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© M. V. Zotova, A. A. Gritsenko, and S. von Löwis
FRIENDS OR FOES? CHANGES IN CROSS-BORDER PRACTICES AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD NEIGHBORS ALONG THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN
BORDER AFTER 2014
Keywords: Ukraine, LPR, DPR, Russian-Ukrainian border, cross-border practices,
everyday life, attitudes toward neighbors
Abstract
This article examines how the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and the sharp deterioration
of official relations between Russia and Ukraine have affected the environment and everyday
life of the population of the border towns of the Rostov (Gukovo, Donetsk, Matveyev
Kurgan) and Belgorod (Graivoron, Shebekino) regions of the Russian Federation. Based on a
series of in-depth interviews with local residents and representatives of municipal authorities,
our article studies the dynamics of cross-border practices after 2014, as well as people’s
attitudes toward the border, the border regime, neighbors, and neighboring states. Our
research shows that a radical change in cross-border practices and (formerly good) neighborly
relations occurred, which contributed to the peripheralization of small border towns and
complicated communication. Such changes have transformed the border from being simply a
symbolic line on a map, separating the territories of the two states, into an actual border that
is perceived and felt in everyday life. In the localities we analyzed, we found transformations
of what had once been an integrated border area into coexisting yet independent sections of
borderland. However, these processes took place for different reasons: in the Belgorod
region, it was the tightening of the border regime and tensions in Russian-Ukrainian relations;
in the Rostov region, it was refugees, the unrecognized status of the LPR and DPR, and fear
of war.
____________
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Maria V. Zotova | https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9162-4932 | zotova@igras.ru | Cand.
Sc. (Geography), senior research associate | Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of
Sciences (29, Staromonetniy pereulok, Moscow, 119017, Russia)
Anton A. Gritsenko | https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9335-4761 | antgritsenko@igras.ru | Cand.
Sc. (Geography), research associate | Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences
(29, Staromonetniy pereulok, Moscow, 119017, Russia)
Sabine von Löwis | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1814-872X | sabine.loewis@zois-berlin.de |
PhD, senior researcher | Center for East European and International Studies (ZOiS)
(Mohrenstraße 60, D-10117 Berlin, Germany)
The research was conducted with the financial support of the following organizations and
grants:
State Assignment of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation:
[state registration number AAAA-A19-119022190170-1] (project no. 0148-2019-0008)
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001659 [EXC 2055]
Russian Science Foundation, https://doi.org/10.13039/501100006769 [project no. 19-17-
00232]
___________________________________________________________
Etnograficheskoye obozreniye, no. 1 (2021): 124–44. https://doi.org/10.31857/
S086954150013601-1
© Russian Academy of Sciences | © RAS Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology
ISSN 0869-5415 | Index 70845 |http://journal.iea.ras.ru
Introduction
The incorporation of Crimea into Russia and the ongoing hostilities in eastern Ukraine have
drawn international attention to Russian-Ukrainian relations. The political crisis has
significantly changed the situation along the Russian-Ukrainian border, making it more
tangible and creating a new everyday reality for border residents (Grinchenko and Mikheyeva
2018; Fournier 2017). Relations with neighbors have increasingly become determined by
mutual stereotypes, which developed under the influence of economic and political, as
opposed to ethno-cultural, factors (Babintsev et al. 2016; Sapryka et al. 2019).
The Russian-Ukrainian borderland is arguably among the most studied post-Soviet
border regions (Kolosov and Vendina 2011; Besier and Stoklosa 2017). Researchers have
considered it primarily in connection with nation- and state-building in Russia and Ukraine
and with the adaptation of the population and economy to the emergence of new state
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borders. A number of scholars have focused on the problems of cross-border cooperation
(Kolosov and Kiryukhin 2001; Anisimov et al. 2013), political and economic relations
between countries, and the everyday needs of people (Borodina et al. 2009). Others have
analyzed the strengthening of sociocultural differentiation across border areas through the
prism of the regional and ethno-cultural self-identifications of the population (Krylov and
Gritsenko 2012; Zhurzhenko 2006; Bublikov 2019; Sapryka et al. 2019). Research by
sociologists has shown that, by the early 2010s, a majority of the population of the Russian
and Ukrainian border regions had practically adapted to the emergence of the border and
become habituated to its existence (Zhurzhenko 2013). Yet this did not lead to its acceptance
by many local residents (ibid.), despite attempts to create distinct national identities and
different images of a common past (Miller 2008; Snezhkova 2013; Gritsenko and Krylov
2013).
Throughout most of its existence, the Russian-Ukrainian border region developed as
part of a single state. The common space and absence of borders in Soviet times encouraged
ease of movement across the region: people easily changed their place of residence or moved
to the territory of the neighboring republic to work or study. Cross-border relations and social
perceptions of neighbors were formed without significant barriers to communication.
Widespread and various interaction practices, the particularities of population settlement, and
a robust network of transport communications contributed to the formation of close
economic, cultural, and social ties across the border region (Popkova 2005); these factors also
oriented the population toward large Ukrainian cities – namely, Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, and
Lugansk (Kolosov and Vendina 2011).
Although the border became a clear obstacle after the introduction of passport and
customs controls, people did not consider such changes onerous (Kolosov and Vendina
2011). Cross-border travel was beneficial to both sides. The price differences allowed people
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to save on purchases by crossing the border, and the demand for a variety of goods and
services stimulated the development of local trade and employment. The new economic
opportunities partially compensated for the difficulties caused by the sharp decline in living
standards and incomes of the population in the 1990s.
The cross-border practices of the Soviet and early post-Soviet periods laid a solid
foundation for the formation of trust and close relationships in the borderland. Thanks to the
unpredictable intertwining of human destinies, a strong sense of unity and cohesion between
communities across the border emerged. People did not give much thought to the nationality
of their friends and acquaintances; a dense social fabric closely linked the neighboring
settlements of the two countries. Ukrainian cities served as regional centers for the entire
borderland, and Russians were well-acquainted with them and felt comfortable there.
Despite the accumulated experience of residents living together for a long time, the
events of 2014 led to the destruction of the usual order of life, the relationships between
border communities, and, consequently, cross-border social integration. In such situations,
the change in both the border regime and its perception by residents becomes the main factor
influencing people’s interactions; it therefore requires the close attention of researchers.
The Theoretical Framework of the Study
In recent years, the field of border studies has undergone a rapid development. One of the key
concepts in this research area is the term “bordering,” which means not only the formation
and arrangement of borders but also changes in their regime, functions, and social meaning,
including those influenced by shifts in the international situation and bilateral relations
(Kolosov 2005; Newman 2011; Kolosov and Scott 2013). Multidimensional processes of
“bordering” occur everywhere, albeit on different scales. They are most noticeable in
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borderlands, which are zones of intensive international contacts and social interactions, where
the political and economic interests of neighboring states collide (Paasi 2009).
Borders are constantly changing because they are the result of sociopolitical
development (Berg 2000; Kolosov and Scott 2013; Kolosov 2018). A. Paasi revealed that the
processes of social and political disintegration and integration often run in parallel: the social
processes work to strengthen national identity and national sovereignty, contributing to the
consolidation of borders; meanwhile, the political processes are aimed at finding common
interests, liberalizing the border regime, and increasing bilateral contacts (Paasi and Prokkola
2008; Paasi 2009). The discovery of the interdependence between national border regimes
and social perceptions has stimulated the study of public and institutional (that is, political)
discourses about neighboring countries and regions (Newman and Paasi 1998; Prokkola
2009; Pfoser 2015; Konrad et al. 2019; Scott et al. 2019).
At the same time, the motives for border crossing by local residents, as well as the
importance of the neighborhood in the life of border communities, have begun to be studied
(Ghosh 2011; Laine et al. 2018; Zotova et al. 2018). According to D. Newman, an analysis of
people’s experiences and individual and collective narratives related to the border provides a
better understanding of the border’s role in the lives of local people and their perceptions of
its function as both a barrier to and space for social interaction (Newman 2006; Newman and
Paasi 1998). By considering how individual and collective perceptions have been shaped by
cross-border practices, our approach shifts attention from political, prescriptive discourses to
everyday discourses that affirm or challenge “realities” that have been constructed from
above (Lamont and Molnár 2002). We draw on work on the anthropology of borders (see
Wilson and Donnan 1998, 2012) to consider how the interaction and interdependence of the
state, nation-building processes, and people living in border areas lead to changes in the role
and meaning of the border in the lives of local people. As Wilson and Donnan explain:
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Because of their liminal and frequently contested nature, borders tend to be characterised by identities
which are shifting and multiple, in ways which are framed by the specific state configurations which
encompass them and within which people must attribute meaning to their experience of border life.
(Wilson and Donnan 1998, 13)
Borders are closely linked to state policies, but the actual situation along the border
and in the borderlands does not always align with those policies. Indeed, the presence of a
state border on a map does not necessarily mean that people, in practice, perceive it as such
on the ground. It may have “another life” and may depend on the relations between different
actors at the local, regional, and national levels (Wilson and Donnan 1998, 21).
We were interested in the adaptation of people to the new conditions, especially after
Ukraine changed the border regime with Russia. It is important to understand how the
population perceives the new functions of the border and how those functions affect cross-
border practices and the course of everyday life. As Stef Jansen puts it, “The interesting
anthropological question is how, when, to whom and to what degree certain things
materialize as a border over time” (Jansen 2013, 26). The purpose of this article is to trace
how the transformation of the border regime and changes in the functions of two sections of
the Russian border – with Ukraine and with the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics
(hereafter, LPR and DPR) − have affected the everyday life of people living in the Russian
border regions, as well as their perception of and attitudes toward the border, their neighbors,
neighboring territories, and neighboring states. We consider the border area not so much in
the context of key objective historical, economic, cultural, and political features of
development as through the prism of the life of ordinary people, their customs, attitudes, and
feelings. By analyzing the everyday experience of residents of Russian border towns, we try
to answer the following questions: Do political changes lead to social disintegration? How do
borders and their configuration change in people’s minds? How strong is social integration in
places where people used to live together? Assessing the shifts in the perception of both
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neighbors and the border allows us to understand the specific processes of the changing
functions of the border in the “disintegrating” sections of post-Soviet borderlands.
In the first part of the article, we focus on the formation of the Russian-Ukrainian
border, the gradual change in its regime, and its perception by local residents. In the second
part, we analyze the process of strengthening the barrier on the section of the border with
Ukraine after 2014 and its impact on the practices and perceptions of the population of the
surrounding territories. Finally, we consider how the emergence of the unrecognized
republics and changes in the border regime affected the lives of people on the border with the
LPR and DPR.
Research Methodology
This study is based on qualitative field work using ethnographic and sociological methods of
information collection in two the Russian border region: Belgorod (bordering the Kharkiv
and Sumy regions of Ukraine) and Rostov (bordering LPR and DPR). We selected towns
with differences in economic specialization, levels of socioeconomic development, and living
standards that were located on major roads in the vicinity of key border-crossing points: in
the Belgorod region, we chose Graivoron (6,400 residents; 8 km from the border) and
Shebekino (41,300; 6 km); in the Rostov region, Donetsk (47,000 residents; 3 km), Gukovo
(66,300; 7 km), and Matveyev Kurgan (15,500; 15 km).
We conducted a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews (1.5–2 hours each) with
local residents and representatives of municipal authorities in these towns in January and
February of 2020. The interviews were conducted according to a predetermined questionnaire
and contained about eighty questions grouped into four interrelated blocks: (1) experience of
living in the border area; (2) cross-border practices and their dynamics starting from the
Soviet era; (3) attitudes toward the border and the changes in its regime; (4) perceptions of
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neighbors and the neighboring state. The spectrum of people’s opinions and arguments was
of particular interest. In our work, we combined two sampling strategies: theoretical selection
and exploratory selection (Glaser and Strauss 1967). First, we relied on known data about the
region and tried to cover different demographic groups as much as possible, taking into
account the age, gender, and the social and professional characteristics of the respondents,
including type of employment (see table 1). For example, in each locality, the sample
included representatives of a profession typical of the town (e.g., workers in the service
sector in Graivoron and Matveyev Kurgan, and former miners or members of their families
who still form a special community in the old centers of the coal industry in Gukovo and
Donetsk), as well as state employees (which represented a quite high proportion of employees
in all selected towns). Second, the organization of our field work was, in part, shaped by the
information obtained during the interviews. Thus, in the selection of respondents, we
considered additional criteria, such as residents’ experience with crossing the Russian-
Ukrainian border after 2014, their experience of living in Ukraine or the presence of relatives
there, and place of birth. With this selection strategy, the sample size could have been
unlimited; it was ultimately be defined by applying principles essential to qualitative research
(Ilyin 2006; Kvale 1996): if the necessary information is obtained and no additional
information is expected, the researcher has the right to terminate the interview collection
process (Merkens 2019, 290–97). This explains the varying numbers of respondents in the
selected localities. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality; the names of
interviewees are withheld (only general descriptions of individuals or groups will be used as
identifiers, e.g., place of residence, gender, age).
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Table 1
Main Characteristics of Sample
Number of respondents
Locality
Gender
Age bracket (years)
Education
Employment
Birthplace
Male
Female
<30
30–50
>50
Secondary
Vocational secondary
education
Higher
Public sector
Services sector,
small business
Mass media
Other
Local
Nonresidents
Donetsk
3
7
3
4
3
2
2
6
3
3
1
3
6
4
Gukovo
4
4
0
4
4
2
4
2
2
3
0
3
5
3
Matveyev
Kurgan
2
6
0
6
2
0
3
5
5
0
2
1
8
0
Graivoron
4
3
1
3
3
1
0
6
5
1
0
1
3
4
Shebekino
3
4
0
5
2
0
3
4
2
2
1
2
2
5
Total
16
24
4
22
14
5
12
23
17
9
4
10
24
16
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Dynamics of the Border Regime and Political Functions of the Russian-Ukrainian
The state border between Russia and Ukraine has formally existed since 1922. However, the
statutes and regulations that form the basis of today’s regulation of the border began to be
developed after 1991. For a number of years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and the formal establishment of the border, people could still cross it almost unhindered, as
they were used to doing (N. D. Borodina and T. L. Borodina 2009):
[…] We moved from Kharkiv to Shebekino in 1994, and in 1998 through 1999 we transported furniture
here. The border was already sort of official, but we crossed it through the fields, not because … [we
wanted to defy the law, but], first, because that way was half as long, not the usual 80 kilomeers …
and, second, we probably would have to pay [customs tax], and the furniture was old, so what was
there to pay for. […] So, we decided to take the shortcut and bypass the official border. (Shebekino:
male, 45 years old)
The bilateral agreements of 1995 and 2006 established 53 checkpoints and 155 local
border crossings on the border, with simplified procedures for residents of adjacent border
regions. Our respondents asserted that they did not perceive the border at all for quite a long
time; they had difficulty remembering how it was established and when the first signs of
border infrastructure (posts, checkpoints, etc.) appeared. By all accounts, this process
happened between the late 1990s and the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first
century:
[…] Before 2006, there were no border checkpoints here. […] The Russians were the first to set up
checkpoints, two years later the Ukrainians. First there were Russian conscripts. They had four wooden
poles, and they put up plastic sheeting. That was the kind of post [put up]. Then they installed some
kind of small cabin, and now the terminal. […] They tried to dig up the road there, but there were no
fences. The fence and barbed wire appeared only three years ago, along with the terminal. (Donetsk:
female, 32 years old)
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[…] Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the border began to strengthen, its crossing stopped being a
formality. […] Document checks began; there was an impression that each border guard interpreted it
however he could and wished. One could pass through calmly or with great nervousness, and by filling
out a bunch of some kind of cards in Ukrainian. […] The biggest difficulty was that we had to stand in
queues for several hours. (Matveyev Kurgan: female, 44 years old)
Although an agreement on the delimitation of the border was signed in 1997, its
demarcation was repeatedly postponed, and it was only in 2010 that the agreement was
actually adopted (see table 2). The demarcation of the border line began in 2012 with the
installation of border markers with the coats of arms of the states, but due to the Maidan
events in 2014, this work was suspended, and then carried out unilaterally by Ukraine:
[…] My children and I went through the forest through Tavolzhanka to Murom one day and walked to
the border. We unexpectedly came to Ukraine. That is, we were walking and walking through the forest
on foot and we came […] We realized that this was no longer our territory, that we were in Ukraine.
[…] It was 2013. Then we remembered that there were postings, but we didn’t pay attention.
(Shebekino: female, 40 years old)
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Table 2
Changes in the Regime of the Russian-Ukrainian Border
Year
Document
Event
1991
Declaration of Independence of
Ukraine
Emergence of the Russian-Ukrainian border.
1992−
1993
Agreement on the Development of
Interstate Relations between Russia
and Ukraine
Maintaining the principle of open state borders with
the phased introduction of customs control that
meets international standards.
1992−
1993
Decree on Urgent Measures to
Organize Customs Control in the
Russian Federation
Borders are no longer “transparent”: the opening of
customs controls in Russian towns bordering
Ukraine, on highways, on railroad lines, and at
airports.
The first thirty-five Russian border control units are
posted at the border.
1994
Intergovernmental Agreement on
Interaction and Cooperation
between the Border Troops of
Ukraine and Russia
Joint border patrols.
1995
Intergovernmental Agreement on
Checkpoints between Russia and
Ukraine
Fifty-three checkpoints are set up.
1997−
2002
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation,
and Partnership between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation.
Agreement between the
Government of the Russian
Federation and Government of
Ukraine on Visa-Free Trips of
Citizens of the Russian Federation
and Ukraine
Recognition of the borders and territorial integrity
of the two countries and the absence of mutual
territorial claims; consolidation of the principles of
strategic partnership.
Securing the possibility of visa-free travel for
citizens of Russia and Ukraine with internal
passports.
Negotiations on the delimitation of the border:
definition of the state border with a description of
its location and mapping.
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2003
Treaty between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine on
Cooperation in the Use of the Sea
of Azov and the Kerch Strait.
State Border Treaty.
Securing the historically established status of the
inland waters of the two countries and freedom of
navigation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait
for merchant ships and warships.
Establishing the line of the boundary between the
two states.
2004
Special Protocol on the Agreement
between the Government of the
Russian Federation and the
Government of Ukraine on Visa-
Free Trips of Citizens of the
Russian Federation and Ukraine
Permission for citizens of one country to stay in the
territory of another country without registration for
up to ninety days when in possession of a migration
card with a border-control stamp.
2006
Agreement on the Procedure for
Crossing the Russian-Ukrainian
State Border by Residents of the
Border Municipalities of the
Russian Federation and Ukraine
(the agreement on small-border
traffic)
155 local border crossings − checkpoints for
simplified crossing of residents from adjacent
border municipalities − were established.
2010
Agreement on the Demarcation of
the Land Section of the Border
Creation of a joint demarcation commission.
2011−
2013
Border Demarcation Plan
Opening of the first border marker on the Bryansk-
Chernigov section.
Beginning of physically demarcating the border.
2014
Statement by the National Security
and Defense Council of Ukraine on
the Unilateral Demarcation of the
Border
Cancellation of the agreement on small-border
traffic. Closure of all checkpoints and local border
crossings (except for Melovoe-Chertkovo).
Erection of fences, construction of a control line,
construction of ditches.
2015
Proclamation of the LPR and DPR.
Decree of the Government of
Introduction of rules for crossing the border
between the LPR, DPR, and Russia using internal
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Ukraine on the Termination of the
Provisions of Bilateral Agreements
Regulating the Crossing of the
Russian-Ukrainian Border.
Ukrainian Government Decree
Banning Russian Airlines from
Flying
passports (LPR, DPR, Ukraine, RF) without the
need to fill out migration cards.*
Ukraine’s unilateral introduction of new rules for
Russian citizens to cross the border (using foreign
passports and additional documents)** and stay in
Ukrainian territory for up to ninety days within six
months from the date of first entry; restriction on
the passage of men aged sixteen to sixty.
Termination of direct flights between countries.
Russian countermeasures against Ukrainian airlines.
2017
Decree of the President of the
Russian Federation “On the
Recognition in the Russian
Federation of Documents and
License Plates Issued to Citizens of
Ukraine and Stateless Persons
Permanently Residing in the
Territories of Certain Districts of
the Donetsk and Lugansk Regions
of Ukraine”
Recognition in the Russian Federation of documents
and license plates issued to citizens of Ukraine and
stateless persons permanently residing in the
territories of certain districts of the Donetsk and
Lugansk regions of Ukraine.
2018
Law of Ukraine “On Termination
of the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Partnership
between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation”
Uncertainty about all economic and social
agreements with Russia based on the Treaty.
Regulation of bilateral relations by the basic norms
of international law.
2018
Decree of the Government of the
Russian Federation “On Increasing
the Period of Temporary Stay in the
Russian Federation of Citizens of
Ukraine Permanently Residing in
the Territories of Certain Areas of
the Donetsk and Lugansk Regions
of Ukraine”
Increasing the continuous period of temporary stay
in Russia for residents of the LPR and DPR to 180
days from the date of each entry.
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2020
Ukraine’s Unilateral Change in the
Order of Travel of Its Citizens to
Russia.
Decision of the National Security
and Defense Council of Ukraine in
Connection with the Spread of the
Coronavirus Infection
Introduction of new rules for crossing the border to
Russia for citizens of Ukraine (using foreign
passports).
Ban on entry to the territory of Ukraine for all
foreign nationals from March 2020 (owing to
COVID-19).
* This is a document detailing information on the entry into Ukraine by foreign
citizens; it serves to control temporary stays in the country and is a form to document entry
and exit.
** Additional documents may be required: an invitation from an individual or legal
entity; paid tourist ticket; a guarantee confirming the intention to return to Russia; proof of
financial solvency.
The Border as an Unfortunate Misunderstanding or an Insurmountable Obstacle:
The Belgorod Section of the Russian-Ukrainian Border
After 2014, the established way of life in the borderlands changed dramatically. The new
conditions for crossing the border introduced by the Ukrainian side were keenly felt by
residents of the Belgorod region:
[…] Now it’s difficult for us to go to Ukraine. First, you need a passport to travel, and second, you
need an invitation from relatives, which must somehow be delivered. However, it is not certain that this
invitation will let you cross the border, that is, it does not mean that you will definitely get through.
And they don’t let men through at all. I was last there [in Ukraine] in 2014 and did not go again after
that. (Shebekino: female, 50 years old)
Only one of our respondents continues to regularly visit his parents, who live in a
neighboring town across the border. The rest no longer visit Ukraine, citing, among other
factors, a lack of good reasons to do so. In their opinion, prices on both sides of the border
have practically equalized, and thus it is no longer profitable to go shopping there (while it
had been previously). People also thought that the quality of Ukrainian goods had noticeably
declined. The main motive for not traveling, however, was fear – namely, fear of what might
16
happen. Many considered crossing the border risky, expecting possible incidents and
provocations on the Ukrainian side. Virtually every respondent recounted stories about the
troubles people encountered during such trips, but these were always “neighbor’s stories,” not
personal experiences:
[…] Do I have to get a passport especially for Ukraine? To go to Ukraine … I won’t do it! What for? I
don’t have relatives there, so there is no need to go. Why would I want to go there, or even take the
risk? It’s a risk, of course, to go there. […] It’s scary to think what idiots you might run into. There are
cases of punctured tires; the car of some people I know was damaged … in 2016–2017, one of the
locals drove there with Russian license plates. They cut his throat just for having Russian license
plates. (Graivoron: female, 60 years old)
Residents perceived the tightening of the border regime in different ways. In
Graivoron, respondents who were born, studied, or worked in Ukraine and who maintained
relations with relatives, former colleagues, and friends still in Ukraine were acutely sensitive
to the new border reality. At the same time, the severance of ties was not too painful for those
who did not have close relationships (of family or friendship) with residents of neighboring
Ukrainian regions. They felt that the harsh border regime has only deprived them of the
opportunity to save money on purchases and take cheap vacations at the Black Sea coast. The
discomfort of having to change established habits was overshadowed by the fear of
hostilities. According to respondents, most local residents have already reoriented their
activities toward Russian regional centers, such as Belgorod or Kursk, where they now go for
shopping, entertainment, education, and medical services. The border has nevertheless
become a significant barrier for them, since the obstacles to travel to a neighboring country
are considered too high:
[…] Of course, people have noticed that [the border is a barrier]. But it’s not really a problem. Well,
there’s less comfort; things became a little more inconvenient for us. That’s all. People lost money on
something that was cheaper to buy [in Ukraine]. The disadvantages are big, but we’ve just readjusted
and don’t make a tragedy of it, we are not boo-hooing over it. (Graivoron: female, 60 years old)
17
The events of 2014 contributed to the peripheralization of border towns and caused
local residents to feel isolated. This was particularly acute in Graivoron, a town through
which many Russians used to travel to Ukraine, including to Black Sea resorts. The town also
lost its appeal to residents of Russia’s northern regions, who used to actively buy dachas
there. Respondents blamed media propaganda for making people in Russia think that the area
neighboring Ukraine was now dangerous and for thus discouraging visitors. The word
“borderland” (prigranichnost’) in the vocabulary of the locals themselves has taken on an
exclusively negative meaning, and the perception of the border has intensified.
[…] Life has changed dramatically. Now it is a dead end, an appendix that no one needs. The passage
of Russians to Ukraine is effectively closed. And this was a a town people passed through. Travelers
used to ask to spend the night – people coming from Karelia, St. Petersburg, the Murmansk region,
Moscow. People used to sleep in their cars in the courtyard. They were heading south, to Crimea, to
Ukraine; many made a stop here along the river. Military pensioners came and bought dachas. As soon
as everything happened with the border, they stopped coming here. Their first question: Is there
shooting here? The border influenced this. Nobody buys houses now. And this used to be a town
people passed through. (Graivoron: male, 50 years old)
The border’s impact on the development of the local economy and living standards
was also an important factor shaping residents’ perception of the border regime. In
Graivoron, about one half of the respondents cited changes in the border regime and in the
character of their neighborhood as the primary causes of the negative trends and the
stagnation of the town’s development. The other half considered these simply the unfortunate
consequences of the country’s general economic situation. In Shebekino, respondents had
fewer economic concerns, because the crisis of interstate relations in fact spurred the town’s
development as a result of the transfer of a number of Ukrainian industrial enterprises to
Russian territory. That said, in all the locations we studied, the challenges of 2014 only
18
compounded the preexisting social and economic problems, reinforcing the local population’s
feelings of hopelessness and frustration.
When discussing relations with neighbors, some respondents emphasized that
disagreements were primarily caused by different assessments of political events in Russia
and Ukraine (this can be explained, in part, by neighbors existing in different information
spaces, or media silos). Many respondents were convinced that they were right and
considered Ukrainians’ accusations of hostility to be unfair and unjust. They believed that it
was the Ukrainians who were “befuddled,” “brainwashed,” or “deceived” by the media.
Residents of the Russian border region seemed to understand and have a sympathetic attitude
toward the problems of their neighbors; in return, however, they reported encountering
hostility and suspicion.
[…] There are even relatives who stopped talking to each other, who are sure that Russia – specifically,
you are to blame for their problems: “You stole Crimea from us, you don’t give us gas, and we are cold
in our apartments.” Relatives in Sumy are categorically against Russia. Some say it’s all Russia’s fault.
They’re sure that it is we who are brainwashed, not they. (Graivoron: female, 45 years old)
Respondents told different stories about their relationships with their relatives living
in Ukraine. Some said they stopped communicating because of political and ideological
disputes. Others said that they maintained relationships but stopped discussing political
events and sensitive topics. Still others said that only with those who supported Russia’s
actions and disapproved of Ukraine’s current course did relations not change. The general
opinion of respondents was that the situation has gradually started to move in a peaceful
direction again, and that calmer communication has replaced aggressive accusations. In short,
people reported being tired of conflicts and disputes. Many experienced an acute phase of
conflict and managed to maintain a warm attitude toward their neighbors, thanks not only to
connections with family and friends but also to an understanding of the community’s shared
fortune.
19
Despite negative experiences that have complicated relations with residents of
neighboring territories, a large number of our respondents still considered the cross-border
region unified. Many of our interlocutors were convinced that people remain united by their
language, culture, mentality, and common past. They emphasized that Ukrainian culture is
not alien to the local population; indeed, many of them used Ukrainian words in their speech
and appealed to their common Slavic roots. Respondents who shared this viewpoint could not
draw a hard line separating Ukraine and Russia, and they listed Kharkiv and a number of
other Ukrainian border settlements as among the “close” (i.e., kindred) cities where many
like-minded people live. Speaking about the prospects of relations between the two states,
they expressed confidence that cooperation with Ukraine would resume sooner or later.
Ukraine seemed hostile to them only because, in their words, it is governed by “pro-Western,
corrupt” rulers who have an extremely negative attitude toward Russia. In general, people
believed that once the government in Ukraine changes, life will return to normal.
[…] People in Ukraine have figured out how to live at loggerheads … Unless they can come up with
something else that can make us quarrel again. Those at the top are the ones provoking things – you see
what they do. […] Ten years should pass, and then something good, something pivotal will happen.
Every year it’s gradually getting better. (Graivoron: female, 60 years old)
New Neighborhood, New Life? – The Rostov Section of the Russian-Ukrainian Border
The border regime between the Russian Federation and the LPR and DPR has not actually
changed since 2014, and formally it has even slightly loosened (see table 2). Despite this,
residents of the Rostov region began to cross the border less frequently after the end of the
hot phase of hostilities in eastern Ukraine and the disengagement of the opposing forces in
2014. The range of motives for crossing the border has narrowed. Visits to relatives are now
the most common, although their frequency has decreased. If before, residents visited their
relatives at least once a month, after 2014, it was one to two times a year on special “good or
20
bad [occasions]: weddings, anniversaries, funerals” (Gukovo: female, 60 years old). Because
of the devaluation of the ruble and the leveling of prices, the number of trips made for the
purchase of Ukrainian goods decreased significantly: “They have the same currency now. It
makes no sense at all for us to go there” (Donetsk: female, 25 years old). Some people
reported making occasional trips to nearby localities for sausage and butter, purchased in
small quantities for personal consumption.
All respondents were nostalgic for the old days – when they would visit markets and
stores in the neighboring territory – and they remembered Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine as
a source of quality products and a variety of goods. Today, residents still make occasional
trips to Lugansk (Luhansk), Krasnodon (Sorokyne), and Sverdlovsk (Dovzhansk) for medical
services, usually dentistry, which tend to be cheaper and of good quality. At the same time, in
Donetsk, Gukovo, and, to a lesser extent, Matveyev Kurgan, new semilegal practices have
emerged, such as bringing cheap vodka and cigarettes from Duty Free across the border and
then handing them over to resellers. An important change in cross-border circulation after
2014 was the sheer predominance of LPR residents, who became classic frontaliers, crossing
the border daily to work on the Russian side. This was caused by a drop in wages and social
benefits, as well as a lack of decent-paying jobs in the new unrecognized republics.
The military conflict in eastern Ukraine has changed the local population’s image of
the border. Whether people perceive the border as an insurmountable obstacle or not, they
view it primarily in the context of risks and threats. The war in close proximity to the Rostov
region has caused residents of Donetsk and Matveyev Kurgan to fear that the military actions
could affect them personally. With respect to potential provocations, respondents compared
the current situation to that of a powder keg:
[…] Since we are in a border area, if a war breaks out, we would be the first to suffer … There is a fear
that everything could spill over here. Nobody knows what the Ukrainians have in mind. The Ukrainian
military was one kilometer away. People here are used to it – you understand that you live near a
21
powder keg, but you have nowhere to run, there’s no one and nothing for you. We’ve gotten used to it.
(Matveyev Kurgan: female, 43 years old)
Despite the formal loosening of the border regime, respondents in Matveyev Kurgan,
Gukovo, and Donetsk spoke of increased feelings of isolation due to the impossibility of
traveling to Ukraine and the difficulty of official cooperation with the LPR and DPR due to
their non-recognized status:
[…] When the border appeared, the piece from Taganrog was like a peninsula. There was nothing
beyond it. There was a feeling of being cut off. Everything gravitated toward Donetsk. And now our
peninsula has moved a little further away. However, the gray buffer zone is not quite complete in
relation to us. (Matveyev Kurgan, female, 44 years old)
Immediately following the start of the armed conflict in Donbas in 2014, a stream of
displaced persons poured into the border towns of the Rostov region from Ukrainian
territory.
1
Despite their fears, local residents provided them with maximum help and support:
they housed them, collected food and supplies for them, and dealt with the people arriving at
the border. These events still evoke very strong feelings in the local population. Experiences
of dealing with the displaced residents of Ukraine varied. Against the background of a
significant number of positive stories of selfless assistance to those in need and of gratitude
for that help, there was particular indignation over situations in which the migrants behaved
in an undignified manner: according to some respondents, the migrants were rude, demanded
special treatment, and blamed all Russians for everything that had happened, including
inciting war. The disagreements and conflicts that resulted had a negative impact on relations
with neighbors:
[…] The attitude toward people abroad changed when we saw how indecently they behaved. Before,
the attitude was generally better, so we didn’t see it [such behavior], we didn’t encounter it so much,
[when] there wasn’t such a flow of people. In the summer 2014, everyone went and helped. Even
people who weren’t expected to. Almost every family took in refugees. Then, when they started
behaving this way, people saw it and began to have doubts. People did everything they could to help.
22
But the refugees acted like pigs. You can’t act like that when people help you without asking for
anything in return. Many people let them stay in their homes and paid for their food and drinks with
their own money, but they … (Donetsk: female, 32 years old)
With the distribution of displaced persons across Russian regions and the return of
some refugees to the territories of Ukraine, the LPR, and the DPR, the animosities practically
disappeared, leaving a noticeable trace in people’s memory. In their place, however, other
tensions emerged, caused by increased competition in the local labor market. For example,
many interviewees attributed the decrease in their own earnings to the mass migration of LPR
and DPR residents who were willing to work for less money. Competition from numerous
frontaliers in Donetsk (the Rostov region) was particularly intense:
[…] People come here and look for work. There are no jobs here as it is. There’s more competition.
They started driving down wages. A lot of workers came from the LPR and drove down the cost of
tombstones and tile laying, including unofficial work. (Donetsk: male, 33 years old)
In the minds of respondents from the Rostov region, Ukraine was divided into two
parts: “close,” “friendly,” “Russian-speaking,” and “good” vs. “hostile” and “run by
Banderites and nationalists.” People contrasted the LPR and DPR to what they perceived as a
“Ukraine that had lost its way” and which was trying to restrict the use of the Russian
language and force the residents of eastern Ukrainian territories, who were traditionally
oriented toward Russia, to follow the pro-Western, nationalist course taken by the Ukrainian
government.
Attitudes toward the unrecognized republics are, today, largely shaped by
comparisons between life on different sides of the border. Negative trends in the development
of Russian peripheral settlements, a lack of jobs, decreased purchasing power of the
population, and rising prices correlate with the events in Ukraine. Residents discussed the
unrecognized republics and their inhabitants through the prism of their own wealth and risk
tolerance, noting that the prices for light, gas, water, and other utilities in the republics were
23
significantly lower. This situation seemed unfair to them because, in their view, the
development of the republics was directly linked to Russian support:
[…] The price of food, of apartments has gone up. With their humanitarian aid, salaries have fallen; in
2014, it was twenty-one thousand [rubles], and now seventeen thousand [rubles]. They have lower
prices, at our expense, and at the expense of everyone they assisted. Our taxes are going up, we are
paying them. And then they come here and splurge. They have communism there. Everything is cheap:
water, gas. Everything is Russian! The rent is mere kopeks [pennies]. (Donetsk: female, 25 years old)
Respondents’ opinions of the self-proclaimed republics were quite divided. The non-
recognized status of the republics was completely incomprehensible to people. In the
everyday speech of residents of the Rostov region, the new entities were still referred to as
“Ukraine” and their neighbors as “Ukrainians.” Many considered the republics to be a “gray”
zone through which weapons and drugs flowed as part of a shadow economy, or a buffer
territory separating them from the “hostile” state. Some interviewees (those without close
relatives on the other side of the border or who moved to the borderland several years ago)
did not support the LPR and DPR’s desire to secede and expressed the hope that the republics
would join Ukraine. They did not, however, believe that reconciliation between the
conflicting sides would be possible because of the blood already spilled and the people killed:
[…] There was no need for war. It would have been better to live as before, as part of Ukraine. […]
The LPR and DPR will not return to Ukraine, so much has happened. […] It takes generations to get
over. […] It will take a long time to clear up. People can reconcile, but when there is the blood of loved
ones between people, it is very hard to do so. (Matveyev Kurgan: female, 44 years old)
Other respondents, who expressed warm feelings toward their neighbors and have
close ties with them, hoped that Russia would establish special relations with the republics. In
their opinion, either the independence of the LPR and DPR should be recognized or they
should be incorporated into the Russian Federation. According to these respondents,
obtaining legitimate status or joining Russia would solve several problems at once: First, the
24
population’s living conditions, wages, and utility bills would be leveled, competition would
disappear, and, as a consequence, the “unfair” (from the point of view of the Russians)
contrasts would disappear. Second, the border with the “hostile” state would be moved to the
west and provide protection for their relatives. Third, there would be no more lawlessness and
chaos in the “gray” zone. And, finally, the actual and psychological boundaries that exist in
people’s minds would match:
[…] The LPR is going the right way. Many people do not consider them republics. It’s more like a
separate region that seceded from Ukraine and is fighting for its own interests. They did the right thing,
but I pity them: no one needs them, neither Russia nor Ukraine; they fought for something, they stood
up for their truth. If Russia had taken the LPR under its wing, they would have been able to support
themselves. (Donetsk: female, 25 years old)
In this context, the issuing of Russian passports to citizens of the LPR and DPR is
perceived by some residents as a forced yet correct step toward normalizing the situation.
Conclusion
The changes that occurred in the Russian-Ukrainian borderland as a result of the separation
and gradual divergence of the trajectories of development of the two states had a noticeable
impact on the lives of the local population. In two sections of the Russian-Ukrainian border
region, people recounted varying experiences of their interactions with the neighboring
country, as determined by their daily practices and habits in relation to the new border regime
and the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Our interviews demonstrated clear differentiation in respondents’ attitudes toward
neighbors and the neighboring state, depending on a person’s place of birth and residence as
well as the intensity of cross-border practices and personal ideological views. Based on the
results of the interviews, we distinguished two main conceptual positions. The first is that
respondents consider residents of neighboring regions to be “close ones” (i.e., kindred), no
25
different from the population of the Russian borderland; they contrast them with all other
Ukrainians, whom they call “Ukropians” (a play on the word for dill, ukrop), “Banderites,” or
“Zapadentsy” (Westerners), and view them as hostile to Russia and Russians. Respondents
from the Rostov region consider residents of the unrecognized republics to be “close ones”
(i.e., kindred), while respondents from the Belgorod region consider “close” those residents
of Kharkiv and the nearest districts of the Kharkiv region, where they still have familial ties,
friendly relations, and positive memories.
2
We observed certain variations within this
position, such as those associated with people’s residence. The respondents who live in the
border towns of the Rostov region have different views on the future of the unrecognized
republics. Some people think that only the official recognition of the independence of the
LPR and DPR or their incorporation into Russia can resolve the existing tensions and
conflicts in the borderland. A number of respondents believe that the incorporation of the
republics into Russia would be wrong, but that it’s the only possible solution after the
hostilities and bloodshed. Another portion of the respondents, although they consider
residents of the LPR and DPR to be close in an ethnocultural sense and distinguish them from
other Ukrainians, reacted negatively to the idea of the republics being officially recognized or
annexed to Russia. While they accept the new rules and procedures for border crossing,
respondents from the Belgorod region do not support the state policy aimed at strengthening
the border regime. They believe that as soon as the authorities in Ukraine change, relations
with their neighbors will immediately go back to their previous state.
The second conceptual position we identified is a view of all neighbors on the other
side of the border as “others” and already “non-natives”; relations with these neighbors have
permanently deteriorated, greatly facilitated by the negative experience with refugees during
the acute phase of the armed conflict and the Russian-Ukrainian political crisis.
Representatives of this group view Ukraine as a different and alien state, currently unfriendly
26
to Russia and its inhabitants, and they consider the territory of the LPR and DPR a dangerous
zone with an unclear status, which should be part of Ukraine (as it was before). Tense
relations coupled with growing border barriers (the tightening of the border regime in the
Belgorod region, and fear of military operations in the Rostov region) led to a significant
reduction in or even termination of cross-border practices. As a result, the borderland ceased
to be perceived as a common or shared space, and the border became associated with risks.
These respondents then began to acknowledge the existing borders with the neighboring
state, which has undeniable sovereignty in their eyes.
Against the background of those who “fit” into these two basic conceptual models, a
group of “neutral” respondents stands out. These interviewees distance themselves from
politics and/or do not discuss political issues with their Ukrainian relatives and friends.
Thus, the daily life of the population of the borderland has changed not only because
of the new rules for crossing the border, but also because of the fear caused by the military
conflict in eastern Ukraine and contact with refugees from the war zone. People’s feelings of
frustration have greatly increased, as threats to their lives and well-being have emerged. They
have fears about the “gray” zone of the LPR and DPR, which may in part explain why they
want the republics to be officially recognized, annexed to Russia, or returned to Ukraine.
Most respondents did not consider any of these prospects ideal, although they all, in the
opinion of the interviewees, would lead to the transformation of areas with unclear status into
controlled territories, and as a result, would contribute to stability in the region.
The transformation of the border on the map into a perceived and experienced border
in reality has led to the double peripheralization of an already peripheral Russian region.
O. J. Martínez (1994, 4–10) specifies four types of interactions in border territories: alienated,
coexistent, interdependent, and integrated. In a sense, in the two regions we analyzed, we
27
observed a de facto transformation of integrated borderlands into coexistent borderlands, but
this process has occured in quite varied ways.
Our research showed the following: People living along the border with Ukraine, in
their everyday lives, easily change their sociospatial practices in order to shop, find work,
recreate, and access education and medical treatment. This leads to a change in their
perception of space and, in particular, the recognition that they live in a region bordering
another state. Residents constantly encounter the border’s existence and discuss sociocultural
similarities and differences among themselves and with their neighbors. In a sense, we can
characterize what is happening as a process of nationalization from the outside or from
above. Residents see that Ukraine uses the border as a powerful instrument to express its
sovereignty, for example, by tightening border control; however, this does not necessarily
mean that the Russian border population perceives itself as “different” socially and culturally.
At the same time, everyday life in the Rostov region (Gukovo, Donetsk, Matveyev
Kurgan) is largely determined by the neighborhood of war-affected territories, as well as by
the non-recognized status of the LPR and DPR and the influx of refugees. The latter has led
to reduced employment opportunities and lower wages. All of this has also contributed to a
change in cross-border practices and the local population’s perception of the border.
Thus, the events of 2014 have led to changes in everyday life in the borderland and
the transformation of previously friendly relations between neighbors. These circumstances
marked the beginning of the process of people recognizing that they live in the territory of
two adjoining states, which are not only demonstrating their sovereignty but also making it
acutely tangible for the people living there. Despite the multidirectional nature of the
bordering processes, the sentiments of residents of the section of the border with Ukraine and
with the LPR and DPR proved to be similar in many ways.
28
Funding Information
This research was supported by the following institutions and grants:
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation [0148-2019-0008]
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001659 [EXC
2055]
Russian Science Foundation, https://doi.org/10.13039/501100006769 [grant no. 19-17-
00232]
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NOTES:
1
The population of the towns doubled for a time, including through the opening of temporary
settlements.
2
At the same time, informants from the border settlements of the Rostov region talked only
about the neighboring LPR and DPR and the border with them; they did not think about the
situation in the Kharkiv region or other border regions of Ukraine, with which they are not
familiar and have little contact. Interviewees from the Belgorod region, although they were
aware of events in Donbas, did not think about the trajectories of future development of the
LPR and DPR.
