We usually succeed in performing illocutionary acts such as commanding, requesting, promising, asserting, conceding, and so on in saying things. There is a systematic relation between what is said and what is achieved in saying it. Yet illocutionary acts may fail to take effect in various ways. You might try to issue a command but fail, for example, because of the lack of suitable authority. The
... [Show full abstract] purpose of this paper is to show how the regularities that enable us to perform illocutionary acts and the background conditions that normally support them can be captured in logical terms. For this purpose, we model the relevant kind of regularities in the form of constraints of local logics introduced in channel theory developed by Barwise and Seligman, by building information channels with the language and sets of models of “dynamified” deontic logic of acts of commanding and promising developed by Yamada. In doing so, it will be seen that the language of needs to be substantially extended in order to talk about the relation between acts of saying things and acts of commanding. We conclude by hinting at how this can be done.