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Democratic Electoral Systems around the world, 1946–2020
Abstract
This research note describes an update to Bormann and Golder's 2013 Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset. We extend the temporal scope of the previous dataset by adding information for all legislative and presidential elections that took place in democratic states from 2011 through 2020. More significantly, the DES dataset now includes information on all elections that are considered democratic by at least one of five different measures of regime type: Democracy and Dictatorship (DD), Freedom House (FH), Polity5, Boix-Miller-Rosato (BMR), and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). The result is that the new DES dataset has greater utility and is over 30% larger than the previous one. A brief overview of the data is presented.
... Similarly, given G's type, the leader always prefers to lead a cohesive group ("+") rather than a divided one ("-"). 19 This ordering plays a central role in our analysis. Our main theoretical predictions can be derived under the assumption that peace Pareto-dominates war and that this ordering of war payoffs holds: Remarkably no extra parameter restriction is required. ...
... 30 Their dichotomous democracy variable covers 199 countries over the 1946 to 2008 period. 31 While this measure is more coarse and conservative than the widely used continuous variable of Polity 32 For robustness checks we also use an alternative data source on electoral systems, namely the Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset of Bormann and Golder (2013), which is another high quality dataset that yields very similar results. 33 Note that whenever a country is classi ed as autocracy, both majoritarian democracy measures are coded as zero (to avoid that they pick up "pro forma" / window-dressing institutions), and when the democracy variable has missing information for a given observation, this is also the case for the majoritarian democracy variables. ...
... The results show that transition to a majoritarian democracy is associated with a higher re-election likelihood of the former autocrat than transition to a democracy with PR. This nding is con rmed in column (2), when we use the alternative data from the Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset of Bormann and Golder (2013) to code majoritarian representation, and in column (3), with a logit instead of an LPM estimation. One concern may be that a series of confounders could jointly determine the type of democracy adopted and leader tenure (such as a country's political history or its development level). ...
Prevailing theories of democracy focus on class conflict. In contrast, we study democratic transition when ethnic tensions are more salient than the poor/rich divide, building a model where (i) ethnic groups negotiate about allocating the economic surplus and (ii) military and political mobilizations rest on the unobserved strength of ethnic attachment. Free and fair elections elicit information and restore inter-ethnic bargaining efficiency. Autocrats can rationally choose democratic transition, even if they risk losing power, as elections reduce the opposition’s informational rent. The predictions of our framework are consistent with novel country-level and ethnic group-level panel correlational evidence on democratization in the post-decolonization period.
... Electoral systems are usually classified into three main categories, namely majoritarian, proportional, and mixed (see e.g., Bormann and Golder 2013).2 Mixed systems combine two formulas, such as proportional and majoritarian rules, in one electoral system (Bormann and Golder 2013, Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, Massicotte and Blais 1999. ...
... Electoral systems are usually classified into three main categories, namely majoritarian, proportional, and mixed (see e.g., Bormann and Golder 2013).2 Mixed systems combine two formulas, such as proportional and majoritarian rules, in one electoral system (Bormann and Golder 2013, Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, Massicotte and Blais 1999. Accordingly, voters elect their representatives through two different systems: one part of the seats are usually elected in single-seat districts, while the other part is elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation. ...
... However, the number of seats has fluctuated. Some researchers classify the single nontransferable vote as a majoritarian system (see e.g., Bormann and Golder 2013), and therefore we expect that voter turnout and the party system fragmentation increase after the introduction of the MMM system in Japan. ...
In this study the authors aim to add to the understanding of whether, and if so how, a change of electoral system affects factors such as voter turnout and the party system, and the authors' focus has been on changes that result in mixed electoral systems. They used three country cases (Japan, Italy, and New Zealand) to explore patterns in a before-and-after design. The findings suggest that a country cannot expect a significant effect on voter turnout if it decides to change its electoral system to a mixed system. Regarding party system fragmentation, the results show that the change of the electoral system in New Zealand from a plurality system to a mixed member proportional system had a clear and immediately positive effect on the party system. However, the results do not indicate that the changes of electoral systems in Japan and Italy have had any significant effect on the party system.
... To further explore the generalizability of our results, we look at the worldwide relationship between average district magnitude and invalid voting in scenarios of concurrent legislative and presidential elections and voluntary voting, to take a setting comparable to ours, and look at such relationship by election type. We use data from Bormann and Golder (2022) for the election's average district magnitude, in logs, and from the International IDEA's Voter Turnout Database for invalid voting. 27 Table 4 shows the correlations between the log of the average district magnitude and invalid voting for each type of election for all concurrent elections with voluntary voting in the data (n = 109), as well as for those since 1990 (n = 101). ...
... *p < .1. Source: Own elaboration based on Bormann and Golder (2022) and International IDEA's Voter Turnout Database. ...
How do large-magnitude proportional systems affect invalid voting? We evaluate a Chilean electoral system reform that introduced proportionality. Voting is voluntary, and legislative and presidential elections are held concurrently. We compare the invalid votes between different types of elections before and after the reform using various difference-in-differences strategies. We find that invalid voting increased in legislative compared to presidential elections (pre-trends were parallel). The increase in invalid voting is greater in post-reform districts with higher magnitude and is not due to pre-reform district characteristics. The results of heterogeneity analyses and a survey experiment suggest the mechanism behind these findings is the cognitive burden associated with a longer ballot. This research highlights an understudied aspect of electoral systems: higher district magnitudes may be demobilizing in terms of valid voting for citizens who are more vulnerable to cognitive burden, even among those motivated enough to vote in the first-order election.
... If backed up by robust oversight and civic safeguards to prevent manipulation and fraud Atkeson et al., 2009;Lewandowsky et al., 2017), technological innovations enable qualitatively better electoral reforms. Minimizing the risks associated with complex ballot procedures they can be instrumentalized in more efficient electoral systems from the PMM family to increase involvement and empowerment of voters (Bormann & Golder, 2022;Farrell, 2011;Neto & Cox, 1997). ...
Drawing on a combination of theoretical perspectives and comparative analysis, this book offers a comprehensive examination of the role elections and electoral systems play in shaping democratic participation, representation and legitimacy.
Critically assessing existing classifications of electoral arrangements, Stoycho P. Stoychev introduces the concept of hybrid systems—Personalized Multi-Member (PMM) and List Single-Member (LSM)—as a refined approach to understanding the balance between majoritarian and proportional principles. Through empirical analysis of voter turnout trends and electoral system performance across diverse contexts, it sheds light on longstanding debates in electoral studies concerning populism, political polarization and the transformative impact of digital technologies.
Intended for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, this study contributes to the ongoing discourse on electoral system design and its implications for democratic performance and engagement.
... Any further responses from the reviewers can be found at the end of the article REVISED 5. We randomly re-sampled about 10% of elections and reclassified them to see if systematic errors occurred, and corrected them where necessary. 3 The more complex V-Dem and Polity5 indices categorize 185 and 173 elections respectively as democratic. Users of our data thus have the choice to pick their preferred definition of democracy and the associated sample of elections, or to take an inclusive approach by picking all elections that have been classified as democratic by at least one democracy indicator. ...
This data note introduces an update to the widely-used Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) data that encompasses the period from 1919 to 1945. The data include 243 legislative lower house and presidential elections in 34 interwar democracies. Information on these elections falls into four categories: first and foremost, DES contains variables that capture the institutional rules that define how elections are organized. Second, the data captures the consequences of electoral rules in the form of summary statistics of electoral outcomes. Third, we include democracy classifications for four major democracy datasets so that users can choose their preferred democracy definition when working with the data. Finally, the DES dataset contains multiple identification variables that allow linking the DES data to a wide variety of other datasets. This update to the DES data is fully compatible with prior releases for the post-war period 1–3 .
... Both cases are illustrative examples of the growing prevalence of multiparty legislatures within presidential systems, a trend observed particularly in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa (Köker, 2017;Robinson and Torvik, 2016;Tsebelis and Rizova, 2007). Moreover, both congresses are characterized as unstable multiparty and fragmented systems (Basabe-Serrano and Martínez, 2014; Tanaka and Vera, 2010), where their mean ENP is close to the regional average, which is around 4 (Bormann and Golder, 2022;Mainwaring, 2018). ...
This study delves into the determinants of legislative overrides in multiparty legislatures, with a specific focus on the influence of partisan fragmentation within congress. Utilizing an original dataset spanning from 1995 to 2017, we examine the cases of Ecuador and Peru. Our argument posits that during lawmaking, a dispersed and fragmented party system prevents the president from anticipating the preferences of the congressional pivotal party. In such a scenario of incomplete information, the president’s capacity to introduce selective incentives through vetoes is limited. In this way, the president is less likely to break the congressional majority supporting a bill. Consequently, the vetoed bill becomes less acceptable compared to the original statute. This, in turn, provides the congressional majority with increased incentives to uphold the original bill, elevating the likelihood of a legislative override. In alignment with this rationale, our findings indicate that an increase in the effective number of parties (ENP) has a positive and significant impact on the probability of a legislative override. Additionally, our evidence underscores a noteworthy contrast between the relatively high rate of legislative overrides in Latin America and findings for the US case.
... In the dichotomous setting, democracy is a binary variable. Many scholars have proposed the dichotomous measurement of democracy (Sartori, 1987;Huntington, 1991;Alvarez et al., 1996;Przeworski et al., 2000;Golder, 2005;Cheibub et al., 2010;Skaaning et al., 2015). And second, alternative measure denote democracy either as an ordinal measure (Collier & Levitsky, 1997;Diamond, 2002;Linz & Stepan, 1996), continuous measure (Bollen & Jackman, 1989;Cutright, 1963;Elkins, 2000), single-dimensional measure (Bollen & Grandjean, 1981) or multi-dimensional measure (Bollen & Paxton, 2000, Gates et al., 2006, Gerring et al., 2009. ...
In this article, latent variable analysis is used to construct hybrid measure of political development based on the plausible common variation between objective and subjective indicators of political institutions. For a sample of 167 countries for the period 1810–2018, we chart long-term paths of political development. Our empirical strategy attempts to overcome the existing potential bias in the measures of democracy in the long run by extracting the institutional characteristics of political regimes, voter turnout, expert-based assessments and electoral outcomes into two latent indices of political development that can be compared both across space and time. The evidence reveals the remarkable persistence of multiple peaks in the world distribution of political development and uncovers contrasting long-term trajectories across countries traditionally featured in the political economy literature. Our findings add to the current debate about measurement of democratic backsliding.
... influence of electoral systems (E). To begin, we employ the effective number of electoral and legislative parties (ENEP and ENPP) variables that are commonly used in other studies, relying onBormann and Golder's (2022) dataset. These account for the size of parties based on their vote share and seat share, respectively. ...
Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions-both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional "friction" in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects-one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.
... influence of electoral systems (E). To begin, we employ the effective number of electoral and legislative parties (ENEP and ENPP) variables that are commonly used in other studies, relying onBormann and Golder's (2022) dataset. These account for the size of parties based on their vote share and seat share, respectively. ...
Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions-both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional "friction" in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects-one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.
... Треба відзначити, що проблема впливу міжнародних акторів й організацій на національні вибори та виборчі процеси є досить актуальною і важливою темою для наукових досліджень у сфері політичних наук, міжнародних відносин та правознавства, причому як уже класичних, так і сучасних. Це можемо бачити, для прикладу, завдячуючи зверненню до праць таких вчених, як Г. Гайслер [7], М. Голдер [8], Й. Елкліт [4], М. Зак [28], Т. Карозерс [1; 2], Дж. Келлі [14][15][16][17], С. Мозафар [22], Т. Райт [27], Б. Сіммонс [26], С. Хайд [11], С. Холмс [9], В. Чанд [3] та чимало інших, в тому числі українських, авторів. ...
... Any further responses from the reviewers can be found at the end of the article REVISED 5. We randomly re-sampled about 10% of elections and reclassified them to see if systematic errors occurred, and corrected them where necessary. 3 The more complex V-Dem and Polity5 indices categorize 185 and 173 elections respectively as democratic. Users of our data thus have the choice to pick their preferred definition of democracy and the associated sample of elections, or to take an inclusive approach by picking all elections that have been classified as democratic by at least one democracy indicator. ...
This data note introduces an update to the widely-used Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) data that encompasses the period from 1919 to 1945. The data include 243 legislative lower house and presidential elections in 34 interwar democracies. Information on these elections falls into four categories: first and foremost, DES contains variables that capture the institutional rules that define how elections are organized. Second, the data captures the consequences of electoral rules in the form of summary statistics of electoral outcomes. Third, we include democracy classifications for four major democracy datasets so that users can choose their preferred democracy definition when working with the data. Finally, the DES dataset contains multiple identification variables that allow linking the DES data to a wide variety of other datasets. This update to the DES data is fully compatible with prior releases for the post-war period 1–3 .
... Regional and national electoral systems differ and we include the average district magnitude (in the first tier) for both regional (ADM regional) and national elections (ADM national). Data for national elections is obtained from the Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset (Bormann and Golder 2022). In addition, we control for the size of the national and regional party systems by including the effective number of parliamentary parties in the regional (ENPP regional) and national (ENPP national) electoral arenas. ...
... We introduce a novel survey dataset, collected online by the survey firm Latana in the following 10 countries: the United States, Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Germany. 1 This selection covers countries across Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern Europe, along with parliamentary, presidential, and premierpresidential democracies. In light of previous work linking affective polarization with less proportional systems , the case selection ranges from the two-party majoritarian American system to the highly proportional and fragmented Dutch system, as we elaborate in Supplementary Material table A3, based on Bormann and Golder (2022). And since radical right parties generate strong negative affect (Helbling and Jungkunz 2020), it covers countries where radical right parties dominate the political arena (e.g., Poland) along with countries in which they are relative newcomers (e.g., Spain). ...
Measures of affective polarization—that is, dislike and hostility across party lines—have been developed and validated in the context of America’s two-party system. Yet increasingly, affective polarization is examined comparatively. We address this issue by introducing a novel dataset that measures aspects of partisan affect in 10 countries with diverse party systems. We detect associations between partisan affect toward out-parties versus affect toward out-parties’ supporters, but their strength varies across countries. We discuss measurement reasons for this variation and consider the implications of our findings for the emerging comparative affective polarization literature.
... Across democratic systems, there is much variation in electoral systems for parliaments including whether voters vote for parties or candidates, and how votes are translated into seats (e.g. Bormann and Golder 2022;Farrell 2011). One of the most complex systems is the flexible-list PR system, in which "(1) parties present pre-ranked lists, (2) voters can express a preference for individual candidates, and (3) additional rules specify under which conditions a candidate can 'jump the queue' given by the pre-electoral list ranking" (Däubler 2020, 2). ...
... First, prior studies have hypothesized that electoral institutions are an important factor influencing the level of affective polarization (Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020). To evaluate the role of electoral systems, we include the (logged) average district magnitude in each country, using data from Bormann and Golder (2013). Following the prior empirical analysis, lower average district magnitude is expected to represent more majoritarian electoral systems, while higher magnitude more proportional ones. ...
Highlighting the strength of “partyism” in many democracies, recent scholarship pays keen attention to increasing hostility and distrust among citizens across party lines, known as affective polarization. By combining a conjoint analysis with decision-making games such as dictator and trust games, we design a novel survey experiment to systematically estimate and compare the strength of the partisan divide relative to other social divides across 25 European democracies. This design also allows us to investigate how the two components of affective polarization, in-group favoritism and out-group derogation, are moderated by the way parties interact with each other. We first find dominance of the partisan divide compared to other social divides that constitute traditional cleavages such as social class and religion. Second, we show that affective polarization in Europe is not primarily driven by out-group animus. Finally, we demonstrate that coalition partnership lessens affective polarization by reducing both in-group and out-group biases.
... Most importantly, the building blocks of the theory are not specific to Mexico. The model studies an election under two institutional features that are present in a wide range of democracies: (1) candidates compete in a single-seat constituency (Bormann and Golder 2013), and (2) a party can choose its own nomination rules (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Additionally, the model assumes that the attachments between politicians and parties are weak. ...
Why do party leaders constrain their own power and allow the use of primary elections? I develop a model of intraparty politics and electoral competition in which an ambitious office‐seeker reevaluates their party affiliation after their party chooses a nomination rule. The model shows that in settings in which the linkages between politicians and parties are weak, party leaders adopt primaries in order to keep potential defectors from pursuing their individual ambitions outside of the party. The main theoretical result shows that only parties that are electorally strong ex ante can use primaries as a strategy to hold their parties together. Thus, in contrast to an extensive literature linking the use of primaries to electorally weak parties, this model posits the existence of a positive relationship between the use of primaries and a party's electoral strength. Analysis of legislative and gubernatorial nominations in Mexico provides strong support for the model's expectations.
... (4) As malapportionment has been shown to be higher in single-member districts systems and lower when using upper tiers in the allocation of seats Kasuya and Kamahara, 2015), we created a categorical variable, Electoral system, coded one if the electoral system is PR, two if it is majoritarian, and three if it is mixed. The source was Bormann and Golder (2013). ...
... The moral scale was constructed using positive and negative mentions of a traditional way of life. Finally, the models include the following control variables: (logged) average district magnitude (Bormann and Golder 2013), trade union density (OECD and AIAS 2021), GDP per capita and GDP growth (OECD 2021), government party (Döring and Manow 2021), government spending (IMF 2020; The World Bank 2020) and turnout (International IDEA 2021). All of these are variables that could potentially impact support for the mainstream right, and many of them have also been used in research on the electoral success of other mainstream parties (Benedetto et al. 2020). ...
While the electoral decline of Social democracy has received considerable attention in the literature, much less is known about how the structural changes experienced by advanced capitalist societies in the past decades have affected support for the mainstream right. In order to fill this gap, this article examines the relationship between secularisation, educational expansion and support for Conservative and Christian democratic parties in 18 West European democracies since the 1960s. The analysis reveals that secularisation is negatively associated with support for the mainstream right, but the effect is only significant for Christian democratic parties. Moreover, the findings support the expectation that social conservatism tends to damage the electoral prospects of mainstream right parties in highly educated societies. This suggests that, although engaging in cultural wars might sometimes seem like a winning strategy in the short term, it is unlikely to produce long-term positive electoral returns for the centre-right in post-industrial contexts.
... where i refers to the country and t represents an election; y i,t refers to either votes for nonmainstream parties, electoral abstentions, or polarization; Austerity i,t−1 is the amount of fiscal consolidation in the legislative period prior to the election; X i,t−1 includes the 15 Data for the control variables come from Armingeon et al. (2019) and Bormann and Golder (2013). For early elections, we follow Schleiter and Tavits (2016) and take the difference between the maximum duration of the legislative term and the actual election. ...
In recent decades, governments in many Western democracies have shown a remarkable consensus in pursuing fiscal austerity measures during periods of strained public finances. In this paper, we show that these decisions have consequences for political polarization. Our macro-level analysis of 166 elections since 1980 finds that austerity measures increase both electoral abstention and votes for non-mainstream parties, thereby boosting party system polarization. A detailed analysis of selected austerity episodes also shows that new, small and radical parties benefit most from austerity policies. Finally, survey experiments with a total of 8,800 respondents in Germany, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom indicate that the effects of austerity on polarization are particularly pronounced when the mainstream right and left parties both stand for fiscal restraint. Austerity is a substantial cause of political polarization and hence political instability in industrialized democracies.
... To examine Hypothesis 6, I coded a lagged dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if elections operate on the basis of proportional representation rules and 0 otherwise. This data comes from an updated version of the Democratic Electoral Systems dataset (Bormann and Golder 2013). ...
What factors contribute to the establishment of ethnically inclusive governments and what ethnic groups enjoy from such inclusion? Although its benevolent effects have been under scrutiny in the voluminous literature on democratization on civil wars, how to arrive at an ethnically inclusive polity has only received scarce attention. This thesis focuses on the dynamics of interethnic cooperation. More precisely, it explores the factors that lead to more ethnically inclusive governments (i.e., power-sharing coalitions) in divided societies and factors that affect the stability of such governments. Overall, the study argues that elite behavior is key to understanding the dynamics of interethnic cooperation and that such behavior is conditioned by the particular ethno-political context in which the elites operate. Once ethno-political factors are entered into the equation, unlike what classical studies of power sharing suggest, formal political institutions should have little or no influence on the formation of ethnically more inclusive governments. The ethno-political factors particularly relate to “ethno-demographic distribution of the population” and “the record of interethnic relations” in each polity. At the level of its actors, the study maintains that the characteristics of ethnic groups have a decisive effect on the likelihood of their inclusion at the political center. In particular, these factors concern the so-called overlapping or reinforcing identity cleavages between ethnic groups and their relative mobilizational capacity.
To test the claims, this study employs a quantitative analysis involving over 100 countries for the years between 1946 and 2017. The analyses situate at both the country- and group-level to reveal a more complete picture of ethnic inclusion and the functioning of the “structural” determinants as well as the operation of its actual “actors” (i.e., ethnic elites). The results confirm the expectations as well as the plausibility of the hypotheses on the effects of the ethno-political factors with respect to the making and maintaining of ethnic inclusion. Overall, the empirical analyses suggest that varying ethno-political contexts of countries and actor characteristics can better explain the variation in ethnic inclusion and the stability of ethnic regimes in that the same ethnic groups remain in power. More precisely, the empirical analyses reveal three main findings. First, at the country-level, the level of ethnic inclusion is lower in ethnically more divided countries as well as in the context of ongoing ethnic violence. In contrast, the previous experiences of inter-ethnic cooperation foster the level of ethnic inclusion. Second, at the group-level, multiple identity cleavages between the ruling group and a given ethnic group decrease its likelihood of being included in the state apparatus, whereas more populous ethnic groups are more likely to make it into the governing circle. Third, and finally, so-called survival analysis shows that the higher levels of ethnic inclusion promote the stability of the ethnic composition of governments. In contrast, the underrepresentation of a coalition partner decreases the stability of such regimes. The study concludes by discussing the theoretical and implications of these results and delivers suggestions for future research.
... Systems dataset (Bormann and Golder 2013) supplemented with data from the Database of Political Institutions . The extent of Decentralization could plausibly be expected to influence patterns of government spending, 18 and is operationalized using 16 The effective number of parties is another often-studied dimension of party systems. ...
This dissertation consists of four article-length chapters that revolve around the study of distributive politics and/or party systems. In the first chapter, I use the case of South Korea to present a theory of conditional core-swing targeting that explains how presidents use their strong budgetary powers to manipulate the distribution of government resources. Presidents whose parties already possess a legislative majority are expected to favor core municipalities to strengthen the foundations of their majority constituency, whereas those who seek majority control are predicted to prioritize swing municipalities in an effort to cross the majority threshold. Using a novel dataset of national subsidy allocations that spans three decades, I find evidence in support of my theory. This chapter demonstrates that the beneficiaries of distributive favoritism are not fixed, and that politicians can engage in complex and varied targeting strategies to achieve their objectives. In the second chapter, I turn my attention to the concept of party system institutionalization. While institutionalized party systems are regarded as key underpinnings of democracies, much of our understanding of this relationship remains disjoint and inconclusive due to unresolved conceptual, measurement, and data challenges. To address these limitations, I focus the concept on the establishment and entrenchment of the interparty rules, and construct a corresponding measure that covers 96 post-WWII democracies using a Bayesian latent variable measurement model. The resulting measure not only has unmatched coverage and demonstrated validity, but also better corroborates theoretical expectations than existing measures. This chapter should facilitate the advancement of systematic understandings about the causes and consequences of party system institutionalization across a global sample of democracies. In the third chapter, I examine how two key dimensions of party systems—their degree of institutionalization and nationalization—jointly impact policymaking and policy outcomes in democracies. Party system institutionalization enhances the capacity of parties to sustain intertemporal policy coordination, whereas party system nationalization incentivizes parties to target broader constituencies. As these mechanisms are distinct, I argue that variations across these two dimensions should have disparate implications for the provision of public goods and services. Using a representative sample of democracies, I demonstrate that while party system institutionalization and nationalization are both necessary for increasing the supply of national policies, the former is more important for generating higher-quality and more equitable public service outcomes. This chapter presents a more comprehensive framework for understanding the relationship between party systems, policymaking, and policy outcomes. In the fourth chapter, which is co-authored with Michael Bernhard and Allen Hicken, we examine party system institutionalization in the context of competitive authoritarian regimes. Party system institutionalization is regarded as a critical underpinning of democracies, but its role in non-democratic systems has been understudied. To address this gap, we construct an original data set that disaggregates electoral volatility—the most common measure of party system institutionalization in democracies—into ruling party seat change and opposition party seat volatility, and further divide opposition party volatility into Type-A and Type-B volatility. We find robust results that democratization becomes more likely when decreases in the ruling party’s seat share are accompanied by opposition party Type-B volatility. This chapter indicates that party system dynamics can be linked to regime performance even in non-democratic contexts.
... Since trade openness and FDI inflows are measured annually, we calculate a one-year-lagged value and convert it to the quarterly data format. We also include two institutional variables related to clarity of responsibility: majority status (2: single-party majority; 1: coalition majority; 0: minority) 16 of the government and average district magnitude (log) from Bormann and Golder (2013). These institutional structures may generate conditions in which incumbent parties are more likely to be punished for economic outcomes. ...
In this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.
... In addition, some of those regimes (e.g., Russia) have profited from high oil and gas prices to consolidate their influence both at home and abroad (Carothers, 2006;Walker & Goehring, 2008). Although election fraud and intimidation of opposition are common, most international observers conclude that by and large the elections that take place in those countries are free and fair (Golder, 2005;Howard & Roessler, 2006;Puddington, 2009). ...
Elections and electoral assistance have come close to meeting the criteria for a "global public goods challenge," the consequences of which affect both the developed and developing worlds. This paper argues that by seeing elections not as the end result but rather a periodical reevaluation of effectiveness, NGOs can better develop programs that measure long- term effectiveness. Based on both the literature and examples of a handful of NGOs, this essay describes the nature and scope of the problem with elections and election assistance. It then looks at the ways in which transnational civil society could contribute to addressing and solving this challenge. It concluded that transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could have a greater impact on this global public goods challenge by: educating stakeholders on the relationship between elections and democracy; linking electoral assistance to election observation; taking sides to uphold international electoral standards yet steering clear of partisanship; engaging national and local civil societies in long-term campaign and coverage monitoring; empowering local poll-watchers; and, using their leverage to take action against election fraud and candidate prosecution.
The extent to which the public takes an interest in politics has long been argued to be foundational to democracy, but the want of appropriate data has prevented cross-national and longitudinal analysis. This letter takes advantage of recent advances in latent-variable modelling of aggregate survey responses and a comprehensive collection of survey data to generate dynamic comparative estimates of macrointerest, that is, aggregate political interest, for over a hundred countries over the past four decades. These macrointerest scores are validated with other aggregate measures of political interest and of other types of political engagement. A cross-national and longitudinal analysis of macrointerest in advanced democracies reveals that along with election campaigns and inclusive institutions, it is good economic conditions, not bad times, that spur publics to greater interest in politics.
The purpose of the study. The formation of a social state, the formation of civil society, the development of a multi-party system and public associations, including in the form officially registered of political parties (PP) and socially oriented non-profit organizations (SO NPO), the emergence of new channels of communication between the population and its active part – the electorate and the state authorities in the Russian Federation, modern trends in the development of a multipolar world and changes in the forms and types of foreign policy relations – all these phenomena and facts of social life become new objects of research of one of the oldest branches of social statistics: political statistics (PS), which makes necessary the formation of updated system of indexes for this branch of statistical science.
Materials and methods. The conceptual basis for structuring sections of the PS, identifying a specific subject, method and research objectives, defining a system of indexes within each section of the PS and the relationships between these modules are presented in the form of an information and logical diagram of subsystems of indexes with the definition of algorithms for their calculation and data sources for their construction.
Results. The results of the author’s applied research on some relationships between modules of indexes of PS sections (the number of SO NPOs and its relationship with the level of well-being of the population, the number of poor people) are presented, highlighting those emerging trends in Russia for 2012–2022, proportions, structural shifts in the sphere of socio-political relations; the main directions for the further development of the system of PS indexes in the context of its subsystems are determined, the problems ofstatistical observation in its various forms over the facts of political life are highlighted.
Conclusion. The obtained research results can be used in analytical activities when organizing targeted studies of PS objects by statistical bodies, ministries and departments, and the Civil Chamber of the Russian Federation; in the educational process in the training of sociologists and political scientists in the country’s universities; in the analytical developments of academic and teaching staff.
This study examines how theoretically driven indicators modify our understanding of transition dynamics in Latin America. Our indicators show that a noticeable wave of reversion to authoritarian rule in Latin America occurred during the last two decades. Moreover, unlike the past, where authoritarian regimes were established with military coups, the Democracy-Dictatorship Reprise for Latin America (DDRLA) confirms that the region's recent experience with democratic reversion has been brought about by presidents who secured office through elections and who manipulated rules to remain in office for more than two terms. For the period from 1946 to 2022, we discuss how the minimalist conception of democratic regimes can be further advanced with our reformed political regime indicator, as well as measures of initial elections and political regime transitions. We then demonstrate the utility of the DDRLA by replicating studies recently published in leading journals.
We compare the nature of party systems across bicameral legislatures using newly available data on upper chamber elections. We examine the similarity in the composition of political parties between the lower and upper chambers (partisan congruence) and introduce a novel measure that captures differences in the nationalization of parties between the two chambers (nationalization congruence). We explore variations in these measures across countries and over time and demonstrate that the power of the upper chamber (symmetry) is linked to both forms of congruence. Moreover, we apply these measures to understand how the interaction between congruence and symmetry—two key dimensions of bicameralism—influences policymaking, focusing on government spending patterns. Our findings reveal that partisan and nationalization congruence can have contrasting implications for government spending in symmetric bicameral systems but have negligible implications in asymmetric bicameral systems.
Do representatives provide fair and proportional representation to each place in their district or, rather, do they favour some places, creating winners and losers of representation? While the impact of geography on representation has been extensively examined in majoritarian systems, we know little about the geographical losers of representation in proportional representation systems. We investigate the extent to which different places receive unequal levels of attention in parliament, relative to what we would expect based on their population size as a normative proportional ideal. Crucially, we conceptualize place‐based representation at the micro‐level by looking inside electoral districts, using Google Places and Named Entity Recognition. Findings indicate that there are significant deviations from the proportional ideal. We find that small localities and large cities are overrepresented in parliament, while the medium‐sized cities and suburban peripheries of major metropolises are underrepresented. Places with a higher percentage of the population with university degrees are also overrepresented in parliament. These results carry important normative implications for forms of territorial‐based representation.
This paper examines the impact of district magnitude, defined as the number of representatives elected per district, on the number of political parties. Conventional wisdom, supported by cross-national and within-country studies, indicates a positive and curvilinear relationship between district magnitude and the number of parties, with diminishing returns in larger-magnitude districts. However, this relationship is complicated by the increasing regionalization of party systems and the distinct socio-economic compositions of districts correlated with district magnitude. To address these limitations and obtain an appropriate counterfactual, we employ a quasi-experimental design using data from Spain, where district magnitude changes by only one seat in some districts and elections. Our findings align with previous research, confirming that the number of electoral parties increases with district magnitude, particularly in low-magnitude districts.
The law of Duverger posits that the single-member plurality electoral system favours the two-party system. The empirical tests of Duvergerian effects often rely on the effective number of parties as the most common measure of party system fragmentation. This study, proceeding from the notion that more focused measures of two-partyness could be of greater utility for this purpose, examines the build-up of two already existing, albeit underused, indices that are intended to operationalize the concept of the two-party system and introduces a new family of party-system indices for the purpose of cross-validation. The quantitative analysis performed on simulated and real-life datasets shows that the measures of two-partyness can improve the methods of inquiry in research on Duvergerian effects, and that some of the indices introduced in this study can serve as useful supplements to the toolkit of political science.
Why do democratization and gender quotas help to empower women politically in some countries, but not in others? This article addresses the question both theoretically and empirically by recognizing the role of historical legacies, and it contributes to the literature by analyzing the contested legacy of communism in women’s political representation. The main theoretical argument of the article focuses on post-communist politicians’ and citizens’ hatred toward everything that reminded them of the communist era after the collapse of the system, including the “woman question.” These politicians and citizens resisted legislative quotas and other pro-women democratic measures, viewing them as Soviet artifacts and symbols of top-down, state-forced women’s liberation. Therefore, ceteris paribus, exposure to communist rule in the past might reverse or nullify the otherwise positive effect of democratization and gender quotas on women’s political empowerment. This hypothesis is tested empirically using a comprehensive sample of 116 countries spanning the years 1991–2015. The findings indicate that the communist past does indeed overshadow the well-established positive influence of democratization and gender quotas upon female political empowerment. A comparative exploration of post-communist Poland and the Czech Republic illustrates the argument further and allows consideration of additional explanatory factors.
Satisfaction with democracy is a widely studied measure of political support that is key for democratic stability. In this article, I explore its relationship with party system closure, that is the extent to which inter-party relations in the governmental area are stable and predictable. I argue that this relationship captures a trade-off between two key democratic outputs: representation and accountability. Analysing a dataset of 755 observations from 26 European countries throughout the period 1973–2019, I show that this trade-off manifests in an ‘inverted-U’ shaped relationship between party system closure and satisfaction with democracy. This result implies an optimal level of party system closure which reconciles the tension between the two in a way that maximises satisfaction with democracy.
The mass-elite congruence in politics is key to a healthy democracy. Existing research uses the match between citizens' ideological positions and those of political elites and parties to assess satisfaction with democracy over time and across countries. However, mass-elite ideological congruence does not necessarily guarantee mass-elite overlap in ideological polarization, the implications of which for democratic satisfaction are little known. Accordingly, our article examines the link between the mass-elite ideological polarization congruence and democratic satisfaction in a multinational context. We reason that when polarized electorates feel let down by their parties' depolarization, these ideologically polarized people would grow frustrated with the disconnected democratic system (seen as ineffective in meeting citizens' expectations and delivering meaningful political alternatives). Then, we find that electorates who do not consider their affiliated parties to be as ideologically polarized as themselves tend to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their countries. Our additional inquiries suggest that this democratic dissatisfaction parallels ambivalence in democratic commitment. We also find that the perception of no differences between parties, and affiliation with populist and losing parties amplifies these disappointed polarized electorates’ dissatisfaction with democracy.
Under what conditions do governments discipline powerful multinational companies for breaching global corporate norms? Existing international relations theories have shown that peer monitoring and transnational advocacy are crucial strategies that shine a spotlight on norm violations. Despite the importance of those strategies, governments in the Global North have not consistently condemned their home-grown multinational companies for breaking norms related to climate or human rights in the Global South. This paper argues that the effect of such spotlighting is crucially moderated by electoral institutions, and legislators in proportional representation systems are more likely than those in majoritarian systems to push multinational companies to comply with global norms when such issues are in the spotlight. I find supporting evidence from the OECD Guidelines’ Specific Instance process and case studies. This article shows that traditional strategies to promote norm compliance, such as transnational advocacy and peer pressure, work differently in different countries, and electoral systems in the Global North can have unintended distributional consequences for norm beneficiaries.
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on three main limitations of the literature regarding the impact of
corruption on democracy. These are the distinctions between causality and
correlation, channels underlying the impact and the shape of the relationship. The
study uses recent developments in panel data causality and non-linear
econometrics, breaks democracy down into different components and analyses the
form of the relationship. We find that the relationship between the variables is
often non-linear. Control of Corruption leads to a higher democracy; the
components of democracy are also affected by corruption. These findings add to
the literature in three respects: (i) corruption has a causal effect on democracy and,
hence, single equation estimation poses problems, (ii) assuming linearity of the
relationships between control of corruption and democracy is also possibly
problematic and (iii) the channels of transmission of the effects of corruption on
democracy are diverse.
The study looked at the impact of democratic elections and electoral processes in the Republic of Uganda. The National Elections Act of 2008 includes provisions to guarantee free and fair elections, but what truly happens all through election stretches of time deviates from those guidelines; intimidation and violence in some areas of Uganda undermine inclusivity; the NEC is believed to lack adequate accountability and total independence from the national government, which detracts from trust; and the legal structure for elections having failed to provide effective oversight. The information was gathered from 211 participants utilizing questionnaires and a limited number of question guidelines as part of the study's research survey. Both selective sampling and simple random sampling were utilized. To examine the results, simple charts, regression analysis, and Pearson's correlation coefficient were used. The results showed a high positive correlation between the dependent variable-democratic election in the Republic of Uganda-and the three independent variables, which were mass indoctrination, electoral legal structure, and elections supervision. The strong high association seen between analysis of relevant that there was a positive and statistically significant (.000) connection between democratic elections and electoral processes. The study came to the overall conclusion that, despite widespread voter misunderstanding of the legal system, the Republic of Uganda's election process result in what are needed free and fair elections.
The study looked at the impact of democratic elections and electoral processes in the Republic of Uganda. The National Elections Act of 2008 includes provisions to guarantee free and fair elections, but what truly happens all through election stretches of time deviates from those guidelines; intimidation and violence in some areas of Uganda undermine inclusivity; the NEC is believed to lack adequate accountability and total independence from the national government, which detracts from trust; and the legal structure for elections having failed to provide effective oversight. The information was gathered from 211 participants utilizing questionnaires and a limited number of question guidelines as part of the study's research survey. Both selective sampling and simple random sampling were utilized. To examine the results, simple charts, regression analysis, and Pearson's correlation coefficient were used. The results showed a high positive correlation between the dependent variable-democratic election in the Republic of Uganda-and the three independent variables, which were mass indoctrination, electoral legal structure, and elections supervision. The strong high association seen between analysis of relevant that there was a positive and statistically significant (.000) connection between democratic elections and electoral processes. The study came to the overall conclusion that, despite widespread voter misunderstanding of the legal system, the Republic of Uganda's election process result in what are needed free and fair elections.
Economic development has been linked to a declining importance of religion. But alongside secularization, there has been an increased salience of religion in electoral politics. These seemingly contradictory trends can be understood by distinguishing between two dimensions of religiosity: religious belief and church attendance. We show that religious voting cleavages are strongest in democracies where there is religious cohesion, which means belief and practice go hand in hand. Voting cleavages require group members to have distinctive policy preferences and be politically engaged. Strong religious beliefs are associated with distinctive policy preferences (but not with political engagement), and church attendance is associated with political engagement. Thus, religious cohesion provides the key ingredients for a religious political cleavage. But what explains variation in religious cohesion in democracies? We find that religious cohesion increases with economic security. Thus, economic security can promote secularization, but also facilitate the religious cohesion associated with strong religious voting cleavages.
Districted proportional systems give an edge to right-wing parties that are more popular in rural areas where district magnitude is small and large parties are mechanically advantaged. In this paper, we explore the role played by voters in this bias by looking at how ideology correlates with strategic voting. We analyze survey data from 44 elections in Western Europe and find that left-wing voters are more likely to support a party that is not viable ( p < 0.01), but once in this position they seem less likely to desert this party for one that is viable ( p < 0.1). Further, we find that this pattern is likely driven by the intensity of partisan preferences as left-wing voters are on average more attached to their favorite party and thus more reluctant to desert it ( p < 0.01). Our study thus demonstrates that the psychological effect of districted proportional systems amplifies the mechanical one in advanced industrial democracies.
Presidential government system has its own disadvantages, one of them is the possibility a minority president presence in this system, namely a president who is not supported by a parliamentary majority, even though the President has a strong mandate from public, but with a minority position, the government’s agenda which carried out by the president could be hampered by parliament or the legislature, therefore it is needed a coalition government. The combination of a presidential system with a multi-party system is difficult to implement because whoever the president is elected will be encountered with a certain condition that it is impossible to support him in parliament without forming a coalition. In order to respond the problem in strengthening the presidential system in Indonesia, the author offers a majority general election system or district system (first Past the Post) as an effort to create an effective and responsible government. This is a legal study which used two approaches, namely statutory approach and conceptual approach. Based on the results of study, it can be concluded that the majority system was more appropriate for creating an effective and responsible government because it could encourage the simplification of political parties and the responsibilities of people’s representatives to the voters in each district.
This study analyzes the enactment of public participation in rulemaking within the European Union and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries. It relies on an original dataset of administrative procedural acts and administrative laws concerning the making of delegated legislation. As 12 out of 39 countries enacted a procedure of notification, publication, and consultation between 1995 and 2015, the study focuses on courts while controlling for other domestic institutional determinants of legislative adoption and countries’ interdependence. The empirical findings show that countries with a highly independent judiciary system are less likely to enact a comprehensive provision for public participation in rulemaking. This finding highlights a paradox, namely that political systems are more likely to adopt rulemaking to enhance democratic legitimacy if they are characterized by a judicial system that does not actively pursue the legality of rulemaking.
An institution often associated with the concept of the local government electoral system is the demographic norm, which marks the boundary between the majority and proportional systems. The aim of this article was the analysis and evaluation of the course of legislative work devoted to the inclusion of the demographic norm in elections to municipal councils under the Electoral Code. The analysis allows for the assumption that the current model of appointing municipal councils is a compromise solution, partly taking into account the arguments of the supporters of the principle of majority and proportionality.
Prior research has argued that public subsidies for parties matter for explaining electoral volatility, but the empirical results have been inconclusive. This article addresses this puzzle by examining how different rules for direct state funding affect different types of electoral volatility, using data from lower chamber elections in eighteen Latin American countries from 1978 through 2014. Focusing on volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit (party replacement volatility) and volatility caused by vote switching among existing parties (stable party volatility), it finds that countries with less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies tend to have lower levels of party replacement volatility. However, the empirical analysis does not provide sufficient evidence that the eligibility thresholds for party subsidies matter for predicting stable party volatility. Overall, this article suggests that less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies help produce stable party systems by reducing risks associated with party replacement volatility.
Si bien ninguna regla electoral es una panacea, la introducción de la segunda vuelta fue una reforma exitosa en Perú y en América Latina en general. Las y los candidatos presidenciales fueron atraídos hacia el centro político y, con la mayoría de los votos, las y los presidentes rara vez sufrieron déficits de legitimidad. Sin embargo, la segunda vuelta también reduce las barreras de entrada y permite un mayor número de partidos. Si bien la reducción de las barreras de entrada ayudó a incorporar a la izquierda a la arena electoral en el periodo posterior a la Guerra Fría, un número grande de partidos resulta problemático para el sistema democrático. Aunque el desafío de la construcción de partidos es gigantesco, es probable que varias reformas adicionales a las reglas electorales sean útiles en el esfuerzo por construir partidos políticos receptivos en Perú y en otras partes de América Latina.
Why do some countries have fewer women in parliament than do others? Recent studies find that women have less access to positions of political power in countries facing external threats. Existing studies, however, do not differentiate between types of threat. We theorize that territorial threats are a particular driver of gender inequality in national parliaments. When a country’s land is under threat, people prefer having “tough” representatives in the national legislature who are competent on the military and defence more so than when a country faces other threats. Moreover, when countries face territorial threats, they build larger standing armies and adopt military conscription, raising the level of militarization in society, which negatively influences women’s access to the national legislature. Using a time-series cross-sectional data set of 101 democracies, we find that countries facing external territorial threats have lower percentages of women in parliament compared to countries facing other or no external threats. Additionally, we find that countries with higher levels of militarization have fewer women in the national legislature.
This paper presents a new measure polyarchy for a global sample of 182 countries from 1900 to 2017 based on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, deriving from an expert survey of more than 3000 country experts from around the world, with on average 5 experts rating each indicator. By measuring the five components of Elected Officials, Clean Elections, Associational Autonomy, Inclusive Citizenship, and Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information separately, we anchor this new index directly in Dahl’s (1971) extremely influential theoretical framework. The paper describes how the five polyarchy components were measured and provides the rationale for how to aggregate them to the polyarchy scale. We find that personal characteristics or ideological predilections of the V-Dem country experts do not systematically predict their ratings on our indicators. We also find strong correlations with other existing measures of electoral democracy, but also decisive differences where we believe the evidence supports the polyarchy index having higher face validity.
An early debate in the empirical study of political democracy concerned the measurement of democracy. Initial work employed dichotomous indicators and incorporated stability into political democracy measures. Evidence accumulated showing that this approach could adversely affect analyses, particularly in the study of income inequality. Despite this, some recent studies have renewed the flawed practices. We draw upon recent work to highlight the confusion that can result when democracy and stability are confounded and the problems with dichotomous indicators. We propose that stability is analytically distinct from political democracy and should be treated as such empirically, and we suggest ways to estimate incremental effects of political democracy. We further argue that political democracy is continuous and that measures of it should reflect this. It is important that the measurement history of this construct not repeat itself.
Using a Bayesian latent variable approach, we synthesize a new measure of democracy, the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS), from ten extant scales. We accompany this new scale with quantitative estimates of uncertainty, provide estimates of the relative reliability of the constituent indicators, and quantify what the ordinal levels of each of the existing measures mean in relationship to one another. Our method eschews the dicult—and often arbitrary—decision to use one existing democracy scale over another in favor of a cumulative approach
Research published in the American Political Science Review shows that anocracies—as defined by the middle of the Polity index of political regime—are more susceptible to civil war than are either pure democracies or pure dictatorships. Yet, certain components of the Polity index include a factional category, where political competition is ``intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival governments and in civil war'' (Gurr 1989, 12). Not surprisingly, these components exhibit a strong relationship with civil war. When they are removed from the Polity index, however, the original relationship disappears. I conclude that the original finding is not driven by the relationship between political institutions and civil war but rather by a less provocative relationship between political violence and civil war.
This article shows that highly correlated measures can produce different results. We iden-tify a democratization model from the literature and test it in more than 120 countries from 1951 to 1992. Then, we check whether the results are robust regarding measures of democracy, time periods, and levels of development. The findings show that measures do matter: Whereas some of the findings are robust, most of them are not. This explains, in part, why the debates on democracy have continued rather than been resolved. More important, it underscores the need for more careful use of measures and further testing to increase confidence in the findings. Scholars in comparative politics are drawn increas-ingly to large-N statistical analyses, often using data sets collected by others. As in any field, we show how they must be careful in choosing the most appropriate measures for their studies, without assuming that any correlated measure will do.
Prominent scholars engaged in comparative research on democratic regimes are in sharp disagreement over the choice between a dichotomous or graded approach to the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy. This choice is substantively important because it affects the findings of empirical research. It is methodologically important because it raises basic issues, faced by both qualitative and quantitative analysts, concerning appropriate standards for justifying choices about concepts. In our view, generic claims that the concept of democracy should inherently be treated as dichotomous or graded are incomplete. The burden of demonstration should instead reston more specific arguments linked to the goals of research. We thus take the pragmatic position that how scholars understand and operationalize a concept can and should depend in part on what they are going to do with it. We consider justifications focused on the conceptualization of democratization as an event, the conceptual requirements for analyzing subtypes of democracy, the empirical distribution of cases, normative evaluation, the idea of regimes as bounded wholes, and the goal of achieving sharper analytic differentiation.
We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime
classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31(2):3–36, 1996). This extension focuses on how incumbents are removed from office. We argue that differences across regime measures must
be taken seriously and that they should be evaluated in terms of whether they (1) serve to address important research questions,
(2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and (3) are reproducible. We argue that existing measures of democracy are not interchangeable
and that the choice of measure should be guided by its theoretical and empirical underpinnings. We show that the choice of
regime measure matters by replicating studies published in leading journals.
KeywordsPolitical regimes-Democracy-Dictatorship-Measurement
Democratic backsliding does not necessarily see all democratic institutions erode in parallel fashion. This article analyses contemporary democratic backsliding through the lens of institutional change, as a process of “democratic decoupling,” in which a systematic gap opens up between the constitutive features of liberal democracy. Specifically, we focus on the worldwide decoupling between electoral quality and rights protections over the past decade. Using global data from the V-Dem project, we establish that elections are improving and rights are retracting in the same time period, and in many of the same cases. We offer several illustrative examples from Asia of illiberal juggernauts who have ridden the waves of free and fair elections to do great damage to rights protections, focusing primarily on Narendra Modi and the ruling BJP in the world’s largest democracy, India.
Why do ethnically diverse elites share power in government coalitions? I argue that uncertainty about their societal support makes ethnic leaders frequently form oversized coalitions when their group does not represent an overwhelming majority. This uncertainty stems from crosscutting cleavage configurations, which enable coethnics to hold membership in multiple groups, and opens up the possibility of future defection to the opposition along shared identity markers. In response, elites prefer coalitions that internalize crosscutting cleavages, as they restrict defections to coalition partners and survive longer. To test these hypotheses, I collected new data on linguistic, religious, and racial intragroup divisions. Using conditional choice models on formation opportunities in 134 ethnically divided societies between 1946 and 2009, I find that, independent of institutional rules, ethnic elites frequently opt for oversized multiethnic coalitions that share as many ethnic markers as possible. These coalitions survive longer than more heterogeneous pacts. © 2019 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
Why do some ethnic groups vote along ethnic lines while others do not? In this article, we theorize that the level of ethnic voting depends, partially, on how ethnicity interacts with economic cleavages. Specifically, we argue that between– ethnic group inequality (BGI) increases ethnic voting and that its effect strengthens as within–ethnic group inequality (WGI) decreases. We thus posit that the full structure of ethnic inequality, not only between-group differences, matters for ethnic voting. After presenting our argument, we conduct the first cross-national test of whether the effect of between-group inequality on ethnic voting is conditional on the level of inequality within ethnic groups. Our analysis employs group-level data on 200 ethnic groups from 65 countries. We find strong support for our hypothesis: BGI increases ethnic voting, but its effect is conditional on WGI. © 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
This paper assesses the impact of different types of flexible fiscal rules on the procyclicality of fiscal policy with propensity scores-matching techniques, thus mitigating traditional self-selection problems. It finds that not all fiscal rules have the same impact: the design matters. Specifically, investment-friendly rules reduce the procyclicality of both overall and investment spending. The effect appears stronger in bad times and when the rule is enacted at the national level. The introduction of escape clauses in fiscal rules does not seem to affect the cyclical stance of public spending. The inclusion of cyclical adjustment features in spending rules yields broadly similar results. The results are mixed for cyclically-adjusted budget balance rules: enacting the latter is associated with countercyclical movements in overall spending, but with procyclical changes in investment spending. Structural factors, such as past debt, the level of development, the volatility of terms of trade, natural resources endowment, government stability, and the legal enforcement and monitoring arrangements backing the rule also influence the link between fiscal rules and countercyclicality. The results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications.
Although many countries have ethnic kin on the “wrong side” of their borders, few seek to annex foreign territories on the basis of ethnicity. This article examines why some states pursue irredentism, whereas others exhibit restraint. It focuses on the triadic structure of the kin group in the irredentist state, its coethnic enclave, and the host state, and provides new data on all actual and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014. The results indicate that irredentism is more likely when the kin group is near economic parity with other groups in its own state, which results in status inconsistency and engenders grievances. It is also more likely in more ethnically homogeneous countries with winner-take-all majoritarian systems where the kin group does not need to moderate its policy to win elections by attracting other groups. These conditions generate both the grievance and opportunity for kin groups to pursue irredentism.
We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.
This research note describes an update to Golder's (2005) Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset. We extend the temporal scope of the original dataset by including all legislative and presidential elections that took place in democratic states from 2001 to 2011. In addition to significantly expanding the size of the DES dataset, we offer a simplified classification scheme for electoral systems. We also provide more detailed information about all democratic elections since 1946, including the dates for each round of elections as well as the rules used in different electoral tiers. A brief temporal and geographic overview of the data is presented.
This article updates and describes a widely used data set on democracy. Covering 1800-2007 and 219 countries, it represents the most comprehensive dichotomous measure of democracy currently available. We argue that our measure's distinguishing features-a concrete, dichotomous coding and a long time span-are of critical value to empirical work on democracy. Inspired by Robert Dahl, we define a country as democratic if it satisfies conditions for both contestation and participation. Specifically, democracies feature political leaders chosen through free and fair elections and satisfy a threshold value of suffrage. After comparing our coding to that of other popular measures, we illustrate how democracy's predictive factors have evolved since 1800. In particular, we show that economic modernization variables have steadily declined in their correlation with democracy over time.
Giovanni Sartori once described African party systems as “formless.” Our contribution challenges this view in an era of resurgent multipartism that swept through the subcontinent in the early 1990s and continues until today. The article brings together contemporary research on African party systems with the wider disciplinary literature on party system institutionalization. Using a data set including all continuous election sequences in Africa from 1950 to 2008, we find that Africa has some of the most volatile party systems ever recorded and yet, tremendous diversity across regimes. We test the relative impact of political institutions, economic performance, the history of party system development, and social cleavage structure on party system institutionalization in Africa. We find that its party systems have been shaped by a set of factors unique to the subcontinent, but some of the general global patterns of party system development hold true in Africa as well.
When do militant organizations transition to political parties? Once reaching the productive limits of political violence, militant organizations sometimes seek to adopt party politics in order to continue pursuing their political ends or "outcome'' goals. However, most militant organizations remain incapable of transitioning due to two common constraints: the base constituency's preference for violence and credibility deficiencies vis-a-vis the adversary. Analyzing an original dataset of 406 organizations, I find evidence that partial outcome-goal achievement and state supporters help militant organizations overcome the obstacles preventing transition. Crucially, whereas the complete achievement of militant outcome goals absorbs the chief organizational incentive to transition, partial achievement of outcome goals fosters transition to the party format more than any other factor.
The effective number of parties, N=1/Σp2i (where pi is the fractional share of the ith party), usually suffices to describe adequately a constellation of parties of different strengths. Difficulties arise when disparity in party sizes is such that the largest share (p1) surpasses 0.50 (meaning absolute dominance), while N still indicates a multi-party constellation. In such cases N∞=1/p1 is proposed as a supplementary indicator: a value less than 2 indicates absolute dominance. An `NP' index proposed earlier is a combination of N and N∞; its values are close to those of N∞, but NP sometimes falls below 2 even when many parties are relevant for coalition formation. Appendix Aoffers an alternative approach based on indices of deviation from a norm, but it proves cumbersome.
Although Duverger is traditionally seen as synonymous with the institution-list approach to party systems, this article shows that he believed social pressures were the driving force behind the multiplication of parties. Electoral institutions are important, but only because they determine the extent to which social forces are translated into political parties. Although the literature has finally come to realize that social and institutional forces interact to shape party systems, scholars still do not seem to fully understood the implications of Duverger’s theory. This article shows that existing research employs flawed statistical specifications, makes inferential errors, and does not calculate desired quantities of interest. Using a new data set that includes elections since 1946, the authors reexamine Duverger’s theory and find that modern tests largely bear out his expectations when properly specified and interpreted. This analysis also extends current research by specifically estimating the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral institutions.
Considerable evidence suggests that legislative fragmentation can negatively affect the survival of democratic presidential regimes. While there is a vast literature examining the determinants of legislative fragmentation, one factor that has traditionally been overlooked is the impact of presidential elections. Do presidential elections increase or decrease legislative fragmentation? Does it matter if presidents are elected by plurality rule or by runoff? Using a new dataset that covers all democratic legislative and presidential elections between 1946 and 2000, I find that presidential coattails can reduce, increase, or have no effect on legislative fragmentation depending on the number of presidential candidates. I also find strong evidence that social heterogeneity increases the number of presidential candidates when runoff systems are employed. Taken together, these results suggest that the widespread adoption of runoffs by newly democratic presidential regimes will likely increase legislative fragmentation, thereby putting their democratic survival at increased risk.
Although the literature examining the relationship between ideological congruence and electoral rules is quite large, relatively little attention has been paid to how congruence should be conceptualized. As we demonstrate, empirical results regarding ideological congruence can depend on exactly how scholars conceptualize and measure it. In addition to clarifying various aspects of how scholars currently conceptualize congruence, we introduce a new conceptualization and measure of congruence that captures a long tradition in democratic theory emphasizing the ideal of having a legislature that accurately reflects the preferences of the citizenry as a whole. Our new measure is the direct counterpart for congruence of the vote-seat disproportionality measures so heavily used in comparative studies of representation. Using particularly appropriate data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we find that governments in proportional democracies are not substantively more congruent than those in majoritarian democracies. Proportional democracies are, however, characterized by more representative legislatures.
We apply formal, statistical measurement models to the Polity indicators, used widely in studies of international relations to measure democracy. In so doing, we make explicit the hitherto implicit assumptions underlying scales built using the Polity indicators. Modeling democracy as a latent variable allows us to assess the “noise” (measurement error) in the resulting measure. We show that this measurement error is considerable and has substantive consequences when using a measure of democracy as an independent variable in cross-national statistical analyses. Our analysis suggests that skepticism as to the precision of the Polity democracy scale is well founded and that many researchers have been overly sanguine about the properties of the Polity democracy scale in applied statistical work.
A group of influential scholars has argued emphatically that democracy should be measured dichotomously. This position challenges-on both theoretical and methodological grounds-the widespread practice of measuring democracy with graded scales, a practice which has been endorsed by leading methodologists who study democracy. This article proposes several empirical tests that evaluate the competing strategies. The evidence suggests that, on the whole, graded measures have superior validity and reliability. Hence, we should understand that specific cases correspond to the concept of democracy to varying degrees-degrees that can and should be measured.