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Conspiracy beliefs and science rejection
Abstract
We review recent work on the relationship between science rejection and conspiracy beliefs. We distinguish between conspiracy beliefs about science specifically and the link between general conspiracist worldviews and science rejection. The first imply the scientific community as the center of a conspiratorial endeavor to misrepresent scientific findings. We outline several potential contributors to these beliefs: science is a social enterprise; its policy implications can clash with deeply held personal beliefs; science is inherently uncertain. Second, more general conspiracist thinking and worldviews also contribute to science rejection, for example in the domains of climate change, vaccination and genetic modification. This could be exacerbated by several cognitive biases associated with conspiratorial thinking. Finally, we briefly review pathways to curb (conspiratorial) science rejection.
... It is inherently difficult to study conspiracy beliefs. People who endorse CTs usually lack trust in the scientific community (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022), which triggers a multi-layered interaction between the subject of the study and the researcher. On the one hand, the researcher faces a reflexivity problem, as the beliefs of the observed depend also on the presence of the observer itself (e.g., Hawthorne effect). ...
... Regarding the former, although many famous CTs don't directly target science, one important class of them mainly revolves around the scientific world, e.g., vaccines causing autism or climate change denialism (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022). Such narratives targeting the scientific community and methods are dangerous, since they amplify public distrust in institutions, misguide discourse, and foster noncompliance with vital health policies, such as vaccine hesitancy (Goertzel, 2010). ...
... However, even CTs not directly implicating science as colluding may still imply some level of distrust in science. For example, CTs that claim that Twin Towers' attack was an inside job also blame scientists for not speaking up about the fact that it is impossible that the buildings fell the way they did as a result of a plane crash (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022). Additionally, scientists typically receive support from conspiracy theorists only if they make unsupported claims on controversial topics like vaccination and climate change, like the case of the "Nobel disease," where Nobel Prize winners endorse unusual beliefs outside their expertise (Basterfield et al., 2020). ...
In recent years several studies have investigated conspiracy beliefs employing correlational designs which heavily relied on self-reported measures. While the limitations of surveys are well-known, we argue that risks of social desirability bias and survey spillover effects are peculiarly high for conspiracy studies where scales are often built on explicit conspiracy cues that may trigger stigmatization and/or priming effects, resulting in beliefs misreporting. These limitations call for a shift towards a laboratory-based methodology, but a survey-free experimental paradigm has not emerged yet; and it might be for good reasons. In fact, there is something inherently contradictory in studying conspiracy beliefs, as the subject of the study itself is anti-scientific. In the light of this contradiction, this paper’s aim is two-fold: first, we will review the limitations of self-reported measures for studying conspiracy beliefs; second, we will discuss the challenges of investigating such an ambiguous phenomenon in an experimental setting.
... Vjerovanje u teorije zavjere povezano je s odbacivanjem znanosti i znanstvenog načina razmišljanja (51). Ovo potvrđuje i umjerena negativna korelacija između povjerenja prema znanosti i mentaliteta zavjera opažena i u ovom istraživanju. ...
... Believing in conspiracy theories is associated with the rejection of science and the scientific way of thinking (51). This is also confirmed by the moderate negative correlation between trust in science and conspiracy mentality, which was observed in this study as well. ...
... For example, science's fraught historical relationship with racism, its role in perpetuating racialized forms of knowledge production, sustaining racial paradigms 29 and disregarding ethical canons by experimenting on non-white human subjects 30 , has reduced research participation in some populations 31 . Furthermore, the epistemic authority of science and scientists has been challenged by misinformation and disinformation 32,33 , a "reproducibility crisis" 34 , conspiracy theories 35,36 and science-related populist attitudes 37,38 . Science-related populism has been conceptualized as a perceived antagonism between 'the ordinary people' and common sense on one side and academic elites and scientific expertise on the other 37 . ...
Science is crucial for evidence-based decision-making. Public trust in scientists can help decision makers act on the basis of the best available evidence, especially during crises. However, in recent years the epistemic authority of science has been challenged, causing concerns about low public trust in scientists. We interrogated these concerns with a preregistered 68-country survey of 71,922 respondents and found that in most countries, most people trust scientists and agree that scientists should engage more in society and policymaking. We found variations between and within countries, which we explain with individual- and country-level variables, including political orientation. While there is no widespread lack of trust in scientists, we cannot discount the concern that lack of trust in scientists by even a small minority may affect considerations of scientific evidence in policymaking. These findings have implications for scientists and policymakers seeking to maintain and increase trust in scientists.
... They had a central role in impeding infection-prevention behaviors during COVID-19 pandemic (Bierwiaczonek, 2022), significantly contributed in reduction of willingness to vaccinate children (Jolley & Douglas, 2017) and play significant role in reducing trust in health authorities. Generalized conspiratorial thinking is linked with wider rejection of scientific evidence and the value of science Rutjens & Većkalov, 2022). Conspiracist beliefs have implications on social cohesion and security. ...
This research evaluates the psychometric characteristics of the short versionof Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale (GCB-15) translated in Macedonian language.A convenient online sample of 615 ethnic Macedonians (53.2% women, average ageM=30.6; SD=20.4) from 18 cities participated voluntarily in the data gathering process.The translation process involved two independent interpretations, a back-translation,and consensus discussions.The mean scores for GCB-15 subscales were higher compared to other studies,possibly indicating elevated conspiracist beliefs in this population. The results fromthe exploratory factor analysis suggested a two-factor structure, distinguishing generalconspiracist ideation and extraterrestrial beliefs. The confirmatory factor analysissupported this model over one- or five-factor structures. The Cronbach Alpha indicesindicated acceptable internal consistency of all subscales (from α=.61 to α=.80) and veryhigh one for the overall scale (α=.91). Convergent validity was confirmed by examiningcorrelations with conspiracist mentality and populist attitudes, while discriminant validitywas demonstrated by non-association with emotional intelligence. Criterion-basedvalidity was confirmed by predicting belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theory, whereasknown groups’ validity showed differences in GCB based on education, economic status,and life satisfaction, however, the hypotheses were supported only partially. In conclusion,the GCB-15 translated in Macedonian proves to be a valuable instrument forstudying conspiracist beliefs in this cultural context, offering additional support for itseffectiveness across various cultures.
... Researchers have expressed concern over the impact of scientific conspiracies in general (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022), the impact this may have on beliefs about the wider role of science in society (Rutjens et al., 2018), and the impact these beliefs may have on the success of technological solutions to societal problems . Our experimental research suggests that effects of exposure to specific scientific conspiracies about biobanks on more distal attitudes towards scientific technologies such as GM, and the role of populist beliefs about scientists, are small, nonsignificant and potentially ephemeral. ...
Many conspiracy theories implicate scientists and science. We investigated the impact of exposure to scientific conspiracies about biotechnologies. Across three preregistered online studies ( Ns = 1,000), participants who read information about conspiracies involving agribiotechnology companies or biobank scientists were more likely to endorse conspiracies. Other effects of exposure to conspiracy information were mixed. In Study 1, reading about an agricultural biotechnology conspiracy had a small significant effect on reducing intentions to eat genetically modified food. In Study 2, exposure to a conspiracy involving biobank scientists decreased support for biobanks, mediated by decreased trust in biobank scientists. In Study 3, this conspiracy had no effect on wider beliefs of the role of science in society (science populism), nor support of genetically modified food-promoting policies. Overall, we found that exposure to conspiracies involving scientific claims increased conspiracy belief endorsement and can further negative effects. However, the effects of conspiracies on science populism appear limited.
... Researchers have expressed concern over the impact of scientific conspiracies in general (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022), the impact this may have on beliefs about the wider role of science in society (Rutjens et al., 2018), and the impact these beliefs may have on the success of technological solutions to societal problems . Our experimental research suggests that effects of exposure to specific scientific conspiracies about biobanks on more distal attitudes towards scientific technologies such as GM, and the role of populist beliefs about scientists, are small, nonsignificant, and potentially ephemeral. ...
Many conspiracy theories implicate scientists and science. We investigated the impact of exposure to scientific conspiracies about biotechnologies. Across three pre-registered online studies (Ns=1,000), participants who read information about conspiracies involving agribiotechnology companies or biobank scientists were more likely to endorse conspiracies. Other effects of exposure to conspiracy information were mixed. In Study 1, reading about an agricultural biotechnology conspiracy had a small significant effect on reducing intentions to eat Genetically Modified food. In Study 2, exposure to a conspiracy involving biobank scientists decreased support for biobanks, mediated by decreased trust in biobank scientists. In Study 3, this conspiracy had no effect on wider beliefs of the role of science in society (science populism), nor support of Genetically Modified food-promoting policies. Overall, we found that exposure to conspiracies involving scientific claims increased conspiracy belief endorsement and can further negative effects. However, the effects of conspiracies on science populism appears limited.
... [55][56][57][58] In addition, future studies should focus on developing strategies to counter mis-and dis-information rapidly propagated on social media and other digital platforms that increase science rejection. [59][60][61] Exposure to such information may contribute to misperceptions about the benefits of clinical research that conflict with established scientific evidence and reduce the likelihood of clinical trial participation. 62 Based upon the study's findings, large-scale health promotion campaigns should be is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. ...
Background: Clinical trials are critical to scientific advances and medical progress, although awareness and participation remain low in general populations. The existing literature indicates that clinical trial knowledge and participation is multifactorial. Yet, little is known about the association between clinical trial participation with health technology use and digital health engagement to search for health information, interact with medical providers, and seek health supports.
Objective: Examine the multivariate association between clinical trial knowledge and participation with past-year health technology use and digital health engagement with medical providers.
Design: Cross-sectional data from a federal surveillance system.
Participants: A total of 3,865 US adult respondents from the Health Information National Trends Survey 5, Cycle 4 conducted in 2020.
Main Measures: The two outcomes were clinical trial knowledge (no knowledge, a little knowledge, a lot of knowledge) and participation (never invited, invited did not participate, invited and participated). There were four binary indicators of health technology use for the following purposes in the past year: searching for health or medical information, communicating with a doctors office, looking up medical test results, and making medical appointments. There were four binary indicators of digital health engagement in the past year: sharing health information on social media, participating in a health forum or support group, watching health-related videos on YouTube, and awareness of ClinicalTrials.gov.
Key Results: Survey-weighted multivariate regression models demonstrated that awareness of ClinicalTrials.gov had the largest associations with clinical trial knowledge and participation. Digital technology use to engage with medical providers and electronic health records was associated with clinical participation, although the vast majority of respondents had never been invited.
Conclusions: Findings from this study can inform the design of large-scale digital health campaigns and quality improvement programs focused on increasing clinical trial participation.
... One such warranted epistemic authority is science. Mistrust in EXPLORING THE MECHANISM UNDERLYING INCOMPATIBLE BELIEFS science has been repeatedly tied to conspiratorial (Rutjens & Većkalov, 2022), but also to pseudoscientific (Fasce & Picó, 2019a) and paranormal beliefs (Fasce & Picó, 2019b). It has not, however, been explored alongside doublethink so far. ...
Despite assumptions that people strive for consistency between their beliefs, endorsement of mutually incompatible ones is not rare - a tendency we have previously labelled doublethink, by borrowing from Orwell. In an attempt to understand the nature of doublethink and the underlying mechanism that enables incompatible beliefs to coexist, we conducted two preregistered studies (total N = 691). To do so, in Study 1, we first explored how doublethink relates to (1) thinking styles (rational/intuitive, actively open-minded thinking, and need for cognitive closure), (2) a set of irrational beliefs (magical health, conspiratorial, superstitious, and paranormal beliefs) and (3) its predictiveness for questionable health practices (non-adherence to medical recommendations and use of traditional, complementary and alternative medicine). We then additionally expanded the set of health behaviors in Study 2, and related doublethink to trust in two epistemic authorities - science and the wisdom of the common man. Finally, in both studies, we explored whether those prone to inconsistent beliefs are also more likely to simultaneously rely on conventional and alternative medicine, despite their apparent incompatibility. While doublethink was positively related to need for cognitive closure and different irrational beliefs that easily incorporate contradictions, as well as negatively to actively open-minded thinking, we did not find it to be predictive of the use of non-evidence-based medicine nor of its simultaneous use with official medicine. It seems that this novel construct can be best understood as a feature of the cognitive system that allows incompatible claims to enter it. However, once beliefs are within the system, they are compartmentalized, without any cross-referencing between them. This is further reflected in non-evidence-based beliefs persisting within the belief system, irrespective of their content.
... In particular, a specific family of conspiracy theories (Medical Conspiracy Theories) depicts "medical, science or technology-related issues as under the control of secretive and sinister organizations and that harm or danger to health will result from their usage" (Lahrach and Furnham, 2017, p. 89). In some cases, conspiracy theories portray scientists and pharmaceutical companies as playing a passive role in favoring conspiracies by not speaking up against the actions of governments and industries (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022). In other cases, conspiracy theories portray scientists and companies as playing an active role, such as having the cure of cancer but not releasing it for their own profits or to control the population (Andrade, 2020). ...
This study explores the relationship between naturalness bias—the preference for natural products over synthetic alternatives—and conspiratorial thinking in medical decision-making. Despite the ambiguous definition of "naturalness," consumer preference for natural products is widespread, influenced by narratives that depict synthetic options as harmful. The primary contribution of this paper is theoretical, as it provides a comprehensive review of previous literature to understand how naturalness bias may intersect with conspiratorial thinking, particularly in the context of medical decisions. In addition to this theoretical discussion, the paper also presents empirical evidence to support the proposed associations. Using a correlational design with 285 participants, we assessed levels of conspiratorial thinking by the means of three different self-reported measures (i.e., CMQ, GCBS and BCTI) and naturalness bias in a drug choice scenario. Results revealed a significant preference for natural drugs, with over 75% of participants exhibiting a strong bias toward natural options. Higher scores on conspiracy belief measures were associated with this preference, particularly beliefs concerning control of information and health-related conspiracy theories (i.e., vaccines causing autism, AIDS origin). These findings suggest that beliefs in conspiracies may reinforce naturalness bias, impacting consumer choices and public health. The study highlights the need for policymakers and health-care professionals to address the influence of conspiracy theories on medical preferences and to promote trust in institutions for informed decision-making.
... More recently, the spread of conspiracy theories [26] on various topics [27], but also on science [28,29] and the social processes underlying their spread [30], show how relevant these phenomena can be to the society. Given the problems of replicability mentioned above, analytical approaches or replicable simulation models can be highly useful. ...
In this paper, we study the influence of a small group of agents (i.e., a lobby) that is trying to spread a rumor in a population by using the known model proposed by Serge Galam. In particular, lobbies are modeled as subgroups of individuals who strategically choose their seating in the social space in order to protect their opinions and influence others. We consider different social gatherings and simulate, using finite Markovian chains, opinion dynamics by comparing situations with a lobby to those without a lobby. Our results show how the lobby can influence opinion dynamics in terms of the prevailing opinion and the mean time to reach unanimity. The approach that we take overcomes some of the problems that behavioral economics and psychology have recently struggled with in terms of replicability. This approach is related to the methodological revolution that is slowly changing the dominant perspective in psychology.
... Conspiracy theories undermined global efforts to contain the COVID-19 virus during the pandemic 3,4 and were used in the lead-up to the January 6, 2021, raid on the Capitol 1 . They lie at the core of political and social polarization 5,6 , fueling vaccine skepticism 7 , climate change skepticism 8,9 , and anti-science movements such as the flat earthers 10,11 . In the age of misinformation 12 , understanding what makes people endorse conspiracy theories is crucial. ...
In the age of misinformation, conspiracy theories can have far-reaching consequences for individuals and society. Social and emotional experiences throughout the life course, such as loneliness, may be associated with a tendency to hold conspiracist worldviews. Here, we present results from a population-based sample of Norwegians followed for almost three decades, from adolescence into midlife (N = 2215). We examine participants’ life trajectories of loneliness using latent growth curve modeling. We show that people reporting high levels of loneliness in adolescence, and those who experience increasing loneliness over the life course, are more likely to endorse conspiracy worldviews in midlife.
... Při výzkumu fake-news autoři odlišují správnost porozumění důkazům a správnost jedincova přesvědčení ohledně tvrzení (Garrett et al., 2016). Vyšší podpora konspiračních teorií je spojena s horší schopností vědeckého usuzování (scientific reasoning), tedy sníženým porozuměním vědeckým vysvětlením, ale i s nižší znalostí (Rutjens & Većkalov, 2022). Efektivita správného porozumění leží v jasné komunikaci vědeckých závěrů s důrazem na vědecký konsensus (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). ...
This thesis examines through mixed-method exploratory research the processes of
understanding and believing when exposed to an information with an emphasis on
unclearness. It focuses on methodology and operationalization based on the most
influential research in the field. Presented research consists of inducing unclearness
by reading a text about the Fermi paradox and processuality through repeated
questions on believing or understanding and a subsequent reflective interview. The
main questions are the possibilities of inducing processes, their forms, specifics and
differences manifested in the reflections of the participants. The thematic analysis
suggests a significant relationship between familiarity, approach to the text, the
construction of the problem space and the resulting attitude.
... The current studies corroborate that political ideology is an important driver of social evaluations of scientists. The role of conspiracy mentality in science attitudes has started getting more attention (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022), especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic during which various conspiracy theories surged (Imhoff and Lamberty, 2020;Pertwee et al., 2022). Scientists are suitable target candidates for conspiracy theories-they are often perceived as an elitist group working in relative isolation (Douglas et al., 2019;Rutjens et al., 2018a). ...
Research on scientist perceptions tends to focus on either stereotypes (white, male) or social evaluations (competent but cold), sometimes yielding incongruent conclusions (e.g. scientists are simultaneously seen as moral and immoral). Across two preregistered correlational studies ( N = 1091), we address this issue by simultaneously assessing stereotypes and social evaluations and their association with two key outcomes: trust in scientists and science career appeal. We find that stereotypes and social evaluations are distinct types of perceptions—they correlate slightly, stem from different worldviews, and predict partially different outcomes. While western enculturation and religiosity predict stereotypes, right-wing political ideology negatively relates to social evaluations. Stereotypes are associated with lower science career appeal among stereotype-incongruent individuals, while social evaluations predict more trust in scientists and higher science career appeal. This work thus sheds light on the psychological pathways to trust in scientists, as well as on the perceived appeal of becoming a scientist.
... Other studies have suggested that low trust in science is associated with low acceptance of a wide range of scientific information, among the most famous are negation of climate changes (van der Linden, 2015) or genetically modified food (Scott et al., 2018). Scientific evidence is often rejected because they are seen as a product of conspiracy (Rutjens & Većkalov, 2022). ...
Background and research aims. Considering the high prevalence of conspiracy theories and misinformation, there is an urgent need to explain the tendency to adopt a conspiracy mentality and identify behavioural (including voting) outcomes of a high conspiracy mentality. The aims of the present paper are 1) the examination of populist attitudes dimensions, relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise as predictors of conspiracy mentality and 2) proposal of comprehensive models, that combine predictors of conspiracy mentality and its voting consequences. Methodology. Studies utilised OSL regression and structural equation modelling. Results. The overall regression was statistically significant. It was found that dimensions of populist attitudes (anti-elitism, sovereignty), relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise were significant predictors of conspiracy mentality. In line with the second research aim, the fitness of models was confirmed and results suggest mistrust of expertise is also a significant predictor of far-right voting. Discussion. The contribution of the paper lies in connecting conspiracy mentality with not only attitudes but also with important behaviour outcome - voting behaviour. We propose future research should experimentally examine whether the reduction of some of the identified predictors could possibly lower levels of conspiracy mentality and whether this reduction translates into voting behaviour.
... Second, this belief stems from a skeptical attitude toward formal institutions or the government and channeled into views on AI. Indeed, with respect to the latter, the presence of conspiracy theories pertaining to science and technology may potentially result in the dismissal of established scientific and technological information (Rutjens and Većkalov, 2022). Similar attitudes toward the scientific verification of AI exist among those who believe that the government has failed to attract the desired amount of foreign direct investment compared to other countries. ...
This study regards AI as a socioecological issue and highlights the social identity determinants of the social perceptions of AI, which is the main dependent variable. We analyze Greece in 2022 as a case study. Our findings suggest that specific social identity variables concerning fundamental and social values, such as religion, views on new technologies, economic and political standings, and education, impact social perceptions of AI in a positive or negative manner. To enhance the analysis, we independently analyze the social identity framework shaping the relationship between jobs and AI, and the need to scientifically verify the results of AI technologies with an expert. Overall, social views of AI are shaped by the influence of a composite portfolio of fundamental and social values (which reflect both social stability and adaptability to change), economic and political standings, and demographics. Therefore, the social understanding of AI, along with other major issues, relates to its complex cultural dimensions. The findings go beyond the superficial understanding of the qualities AI should have since they underline the importance of existing institutional and value systems in the design of appropriate policies to combat the negative consequences, or capitalize on the benefits of such technologies.
... While science is generally held in high esteem, its epistemic and cultural authority has been challenged by mis-and disinformation 11,12 , historical failings of science 13 , an alleged "reproducibility crisis" 14 , conspiracy theories 15,16 , and science-related populist attitudes 17,18 . ...
Scientific information is crucial for evidence-based decision-making. Public trust in science can help decision-makers act based on the best available evidence, especially during crises such as climate change or the COVID-19 pandemic 1,2. However, in recent years the epistemic authority of science has been challenged, causing concerns about low public trust in scientists 3. Here we interrogated these concerns with a pre-registered 67-country survey of 71,417 respondents on all inhabited continents and find that in most countries, a majority of the public trust scientists and think that scientists should be more engaged in policymaking. We further show that there is a discrepancy between the public's perceived and desired priorities of scientific research. Moreover, we find variations between and within countries, which we explain with individual-and country-level variables, including political orientation. While these results do not show widespread lack of trust in scientists, we cannot discount the concern that lack of trust in scientists by even a small minority may affect considerations of scientific evidence in policymaking. These findings have implications for scientists and policymakers seeking to maintain and increase trust in scientists.
... While science is generally held in high esteem, its epistemic and cultural authority has been challenged by mis-and disinformation 11,12 , historical failings of science 13 , an alleged "reproducibility crisis" 14 , conspiracy theories 15,16 , and science-related populist attitudes 17,18 . ...
Scientific information is crucial for evidence-based decision-making. Public trust in science can help decision-makers act based on the best available evidence, especially during crises such as climate change or the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in recent years the epistemic authority of science has been challenged, causing concerns about low public trust in scientists. Here we interrogated these concerns with a pre-registered 67-country survey of 71,417 respondents on all inhabited continents and find that in most countries, a majority of the public trust scientists and think that scientists should be more engaged in policymaking. We further show that there is a discrepancy between the public's perceived and desired priorities of scientific research. Moreover, we find variations between and within countries, which we explain with individual-and country-level variables, including political orientation. While these results do not show widespread lack of trust in scientists, we cannot discount the concern that lack of trust in scientists by even a small minority may affect considerations of scientific evidence in policymaking. These findings have implications for scientists and policymakers seeking to maintain and increase trust in scientists.
... While science is generally held in high esteem, its epistemic and cultural authority has been challenged by mis-and disinformation 11,12 , historical failings of science 13 , an alleged "reproducibility crisis" 14 , conspiracy theories 15,16 , and science-related populist attitudes 17,18 . ...
Scientific information is crucial for evidence-based decision-making. Public trust in science can help decision-makers act based on the best available evidence, especially during crises such as climate change or the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in recent years the epistemic authority of science has been challenged, causing concerns about low public trust in scientists. Here we interrogated these concerns with a pre-registered 67-country survey of 71,417 respondents on all inhabited continents and find that in most countries, a majority of the public trust scientists and think that scientists should be more engaged in policymaking. We further show that there is a discrepancy between the public’s perceived and desired priorities of scientific research. Moreover, we find variations between and within countries, which we explain with individual- and country-level variables, including political orientation. While these results do not show widespread lack of trust in scientists, we cannot discount the concern that lack of trust in scientists by even a small minority may affect considerations of scientific evidence in policymaking. These findings have implications for scientists and policymakers seeking to maintain and increase trust in scientists.
... Previous studies reported that beliefs in conspiracies are related to feelings of alienation, powerlessness, hostility, and being disadvantaged [4]. Research findings indicated that people believe in conspiracies not because they prefer simplified explanations of complex events [4], but because of delusionality, dogmatism, reduced analytic thinking [5], certain maladaptive personality traits [3,5,6], cognitive functions [5,[7][8][9][10][11][12], loneliness [7], paranoia [13], anxious attachment [14], anxiety, uncertainty aversion, existential threat [15], narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy [16], avoidance coping [17], science rejection [18], socio-demographic factors [6], and socio-economic factors [19]. ...
Conspiracy beliefs can have a significant destructive impact on sustainable development. When individuals embrace conspiracy theories, it can result in social mistrust, polarization, and even harmful behaviors. Previous studies linked creativity to intelligence and fairly evidenced links between conspiracy beliefs and paranoid thinking and diminished psychological wellbeing. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the associations between conspiracy beliefs and creativity, negative attitudes toward people, and psychological wellbeing. Based on the data derived from the ESS10, several relationships using mediation and SEM analyses were disclosed. The study confirmed that positive attitudes toward people significantly negatively predict conspiracy beliefs and significantly positively predict psychological wellbeing and self-reported creativity, while psychological wellbeing significantly negatively predicts conspiracy beliefs and is a mediator in the links between attitudes toward people and conspiracy beliefs. The SEM model demonstrated an acceptable fit, χ2 = 987.210; Df = 16; CFI = 0.989; TLI = 0.975; NFI = 0.989; RMSEA = 0.040 [0.038–0.042], SRMR = 0.039. The study supported the insights of A. Hon that “conspiracy theories thrive in the absence of trust”. However, there are several avenues for future research to address potential limitations, including using more comprehensive scales, employing diverse research methods, controlling for confounding variables, or exploring potential moderating variables, such as personality traits or cultural factors.
... Information advocates discussed their trust in science, medicine, physicians, and public health organizations. They neither rejected science nor engaged in conspiratorial thinking, which are the traits of individuals who believe in health misinformation [8]. Instead, similar to past research, study participants preferred receiving COVID-19 information from individuals and organizations who had or represented relevant scientific training or background and whom they believed lacked a hidden agenda for sharing information about the pandemic [9]. ...
Background
The rampant spread of misinformation about COVID-19 has been linked to a lower uptake of preventive behaviors such as vaccination. Some individuals, however, have been able to resist believing in COVID-19 misinformation. Further, some have acted as information advocates, spreading accurate information and combating misinformation about the pandemic.
Objective
This work explores highly knowledgeable information advocates’ perspectives, behaviors, and information-related practices.
Methods
To identify participants for this study, we used outcomes of survey research of a national sample of 1498 adults to find individuals who scored a perfect or near-perfect score on COVID-19 knowledge questions and who also self-reported actively sharing or responding to news information within the past week. Among this subsample, we selected a diverse sample of 25 individuals to participate in a 1-time, phone-based, semistructured interview. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and the team conducted an inductive thematic analysis.
Results
Participants reported trusting in science, data-driven sources, public health, medical experts, and organizations. They had mixed levels of trust in various social media sites to find reliable health information, noting distrust in particular sites such as Facebook (Meta Platforms) and more trust in specific accounts on Twitter (X Corp) and Reddit (Advance Publications). They reported relying on multiple sources of information to find facts instead of depending on their intuition and emotions to inform their perspectives about COVID-19. Participants determined the credibility of information by cross-referencing it, identifying information sources and their potential biases, clarifying information they were unclear about with health care providers, and using fact-checking sites to verify information. Most participants reported ignoring misinformation. Others, however, responded to misinformation by flagging, reporting, and responding to it on social media sites. Some described feeling more comfortable responding to misinformation in person than online. Participants’ responses to misinformation posted on the internet depended on various factors, including their relationship to the individual posting the misinformation, their level of outrage in response to it, and how dangerous they perceived it could be if others acted on such information.
Conclusions
This research illustrates how well-informed US adults assess the credibility of COVID-19 information, how they share it, and how they respond to misinformation. It illustrates web-based and offline information practices and describes how the role of interpersonal relationships contributes to their preferences for acting on such information. Implications of our findings could help inform future training in health information literacy, interpersonal information advocacy, and organizational information advocacy. It is critical to continue working to share reliable health information and debunk misinformation, particularly since this information informs health behaviors.
... Similarly, a recent meta-analysis found a significant negative association between reflectiveness and conspiracy beliefs (Yelbuz et al., 2022). The latter are also closely linked with trust in science (Rutjens & Većkalov, 2022). Therefore, we hypothesize that reflectiveness (H7) will be positively related to trust in science. ...
Background: Previous studies show that trust in science is an important predictor of health behavior. While it varies significantly in the population, the factors explaining this variability are not fully understood. In the present study, we first aimed to investigate the role of previously documented predictors of trust in science, specifically education, political conservatism, religiousness, conspiracy ideation, and openness to experience. Second, we aimed to investigate the incremental value of two novel predictors-intellectual humility and cognitive reflection. Method: An adult sample from the United States (N = 705) completed an online questionnaire containing basic demographic questions and measures of trust in science and the proposed predictors. Findings: The results showed that political conservatism, religiousness, conspiracy ideation, and openness to experience significantly contributed to trust in science, while education did not. Furthermore, after controlling for these factors, an aspect of intellectual humility, openness to revising one's viewpoint, emerged as one of the key predictors of trust in science. Conclusion: Our study provides a better understanding of factors contributing to trust in science and highlights a novel malleable factor that could be addressed with future interventions.
... Whilst accuracy-nudge approaches to date focus on the concept of accuracy and the quality of information, there is an assumption that people may alter their viewpoint depending on whether they can assess the quality of information presented. Such approaches would appear to assume that those prone to CT beliefs may lack a foundational understanding of key scientific concepts important to evaluate such conspiracist information or possess the necessary skills but apply these skills inconsistently or selectively (e.g., concepts of causality, confounding variables, response bias; De Coninck et al., 2021;Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017;Georgiou et al., 2021c;Gjoneska, 2021;Rutjen & Ve ckalov, 2022). This points to the need for interventions to hone scientific reasoning skills. ...
Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs have become an important policy‐relevant research area since the events of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Increasing interest has been directed towards strategies that might reduce people's susceptibility to conspiratorial beliefs. In this study, we examined whether encouraging a stronger orientation toward critical scientific appraisal of conspiratorial accounts could reduce CT acceptance. After completing baseline measures of COVID‐19 related beliefs and analytical and scientific reasoning abilities, a total of 700 adults were randomly allocated to a control or scientific reasoning manipulation. People assigned to the scientific reasoning condition were found to display significantly lower CT belief endorsement post‐intervention as compared to the control group. As well as having implications for the design of future intervention studies, the results of this study encourage a greater focus on specific reasoning skills that may be amenable to a psychoeducation approach, in order to further develop methods to prevent CT beliefs. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
... The existing research within the latter group focuses mainly on attitudes toward political ideologies such as conservatism and liberalism, and the support of specific political parties, such as Democrats and Republicans in the US Uscinski & Parent, 2014;van der Linden et al., 2021). Besides ideologies and political orientations, studies in this group also cover relations between conspiracy thinking and attitudes toward religion (Dyrendal et al., 2018) or science (Rutjen & Većkalov, 2022). Occasionally, all three types of explanations are discussed (Butter & Knight, 2020;Douglas et al., 2017;Douglas et al., 2019;Lantian et al., 2020). ...
Religion and democracy are not only social institutions but also objects of attitudes. This article focuses on conspiracy thinking and its links with attitudes toward religion and democracy. Due to its contextual character, the study is limited to Poland and the article intends to report the data on the subject from surveys conducted in this country. In terms of conspiracy thinking and attitudes toward religion, the literature review of existing Polish survey data (Study 1) led to the conclusion that not all types of religious life are correlated with conspiracy thinking. Individual spirituality (the centrality of religiosity and the quest orientation of religiosity) matters less in terms of conspiracy thinking than religion understood as a specific element of ideology (Polish Catholic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, or collective narcissism). In terms of attitudes toward democracy (Study 2), the original dataset is coded in a new way (as categorial variables) and then presented. It suggests that, contrary to earlier research, conspiracy thinking does not necessarily lead to the support of anti-democratic attitudes. Alienation as much as radicalization might be a consequence of conspiracy thinking. There is no significant difference in terms of conspiracy thinking between adherents of authoritarian rules and conditional democrats, indifferent democrats, or people with ambivalent opinions on democracy, described in comparative research on political culture as dissatisfied democrats or critical citizens. The lower level of conspiracy thinking has been identified only among consistent democrats.
... Recent societal developments have made the impact of conspiracy theories abundantly salient (e.g., the 2016 Trump election; the COVID-19 pandemic). Research underscores the importance of conspiracy theories for understanding some of the most 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 pressing issues of our time, including climate change [3], populism [4], radicalization and terrorism [5], health behavior [6], rejection of science [7], economic inequality [8], and crime [9]. Studying conspiracy beliefs hence enables a meaningful theoretical contribution on these issues, and may also inform policy or practical interventions [10]. ...
انتشرت في العالم حديثًا، وفي أوساط مجتمعنا العربيّ خصوصًا، جماعاتٌ عدّة تروّج لسطحيّة الأرض وادِّعاء أنّ حقيقة كروِيّة الأرض نظريّة باطلة، معتقدين أنّ العالم هو ضحيّة خداعٍ كبيرٍ ومؤامرةٍ مدبّرةٍ بشأن كثيرٍ من القضايا المعاصرة، خصوصًا "شكل الأرض"، وتزعم أنّ الأرض مسطّحة، وغير ذلك كذبٌ وافتراء. على الرّغم من بطلان هذا الادّعاء والحقيقة العلميّة الجليّة التي تدلّ على كرويّة الأرض، إلاّ أنّ اعتقاد أنّ الأرض مسطّحة الشّكل، المبنيّ على علمٍ زائف، قد تبنّته فئةٌ معتبرةٌ في مجتمعاتنا من مستخدمي وسائل التّواصل الاجتماعيّ واليوتيوب، وتزداد هذه الظّاهرة توسّعًا وانتشارًا مريبين، يدعوان إلى القلق والتّفاعل، حيث تدع الحليم حيرانًا. المثير للدّهشة والغرابة أنّ من مروّجي وأتباع هذه النّظريّة الباطلة طبقةً مثقّفةً من خرّيجي المعاهد والجامعات، بيد أنّه لم يكن منهم علماءُ ذوو شأن. حيث نظّموا مؤتمراتٍ وملتقياتٍ دفاعًا عن نظريّتهم، ونشروا فيديوهاتٍ، وحرّروا عشراتِ المنشوراتِ والمقالاتِ المدعومة غالبًا بصورٍ وخرائطَ تدّعي أنّ الأرض مسطّحة وليست كرويّة، وأنّ العلماء قديمًا وحديثًا، خاصةً وكالة الفضاء الأميركية "ناسا"، ضلّلوا النّاس بكروية الأرض، وأنّ صور الأرض، وكذا نزول رواد الفضاء على سطح القمر، مجرّد صور "فوتوشوب" ومشاهد مفبركة ومزيّفة من صنع الشركات السينمائية الأمريكية المتواطئة. لم تأخذ هذه الظّاهرة حظًّا وافرًا من الدّراسة والوقوف على أبعادها التّاريخية والاجتماعية والعلمية، وحتى السّياسية، رغم وجود بعض الدّراسات والبحوث حول أسباب ودوافع الاعتقاد بأنّ الأرض مسطّحة واعتبارها مؤامرةً تُحاك ضدّ الإنسان المعاصر، إلاّ أنّ هناك عواملَ وأسبابًا مشتركةً تقف وراء التّرويج لها ولغيرها من الاعتقادات الباطلة، تتطلّب الاهتمام وبذلَ جهدٍ للتّعمّق في دراستها ومناقشتها والحدّ منها. سنعالج في هذه الورقة البحثّية ظاهرة انتشار نظريّة "مؤامرة كروية الأرض" في العالم، من خلال نشأتها والوقوف على عوامل وأسباب تفشّيها في العالم، وخاصة في الوطن العربي حديثًا، كما سنعرض ونناقش مقترحات حلول وآليّاتٍ للحدّ من انتشار الظّاهرة بين أوساط المجتمع.
Anti-science movements brought more than public distrust in science. Perhaps even more worryingly, these movements are also associated with instances of harassment of—and violence against—scientists. However, virtually nothing is known about individuals likely to harass or harm scientists. Across two pre-registered studies (total N = 749), we investigated the role of worldviews (e.g., political ideology, conspiracy mentality, science cynicism), radicalization risk factors (relative deprivation and threat), and personality traits and how these relate to harassment of scientists (both attitudes and behavior). We found that science cynicism–the perception that scientists are incompetent and corrupt–drives approval of scientists’ harassment (attitudes), as well as harmful behavior (e.g., refusing to donate money, not signing a petition). Additionally, perceiving scientists as threatening, as well as dark personality traits (psychopathy and narcissism), contributed to approving scientists’ harassment. Overall, the present research takes a first step in identifying predictors of the willingness to harm scientists.
Conversation with a trained chatbot can reduce conspiratorial beliefs
Background
The COVID-19 pandemic was a devastating public health event that spurred an influx of misinformation. The increase in questionable health content was aided by the speed and scale of digital and social media and certain news agencies’ and politicians’ active dissemination of misinformation about the virus. The popularity of certain COVID-19 myths created confusion about effective health protocols and impacted trust in the health care and government sectors deployed to manage the pandemic.
Objective
This study explored how people’s information habits, their level of institutional trust, the news media outlets they consume and the technologies in which they access it, and their media literacy skills influenced their COVID-19 knowledge.
Methods
We administered a web-based survey using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to assess US adults’ (n=1498) COVID-19 knowledge, media and news habits, media literacy skills, and trust in government and health-related institutions. The data were analyzed using a hierarchical linear regression to examine the association between trust, media literacy, news use, and COVID-19 knowledge.
Results
The regression model of demographic variables, political affiliation, trust in institutions, media literacy, and the preference for watching Fox or CNN was statistically significant (R2=0.464; F24,1434=51.653; P<.001; adjusted R2=0.455) in predicting COVID-19 knowledge scores. People who identified as politically conservative, watched Fox News, and reported lower levels of institutional trust and media literacy, scored lower on COVID-19 knowledge questions than those who identified as politically liberal, did not watch Fox News and reported higher levels of institutional trust and media literacy.
Conclusions
This study suggests that the media outlets people turn to, their trust in institutions, and their perceived degree of agency to discern credible information can impact people’s knowledge of COVID-19, which has potential implications for managing communication in other public health events.
Conspiracy theories spread through social and other media often bringing easy explanations of events that cannot be easily explained. Beliefs in conspiracy theories may lead to simplified and radical viewpoints that can negatively influence one's behavior and actions. The paper analyzes the association between beliefs in popular conspiracy theories spread through social media and work performance using the results of an authors’ test of conspiracy theories applied to a sample of 178 students of the Faculty of Military Leadership, University of Defence in Brno, Czech Republic. The students were selected as representatives of high-profile professions that should be trained to deal with potential disinformation and conspiracy theories. The assumption was that the students would be generally immune to the impact of conspiracy theories. The analysis did not confirm a hypothesis that individuals with top work performance are less prone to beliefs in conspiracy theories than individuals with solid/poor work performance. The findings confirm the necessity to systematically train people working in high-profile professions to work with available information and deal with potential disinformation and conspiracy theories. The findings are useful in the HR management practice of organizations that care about the professional qualities of their people and encourage further research on the origin, spread, and impact of conspiracy theories in the workplace.
Looking at 76 representative articles published in pyschology between 2017 and 2023 (reviewed between December 2022 and February 2023), I examine the role of motivating examples —a kind of illustrative example, typically used by researchers at the beginning of their work to motivate the issue or problem they want to resolve or address in that work—in the psychological work on conspiracy theory theory (the academic study of conspiracy theory). Through an examination of how motivating examples are both introduced and used in the psychological literature, I argue that the way psychologists employ such examples ends up relying on what Joseph Uscinski and Adam Enders deem as an unviable and easily abused ‘I-know-it-when-I-see-it’ standard. As will be demonstrated, much of the recent work in the psychology of conspiracy theory assumes and thus fails to establish what is supposedly problematic about belief in the conspiracy theories. As a consequence the surveyed work typically fails to adequately capture belief in actual conspiracy theories. I propose two solutions to help move the psychological work on conspiracy theory theory to safer conceptual grounds.
Looking at set of 76 representative articles published by social psychologists between 2017 and 2023 (reviewed between December 2022 and February 2023), I examine the role of motivating examples- --a kind of illustrative example, typically used by researchers at the beginning of their work to motivate the issue or problem they want to resolve or address in that work---in the social psychological work on conspiracy theory. Through an examination of the language around how motivating examples are introduced and used in the social psychological literature, I argue that the abstract and vague way that social psychologists employ such examples ends up relying on what Joseph Uscinski and Adam Enders deem as an unviable and easily abused `I-know-it-when-I-see-it' standard. As will be demonstrated, much of the recent work in the social psychology of conspiracy theory assumes and thus fails to establish what is supposedly problematic about belief in the conspiracy theories used as motivating examples. As a consequence the surveyed work typically fails to adequately capture belief in actual conspiracy theories, let alone establish a case for a general suspicion of such beliefs. This work, then, adds to and extends upon existing critiques of the social psychology of conspiracy theory by members of the wider community of scholars studying conspiracy theories. The upshot of this research is that if social psychologists want their work to be of use to the broader scholarly community studying these things called `conspiracy theories', then they need to connect work their work on the problems of conspiracy beliefs or mindsets to concrete examples of belief in unwarranted conspiracy theories.
The Australian Native Title Act 1993 ( Cth ) provides for the recognition of rights and interests which arise from the traditional laws and customs of Australian First Nation peoples. Processing applications for a determination of native title can take many years and involves numerous stakeholders, presentation of evidence of ongoing connection with the land and sea within a claim area, negotiations with other parties including from industry and government, as well as negotiations between Indigenous groups. The process can be long, arduous, and often outcomes fail to satisfy the expectations of native title claimants. In this paper we investigate how individuals who either disagree with the premise underlying native title, or who have suffered negative impacts through the course of native title claims, may be either targeted by, or swept up in, Australian sovereign citizen rhetoric. We aim to contextualise presentations of sovereign citizen ideas in native title claim processes by providing an overview of the history of sovereign citizen thought, and examples of its contemporary expression in some Australian online forums. In doing this we aim to provide a broad foundation for future research into the issue. The dialogue in sovereign citizen online communities exposes people to extremism and superconspiracies. This article will provide a theoretical framework and historical context to the Australian sovereign citizen phenomena and describe online amplification of disinformation in Australia that has the potential to cause harm. We illustrate how stakeholders who are drawn to relatively moderate online content (such as opposing native title) may be radicalised through gradual exposure to extremist anti‐government sentiment and hate speech. This article highlights the need for further research into sovereign citizenry in Australia, and strategies for native title practitioners to engage claimants who subscribe to and disseminate sovereign citizen disinformation in native title processes.
This work examines worldview predictors of attitudes toward nanotechnology, human gene editing (HGE), and artificial intelligence. By simultaneously assessing the relative predictive value of various worldview variables in two Dutch samples (total N = 614), we obtained evidence for spirituality as a key predictor of skepticism across domains. Religiosity consistently predicted HGE skepticism only. Lower faith in science contributed to these relationships. Aversion to tampering with nature predicted skepticism across domains. These results speak to the importance of religiosity and spirituality for scientific innovation attitudes and emphasize the need for a detailed consideration of worldviews that shape these attitudes.
Belief in a conspiracy theory may, for some, provide a social identity. Because of the nature of many conspiracy theories, social identities associated with such beliefs may be subject to varied and considerable threats. Whilst various mechanisms for dealing with social identity threat have received widespread attention, this paper introduces an as yet unexplored strategy – that of ‘motivated ignorance' – as a further mechanism for social identity maintenance. This is a behavior where individuals actively avoid freely available and accessible information in order to protect a social identity from information that may be harmful to the existence of the broader social group, and thus the individual’s own sense of self. Using a netnographic approach, we explored motivated ignorance related to the social identities formed around beliefs in the Flat Earth. Data revealed two categories of motivated ignorance. Firstly, that of ‘poisoning the well', where ignorance was justified by derogating the perceived epistemic quality of the information. The second was more instrumental, through ad hominem attacks on the source rather than the epistemic quality of information. The study suggests that motivated ignorance may be used as a strategy that may be used to protect social identities that are under threat, adding a further mechanism to the literature on coping with social identity threat.
Recent years have not only seen growing public distrust in science, but also in the people conducting science. Yet, attitudes toward scientists remain largely unexplored, and the limited body of literature that exists points to an interesting ambivalence. While survey data suggest scientists to be positively evaluated (e.g., respected and trusted), research has found scientists to be perceived as capable of immoral behavior. We report two experiments aimed at identifying what contributes to this ambivalence through systematic investigations of stereotypical perceptions of scientists. In these studies, we particularly focus on two potential sources of inconsistencies in previous work: divergent operationalizations of morality (measurement effects), and different specifications of the broad group of scientists (framing effects). Results show that scientists are generally perceived as more likely to violate binding as opposed to individualizing moral foundations, and that they deviate from control groups more strongly on the latter. The extent to which different morality measures reflect the differentiation between binding and individualizing moral foundations at least partially accounts for previous contradictory findings. Moreover, the results indicate large variation in perceptions of different types of scientists: people hold more positive attitudes toward university-affiliated scientists as compared to industry-affiliated scientists, with perceptions of the ‘typical scientist’ more closely resembling the latter. Taken together, the findings have important academic ramifications for science skepticism, morality, and stereotyping research as well as valuable practical implications for successful science communication.
Van Stekelenburg and colleagues (2021) show that boosting understanding of scientific consensus reduces false beliefs about genetically modified foods (GMOs). Specifically, demonstrating the value of scientific consensus and providing information about scientific consensus on GMOs helps to correct misperceptions about GMOs being harmful. However, this technique is ineffective in reducing climate change misbeliefs. This is not surprising. We argue that the reported strategy, being a knowledge-based technique, has limited applicability to other contentious science domains. This is because misperceptions of such domains often do not involve poor science knowledge, but rather specific ideologies.
While conspiracy theories about COVID-19 are proliferating, their impact on health-related responses during the present pandemic is not yet fully understood. We meta-analyzed correlational and longitudinal evidence from 53 studies (N = 78,625) conducted in 2020 and 2021. Conspiracy beliefs were weakly associated with more reluctance toward prevention measures both cross-sectionally and over time. They explained lower vaccination and social distancing responses but were unrelated to mask wearing and hygiene responses. Conspiracy beliefs showed an increasing association with prevention responses as the pandemic progressed and explained support for alternative treatments lacking scientific bases (e.g., chloroquine treatment, complementary medicine). Despite small and heterogenous effects, at a large scale, conspiracy beliefs are a non-negligeable threat to public health.
Understanding vaccine hesitancy is becoming increasingly important, especially after the global outbreak of COVID-19. The main goal of this study was to explore the differences in vaccination conspiracy beliefs between people with a university degree coming from different scientific fields—Social Sciences & Humanities (SH) and Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM). The study was conducted on an online convenience sample of respondents with college and university degrees in Croatia (N = 577). The results revealed that respondents educated in SH proved to be more prone to vaccination conspiracy beliefs. The indirect effect through science literacy was confirmed, while this was not the case for the indirect effects through health beliefs (natural immunity beliefs) and trust in the healthcare system. However, all three variables were important direct predictors of vaccination conspiracy beliefs. Female gender and religiosity were positively correlated with vaccination conspiracy beliefs, while age was not a statistically significant predictor. The authors concluded by emphasizing the necessity of the more theoretically elaborated approaches to the study of the educational and other socio-demographic differences in vaccine hesitancy.
Science can improve life around the world, but public trust in science is at risk. Understanding the presumed motives of scientists and science can inform the social psychological underpinnings of public trust in science. Across five independent datasets, perceiving the motives of science and scientists as prosocial promoted public trust in science. In Studies 1 and 2, perceptions that science was more prosocially oriented were associated with greater trust in science. Studies 3 and 4a & 4b employed experimental methods to establish that perceiving other-oriented motives, versus self-oriented motives, enhanced public trust in science. Respondents recommend greater funding allocations for science subdomains described as prosocially oriented versus power-oriented. Emphasizing the prosocial aspects of science can build stronger foundations of public trust in science.
We investigated linguistic factors that affect peoples’ trust in science and their commitment to follow evidence-based recommendations, crucial for limiting the spread of COVID-19. In an experiment (N = 617), we examined whether complex (vs. simple) scientific statements on mask-wearing can decrease trust in information and its sources, and hinder adherence to behavioral measures. In line with former research on social exclusion through complex language, we also examined whether complexity effects are mediated via feelings of social exclusion. Results indicate that negative effects of text complexity were present, but only for participants with a strong conspiracy mentality. This finding informs how to increase trust in science among individuals with a high conspiracy mentality, a population commonly known for its skepticism towards scientific evidence.
Some people hold beliefs that are opposed to overwhelming scientific evidence. Such misperceptions can be harmful to both personal and societal well-being. Communicating scientific consensus has been found to be effective in eliciting scientifically accurate beliefs, but it is unclear whether it is also effective in correcting false beliefs. Here, we show that a strategy that boosts people’s understanding of and ability to identify scientific consensus can help to correct misperceptions. In three experiments with more than 1,500 U.S. adults who held false beliefs, participants first learned the value of scientific consensus and how to identify it. Subsequently, they read a news article with information about a scientific consensus opposing their beliefs. We found strong evidence that in the domain of genetically engineered food, this two-step communication strategy was more successful in correcting misperceptions than merely communicating scientific consensus. The data suggest that the current approach may not work for misperceptions about climate change.
Ending the COVID-19 pandemic will require rapid large-scale uptake of vaccines against the disease. Mandating vaccination is discussed as a suitable strategy to increase uptake. In a series of cross-sectional quota-representative surveys and two preregistered experiments conducted in Germany and the US (total N = 4629), we investigated (i) correlates of individual preferences for mandatory (vs voluntary) COVID-19 vaccination policies; (ii) potential detrimental effects of mandatory policies; and (iii) interventions potentially counteracting them. Results indicate that reactance elicited by mandates can cause detrimental effects, such as decreasing the intention to vaccinate against influenza and adhere to COVID-19 related protective measures.
People tend to simultaneously accept mutually exclusive beliefs. If they are generally prone to tolerate inconsistencies, irrespective of their content, we say they are prone to doublethink. We developed a measure to capture individual differences in this tendency and demonstrated its construct and predictive validity across two studies. In Study 1, participants ( N = 240) filled in the doublethink scale, the rational/intuitive inventory, and three measures of conspiratorial beliefs (conspiracy mentality, belief in specific and contradictory conspiracies). Doublethink was meaningfully related to all measured variables and was predictive of all conspiratorial beliefs over and above rational/intuitive thinking styles. In Study 2 ( N = 149), we included the need for cognition and preference for consistency in the predictor set alongside doublethink, while the criterion set remained the same. Once again, doublethink related in an expected way to other measured variables and was predictive of belief in conspiracy theories after accounting for the effects of need for cognition and preference for consistency. We discuss the properties of the scale and how it relates to other consistency measures, and offer two ways to conceptualize doublethink: as a lack of metacognitive ability to spot inconsistencies or as a thinking style that easily accommodates inconsistent beliefs.
Research on belief in conspiracy theories identified many predictors but often failed to investigate them together. In the present study, we tested how the most important predictors of beliefs in conspiracy theories explain endorsing COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality. Apart from these three measures of conspiratorial thinking, participants (N = 354) completed several measures of epistemic, existential, and social psychological motives, as well as cognitive processing variables. While many predictors had significant correlations, only three consistently explained conspiratorial beliefs when included in one model: higher spirituality (specifically eco-awareness factor), higher narcissism, and lower analytical thinking. Compared to the other two conspiratorial measures, predictors less explained belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, but this depended on items’ content. We conclude that the same predictors apply to belief in both COVID and non-COVID conspiracies and identify New Age spirituality as an important contributor to such beliefs.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Efforts to understand and remedy the rejection of science are impeded by lack of insight into how it varies in degree and in kind around the world. The current work investigates science skepticism in 24 countries ( N = 5,973). Results show that while some countries stand out as generally high or low in skepticism, predictors of science skepticism are relatively similar across countries. One notable effect was consistent across countries though stronger in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) nations: General faith in science was predicted by spirituality, suggesting that it, more than religiosity, may be the ‘enemy’ of science acceptance. Climate change skepticism was mainly associated with political conservatism especially in North America. Other findings were observed across WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations: Vaccine skepticism was associated with spirituality and scientific literacy, genetic modification skepticism with scientific literacy, and evolution skepticism with religious orthodoxy. Levels of science skepticism are heterogeneous across countries, but predictors of science skepticism are heterogeneous across domains.
Background
We investigated if people’s response to the official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic is associated with conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19, a distrust in the sources providing information on COVID-19, and an endorsement of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM).
Methods
The sample consisted of 1325 Finnish adults who filled out an online survey marketed on Facebook. Structural regression analysis was used to investigate whether: 1) conspiracy beliefs, a distrust in information sources, and endorsement of CAM predict people’s response to the non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) implemented by the government during the COVID-19 pandemic, and 2) conspiracy beliefs, a distrust in information sources, and endorsement of CAM are related to people’s willingness to take a COVID-19 vaccine.
Results
Individuals with more conspiracy beliefs and a lower trust in information sources were less likely to have a positive response to the NPIs. Individuals with less trust in information sources and more endorsement of CAM were more unwilling to take a COVID-19 vaccine. Distrust in information sources was the strongest and most consistent predictor in all models. Our analyses also revealed that some of the people who respond negatively to the NPIs also have a lower likelihood to take the vaccine. This association was partly related to a lower trust in information sources.
Conclusions
Distrusting the establishment to provide accurate information, believing in conspiracy theories, and endorsing treatments and substances that are not part of conventional medicine, are all associated with a more negative response to the official guidelines during COVID-19. How people respond to the guidelines, however, is more strongly and consistently related to the degree of trust they feel in the information sources, than to their tendency to hold conspiracy beliefs or endorse CAM. These findings highlight the need for governments and health authorities to create communication strategies that build public trust.
In the current paper, we argue that to get a better understanding of the psychological antecedents of COVID-related science skepticism, it is pivotal to review what is known about the (social) psychology of science skepticism. Recent research highlighting the role of ideologies and worldviews in shaping science skepticism can inform research questions as well as pandemic responses to COVID-19. It is likely that the antecedents of general COVID-19-related skepticism substantially overlap with the antecedents of climate change skepticism. Additionally, skepticism about a potential vaccine in particular will likely be fueled by similar worries and misperceptions to those shaping more general antivaccination attitudes, of which conspiracy thinking is particularly worth highlighting. We conclude by reflecting on how the COVID-19 crisis may shape future social-psychological research aimed at understanding trust in science and science skepticism.
There has been increasing concern with the growing infusion of misinformation, or “fake news”, into public discourse and politics in many western democracies. Our article first briefly reviews the current state of the literature on conventional countermeasures to misinformation. We then explore proactive measures to prevent misinformation from finding traction in the first place that is based on the psychological theory of “inoculation”. Inoculation rests on the idea that if people are forewarned that they might be misinformed and are exposed to weakened examples of the ways in which they might be misled, they will become more immune to misinformation. We review a number of techniques that can boost people’s resilience to misinformation, ranging from general warnings to more specific instructions about misleading (rhetorical) techniques. We show that based on the available evidence, inoculation appears to be a promising avenue to help protect people from misinformation and “fake news”.
In schizophrenia research, patients who “jump to conclusions” in probabilistic reasoning tasks tend to display impaired decision-making and delusional belief. In five studies, we examined whether jumping to conclusions (JTC) was similarly associated with decision impairments in a nonclinical sample, such as reasoning errors, false belief, overconfidence, and diminished learning. In Studies 1a and 1b, JTC was associated with errors stimulated by automatic reasoning, oddball beliefs such as conspiracy theories, and overconfidence. We traced these deficits to an absence of controlled processing rather than to an undue impact of automatic thinking, while ruling out roles for plausible alternative individual differences. In Studies 2 and 3, JTC was associated with higher confidence despite diminished performance in a novel probabilistic learning task (i.e., diagnosing illnesses), in part because those who exhibited JTC behavior were prone to overly exuberant theorizing, with no or little data, about how to approach the task early on. In Study 4, we adapted intervention materials used in schizophrenia treatment to train participants to avoid JCT. The intervention quelled overconfidence in the probabilistic learning task. In summary, this research suggests that a fruitful crosstalk may exist between research on psychopathology and work on social cognition within the general public.
Populism typically pits political elites against “the virtuous people.” A distinct variant of populism (“science-related populism”) extends beyond politics, targeting academic elites and suggesting they ignore people’s common sense and will. Individual endorsement of such a worldview (“science-related populist attitudes”) has been conceptualized but not yet measured. Hence, we developed the SciPop Scale, a survey instrument to measure science-related populist attitudes. We tested 17 survey items in a first representative survey and developed an 8-item scale. We then tested German, French, and Italian versions of this scale in a second representative survey, employing confirmatory factor analysis, Item Response Theory, and external validity tests. Findings show that the SciPop Scale is a robust and reliable measure of populist demands toward science.
During the coronavirus disease pandemic rising in 2020, governments and nongovernmental organizations across the globe have taken great efforts to curb the infection rate by promoting or legally prescribing behavior that can reduce the spread of the virus. At the same time, this pandemic has given rise to speculations and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy worldviews have been connected to refusal to trust science, the biomedical model of disease, and legal means of political engagement in previous research. In three studies from the United States ( N = 220; N = 288) and the UK ( N = 298), we went beyond this focus on a general conspiracy worldview and tested the idea that different forms of conspiracy beliefs despite being positively correlated have distinct behavioral implications. Whereas conspiracy beliefs describing the pandemic as a hoax were more strongly associated with reduced containment-related behavior, conspiracy beliefs about sinister forces purposefully creating the virus related to an increase in self-centered prepping behavior.
This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK‐based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford‐Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O‐Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy‐belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential‐based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy‐conspiracist beliefs relationship.
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Rationale and Objective
It is well established that people who use complementary and alternative medicines (CAM) are, on the whole, more vaccine hesitant. One possible conclusion that can be drawn from this is that trusting CAM results in people becoming more vaccine hesitant. An alternative possibility is that vaccine hesitancy and use of CAM are both downstream consequences of a third factor: distrust in conventional treatments. We conducted analyses designed to disentangle these two possibilities.
Method
We measured vaccine hesitancy and CAM use in a representative sample of Spanish residents (N = 5200). We also measured their trust in three CAM interventions (acupuncture, reiki, homeopathy) and two conventional medical interventions (chemotherapy and antidepressants).
Results
Vaccine hesitancy was strongly associated with (dis)trust in conventional medicine, and this relationship was particularly strong among CAM users. In contrast, trust in CAM was a relatively weak predictor of vaccine hesitancy, and the relationship was equally weak regardless of whether or not participants themselves had a history of using CAM.
Conclusions
The implication for practitioners and policy makers is that CAM is not necessarily a major obstacle to people's willingness to vaccinate, and that the more proximal obstacle is people's mistrust of conventional treatments.
Recent work points to the heterogeneous nature of science skepticism. However, most research on science skepticism has been conducted in the United States. The current work addresses the generalizability of the knowledge acquired so far by investigating individuals from a Western European country (The Netherlands). Results indicate that various previously reported findings hold up: Mirroring North American patterns, climate change skepticism is associated with political conservatism (but only modestly), and scientific literacy does not contribute to skepticism, except about genetic modification (Study 1 only) and vaccine skepticism (Study 2 only). Results also reveal a crucial difference: Religiosity does not consistently contribute to science skepticism, except about evolution. Instead, spirituality is found to most consistently predict vaccine skepticism and low general faith in science—which in turn predicts willingness to support science. Concerns about societal impact play an additional role. These findings speak to the generalizability of previous findings, improving our understanding of science skepticism.
People who hold scientific explanations for natural phenomena also hold folk explanations, and the two types of explanations compete under some circumstances. Here, we explore the question of why folk explanations persist in the face of a well‐understood scientific alternative, a phenomenon known as explanatory coexistence. We consider two accounts: an associative account, where coexistence is driven by low‐level associations between co‐occurring ideas in experience or discourse, and a theory‐based account, where coexistence reflects high‐level competition between distinct sets of causal expectations. We present data that assess the relative contributions of these two accounts to the cognitive conflict elicited by counterintuitive scientific ideas. Participants (134 college undergraduates) verified scientific statements like “air has weight” and “bacteria have DNA” as quickly as possible, and we examined the speed and accuracy of their verifications in relation to measures of associative information (lexical co‐occurrence of the statements' subjects and predicates) and theory‐based expectations (ratings of whether the statements' subjects possess theory‐relevant attributes). Both measures explained a significant amount of variance in participants' responses, but the theory‐based measures explained three to five times more. These data suggest that the cognitive conflict elicited by counterintuitive scientific ideas typically arises from competing theories and that such ideas might be made more intuitive by strengthening scientific theories or weakening folk theories.
Science deniers question scientific milestones and spread misinformation, contradicting decades of scientific endeavour. Advocates for science need effective rebuttal strategies and are concerned about backfire effects in public debates. We conducted six experiments to assess how to mitigate the influence of a denier on the audience. An internal meta-analysis across all the experiments revealed that not responding to science deniers has a negative effect on attitudes towards behaviours favoured by science (for example, vaccination) and intentions to perform these behaviours. Providing the facts about the topic or uncovering the rhetorical techniques typical for denialism had positive effects. We found no evidence that complex combinations of topic and technique rebuttals are more effective than single strategies, nor that rebutting science denialism in public discussions backfires, not even in vulnerable groups (for example, US conservatives). As science deniers use the same rhetoric across domains, uncovering their rhetorical techniques is an effective and economic addition to the advocates’ toolbox.
In an online Qualtrics panel survey experiment (N = 1620), we found that scientists posting self-portraits (“selfies”) to Instagram from the science lab/field were perceived as significantly warmer and more trustworthy, and no less competent, than scientists posting photos of only their work. Participants who viewed scientist selfies, especially posts containing the face of a female scientist, perceived scientists as significantly warmer than did participants who saw science-only images or control images. Participants who viewed selfies also perceived less symbolic threat from scientists. Most encouragingly, participants viewing selfies, either of male or female scientists, did not perceive scientists as any less competent than did participants viewing science-only or control images. Subjects who viewed female scientist selfies also perceived science as less exclusively male. Our findings suggest that self-portraiture by STEM professionals on social media can mitigate negative attitudes toward scientists.
Science is valued for its basic and applied functions: producing knowledge and contributing to the common good. Much of the time, these are perceived to work in harmony. However, science is sometimes seen as capable of subverting the common good, by facilitating dangerous technologies (e.g., weapons of mass destruction) or exerting a malign influence on public policy, opinion, and behaviour. Employing the social functionalist framework of Tetlock (2002), we propose that efforts to censor and suppress scientific findings are motivated by concerns about their societal impact. We begin by covering recent political shifts towards more censorial and punitive responses to scientific research in the U.S. and elsewhere. We go on to propose that beyond traditional explanations of how people evaluate scientific findings, such as cognitive consistency motivations, people’s evaluations are shaped by perceptions of the potential societal impact of scientific data. Our recent studies have shown that independently of the extent to which scientific findings contradict people’s beliefs (as in the confirmation bias), people reject and oppose the publication, application, and funding of research to the extent that they judge its findings as threatening to the public interest. In the final part of the chapter, we outline avenues for further theory and research. Here, we particularly emphasize the importance of establishing whether concerns about impact are themselves rationalizations of opposition to research that are motivated by other moral concerns, such as perceived purity violations (Graham et al., 2009). Finally, we underline that it is crucial that further research examines perceptions of science as a dangerous force that must be neutralized, and the potential of these perceptions to obstruct not only the public understanding of scientific research, but ultimately, the research itself.
We explore the risk that self-reinforcing feedbacks could push the Earth System toward a planetary threshold that, if crossed, could prevent stabilization of the climate at intermediate temperature rises and cause continued warming on a "Hothouse Earth" pathway even as human emissions are reduced. Crossing the threshold would lead to a much higher global average temperature than any interglacial in the past 1.2 million years and to sea levels significantly higher than at any time in the Holocene. We examine the evidence that such a threshold might exist and where it might be. If the threshold is crossed, the resulting trajectory would likely cause serious disruptions to ecosystems, society, and economies. Collective human action is required to steer the Earth System away from a potential threshold and stabilize it in a habitable interglacial-like state. Such action entails stewardship of the entire Earth System-biosphere, climate, and societies-and could include decarbonization of the global economy, enhancement of biosphere carbon sinks, behavioral changes, technological innovations, new governance arrangements, and transformed social values.
Studies showing that scepticism about anthropogenic climate change is shaped, in part, by conspiratorial and conservative ideologies are based on data primarily collected in the United States. Thus, it may be that the ideological nature of climate change beliefs reflects something distinctive about the United States rather than being an international phenomenon. Here we find that positive correlations between climate scepticism and indices of ideology were stronger and more consistent in the United States than in the other 24 nations tested. This suggests that there is a political culture in the United States that offers particularly strong encouragement for citizens to appraise climate science through the lens of their worldviews. Furthermore, the weak relationships between ideology and climate scepticism in the majority of nations suggest that there is little inherent to conspiratorial ideation or conservative ideologies that predisposes people to reject climate science, a finding that has encouraging implications for climate mitigation efforts globally.
Objective:
Strengthening of antivaccination movements in recent decades has coincided with unprecedented increases in the incidence of some communicable diseases. Many intervention programs work from a deficit model of science communication, presuming that vaccination skeptics lack the ability to access or understand evidence. However, interventions focusing on evidence and the debunking of vaccine-related myths have proven to be either nonproductive or counterproductive. Working from a motivated reasoning perspective, we examine the psychological factors that might motivate people to reject scientific consensus around vaccination. To assist with international generalizability, we examine this question in 24 countries.
Methods:
We sampled 5,323 participants in 24 countries, and measured their antivaccination attitudes. We also measured their belief in conspiracy theories, reactance (the tendency for people to have a low tolerance for impingements on their freedoms), disgust sensitivity toward blood and needles, and individualistic/hierarchical worldviews (i.e., people's beliefs about how much control society should have over individuals, and whether hierarchies are desirable).
Results:
In order of magnitude, antivaccination attitudes were highest among those who (a) were high in conspiratorial thinking, (b) were high in reactance, (c) reported high levels of disgust toward blood and needles, and (d) had strong individualistic/hierarchical worldviews. In contrast, demographic variables (including education) accounted for nonsignificant or trivial levels of variance.
Conclusions:
These data help identify the "attitude roots" that may motivate and sustain vaccine skepticism. In so doing, they help shed light on why repetition of evidence can be nonproductive, and suggest communication solutions to that problem. (PsycINFO Database Record
Many topics that scientists investigate speak to people's ideological worldviews. We report three studies—including an analysis of large-scale survey data— in which we systematically investigate the ideological antecedents of general faith in science and willingness to support science, as well as of science skepticism of climate change, vaccination, and GM. The main predictors are religiosity and political orientation, morality, and science understanding. Overall, science understanding is associated with vaccine and GM food acceptance, but not climate change acceptance. Importantly, different ideological predictors are related to the acceptance of different scientific findings. Political conservatism best predicts climate change skepticism. Religiosity, alongside moral purity concerns, best predicts vaccination skepticism. GM food skepticism is not fueled by religious or political ideology. Finally, religious conservatives consistently display a low faith in science and an unwillingness to support science. Thus, science acceptance and rejection have different ideological roots, depending on the topic of investigation. (150 words) 3 Exploring the ideological antecedents of science acceptance and rejection Throughout history, the relationship between science and religion has been tense and contentious. At various times in history, for example when Galileo Galilei introduced his
Widespread misperceptions undermine citizens’ decision-making ability. Conclusions based on falsehoods and conspiracy theories are by definition flawed. This article demonstrates that individuals’ epistemic beliefs–beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how one comes to know–have important implications for perception accuracy. The present study uses a series of large, nationally representative surveys of the U.S. population to produce valid and reliable measures of three aspects of epistemic beliefs: reliance on intuition for factual beliefs (Faith in Intuition for facts), importance of consistency between empirical evidence and beliefs (Need for evidence), and conviction that “facts” are politically constructed (Truth is political). Analyses confirm that these factors complement established predictors of misperception, substantively increasing our ability to explain both individuals’ propensity to engage in conspiracist ideation, and their willingness to embrace falsehoods about high-profile scientific and political issues. Individuals who view reality as a political construct are significantly more likely to embrace falsehoods, whereas those who believe that their conclusions must hew to available evidence tend to hold more accurate beliefs. Confidence in the ability to intuitively recognize truth is a uniquely important predictor of conspiracist ideation. Results suggest that efforts to counter misperceptions may be helped by promoting epistemic beliefs emphasizing the importance of evidence, cautious use of feelings, and trust that rigorous assessment by knowledgeable specialists is an effective guard against political manipulation.
There is a worryingly large chasm between scientific consensus and popular opinion. Roughly one third of Americans are skeptical that humans are primarily responsible for climate change; rates of some infectious diseases are climbing in the face of antiimmunization beliefs; and significant numbers of the population worldwide are antievolution creationists. It is easy to assume that resistance to an evidence-based message is a result of ignorance or failure to grasp evidence (the "deficit model" of science communication). But increasingly, theorists understand there are limits to this approach, and that if people are motivated to reject science, then repeating evidence will have little impact. In an effort to create a transtheoretical language for describing these underlying motivations, we introduce the notion of "attitude roots." Attitude roots are the underlying fears, ideologies, worldviews, and identity needs that sustain and motivate specific "surface" attitudes like climate skepticism and creationism. It is the antiscience attitude that people hear and see, but it is the attitude root-what lies under the surface-that allows the surface attitudes to survive even when they are challenged by evidence. We group these attitude roots within 6 themes- worldviews, conspiratorial ideation, vested interests, personal identity expression, social identity needs, and fears and phobias-and review literature relevant to them. We then use these insights to develop a "jiu jitsu" model of persuasion that places emphasis on creating change by aligning with (rather than competing with) these attitude roots.
Adding to the growing literature on the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, the present paper argues that a small part in motivating the endorsement of such seemingly irrational beliefs is the desire to stick out from the crowd, the need for uniqueness. Across three studies, we establish a modest but robust association between the self-attributed need for uniqueness and a general conspirational mindset (conspiracy mentality) as well as the endorsement of specific conspiracy beliefs. Following up on previous findings that people high in need for uniqueness resist majority and yield to minority influence, Study 3 experimentally shows that a fictitious conspiracy theory received more support by people high in conspiracy mentality when this theory was said to be supported by only a minority (vs. majority) of survey respondents. Together these findings support the notion that conspiracy beliefs can be adopted as a means to attain a sense of uniqueness.
Keywords: conspiracy
People with high education are less likely than people with low education to believe in conspiracy theories. It is yet unclear why these effects occur, however, as education predicts a range of cognitive, emotional, and social outcomes. The present research sought to identify mediators of the relationship between education and conspiracy beliefs. Results of Study 1 revealed three independent mediators of this relationship, namely, belief in simple solutions for complex problems, feelings of powerlessness, and subjective social class. A nationally representative sample (Study 2) replicated these findings except for subjective social class. Moreover, variations in analytic thinking statistically accounted for the path through belief in simple solutions. I conclude that the relationship between education and conspiracy beliefs cannot be reduced to a single mechanism but is the result of the complex interplay of multiple psychological factors that are associated with education. © 2016 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.
Although public endorsement of conspiracy theories is growing, the potentially negative societal consequences of widespread conspiracy ideation remain unclear. While past studies have mainly examined the personality correlates of conspiracy ideation, this study examines the conspiracy-effect; the extent to which exposure to an actual conspiracy theory influences pro-social and environmental decision-making. Participants (N = 316) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions; (a) a brief conspiracy video about global warming, (b) an inspirational pro-climate video or (c) a control group. Results indicate that those participants who were exposed to the conspiracy video were significantly less likely to think that there is widespread scientific agreement on human-caused climate change, less likely to sign a petition to help reduce global warming and less likely to donate or volunteer for a charity in the next six months. These results strongly point to the socio-cognitive potency of conspiracies and highlight that exposure to popular conspiracy theories can have negative and undesirable societal consequences.
There is currently widespread public misunderstanding about the degree of scientific consensus on human-caused climate change, both in the US as well as internationally. Moreover, previous research has identified important associations between public perceptions of the scientific consensus, belief in climate change and support for climate policy. This paper extends this line of research by advancing and providing experimental evidence for a "gateway belief model" (GBM). Using national data (N = 1104) from a consensus-message experiment, we find that increasing public perceptions of the scientific consensus is significantly and causally associated with an increase in the belief that climate change is happening, human-caused and a worrisome threat. In turn, changes in these key beliefs are predictive of increased support for public action. In short, we find that perceived scientific agreement is an important gateway belief, ultimately influencing public responses to climate change.
Conspiracy theories are immensely popular today, yet in the social sciences they are often dismissed as "irrational," "bad science," or "religious belief." In this study, we take a cultural sociological approach and argue that this persistent disqualification is a form of "boundary work" that obscures rather than clarifies how and why conspiracy theorists challenge the epistemic authority of science. Based on a qualitative study of the Dutch conspiracy milieu, we distinguish three critiques that are motivated by encounters with scientific experts in everyday life: the alleged dogmatism of modern science, the intimate relation of scientific knowledge production with vested interests, and the exclusion of lay knowledge by scientific experts forming a global "power elite." Given their critique that resonates with social scientific understandings of science, it is concluded that conspiracy theorists compete with (social) scientists in complex battles for epistemic authority in a broader field of knowledge contestation.
© The Author(s) 2014.
This article presents and tests psychological distance to science (PSYDISC) as a domain-general predictor of science skepticism. Drawing on the concept of psychological distance, PSYDISC reflects the extent to which individuals perceive science as a tangible undertaking conducted by people similar to oneself ( social), with effects in the here ( spatial) and now ( temporal), and as useful and applicable in the real world ( hypothetical distance). In six studies (two preregistered; total N = 1,630) and two countries, we developed and established the factor structure and validity of a scale measuring PSYDISC. Crucially, higher PSYDISC predicted skepticism beyond established predictors, across science domains. A final study showed that PSYDISC shapes real-world behavior (COVID-19 vaccination uptake). This work thus provides a novel tool to predict science skepticism, as well as a construct that can help to further develop a unifying framework to understand science skepticism across domains.
Recent studies suggest climate change consensus messages may cause psychological reactance for conservatives. However, it remains unknown how much this reactance impacts the effectiveness of consensus messaging. Using data from a recent meta-analysis on climate change interventions, the current paper seeks to add context to the debate over reactance. We integrated data from 20 experiments (N = 19,200 participants) that test how consensus messages (compared to a control condition) impact climate change attitudes. The effect of consensus messages on attitudes was small yet statistically significant and positive (g = 0.09), and not significantly moderated by political affiliation. Moreover, the moderating role of political affiliation was similar for consensus messages compared to other interventions for climate change attitudes. While conservatives may experience resistance to consensus messages, there is little meta-analytic evidence that consensus messages backfire.
Many people believe conspiracy theories, even though such beliefs are harmful to themselves and their social environment. What is the appeal of conspiracy theories? In this contribution I propose that conspiracy theories have psychological benefits by imbuing perceiver’s worldview with meaning and purpose in a rewarding manner. Conspiracy theories enable an alternative reality in which perceivers (a) can defend a fragile ego by perceiving themselves and their groups as important, (b) can rationalize any of their beliefs and actions as legitimate, and (c) are entertained through the opportunity to uncover a mystery in an exciting tale. These are short-term benefits, however, suggesting that conspiracy theories provide people with a form of instant gratification.
Scientific consensus communication is among the most promising interventions to minimize the gap between experts’ and the public’s belief in scientific facts. There is, however, discussion about its effectiveness in changing consensus perceptions and beliefs about contested science topics. This preregistered meta-analysis assessed the effects of communicating the existence of scientific consensus on perceived scientific consensus and belief in scientific facts. Combining 43 experiments about climate change, genetically modified food, and vaccination, we show that single exposure to consensus messaging has a positive effect on perceived scientific consensus (g = 0.55) and on factual beliefs (g = 0.12). Consensus communication yielded very similar effects for climate change and genetically modified food, while the low number of experiments about vaccination prevented conclusions regarding this topic specifically. Although the effect is small, communicating scientific consensus appears to be an effective way to change factual beliefs about contested science topics.
Background
Widespread vaccine hesitancy and refusal complicate containment of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Extant research indicates that biased reasoning and conspiracist ideation discourage vaccination. However, causal pathways from these constructs to vaccine hesitancy and refusal remain underspecified, impeding efforts to intervene and increase vaccine uptake.
Method
554 participants who denied prior SARS-CoV-2 vaccination completed self-report measures of SARS-CoV-2 vaccine intentions, conspiracist ideation, and constructs from the Health Belief Model of medical decision-making (such as perceived vaccine dangerousness) along with tasks measuring reasoning biases (such as those concerning data gathering behavior). Cutting-edge machine learning algorithms (Greedy Fast Causal Inference) and psychometric network analysis were used to elucidate causal pathways to (and from) vaccine intentions.
Results
Results indicated that a bias toward reduced data gathering during reasoning may cause paranoia, increasing the perceived dangerousness of vaccines and thereby reducing willingness to vaccinate. Existing interventions that target data gathering and paranoia therefore hold promise for encouraging vaccination. Additionally, reduced willingness to vaccinate was identified as a likely cause of belief in conspiracy theories, subverting the common assumption that the opposite causal relation exists. Finally, perceived severity of SARS-CoV-2 infection and perceived vaccine dangerousness (but not effectiveness) were potential direct causes of willingness to vaccinate, providing partial support for the Health Belief Model’s applicability to SARS-CoV-2 vaccine decisions.
Conclusions
These insights significantly advance our understanding of the underpinnings of vaccine intentions and should scaffold efforts to prepare more effective interventions on hesitancy for deployment during future pandemics.
Although many psychological and sociological factors have been implicated in the development of conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs, analytical thinking has been considered a key protective factor. However, it is not clear if engaging in systematic or rigorous information searching is always protective, particularly if this involves a confirmation bias or a lack of scientific reasoning. For example, higher scores on autistic traits, which are commonly associated with a tendency to engage in systematic information searching, have been found to be associated with stronger endorsement of CT beliefs. Here, we investigated whether measures of analytical reasoning need to be refined to focus specifically on scientific reasoning, as analytical thinking has recently shown a positive association with conspiracy beliefs. A total of 565 adults with varying levels of autistic traits, completed measures of CT beliefs, standard analytical reasoning and information searching measures, but also measures of scientific reasoning and belief flexibility (using the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence or BADE task). We found that standard measures of analytical thinking and active‐open minded thinking were positively associated with CT beliefs and autistic traits. Conversely, higher levels of scientific reasoning and belief flexibility were negatively associated with CT beliefs, autistic and schizotypal traits. The findings encourage the use of more focused measures of logical and scientific reasoning in both psychoeducation interventions and future research relating to CT beliefs. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Rationale
Immunization is a critical tool in the fight against infectious disease epidemics. Understanding hesitancy towards immunization is even more important nowadays, with the continuous threat of COVID-19 pandemic. Medical conspiracy beliefs, scientific skepticism, as well as low trust in governmental institutions, and evidence-based knowledge all have troubling effects on immunization.
Objective
To examine how these factors cross-react to influence vaccine behavior against any vaccine preventable disease (VPD), we hypothesized a model consisting of the belief in conspiracy theories as the predictor, and as the mediators subjective and objective vaccine knowledge, and trust in the health care system and science. The model was tested by examining the vaccine intentions for the children and self for any VPD.
Methods
Two separate studies were conducted on the representative samples of Serbian population; the first study investigated the intentions for child vaccination and the second study examined the vaccine intentions against any VPD, including adult vaccination. We used path analysis followed by logistic regression to analyze the data.
Results
The results revealed high vaccine hesitancy motivated by the belief in the vaccine conspiracy theories, through its effect on reduced trust in medical science and institutions, and low objective vaccine knowledge.
Conclusions
The results of this study may be used to implement appropriate policy changes and implementation of the public health campaigns to promote immunization with a wide range of vaccines against common diseases, such as measles, human papillomaviruses, or pertussis, and novel diseases, such as COVID.
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, French public opinion has been divided about Pr. Didier Raoult and his hydroxychloroquine-based treatment against COVID-19. In this paper, our aim is to contribute to the understanding of this polarization of public opinion by investigating the relationship between (analytic vs. intuitive) cognitive style and trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Through three studies (total N after exclusion = 950), we found that a more intuitive cognitive style predicted higher trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Moreover, we found that Trust in Raoult was positively associated with belief that truth is political, belief in conspiracy theories, belief in pseudo-medicines and pseudo-medical and conspiratorial beliefs regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. We also found a negative association with knowledge of scientific methods and regard for scientific method over personal experience. However, higher trust in Didier Raoult was not associated with self-reported compliance with official regulations concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. © 2020, Society for Judgment and Decision making. All rights reserved.
Objective: Vaccine hesitancy has been identified as one of the major contributors to child under-vaccination. Research indicates that some hesitant parents’ mistrust extends to specific conspiracy ideation, but research on vaccine conspiracy beliefs is still scarce. Our objective was to explore factors contributing to parental vaccine conspiracy beliefs and actual vaccine uptake in children.
Design: A cross-sectional correlational design with a non-probabilistic sample of 823 volunteer participants surveyed online.
Main outcome measures: We focussed on the contributions of the analytically rational and experientially intuitive thinking styles, as well as measures of emotional functioning, namely optimism and emotions towards vaccination, to vaccine conspiracy beliefs and vaccine uptake as outcomes.
Results: The obtained results showed that greater vaccine conspiracy beliefs were associated with stronger unpleasant emotions towards vaccination and greater experientially intuitive thinking, as well as lower levels of education. Furthermore, unpleasant emotions towards vaccination and intuitive thinking were associated with vaccine refusal.
Conclusion: These findings confirm the primary importance of emotions, along with the propensity towards intuitive thinking, in the context of vaccine conspiracy beliefs and refusal, supporting the notion that parents’ avoidance is guided by their affect. These results have direct implications for addressing vaccine hesitancy within public campaigns and policies.
The Gateway Belief Model describes a process of attitudinal change where a shift in people's perception of the scientific consensus on an issue leads to subsequent changes in their attitudes which in turn predict changes in support for public action. In the current study, we present the first large-scale confirmatory replication of the GBM. Specifically, we conducted a consensus message experiment on a national quota sample of the US population (N=6,301). Results support the mediational hypotheses of the GBM: an experimentally induced change in perceived scientific consensus causes subsequent changes in cognitive (belief) and affective (worry) judgments about climate change, which in turn are associated with changes in support for public action. The scientific consensus message also had a direct effect on support for public action. We further found an interaction
with both political ideology and prior attitudes such that conservatives and climate change disbelievers were more likely to update their beliefs toward the consensus. We discuss the model's theoretical and practical implications, including why conveying scientific consensus can help reduce politically motivated reasoning
Genetically engineered food has had its DNA, RNA, or proteins manipulated by intentional human intervention. We provide an overview of the importance and regulation of genetically engineered food and lay attitudes toward it. We first discuss the pronaturalness context in the United States and Europe that preceded the appearance of genetically engineered food. We then review the definition, prevalence, and regulation of this type of food. Genetically engineered food is widespread in some countries, but there is great controversy worldwide among individuals, governments, and other institutions about the advisability of growing and consuming it. In general, life scientists have a much more positive view of genetically engineered food than laypeople. We examine the bases of lay opposition to genetically engineered food and the evidence for how attitudes change. Lay people tend to see genetically engineered food as dangerous and offering few benefits. We suggest that much of the lay opposition is morally based. One possibility is that, in some contexts, people view nature and naturalness as sacred and genetically engineered food as a violation of naturalness. We also suggest that for many people these perceptions of naturalness and attitudes toward genetically engineered food follow the sympathetic magical law of contagion, in which even minimal contact between a natural food and an unnatural entity, either a scientist or a piece of foreign DNA, pollutes or contaminates the natural entity and renders it unacceptable or even immoral to consume. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Nutrition Volume 38 is August 21, 2018. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
As science continues to progress, attitudes toward science seem to become ever more polarized. Whereas some put their faith in science, others routinely reject and dismiss scientific evidence. This chapter provides an integration of recent research on how people evaluate science. We organize our chapter along three research topics that are most relevant to this goal: ideology, motivation, and morality. We review the relations of political and religious ideologies to science attitudes, discuss the psychological functions and motivational underpinnings of belief in science, and describe work looking at the role of morality when evaluating science and scientists. In the final part of the chapter, we apply what we know about science evaluations to the current crisis of faith in science and the open science movement. Here, we also take into account the increased accessibility and popularization of science and the (perceived) relations between science and industry.
Conspiracy theories offer simple answers to complex problems by providing explanations for uncertain situations. Thus, they should be attractive to individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty and seek cognitive closure. We hypothesized that need for cognitive closure (NFCC) should foster conspiracy beliefs about events that lack clear official explanations, especially when conspiracy theories are temporarily salient. In Experiment 1 NFCC positively predicted the endorsement of a conspiracy theory behind the refugee crisis, especially when conspiratorial explanations were made salient. Experiment 2 showed that when conspiratorial explanations were made salient, NFCC positively predicted beliefs in conspiracies behind a mysterious plane crash. However, the link between NFCC and beliefs in conspiratorial explanations was reversed in the case of a plane crash with an official, non-conspiratorial, explanation for the accident. In conclusion, people high (vs. low) in NFCC seize on conspiratorial explanations for uncertain events when such explanations are situationally accessible.