certain skill to play a sport or act in a film that another minor may not possess. This
is alsotrue for general service contracts that can be gleaned from the High Court of Bombay stating: “In
a contract of service, what the other party relies upon is the promise of the minor to serve and his actual
service from day to day. The employer agrees to pay the salary specified not merely because the father
has promised that the minor will serve in terms of the contract.” Cine Star case, p. 269.
45 Cine Star case, p. 264.
46 Section183, ICA.
47 Cine Star case, p. 264.
48 Section 70 ICA cited in Cine Star case, p. 264; Madhab Koeri v Baikuntha Karmaker 52 Ind. Cas.
338 (India) decided by the High Court of Patna.
49 Cine Star case, p. 265.
50 Ibid., p. 267–268.
51 At the time Mohori Bibee was decided, Sect.1 Infants Act was in force which declared minors’ con-
tracts for repayment of money or goods to be absolutely void. The legislation did not declare all contracts
with minors void but was limited to a specific category of lending or supply agreements that required a
minor to repay. Mohori Bibee was influenced by this legislation and the authors hypothesise that just as
equity could not come to the rescue of the mortgager due to legislative prescription in the UK, the Privy
Council held that the Indian legislative framework prevented any equitable relief.
52 Cine Star case, p. 269–270.
53 Ibid.
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
By declaring contracts as void ab initio, Indian courts felt they were providing
minors with discretion to take up service on more favourable terms, even though, the
first contract had not been completed and it was beneficial to the minor.54 However,
the rationale appears flawed. While a minor may walk away from the first contrac-
tual arrangement and enter a second, the second arrangement also suffers from the
same defect of unenforceability and continues until the age of majority, that is, the
second service contract would not be recognised under Indian law just like the first
contract and a minor could be entering new arrangements but not receive any recog-
nition for those services offered. It was a never-ending cycle that barely benefitted
or protected the minor. Rather, it created a hurdle for minors from being actively
recruited by a sporting or entertainment organisation through contracts.
The practical implications in sports and entertainment are many. As a result of
the stretched construction by the Privy Council adopted by Indian courts,55 minors
could neither ‘sue for contractual damages’ for what they believe were contracts,
nor could such an action be taken against them.56 Given the non-existence of any
contractual arrangement, minors were unable to ratify the contract upon attaining
majority. This arrangement left minors hapless insituations where they worked as
child actors or sportspersons. As seen in the Cine Star case, a film producer was
successfully able to avoid a partly executed work arrangement benefitting a minor
artist by contending non-existence of the contract. Despite the minor claiming that
she was willing to work on set, the court held that the film producer was not required
to pay damages for unpaid salary of INR 8,708.10 and consequently, a mere INR
791.54 was received for attending shootings and/or rehearsals.57
Exceptions
Arrangement forNecessaries
India considers ‘contracts’ for goods and services supplied to minors for necessaries
as quasi-contractual arrangements where the advantage received is restored from the
minor’s property and no personal liability accrues.58 Since India does not consider
an arrangement for necessaries as contracts, it would be futile to call them ‘contracts
for necessaries’.
54 Cine Star case, p. 270 per Desai, J. in the High Court of Bombay: “I take it to be the English law that
if a contract of service is beneficial to the minor at the date it is entered into, he is not entitled to repudi-
ate it, because of the better terms he may obtain at a future date. In Indian law, the contract being void,
he is at liberty to take up service on better terms, even while the first contract remains executory and
unfulfilled.”.
55 See e.g., Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary.
56 The general practice is for minors to commence legal proceedings through their guardians. See e.g.,
Cine Star case. Since rules of sporting organisations are not contracts in India, relief through civil suits
may not be available. Rather, it has been observed, minors take the route of constitutional remedies for
setting aside sporting rules as arbitrary or violative of their fundamental rights.
57 Cine Star case, p. 258.
58 Section68, ICA.
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S.Star, D.Dhankar
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While ‘necessaries’ have not been defined under the ICA, sect.68 provides that
if a person incapable of contracting is supplied with necessaries for maintaining his/
her condition in life, the supplier is required to be reimbursed from the property of
such incapable person.59 Suppliers who provide necessaries to a minor may claim
a remedy similar to restitution from property of the minor if the minor does not
compensate them. India has adopted the common law understanding of necessaries
which broadly means any goods or services suited to maintain the minor’s status,
degree, and station of life.60
Apart from medical and legal expenses,61 necessaries include school education,
teaching, and instruction.62 Indian courts have cited cases to acknowledge that a
minor accompanying a well-known athlete on tour would amount to an educational
experience so invaluable, it constituted a necessity.63
Apprenticeship Contracts
Contracts with apprentices are valid in India. The validity stems from express provi-
sions of the Apprentices Act64 and corresponding rules.65 An apprentice is a person,
at least fourteen years old, undergoing a training course pursuant to a contract of
apprenticeship.66
Apprenticeship contracts are executed by employers and guardians of the minor,
even though, a minor may have also signed the document.67 Guardians need not be
party to the apprenticeship contract under common law of Australia and the UK,
whereas they are required to be a signatory in India.68 Where an apprentice prema-
turely terminates the apprenticeship contract for failure to adhere to its terms and
conditions, the guardian is liable for training and other costs to the employer.69
59 Ibid.
60 Jagon Ram Marwari v Mahadeo Prosad Sahu (1909) 36 ILR Cal. 768 (India).
61 Watkins v Dhunnoo Baboo (1881) 7 ILR Cal 140 (India).
62 See e.g., Sadasheo Balaji v Firm Hiralal Ramgopal AIR 1938 Nag 65 (India); Smt G Umamahesh-
wari v Shiva Kumar (High Court of Karnataka, 7 December 2020) (although a case of family law, the
court declared school education as a necessity for minors).
63 Roberts v Gray referred in Cine Star case, p. 263.
64 Apprentices Act 1961 (India) (‘Apprentices Act’).
65 Apprenticeship Rules 1992 (India) (‘Apprenticeship Rules’).
66 Section2 (aa) and 3, Apprentices Act; Note that a person must be at least 18years for an apprentice-
ship in designated trades related to hazardous industries (Section3, Apprentices Act).
67 Section 4, Apprentices Act; See the Model Contract of Apprenticeship Training for Major/ Minor
Apprentices under Schedule III of the Apprenticeship Rules which contains space for both guardians and
apprentices to sign.
68 Mukesh K. Tripathi v Senior Divisional Manager, L.I.C. (2004) 3 LLJ 740 (India), para. 30 (‘Mukesh
Tripathi v Senior Divisional Manager, L.I.C’) where the Supreme Court of India cited Halsbury’s Laws
of England, 4th ed., vol. 16, 2003 to provide the common law positionon apprenticeships; Sect. 4,
Apprentices Act.
69 Sections 7 and 11, Apprentices Act read with rule 6, Apprenticeship Rules; U.P. State Electricity
Board v Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 402 (India) para. 106.
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
Apprenticeships can be offered to minors under designated or optional trades.70 In
India, the list of designated trades or optional trades do not include training minors
as sports players or actors. The closest to these field, are apprenticeship opportu-
nities as a photographer and sports goods maker in wood and leather (Directorate
General of Training 2021a; Directorate General of Training 2021b). Conversely, in
Australia and the UK training may be provided to minors as sports players by rec-
ognised institutes,71 and may include apprenticeships in sporting excellence, sports
development, community arts and technical roles in films (National Apprenticeship
Service 2021; National Careers Institute 2021). For instance, David Beckham com-
menced his career as an apprentice with Manchester United at the age of sixteen
(Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry 2019: p. 53) and Sir Ian
McKellen, an actor known for his role in the Lord of Rings, began as an apprentice
with Coventry’s Belgrade Theatre (Weaver 2019).
In all three jurisdictions, an apprenticeship contract is binding if it is for the
minor’s benefit.72 Conceptually, it seems paradoxical that Indian law recognises
an apprenticeship contract as valid if a guardian executes it on behalf of a minor,
whereas a contract for professional service with a minor is void, even if, it is for the
minor’s benefit.
Scholarships, Stipends andPrize Money
Minors may receive payments as stipends or scholarship funds for their services. In
Sheri Rusi Crawford v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association,73 a sixteen-year-old
tennis player received a scholarship from Dena Bank pursuant to which she provided
an undertaking to play on behalf of the bank in various tournaments (The Telegraph
2001). In exchange, Sheri was ‘paid’ a monthly stipend.74 While the case was con-
cerned with whether a sports federation had taken arbitrary decisions, the High
Court of Bombay took note of an emerging practice of banks formulating ‘a scheme
of recruitment for outstanding sportspersons’ in consultation with the Central Gov-
ernment where minors between 15–18 years were provided scholarship money
not exceeding clerical salary.75 Similarly, the state cricket federations have offered
‘central contracts’ (Firstpost 2019) in the nature of a scholarship schemes, offering
minors ‘remuneration’ to help them grow and concentrate on the game (Raj 2020;
Gupta 2020). As such, there is clearly a practice of entering into scholarship and
70 Sections2(e) and 2(ll), Apprentices Act.
71 In the UK, institutes listed under the Register of Apprenticeship Training can provide apprenticeship
in sports per the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009 (UK) read with the Appren-
ticeships (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2017 (UK) and Apprenticeships (Form of Apprentice-
ship Agreement) Regulations 2012 (UK). In Australia, Registered Training Organisations make appren-
ticeship opportunities available per sect.3 National Vocational Education and Training Regulator Act
2011 (Cth) and sect.16A, Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act 2001 (NSW) (‘Traineeship Act’).
72 Mukesh Tripathi v Senior Divisional Manager, L.I.C, para. 29; sect.32, Traineeship Act 2001 (NSW);
De Francesco v Barnum.
73 Sheri Rusi Crawford v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association LNIND 2002 BOM 634 (India) (‘Sheri
Rusi Crawford v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association’).
74 Sheri Rusi Crawford v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association, para. 2.
75 Ibid., para. 5.
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S.Star, D.Dhankar
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stipend agreements with minors in the sports industry in India (See further, Rathore
2018).76
While contracts of service with minors are void, children may voluntarily par-
ticipate in competition-like arrangements on reality television shows without remu-
neration. In some events, prize money may be awarded to the winner. The case of
Zee Entertainment v Sony Pictures Networks India Pvt Ltd,77 although a copyright
infringement case, is an illustration of how this works in practice. This case involved
a group of children (between 5 and 12years old) participating in a talent competi-
tion on a television show called ‘India’s Best Dramebaaz’. The children performed
before a panel of judges who ultimately declared the winner. Interestingly, the tele-
vision channel required “contestants” (who were children) to execute contracts with
them. However, if challenged, contracts with minors are unlikely to be enforceable
unless brought within an ‘exception’ or a statute.
Statutory andRegulatory Provisions
In addition to the ICA, other statutes govern contracts with minors in certain limited
circumstances. Focused on protecting the welfare of children, such statutes presup-
pose the validity of legally binding contracts with minors. For instance, under the
Pledging Act, contracts by guardians pledging the labour of a child are void, except
in limited circumstances.78 Under the OSHWC Code79 adolescents fourteen years
and over but below eighteen years are permitted to work in a factory only where
strict procedures are followed.80 Departments without a manufacturing process
where wages are ordinarily payable to a certain number of workers in film studios
were unlikely to be classified as factories according to the High Court of Madras
which considered the argument that if film studios were factories, films with roles
for children below the age of fourteen could not be undertaken and “a Shirley Tem-
ple could never act in a studio”.81
76 Including schemes led by the Sports Authority of India (SAI) such as the National Sports Talent Con-
test (NSTC) Scheme, and the SAI Training Centre, under which a stipend is received by minors. The sti-
pend offered to the minor in Sheri Rusi Crawford v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association was pursuant
to a joint scheme between Dena Bank and the Central Government.
77 Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd v Sony Pictures Networks India Pvt Ltd AIR 2017 Bom 221 (India)
(‘Zee Entertainment v Sony Pictures Networks India Pvt Ltd’).
78 Sections2–3, Children (Pledging of Labour) Act 1933 (India) (‘Pledging Act’). The Pledging Act has
been repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act 2016 (India): contracts are void unless (i) they are not
detrimental to the child, and (ii) the only benefit received under the contract is reasonable wages for the
services provided.
79 Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 (India) (‘OSHWC Code’).
80 Sections25(4), 32(1),33, 42(2) 93(2) OSHWC Code.
81 K.Y.V. Sarma, In re. Appellant Versus (1953) 1 LLJ 29 (India).
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
The law with respect to child artists substantially changed in, and after 2016
when the Child Labour Act and its accompanying rules were amended.82 The Child
Labour Act places a general prohibition on employing or permitting a child to work
in any occupation except a child artist in an audio-visual industry, including films or
television programmes, or participating in sports as an athlete.83
Even if a contract includes provisions safeguarding a child’s welfare and safety,
the contract will be considered void ab initio and unenforceable unless exceptions
apply. Rather, Child Labour Rules appear to have taken a step in protecting child art-
ists by requiring production houses and event organisers to follow minimum stand-
ards to ensure welfare of the child in sports and entertainment.84
Australia85 and the UK86 regulate the employment of children in creative pro-
cesses similar to India. However, in India a number of anomalies arise where juris-
prudence from cases on contract law appears to contradict existing practice, and leg-
islative frameworks. For instance, an anomaly arises between the Cine Star case and
Child Labour Rules. Given the interpretation of the ICA by Indian courts, service
contracts with minors are not recognised under general contract law and there can
be no agreement governing the minor’s income or terms of work. On the other hand,
the Child Labour Rules require 20% of the income earned by a child from the pro-
duction or (sporting) event to be deposited in the minor’s bank account.87 In such a
case, the income could be minimum wages or as agreed by the parties. However, the
production house or sporting event organiser could contend that service contracts
with minors (or their guardians) are unenforceable and consequently, only minimum
wages are payable under law. This is not the case in Australia and the UK that allow
minors to claim remuneration as agreed between the parties under beneficial service
contracts which are valid.
A second anomaly arises between the Pledging Act and the decision in the Cine
Star case. Under the Pledging Act, guardians may enter agreements pledging the
services of their child if the benefit received under contract is wages for child’s
service. However, the Cine Star case holds service contracts entered by guardians
as void due to lack of consideration. Here, the statute assumes that guardians can
82 Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 (India) (‘Child Labour Act’),
amended by the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Amendment Act 2016 (India); Child Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Rules 1988 (India) (‘Child Labour Rules’), amended by the Child Labour
(Prohibition and Regulation) Amendment Rules 2017 (India). Section2(ii), Child Labour Act defines a
child as a person who has not completed the age of fourteen years or an age prescribed under the Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 (India), whichever is more.
83 Section3, Child Labour Act.
84 Including (i) taking responsibility for a child’s safety and security (Rule 2C(1)(b), Child Labour
Rules); (ii) ensuring prescribed maximum working hours are adhered to and school attendance is not sig-
nificantly impeded (Rule 2C(1) (a) & (d), Child Labour Rules); and (iii) requiring a certain proportion of
a child’s income to be placed in a fixed deposit in their favour (Rule 2C(1)(f), Child Labour Rules.
85 In Australia, children in creative processes are regulated by State-specific legislations. See e.g., Chil-
dren and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) and Child Protection (Working with
Children) Act 2012 (NSW).
86 In UK, see e.g., Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (UK), Children and Young Persons Act 1963
(UK), and The Children (Performances and Activities) (England) Regulations 2014 (UK).
87 Rule 2C(1)(f), Child Labour Rules.
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S.Star, D.Dhankar
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contract for employment on behalf of minors, but interpretation of the ICA high-
lights that such contracts are often void. Further, the Child Labour Rules require the
production house or event organiser to provide certain welfare and safety measures
but a minor sportsperson seeking to negotiate specific clauses on sporting equip-
ment, food or energy drinks may find such clauses unenforceable and confined to
basic requirements provided by employment law.
A third anomaly arises between the Child Labour Rules which recognise that a
child is capable of providing legal consent to participate in an audio-visual or sport-
ing activity88 and the ICA where a child lacks legal capacity and understanding to
provide valid consent.
A fourth anomaly arises between Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary and the Cine
Star case. Pursuant to the decision in the Cine Star case, service contracts executed
by guardians on behalf of minors were void due to the absence of good considera-
tion. Conversely, in Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary, although a case on mortgage,
contracts executed by guardians on behalf of minors may be valid. This means
Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary recognises the ability of guardians to provide valid
consideration. However, Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary neither discusses the general
issue of consideration observed in the Cine Star case nor mentions the case itself.
This is also true for the Cine Star case where the Pledging Act is neither cited nor
considered requiring a revisitation for being per incurium.
Other Exceptions
Other exceptions to the rule that contracts with minors are void ab initio include
marriage contracts, and (historically) contracts for transfers that benefit minors.
Marriage contracts under special custom89 and personal law90 can be enforced in
India.91 In cases of marriage under specific customs, guardians are permitted to contrac-
tually bind minors but in commercial matters92 on contract of sale for immovable prop-
erty, they are not competent to bind the minor or his estate. While various High Courts93
88 Rule 2C(1)(g), Child Labour Rules.
89 Notwithstanding, Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 (India) (‘Child Marriage Act’) where a
marriage between a male below the age of twenty-one years and a female below the age of eighteen
years is a punishable offence, Indian courts have permitted minors (upon attaining the age of majority) to
enforce a marriage arrangement entered by their guardians. See e.g., Rose Fernandez v Joseph Gonsalves
AIR 1925 Bom 97 (India); Khimji Kuverji v Lalji Karamsi AIR 1941 Bom 129 (India) and Tulshiram
S/O Maroti Kohad v Roopchand S/O Laxman Ninawe AIR 2006 Bom 183 (India). The Child Marriage
Act makes a child marriage voidable at the option of the contracting party, that is, the minor at the time
of marriage but these marriages can be declared void in certain circumstances.
90 Abdul Razak v Mahomed Hussen (1916) 19 Bom. L.R. 164 (India).
91 Cine Star case, p. 270.
92 Mir Sarwarjan v Fakhruddin Chowdhuri (1912) 39 Ind App 1 (PC) (India).
93 See e.g., A.T. Raghava Chariar v O.A. Srinivasa Raghava Chariar (1917) 40 ILR Mad 308 (India)
where a minor was permitted to enforce a transfer under a mortgage where the entire mortgage amount
had been advanced by him.
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219
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
have considered transfers of property that benefit a minor to be valid, this was overruled
in 2014 by the Supreme Court in Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary.94
Sporting Rules asContracts: Analysis From India
Despite courts refusing to recognise the validity of contracts with minors in India,
they enter arrangements with sports organisations while playing tournaments. In the
absence of contracts, rules of sports organisations formulated privately and with-
out legislative or executive force have been found to govern minor sports players.
Some commentators have argued that sporting rules are an alternate form of con-
tracts requiring ‘contractual submission’ (Sullivan 2016: 66) from minor athletes
when they consent to participate in the sporting activity. These rules embed their
own set of terms and conditions that bind athletes by virtue of their participation in a
sport– akin to a unilateral contract.95
Indian courts have considered rules established by sporting bodies as binding
on minors, such as mandatory medical tests to determine age of an athlete, rather
than declaring such rules void ab initio like contracts. However, the common law
approach of finding minors’ contract invalid in order to protect them seems contra-
dictory to permitting sporting rules to apply. If minors lack the ability to understand
the legal nature of contracts, by the same token, they should lack the ability to com-
prehend sporting rules that are often written with the same complexity and flair for
legalese.
Interestingly, while deciding cases on validity of medical tests in age disputes
of minors, High Courts have held that national sport federations have the power to
make rules with respect to eligibility and selection of athletes, including minors.96
In Sagar Prakash v BCCI,97 a minor (represented by his father), raised concerns on
scientific tests performed pursuant to rules formulated by the Board of Control for
Cricket in India (‘BCCI’), a private society rather than any government authority.
The High Court of Bombay held that such rules were not arbitrary or discrimina-
tory, and tests conducted under the rules were “valid and binding”.98 There were two
reasons for the decision, first, adoption of a ‘National Code Against Age Frauds in
94 Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary, para. 18: The Supreme Court of India observed that it was an errone-
ous position of law to find minors as mortgagees despite transfer of property being in their interest. Con-
tracts with minors were void abinitio and consequently, no rights (presumably, rights to transfer) could
be claimed under the mortgage deed.
95 An analogy can be drawn with Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 QB 256 (UK) where an
offer made to the world at large (such as an offer to participate in a sporting competition for a reward)
leads to a valid contract called a unilateral contract by performing conditions contained in the offer with-
out communicating express acceptance to the other party. While a unilateral contract can be formed
between an adult athlete and organisers of a sports competition, it cannot be formed with minors due to
their lack of capacity to contractin India.
96 See Judge (2020).
97 Master Sagar Prakash Chhabria v The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) 2015 Indlaw
Mum 1606 (India) (‘Sagar Prakash v BCCI’).
98 Ibid., para. 16 & 24.
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S.Star, D.Dhankar
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Sports’, and second, the policy rationale of reducing age fraud through age verifica-
tion tests.99
In Yash Sehrawat v BCCI,100 a similar case of age dispute, the High Court of
Delhi somewhat departed from this view by holding, if documentary evidence is
found authentic, it was valid proof age, notwithstanding medical procedures under
various sports codes.101 Despite these conflicting decisions, courts seem willing to
accept that minors are not bound by contracts with sporting bodies but they are sub-
ject to private rules formulated by sporting federations if consistent with applicable
statutory provisions.
Apart from age disputes, Indian courts have declared sporting rules legal, even
in, the absence of an express contract. In BCCI v Cricket Association of Bihar,102
the Supreme Court of India noted that players and teams were subject to applica-
ble rules prescribed by the BCCI. The rules stated that participation in the Indian
Premier League (IPL) was deemed to constitute acceptance by the cricketer “of an
agreement with an obligation owed to BCCI to be bound by the regulations, the
laws of cricket…”103 These rules are applicable to all cricketers, including minors.
Indeed, a numberof minors have participated in the IPL, including budding cricket-
ers who first played at the age of seventeen years — Rahul Chahar (Swag Cricket
2022), Abhishek Sharma (Sportstar 2018a), Sarfaraz Khan (Choudhury 2015),
Riyan Prayag (The Hindu 2019) and Mujeeb Ur Rahman (Sportstar 2018b). There
is also Prayas Ray Barman, who made his debut at the age of sixteen (Scroll 2019).
Following BCCI v Cricket Association of Bihar, the BCCI’s applicable rules would
be considered binding on each of these minors as participants in the IPL, despite
the fact that the law does not typically recognise a contract between the minor and
organiser.
Disciplinary rules apply to minors in sport. In Kemee v UOI104 minors who were
state and national level chess players allegedly created nuisance and used derogatory
language against officers of the state chess federation. The players were suspended
for two years during pendency of the suit against them. The High Court of Himachal
Pradesh observed that a broader outlook was warranted by the state federation in
99 Ibid., para. 24. The National Code Against Age Frauds was adopted by Sports by the Ministry of
Youth Affairs and Sports. This Code permits a method of assessing age through skeletal maturity of
players to ensure competitiveness through a level playing field (consistent with the TW-3 test used for
determining age).
100 Yash Sehrawat v Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) LNIND 2013 DEL 1736 (India)
(‘Yash Sehrawat v BCCI’).
101 Under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000 (India) (‘Juvenile Justice Act’,
now repealed) read with Rule 12(3), Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Rules 2007 (India)
[now repealed], the Central Government listed specific documents as evidence of age. The High Court of
Delhi observed that the BCCI had undermined the credibility of documentary proof by assuming such
evidence was falsified without assessing its genuineness and resting its decision solely on the outcome of
the TW-3 test provided by its sporting rules. It held that documentary evidence should be considered if a
minor is found ineligible under the TW-3 test.
102 Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) v Cricket Association of Bihar LNIND 2015 SC 49
(India) (‘BCCI v Cricket Association of Bihar’).
103 Ibid., paras. 48–49.
104 Kemee v Union of India (UOI) 2019 Indlaw HP 1488 (India) (‘Kemee v UOI’).
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
such matters. It noted that indiscipline could not be tolerated under federations rules
and may result in sanction but the inability of minors to participate in chess tourna-
ments for two years was enough for the matter to rest and for suspension to be lifted.
National and state sport federations establish rules that govern what participants
in a sport can (and cannot) do. By participating in a sport, all players (including
minors) consent to rules formulated by these federations. The High Court of Bom-
bay has found federations to have ‘monopolistic status’ and.
“[w]ithout the approval of the Federation, no-one in India can play in any
recognised tournaments or even represent India abroad in any of the tourna-
ments”.105
In some instances, rules of private sporting bodies like the BCCI and tennis asso-
ciations have been referred as “laws”.106 India allows the application of such rules,
regardless of intention to create legal relations since the rules apply without any
existence of a contract. On the other hand, in Australia if the rule-making body is
an unincorporated voluntary association in amateur sports, courts are reluctant to
find a contract between the sports association and an athlete due to the absence of
a clear positive indication from the sporting association to create legal relations for
an enforceable contract.107 However, if the rule making body has a monopoly over
an athlete’s right to participate in a sport and takes disciplinary action, the courts are
likely to find that parties intended to enter a legally enforceable contract.108
In Australia and the UK, if a minor is aggrieved with a contractual matter, the
recourse available is easier to obtain. The minor can file a civil suit. With non-exist-
ence of their contract in India and limitations on forming arrangements with fed-
eration or professional sporting bodies, it follows that minors have limited recourse
to challenge decisions of these organisations, and instead, rely on internal dispute
resolution procedures. Occasionally, a minor athlete may seek redressal from sport-
ing rules or codes by invoking the court’s writ jurisdiction under constitutional law,
claiming sporting rules violate their constitutional rights.109
Constitutional writs are perceived as time consuming and confined to a narrow
scope of cases or relief (see Rigozzi etal. 2003).110 To qualify for meeting the writ
jurisdiction, the minor needs to prove that the sporting organisation is either a state
or performs a public function. While sport federations have been found to fall within
the writ jurisdiction of Indian courts due their monopolistic control and public func-
tion, it may be difficult for a minor to bring legal action against private leagues not
105 Sheri Rusi Crawford v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association, para. 22.
106 Sheri Rusi Crawford v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association, paras 13–15.
107 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 (Australia) cited in Sullivan (2010: 5).
108 Rush v W A Amateur Football Club Inc [2001] WASC 154 (Australia) cited in Sullivan (2010:7).
109 Often, minors seek a writ against the sporting organisation for violating Art. 14 of the Indian Consti-
tution guaranteeing them equality and equal protection of the law under Art. 32 or 226 from the Supreme
Court or High Court, respectively.
110 It should be noted that athletes (including minors) across the world have access to domestic courts if
they allege that their human rights have been violated. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights
is another forum often used by athletes who have accused sporting bodies, including WADA.
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S.Star, D.Dhankar
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found to carry a public function.111 The writ jurisdiction primarily allows for an
arbitrary rule or decision of the sporting organisation to be set aside but may not pro-
vide relief for damages or specific performance available under contract law. Often
a contention raised by sporting organisations is the inapplicability of the court’s writ
jurisdiction on them that further complicates the process.
The Global Conundrum ofAnti‑Doping Rules
Some sporting rules are long and complex. They include provisions with legal impli-
cations such as the NADA Rules112 and the WADA Code,113 which are more than
fifty and hundred pages, respectively. These regulations do not appear to be written
in plain language suitable for minors to understand. Similar anti-doping rules are
applicable to minors in Australia, India and the UK.
In Australia, the WADA Code is applied nationally through legislation.114 While,
India and the UK have embedded it through anti-doping rules instead of adopting
the legislative pathway.115 The WADA Code, NADA Rules and relevant national
anti-doping rules are applicable to numerous stakeholders, including national sport
federations, athletes and athlete support personnel.116 Even though minor athletes do
not enter a contract directly with WADA or NADA by signing the WADA Code or
NADA Rules, they are bound by them indirectly when they consent to participate in
the sporting activity and are taken to have “agreed to and be bound by these Anti-
Doping Rules, and to have submitted to the authority of NADA to enforce these
Anti-Doping Rules, including any Consequences for the breach thereof”.117
The WADA Code and NADA Rules assume that minors are capable of providing
consent, including consent to the dope-testing regime, consequences of non-compli-
ance and mandatory arbitration framework set up under the WADA Code. As such,
minor athletes are bound by the complex legal nuances of the anti-doping regula-
tions by virtue of their participation in a recognised sport.
Apart from being bound by sporting rules, the WADA Code places certain
responsibilities on minor athletes by requiring them to be “… knowledgeable of and
comply with all applicable anti-doping policies and rules adopted pursuant to the
[WADA] Code …”118 and to “… be available for Sample collection at all times.”119
Minor athletes are also responsible for ensuring any medical treatment received does
not violate anti-doping rules and the WADA Code. The stringency of responsibility
111 See e.g., Zee Telefilms Ltd. v Union India (2005) 4 SCC 649 (India) (cricket), Sheri Rusi Crawford
v Mumbai City Table Tennis Association (table tennis); Kerala Football Association [KFA] v Dilsha
LNIND 2018 KER 18652 (India) (football).
112 National Anti-Doping Rules 2021 (‘NADA Rules’).
113 World Anti-Doping Code 2021 (‘WADA Code’).
114 Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority Act 2006 (Cth).
115 See e.g., NADA Rules; 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules (UK).
116 See e.g., WADA Code, p. 17 and NADA Rules, p. 4.
117 NADA Rules - ‘Scope of these Anti-Doping Rules’, p. 4.
118 Article 21.1.1, WADA Code.
119 Article 21.1.2, WADA Code.
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
on such athletes extends to a requirement on them to inform medical practitioners
about their (minor athlete’s) obligation not to use prohibited substances.120
Due to athletic responsibilities and the binding nature of sporting rules, a sixteen-
year-old Indian tennis player was recently suspended by the National Anti-Doping
Agency (NADA) for testing positive to a banned substance during an in-competition
test (Press Trust of India 2019). The suspension was eventually lifted after NADA
was convinced that the minor unknowingly ingested the substance contained in
a medicine (Mumbai Mirror 2019). However, the case highlights that minors are
bound by anti-doping rules endorsed by the Indian government, applicable to all ath-
letes. An analogy can be drawn with the case of Andreea Raducan, where a sixteen-
year-old gymnast was stripped of her gold medal for failing a dope test.121 She alleg-
edly ingested two Nurofen tablets for headache and a running nose prescribed by her
medical practitioner. The Court of Arbitration for Sport stated that it had jurisdiction
to try and decide the matter on the basis of an entry form signed by the gymnast
where she “agree[d] to comply with the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code in
force at the time of the Olympic Games”.122 Doping is a strict liability offence and
mere presence of a prohibited substance was sufficient to hold the minor at fault.
Personal circumstances such as intention, age, or lack of competitive advan-
tage received by the minor are not required to prove liability for a doping viola-
tion (although these might be mitigating factors in reducing the sanction). Such
decisions run counter to the stringent protection offered by law in Australia, India
and the UK. Accordingly, minors are being bound by contract-like arrangements,
being subject to anti-doping tests should they wish to play sport and awarded strin-
gent sanctions, similar to adults without regard to age. Although, under the recent
amendments to the WADA Code, minors are typically considered “protected per-
sons” and may receive a reduced sanction for a doping violation (Kambhampati &
Star 2021),123 nevertheless, they are strictly liable for any violation of the rules. In
such circumstances, the issue of procedural fairness is particularly important (Star &
Kelly 2021).
It could be argued that sporting rules like the WADA Code are akin to contracts
that bind minors but without the minor’s direct acceptance. At least in the contrac-
tual space, privity of contract comes to the rescue to save a person from an obliga-
tion that was not accepted by them, but no such respite is seen for sporting rules. In
fact, contractual breaches may be perceived less severe than strict liability of sport-
ing rules where minors have been suspended or stripped of medals without knowl-
edge or intention to ingest prohibited substances that violated the sporting rules. If
protecting minors is the fundamental principle of law, there is an imbalance between
sporting rules and statutory regulations that expose minors to harsh consequences
120 Article 21.1.4, WADA Code.
121 Andreea Raducan v International Olympic Committee (IOC), Court of Arbitration for Sport, Arbitra-
tion CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Sydney) 00/011, award of 28 September 2000).
122 Ibid., p. 4.
123 Article 10.3, WADA Code. Note that a “protected person” includes an athlete under the age of 16, or
an athlete under the age of 18 who is not included in any registered testing pool and has never competed
in an international event in an open category.
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224
S.Star, D.Dhankar
1 3
or recognise their ability to work as child artists, on one hand, and contract law, on
the other, that holds minors need protection from making decisions they are legally
incapable of understanding and as a consequence, they cannot enter contracts.
General Application forMinors inSport andEntertainment
The business of sport and entertainment has evolved into a global industry. Child
actors and young athletes are an important part of the sport and entertainment eco-
system. Even though, sporting rules present complex challenges, many, envisage
welfare measures protecting players. However, in emerging sports with little or no
rules, minors are left vulnerable if their contracts containing consumer protection
and athlete welfare clauses are not recognised by jurisdictions due to legal inca-
pacity (See e.g., Kelly etal. 2021; Derrington etal. 2021: 302–332). For instance,
esports has become popular with younger demographics (Star and Bakshi, 2021).
Due to the lack of a global governing body (Kelly etal. 2021), esports players can
only rely on the protection afforded by domestic legislation and common law.
In Australia and the UK, youth engaged in esports tournaments can form pro-
fessional service contracts and claim contractual protection whereas in India, such
contracts would not be recognised under general contract law. In practice, guard-
ians of esports players are likely to sign contracts in India and if such contracts are
in the nature of service contracts, they will be void by application of the Cine Star
case, although, they may receive validity under personal law. Other options are to
demonstrate e-sports arrangements as apprenticeships or necessaries which may not
be easy to prove as e-sports is not recognised as a designated or optional trade for
the purpose of apprenticeships in India; nor could it be claimed as a necessary. As
such, there is very little protection available to minor esports players or teams seek-
ing to retain them in India unless they bring their case under an exception. Simi-
lar concerns of contracts rendered void ab initio emerge for the other party when
minors accept terms and services on e-commerce websites and social media (See
e.g., Gangwar 2022).
With legal systems presenting different levels of protection for minors; private
international governing bodies and sporting institutions have established their own
sets of rules to protect minors. For instance, the international governing body for
football, has established the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfers of Players
(RSTP), prohibiting the international transfer of minors,124 except in certain limited
circumstances.125 The RSTP were implemented by FIFA to prevent “… the expo-
sure of young players to emotional and physical harm, financial exploitation, and
human trafficking through engaging with football has been documented” (Yilmaz
2018: 15–28; Esson 2015: 1383–1397; Stafford et al., 2015: 121–137; Eliasson
2017: 470–496).
124 Article 19(1), FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players 2021.
125 Ibid., Art. 19(2).
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
Applying Article 19 of the RSTP, a number of international clubs have been
sanctioned by FIFA for violating international transfer rules for minors (for further
reading, see e.g., Yilmaz 2018: 15–18).126 Some form of professional service con-
tracts with minors are recognised in jurisdictions like Australia and the UK but con-
tracts with international clubs might not be permitted until the footballer reaches the
age of majority. One reason could be strict rules on international transfers for minor
footballers under FIFA’s policies. In India, the question of professional service con-
tracts with minors for purpose of international transfers does not arise.
Entering professional service contracts with sporting clubs or endorsement con-
tracts with brands for receiving remuneration is available to minors in Australia
and UK. These contracts are likely to be considered beneficial contracts of service,
assuming their terms and conditions are not onerous for the athlete. However, in
India, such contracts are unlikely to be valid- beneficial or not. Despite this, minors
have commenced professional careers and endorsed brands in arrangements that
would, ordinarily, be considered contracts had they been adults. For example, at
the age of sixteen, Sachin Tendulkar endorsed Johnson & Johnson’s, BAND-AID®
product line (Hector & Mithel 2013; Dasgupta 2013). He also commenced his
cricket career before reaching the age of majority. Minor sports players take the risk
posed by the non-existence of service contracts by trusting the other party to fulfil
their bargain. Contractual remedies may not be available to minors due to their lack
of capacity that prevents contract formation and consequently, prevents the availabil-
ity of contractual remedies. Further, quasi-contractual remedies similar to restitution
may be availed by minors only where they have completed the brand endorsement or
participated in the sporting event.
The rationale for a minor’s incompetence to contract stems from the lack of
understanding legal and other nuances in contract. Yet, the High Court of Bombay
in Sagar Prakash v BCCI considered evidence that was “sufficient to indicate that
the Petitioner [minor] had knowledge of these rules and the policy.”127 The WADA
Code takes a step further by placing the responsibility on minor athletes to be
knowledgeable about the anti-doping rules and ensure compliance personally and
from medical practitioners treating them. If minors are capable of having knowledge
that leads them to be bound by sporting rules and policies, it is an axiomatic anom-
aly for Indian courts to insist their contracts are non-existent by virtue of incapabil-
ity of understanding legal nuances. It has been acknowledged that protecting minors
is the aim of Indian law, but like other jurisdictions, strict liability of sporting rules
applies where the defence to an allegation of doping is on the balance of probabili-
ties equally for adults and minors (Kleiderman etal., 2020: 179–187).
The current contractual regime in India tips the balance away from minors in
Sagar Prakash v BCCI seeking to pursue cricket as a profession at an early age128
126 Examples include allegations against Manchester City (2019) and other franchises which were found
to have violated rules with respect to international transfer of minors - Real Madrid (2015); FC Barce-
lona (2014); B. FC Midtjylland (2009); FC Cadiz (2005).
127 Sagar Prakash v BCCI, para. 10.
128 Sagar Prakash v BCCI, para. 5.
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226
S.Star, D.Dhankar
1 3
by rendering their service contract with sporting bodies- void ab initio. This means
specific clauses on remuneration, health and sporting equipment, which may ben-
efit a minor but, may not be classified as a necessity, are unenforceable. A conflict
further arises in continuity of schooling endorsed by the Child Labour Rules that
places a responsibility on the event or tournament organisers to ensure no child
faces discontinuity in education or works more than 27 consecutive days beyond
five hours a day.129 There are serious concerns that if a minor ‘works’ in a sporting
tournament for more than five hours the tournament organiser could be in violation
of Child Labour Rules. In this background, there is a pressing need for India to con-
sider reform. For instance, if a minor receives remuneration similar to junior sports
players in Australia and the UK under a voidable contract, the minor could direct
remuneration for building sporting skills, spending funds on better sporting equip-
ment and taking care of family.
Concluding Remarks: Considering anAgenda forReform
Indian contract law fails to acknowledge that minors participate in society, while the
Child Labour Act and accompanying rules accept that minors work in the sports and
entertainment industry. Rather, it has made it more onerous for minors to hold the
other party to their promise and be bound by it, made it easier for the other party to
renege their promise to the detriment of the minor, and made it harder for willing
minors to enforce their promise, even if the arrangement was for their benefit.
Regardless of one’s views on the Privy Council’s decision, legislation, particu-
larly in Indian employment law has sought to provide some welfare protection to
minors that ‘beneficial contracts’ might have otherwise provided. Yet, welfare pro-
tections and minimum wages cover only a portion of the terms in a professional
contract, whereas other important terms such as nature of the work, equipment and
other specialised needs are not covered by legislation.
India’s deviation can be explained better through a historical journey of British
India. Sir Henry Maine130 (See Stokes 1887–1888: ix–xxviii) described the purpose
of the ICA as enacting a code of substantive law based on English contractual prin-
ciples but modified to accommodate the people of India (House of Commons UK
1867: 86). Apart from statutory interpretation in Mohori Bibee described by Pollock
& Mulla as “their Lordships considered themselves free to act on their own view”
(Pollock & Mulla 1909: 55), the deviation can be credited to its consistency with
personal law.131 Commentaries on the ICA written after its enactment and before
Mohori Bibee demonstrate that seeds for holding the non-existence of contracts with
minors due to incapacity were sown much earlier than the Privy Council’s decision
in 1903. A commentary from 1879 stated that under Hindu law, minors could not
form contracts themselves nor have one entered for them unless authorised by law
129 Rule 2C(1)(a) &(d) Child Labour Rules.
130 Member of the Council of India credited with laying the groundwork for the ICA.
131 Mohori Bibee, p. 549–550.
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
out of legal necessity (Sutherland 1879). Similarly, under Islamic law, minors lacked
capacity sui juris to undertake a contractual debt or engage in any non-beneficial
transaction without a guardian’s consent (Sutherland 1879: 17). A commentary pub-
lished in 1874 had gone further to declare that English law differed from its Indian
counterpart by holding contracts with minors as voidable while they were absolutely
void in India (Macrae 1874: 16).
India follows Mohori Bibee to the book where restitution under sect.64 ICA for
voidable contracts and sect.65 ICA for void contracts does not apply to minors due
to the non-existence of their contract.132 On the other hand, Malaysia allows a minor
to benefit from the remedy of restitution under sect.66 Contracts Act, 1950 as seen
in Leha Binte Jusoh v Awang where the Federal Court of Malaysia (‘Federal Court’)
followed Mohori Bibee to hold contracts with minors, void ab initio but deviated
on the issue of available remedies in a specific situation: where a minor enters an
agreement of sale, pays the complete purchase price for the property and takes pos-
session, the contract of sale is void. To find a constructive trust with administratrix
of the deceased seller holding the property on behalf of the minor (beneficiary to the
property) would amount to enforcing a void ab initio contract which was not ten-
able. Instead, without providing reasons, the administratrix of the seller’s estate was
ordered to repay the complete purchase price provided by the minor at the time of
purchase pursuant to sect.66 Contracts Act 1950 which is pari materia to sect.65
ICA.
From the perspective of sports and entertainment, the Malaysian position resolves
part of the problem. Even if India considers restitution as a potential remedy under
sect.65 ICA, it will apply when the minor has provided the other party with some
benefit (executed agreements) rather than awaiting performance (executory arrange-
ments). This is because under executory agreements, the minor will need to prove
unjust enrichment by the other party through evidence that may not be easily avail-
able. Further sect. 70 ICA provides a quasi-contractual remedy where a person
providing a non-gratuitous benefit to another can claim compensation or have the
benefit returned. The law is still to develop appropriate remedies or recourse for
executory service arrangements with minors on just and equitable grounds. In such
a situation, there are two potential reformative actions to align India with practical
realities of society. First, courts could reinterpret existing statutory provisions, and
second, legislative reform can be adopted.
Adopt aSimilar Approach toAustralia andtheUK
Apart from minors’ contracts, it has been observed that India continues to follow
traditional, albeit antiquated methods of interpretation to uphold validity of exemp-
tion clauses (Khanderia, 2022). As such, there is a growing need for the legislature
132 Since a contract with a minor does not exist, there is no contractual remedy such as restitution. See
Mohori Bibee, p. 548: “It is sufficient to say that this section [sect.65], like Section64, starts from the
basis of there being an agreement or contract between competent parties, and has no application to a
case in which there never was, and never could have been, any contract.”.
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228
S.Star, D.Dhankar
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and judiciary to take an interest in adopting interpretations in consonance with con-
temporary needs for different concepts under the ICA.
The interpretation in the UK and Australia aims to strike a balance between the
interest of minors and the other contracting party (Shannon and Hunter, 2015:1190).
With a view of protecting minors, contracts are voidable at their option allowing
them to repudiate and exit the transaction. However, to prevent minors from declar-
ing contracts void when a benefit is received from the other party, common law
holds beneficial contracts for minors valid and enforceable. This was seen in Doyle
v White City Stadium where a minor was not permitted to repudiate a contract if
the benefit received was remuneration for making a living. The decision protected
the financial interest of the other party. However, if contractual terms were harsh
and not overall beneficial to the minor, as seen in De Francesco v Barnum, courts
desisted from recognising the validity of such contracts and permitted the minor to
repudiate.
By considering contracts with minors voidable unless beneficial to them, India
would allow consistency with its employment and other legislations that are silent
on the specific relation between an employer and a minor employee. Rather, these
legislations presuppose the existence of such relations that can, at best, be explained
through contract law. Further, voidable contracts provide scope to align contract law
with sporting rules and the legal position in India prior to Mohori Bibee. It would
also provide minors with recourse to contractual remedies, in addition to, constitu-
tional writs.133
Legislative Reform
Voidable contracts present challenges by tipping the balance in favour of the minor
where a minor has the option to disaffirm the contract and decide not the bound by
it but the other party to the contract is bound when the contract is entered (Wolfe
1988: 145–146). There is no option for the other party to disaffirm.
In the United States, cases have arisen in the entertainment industry where
minors availed the option to disaffirm the contract for a better opportunity, leaving
behind a high cost of production (Shannon and Hunter, 2015: 1180–81). The USA
brought into effect a slew of laws134 (Krieg 2004: 434) to prevent minors from dis-
affirming contracts where courts had provided approval. There were primarily two
areas where a minor could not disaffirm a contract: first, contracts for necessaries,
and second, sports and entertainment contracts including service as a dancer, actor,
133 India could allow minors to claim damages for promised wages under executory contracts if the other
party disaffirms the contract and for the other party, damages could be claimed for loss of work if the
minor disaffirms the contract provided, damages are made available from the minor’s property and not
person.
134 California Family Code and California Labor Code. The change came through shortfalls in common
law to address rising concerns of parties taking the risk of contracting with minors. A film maker invests
both finance and time to train the minor artists for the role and to publicise the film. The film maker
stands to lose heavy investments in developing and marketing the motion picture, if a minor were to dis-
affirm the contract.
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Major Differences inMinors’ Contracts: AComparative Analysis…
musician, singer, sportsperson and other activities if the contract had been approved
by a superior court.135 Prior to approval, the superior court would require establish-
ment of a trust fund to safeguard the minor’s income, a change (known as Coogan’s
Law) that was brought by the case of John Leslie Coogan (See e.g., Hibschman
1938; Ayalon 2013).136
While India does not provide contractual recognition for arrangements with
minors, the Child Labour Act and accompanying rules provide a framework similar
to Coogan’s Law.137 Both the USA and India provide protection for a child’s earn-
ings under employment law. However, the protection is incomplete in India because
if the agreement in relation to a minor’s income is not recognised by law it will have
no meaning should a dispute similar to Cine Star case arise.
Currently, there is concern in India about legal guardians spending the minor’s
income not set aside in a trust. For instance, Daisy Irani, a former child artist has
expressed concerns over being forced to act mechanically (Verma 2016) being
harmed by her well-connected guardian in the Indian film industry and a mother
who “was hell-bent on making me [her] a star” (The News Minute 2018). In context
of being able to retain her income as a child artist, Daisy Irani stated: “We were
pushed into acting by our parents. By the time we grew aware of our predicament,
our childhood was gone. We made a lot of money, but got none of it” (Jha 2012).
Recently, in Dharma Productions v ACIT,138 the production house accepted that
under the agreement with the ‘star cast’ that implicitly included minors, the star was
obligated to accompany the film unit to outdoor locations for shootings and ‘take
along’ any relative. Practical realities of cases like Daisy Irani put to test the theoret-
ical argument raised in the Cine Star case that non-recognition of a minor’s contract
allows the minor to leave employment at any time without consequences.
It is clear that the current position under Indian law is inadequate. The judici-
ary and legislature in the UK, Australia and the USA have ensured that laws with
respect to minors and contracts have evolved. India leans towards legislation to
address infirmities with respect to minors, whether it is through the Child Labour
Act and accompanying rules, Partnership Act or statutes on personal law. It would
be more practical for India to reform the inadequacies that exist under the current
laws through statutory reform. India is at an advantage in building effectiveness
135 Sections6710-6713 (Chapter2) and Sections6750-6753 (Chapter3), California Family Code.
136 This case involved a child actor who brought legal proceedings against his mother and stepfather for
usurping earnings from his work in motion picture films as natural or legal guardians.
137 Section 1308.9 California Labor Code states that establishment of a ‘Coogan’s Trust Account’ is
required prior to the Labor Commissioner providing written consent for employment of a minor under
the specific category of contracts listed under chapter3 of the California Family Code.
138 Dharma Productions Private Limited, Mumbai v Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (ACIT),
Mumbai 2018 Indlaw ITAT 4744 (‘Dharma Productions v ACIT’): Although an income tax case, the
production house acknowledged that “in case your [star cast’s] services are required outside Mumbai,
you shall accompany the Unit to any outdoor location fixed by us” at [17]. Since contracts with minors
are unenforceable, it raises concerns on minors facing vulnerability outside general contract law for tasks
undertaken directly or through family members to accompany the film crew to outdoor locations but
with little contractual recourse as service contracts entered by minors or their guardian are void ab initio
according to the Cine Star case.
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230
S.Star, D.Dhankar
1 3
through a simple amendment and its enforcement under the ICA (See, e.g.,Krieg
2004: 438). The ICA could be amended by clearly stipulating that minors’ contracts
are voidable at their option but in certain circumstances they could not disaffirm
the contract without court approval. Amending the ICA, a central legislation, would
accord greater transparency and uniformity in the system than enacting a statute
in every state. In conclusion, given the lack of cohesion in recent jurisprudence on
the validity of minor contracts, without legislative reform, the shortcomings of the
current judicial interpretation of the ICA for failure to recognise service contracts
involving minors, is likely to remain.
Acknowledgements The authors thank Manasi Kumar, Maren Heidemann, May Fong Cheong, and
Saloni Khanderia for their helpful feedback.
Author contributions The authors have contributed equally to this work.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by CAUL and its Member Institutions.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen
ses/ by/4. 0/.
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