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ANALISIS PENGARUH TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN DAN UKURAN PERUSAHAAN TERHADAP PEMILIHAN AUDITOR EKSTERNAL
Abstract
Tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk menguji: 1) pengaruh tata kelola perusahaan terhadap pemilihan auditor eksternal, 2) pengaruh ukuran perusahaan terhadap pemilihan auditor eksternal. Populasi penelitian ini adalah perusahaan Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) yang terdaftar pada Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) dari tahun 2014 sampai dengan 2018. Metode statistik yang digunakan adalah regresi logistik. Hasil penelitian menunjukan bahwa 1) tata kelola perusahaan positif tidak berpengaruh terhadap pemilihan auditor eksternal, 2) ukuran perusahaan berpengaruh terhadap pemilihan auditor eksternal. Kata Kunci: Tata Kelola Perusahaan, ukuran perusahaan, pemilihan auditor
... Kebanyakan perusahaan memilih solusi untuk melakukan pendanaan eksternal melalui pasar modal, dengan melakukan Go Public (Linazah & Setyowati, 2015). Dalam aktivitasnya, Go Public dapat memberikan sejumlah manfaat bagi perusahaan, antara lain meningkatkan modal kerja untuk membiayai pertumbuhan perusahaan, membayar hutang, melakukan investasi, dan melakukan akuisisi (Nurhandika & Manalu, 2021;Solida et al., 2020 (Harfadillah, R. F. et al., 2018) perusahaan tidak memiliki pengalaman mengenai pasar modal serta tidak mengetahui seperti apa kebijakan dan strategi yang perlu disiapkan, sedangkan underwriter memiliki lebih banyak pengalaman dan informasi mengenai pasar modal. Terjadilah asimetri informasi, akibat dari perbedaan informasi yang dimiliki. ...
This study aims to examine and analyze what factors influence stock underpricing in companies that carry out Initial Public Offerings. The research method used in this research is descriptive method and verification method. The population in this study are all companies that are conducting Initial Public Offerings in 2019-2021. The samples obtained using quota sampling are 145 companies. The analysis technique used is multiple linear regression. Data processing uses the IBM SPSS 20 program The results of this study indicate that profitability, market value, liquidity, and firm age has a negative and significant effect on stock underpricing. Capital structure has a positive and significant effect on stock underpricing. All variables in this study have significant influence on stock underpricing. Then the regression estimation results show that the predictive ability of the 5 independent variables on stock underpricing is 73%, while the remaining 27% is influenced by other factors outside the model which are not included in this analysis.
... auditor independen untuk meverivikasi laporan keuangan perusahaan telah sesuai aturan dan relevan untuk dipertanggungjawabkan kepada para stakeholder (Adli & Suryani, 2019;Anderson et al., 2004;Harsono & Rina, 2023;Mubarok et al., 2023). Pengauditan oleh auditor independen penting bagi pengembangan dalam pengungkapan informasi keuangan perusahaan secara baik (Nurhandika & Manalu, 2021). Menurut Fortuna & Syofyan, (2020); Gharibi & Geraeely, (2016); Malek & Saidin, (2013); Priyatna & Pramono, (2015) auditor independen dalam pengerjaan investigasi laporan keuangan perusahaan dapat mengurangi permasalahan agency cost. ...
Penelitian ini betujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh pergantian manajemen, opini audit, dan potensi kebangkrutan terhadap pergantian auditor. Jenis penelitian ini adalah penelitian kuantitatif dengan jenis data sekunder. Penelitian ini menggunakan purposive sampling method dalam pengambilan sampelnya. Sampel penelitian ini berjumlah 22 perusahaan sub sektor minyak, gas, dan batu bara periode 2018-2022. Analisis regresi penelitian ini menggunakan analisis regresi logistik dengan menggunakan STATA 17. Hasil penelitian ini adalah pergantian manajemen, opini audit, dan potensi berpengaruh positif terhadap pergantian auditor.
Statutory audits are only beneficial if the appropriate audit quality is both provided and perceived by the users of audited financial statements. On the one hand, Big 4 audit firms are commonly viewed as producing high quality audits. On the other hand, regulators complain about the high market share of Big 4 audit firms. In this context, it is of interest to examine the drivers of a Big 4 audit firm selection. Despite extensive prior research, there is still a lack of findings form Continental European countries and on the impact of corporate governance on auditor choice. This paper on hand is intended to fill the related research gap. Thus, our study identifies variables that determine the auditor choice of large German listed companies. Based on a sample of 432 firm-year observations for the period 2010–2014, our logistic regression analysis suggests that the corporate governance structure influences auditor choice significantly. Notably, the annual meeting frequency of the audit committee and the size of the supervisory board are positively associated with the engagement of a Big 4 audit firm. However, the meeting frequency of the supervisory board and the compliance to the German corporate governance code are negatively related to the choice of a Big 4 auditor. Additionally, the proportion of female supervisory board members does not exert a significant impact. The results remain stable when the DAX30 observations, for which statutory audits are exclusively performed by Big 4 audit firms, are excluded. The main contribution of our paper is, that it sheds light on the impact of corporate governance variables not analyzed by prior research, like supervisory board characteristics, deviations from a corporate governance code, or the female quota, in a Continental European setting, and that it mainly indicates a complementary relationship. Despite the peculiarities of the German setting, the two-tier corporate governance system and the low level of investor protection, the findings of our study are not only relevant for Germany, since many other Continental European countries are characterized by a similar environment. The study’s findings are of particular interest for regulators when addressing audit market structure problems.
This study aimed to investigate the link between family firm and specialist auditor selection, the investor reaction in family and non family firms on specialist auditor selection, the influence of family CEO and hired CEO on specialist auditor selection, and the influence of divergence between cash flow right and control right on auditor specialist selection.This research applied purposive sampling method by using 108 companies that were selected from 534 companies in period 2009-2013. Logistic regression was implemented to 108 companies (i.e 540 firms-years). The findings of the research were family firms were more likely to appoint auditor with industry expertise than non family firm, family firms that switched audit partners from non-specialists to specialists had higher earning response coefficient (ERC) than nonfamily firms, positive association between family firms and industry specialist auditor selection came primarily from CEOs hired outside rather than family CEOs, among family firms, the likelihood of choosing industry specialist auditors increased with the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights.
p>Mekanisme Corporate Governance memiliki pengaruh terhadap pemilihan auditor eksternal oleh perusahaan. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh mekanisme Corporate Governance yang diproksikan dengan kepemilikan saham terbesar, ukuran dewan komisaris, efektivitas komite audit, dan proporsi dewan komisaris independen terhadap pemilihan auditor eksterna pada perusahaan non perbankan . Penelitian ini menggunakan auditor Big 4 dan auditor Non Big 4 sebagai proksi dari pemilihan auditor eksternal yang akan dipilih oleh perusahaan.
Metode analisis yang digunakan adalah Logistic Regresion. Dimana jumlah sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan non perbakan yang terdaftar di Burs Efek Indonesia tahun 2013 sebanyak 177 perusahaan.
Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dewan komisaris dan efektivitas komite audit berpengaruh terhadap pemilihan auditor eksternal sedangkan komisaris independen dan kepemilikan saham terbesar tidak berpengaruh terhadap pemilihan auditor eksternal.</p
In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm.1 In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature, such as the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness-of-markets problem.
We use a unique and confidential database of 15,392 tax audits performed by the Croatian Tax Administration during the 2002–2006 period to examine the impact of task complexity, auditor experience, and auditor effort on audit performance. We provide external validation to prior experimental and analytical research showing that task complexity decreases while auditor experience and effort increase audit performance. We also extend this literature by examining the roles of task complexity and experience in moderating the impact of the effort on audit performance. We find that task complexity mitigates, while experience enhances the positive relationship between auditor effort and performance. However, we also find that auditor experience reinforces the positive effect of auditor effort on performance to a greater degree when complexity is high. Taken together, our findings provide new evidence on how audit and auditor characteristics impact audit performance, and new insight into how task complexity and auditor experience separately and jointly moderate the impact of auditor effort on performance.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs are not dependent on product market competition. However, elsewhere in the economics literature, theoretical analysis and empirical research have indicated that product market competition reduces agency costs by reducing the marginal cost of eliciting effort from agents. We investigate the relationship between product market competition and audit fee, as an example of agency cost. Taking advantage of a proprietary data set for Greek audit firms, we find that the audit fee and audit hours are inversely associated with client firm product market competition. We conclude that audit effort, as an agency cost, is reduced where competitive forces reduce the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents.
As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China is becoming more and more important to investors throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of firms’ auditor choice in China in respect of their corporate governance mechanism. Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their auditor choice decisions, i.e., to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure (the opaqueness gains). We develop a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism on auditor choice decisions made by IPO firms getting listed during a bear market period of 2001–2004 in China. Three variables are used to proxy for firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e., the ownership concentration, the size of the supervisory board (SB), and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors (BoDs). We classify all auditors in China into large auditors (Top 10) and others (non-Top 10), assuming the large auditors can provide higher quality audit services. The empirical results show that firms with larger controlling shareholders, with smaller size of SB, or in which CEO and BoDs chairman are the same person, are less likely to hire a Top 10 (high-quality) auditor. This suggests that when benefits from lowering capital raising costs are trivial, firms with weaker internal corporate governance mechanism are inclined to choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain their opaqueness gains. On the other hand, with improvement of corporate governance, firms should be more likely to appoint high-quality auditors.
This empirical study extends the existing, yet limited, literature on the influence of ownership concentration and family control on auditor choice. Following prior studies, a firm is considered using a higher-quality audit when its external auditor is one of Big 4 audit firms. The sample consists of 787 firm-year observations of public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the financial years 2005-2007. Empirical evidence obtained reveals that firms with larger ownership concentration are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. Hence, in such firms, high-quality audits are employed to mitigate agency issues. However, when the controlling shareholder is a family, the association between ownership concentration and demands for high-quality auditors turns negative, implying that family-controlled firms tend to sustain opaqueness gains by hiring lower-quality auditors.
This paper explores the relationship between selected corporate governance attributes and auditor choice behaviour in a developing country setting. Results of four auditor choice models suggest that client size and growth opportunities significantly explain auditor choice. Sponsor shareholding, institutional shareholding, and the presence of audit committees also have significant influence on auditor choice in some but not all the models. The big-four affiliated audit firms do not enjoy significant market power. They are responsible for auditing only 17.1 percent of listed companies. Their market share ranges from 17.1 percent to 56.1 percent depending on the measure of market share used.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the corporate governance role of external audits in a setting where companies traditionally rely more on debt than equity capital. We partition the German audit market into two groups: the first group comprises the top two auditors on the basis of market share, which we classify as the dominant auditors, and the other group consists of all other auditors. We predict that a German company's demand for audit services from one of the two groups of auditors is determined by its set of stakeholders. We find a positive relation between German companies' demand for dominant audit suppliers and the variables that we use as proxies for the stakeholder interests of creditors, dispersed shareholders, and foreign suppliers. We also find a negative association between German companies' dominant audit supplier choices and the stakeholder interests of closely-held companies. Our results suggest that audits play a corporate governance role conditional on companies' relations with alternative stakeholders.
In this study, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on the firm's choice of an external auditor. Further, we test how the relation between corporate governance and auditor choice may be affected by the strength of legal environment. The results show that firm-level governance scores are positively related to the firm's auditor choice. This association is strengthened by country-level legal protection. Specifically, the positive association between auditor choice and the firm-level governance scores is weaker (stronger) in a low (high) legal environment. These findings are robust after controlling for determinants that were found to be significant in earlier research. Overall, our results suggest that the benefits arising from the employment of high-quality auditors are likely to be greater when legal environment is stronger because both auditors and firms are subject to more severe legal punishments for opportunistic behavior.
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