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Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956, Between the United States and the Soviet Union
... Зокрема в Гаазькій конвенції 1907 р. (розд.III, ст.47, п.2) використано юридичну мову повної заборони («грабунок офіційно заборонений»). Крім того, ця абсолютна заборона вимагала від державучасниць війни не тільки запобігати грабежам і карати своїх порушників, а й компенсувати жертвам вартість украденого майна 6 . ...
... Однак до несанкціонованого мародерства вдавалися не тільки нацистська та радянська держави і створені ними інституції -воно ставало модусом повсяк денних практик військовиків чи не всіх воюючих армій та парамілітарних об'єд нань. Американський дослідник К.Елфорд зауважив, що «широко розповсюджене 6 Inal T. Looting and Rape in Wartime: Law and Change in International Relations. -Р.40-41. ...
This chapter provides an overview of dependent constitution-making under one-party regimes in Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia during the first decade after the Second World War. Employing and further developing the concept of the informal Soviet empire, it discusses the structural adjustments in law and governance in the Soviet dependencies. The chapter outlines the development of the concepts of “people's republic” and “people's democracy” and discusses the process of adoption and the authorship of the constitutions. It then compares their texts with attention to sovereignty and political subjectivity, supreme state institutions, and the mentions of the Soviet Union, socialism, and ruling parties. Finally, it surveys the role of nonconstitutional institutions in political practices and their reflection in propaganda. The process of constitution-making followed the imperial logic of hierarchical yet heterogeneous governance, with multiple vernacular and Soviet actors partaking in drafting and adopting the constitutions. The texts ascribed sovereignty and political subjectivity to the people, the toilers, classes, nationalities, and regions, often in different combinations. Most of the constitutions established a parliamentary body as the supreme institution, disregarding separation of powers, and introduced a standing body to perform the supreme functions, including legislation, between parliamentary sessions, which became a key element in the legal adjustment. Some constitutions mentioned socialism, the Soviet Union, and the ruling parties. The standardization of governance in the informal Soviet empire manifested itself in the constitutional documents only partially. Propaganda and archival documents revealed the prominence of nonconstitutional institutions, parties and leaders, as well the involvement of Soviet representatives in state-building. Domestic parties and leaders in the Soviet dependencies were also presented as subordinate to their Soviet counterparts in propaganda.
Over the course of the twentieth century, a broad array of parties as organizations of a new type took over state functions and replaced state institutions on the territories of the former Ottoman, Qing, Russian, and Habsburg Empires. In the context of roughly simultaneous imperial and postimperial transformations, organizations such as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in the Ottoman Empire (one-party regime since 1913), the Anfu Club in China (parliamentary majority since 1918), and the Bolshevik Party in Russia (in control of parts of the former empire since 1918), not only took over government power but merged with government itself. Disillusioned with the outcomes of previous constitutional and parliamentary reforms, these parties justified their takeovers with slogans and programs of controlled or supervised economic and social development. Inheriting the previous imperial diversities, they furthermore took over the role of mediators between the various social and ethnic groups inhabiting the respective territories. In this respect, the parties appropriated some of the functions which dynastic and then constitutional and parliamentary regimes had ostensibly failed to perform. In a significant counter-example, in spite of prominent aspirations, no one-party regime emerged in Japan, for there the constitutional monarchy had survived the empire's transformation to a major industrialized imperialist power. One-party regimes thrived on both sides of the Cold War and in some of the non-aligned states. Whereas several state socialist one-party regimes collapsed in 1989–1991, some of the communist parties have continued to rule, and new parties managed to monopolize political power in different Eurasian contexts.
Diplomacy has played a key role in conflicts since ancient times. Over time, the role of diplomatic agents has changed, to take on, gradually, greater importance especially in wartime. This article focuses on the activities of the Italian foreign service in World War II and on the role of diplomats during the civil war that followed the fall of Fascism and the subsequent armistice with the Allies. In this dramatic context, some diplomats confirmed their loyalty to the king, while others joined the new-born Italian Social Republic (R.S.I.), a puppet state ruled by Mussolini under the protection of Nazi Germany. Somewhere, two Italian diplomatic representations coexisted shortly. A page in the history of diplomacy, unknown to wide audience, that this contribution aims to bring to light. The article strives to draw conclusions on the implications and consequences of this ‘diplomatic civil war’ on post-war Italian foreign policy.
In this paper, I analyze different situations in which the doctor-patient relationship, the knowledge/information produced within this framework, and the practices of medical questioning came to the fore in the work of the state security services, one of the typical institutions of social observation and surveillance of the Hungarian socialist state. I examine work and recruitment dossiers opened from 1956 to the 1980s which document either physicians’ uses in state security observation of information which they gained about their patients during their professional (medical) activities in or in which the physician-patient relationship appears as a context of the physician’s recruitment. I discuss how physicians constructed the patient when the gaze of the state security forces was also arguably part of their medical gaze. I contend that medical knowledge and, more generally, information revealed in the professional (medical) context and used in the framework of network surveillance, taken out of their strict medical context, constituted a gray zone of power. On the one hand, this information was a useful tool with which the regime could exert some measure of effective social and political control beyond the borders of healthcare, while on the other hand, it could help physicians develop a certain degree of social resistance.
The Hungarian People’s Republic (1949–1989) was an autocratic regime governed by the state party (Hungarian Working People’s Party; from 1956 on: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) under the influence of the Soviet Union. The key feature of the regime was the leadership of János Kádár (from 1956 to 1988), the single-party state and the entanglement between the state and the Communist/Socialist Party (we can only speak of hardline communism until after the Revolution of 1956—from the 1960s on state socialism is a more accurate description and the party name reflected this characteristic). Our data are illustrative of the constant effort directed at increasing output legitimacy. The electoral system, the way the National Assembly continued to operate, and the publication of a designated set of legislative items all served to keep up the appearance of democracy. The thematic distribution of decisions was not primarily reflective of public preferences but of the agenda pursued by decision-makers. The punctuations in the policy agendas of the Kádár era were partly caused by Soviet decisions that elevated the role of certain policy areas in the Hungarian policy arena.
The changes occurring in countries of Central and Eastern Europe after 1945 deprived young people of their subjectivity, divested them of the possibility of legal activities outside the structures controlled by the rulers. Simultaneously, the activities taken by the latter threatened the values which were fundamental for the most of them. Some of young people attempted – more or less – to engage in active resistance, usually determined axiologically. It took, among other things, the form of refusal to participate in official youth organisations while staying in religious communities. Some also publicly expressed their oppositions in the form of participation in street demonstrations. Others joined the anti-communist underground or established their own underground groups. Young people’s anti-system attitudes were discussed on the examples of Belarus, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, the German Democratic Republic and Ukraine.
This article focuses on attitudes towards Russia in Bulgaria and Hungary — two EU and NATO countries with special relations to Russia — in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military intervention in support of separatists in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and onwards. We begin by putting the relations to Russia in a historical perspective. We then set out to account for support for Russia with the help of survey data from the Post-Crimea Barometer (2015) — a unique survey focusing on geopolitical orientation (East versus West) and attitudes towards Russia in Latvia, Hungary and Bulgaria in a post-Crimea setting. Latvia is a special case because of its large Russian minority population; we therefore confine our comparison to Bulgaria and Hungary. The findings suggest that long-term attachment to Russia is decisive in Bulgaria. In Hungary, long-term attachment to Russia is important, but not sufficient to account for post-Crimea attitudes towards Russia.
In Hungary, until the end of the 1940s, there were two main established methods of occupying the mentally ill who were fit for work. From the end of the nineteenth century, a lesser number of patients underwent work therapy in mental asylums, whereas the others were treated with so-called family therapy (otherwise known as the heterofamilial system), exploiting the capacities of families in the countryside. As an important part of this, the mentally ill helped in housekeeping and agricultural work. However, following the political and ideological turn of 1948, the latter form of treatment became debated, and then it was gradually superseded. Parallel to this process, work therapy came to be the most popular type of treatment for mental illnesses, as work formed the basis of the ideology of the communist state, and thus, healing through work harmonized with the general tendencies of the era. This article examines texts related to work therapy published in neurological–psychiatric and psychological journals and monographs between 1954 and 1964. However, although work therapy appeared to be the “handmaiden of ideology,” and even though it was supposed to fulfil a particular role, in reality, the role and perception of work therapy were a lot more complicated.
Business history for three generations has focused almost exclusively on capitalist firms, their managers, and their relations with markets, states, and rivals. However, enterprises on all scales also operated within communist nations “building socialism” in the wake of World War II. This article represents a first-phase exploration of business practices in three Central European states as Stalinism gave way to cycles of reform and retrenchment in the 1960s. Focusing chiefly on industrial initiatives, the study asks: How did socialist enterprises work and change across the first postwar generation, given their distinctive principles and political/economic contexts, and implicitly, what contrasts with capitalist activities are worth considering.
Eisenhower's foreign policy was shaped at multiple levels by his appreciation of the importance of world public opinion. By the time of Eisenhower's inauguration in 1953, American public diplomacy had developed a global reach. In analyzing the role of psychological warfare during the Eisenhower years, most of the scholarship has focused instead on two overarching issues: first, the campaign to 'rollback' Soviet influence and 'liberate' Eastern Europe, and, second, the role of propaganda in framing Eisenhower's approach to peace and disarmament. In analyzing the role of psychological warfare during the Eisenhower years, most of the scholarship has focused instead on two overarching issues: first, the campaign to 'rollback' Soviet influence and 'liberate' Eastern Europe, and, second, the role of propaganda in framing Eisenhower's approach to peace and disarmament. Both areas highlight the complex interplay between policy and propaganda.
Following World War II, Hungary bore the scars of economic devastation, social chaos, and political uncertainty. The Provisional Government, set up in Debrecen in 1944, worked with the Allied Control Commission to reestablish control and issue elections as soon as possible. Yet, whilst many politicians were scrambling to secure positions in the government, the Communists, referred to as Muscovites,1 began their own tract for power in Hungary.
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