(PDF) Smart development for peripheral areas. A never-ending story?

Tér és Társadalom 36. évf., 3. szám, 2022 https://doi.org/10.17649/TET.36.3.3423

ARTICLES / TANULMÁNYOK

Smart development for peripheral areas.

A never-ending story?

Okos fejlődés vidéki területeken. Végtelen történet?

ANDRÉ TORRE

André TORRE: professor, University Paris-Saclay; UMR SADAPT, INRAE, Agroparistech,

16 rue Claude Bernard, 75231 Paris Cedex 05; andre.torre.2@inrae.fr; https://orcid.org/

0000-0001-5644-7520

KEYWORDS: smart development; peripheral areas; innovations

ABSTRACT:

Many

European

countries

have

implemented

development

policies

for

regions

and

territories

in

order

to

contribute

to

their

growth

and

reduce

inequalities.

The

EU

has

developed

policies

for

cohesion

and

smart

development

which

aim

to

promote

the

growth

of

all

territories

and

reduce

the

gaps

between

them.

The

implementation

of

those

policies

raises

questions

about

the

place

of

and

role

of

peripheral

areas

in

terms

of

development.

Will

they

remain

under-developed

regions,

lagging

behind?

Or

are

they

able

to

participate

in

overall

development

processes?

The

topic

of

our

paper

is

an

exploration

of

smart

development

for

peripheral

areas,

and

more

especially,

rural

areas,

in

Europe.

The

question

arises

as

to

whether

these

areas

are,

despite

their

handicaps,

capable

of

meeting

the

challenges

of

development,

and

most

of

all

of

satisfying

the

conditions

for

a

smart

development

process.

In

order

to

address

the

question

of

the

development

potential

of

peripheral

areas,

we

start

by

presenting

the

European

policies

of

cohesion

and

smart

development,

before

highlighting

the

limits

of

their

acceptance

by

local

people.

We

then

show

that

there

are

other

types

of

territorial

innovations

than

those

identied

in

the

most

well-known

policies,

and

nally

we

propose

development

strategies

for

a

particular

type

of

peripheral

area:

rural

territories.

We

found

that

even

while

the

development

policies

devoted

to

these

territories

have

multiplied

over

the

last

thirty

years,

the

inhabitants

of

peripheral

areas

very

often

feel

dissatised

with

their

situation

and

express

their

opposition

through

extreme

votes

or

public

demonstration.

One

of

the

major

reasons

for

this

growing

gap

between

the

proliferation

of

EU

policies

and

the

dissatisfaction

of

the

population

is

that

innovations

and

novelties

coming

from

these

areas

are

rarely

considered

and

encouraged

by

the

current

policies.

The

latter

attach

too

great

an

importance

to

technological

dimensions

and

are

mainly

directed

towards

industrialized

and

densely

populated

areas,

whereas

innovations

stemming

from

peripheral

territories,

which

are

very

real,

are

concentrated

primarily

in

the

social,

institutional,

and

organizational

elds.

In

the

end,

many

policies

are

disconnected

from

the

needs,

the

will,

and

the

skills

of

local

populations

in

peripheral areas.

In

order

to

avoid

these

problems

and

to

reduce

the

obstacles

on

the

development

paths

of

peripheral

areas

we

advocate

policies

that

are

better

adapted

to

these

territories

and

which

seriously

consider

their

innovative

character.

The

case

of

rural

areas

in

Europe

provides

interesting

insights

because

it

shows

that

a

mix

of

‘traditional’

Smart development for peripheral areas. A never-ending story? 11

and

more

social

and

institutional

policies

is

possible,

and

that

various

mixes

can

be

adapted

to

the

peculiarities

of

these

regions;

from

peri-urban

areas

to

remote

agricultural

or

forested

lands.

In

any

case,

it

is

important

to

stress

that

the

measures

that

are

applied

must

be

adapted

to

the

respective

characteristics

of

the

dierent

categories

of

territory

and

not

be

based

on

a

catalogue

adaptable

to

any

type

of

peripheral

areas.

It

is

at

this

price

that

we

may

avoid

the

disjunction

between

the

dierent

territories

of

the

EU

and

the

appearance

of

zones

of

separatism,

or

even

the

dislocation of the European community.

TORRE, André: professzor, University Paris-Saclay; UMR SADAPT, INRAE, Agroparistech, 16 rue

Claude Bernard, 75231 Paris Cedex 05; andre.torre.2@inrae.fr; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5644-7520

KULCSSZAVAK : okos fejlődés; periférikus térségek; innovációk

ABSZTRAKT

:

A

növekedés

és

az

egyenlőtlenségek

csökkentése

érdekében

számos

európai

ország

vezetett

be

regionális

és

területi

fejlesztési

politikákat,

s

az

Európai

Unió

is

elindította

a

kohézió

és

az

okos

fejlődés

politikáit,

amelyek

a

területi

növekedést

és

a

területi

különbségek

mérséklését

cé‐

lozzák.

E

politikák

megvalósítása

felveti

azt

a

kérdést,

hogy

a

periférikus

területeknek

hol

a

helye

és

mi

a

szerepe

a

fejlesztésben.

Vajon

fejletlen,

elmaradott

régiók

maradnak?

Vagy

képesek

arra,

hogy

bekapcsolódjanak

az

általános

fejlődési

folyamatokba?

Tanulmányunk

az

okos

fejlődés

lehetőségeit

tárgyalja

Európa

periférikus

vidéki

térségeiben.

Az

a

kérdés,

hogy

ezek

a

térségek,

minden

hátrá‐

nyuk

ellenére,

képesek-e

válaszolni

a

fejlődés

kihívásaira,

s

leginkább,

hogy

képesek-e

megfelelni

az

okos

fejlődés

feltételeinek.

A

periférikus

térségek

fejlődési

potenciáljára

vonatkozó

kérdés

megvála‐

szolását

a

kohéziót

és

az

okos

fejlődést

célzó

európai

politikák

bemutatásával

kezdjük,

majd

rámu‐

tatunk

e

politikák

lokális

elfogadottságának

korlátaira.

Ezt

követően

bemutatjuk,

hogy

a

területi

innovációnak

más

típusai

is

léteznek,

mint

azok,

amelyeket

a

leginkább

ismert

politikák

azonosíta‐

nak,

s

végezetül

javaslatot

teszünk

a

periférikus

térségek

egy

sajátos

típusa,

a

vidéki

területek

fej‐

lesztési stratégiáira.

Azt

tapasztalhattuk,

hogy

miközben

az

e

területek

fejlesztésének

szentelt

politikák

az

elmúlt

harminc

év

alatt

megsokasodtak,

a

periférikus

térségek

lakói

gyakran

elégedetlenek

a

helyzetükkel,

és

szembenállásukat

a

szélsőséges

pártokra

leadott

szavazatokkal

vagy

tüntetésekkel

fejezik

ki.

A

burjánzó

uniós

politikák

és

az

elégedetlenség

közötti

növekvő

távolság

egyik

legfontosabb

oka

az,

hogy

az

ilyen

térségekből

érkező

innovációkat

és

újdonságokat

a

mindenkori

politikák

ritkán

veszik

tekintetbe

és

ösztönzik.

E

politikák

túl

nagy

jelentőséget

tulajdonítanak

a

technológiai

dimenziók‐

nak,

és

leginkább

az

iparosodott

és

alacsony

népsűrűségű

térségekre

irányulnak,

miközben

a

peri‐

férikus

területeken

elinduló,

ténylegesen

létező

innovációk

elsősorban

a

szociális,

intézményi

és

szervezeti

szférákban

jelentkeznek.

A

végeredmény,

hogy

számos

politika

nem

találkozik

a

periféri‐

kus vidékek lakóinak igényeivel, szándékaival, tudásával és képességeivel.

Annak

érdekében,

hogy

ezeket

a

problémákat

elkerüljük

és

mérsékeljük

a

periférikus

vidé‐

kek

fejlődési

útjában

álló

akadályokat,

olyan

politikákra

teszünk

javaslatot,

amelyek

jobban

alkal‐

mazhatók

e

területeken,

és

komolyan

gyelembe

veszik

innovatív

természetüket.

Az

európai

vidéki

térségek

példája

érdekes

belátásokat

kínál,

mert

rámutat

arra,

hogy

lehetséges

a

„hagyományos”,

valamint

a

szociális

és

intézményi

politikák

ötvözése,

és

hogy

ezek

különböző

egyvelege

a

városkör‐

nyékektől

a

távoli

mezőgazdasági

és

erdősült

területekig

könnyen

igazítható

e

régiók

sajátosságai‐

hoz.

Fontos

továbbá

hangsúlyozunk,

hogy

az

alkalmazott

mérési

eszközöknek

alkalmazkodniuk

kell

a

különböző

területek

mindenkori

sajátosságaihoz,

és

nem

alapulhatnak

egy

olyan

katalóguson,

amely

a

periférikus

vidékek

összes

típusára

ráhúzható.

Ezen

az

áron

kerülhetjük

el

az

Európai

Unió

különböző

területei

közötti

megosztottságot

és

a

szeparatizmus

zónáinak

megjelenését,

vagy

akár

az európai közösség működésképtelenségét.

12 André Torre

Introduction

The

issue

of

regional

or

territorial

development

has

become

an

important

topic

of

debate

in

a

context

of

uncertain

growth,

signicant

inequalities,

and

environmental

and

biodiversity

concerns.

It

is

part

of

a

historic

movement

of

decentralization

policies

at

the

global

level

and

might

also

be

considered

a

response

to

a

demand

for

participatory

democracy

and

participation

stemming

from

local

populations.

Many

countries,

especially

at

the

European

level,

have

implemented

development

policies

for

regions

and

territories

in

order

to

contribute

to

their

growth

and

reduce

inequalities.

The

EU

has

been

moving

in

this

direction

and

has

developed

policies

for

cohesion

and

smart

development

which

aim

to

promote

the

growth

of

all

territories

and

reduce

the

gaps

between

them (European Commission 2022; Foray 2018).

The

implementation

of

those

policies

and

the

constant

concern

about

social

and

spatial

inequalities

between

various

types

of

areas

and

territories

raise

questions

about

the

place

and

role

of

peripheral

areas

in

terms

of

development.

Will

they

remain

under-developed

regions,

lagging

behind?

Or

are

they

able

to

participate

in

the

overall

development

processes?

The

topic

of

our

paper

concerns

the

exploration

of

potentially

smart

development

for

peripheral

areas,

and more especially, rural areas in Europe.

To

provide

an

answer

to

this

question,

one

must

rst

provide

a

denition

of

peripheral

territories

and

their

possible

dierence

from

more

central

areas

which

are

suering

less

from

developmental

delays.

A

rapid

survey

of

the

factors

used

to

dene

the

peripheral

regions

reveals

that

there

is

little

research

on

the

relations

of

center

and

periphery,

and

that

the

theorization

of

the

notions

of

central

and

peripheral

regions

is

largely

absent

in

the

literature.

Some

works

mention

geographical

factors;

most

typically

transport

costs

due

to

lower

accessibility.

Other

factors

are

demographic

dimensions

like

low

population

density

and

population

aging

and

decline

(Eder

2019).

A

third

explanation

is

linked

with

economic

factors:

the

lack

of

support

infrastructure,

weakness

of

human

capital

or

R&D

expenditure,

and

the

dominance

of

traditional

industries

or

agriculture

(Pinto,

Esquinas,

Uyarra

2015;

Trippl,

Asheim,

Miorner

2016).

However,

only

few

publications

consider

peripheral

areas

from

the

geographical

point

of

view,

and

researchers

prefer

to

base

their

analyses

on

a

combination

of

economic,

geographic,

and

more

rarely,

demographic

factors

(Soursa

2007;

Melancon, Doloreux 2013; Dubois 2015; Torre, Wallet 2020).

In

this

paper,

we

will

consider

that

peripheral

regions

are

characterized

by

low

technological

innovation

capacity

because

of

the

absence

of

conventional

innovation

drivers

in

these

areas,

and

that

they

are

decient

in

at

least

one

of

the

following

domains,

generally

considered

highly

conducive

to

innovation

activity:

– High-level

skills

in

research

and

development

linked

to

the

weakness

of

public

and

private

laboratories

and

R&D

departments

of

large

companies;

Smart development for peripheral areas. A never-ending story? 13

– The

concentration

of

talent

and

presence

of

a

creative

class

–

which

generate

many

inventions

and

innovations,

and

are

sources

of

increased

knowledge – specially compared to in big cities;

– Transport

and

communication

networks:

these

areas

seem

isolated

and

dicult to access;

– Size

and

characteristics

of

market

demand:

The

small

size

of

local

communities

does

not

allow

for

the

creation

of

adequate

market

demand;

– Presence

of

a

network

of

skills

and

potential

partners:

this

other

eect

of

small

population

size

leads

to

the

low

density

of

enterprises

and

– Access

to

nance

for

innovative

projects

and

to

land

for

economic

development:

here

again,

this

is

population

density,

transaction

volumes, and availability of resources.

The

question

then

arises

as

to

whether

these

areas

are,

despite

their

handicaps,

capable

of

meeting

the

challenges

of

development,

and

most

of

all,

of

satisfying

the

conditions

for

a

smart

development

process.

In

order

to

address

the

question

of

the

development

potential

of

peripheral

areas,

we

will

proceed

in

four

steps.

We

begin

by

presenting

the

European

policies

of

cohesion

and

smart

development,

before

highlighting

the

limits

of

their

acceptance

by

local

people.

We

then

show

that

there

are

other

types

of

territorial

innovations

than

those

identied

in

the

most

well-known

policies,

and

nally

we

propose

development

strategies for a particular type of peripheral area: rural territories.

The EU’s Cohesion and Smart Development policies

The

EU’s

Cohesion

Policy

started

in

the

late

1980s

based

on

the

idea

that

the

market

forces

are

not

necessarily

sucient

to

signicantly

reduce

regional

disparities.

The

fund’s

development

programs

are

designed

for

EU

regions

that

are

backward

or

facing

structural

diculties,

to

use

the

ocial

terms

(OECD

2012;

European

Commission

2014,

2022).

The

EU

created

this

instrument

of

nancial

solidarity

between

Member

States

with

the

aim

of

improving

the

competitiveness

of

growth-lagging

regions

and

correcting

regional

imbalance.

The

goal

has

always

been

to

reduce

regional

disparities,

restructure

regional

economies,

create

jobs,

and

stimulate

private

investment

in

these

areas.

Given

the

very

sensible

addressing

of

the

issue

of

the

unequal

distribution

of

wealth,

the

general

objective

is

to

stimulate

the

levelling

up

of

the

least

developed

countries/regions.

The

question

whether

these

cohesion

policies

really

help

to

reduce

(or

rather

accentuate)

disparities

is

a

key

issue

in

the

literature,

with

arguments

in

favor

of

one

or

the

other,

whereas

the

spatial

heterogeneity

of

regional growth questions the design of the territorial development policies.

14 André Torre

A

good

part

of

European

policies,

including

cohesion

policy,

have

taken

a

territorial

turn

since

the

2010s,

starting

in

the

programming

period

2014–20

after

criticisms

addressed

at

the

Lisbon

Strategy

–

which

aimed

to

make

Europe

the

world’s

leading

technological

power

–

and

in

particular

following

the

Barca

report

(2009).

The

diagnosis

of

this

policy

revealed

several

limitations

(Giannitsis

2009)

and

led

to

a

movement

towards

the

territorialization

of

EU

cohesion

policy

(Bourdin

2019).

In

particular,

the

new

approach

points

to

the

fact

of

the

smaller

share

of

European

regional

economies

composed

of

high-

tech

and

R&D-intensive

sectors,

and

also

the

fragmentation

of

R&D

eorts

which

have

prevented

the

emergence

of

critical

mass

eects

and

of

localized

learning

processes.

They

also

put

the

stress

on

the

lack

of

attention

to

the

dierences

between

the

various

regions

and

territories

of

the

EU,

and

to

the

failure

of

a

‘one-size-ﬁts-all’

technology

development

policy.

In

addition,

many

of

the

policies

implemented

by

EU

public

authorities

to

promote

convergence

between

the

economies

of

European

states

(such

as

ERDF

programs)

have

been

unable

to

prevent

processes

of

marginalization

and

are

now

sharply

criticized,

and

funding

for

these

programs

has

been

signiﬁcantly

reduced

(Camagni,

Capello 2013; Berkowitz et al. 2015).

The

modern

approaches

to

territorial

development

have

taken

into

account

the

key

role

of

geography

in

policies

targeting

economic

growth

after

the

failure

of

the

Lisbon

Strategy

(Varga

2017).

European

regional

policy

has

been

reoriented

(Barca,

McCann,

Rodríguez-Pose

2012;

Bachtler

et

al.

2017)

around

the

idea

that

competitive

advantage

is

created

and

sustained

through

a

highly

localized

process.

The

result

has

been

huge

reection

about

the

specic

factors

that

lie

at

the

origin

of

competitive

advantage,

such

as

the

quality

of

human

capital,

the

presence

of

infrastructure

knowledge,

and

the

existence

of

networks

and

clusters

(Capello,

Nijkamp

2019;

Crescenzi,

Rodríguez-Pose

2012).

All

these

factors

have

reinforced

the

idea

that

territorial

and

local

policies

should

be conceived and applied at the regional level (Lagendijk 2011).

The

principles

for

a

new

development

policy

have

been

dened,

distinguishing

between

‘core’

regions

with

the

capacity

to

create

generic

R&D

activities

thanks

to

the

presence

of

research

laboratories,

and

‘periphery’

regions,

which

are

more

oriented

towards

specialized

knowledge

domains

external

partners.

Thanks

to

the

research

in

regional

science

and

regional

development

(Capello

2019),

the

core

vs.

periphery

distinction

gradually

gave

way

to

place-based

considerations

and

to

the

adoption

of

an

approach

to

development

that

looks

beyond

activities

technological

domains

and

R&D

processes

(Carayannis,

Rakhmatullin

2014).

So-called

Smart

Specialization

Strategy

(S3)

or

policy

diers

from

in

that

it

takes

greater

account

of

knowledge

networks

and

spatial

dimensions,

as

well

as

regionally

speciﬁc

modes

of

governance.

As

McCann

and

Ortega

Argilés

(2013)

stated,

there

has

been

a

shift

from

a

“narrow

sectoral

and

science-based

R&D

way

of

thinking

about

innovation”

Smart development for peripheral areas. A never-ending story? 15

to

a

policy

“developed

into

a

more

multi-dimensional

policy

approach

involving

matters of institutions, geography and linkage development.”

According

to

the

European

Commission,

S3

thus

leads

to

a

more

comprehensive

set

of

development

objectives

and

encourages

regions

to

build

their

innovation

strategies

both

on

the

basis

of

existing

structure

and

according

to

the

potential

for

diversiﬁcation.

This

approach,

which

now

tends

to

characterize

European

policies

(McCann,

van

Oort

2016;

Radosevic

et

al.

2017),

emerged

from

the

work

of

a

group

of

researchers

of

the

economics

of

innovation

conducted

for

the

European

Commission

as

part

of

the

‘Knowledge

for

Growth’

expert

group

(Foray,

David,

Hall

2009;

Foray

2014).

The

basic

principles

have

gradually

been

dened

and

rened.

From

an

analytical

point

of

view,

they

are

essentially

linked

to

selection

criteria

based

on

the

following

three

concepts:

embeddedness,

connectedness, and related variety, or relatedness.

The

concepts

of

embeddedness

and

connectedness

underlie

the

idea

that

activities

selected

to

benet

from

specic

development

programs

should

not

be

selected

solely

on

the

basis

of

their

level

of

excellence.

They

must

be

linked

to

other

activities

located

upstream

and

downstream

of

value

chains

with

strong

ties

to

the

local

environment.

This

type

of

linkage

can

generate

network

externalities,

which

promote

growth

by

means

of

external

eects,

and

are

likely

to

boost

the

regional

network

and

stimulate

a

virtuous

growth

cycle

thanks

to

activities

that

have

critical

mass

in

sectors

in

which

the

region

has

competitive

advantages.

It

is

also

important

that

connections

with

the

external

environment

(in

terms

of

product

or

technology

exchanges)

are

maintained,

so

as

to

benet

from external innovation and/or the sale of locally produced goods.

The

funding

decisions

made

by

public

authorities

must

take

into

account

the

characteristics

of

local

productive

systems

and

architectures,

and

not

merely

the

pure

comparative

advantages

of

a

region

in

various

production

sectors.

The

concept

of

which

is

often

used

in

relation

to

embeddedness

and

connectedness,

was

introduced

by

Frenken,

van

Oort

and

Verburg

in

2007

in

an

attempt

to

show

that

a

region

benets

more

from

engaging

in

broad

‘activity

domains’

—

in

which

are

characterized

by

technologies

or

forms

of

production

that

are

closely

and

consistently

interrelated

—

than

from

specializing

in

a

single

activity.

These

recommendations

have

been

translated

into

practical

growth

and

development

strategies.

The

EU

invited

each

region

to

choose

a

few

key

domains

or

activities

or

technologies,

based

on

three

criteria:

the

overall

context

(the

chosen

activity

should

t

into

a

value

chain

and

not

be

isolated

at

the

local

level),

specialization

in

specic

elds

of

activity,

and

coherent

diversication

through

(the

selected

sectors

must

be

closely

or

belong

to

interconnected

and

complementary

elds

of

activity).

Thus,

to

qualify

for

development

funds,

EU

regions

have

had

to

set

up

programs

and

projects

aimed

at

promoting

entrepreneurship

and

innovation,

16 André Torre

guided

by

a

strategy

explicitly

drawn

up

on

the

basis

of

an

inventory

of

the

strengths

of

the

territory.

In

principle,

the

logic

of

the

policy

prioritization

process

is

neither

exclusive

nor

exhaustive

but

based

on

thematic

choices

and

is

conceived

to

promote

competition

in

resource

allocation

proposals

(McCann

2015).

Finally,

it

should

be

noted

that

governance

issues

have

been

considered

to

a

certain

extent

(Morgan

2017),

since

it

is

recognized

that

each

region

must

interact

with

and

take

into

account

its

own

entrepreneurial

environment

and

make

its

choices

according

to

the

latter’s

characteristics

and

to

its

relationships

with it, and therefore consider the wishes of local actors.

The limits of these policies: protest by vote and in the street

Traditional

electoral

sociology

approaches

put

the

stress

on

the

preponderance

of

the

role

of

social

class

and

economic

and

psychological

approaches

to

explain

electoral

behavior

(Stavrakakis

et

al.

2017).

But

the

rise

of

populism

and

populist

parties

in

many

contemporary

Western

democracies

throughout

Europe

and

beyond

to

the

American

continent

(Müller

2017)

during

the

last

two

decades

have

brought

new

issues

to

the

table

and

forced

researchers

to

nd

new

explanations.

Obviously,

beyond

the

traditional

explanations

mobilized

by

sociology

and

political

science,

other

determinants

have

been

put

forward,

notably

by

geographers

via

what

is

known

as

ecological

analysis

(Forest

2018).

Approaches

in

electoral

geography

have

made

it

possible

to

enlarge

the

initial

vision

and

to

consider

that

an

individual's

vote

may

also

depend

on

their

characteristics

and

factors

at

the

level

of

the

territories

in

which

they

live

(Johnston, Shelley, Taylor 2014; Köppen et al. 2020).

In

dierent

countries

like

the

United

Kingdom,

France,

Italy,

and

the

United

States,

one

can

observe

a

rise

in

extreme

or

protest

voting.

This

is

the

case

of

pro-Trump

voting,

or

of

voting

for

the

extreme

right

in

various

EU

countries

(like

for

the

Front

National

in

France

or

Liga

del

Norte

in

Italy),

or

for

Brexit,

for

example

(the

position

of

UKIP

and

part

of

the

Tories).

The

study

of

recent

events

such

as

Brexit

(Los

et

al.

2017;

Abreu,

Öner

2020),

the

American

elections

(Gusterson

2017;

Rodríguez-Pose,

Lee,

Lipp

2021),

and

the

European

elections

(Di

Matteo,

Mariotti

2020)

highlight

the

fact

that

this

rise

in

extreme

voting

is

not

even,

and

is

particularly

restricted

to

several

areas

with

peculiar

characteristics.

Various

countries

ﬁnd

themselves

in

the

grip

of

problems

the

so-called

‘geography

of

discontent’

(Dijkstra,

Poelman,

Rodríguez-Pose

2020),

and

many

scholars

identify

that

the

rise

of

populism

is

particularly

signicant

in

areas

on

the

periphery

or

far

from

major

cities

(Van

Gent,

Jansen,

Smits

2014;

Gordon

2018;

McCann

2020).

They

have

identied

these

areas

as

‘places

that

don’t

matter’

(Rodríguez-Pose

2018;

McCann

2020);

namely,

rural

territories,

peripheral

areas,

urban

districts

in

diculty,

etc.,

and

they

highlight

the

dicult

local

Smart development for peripheral areas. A never-ending story? 17

situations

in

places

that

have

fueled

people's

dissatisfaction

with

the

socioeconomic

environment

in

which

they

live.

For

example,

Rodríguez-Pose,

Lee

and

Lipp

(2021)

and

Beecham,

Williams

and

Comber

(2020)

show

that

in

the

American

context

local

socioeconomic

characteristics

–

particularly

those

that

characterize areas in decline – may explain part of the vote for Trump.

This

analysis

of

election

results

in

various

countries

has

brought

an

essential

spatial

component

into

the

debate.

It

has

opened

room

for

the

idea

of

the

paradoxical

importance

of

these

places

that

‘don’t

matter,’

where

people’s

behaviors

are

at

the

basis

of

the

vote

of

discontent.

And

it

has

given

birth

to

the

idea

of

an

opposition

between

the

‘globalized

elites

of

the

large

metropolises’

and

the

‘real

people

of

the

forgotten

places’

(Ferrante,

Pontarollo

2020).

According

to

Rodríguez-Pose

(2018),

a

geography

of

electoral

behavior

can

be

drawn

according

to

three

main

types

of

local

areas

and

their

territorial

characteristics:

(i)

productive

and

dynamic

areas

that

concentrate

economic

activity,

(ii)

non-

productive

but

dynamic

territories

that

benet

from

the

wealth

produced

by

the

productive

areas,

(iii)

former

industrial

regions,

now

in

decline,

in

which

one

can

make

a

distinction

between

(a)

areas

where

a

market

sector

subsists,

and

(b)

areas

that

depend

essentially

on

social

income,

which

are

the

most

fragile

in

the

face of reduced public spending.

Some

authors

also

refer

to

the

crisis

in

the

small

towns

of

rural

areas,

regardless

of

the

decline

of

the

shops

in

the

centers

of

these

towns.

More

generally,

a

lot

of

scholars

agree

on

the

idea

that

the

withdrawal

of

public

services

(closure

of

railway

stations,

post

oces,

etc.)

and

the

weakening

of

public

investment

have

also

increased

the

sense

of

abandonment

and

marginalization

felt

by

people

living

in

peripheral

areas,

and

most

of

all

in

rural

territories

(Broz,

Frieden,

Weymouth

2019).

But

it

is

fair

to

note

that

to

this

protest

vote

–

which

expresses

the

rejection

and

the

voice

of

voters

living

in

these

peripheral

areas

–

is

associated

with

an

additional

characteristic:

major

protestations

on

the

streets.

Opposition

does

not

only

take

place

through

legal

channels;

it

also

takes

more

frontal

and

violent

forms,

and

in

a

way

can

be

compared

to

the

movement

of

revolutions

and

reforms

that

can

be

seen

all

over

the world.

The

case

of

France

is

particularly

interesting

from

this

point

of

view

(Torre,

Bourdin

2021).

In

2018,

the

country

was

shaken

by

a

large-scale

protest

movement

well

known

as

the

‘yellow

vests’

movement

(related

to

the

name

of

the

garment

the

protestors

were

wearing).

The

movement

started

with

motorists

angry

at

rising

fuel

prices

and

against

the

decision

of

the

government

to

reduce

authorized

speeds

on

secondary

roads.

But

it

rapidly

turned

into

a

general

protest

against

government

policy

in

all

its

dimensions

and

especially

regarding

the

lack

of

consideration

for

peripheral

areas.

Participants

blocked

trac

as

close

as

possible

to

their

homes

and

launched

local

demonstrations

on

roundabouts.

They

also

made

big

protests

in

the

major

French

cities

where

they

were

not

18 André Torre

leaving,

in

order

to

render

visible

to

the

public

authorities

and

to

urban

dwellers

their living conditions and the problems they face in their day to day lives.

Protest

about

the

increase

in

the

tax

on

petroleum

products

was

rapidly

accompanied

by

other

ideas

and

attempts

at

reclamation.

The

demonstrators

complained

of

a

feeling

of

abandonment

by

public

authorities.

In

particular,

they

highlighted

their

abandonment

in

terms

of

public

services.

The

absence

and

disappearance

of

post

oces,

of

tax-collection

oces,

schools

and

lyceums,

hospitals,

maternity

wards,

doctors,

etc.,

but

also

the

gradual

disappearance

and

abolition

of

connecting

railway

lines

and

their

remoteness,

which

obliges

them

to

make

long

and

expensive

journeys,

both

to

get

to

work

and

to

acquire

the

goods

and

services

they

need

to

live.

Step

by

step,

fundamental

questions

were

raised

about

public

policies

peripheral

areas

in

a

context

of

falling

public

spending

and

growing

inequality,

with

signicant

territorial

repercussions

(Bourdin,

Torre

2020;

Torre,

Bourdin

2021).

This

movement

can

be

seen

as

the

behavior

of

disenchantment;

the

participants

had

no

condence

in

politics

or

were

no

longer

part

of

the

‘political

oer’

(Kostelka

2017).

They

expressed

their

voice

in

a

dierent

way,

using

conictual

behavior

instead

of

expressing

their

agreement or their disagreement by voting.

Some examples of (non-technological) territorial innovations

We

have

just

noted

a

signicant

discrepancy

between

the

policies

supposed

to

address

peripheral

areas

and

take

into

account

their

specicities

and

the

very

mixed

perceptions

of

the

local

populations:

The

latter

have

a

sense

of

abandonment

and

the

impression

that

the

measures

implemented

by

the

policies

are

inadequate.

One

of

the

ways

in

which

this

gap

can

be

analyzed

is

that

these

development

policies

fail

to

take

advantage

of

much

of

the

creativity

and

innovation

at

the

heart

of

many

of

the

activities

carried

out

in

the

territories

because

they

are

primarily

based

on

a

conception

of

technological

or

even

organizational

innovation

and

forget

about

other

forms

of

innovation.

If

we

want

to

help

these

territories

and

encourage

their

development,

it

is

important

to

consider

all

Smart development for peripheral areas. A never-ending story?

Abstract