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Illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind
... In the article, I argue that a key aspect of the illusion problem is explaining the function of the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. Although some authors (Frankish 2022) suggest the illusion probably has no particular function but is a by-product of introspection, others (Dennett 1991(Dennett , 2018Humphrey 2011Humphrey , 2016Humphrey , 2023Graziano 2016Graziano , 2019Graziano and Webb 2017) have pointed out that it has played an important role in the evolution of consciousness. I think this is crucial because if illusionists formulate a positive account of why we have the illusion of phenomenal consciousness and, significantly, of why the illusion has evolved, then illusionism will present a strong alternative to other theoretical approaches to consciousness. ...
... Illusionism (Frankish 2016(Frankish , 2017a(Frankish , 2022Dennett 1991Dennett , 2016Dennett , 2018 rejects the claim that experiences have mysterious properties that pose a hard problem for contemporary scientific research and, conversely, posits that scientific research can explain conscious experience. At the heart of illusionism lies the following thesis: phenomenal consciousness does not exist; it only seems to -it is an illusion. ...
... A similar situation occurs with the hard/illusion problem transition. While hard problem discourse is perceived by realists as essential within the current philosophy of mind and especially within the discussion on phenomenal consciousness, the illusionists consider it too mysterious (epistemological statement), comprising undesirable ontological baggage that one should eliminate to progress (Frankish, 2021;Frankish & Sklutová, 2022). However, such passage implies posing a similar type of question as the one asked by realists when they deem illusionists unable of solving the illusion problem, which replaces the hard one. ...
... A familiar strategy of avoiding making ontological conclusions on the nature of consciousness, based on the statements about its epistemological features, was proposed, for example, by Husserl (Welton, ed., 1999). This strategy's suitability for the realist-illusionist discussion is not excluded, taking into account that this appeal to a phenomenologist hardly begs the question against illusionism as previously concentrated on the subjective experience and the latter does not reject its existence (Frankish, 2022). ...
This article is about the discussion between realists and illusionists on phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal properties or qualia. The author considers what he calls the epistemological-ontological transition — the transition from epistemologically significant statements to ontologically significant ones. The option to avoid such a transition is tested in order to overcome some obstacles that it can bring to the discussion. The paper provides examples of the transition made by both camps as well as some advantages and disadvantages of rejecting it. The author comes to the conclusion that there are meaningful arguments for both options. On one hand, rejection of the transition to ontology may be beneficial for the following reasons. First, it tends to puzzle the opponents and to slow the discussion. Second, the very reason for the transition is poorly justified. Third, the core of the discussion between illusionists and realists — or at least its argumentative part — is rather epistemological, hence, moving to ontology might blur key arguments. On the other hand, one might aspire to save the transition due to the ontological roots of the discussion which must lead its argumentative part. The author then points out that eliminating the transition does not assume denying the ontological significance of the present discussion and that the problem of the nature of consciousness is definitely worth considering — but, perhaps, after the epistemological part of the problem is carefully analyzed.
The purpose of the article is to highlight the key philosophical cases in the medical and ethical debate on life and death - ontological, axiological and anthropological. For the philosophy of medicine, the concepts of life and health are fundamental dimensions, as they combine elements of nature and human existence. The aim of the article is to differentiate the existential, value and human contexts of philosophy in the medical space. The methodology used in the study is focused mainly on the analytical cluster of general scientific knowledge. The analysis of the literature on the problem of life and death in medical and ethical discourse allowed us to separately group the medical, philosophical and scientific and worldview clusters of this problem. Through generalising and comparative analysis, an attempt is made to unify the problem of life and death in the context of a single philosophical and scientific paradigm. To achieve these objectives, it is advisable to use the principles of interdisciplinarity, which help to bring to a common understanding the various ideas and views on the ethical component of the dichotomy of life and death in medicine. The results of the study indicate that the human-dimensional philosophical component dominates the ontological and axiological components in the modern worldview of human existence. This is the result of the policy of anthropocentrism in its global manifestation and the consequence of the use of a pragmatic approach in the system of human sciences. However, the COVID-19 pandemic, a minor factor by civilisational standards, has managed (albeit for a short period) to reorient the philosophical issues of life and death to existential dimensions. A promising area of research is modelling the situation of a socio-cultural crisis of a global scale in the healthcare system and the readiness of society to re-position the problem of life and death. Thus, the philosophy of medicine clearly structures the problem of life and death in three fundamental cases: ontological, axiological and anthropological, which change their priority in the scientific and philosophical discourse depending on the socio-cultural trends in the development of society and civilisation.
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