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Semiogenesis: A Dynamic System Approach to Agency and Structure

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This paper will develop the concept of semiogenesis – a process of novel sign generation – and how instances of this process, such as agency, relate to their built environment and beyond. Section two will build on Hoffmeyer’s discussion of swarms, specifically the idea of overlapping swarms and its manifestation in the creation of termite mounds, in order to introduce three types of structure. Building upon this real-world example explored in section two, the third section will present a heuristic for semiogenesis: a neuromorphic dynamic system model grounded in information and thermodynamic theory. Through the lens of this heuristic model, the penultimate section will more rigorously characterize the similarities and differences between termite and human agency in their respective built milieus.
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Biosemiotics (2022) 15:261–284
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-022-09494-8
Abstract
This paper will develop the concept of semiogenesis – a process of novel sign
generation – and how instances of this process, such as agency, relate to their
built environment and beyond. Section two will build on Homeyer’s discussion
of swarms, specically the idea of overlapping swarms and its manifestation in the
creation of termite mounds, in order to introduce three types of structure. Building
upon this real-world example explored in section two, the third section will present
a heuristic for semiogenesis: a neuromorphic dynamic system model grounded in
information and thermodynamic theory. Through the lens of this heuristic model,
the penultimate section will more rigorously characterize the similarities and dier-
ences between termite and human agency in their respective built milieus.
Keywords Agency · Structure · Semiosis · Semiogenesis · Stigmergy · Jesper
Homeyer
Introduction
At the heart of this paper is the claim that agency is not equivalent to individual
organisms, and that agency is a paradox insofar as one attempts to characterize it as a
localizable phenomenon, either in time or space. This claim will have some similari-
ties with that of thinkers as early as Heraclitus (c.535–c.475 BC) and more recent
examples such as Jesper Homeyer. In particular, Homeyer’s notion of swarms of
swarms, or overlapping swarms (Homeyer, 1997), will be leveraged to illustrate
this claim and its implications throughout this paper. More rigorous characteriza-
tions of similar phenomena – such as patterns of patterns and overlapping distribu-
Received: 13 June 2022 / Accepted: 1 July 2022 / Published online: 9 August 2022
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022
Semiogenesis: A Dynamic System Approach to Agency and
Structure
J. AugustusBacigalupi1
J. Augustus Bacigalupi
bacigalupiworks@gmail.com
1 University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
1 3
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
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