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Exploring the Relationships between UN Sanctions and Mediation
Abstract
Sanctions and mediation are often applied simultaneously by the UN , but there has been little systematic exploration of their interrelationships. Drawing on research from the Sanctions and Mediation Project ( SMP ), both complications and complementarities can be identified. Sanctions can complicate mediation by fostering exclusion, emboldening nonsanctioned parties, closing mediation space, undercutting mediator impartiality, and forcing premature agreements. At the same time, sanctions can complement mediation by deterring spoilers, breaking stalemates, incentivizing cooperation, modifying cost-benefit calculations, ensuring broad participation in talks, and facilitating the onset of talks. The conditions under which complementarity can be enhanced include UN Security Council unity, focus and coherence of mandates, and regional cooperation. This article concludes with policy recommendations for different institutional actors and some suggestions for future research.
... Scholars such as Baldwin (1985) and Kirshner (1997) have explored how sanctions can be used as part of a broader strategy to achieve diplomatic objectives. Biersteker et al. (2022) examine the relationship between sanctions and mediation. Their findings suggest that effective sanctions regimes often complement diplomatic efforts, creating a synchronized approach that enhances the overall effectiveness of foreign policy. ...
This paper provides a comparative analysis of the divergent outcomes of smart sanctions in Myanmar and Zimbabwe in the 2000s, examining their effectiveness in prompting political change. Smart sanctions, aimed at specific individuals and entities to minimize humanitarian impacts, have become a prominent tool in international relations. Their success, however, hinges on key factors such as the precision in targeting decision-makers, the political structure and stability of the regime, the cohesion of the sanctioning coalition, and the ability of targeted entities to evade the measures. An in-depth analysis of Myanmar’s military junta and Zimbabwe’s authoritarian regime reveals that smart sanctions were more effective in Myanmar, contributing to political reforms, whereas Zimbabwe’s entrenched political control and reliance on alternative international alliances allowed the regime to withstand external pressures. These findings emphasize the critical importance of tailoring sanctions to the specific political and economic context of each regime, along with the need for cohesive international cooperation and stringent enforcement to ensure the effectiveness of smart sanctions.
... Wright (2015), and of Biersteker, Brubaker, and Lanz (2022), future studies should systematically theorise and empirically explore the effect of sanctions on authoritarian regimes vis-à-vis other coercive measures. In doing so, qualitative and quantitative perspectives could be more systematically connected, as could Comparative Authoritarianism and IR research on sanctions. ...
This chapter analyses the nature and effects of external pressure imposed on authoritarian regimes. Around three-quarters of all countries under United Nations, United States and European Union sanctions are authoritarian, and “democracy sanctions” that aim at improving democratic and human rights in targeted countries constitute the biggest sanctions category. Yet, authoritarian regimes represent particularly problematic targets as they more easily shield themselves from external pressure than their democratic counterparts do. Authoritarians have a tighter grip on the public discourse and the struggle over the meaning of sanctions. They often even use them to their own advantage, denouncing sanction senders as “imperialist” and blaming them for their economic woes. The chapter presents trends in the application of sanctions pressure against authoritarian regimes, reviews mechanisms of how economic and diplomatic restrictions work, and examines authoritarian targets’ attempts to engage in pressure proofing.
While sanctions and mediation are often used to address the same conflict situations, they are usually employed without significant coordination. Focusing on a rare case of a mediator successfully wielding the threat of sanctions, this article explores the utility of sanctions for mediation in the Yemeni political transition during the mandate of UN special adviser Jamal Benomar. Although the transition ultimately derailed, the analysis shows that the threat of sanctions can be used in different phases of the mediation process to provide mediators with the leverage needed to convince conflict parties to engage in negotiations, break stalemates during talks, nudge parties toward an agreement, or persuade potential spoilers to refrain from undermining the implementation of the negotiated agreement. Their success, however, not only depends on the degree of convergence between the application of the two instruments, but also on the type of target, regional support, and institutional backing.
The UN -imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone began in 1997 after the Revolutionary United Front ( RUF ) led a coup that forced newly elected president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah into exile. Alongside its peacemaking efforts, the UN Security Council explicitly supported the reinstatement of Kabbah, and its sanctions targeted the RUF by limiting travel and banning the trade of arms, petroleum, and diamonds. This article analyzes whether and how UN sanctions pushed the RUF to negotiate, accept, and implement agreements mediated by the Economic Community of West African States and the UN . Its findings are drawn from the qualitative analysis of official documents, memoirs, and interviews with key negotiators. It adds to the inclusion debate in peace mediation literature by discussing whether the coordinated use of sanctions and mediation can resolve the difficulties inherent in including veto players in peace negotiations.
The UN frequently employs sanctions on the same conflicts where it attempts medi�ation. While both efforts carry a UN stamp, they follow different political logics that
are not always coherent with each other: sanctions are enacted by the UN Security
Council, while mediation is led by a special representative/envoy of the UN Secretary�General, often on the basis of a Security Council mandate. This article explores two UN interventions in Libya that combined mediation with mandatory sanctions: the
conflict leading to the overthrow of the Muammar Qaddafi regime (2011) and the civil
war that ensued when the country was split between the first elected parliament and
its successor (2014–2015). The Libyan case illustrates that the coherence of mediation
and sanctions ultimately depends on the UN Security Council unity of purpose.
While sanctions and mediation are often used to address the same conflict situations, they are usually employed without significant coordination. Focusing on a rare case of a mediator successfully wielding the threat of sanctions, this article explores the utility of sanctions for mediation in the Yemeni political transition during the mandate of UN special adviser Jamal Benomar. Although the transition ultimately derailed, the analysis shows that the threat of sanctions can be used in different phases of the mediation process to provide mediators with the leverage needed to convince conflict parties to engage in negotiations, break stalemates during talks, nudge parties toward an agreement, or persuade potential spoilers to refrain from undermining the implementation of the negotiated agreement. Their success, however, not only depends on the degree of convergence between the application of the two instruments, but also on the type of target, regional support, and institutional backing.
This article analyzes the role of UN sanctions in the context of peace negotiations in South Sudan from the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013 until the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015. Drawing on the literature regarding third-party intervention in civil wars, it explores whether the UN sanctions regime—established in March 2015—was conceived as an instrument of leverage to get the parties to agree to a settlement. The article asks two questions: Have sanctions and mediation been coordinated? Has the interlink between sanctions and mediation been successful? First, there has been little coordination between sanctions and mediation. Second, UN sanctions did not appear to play a crucial role in the mediation process. This analysis is based on desk research and nineteen interviews with officials from the UN , the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and other regional actors conducted between 2017 and 2018.
The UN frequently employs sanctions on the same conflicts where it attempts medi�ation. While both efforts carry a UN stamp, they follow different political logics that
are not always coherent with each other: sanctions are enacted by the UN Security
Council, while mediation is led by a special representative/envoy of the UN Secretary�General, often on the basis of a Security Council mandate. This article explores two UN interventions in Libya that combined mediation with mandatory sanctions: the
conflict leading to the overthrow of the Muammar Qaddafi regime (2011) and the civil
war that ensued when the country was split between the first elected parliament and
its successor (2014–2015). The Libyan case illustrates that the coherence of mediation
and sanctions ultimately depends on the UN Security Council unity of purpose.
The new UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, has made prevention his top priority. Conflict prevention is now understood not only in terms of averting the outbreak, but also the continuation, escalation and recurrence, of conflict. The Secretary-General has recognised that in order for the UN to shift from its current, largely reactive, posture to a prevention-oriented approach, it will need to better integrate its peace and security, development and human rights pillars of work. Sustaining peace and sustainable development will need to work hand in glove, rather than along two separate tracks as has often been the case in the past. In an effort to help shift the system toward this new approach, the UN and the World Bank are undertaking a joint flagship study on Preventing Violent Conflict. This thematic paper on UN sanctions and the prevention of conflict was produced as a backgrounder for the UN-World Bank study.
The UN -imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone began in 1997 after the Revolutionary United Front ( RUF ) led a coup that forced newly elected president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah into exile. Alongside its peacemaking efforts, the UN Security Council explicitly supported the reinstatement of Kabbah, and its sanctions targeted the RUF by limiting travel and banning the trade of arms, petroleum, and diamonds. This article analyzes whether and how UN sanctions pushed the RUF to negotiate, accept, and implement agreements mediated by the Economic Community of West African States and the UN . Its findings are drawn from the qualitative analysis of official documents, memoirs, and interviews with key negotiators. It adds to the inclusion debate in peace mediation literature by discussing whether the coordinated use of sanctions and mediation can resolve the difficulties inherent in including veto players in peace negotiations.
The sanctions debate has often focused on the ability of achieving compliance with the demands of the initiator, the sender. However, a large number of UN sanctions aim at ending wars and initiating peace processes, rather than achieving, for instance, regime change. The ability of the sanctions to foster a negotiated settlement requires a different approach, this chapter (from 2015) argues. Using data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium the authors illustrate how sanctions can promote settlement during different phases of a conflict.
This chapter presents an overview of what is known about mediation (as of 2014) by two well-known mediation researchers. It goes into the definition, data, frequency and strategies of mediation. It also discusses particular problems, such as mediator bias and coordination between mediation efforts. Finally, it raises matters of outcomes of mediation and challenges for continued mediation research.
Villains need to be de-villainized for talking to begin; this is a cornerstone of negotiation literature. But what happens when villains are proscribed, or listed as terrorists? While an emerging body of work has started to explore the effects of proscription by emphasizing aspects of demonization and banishment, it has not so far explored how banishment ends. This article offers a theoretical and empirical contribution to this discussion by exploring the effects of proscription on the dynamic interaction between conflict parties and how negotiations still do take place with armed groups listed as terrorists. To do this it maps representations made by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia through a qualitative discourse analysis of 335 statements triangulated with 50 personal interviews. The article argues that proscription makes the initiation of negotiations impossible because it leads to a form of extreme vilification. This is especially true for the government, unable to switch directly to de-vilifying its proscribed enemy. First it has to normalize its vilification – a concept I describe here as a ‘linguistic ceasefire’. This helps explain how banishment can end and peace negotiations can be initiated in an age of proscription.
There is growing policy consensus in Washington and other Western capitals that economic sanctions are powerful tools to cope with major foreign policy crises. Are sanctions, particularly targeted sanctions, really the potent instruments optimists suggest? Under what circumstances do punitive economic measures induce policy change in sanctioned countries? To probe these queries, in this article I outline the conditions that have been identified as more likely to lead to successful sanctions outcomes in the literature. I also discuss four major shortcomings of existing scholarship. First, the sender-biased interpretation of sanctions effectiveness renders the treatment of the ‘ineffective’ cases with negative outcomes the same as those cases that induce no discernable change in target behavior. Second, the prevalent use of static data from existing sanctions databases reduces the ability of researchers to study various time-specific factors affecting the probability of sanctions success. Third, the dominant state-centric bargaining model in the literature offers limited insight into contemporary coercive measures directed at non-state actors. Fourth, the study of sanctions in isolation of other instruments that frequently accompany them, such as incentives and diplomatic pressure, leads to a partial understanding of the specific role sanctions play in shaping the outcome of key foreign policy initiatives.
International sanctions have become the instrument of choice for policymakers dealing with a variety of different challenges to international peace and security. This is the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of all the targeted sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on the collaboration of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners from across the globe (the Targeted Sanctions Consortium), the book analyzes two new databases, one qualitative and one quantitative, to assess the different purposes of UN targeted sanctions, the Security Council dynamics behind their design, the relationship of sanctions with other policy instruments, implementation challenges, diverse impacts, unintended consequences, policy effectiveness, and institutional learning within the UN. The book is organized around comparisons across cases, rather than country case studies, and introduces two analytical innovations: case episodes within country sanctions regimes and systematic differentiation among different purposes of sanctions.
International sanctions have become the instrument of choice for policymakers dealing with a variety of different challenges to international peace and security. This is the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of all the targeted sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on the collaboration of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners from across the globe (the Targeted Sanctions Consortium), the book analyzes two new databases, one qualitative and one quantitative, to assess the different purposes of UN targeted sanctions, the Security Council dynamics behind their design, the relationship of sanctions with other policy instruments, implementation challenges, diverse impacts, unintended consequences, policy effectiveness, and institutional learning within the UN. The book is organized around comparisons across cases, rather than country case studies, and introduces two analytical innovations: case episodes within country sanctions regimes and systematic differentiation among different purposes of sanctions.
Capitalizing on the newly released dataset on United Nations sanctions and armed conflicts, this article raises the question whether targeted sanctions have an impact on the dynamics of armed conflicts, and, if they do, in what way. To answer this question the authors correlate UN sanctions policies to measures related to armed conflict in the period 1991–2013. This is done by systematizing and analysing data produced by the UN Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). It is a first attempt to deal with questions such as the relationship between UN targeted sanctions and armed conflict type, conflict termination and conflict outcome (victory, peace agreements, etc.). The article demonstrates that there are several instances where the UN has decided not to impose targeted sanctions, although the conditions were similar to those cases that saw such action. There is a tendency to use targeted sanctions only in certain types of conflicts. The authors suggest that this is partly rooted in the structure of the UN as an inter-state organization. Thus, sanctions are more of a political instrument than has perhaps been recognized in sanctions research to date.
Stephen John Stedman is Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University.
This paper was commissioned by the Committee on International Conflict Resolution of the National Research Council. A different version will be published by the council. I would like to thank the following for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions: Howard Adelman, Cynthia Chataway, Juergen Dedring, Michael Doyle, Daniel Druckman, William Durch, Alexander L. George, Charles L. Glaser, Robert Jervis, Stephen Low, Michael O'Hanlon, Jerrold Post, Tonya Putnam, Donald Rothchild, Timothy D. Sisk, Janice Gross Stein, Paul Stern, and Saadia Touval. I would also like to thank the current and former policymakers and diplomats who spoke with me off the record about their peacemaking experiences.
1. Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 231. For analysis of various risks, see pp. 14-16, 231-232.
2. Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflicts," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 369-371.
3. Until now, the most widely cited figure for deaths in the Rwandan genocide is 800,000 from Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). In a forthcoming book on the subject, Howard Adelman estimates the figure to be over 1 million.
4. For example, in South Africa prior to 1990 there was no public agreement among the antagonists to peacefully resolve their conflict. Only after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and after several public agreements were reached that committed the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African government to a process of negotiation can one speak of a South African peace process. Similarly, in the case of Cambodia, even though negotiations dragged on for several years, the Cambodian peace process began only after the parties formally committed themselves to the Paris Peace Accords.
5. Timothy D. Sisk, in Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 1996), concludes that successful power sharing depends on "a core of moderate, integrated elites [that] has a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny," p. 117. Most recommendations for power sharing in civil wars simply assume parties are willing to share power.
6. Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1994, passim.
7. This is a paraphrase of a quotation from Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 66.
8. Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 20-33.
9. Roy Licklider estimates that 81 percent of civil wars in the twentieth century that were fought over identity issues and ended through the victory of one side did not result in genocide. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 681-690.
10. The appellation of "greedy" comes from Charles L. Glaser, but differs from his definition. Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. Glaser uses "greedy" to refer to parties' motivation for aggressive behavior. In my use of the term, "greedy" does not imply that the spoiler acts out of greed, but rather that it expands its goals and is willing to incur high costs and risks to achieve them.
11. Using my definition, it is a tough call whether the Bosnian Serbs were a spoiler at that point. One could argue that the public peace process had achieved the commitment of the Bosnian and Bosnian Croat parties and therefore the Bosnian Serbs were spoilers.
12. Again, it is difficult to determine whether Aideed was a spoiler by my definition. One could argue that the Addis Ababa agreements between the various clan factions in Somalia constituted a formal peace process and therefore Aideed was a spoiler...
External mediation in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War has rested on a standardized conflict resolution mechanism, which differs significantly from the state-centric mechanism prevalent during the Cold War. This accords a broadly equal standing to all parties to the conflict, and seeks to reach a settlement acceptable to them all. This, in turn, calls for a ceasefire, followed by either of two mechanisms designed to create a liberal constitutional order, guaranteed by internationally supervised elections. In the Rwanda conflict of 1990-94, conscientious implementation of this mechanism not only failed to avert genocide, but even helped to create the conditions that made it possible. This failure illustrates important weaknesses in the mechanism itself, notably the way in which mediators become implicit participants in the conflict, and the divorce of a mechanistic approach to conflict resolution from the political prerequisites for a successful settlement.
Who gets a seat at the table and who does not is an important consideration for successful peacemaking. However, current research does not provide sufficient guidance for understanding the politics of participation in peace negotiations. This article develops a conceptual framework for understanding these dynamics. Its central theme is that the inclusion or exclusion of a given actor in peace negotiations is affected by two independent factors. One factor pertains to the practical requirements of the peace process and addresses the following question: does the participation of a given actor augment the chance of reaching a sustainable peace settlement? The other factor relates to the normative dimension of peace talks: is the participation of a given actor consistent with the values of international mediators and sponsors of peace negotiations? The article argues that the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion result from the interplay of these two factors. The most straightforward situation for mediators is when practical requirements and international norms are mutually reinforcing. Difficulties arise from scenarios where practical effectiveness and norms contradict each other. This is the case when the involvement of a given person (or group) is imperative in terms of the peace process, but difficult to justify politically because this person has committed terrorist acts or is indicted by an international court.
Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument.
UN Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice
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Background Paper on Mediation
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Background Paper on Sanctions
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Mediation and Sanctions: Applying Conflict Prevention Tools in Atrocity Prevention
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Somalia Country Study
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UN Sanctions and Peace Negotiations: Possibilities for Complementarity
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Sanctions and Stability Pacts: The Economic Tools of Peacemaking
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Paving Pathways to Peace Talks with Sanctions Exemptions?
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International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era
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A Survey of Mediation in African Coup
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