Regulating and governing China's internet and digital media in the Xi Jinping era

Abstract

The article outlines key regulatory and governing issues and actions in China's internet and digital media in the first decade under the leadership of Xi Jinping. It argues that both the domestic and global dimensions are equally crucial to understanding China's internet regulation and governance in the Xi era. It further argues that the two interrelated dimensions that emphasise the state's centrality and supremacy in internet-related regulatory issues and frameworks help strengthen China's existing political structure at home and promote China's digital power globally in the digital age.

Full text

Regulating and governing China’s
internet and digital media in the
Xi Jinping era
Jian Xu
Deakin University, Australia
Haiqing Yu
RMIT University, Australia
Abstract
The article outlines key regulatory and governing issues and actions in China’s internet and digital
media in the first decade under the leadership of Xi Jinping. It argues that both the domestic and
global dimensions are equally crucial to understanding China’s internet regulation and governance
in the Xi era. It further argues that the two interrelated dimensions that emphasise the state’s cen-
trality and supremacy in internet-related regulatory issues and frameworks help strengthen
China’s existing political structure at home and promote China’s digital power globally in the
digital age.
Keywords
Chinese internet, digital media, regulation, governance, Xi Jinping
Regulation and control of the internet are always seen as the key characteristics that distinguish the
Chinese internet from the ‘libertarian internet’in liberal-democratic nations in the West. In the rela-
tively small but fast-growing field of Chinese internet studies, the regulation and governance of
China’s internet and digital media has been one of the most concerned topics (Cai and Dai,
2021; Griffiths, 2019; King et al., 2013; Miao et al., 2021; Roberts, 2018; Shen, 2016). Since Xi
Jinping came to power in 2012, there has been a consensus that China shows an ideological turn
towards Maoism in both domestic and international politics (Brown and Be
rzina-C
erenkova,
2018; Klimešand Marinelli, 2018; Zhao, 2016). As the barometer of Chinese politics, the internet
has demonstrated what Yang (2014) calls ‘the return of ideology’. Such an ideological turn has seen
the escalation of ‘regulation’and ‘governance’of the internet and digital media under Xi’s
Corresponding author:
Jian Xu, School of Media and Communication, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood VIC 3125, Australia.
Email: j.xu@deakin.edu.au
Original Article
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DOI: 10.1177/1329878X221116402
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leadership. This is arguably the most prominent characteristic in the policymaking, economy,
culture and politics of China’s internet and digital media. Its impact on and repercussion in the
field of digital media and communication are beyond China and Chinese-language platforms.
Along with the platformisation of the Chinese culture and society (de Kloet et al., 2019), we have
seen a step-up in internet governance through the implementation of regulatory laws and provisions
issued by Chinese state regulators in the last decade. These include the Cybersecurity Law (2017),
Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem (2020), Provisions on
the Management of Internet User Public Account Information Services (2021), and Data Security
Law and Personal Information Protection Law (2021), among others. They are all aimed at ‘clear-
ing’(qinglang), ‘civilising’(wenming), and ‘safeguarding’(baozhang) the cyberspace to strengthen
the state’s control over online information and data and maintain cybersecurity and political
stability.
In the meantime, the corporate/platform-state relations have become more ‘symbiotic and col-
laborative’(Zhang, 2020: 124). We have witnessed a growing alliance between state regulatory
agencies and digital platforms to govern emerging digital practices, cultures and economies,
such as online live streaming (Gu, 2021), algorithmic distribution of news (Xu and Flew, 2022),
wanghong e-commerce (Yu and Goh, 2021), fandom fake data (Conrad and Mullin, 2021). And
industry associations, such as the Internet Society of China (zhongguo hulianwang xiehui) and
China Federation of Internet Societies (zhongguo wangluo shehui zuzhi lianhehui), have become
more prominent in monitoring and implementing internet governance policies and regulations.
Such industry associations are government-organised or affiliated ‘industry self-discipline’entities
that help transform the state-industry relations from direct ‘state control’to indirect ‘state coordin-
ation’(Gallagher, 2004: 420), while maintaining the dominant power of the state. Moreover,
nationwide campaigns have been initiated to promote digital literacy and cybersecurity education
among young people. Such campaigns employ the style of Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s)
‘United Front’(tongzhan) work and mass education by involving and uniting everyone from
‘new media professionals’(e.g. wanghong, online public opinion leaders, and ‘self-media’entre-
preneurs) to CEOs of internet companies. Chinese internet governance is thus characterised by a
coordinated approach that involves all key stakeholders and requires their active cooperation.
The requirement of ‘self-discipline’and ‘self-governance’of internet users, content producers
and digital business owners is essential to the success of the Chinese-style internet governance
regime.
The Chinese model of internet governance has also demonstrated global implications. We have
witnessed China’s global promotion of its vision for global internet governance in the last decade or
so. Since 2014, the Chinese government has been organising the annual World Internet Conference
to promote Chinese agendas in global internet governance, particularly the concept of ‘cyber sov-
ereignty’. It emphasises the state’s right to ‘fully control content and data flows within its borders’
as well as the state’s capacity to maintain ‘autonomy and self-sufficiency in the digital realm’from
being influenced by foreign digital capitalism and political powers. This, according to Creemers
(2020: 3), underscores the state’s‘ultimate authority in the digital space’.
China’s approach to the internet governance is a challenge to the ‘multistakeholder approach’
of internet governance promoted by the US. China has tried to work with other countries to build
a‘community of shared future in the cyberspace’(wangluo kongjian mingyun gongtongti)inits
strive for leadership in a new world cyber order. If multi-stakeholderism in internet governance
is just ‘afiction that provides meaning to a disorderly world’(Hofmann, 2016: 29), the Chinese
notion of ‘cyber sovereignty’provides an alternative framework to global cyberspace govern-
ance in the era of splintered internet. It is part of China’s ambition to regain its centrality in
the international system as a major power. It has much more practical implications in China’s
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domestic internet governance regime which we outlined earlier and also in China’s cyber dip-
lomacy. The most prominent examples are arguably the global expansion of China’sdigital
infrastructure through the Digital Silk Road Initiative as well as the ‘going global’of Chinese
digital technologies (e.g. 5G and facial recognition technology) and digital platforms (e.g.
TikTok and WeChat).
In China, regulating and governing the internet is not a new phenomenon but has incorpo-
rated multiple stakeholders in the governing process in accordance with ‘collaborative govern-
ance’(xietong zhili) promoted by the Xi Jinping administration. Such a collaborative
governance approach is state-centred, similar to its international version of cyber sovereignty.
It is not just about government control but characterised by networked governance, which
involves key actors in a networked relationship with the state. Over the years, the Chinese
model of internet governance has become more multi-dimensional, panoramic and preemptive
(Cai and Dai, 2021).
China’s ambition to shape cyberspace norms and its proactive participation in global internet
governance is relatively new against the backdrop of China’s pursuit of global discourse and
digital powers. Globally, China’s role as a game-changer in global internet governance has pro-
voked resistance from the global West who has continued to argue for the multistakeholder
approach and internet freedom. In the tech cold war between Washington and Beijing over the
future of the internet and digital technology, cyber security and national security are handy rhetoric
for both sides in promoting their versions of cyberspace governance. The battle for cyber sover-
eignty can be a double-edged sword, as illustrated in the ban of Huawei 5G (Sabbagh, 2020),
the ban of Chinese apps in India (Abi-Habib, 2020), and Trump’s executive order to ban TikTok
(Swanson et al., 2020), among others, amid the global ‘Sino techlash’.
The two interrelated dimensions outlined above are equally crucial to understanding China’s
internet regulation and governance in the Xi era. We argue that both the domestic and global dimen-
sions of internet governance emphasise the state’s centrality and supremacy in internet-related regu-
latory issues and frameworks. Such a Chinese approach to internet governance helps strengthen
China’s existing political structure at home and promotes China’s digital power globally. How dif-
ferent actors and countries respond to the rise of digital China and its accompanying discourse on
internet governance is our collective task of this special issue.
The special issue consists of six original research articles that examine the regulation and gov-
ernance of China’s internet and digital media from various perspectives. The regulatory agendas
covered in the articles range from macro level (digital infrastructure and economy), meso level
(digital platform), to micro level (online expression and digital labour). Multiple stakeholders
involved in the regulation and governance are identified and discussed, including the central and
local governments and regulatory agencies, digital platforms/companies, non-governmental orga-
nisations, internet users, and even foreign governments and regulatory authorities. The six articles
together provide an up-to-date critical analysis of the state of China’s internet regulation and gov-
ernance under Xi’s power.
Yu Hong and Yiran Wei’s article examines China’s temporal–spatial governance of the digital
transition –the shifting assemblage of the cyberspace, by critically interpreting the 14th Five-Year
Plan (2021–2025). Adopting a transcultural political economy framework, the article asks what the
state’s mandates for the governance of the digital transition look like, and in what capacity and dir-
ection the Chinese state is engaged in the governance. They identify ‘projecting digital China’,
‘countering present imperial supply-chain hierarchy’and ‘reordering the future spatiality of the
cyberspace’are three main themes underscored in the 14th Five-Year Plan which aims to adapt
to the global digital transition on the one hand and promote China’s digital sovereignty and com-
petitiveness on the other hand. They argue that the 14th Five-Year Plan articulates new policy
Xu and Yu 3

paradigms in order to harness digitisation for the purpose of gaining China’s strategic autonomy in
global digital infrastructure, economy and power.
While Hong and Wei’s article focuses on the top-level design of China’s governance of the
digital transition, Jian Xu, Qian Gong and Wen Yin’s article looks more specifically at the regula-
tion and governance of ‘cyber historical nihilism’(CHN) –popular online discourses that challenge
the officially-endorsed narratives on the CCP, the People’s Liberation Army, the CCP leaders, revo-
lutionary martyrs, role models, etc. They point out that CHN is mainly governed as harmful ‘online
content’and a threatening ‘ideological trend’, and its governance has incorporated agencies and
measures of China’s‘internet governance’and ‘ideological and political education’. They argue
that CHN has been securitised by the CCP as an urgent threat to the nation’s ideological and pol-
itical securities. The governance of CHN aims to maintain the CCP’s authority in history writing
and its legitimacy and longevity as the ruling party. The CCP’s emphasis and intensity in governing
CHN have not only demonstrated the ideological turn to Maoism in internet governance, propa-
ganda and politics under Xi’s leadership, but also the CCP’s ability and resilience to adapt to
new challenges in the ideological field in the digital age.
Similar to the second article, the third article by Chunyu Zhang, Runhua Zhu and Shiwei Mo
also studies the regulation and governance of potentially disruptive online expressions, but in
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, as crisis management strategies. Their paper studies
how the CCP handles online public opinion incidents about the death of Dr Li Wenliang, a whistle-
blower of China’s COVID-19 pandemic. They examine in detail how the government adopted mul-
tiple information management and propaganda strategies to censor, appease and deflect online
expressions on Weibo for the purpose of stability maintenance in the pandemic crisis. They find
that the CCP applied ‘authoritarian participatory propaganda’strategies to successfully convert
public emotions from outrage against the government to pro-government ‘crisis nationalism’.
They argue that the CCP’s capacity of managing online information flow and public emotions
with flexible and resilient censorship and propaganda in times of crisis greatly contributes to the
CCP’s authority and leadership in the pandemic.
The fourth article by Chengxi Liao and Pengfei Fu shifts the regulatory focus from online
content and online public opinion addressed by the last two articles to digital labour and platform.
It examines the governance of digital fandom and its platforms against the backdrop of the recent
state-led ‘Clean Up’campaign to rectify Chinese idol fandom culture. Taking Taoba –a digital
fandom fundraising platform as a case study, and using the walkthrough method to observe chan-
ging practices of xiufen (fans of idol competition shows) in and post the ‘Clean Up’campaign on
this platform, they find that Chinese idol fans are subject to a governance structure where power
relations between platform, state and fans are highly complex and entangled. The state–corpor-
ate–society co-opting mode of governance has evolved towards what they call ‘coercive co-opting’,
in which digital platforms and fans conform with the imaginaries and ideologies of the state, while
the authorities still intervene in an intimidating and suppressive manner.
Yi Wang and Joanne Gray’s article studies the Chinese government’s recent attempt to
regulate the monopoly of China’s internet giants Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. They investi-
gate the key moments in the evolution of anti-monopoly/oligopoly actions taken by the
Chinese government against its dominant digital platforms. They compare China’s regulation
of tech monopolies with the EU’s digital sovereignty agenda that focuses on the discourse
regarding greater digital economy competition in the region. They argue that the issue of mon-
opoly should be taken seriously while discussing digital sovereignty which is mainly seen as a
mere geopolitical issue. They see China’s position against domestic tech monopolies as a crit-
ical moment showing China’s international alignment with the EU in the digital sovereignty
landscape.
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The final article by Haiqing Yu and Luzhou Li looks at the regulation and governance issue from
a global perspective by examining the market, politics and governance of two most popular
‘made-in-China’digital platforms in Australia, WeChat and TikTok. The two platforms represent
two different models in platform governance adopted by Tencent and ByteDance in response to the
‘Sino techlash’in Australia and other liberal-democratic nations in the West: WeChat adheres to the
Chinese ‘strict liability’model and TikTok leans towards the Western ‘broad immunity’model in
platform governance. This is due to key differences in nature and the main market of the two plat-
forms. By adopting a distancing strategy from their domestic brands, WeChat and TikTok have
created a dual structure in which they manage their branding and operations differently in China
and abroad. The article argues that the dual structure allows Chinese tech capital to reach deeper
into the global market while avoiding potential breaches of China’s stringent content rules.
Together, the six articles in the special issue have pointed out the centrality of the state in China’s
internet governance, the need for technology companies, digital platforms and internet users to
adopt a flexible and adaptive approach to the volatile space of governance, as well as the regulatory
turn in global internet governance. As Terry Flew observes in Regulating Platforms, digital plat-
form governance has seen the ‘return of state actors’, with the end of the libertarian internet, the
decline of the multistakeholder model in global internet governance, and the rise of techno-
nationalism worldwide (Flew, 2021). In China, the state actors have never retreated and have
always been in the centre of the gameplay. Their dominant role has greatly escalated in the Xi
Jinping era. Against the regulatory turn of the global internet, is it the ripe time or still premature
to argue that the global internet (platform) governance is leaning towards the ‘China model’?We
hope articles in this special issue could illustrate some of the contemporary regulatory and govern-
ing issues of China’s internet and digital media. We hope they provide useful references for us to
look back into the history, look forward to the future of China’s internet governance, and look aside
to understand the position, response and influence of the Chinese approach to internet governance
in the global context.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iDs
Jian Xu https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2798-0996
Haiqing Yu https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8368-4214
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