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The Religious-Political Ideology of Houthis’ Rebellion in Yemen: Theoretical Perspective of the Divine Right to Rule

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Abstract

This article examines the religious-political ideology of the Houthi movement in Yemen. In particular, it explores the political objectives and historical roots of the Houthis' rebellion that was initiated in 2004 and continued into 2009 through six rounds of wars, which were called Sa'dah wars. The Houthis implemented a military coup in 2014 against Mansour Hadi's government and seized state institutions which led to Yemen's current civil war. A catastrophic battle also erupted when the Saudi-led military coalition decided to intervene in the conflict in 2015, with the aim of restoring the legitimacy of the previous regime as well as defeating the Houthis insurgency. Despite numerous studies on the issues relating to civil war in Yemen, there is no adequate study on the perspective of Houthis' religious-political ideology. This research is qualitative using in-depth interviews with seven experts and observers of the Yemeni war. This article analyses major reasons for the historical rebellion and the ongoing catastrophic war in Yemen, based on the Houthis' religious-political ideology. The findings of this article inform that the current conflict in Yemen is rooted in historical circumstances which gave rise to a heavy responsibility or burden on the Houthis, whereby according to the theory of the divine right to rule, the Houthis and their ancestors, the Hashemites claim the monopoly of regional (present day Yemen) power. Thus, this theory has been considered as one of the key dynamics of the outbreak and the continuation of the current war in Yemen. It is very likely that the trend of increased Houthis' rebellion will continue for the next few years in Yemen due to the movement's firm aim of power struggle, based on their religious-political ideology of the 'divine right to rule'.
The Religious-Political Ideology of Houthis’ Rebellion in Yemen: Theoretical
Perspective of the Divine Right to Rule
Ideologi Politik Beragama Penentangan Houthi di Yemen: Perspektif Teori Hak Ketuhanan untuk
Memerintah
Mugahed S. Sarhan
Mohd Irwan SyazlI SaIdIn
zarIna othMan
ABSTRACT
This article examines the religious-political ideology of the Houthi movement in Yemen. In particular, it explores the
political objectives and historical roots of the Houthis’ rebellion that was initiated in 2004 and continued into 2009
through six rounds of wars, which were called Sa’dah wars. The Houthis implemented a military coup in 2014 against
Mansour Hadi’s government and seized state institutions which led to Yemen’s current civil war. A catastrophic battle
also erupted when the Saudi-led military coalition decided to intervene in the conict in 2015, with the aim of restoring
the legitimacy of the previous regime as well as defeating the Houthis insurgency. Despite numerous studies on the
issues relating to civil war in Yemen, there is no adequate study on the perspective of Houthis’ religious-political
ideology. This research is qualitative using in-depth interviews with seven experts and observers of the Yemeni war.
This article analyses major reasons for the historical rebellion and the ongoing catastrophic war in Yemen, based on
the Houthis’ religious-political ideology. The ndings of this article inform that the current conict in Yemen is rooted
in historical circumstances which gave rise to a heavy responsibility or burden on the Houthis, whereby according to
the theory of the divine right to rule, the Houthis and their ancestors, the Hashemites claim the monopoly of regional
(present day Yemen) power. Thus, this theory has been considered as one of the key dynamics of the outbreak and the
continuation of the current war in Yemen. It is very likely that the trend of increased Houthis’ rebellion will continue
for the next few years in Yemen due to the movement’s rm aim of power struggle, based on their religious-political
ideology of the ‘divine right to rule’.
Keywords: Yemen; Houthis; religious-political objectives; root causes of war; theory of divine right to rule
ABSTRAK
Artikel ini mengkaji ideologi politik beragama gerakan Houthi di Yaman. Artikel ini secara khusus meneroka objektif
politik dan asas sejarah pemberontakan Houthi yang meletus sejak 2004 dan berterusan sehingga 2009 menerusi enam
siri peperangan, yang turut dikenali sebagai peperangan Sa’dah. Rampasan kuasa telah digerakkan oleh pemberontak
Houthi pada tahun 2014 untuk menentang kerajaan pimpinan Mansour Hadi dengan mengambil alih institusi-institusi
negara sehingga membawa kepada perang saudara kotemporari di Yaman. Pertempuran besar telah meletus apabila
pakatan ketenteraan yang diketuai oleh Arab Saudi memutuskan untuk campur tangan dalam konik Yaman. Meskipun
terdapat pelbagai kajian lepas yang memberi tumpuan terhadap isu perang sivil di Yaman, tidak banyak penyelidikan
yang memfokuskan kepada perspektif Houthi terhadap ideologi politik beragama. Menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif
menerusi temubual mendalam bersama tujuh pakar dan pemerhati perang Yaman, kajian ini menganalisis sebab
musabab kepada sejarah pemberontakan dan peperangan yang masih berterusan di Yaman. Dapatan kajian artikel
ini menjelaskan bahawa konik semasa di Yaman adalah terkait dengan beban sejarah lepas, di mana menurut teori
hak ketuhanan untuk memerintah, puak Houthi dan keturunan bani Hashim menuntut monopoli kuasa wilayah.
Justeru, teori ini telah dipertimbangkan sebagai salah satu dinamika utama kepada kelangsungan peperangan semasa
di Yaman. Pemberontakan Houthi di Yaman dijangka akan berterusan untuk beberapa tahun akan datang berikutan
matlamat untuk berkuasa yang masih utuh, berteraskan ideologi politik agama dan hak ketuhanan untuk memerintah.
Kata kunci: Yemen; Houthis; objektif politik beragama; punca peperangan; teori hak ketuhanan untuk memerintah
ISLĀMIYYĀT 44(1) 2022: 231 - 240
(https://doi.org/10.17576/islamiyyat-2022-4401-20)
232
Islāmiyyāt 44(1(
INTRODUCTION
Over the past millennium, Yemen is one of the
countries in the Arab peninsula that is most associated
with political violence, which is due to the theory
of the divine right to rule. This predicament has
penetrated the country via the Hashemites clerics’
ghters who are the ancestors of the Houthis’ rebels.
The current war in Yemen can be traced back to this
history, in which every new wars were claimed to
have its previous roots, regardless of the nature and
quality of those roots (Pulkkinen 2017). In this sense,
Yemeni’s history is suffered with conict, where
the Yemenis are living in a potential state onset of
war, which has made a pattern like conict culture,
deeply rooted in the Yemeni people. Moreover, the
perpetuation of the wars created a sense of society
and cultural syndrome that are embedded in the
imaginations of Yemeni’s successive generations.
The current war in Yemen is an extension of the
previous wars that is linked to religious ideologies,
which dates back to the late ninth century (897 AD)
(Julan & Matei 2015). On that year, Yahya Hussein
al-Rassi (the rst grandfather of the Yemeni’s Houthi
group) intended to establish a religious state in
Yemen from Hejaz, which is under the name of the
theory of the divine right to rule, and the exclusivity
of the rule to the dynasty. This idea indicates that the
ruler is afliated solely with the fourth caliph, Ali bin
Abi Talib, and the descendants of his sons, Hassan
and Hussein, or what became known as the Alawi
Hashemite state based on heredity. Accordingly, the
claim to the right of leadership and ruling are not
only limited to Yemenis but also the whole Muslim
community (Julan & Matei 2015; Porter 2017; Vom
Bruck 2016). Nevertheless, the theory of the divine
right to rule, which has caused invasions in Yemen,
resulting in dozens of wars that have detrimentally
affected the Yemenis’ stability and prosperity.
This paper explores the political objectives of the
Houthis insurgency, which were based on religious
ideologies, derived from the descendants of Prophet
Mohammed. The qualitative research method was
applied because the method allowed for an in-depth
exploration of perceptions and underlying reasons
and motivations for specic actions (Rabionet 2011).
Specically, this idea facilitated a more nuanced
understanding of the role of the Houthis rebellion’s
religious ideologies as well as their political engines.
Seven interviews were conducted with experts and
observers of the conict in Yemen over Skype and
in person in Yemen, Malaysia, Egypt and UAE in
2019. The interviews were utilised as a way to
obtain more in-depth information on the historical
roots of the current war in Yemen. The transcribed
interviews were encoded based on the related topics
and headings. Then, the data were categorised
manually into smaller subgroups under keywords
and themes, in which these subgroups were then
selected according to the literature review, previous
research, and research questions. Lastly, the results
of data analysis form a collection of citations and
quotes. Additionally, secondary sources, such as
International reports and previous analytical studies
related to the issues of Yemen civil conict were
also employed in this study.
ANCIENT YEMEN AND ITS
INDIGENOUS POPULATION
Historically, Yemen is considered one of the
region’s prominent-established empires along
with the Sasanian and Byzantine empires. In the
twentieth century, historians and the derivative of
the discovered inscriptions indicate that the ancient
Yemeni empire comprises the kingdom of Sheba and
Himyar that established in the second millennium
BC (Hoyland 2001). According to the local tribal
tradition, the capital of Yemen, Sanaa, was built
by Shem, which was the son of Noah who built the
biblical ark. As opposed to the present conditions,
Yemen developed strong kingdoms and a thriving
culture. Yemen’s documented history spans more
than 3,000 years, as expressed today in the country’s
vast, well-developed arts, and architecture. The
region was ruled by several civilisations from 1000
BCE, prospered due to the spice trades, and thrived
by irrigation and cultivation. This area served as
a route from India and provided aromatics such
as myrrh and frankincense to Egypt, Greece, and
Rome. An ingenious dam was built about 800 BCE
at Maarib, provided irrigation to Yemeni farmland
for more than 1000 years (Watson 2016). Given
the importance and wealth of ancient Yemen, the
Romans called this region Arabia Felix, which
means ‘Happy Arabia’.
Yemen’s indigenous population comprises the
descendants of Qahtan, who is the son of Prophet
Houd, and the great ancestor of the Yemeni clans
in the southern Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore,
the descendants of Qahtan were named Himyar and
Kahlan, which are the sons of Saba Bin Qahtan.
Hence, Yemen’s indigenous population originated
from the descendants of Himyar and Kahlan, which
The Religious-Political Ideology of Houthis’ Rebellion in Yemen: Theoretical Perspective of the Divine Right to Rule
233
formed the two main tribes that became the majority
of the current Yemen population. Currently, in the
Republic of Yemen, these tribes have migrated from
Yemen to the Arab world at varying intervals of
time. (Hoyland 2001; Lucks 2008; Manea 2012).
THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE
RIGHT TO RULE
Fundamentally, the theory of the divine right to
rule indicates the striving of the claim to be the
descendants of Prophet Mohammed via his daughter
Fatimah and her sons, Hassan and Hussein.
Moreover, given that they are the heirs of the Holy
Quran and Sunnah after the Prophet Mohammed’s
death, the claim essentially allows the descendants
to rule the Muslim world (Al-Ahmadi 2007).
Additionally, the Hashemites believe in the divine
right of the Prophet’s relatives to lead and rule
the Muslims in all areas of life such as religious,
political, military, economic, cultural, social, and
educational issues. Specically, this sacred right is
limited to the descendants of Hassan and Hussein
until the day of judgement, which is according to the
religious ideas of the Hashemites (Albahesh 2018
& Jaber 2018). However, this theory is changing
continuously according to the nature of the conict,
and thus, it has many pictures suchas the Zaydi
doctrine, Wilayah, Imamate, and recently Houthism
(Al-Ahmadi 2007 & Al-Batool 2007). Accordingly,
in 2012, the intellectual and cultural document of the
Houthis was issued and signed by the leader of the
rebels Abdul Malek al-Houthi. The main concerpt of
the document highlights that:
We believe that God Almighty elected the household of the
Prophet and made them guides to the Umma and inheritors
of the holy book after the Messenger of God until the day of
judgment, and that in every age, He prepares one to be a guiding
light for His worshippers, one able to lead and champion the
Umma in all its needs (ACRPS 2014).
However, this theory is changing continuously
according to the nature of the conict, and thus, it has
many pictures such as the Zaydi doctrine, Wilayah,
Imamate, and recently Houthism (Al-Ahmadi 2007;
Al-Batool 2007).
THE RISING OF HOUTHISM: WHO ARE THE
HOUTHIS AND HOW DID THEIR ANCESTORS
PENETRATE YEMEN?
After the Prophet Mohammed’s death, a bloody
political conict between the Quraish tribe
occurred, where the eligibility of the leadership of
Muslims was raised. Moreover, the conict started
after the caliphate of Abu Baker, Omar, and Othman
and especially during the period of Ali’s caliphate.
The tribe was splitted into two branches, namely,
the Umayyads and the Hashemites, in which the
Hashemites had been further divided into the
Abbasis and the Alawites. Notably, the sudden
drastic increase in the wars between the Umayyads
and Hashemites has caused the Umayyad’s rule
under the Hashemian ag to be overthrown.
However, based on the divine right to rule, a
political rivalry between the Hashemites stirred the
relationship between the Abbasids and Alawites
(Ali’s descendants). Specically, the Abbasi regime
initiated the war against the Alawites, in which
most Alawites were killed and imprisoned during
the Umayyad period, where many were forced to
ee (Vom Bruck 2016). Thus, this political conict
led the Alawites to look for other lands to build
their Imamate state, which is based on the divine
right theory to rule, and their claim that they are
descendants of Prophet Mohammed.
In the trajectory to nd land for a theological
Imamate system, Yemen was targeted by the
Alawites. In this context, by the late ninth century (897
AD), Yahya bin Hussein al-Rassi and his followers
penetrated Yemen to establish a religious state in
northern Yemen, which was based on the theory of
the divine right to rule. Furthermore, he claimed
that he was the descendant of Prophet Mohammed,
which meant that Muslims must respect and select
him as a ruler as well as the Imam. Additionally, he
also said to Yemenis that ‘If you obey me, you will
only lose Prophet Mohammad’s personality,’ which
indicated that there was no difference between him
and the Prophet Mohammad; thus, the Yemenis must
obey him. However, according to his claim that he
was from the Bani Hashim tribe in Hijaz, Yahya al-
Rassi was not geographically or ethnically belong
to the Yemeni’s society. Therefore, the Yemeni
tribes resisted al-Rassi and his soldiers because they
refused to be ruled by migrants who came from
behind the borders, which did not belong to Yemen’s
soil.
234
Islāmiyyāt 44(1(
Additionally, the Yemenis rejected this invasion
and declared as an independent state with its
unique civilisation, in which they were to be ruled
by someone who does not belong to its territory,
identity, and history. However, Yahya al-Rassi did
not succumb to the rejection and gathered more
than six thousand ghters from Hijaz and Iran
(Tabaristan) to combat the tribes of Yemen. As a
result of this predicament, several wars erupted
that started with the al-Rassi, which was the great
grandfather of the Houthis, followed by his sons and
grandsons. Thus, with several Alawites that were
loyal to him, al-Rassi went to the Sa’adah province
and began his battles to create a religious state, which
was opposing the Yemeni tribal leaders who fought
him and his army for years until his death in 911 AD.
Between 897 to 911 AD, more than 140 battles were
waged by al-Rassi against Yemenis, where the main
idea was to impose the Hashemite dynasty’s theory
of the divine right to rule in their descendants and
offspring imposed on Yemenis. Since then, wars had
occurred where the Yemenis form the indigenous
people, while the Hashemites as aggressors, which
continued until now with the Houthis, who were
the new generation of their ancestor Yahya al-Rassi
and his alliance with the Iranians (Tabaristanis) (Al-
Ahmadi 2007; Al-Ahmadi 2018; Pulkkinen 2017).
Moreover, the Yemenis belong to the Qahtan
tribe, which is dominant in the southern Arabian
Peninsula, while the Hashemites and Alawites
belong to the Adnan tribe that is dominant in the
northern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, the
conict was indicated to occur between the Qahtanis
and the Adnanis, and meanwhile, the Hashemites
established themselves as a superior class compared
to other Yemenis tribes. Furthermore, the ‘Zaydi
Imams’ in Yemen came from this supremacist class
controlled by force in intermittent periods on some
territories of northern Yemen until the revolution
of the 1960s. Today, the Houthis clan that leads the
current rebellion is linked with the tribal group of
Hashemites (Manea 2012). Generally, the Houthis
are the new wave of the Hashemites or Alawites
dynasty, in which they apply a mandate perspective
(Wilayah), based on the theory of the divine right
to rule Yemen’s land, while completely ignoring
to the civilised conceptions of democracy and free
elections.
At the beginning of the 1960s, a Yemeni
revolution against the Imamate theological system
(ancestors of the Houthis) erupted and established
the rst Republican system. The revolution
targeted the Imamate system led by the Hashemites
clerics, which derived from the divine right theory.
Furthermore, in the previous theological Imamate
structure, the Hashemite families dominated the
government’s leading positions based on the divine
right to rule theory. Therefore, the revolution
targeted these monopoly religious standers, which
kept a unique rank in the political body as compared
to the indigenous people. As a result, in relative to the
vast majority of Yemenis, the republican system no
longer acknowledges the Hashemites in Yemen as a
separate social group. It was one of the objectives of
the revolution of 26 September 1962, that states the
elimination of differences and privileges between
Yemeni social classes (Al-Rasheed & Vitalis 2004).
Despite the success of the 1960s revolution, the fear
for the return of the religious and rigid Imamate
regime to the pre-26th revolution is still becoming
a source of anxiety for the indigenous people of
Yemen. Therefore, the rise of the Houthis provoked
an uneasiness towards the Hashemites’ ambitions to
restore the Imamate rule and repeat their dark past
against the Yemenis (Porter 2018). Hence, this idea
is because the Hashemites refused to accept living
under a democratic system after the 1962 revolution,
which did not coincide with their theory (the divine
right) (Al-Ghaili 2018).
The rise of Houthism is based on the concept of
the Hashemites’ divine right to rule Yemen and to
restore the system of Imamate that collapsed after
the revolution of 1962. To mobilise the Hashemites
families, the Houthism used the ideology that
became the solid foundation for its agenda to restore
the extinct theological Imamate system (Jaber 2018
& Mohammed 2018). Therefore, to mobilise the
Hashemites, the Hashemite’s family leaders started
a network of social programmes and political
parties under the all-encompassing title al-Shabab
al-Moamen ‘Believing Youth’ and Al-Haq party to
give them an organised political voice (Lewis 2015).
Consequently, in 1979 after the Iranian revolution,
the arrival of Khomeinism came to power, in which
the father of the founder of Houthism (Badr al-Din
al-Houthi) started connecting with the new Iranian
regime. This idea was because Khomeini was a Shiite
cleric that shared al-Houthi in al-Wilayah concept
(the divine right theory) (Al-Ahmadi 2007). In the
middle of the 1980s, because of this connection, the
Houthism activities focused on organising religious
courses in mosques of Sa’adah and teaching within
the framework of the Zaydism doctrine, especially
the Hashemite families. Later, at the end of the
The Religious-Political Ideology of Houthis’ Rebellion in Yemen: Theoretical Perspective of the Divine Right to Rule
235
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Houthism
established an entity called the Believing Youth
Forum (BYF), which was to spread the Houthism
thoughts nationwide by building centres, which
sought more than 15,000 followers (Albloshi 2016;
Freeman 2009 & Juneau 2016).
The rise of Houthism was related to the rst
leader of the movement, which is the son of the
Hashemite cleric, Badr al-Din al-Houthi or Hussein
Badr al-Din. At the beginning of his political career,
Hussein in cooperation with the Hashemites’ clerics
founded the ‘Truth party’ and won two seats in the
parliamentary elections of 1993. Specically, the
party serves as a political forum for their religious
beliefs as well as to protect their interests (Albloshi
2016 & Palik 2018). Later, Hussein al-Houthi left
the party and focused on the BYF, and by leveraging
common demands from the central government,
he transformed the forum into a political platform,
which eventually became a military rebellion (Nagi
2019).
Over time, in 2004, the Houthism began its
rebellion against the central government until 2010
(Al-Ghaili 2018), where they fought six rebellion
wars (the so-called wars of Sa’adah) between 2004
and 2010, and several wars and disputes within the
Yemeni tribes in Sa’adah, Amran, and Jawf (Clausen
2018 & Palik 2018). Although the leader of the
insurgency, Hussein al-Houthi was killed during
the ght in 2004, the rebellion continued due to the
new political-religious engines, which led to their
insurgency, and was the precursor to the 2014 coup
and the current war (Al-Ghaili 2018 & Jaber 2018).
Most Yemenis considered the rise of Houthism was
an effort to target and overthrow the republican
system, which would end the monopoly over-power
of the Hashemites dynasty since the 26 September
1962 revolution (Al-Dawsari 2017).
REGIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
THAT SUPPORT THE HOUTHIS
Regional terrorist groups standing alongside
the Houthis rebels believe in the theory of the
guardianship of the jurist (i.e., the theory of the
divine right to rule). Among these prominent
groups are the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), Hezbollah (Lebanon), and Asa’ib Ahl Al-
Haq (Iraq). In addition to considering Iran as an
ofcial sponsor of (state) terrorism, in 2019 the
United States designated Iran’s IRGC as a foreign
terrorist organization (Byman 2020). Also, on the
10th of August 1997 and the 1st of October 2020,
the United States designated Hezbollah and Asa’ib
Ahl Al-Haq as foreign terrorist organizations. These
organizations are fully supported by the IRGC of
Iran and the Supreme Leader of the Iranian regime.
On January 10th, 2021, the U.S. Department of
State has designated the Houthis Group (Ansar
Allah) as a terrorist organization. The designation
became effective on 19 January 2021. However, on
February 12th, 2021, the U.S. Department of State
has revoked the designation of the Houthis group as
a terrorist organization after Biden’s administration
took ofce.
These organizations have a history of
intervention in Yemen’s internal affairs. In 2009,
Iran was accused of training Houthi insurgents
by the Yemeni government. The Yemeni media
claimed that they had been trained in an Iranian-run
settlement in Eritrea. In December 2014, numerous
media reports quoted US intelligence ofcials who
said that Hezbollah and IRGC units were training
Houthi rebels in Lebanon and the IRGC base near
the Iranian city of Qom. According to these reports,
the IRGC advisers who serve the Houthis (Ansar
Allah) may be dozens or hundreds. General Abdul
Reza Shahlai, director of the Iranian Qods Force
for External Operations, a branch of the IRGC, is
the most prominent of those advisers who are still
advising the Houthis inside Yemen. The IRGC
aimed to prepare Houthis to become, like Hezbollah
in Lebanon, a pawn in Iran’s regional game as a
guarantor of its access to the strategic Bab al-Mandab
Strait in the Southern Red Sea region (Juneau
2016, Knights, Ingram, Whiteside, & Winter 2020;
Vatanka 2020 & Zweiri 2016). As proof of IRGC’s
support for the Houthis, in early 2013, Yemeni coast
guards caught a Panamanian ag-operated vessel
carrying small arms and ammunition, 122 mm
rockets, C4 explosives, bomb-making equipment
to assemble IEDs, and night vision goggles made
in Iran. Besides, Yemeni forces found anti-aircraft
missiles that appeared to be Iranian-made Misagh-2
missiles (Terrill 2014). Additionally, in February
2020, the US Navy seized Iran’s weapons, including
three Iranian surface-to-air missiles and 150 anti-
tank guided missiles, in a traditional sailing vessel
in the Arabian Sea. The U.S. warship’s statement
said the weapons were on their way to the Houthis
rebels in Yemen (Reuters 2020).
In addition to hosting the Houthis media on
the Lebanese land, Hezbollah has been involving
in the ongoing war in Yemen. In 2016 the Yemeni
236
Islāmiyyāt 44(1(
legitimate government announced to have physical
evidence that Hezbollah training the Houthi rebels
and ghting alongside them in attacks on Saudi
Arabia’s border. Abu Ali Tabatabaei, former
Hezbollah specials operations commander in
southern Lebanon has been sent to Yemen as a
military advisor for the Houthis. Also, one of the
prominent leaders of Hezbollah Khalil Harb, a former
special operations commander and a close adviser
to Hasan Nasrallah, was overseeing Hezbollah’s
activities in Yemen according to the U.S. ofcial’s
government. Moreover, in April 2015, Naeem
Qasem, the Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General
warned Saudi Arabia that would “incur very serious
losses” and “pay a heavy price” as a result of its war
against the Houthis in Yemen (Levitt 2016 & Wyss
2016). In 2019, Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah,
acknowledged in a speech that his ghters existed
in Yemen ghting alongside the Houthis rebels. He
added that some of the Hezbollah ghters had been
killed in the Yemeni battleground (KhabarAgency
2019).
PROLONGING YEMEN’S WAR: HOUTHISM
AND THE HASHEMITE’S BELIEF OF THE
DIVINE RIGHT TO RULE
In this article, the research analysed the conict in
Yemen and explored the main engine that played
a vital role to the outbreak of the wars, which
caused the catastrophic implications on Yemen and
its national security. The interviews with Yemeni
experts highlighted the dark angles of the Yemeni
war that was not discussed clearly in the past. Hence,
in this context, the historical roots of the wars such
as penetration of Hashemites to Yemen with their
religious-political theory to rule, are most associated
with the current conict; thus, informant 1, Ali
Muhammad Mutee Al Dahab who is a non-resident
researcher at Al Jazeera Center for Studies has
stated the following opinions during our interview
with him in Egypt on 9 May 2019:
There are those who look at this war in a philosophy which is
away from historical roots and expand its dimensions, motives,
and goals, but this cannot ignore the essence of the conict and
its real engines. In fact, the current conict is linked to historical
bloodshed-burdens. All the events are revolving around the
monopolisation of power, and the one who deserves it. Violence
has been the only way to achieve it since the arrival of Yahya
bin Hussein al-Rasi in Yemen in the 80s of the third Hijri
century, 897 A.D. In this conict, the Houthis are a political and
religious group based on these determinants, in accordance with
their belief in the right to rule, as they claim to be descendants
of the Prophet Mohammad’s family. However, this exclusivity
has faced erce Yemeni resistance at all political and historical
junctures, in which the Hashemites came to power or in the
events of the restoration of the Yemenis to rule their country
and the latest of which was the 26 September 1962 revolution
(Al Dahab 2019).
Meanwhile, informant 2, Mareb Qaid Ahmed
Alward who is a Yemeni based journalist indicates
that the involvement of the Houthism in the current
war as well as during insurgencies between 2004 and
2010 was due to the religious-political objectives, or
the Hashemite’s right to rule. Based on our personal
discussion with him on 25 May 2019 in Yemen, he
claimed that:
The Houthi movement represents a political front for an old
political project, behind which the ‘political Hashemite’ is
emerging. The political Hashemite means a group of members
relies on religious views seek to monopoly authority through
the concept of Imamate, claiming that they are entitled to
it, based on legitimate texts that have been said and are still
controversial. In this sense, the Houthi movement, as a front
of political Hashemite, and political Hashemite as a powerful
movement of the Houthi movement, is largely involved in the
current war in Yemen. This is not only since the September
2014 and February 2015 coup but also since the Houthis
declared their rebellion against Yemeni military institution in
2004. Therefore, the movement, with its engines and religious
and political tributaries, undermined the state’s foundations,
especially after the 2014 coup (Alward 2019).
In his explanation on the Houthism’s approach
that resorted to violence to achieve its political
objectives, he further argued that:
The ongoing conict in Yemen, since the intervention of the
Arab Coalition to support the legitimacy in Yemen, must have
historical reasons. For example, the Houthi group is a historical
extension of the regime of imams who ruled some North Yemen
territories for interval periods in the past until the revolution
of the Republican on 26 September 1962. The Houthis group
believes in what the Imamates believed during their reign, which
is the theory of the divine right to rule that must monopoly by
their descendants only away from the principle of democracy.
This is why the cycles of conict repeat themselves, as all the
families of the Hashemite families took over the rule of North
Yemen for a period of time. The point I want to say that the
Imamates and those who following the Zaydi doctrine are all
working to impose their rule by force. The danger of the conict
- in my view - is a religious conict based on the claim of the
divine right to rule the country, which means the futility of all
political negotiations aimed at ending the Houthi coup. So, the
military force is the only way in which Houthis believe, and it is
the only way to end the conict (Alward 2019).
It is clear that based on the theory of the divine
right to rule, the Houthism’s adoption among the
Yemeni society would potentially lead to closing
all political solutions. On the other hand, another
The Religious-Political Ideology of Houthis’ Rebellion in Yemen: Theoretical Perspective of the Divine Right to Rule
237
observant (informant 3), Faisal Ali (President of
the Yemenyoon Center for Studies in Malaysia),
based on our interview with him in Kuala Lumpur
on 19 May 2019, has pointed out the return of the
Imamate rule, which was overthrown in the 1960s.
Specically, the Imamates’ followers disguised
themselves in political parties to serve the main
goal of returning the ‘Imams’ to rule the country.
Moreover, regarding the seized out of the state
institutions in 2014, he added that the establishment
of the youth believers in the early nineties was an
extension of the Imamate’s endeavours to return to
the rule, as can be seen in the following quotes:
In my opinion, this is dated back to 1962, when the rule of the
Imamate ancestors was overthrown. The Imams continued to
observe the right opportunity to invade the state and restore
what they consider to be their own divine right, so they
penetrated the state and trained their members intellectually and
militarily. The Imams failed to return from the political door
through the parties they established, such as ‘Truth Party’, or
their inltration through other Yemeni parties. Despite their
failure to seize power, they succeeded in achieving political
gains and re-positioning themselves in existing state institutions
such as the judiciary and the military institutions (Ali 2019).
However, Mousa Qasem, a Yemeni political
analyst (Informant 4 – personal interview on 15 June
2019 in Malaysia) has opiniated that the rebellion of
the Houthism was associated with the state-Imamate
conict that resulted from the 1960s revolution.
According to him:
In the early sixties of the last century, the Yemenis made a revolt
against the rule of the Hashemite Imams, specically on 26
September 1962, and that revolution was the last battle fought
by the Yemeni ‘indigenous people’ against the Hashemite
rule. Then, they declared the rst Republic in the history of
Yemen after the victory of the revolution. However, during
the period in the post Republic establishment, the Hashemites
were stratigically working in hiding to restore what they saw
as opportunity to claim right to rule Yemen, based on their
rm perspective of the divine right to rule. Therefore, they
started inciting rebellions against the central Yemeni state
and specically during the period from 2004 to 2010. These
rebellions, which killed tens of thousands of Yemenis, civilians,
and military, formed what has become known today as the
‘Houthi group’ attributed to the leader of the rebellion ‘Hussein
al-Houthi’ who is a descendant of al-Rassi that entered Yemen
in 897 A.D. to establish a theological state of Hashemite. Later,
in 2014, during the transition period, the ‘Houthi group’ took
advantage of the opportunity to re-impose the theory of divine
right to rule by the military coup which led to the current
catastrophic war (Qasem 2019).
In this respect, another academic expert on
Yemen’s conict (Informant 5 name withheld
upon interviewee request) supported the above
analysis regarding the state-Imamate conict, which
remained in the dark for decades, and he explained
that during an interview on 10 June 2019:
The historical roots of the war in Yemen dated back to the
Republican-Imamate conict that existed in the 1960s after the
revolution of 26 September that ended the rule of Hashemites-
Imamates who governed the troubled North Yemen since 1918.
After eight years of conict in the 1960s, a reconciliation was
signed in al-Taif in Saudi Arabia, to end the war by 1970,
but the conict remained hidden for two decades until the
establishment of the ‘Young Believers Forum’ in the nineties
of the last century by Hussein Badr al-din al-Houthi and with
the support of his father Badruddin Amir al-Din al-Houthi, who
is considered a Hashemite religious cleric. Thus, the Houthis
continued to form groups to wage their rst armed battle against
the central government in 2004 (Informant 5 2019).
In line with the above opinions, Sanhan Ali
Senan Alsayed (Informant 6), a Yemeni journalist
who works on contemporary history and politics
of Yemen linked the Houthism insurgencies with
their followers’ belief on the divine right to rule
as it represented the Imamate while the Yemeni
government was seen to represent the republican
system. Based on our personal communication with
Alsayed in UAE on 15 May 2019, he strongly argues
that:
After the 1960s revolution, which erased the existence of the
Imamate, life remained stable to a great extent in terms of
political conicts between the Republic and the Imamate.
But since 2014, Hashemite has been able to ride the wave of
revolution and benet from the rivalry between the revolution
and the ruling party. Therefore, the current conict has roots
extending to the conict between the Republic and the Imamate,
and this is what is happening now as Houthis have swallowed
all joints of the state as an attempt to control all institutions
in Yemen. Hence, the main factor is the conict between the
Republic represented by the legitimate government and the
Imamate represented by the Houthis rebels. There is an attempt
by the Houthis to restore what they believe as a divine right to
rule, which was robbed by the 1960s revolution that led to the
formation of Yemen Arab Republic. As strange as this is, the
Houthis believe in the right to take part in the government but at
the same time they were planning to topple the regime by force.
These are clearly the reasons which have been repeated over
the years and during different periods in Yemen (Informant 6).
Speaking of foreign involvement in the
recent conict, Mohammed Abdullah Ahmed AL-
Muhaimid (Informant 7, personal communication
on 12 June 2019 in Yemen), a Yemeni based
political activist indicates that there seemed to be
a historical extension of proxy wars and conicts
in Yemen, especially with the Iranian intervention
to support the Houthis. Tehran’s intervention in
support of the Houthis and their inter-relationship
with the rebel movement reected the theory of the
238
Islāmiyyāt 44(1(
rule of the guardian jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) after
the 1979 revolution, which is the idea of governance
closest to the idea of the Houthis (the Imamate or the
Wilayah). As stated by him:
The success of the Khomeini revolution played a prominent
role in the return of the dream of restoring the so-called ‘divine
right to rule’ in Yemen. Several Hashemites clerics have turned
their faces to Islamic Republic of Iran, including Badr al-Din
al-Houthi, the spiritual father of the Houthi movement (Al-
Muhaimid 2019).
Based on these expert interviews’ explanation,
our analysis of the current war in Yemen is seen to be
associated with the historical and theological views,
where they revolve around the monopoly of power
based on the Houthism’s belief in the principle of the
divine right. Furthermore, violence was perceived
to be the only way to full this principle after the
penetration of the ancestor of the Houthis, Yahya
Hussein al-Rasi from Hijaz to Yemen in 897 A.D.
Hence, this analysis conrmed the idea of Zaydism
(i.e. political Hashemiyya) which was also based on
the principle of the divine right to rule rather than
the popular mandate. Undoubtedly, the historical
conict in Yemen is assciated with the belief in the
divine right of one kind of human being to rule,
which is adopted by the Hashemites, including the
Houthi movement. The only way to enforce such
thoughts by the Houthis was to focus on using
‘swords and weapons’ (Mohammed 2018; Porter
2017; Steinbeiser 2015).
This research claried the Houthism’s beliefs in
the divine right to rule the Muslim world, including
Yemen, where the approach played a central role in
the outbreak of rebellions. This idea is essentially
based on their claim that they are the descendants
of Prophet Mohammad, derived from his daughter
Fatima and her sons Hassan and Hussein. However,
in the current and previous conicts, the history
of Hashemites’ kingdom in Yemen, and the
discriminatory thoughts of their followers on power
and right to rule were strongly disapprove by a number
of Yemenis. Accordingly, previous studies reported
that the Houthi community believes in the divine
right of the Prophet’s relatives to rule and govern
Muslims in all spheres of life (political, religious,
economic, cultural, social, military, and educational
issues). The so called ‘divine right to rule’ in Yemen
was limited to the descendants of both Hassan
and Hussein, according to Hashemite ideology
(Albahesh 2018 & Jaber 2018). Nevertheless, due
to the small base that supports Houthis and the
thoughts of their ancestors in Yemen, the majority
of Yemenis rejected these religious-political agenda
(Al-Dawsari 2017).
On the other hand, among of the roots of the
Yemen conict is the endeavour by Houthism
to take revenge on the republican system, which
established on the ruins of the Imamate regime
(Houthi’s ancestors) after the 1962’s revolution.
Therefore, Houthism (i.e. Hashemites) has always
been seeking the right time and place to restore the
Imamate doctrine of rule, despite the signicant
refusal by the Yemenis. In general, the present
conict is an extension of the previous conicts
between the state and Imamate systems. In this
sense, the Houthis were overwhelmed by the notion
of the divine right of the Hashemites to rule Yemen,
in which to restore the Imamate regime after the
1960s revolution. Furthermore, we are certain that
the Houthis used this doctrine to mobilise families
belonging to the Hashemites, which became a solid
cluster for the Houthism to return to the extinct
theological Imamate system (Al-Dawsari 2017;
Jaber 2018 & Mohammed 2018). Similarly, some
studies have indicated that the majority of Yemenis
believe that Houthism triggered the current conict
is about reclaiming their God-given right to rule,
which was stripped from their previous theological
framework in the 1962 revolution. Thus, the
majority of Yemenis regarded this war as a battle
for a republican system that ended the Hashemite
dynasty’s monopoly of power in the revolution of
the 1960s (Al-Dawsari 2017; Al-Ghaili 2018; Jaber
2018; Orkaby 2014).
CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, this paper found that one of the
key internal dynamics of the conict in Yemen is
Houthism, which represents the political front
for an old political project of the so-called ‘the
political Hashemiyya’. This project, which relies
on the divine right to rule principle, is the crucial
internal factor of the Yemeni civil wars. The Houthi
movements, after the revolution of 1962, refused to
acknowledge the legitimacy of being ruled under
the Yemen Arab Republic political regime that was
seen as not incline to their ideology (the theory of
the divine right). Therefore, these circumstances
led the Hashemites to rebel and battle against the
Yemeni central government to reclaim the right
to rule in Yemen, based on the theological-divine
perspectives.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was partially funded by the Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia’s Early Career Research Fund
Scheme, grant code GGPM 2020-042. The authors
would like to thank all informants and experts who
participated in this research.
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AUTHORS
Mugahed. S. Sarhan
Centre for Research in History, Politics and International
Aairs,
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia
P105898@siswa.ukm.edu.my
Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin (Corresponding author)
Centre for Research in History, Politics and International
Aairs,
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanties
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia
irwansyazli@ukm.edu.my
Zarina Othman
Centre for Research in History, Politics and International
Aairs,
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia
zo@ukm.edu.my
240
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