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Abstract and Figures

As of June 2022, the cost to rebuild Ukraine’s infrastructure destroyed by Russia likely exceeds $1 trillion. With forecasted high poverty rates, social services will likely cost an additional $1 trillion until Ukraine can financially self-sustain. Lastly, the cost to recapitalize and make Ukrainian companies operational following the war may cost an additional $1 trillion. Given the size of the financial challenge, Ukraine’s future economic health and speed of recovery depend on Foreign Direct Investment. Ukraine’s ongoing corruption challenges and increased geopolitical risk will make a material foreign investment into high-value manufactured goods export industries difficult. However, high-value service exports are risk tolerant. The world is in the early stages of what will likely be the largest and most impactful skilled talent shortage in history. The world likely will experience a shortage of 85 million technology and tech-enabled workers by 2030. Given Ukraine’s high Tertiary Education Rate, the country is uniquely positioned to become a primary destination economy for multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking an elite workforce. Ukraine should target an ICT Service Exports Per Capita rate of $1,500 – up from $163 in 2021. The target is achievable and would generate $64 billion in high-value exports- up from $7.11 billion in 2021. Given changes in the world of work stemming from new technologies such as artificial intelligence, IoT, and automation, these same skills will be needed to help rebuild Ukraine following the war. While the target is achievable, Ukraine’s success will be primarily constrained by its ability to engage MNCs in collaborative workforce development and consumption programs. Fortunately, reference programs (such as the Center for Biostatistical Programming- created by Mr. Hatch) demonstrate MNC’s enthusiasm for partnering with Ukraine in creating elite talent.
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Ukraine:
Post-War
Economic &
Workforce
Development
June 2022
Phil Hatch
+1.503.964.8522
phil@akholi.com
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 2
Abstract
As of June 2022, the cost to rebuild Ukraine's infrastructure destroyed by Russia likely exceeds
$1 trillion. With forecasted high poverty rates, social services will likely cost an additional $1 trillion
until Ukraine can financially self-sustain. Lastly, the cost to recapitalize and make Ukrainian
companies operational following the war may cost an additional $1 trillion.
Given the size of the financial challenge, Ukraine's future economic health and speed of recovery
depend on Foreign Direct Investment. Ukraine's ongoing corruption challenges and increased
geopolitical risk will make a material foreign investment into high-value manufactured goods
export industries difficult. However, high-value service exports are risk tolerant.
The world is in the early stages of what will likely be the largest and most impactful skilled talent
shortage in history. The world likely will experience a shortage of 85 million technology and tech-
enabled workers by 2030. Given Ukraine's high Tertiary Education Rate, the country is uniquely
positioned to become a primary destination economy for multinational corporations (MNCs)
seeking an elite workforce. Ukraine should target an ICT Service Exports Per Capita rate of
$1,500 up from $163 in 2021. The target is achievable and would generate $64 billion in high-
value exports- up from $7.11 billion in 2021.
Given changes in the world of work stemming from new technologies such as artificial intelligence,
IoT, and automation, these same skills will be needed to help rebuild Ukraine following the war.
While the target is achievable, Ukraine's success will be primarily constrained by its ability to
engage MNCs in collaborative workforce development and consumption programs. Fortunately,
reference programs (such as the Center for Biostatistical Programming- created by Mr. Hatch)
demonstrate MNC's enthusiasm for partnering with Ukraine in creating elite talent.
Special gratitude to Mr. Martin Winstanley for his support in producing this report.
ISBN: 979-8-218-01698-2
DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.20023028
Author: Phil Hatch
ORCID: 0000-0003-1709-8860
https://www.linkedin.com/in/philliphatch/
phil@akholi.com
+1.503.964.8522
Publisher: Phil Hatch / Akholi
https://www.akholi.com
https://mozok.works
Publication Date: June 1st, 2022
Version: 1.01.6
Last Edit Date: June 8, 2022
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 3
Mr. David Arkless
I have worked with the people of Ukraine for many years. While
the war is heartbreaking beyond comprehension, the hope and
enthusiasm of the people in the face of such hardship are
inspirational. I believe in the people of Ukraine!
The world is transitioning through a new industrial revolution that
changes every aspect of business. The workforce needed within
this new world will be far more technical than in any previous time.
The world does not naturally produce enough of these new
workers, creating significant challenges for companies. However,
this shortage of workers also creates enormous opportunities for countries to emerge as leaders
in the technology workforce world.
Ukraine has immense potential to become a leader in the future workforce space. However,
Ukraine must take steps now to prepare for the growth of its technology workforce and industry
following the war.
In 2013, Mr. Hatch (then a senior executive with ManpowerGroup-Experis) created a joint venture
between the pharmaceutical industry and Ukrainian universities. The joint venture worked
together to create high-value workers that the pharmaceutical industry needs.
Ukraine needs more of these programs. Specifically, Ukraine needs international employers to
work with universities to create an elite workforce at scale. Ukraine needs these relationships
now.
If these programs are approached using lessons learned from Mr. Hatch's efforts, Ukraine will
likely gain significant support from multinational corporations in developing its greatest asset- the
people of Ukraine.
I encourage President Zelensky to take moderate steps now to create such a collaborative
workforce and technology industry development programs with active involvement from major
international employers. The world is asking how to help Ukraine further. Give multinational
companies a framework for helping Ukraine emerge stronger and better after the war.
-David Arkless
June 2nd, 2022
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 4
Mr. Phil Hatch
I first traveled to Ukraine almost twenty years ago after accepting
a senior executive role with a US technology company with
delivery centers in Kharkiv. For some reason, Ukraine resonated
with me and became a major dynamic in my personal and
professional life.
The war in Ukraine, for me, is not a news story. The Russian
invasion of Ukraine is personal. I have many friends and former
employees directly affected by this war. I must act.
Over the years, I have helped launch Ukrainian outsourcing firms and provided advisory services
to the Ukrainian government. Starting with Vice Prime Minister Semynozhenko through various
ruling regimes over the years, I have been extensively involved in the technology industry. I
introduced companies such as Disney and Roche to the Ukrainian workforce.
As a senior executive with ManpowerGroup/Experis, I created a business group that partnered
major international employers with public-sector agencies and academia to collaboratively create
a scalable and modern workforce. In 2013, I launched a pilot program partnering with Roche, a
local outsourcing firm, Experis, and V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University that created
biostatistical programmers the global pharmaceutical industry needed. This program thrived until
the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ukraine became arguably the top workforce
for elite biostatistical programming through this program.
Ukraine needs similar programs now. Given changes in the world of work and the scale of
devastation, Ukraine needs multinational corporation involvement and investment in further
developing the Ukrainian workforce. The timing and extent of such partnerships between Ukraine
and global employers will likely dictate the speed of Ukraine's economic recovery following the
end of the war.
-Phil Hatch
+1.503.964.8522
phil@akholi.com
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 5
Executive Summary
The cost to rebuild Ukraine following the end of the war, combined with likely high social services
costs until Ukraine can financially self-sustain and the need to recapitalize Ukrainian companies,
may total between $2 - $3 trillion. Adjusted for inflation, the Marshall Plan totaled $155.95 billion.
Some form of reconstruction program like the Marshall Plan, extensively backed by Western
nations combined with various financial instruments from IGOs such as IMF, will likely leave
Ukraine with a shortfall well exceeding $1 trillion. Ukraine will need to materially increase FDI to
rebuild the nation following the war's end.
International corporations do not approach FDI as a grant. FDI, by nature, is an investment with
involved parties expecting a return on their investment. Fortunately, Ukraine has an under-
commercialized asset in great demand and is a proven opportunity for material FDI: The
workforce.
By 2030, international employers may experience a shortage of skilled workers totaling 85 million
people. This skilled talent shortage may cost global employers over $8.5 trillion in revenues
because they cannot find the talent they need. (Korn Ferry, 2018)
The risk to global employers stemming from the skilled talent shortage is significant enough that
companies are making significant investments in collaborative workforce development programs.
Microsoft launched a program in partnership with NASSCOM in India to create 1 million AI workers
in 2021 alone. (Microsoft, 2020)
Ukraine has the raw components needed to become a globally recognized destination workforce
for the technology industry with widespread involvement from MNCs in developing the workforce
further. Ukraine has enormous potential for growth within the technology industry and can
generate industry growth, jobs, and industry-related FDI.
Ukraine needs to begin engaging MNCs on various collaborative workforce development
programs immediately. Doing so will help hedge the anticipated talent flight following the war,
provide Ukraine with STEM workers needed to rebuild the country, seed a thriving technology
industry, and generate material FDI.
Doing so will likely transform the country. With MNC involvement, Ukraine can likely grow its ICT
industry from $7.11 billion (2021) to over $60 billion.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Mr. David Arkless ................................................................................................................... 3
Mr. Phil Hatch ......................................................................................................................... 4
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 5
Reference Materials ................................................................................................................... 9
Figures ..................................................................................................................................10
Tables ...................................................................................................................................12
Source Data and Considerations ...........................................................................................13
Primary Data Sources ........................................................................................................13
Considerations & Assumptions ..........................................................................................13
Acronyms & Definitions .........................................................................................................14
Center for Biostatistical Programing ..........................................................................................15
War in Ukraine ..........................................................................................................................18
Uncertainty ............................................................................................................................19
Talent Flight & Repatriation ...................................................................................................20
Cost to Rebuild Ukraine .........................................................................................................21
Key Global Dynamics ................................................................................................................23
4th Industrial Revolution .........................................................................................................24
A Complete Change in the World of Work ..........................................................................24
The Workforce Value Proposition Will Change ...................................................................24
The Point of Production Will Change ..................................................................................25
Shift From Production to IP Generation ..............................................................................26
Competing in a New Reality ...............................................................................................26
Collaborative Industry Partnerships ....................................................................................27
Global Skilled Talent Shortage ..............................................................................................29
4th Industrial Revolution Limiter: Talent ..............................................................................30
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Evolution Skills Needed, & Education ....................................................................................31
The Rise of High-IP and Tech-Savvy Workforce ................................................................31
Education Rate of Change (D1) .........................................................................................31
Connecting Education to Jobs ............................................................................................32
The Future of Education: Collaborative Workforce Development Programs .......................32
Ukrainian Durable Industries .................................................................................................34
Goods Vs. Service Exports ....................................................................................................35
Risk ....................................................................................................................................35
Speed to Implement ...........................................................................................................37
Transformative Power of Service Exports Industries ..........................................................37
The Power of Multinational Corporations ...............................................................................38
Foreign Direct Investment ..................................................................................................38
Intellectual Property & Education .......................................................................................38
Business Assistance ..........................................................................................................39
The Role of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Engaging MNCs ...........................................40
Diia City .............................................................................................................................41
Technology Industry Trends ..................................................................................................43
Business Vs. Consumer Technology Markets ....................................................................43
Service Exports Precede Packaged Software Exports .......................................................43
Ukraine Performance ................................................................................................................44
Corruption .............................................................................................................................45
Academia, Research, and Innovation ....................................................................................48
Innovation ..........................................................................................................................50
Demographics, Employment & the Workforce .......................................................................52
Population ..........................................................................................................................52
Employment .......................................................................................................................53
Labor Cost .........................................................................................................................55
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 8
Economy ...............................................................................................................................56
GDP & GDP Per Capita .....................................................................................................56
Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Ukraine's Economy ..................................................59
FDI & Access to Capital .........................................................................................................60
Effect of Euromaidan and Resulting War in Donbas on Working Capital ............................64
Exports ..................................................................................................................................65
High-IP Exports ..................................................................................................................69
High-Value Exports Per Capita Analysis ............................................................................70
ICT Exports ...........................................................................................................................71
ICT Service Exports ...........................................................................................................72
ICT Service Exports Per Capita .........................................................................................73
ICT Service Exports Growth ...............................................................................................76
Causality ...............................................................................................................................81
Confidence Crisis Cycle .....................................................................................................83
Ukrainian Potential ....................................................................................................................84
Growth Industries ..................................................................................................................85
Targets ..................................................................................................................................88
Target Justification .............................................................................................................91
Ukrainian Technology Industry Development Plan ....................................................................94
Concept Model ......................................................................................................................95
Keys to Success ....................................................................................................................98
Start Now ...........................................................................................................................98
Think Big ............................................................................................................................98
Involve MNCs ....................................................................................................................98
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 100
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Reference
Materials
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 10
Figures
Figure 1: Growth High-Value Exports Per Capita (UN COMTRADE, IMF BOP, WB).................25
Figure 2: Bayer - Microsoft Agriculture Partnership ...................................................................27
Figure 3: High-Value Exports by CPI Quintile (TI, UN COMTRADE, IMF BOP) .........................35
Figure 4: Lebanon - Ukraine Comparison (IMF, WB).................................................................35
Figure 5: Belarus HTP Service Exports Per Capita (IMF BOP) .................................................42
Figure 6: High-Value Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF, UN, WB)) ............................45
Figure 7: High-Tech Goods Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile (WB, IMF, UN, TI) ...................46
Figure 8: Lebanon - Ukraine Comparison (IMF, WB).................................................................46
Figure 9: Tertiary Education Participation Rate (UNESCO) .......................................................48
Figure 10: YOY Tertiary Education Participation Rate (UNESCO) ............................................48
Figure 11: STEM & ICT Graduate % Rate (UNESCO) ..............................................................49
Figure 12: Researchers Per Million Residents (UNESCO) ........................................................50
Figure 13: Patent Applications per Million Residents (UNESCO) ..............................................51
Figure 14: Ukrainian Population YOY (WB) ...............................................................................52
Figure 15: Labor Force Participation Rate (ILO) ........................................................................53
Figure 16: Unemployment Rate (ILO) .......................................................................................53
Figure 17: Ukrainian YOY Labor Force Participation Rate & Unemployment (ILO) ...................54
Figure 18: Java Developer Salaries (glassdoor.com 2022) .......................................................55
Figure 19: Ukrainian YOY GDP & GDP Per Capita (IMF) ..........................................................56
Figure 20: Ukrainian GDP Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF) ..........................................57
Figure 21: GDP Per Capita by Tertiary Education Rate Quintile (IMF, WB, UNESCO) ..............58
Figure 22: GDP Per Capita & Tertiary Education Rate by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF, UNESCO) ......59
Figure 23: Ukrainian Gross Capital Formation & FDI Net Inflows (IMF) .....................................60
Figure 24: GFC & FDI Net Inflow Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF, WB) ........................61
Figure 25: GFC & FDI Net Inflow Per Tertiary Education Rate Quintile (IMF, UNESCO) ...........62
Figure 26: GFC & FDI Net Inflow Per Capita by CPI Quintile (IMF, TI) ......................................63
Figure 27: FDI Net Inflow Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF, WB) ....................................64
Figure 28: Ukraine YOY Exports (IMF BOP) .............................................................................65
Figure 29: Ukrainian Exports Growth Rates (IMF) .....................................................................66
Figure 30: High-IP Exports Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF, UN, WB) ..........................70
Figure 31: High-IP Service Exports Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF BOP, WB) ............70
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 11
Figure 32: Ukrainian YOY ICT Exports Per Capita (IMF BOP, WB) ...........................................71
Figure 33: ICT Service Exports Per Capita Regional Comparatives (IMF BOP, WB) ................73
Figure 34: ICT Service Exports Per Capita by Region (IMF BOP, WB) .....................................73
Figure 35: ICT Service Exports Per Capita by Education Quintile (IMF, UNESCO, WB) ...........74
Figure 36: ICT Service Exports by ICT Graduate % Quintile (UNESCO, IMF BOP, WB) ...........74
Figure 37: ICT Service Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF BOP, WB).........................75
Figure 38: YOY ICT Service Exports Growth Rate Regional Comparative (IMF, WB) ...............76
Figure 39: ICT Service Exports YOY Growth % by Region (IMF BOP, WB) ..............................77
Figure 40: ICT Service Exports Growth Rate by Education Quintile (IMF BOP, UNESCO, WB) 78
Figure 41: ICT Service Exports YOY Growth % by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF, WB) ..........................78
Figure 42: ICT Service Exports Growth Rate by ICT Grad % Quintile .......................................78
Figure 43: ICT Service Exports $ Global Rank (IMF BOP) ........................................................79
Figure 44: ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ Global Rank (IMF BOP) ......................................79
Figure 45: Ukraine Forecasted ICT Service Export Growth (IMF BOP, Hatch) ..........................80
Figure 46: Ukrainian IT Industry Underperformance Correlations ..............................................82
Figure 47: Ukraine ICT Service Exports Underperformance Causality (Hatch) ..........................83
Figure 48: Ukraine YOY University Graduates (UNESCO) ........................................................91
Figure 49: Development Framework Core Concept ..................................................................96
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Tables
Table 1: Top Ukrainian Exports (IMF, UN COMTRADE, Hatch) ................................................67
Table 2: Fastest Growing Ukrainian Exports (IMF BOP, UN COMTRADE) ...............................68
Table 3: High-IP Ukrainian Exports (IMF BOP, UN COMTRADE) .............................................69
Table 4: ICT Service Exports Subcategories (IMF BOP) ...........................................................72
Table 5: Ukrainian Exports ........................................................................................................86
Table 6: Ukraine ICT Service Exports Targets (Hatch) ..............................................................88
Table 7: Forecasted ICT Service Exports Value (Hatch) ...........................................................89
Table 8: Forecasted Job Growth (Hatch) ...................................................................................90
Table 9: Baltic Comparative (IMF BOP, Hatch) .........................................................................93
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Source Data and Considerations
Primary Data Sources
World Bank
World Development Indicators
https://databank.worldbank.org/
International Monetary Fund
Balance of Payments
https://data.imf.org/
International Labor Organization
ILOSTAT
https://ilostat.ilo.org/
UNESCO
UNESCO Institute for
Statistics
http://data.uis.unesco.org/
United Nations
UN Comtrade Database
https://comtrade.un.org/
Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index
https://www.transparency.org/
glassdoor
Salaries
https://www.glassdoor.com
Korn Ferry
Global Talent Shortage
https://www.kornferry.com
World Bank
GovData360
https://govdata360.worldbank.org/
Considerations & Assumptions
1. Not all countries follow common recommendations for categorizing packaged software,
software development, and technology hardware (goods) exports- such as the Handbook on
Measuring Digital Trade. (OECD, WTO, & IMF, 2020) ICT Service Exports (indicator code
BXSOTCM_BP6_USD) will be the primary indicator for all technology service exports.
2. Not all economies report using the IMF BoP BPM6 standard. Economies not in compliance
with BPM6 are excluded from analysis.
3. As of the date of writing this report, not all countries have reported all data for 2021. For
countries that have not reported a value for a specific indicator in 2021 used in a model, their
2020 value will be used.
4. If there is an omission for a country's indicator in a specific year, the value will be calculated
by averaging the preceding and following year's indicator value.
5. Statistical outliers that report significantly high BoP or COMTRADE data due to various tax
schemes (such as Luxembourg) are omitted from models.
6. Given the uncertainty in migration due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, forward-looking
calculations will use Ukraine's 2021 population.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Acronyms & Definitions
Artificial Intelligence
Balance of Payments
Center of Excellence
UN Comtrade Database (official trade statistics)
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index
Foreign Direct Investment
Harmonized System export categorization.
High Technology Park. A tech-centric SEZ.
Information, Computer, and Technology
International Labor Organization
International Monetary Fund
Internet of Things
Multinational Corporations
Special Economic Zones
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math
Total Available Market
Transparency International
United Nations
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
World Bank
World Economic Forum
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Proof of Concept Program:
Center for
Biostatistical
Programing
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 16
In 2012, several global pharmaceutical companies engaged Mr. Hatch (while a senior executive
with ManpowerGroup/Experis), asking for assistance in finding a reliable source of biostatistical
programmers. Mr. Hatch proposed creating a collaborative workforce development program for
the pharmaceutical executives after a study demonstrated no significant pools of talent with the
right skills anywhere globally.
After some discussion, Mr. Hatch structured a joint venture between Experis, Intego Group (a
local Ukrainian outsourcing firm), Roche, and V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in April
2013. Through this joint venture, all parties agreed to create a biostatistical programming and
bioinformatics program at the university.
In fall 2013, the Center for Biostatistical Programming (biostatcenter.com) officially launched with
active involvement from all joint venture parties.
In the spring of 2014, students began graduating with a Master's Minor in Biostatistical
Programming, with all graduates retained by Roche (through Intego-Group and Experis).
The program continued to expand and financially self-sustain until the Russian invasion of Ukraine
in February 2022. Over twenty pharmaceutical or clinical trial companies have retained talent
produced through this program. Graduates routinely received awards from various industry trade
groups, and Ukraine was widely considered the reference workforce for elite biostatistical
programming talent.
This program has been widely regarded as a success. Key findings from this proof-of-concept
program include:
1. If the quality of talent produced through such a program is high, international companies will
tolerate risk. Euromaidan and the following war in the Donbas region in Ukraine happened
shortly after this program's launch. Although Ukraine had material geopolitical risk, it did not
matter. International companies continued to be involved in this program until the outbreak of
war in February 2022.
2. If programs are structured through a compelling commercial model, international employers
will invest in covering program costs in full. This program was launched and continued to
operate without any grants or donations from the Ukrainian government, NGOs, or IGOs.
2022 © Phil Hatch
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3. The quality of talent Ukraine can produce is highly compelling. This program produced
arguably the best biostatistical programming talent globally. More importantly, global
employers quickly recognized the potential of Ukrainians and agreed to invest in developing
this asset further.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 18
War in
Ukraine
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Uncertainty
War is one of the most disruptive dynamics for any economy. It is impossible to accurately model
the full impact of the war on Ukraine's economy or define detailed steps needed to rebuild post-
war. Given uncertainties:
1. Modeling will factor 2021 Ukrainian economic and industrial performance.
2. Launch dates for any full-scale economic recovery program will not be known until closer to
the war's end.
A colleague once stated, "We might not know where we are eating breakfast on the third day of
our holiday, but we know we are going to Hawaii." We do not know specific details about an
economic and workforce development program post-war, but we know the derivative. There are
key themes that will continue to ring true and will be focused on in this document.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Talent Flight & Repatriation
Given changes in the global economy stemming from the rise of the 4th Industrial Revolution, high-
IP producing talent will dictate economic performance more frequently in the years ahead.
Ukraine's talent flight problem preceding the war has already been problematic and has been
chiefly responsible for Ukraine's lower than the regional average in the tech industry. The war has
greatly increased the net outflow of people from the country.
As of May 27, 2022, UNHCR estimates that 6.7 million people have left the country- or 16% of
the Ukrainian population. (UNHCR, 2022)
In preparation for this paper, I conducted a poll of 100 Ukrainians that left the country due to the
war. Employment following the war was the primary consideration for the repatriation of refugees.
1. The war has had a material effect on the financials of Ukrainians. 91% of respondents noted
they needed a job in Ukraine before returning.
2. 70% of refugees with a spouse still in Ukraine stated they intend to return to Ukraine if they or
their spouse had full employment in the country. Without full employment of the refugee or the
spouse, intent to return to Ukraine dropped to 24.2%
3. Over 90% of respondents that had gained full employment with a company outside of Ukraine
noted they are not likely to return to the country.
4. 50% of respondents noted they would not return to Ukraine if their homes were destroyed.
5. Although Zelensky is receiving praise for his leadership during the war, only 3% stated they
believe the Ukrainian government could create a thriving business ecosystem (including a
material reduction in corruption) following the war.
The consistent theme in repatriation is employment. The extent Ukraine can create Ukraine-
related jobs now and the scale of a job creation program to be launched immediately following
the war will dictate Ukraine's ability to keep (and bring) people home. Without such programs,
Ukraine will likely experience one of the largest talent flight events in history.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Cost to Rebuild Ukraine
The war in Ukraine is incomprehensible. The damage to Ukraine's infrastructure has not been
seen since WW2. By the end of April 2022, economists estimated that the damage to Ukraine's
infrastructure and capital stock might exceed $1 trillion. (VIVIENNE WALT, Fortune.com, 2022)
While this figure is alarming, it understates the cost of rebuilding and relaunching the Ukrainian
economy.
1. UNDP estimated that up to 90% of Ukrainians are at risk of living in poverty post-war. (UNDP,
2022) Extensive social benefits programs will be needed at an unprecedented level. Further,
the cost of providing social benefits will be materially higher. In many municipal areas, basic
services such as healthcare no longer exist. Facilities were destroyed. (World Health
Organization, 2022) The lack of such services in communities across the country will
significantly increase the cost of delivery. If it takes a decade to achieve economic self-
sustenance, Ukraine could theoretically need an additional $500 billion - $1 trillion to cover
social benefits alone. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
2. There is a material activation cost (Frankenstein Cost- cost to bring the economy to life) once
the infrastructure has been rebuilt. There are costs related to restarting education once a
university has been rebuilt. Companies need working capital to restart commercial services
once power, internet, and office space have been rebuilt. If the war were to end today, the
activation cost (including needed working capital) of every aspect of the Ukrainian economy
could theoretically cost between $500 billion - $1 trillion. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
The total cost to rebuild and relaunch the Ukrainian economy will be unprecedented, and the
world is not prepared for such a financial need. European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD- the development bank created in 1991 to assist Eastern Bloc countries
post-Soviet Union) had a total outstanding loan balance of $28.62 billion in 2020. Adjusted to
today's dollars, the Marshall Plan ($13 billion in 1945) totaled $155.95 billion.
Current thoughts regarding funding the rebuild of Ukraine include some form of a program like
the Marshall Plan with active involvement from the IGOs and Western countries. Discussions
about donating seized Russian assets to Ukraine to further offset the cost of rebuilding the country
are ongoing.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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If the war were to stop today, the combination of some new form of a Marshall Plan (including
grants and secured loans) and donation of seized Russian assets likely would not be enough to
rebuild the entire country.
Assuming a reconstruction program like the Marshall Plan ($155.95 billion), and all frozen Russian
assets were seized and then sold ($300 billion), Ukraine likely will have an outstanding cost of
reconstruction, economic development, and ongoing social services that exceed $1 trillion over
the first decade following the war.
The only viable option for Ukraine is to increase foreign direct investment (FDI). Over the past
decade, FDI Net Outflows (indicator: BM.KLT.DINV.CD.WD) have averaged $1.7 trillion per year,
exceeding all grants and loans made by all IGOs, NGOs, and government development agencies
combined. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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Key Global
Dynamics
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
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4th Industrial Revolution
New technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), automation, 3-D printing, robotics, and 5G
are pushing the entire world through a massive transformation that is widely described as the "4th
Industrial Revolution." The transformation that will occur over the next two decades will be more
significant than any previous moment in time.
While the world has much work to do before this transition is complete, the transition is happening
faster than most realize. Some functional robots in agriculture and mining are already price-
competitive with manual labor in Africa. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
A Complete Change in the World of Work
The 4th Industrial Revolution will bring about a complete transformation in every aspect of the
business world. Changes will include:
1. AI-augmented leadership and management.
2. Every function. (I.e., AI-empowered automation in the entire supply chain.)
3. How companies interact with their customers, vendors, and partners.
4. Production.
5. The overall business value proposition.
6. Every job.
7. Skills needed per job.
The Workforce Value Proposition Will Change
The entire workforce value proposition will change. These technologies reduce labor costs as a
component of the Cost of Goods Sold (COGs). (Aghion, Antonin, Bunel, & Jaravel, 2021) One
worker using these advanced technologies can produce far more than a large team of manual
labor. Further, the risk is amplified. One bad employee can negatively affect total production on a
massive scale.
Given the amplification of a single worker and the reduction of labor costs as a component of
COGs, global employers will seek elite talent over low-cost talent. This trend has also started.
There is a correlation between global purchasing patterns and the rise of these new technologies.
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Figure 1: Growth High-Value Exports Per Capita (UN COMTRADE, IMF BOP, WB)
The world's top education rate and labor cost quintile has doubled high-value manufactured goods
and service exports per capita from 2010 through 2020. The least educated quintile has declined
by 2.5%.
The Point of Production Will Change
With labor costs becoming immaterial in COGs, companies will often shift production closer to the
point of consumption to reduce shipping and handling costs.
Although early pioneers in moving production closer to the point of consumption (such as Adida's
Speedfactory initiative) may have struggled, the model is sound and will become a material trend
in the years ahead. (Supplychaindrive.com, 2020)
This movement of production from low labor cost markets closer to primary consumption points
will materially affect existing manufacturing hubs globally.
Driven by direct job loss due to automation and global manufacturers moving production from
China toward major consumer markets in the EU, US, and other wealthy countries, China may
lose up to 100 million manufacturing jobs. (China Power, 2018)
Any country depending on labor cost arbitrage to generate material job growth likely will struggle
in the years ahead.
210%
143% 131% 124%
98%
0%
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100%
150%
200%
250%
Top Education Rate
Quintile
2nd Education Rate
Quintile
3rd Education Rate
Quintile
4th Education Rate
Quintile
Bottom Education
Rate Quintile
2010-2020 Growth High-Value Manufactured Goods & Service Exports Per
Capita
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Shift From Production to IP Generation
The rise of these technologies is also changing the fundamental value proposition for companies
worldwide.
In 2015, Nike's then COO Eric Sprunk attended an industry event hosted by GeekWire. Sprunk
was discussing the use of 3-D printing in Nike's manufacturing process when he was asked for
his thoughts on the ability of end consumers to print shoes at home. (TAYLOR SOPER, 2015)
Sprunk noted, "Do I envision a future where [Nike] might still own the file, from an IP perspective
because it's a Nike product; you can't have just anybody make a Nike productand you can
manufacture that either in your home or we will do it for you at our store?... Oh yeah, that's not
that far away."
These 4th Industrial Revolution technologies will shift many companies from a manufacturing and
capacity-based value proposition toward a heavy IP production value proposition. Companies will
gain market share based on their ability to provide top intellectual property. In many cases, their
production (manufacturing) will become commoditized. In some cases, manufacturing may be
omitted as 3-D printing gains traction.
Company success will shift more toward IP production in the years ahead.
Competing in a New Reality
The performance gap between companies that have successfully adopted 4th Industrial
Revolution technologies over those companies yet to adopt these new technologies will be larger
than in any previous Industrial Revolution. (Enno de Boer, 2019)
Likewise, countries that will experience the greatest growth in jobs over the coming decade will
be those that provide elite 4th Industrial Revolution aligned workers, regardless of labor cost. The
current global workforce consumption model will change. Many countries with thriving high-value
manufactured goods and service exports industries will be left behind because they cannot
modernize their workforce quickly. (UNCTAD, 2021)
While the threat of job displacement is enormous, there has never been a better time to create
transformative job and economic growth. Countries that are most effective and fastest in aligning
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their workforce to global demand can experience economic and job growth that far exceeds the
growth in countries such as India in the early outsourcing boom.
Collaborative Industry Partnerships
Figure 2: Bayer - Microsoft Agriculture Partnership
"Today, Bayer announced a strategic partnership with Microsoft to build a new cloud-based set
of digital tools and data science solutions for use in agriculture and adjacent industries, bringing
new infrastructure and foundational capabilities to accelerate innovation, boost efficiency, and
support sustainability across value chains" Bayer, November 17, 2021
As much as analysts claim to know the full scope of changes in the world of work, there is a great
deal of uncertainty. Leading MNCs are partnering together now to define the future role of
technology in all industries.
Combining these collaborative industry development programs with tendencies that companies
buy goods and services from entities they helped create, any country wanting to establish a
Bayer agronomic expertise and leading digital farming
platform, combined with Microsoft Azure, form the
foundation for new digital solutions to advance agriculture
and adjacent industries.
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thriving high-value service export or packaged software industry must actively participate in such
programs.
Ukraine must partner with programs such as the Bayer-Microsoft agriculture program focused on
developing the talent these programs need.
Although there will likely be sympathy for Ukraine opening the door to such programs, Ukraine
must demonstrate an ability to produce elite talent at scale. Ukraine must earn on merit the role
of becoming the future workforce for such programs. Posturing for being the destination workforce
for such programs has already started. Ukraine cannot wait until the end of the war to create a
material position as a destination workforce within a 4th Industrial Revolution context.
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Global Skilled Talent Shortage
The rise of 4th Industrial Revolution technologies creates the need for an entirely new workforce.
Job displacement in the coming years will be unprecedented. In February 2021, McKinsey &
Company noted that up to 100 million people in G8 economies would likely need to change jobs
due to the rise in automation. (McKinsey & Company, 2021) OECD further estimates that half of
all jobs globally are at risk of displacement due to automation. (OECD, 2018)
While the number of jobs lost due to 4th Industrial Revolution technologies will be high, these
same technologies create demand for an entirely new workforce that does not materially exist
today.
Driven by a combination of changes in the world of work and demographics, the world is in the
early stages of what will be the longest-lasting and most impactful skilled talent shortage in history.
Korn Ferry estimates that by the year 2030, there may be as many as 85 million jobs unfulfilled
because employers cannot find the talent they need. Further, Korn Ferry notes this skilled talent
shortage will cost global employers $85 trillion in revenues because they cannot find the workers
needed to fulfill orders. (Korn Ferry, 2018)
The growing risk to global employers stemming from the skilled talent shortage pushes companies
toward more strategic talent sourcing models. Companies are taking steps now to create "talent
farms" in growing numbers and scale. (Similar to the Center for Biostatistical Programming
created by Mr. Hatch as referenced earlier in this document.)
These strategic talent development programs are growing. Numerous programs now exceed total
numbers and the strategic importance to the employer of any previous such program in history.
In September 2020, Microsoft announced an initiative with NASSCOM to create 1 million AI
workers in India by the end of 2021. (Microsoft, 2020)
Scaled to Ukraine's population, a single program like the Microsoft/NASSCOM program would
create 32,000 AI workers in Ukraine each year.
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4th Industrial Revolution Limiter: Talent
One specific aspect of the global skilled talent shortage is that a lack of workers with 4th Industrial
Revolution skills limits adoption rates of the same technologies. (Joe McKendrick, Forbes, 2022)
The global lack of workers with new technical skills is both an opportunity and a threat.
Reconstruction of Ukraine following the war will depend on workers with 4th Industrial Revolution
skills. Of specific importance to this document, Ukraine will need workers that:
1. Fully understand how these technologies can transform specific Ukrainian durable industries
(such as agriculture) and can help craft an industry reconstruction program.
2. Can implement these same technologies during Ukraine's reconstruction.
3. Can train end workers in these newly reconstructed industries.
4. Can provide technical support long-term.
Reconstruction of Ukraine post-war will likely not be inhibited if Ukraine cannot provide a material
percentage of the needed 4th Industrial Revolution type STEM workers. However, Ukraine will fail
to leverage a highly valuable transition catalyst. MNCs involved in reconstruction following the
war will use Ukraine to train and commercialize a workforce in other countries.
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Evolution Skills Needed, & Education
The Rise of High-IP and Tech-Savvy Workforce
The rise of the 4th Industrial Revolution is creating the need for a more IP-centric skillset that is
far more technical than any previous moment in time.
The skills needed in the future are rapidly changing as the world progresses through the 4th
Industrial Revolution. World Economic Forum (Kate Whiting-WEF, 2020) noted material growth
in demand for the following skills by 2025:
1. Analytical thinking and innovation.
2. Active learning and learning strategies.
3. Complex problem-solving.
4. Critical thinking and analysis.
5. Creativity, originality, and initiative.
6. Leadership and social influence.
7. Application and use of technology.
8. Technology design and programming.
9. Resilience, stress tolerance, and flexibility.
10. Reasoning, problem-solving, and ideation.
Each needed skill noted above either creates intellectual property or facilitates the use of
intellectual property within the company.
Education Rate of Change (D1)
Excluding current geopolitical risk and the COVID-19 Pandemic, the world still is more volatile
than ever before. The rate of development and application of best practices using these new
technologies is unprecedented and will likely continue to increase well into the future.
Workers will need to reskill (in part or full) on a far more frequent basis. The global business
community spends over $370 billion on employee training. (Imed Bouchrika - Research.com,
2020). This amount will increase in the years ahead as employees need to refresh their skills
more frequently.
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Connecting Education to Jobs
There is a disconnect between traditional higher education and jobs. In 2021, Harvard's the
Project on Workforce noted, " America needs more pathways that bridge education and career."
(Fuller, Lipson, Encinas, Forshaw, Gable, & Schramm, 2021)
Although Harvard referenced the United States, the challenges of connecting education to jobs
are common in most countries.
Countries need to address two primary challenges:
1. Countries need to keep academia current with new business best practices and technologies.
The gap between academia and the private sector is growing, and few universities can afford
to keep current their technical infrastructure, curriculum, and instructors.
2. Companies prefer practical experience in hiring talent. In highly developed economies,
students may have an opportunity to gain practical experience through various programs such
as internships. However, most of the world cannot provide such opportunities to their students.
Although regionally near highly developed economies such as Germany, Switzerland, France,
and the UK, Ukraine has not traditionally provided enough opportunities for students to gain
practical experience with major international MNCs.
The Future of Education: Collaborative Workforce Development Programs
Given:
1. The skilled talent shortage is a material business risk to all global employers,
2. Companies show a high preference for practical experience with all new hires (including
recent college graduates),
3. The gap in technologies and business best practices is growing between the private sector
and academia,
4. The rate of skills refresh for current employees will continue to accelerate,
Major global employers will turn toward collaborative workforce development programs more
frequently.
The idea of public-private partnerships in education is not new. However, they will grow in
importance, scale, and frequency in the years ahead.
Of special note:
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1. MNCs will turn toward collaborative workforce development programs (MNCs partnering with
academia and other public institutions to create high-demand talent together) more frequently
to hedge the skilled talent shortage.
2. The scale of these collaborative workforce development programs will continue to rise. The
Microsoft-NASSCOM AI program targeted the development of 1 million AI workers in India in
a single year.
3. The level of involvement by MNCs in collaborative workforce development programs will
increase. In addition to curriculum and infrastructure, MNCs will offer participating students
additional learning opportunities such as internships and mentors.
Given the cost to reskill existing workers, there is an opportunity for traditional higher education
institutions to grow in importance in corporate training if they are actively participating in a
collaborative workforce development program with MNCs.
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Ukrainian Durable Industries
Ukraine has numerous "durable industries" (those that will continue to have global demand post
4th Industrial Revolution transition). Although many will likely exceed pre-war production levels
and generate material economic contribution, numerous industries (such as agriculture) will not
create pre-war job numbers assuming industry redevelopment adopts 4th Industrial Revolution
technologies.
Twenty-two out of Ukraine's top 25 exports are forecasted to experience high job displacement
by 2030 due to the rise of automation and other technologies. Only 3 out of the 25 top exports (all
high-IP service exports) are forecasted to have material job growth by 2030.
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Goods Vs. Service Exports
Risk
Figure 3: High-Value Exports by CPI Quintile (TI, UN COMTRADE, IMF BOP)
A country's risk profile has the greatest effect on exports of all variables. While risk affects all
exports, high-value manufactured goods are specifically affected by high-risk levels.
Figure 4: Lebanon - Ukraine Comparison (IMF, WB)
$-
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Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile Ukraine (4th
CPI Quintile)
4th Quintile Bottom Quintile
High-Value Manufactured Goods & Service Exports Per Capita by
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Quintile
Service Exports Goods Exports
$-
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Ukraine (2021) Lebanon (2011)
Ukraine-Lebanon Service Exports Per Capita
IP Licensing Other Business Services Other Services ICT Services
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Some examples exist of high-risk markets achieving material success with high-value service
exports. In 2011, Lebanon (with a lower CPI score and Tertiary Education rate than Ukraine)
achieved $2,766.45 in high-value service exports, exceeding Ukraine's best performance in 2021.
If Ukraine were to match Lebanon's performance, Ukraine would generate an additional $115
billion in high-value and high IP exports- more than doubling Ukraine's GDP when considering
secondary currency cycling. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
Of special note: Lebanon's ICT Service Exports Per Capita rate of $187.23 in 2011 is higher than
Ukraine's best score of $163.50 in 2021.
There are no material exceptions or outliers with manufactured goods exports. Causality for lack
of manufactured goods exports from high-risk markets is well understood:
1. The working capital needed to establish manufacturing is material. Few investors are willing
to make such an investment in a high-risk market.
2. The infrastructure needed for high-value manufacturing is rigid and cannot be mobilized the
same as high-value service export industries.
3. Customers (global buyers of manufactured goods) are concerned with delivery disruptions
and heavily favor purchasing from low-risk markets.
The current war in Ukraine presents a significant risk. Ukraine has little chance of generating the
needed investment to establish a high-value manufactured goods export industry until after the
war.
The end of the conflict will not resolve significant risk concerns (i.e., corruption) endemic to the
Ukrainian government to a level needed to drive material investment into establishing a thriving,
high-value manufactured goods exports industry. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
However, given a reasonable level of risk tolerance with high-value service exports and proof of
concept programs preceding the war (such as the Center for Biostatistical Programming), Ukraine
can gain international investments needed to establish thriving high-value service exports industry
well beyond Q4 2021 levels.
Ukraine should begin working now to seed these service export industries now.
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Speed to Implement
The time required to implement a thriving high-value service exports industry is materially shorter
than establishing high-value manufactured goods.
Transformative Power of Service Exports Industries
Although service exports may not be considered as prestigious as high-value goods exports,
service exports can be economically transformative. The growth of the Indian economy over the
past twenty years is a reference example of the potential of service exports to transform an
economy.
Hyderabad, India, demonstrates the scale and speed of transformation when establishing a
compelling service exports industry. Following a twenty-year transformation, Hyderabad has
today:
1. Over 600k tech jobs.
2. Over 2 square kilometers of presold office space are waiting to be built in the tech industry.
3. Registered over 100k new companies and representative companies.
4. Achieved a base FDI level of over $1.5 billion per year. Google committed over $2 billion to
develop the tech industry and workforce further.
5. Likely generates over $2,000 ICT Service Exports Per Capita. (Compared to Ukraine's
$163.50 in 2021)
Scaling this by population size, Ukraine would have:
1. 2.37 million technology jobs across the country.
2. Over $83 billion in ICT Service Exports per annum.
While these targets may seem unrealistic, consider that 2.37 million additional technology jobs
represent less than 3% of the forecasted shortage of 85 million technology and tech-enabled
workers (Korn Ferry, 2018) by the year 2030.
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The Power of Multinational Corporations
Multinational corporations (MNCs) will be critical to Ukraine's recovery after the war.
Foreign Direct Investment
Ukraine will need a significant improvement in FDI inflows to rebuild the country (society,
economy, and infrastructure). FDI is not a grant or charitable donation. FDI is an investment with
the investors seeking a return on their investment. Material FDI is generated to develop further
and facilitate the consumption of a proven asset.
Of Ukraine's top twenty-five exports, only service exports are forecasted to have material job
growth. Fortunately, these high-value service export industries have a proven history of
generating material FDI in other markets. India's ICT industry accounts for 74% of all FDI. (The
Economic Times - India, 2021) India likely received well over $200 billion in the past decade to
develop further and facilitate the consumption of the Indian technology workforce. (Phil Hatch,
2022)
Ukraine does have a compelling history of elite-level STEM talent. The asset (the educated
workforce) has likely been proven to the degree that global employers will invest in further
developing and consuming this asset. (Phil Hatch, 2022) The Center for Biostatistical
Programming is proof of the willingness of global employers to develop further and consume the
Ukrainian workforce.
Intellectual Property & Education
Global employers also have the intellectual property needed to create a modern workforce.
Without the active involvement of MNCs in education, Ukraine will struggle to implement current
academic programs.
Keys to Ukraine's success, global employers will be needed to provide:
1. Current curriculum, technologies, and instructors.
2. Internship opportunities for Ukrainians allowing students to gain needed technical, functional,
and industry expertise to be widely employable.
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Business Assistance
Major international employers (especially the major technology companies) have extensive
programs that help new companies thrive. As an example, Intel's Partner Alliance program offers
companies access to new technologies, extensive training opportunities, subject matter experts,
co-marketing funding, and lead generation.
Given the power of multinational corporations, companies attempting to go to market without the
involvement of MNC partner programs face material challenges.
Ukraine must help facilitate the involvement of Ukrainian companies in such partnership
programs. Without involvement in such programs, Ukrainian companies will compete against the
spending and asset power of the major MNCs.
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The Role of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Engaging MNCs
In 2017, Amazon issued a request for proposal (RFP) for a second headquarters (referred to as
"H2"). By the end of October 2017, Amazon had received 238 proposals. Many of the received
proposals were the length, scale, and sophistication of an Olympics or FIFA World Cup hosting
proposal.
In the end, Amazon selected Northern Virginia as the winning proposal. After the fact, Amazon
noted they selected Northern Virginia due to the workforce's size and quality combined with the
region's ability to create talent in partnership with local academia collaboratively. (CNBC - Scott
Cohn, 2019)
Although Northern Virginia offered Amazon material financial incentives (grants, tax credits, etc.),
other cities that submitted proposals offered Amazon larger financial incentives. The core asset
(the workforce) swayed Amazon's decision in the end.
Another material public-private partnership is Microsoft's partnership with NASSCOM to create
over 1 million AI workers in 2021. This program was not limited to talent creation and consumption
within the vast Indian SEZ infrastructure.
Specific to high-value workers, the world has reached a point where a special economic zone is
widely considered the price to pay to enter the game. SEZs are not a guarantee a country will win
the MNC partnership game. Referencing Amazon's H2 RFP, the workforce size, quality, and
ability to collaboratively create talent are far more important.
As talent scarcity increases and labor costs further drop as a component of the Cost of Goods
Sold, the ability of SEZs to sway MNCs on a cost basis will decrease further.
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Diia City
Ukraine's announcement of Diia City in 2021 is compelling. (Ukrainian Presidential Office, 2022)
Diia City is critically important to Ukraine's future economic growth. However, Ukraine faces three
specific challenges:
1. The world is saturated with various technology parks and special economic zones. As of 2022,
there are likely well over 1,000 such programs globally. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
2. Many existing and planned technology parks offer similar or more competitive components.
Some examples within the greater CEE/CIS greater region:
a. The Polish Investment Zone (Krakow Technology Park is a component) offers similar
tax incentives and IP legal considerations. (Krakow Technology Park, n.d.)
b. Belarus's High-Tech Park offers a near total tax deferral until 2049. (HTP-Belarus, n.d.)
c. Kazakhstan's Astana Hub/AIFC offers a 0% tax rate and is also based on English Law.
(Astana Hub, n.d.)
3. As noted earlier, major international corporation investment and participation in a specific
market are becoming more tied to the quality of the workforce and ability to create talent over
various financial incentives. Microsoft's NASSCOM AI program is not tied to SEZs in India.
Amazon's H2 selection was primarily based on the quality of the workforce and the ability to
create talent in the Northern Virginia region. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
Although current geopolitical dynamics will materially affect Belarus's technology industry, HTP
Belarus is widely cited by countries in the CEE/CIS region as an example of a technology park
program success. Excluding geopolitics, Belarus has traditionally performed reasonably well with
its technology industry. That said, the role of HTP Belarus in the country's technology industry
growth must be understood.
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Figure 5: Belarus HTP Service Exports Per Capita (IMF BOP)
Although the Belarus HTP program's roots stretch back to 2007, the "Decree on the Development
of the Digital Economy" signed in December 2017 forms much of what is considered to be HTP-
Belarus's primary selling point. Belarus's technology industry was growing rapidly before the
decree.
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Technology Industry Trends
Business Vs. Consumer Technology Markets
TAM for the global business technology software and services industry far exceeds the consumer
market. By year end of 2022, the business software and services market will likely exceed:
1. $400 billion in software sales.
2. $700 billion in technology services.
The global consumer software market will likely total $200 billion.
Although the size of the consumer software market is material, targeting the business software
market (and related service exports) provides the greatest opportunity for growth.
Service Exports Precede Packaged Software Exports
Packaged software tends to follow the establishment of a thriving software service export industry.
Outsourcing services allows the economy to build a critical mass of technology workers needed
for the organic growth of product companies.
Further, a thriving service export industry facilitates the building of industry knowledge needed for
compelling business packaged software solutions. I.e., a team providing software development
services for global pharmaceutical industries allows the greater workforce to gain key pain point
knowledge specific to the pharmaceutical industry that can lead to a compelling software solution.
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Ukraine
Performance
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Corruption
An ongoing corruption issue has plagued Ukraine since the country's formation in 1991. Out of
every factor, corruption has the greatest effect on a country's ability to generate high-IP exports.
Figure 6: High-Value Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF, UN, WB))
Ukraine's 2021 CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) score of 32 is problematic. Ukraine ranks
within the 4th quintile globally.
$-
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Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Ukraine Bottom Quintile
High-Value Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile
Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property Other Business Services Other Services ICT Services FDI Net Inflow Gross Capital Formation High-Tech Goods
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Figure 7: High-Tech Goods Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile (WB, IMF, UN, TI)
High-value manufactured goods are highly susceptible to CPI scores. High-value (especially high-
tech) manufactured goods are almost exclusive to countries within the top CPI quintile.
While Ukraine's corruption score is problematic, it is not prohibitive in establishing high-value
service exports. Several reference economies with a similar CPI score to Ukraine have achieved
notable high-value service export success. Lebanon will be used again as a comparison.
Figure 8: Lebanon - Ukraine Comparison (IMF, WB)
$114,287.30
$15,927.97
$3,725.69 $1,771.20 $62.36 $26.64
$-
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Unweighted Average High-Tech Manufactured Goods Exports Per Capita
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Ukraine (2021) Lebanon (2011)
Ukraine-Lebanon Service Exports Per Capita
IP Licensing Other Business Services Other Services ICT Services
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If Ukraine were to match Lebanon's performance, Ukraine would generate an additional $115
billion in high-value and high IP exports- likely more than doubling Ukraine's GDP when
considering secondary currency cycling. (Phil Hatch, 2022)
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Academia, Research, and Innovation
Ukraine is a highly educated country with a Tertiary Education Participation Rate of 82.67%,
placing the country above the median for the top Tertiary Education Rate quintile.
Figure 9: Tertiary Education Participation Rate (UNESCO)
Figure 10: YOY Tertiary Education Participation Rate (UNESCO)
94.86%
92.96%
87.89%
87.10%
86.60%
86.40%
82.67%
81.84%
80.14%
75.18%
74.23%
73.52%
73.38%
72.01%
69.18%
68.36%
65.77%
65.59%
63.31%
57.98%
52.44%
51.35%
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Latvia
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Belarus
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Ukraine
Denmark
Belgium
Ireland
Estonia
Germany
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Poland
France
United Kingdom
Czechia
Switzerland
Republic of Moldova
Hungary
Romania
Slovakia
Tertiary Education Participation Rate
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30 Year Tertiary Education Participation Rates
World Upper middle income
Ukraine High income
European Union Central Europe and the Baltics
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While Ukraine's Tertiary Education Rate is second highest in the CEE region, the STEM and ICT
graduate percentage of total graduates is middle compared to CEE peers.
Figure 11: STEM & ICT Graduate % Rate (UNESCO)
17.55%
18.58%
19.23%
19.82%
19.93%
20.81%
21.82%
22.54%
23.35%
24.25%
25.31%
25.35%
25.42%
25.77%
25.86%
26.25%
27.27%
27.91%
28.38%
30.01%
31.36%
35.46%
36.78%
2.14%
3.13%
4.39%
4.05%
4.38%
3.82%
3.87%
4.92%
4.91%
5.84%
7.77%
2.73%
5.65%
3.59%
5.04%
3.98%
3.68%
7.96%
7.35%
6.32%
5.15%
5.64%
4.54%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
Belgium
Netherlands
United States
Bulgaria
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia
Denmark
Hungary
Ukraine
Ireland
Switzerland
Republic of Moldova
France
Czechia
United Kingdom
Lithuania
Estonia
Finland
Romania
Russian Federation
Belarus
Germany
STEM & ICT % of All Graduates
STEM Graduate % ICT Graduate %
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 50
Innovation
Ukraine has not translated high tertiary education rates, STEM graduate %, or ICT graduate %
into a thriving innovation ecosystem. Although ICT service exports are materially growing, Ukraine
trails peer nations in the region and others with similar education profiles.
Two examples demonstrate Ukraine's innovation ecosystem status.
Figure 12: Researchers Per Million Residents (UNESCO)
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Iceland
Austria
Netherlands
Ireland
Germany
Belgium
Slovenia
France
United Kingdom
Czechia
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Poland
Slovakia
Russian Federation
Bulgaria
Italy
Serbia
Croatia
Latvia
Georgia
Ukraine
Romania
Republic of Moldova
Researchers in R&D per Million Residents
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 51
Figure 13: Patent Applications per Million Residents (UNESCO)
0
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
0.0006
Germany
Finland
Austria
Denmark
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Russian Federation
Norway
Netherlands
Slovenia
Iceland
Poland
Belgium
Czechia
Latvia
Hungary
Romania
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Belarus
Republic of Moldova
Ukraine
Croatia
Georgia
Serbia
Estonia
Patent Applications per Million Residents
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 52
Demographics, Employment & the Workforce
Population
The primary demographic dynamic affecting Ukraine's economic performance is talent flight.
Figure 14: Ukrainian Population YOY (WB)
Ukraine has lost 4.66% of the total population from 2012 through 2021 (preceding the war). This
loss of 2.13 million people ranks Ukraine only behind Syria in terms of total population decline
from 2012 through 2021.
In 2019, Ukraine's then Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin stated that 100 thousand individuals were
leaving Ukraine each month. (CNBC - Yuliya Talmazan, 2019)
Causality for Ukraine's population decline is important. For this paper, Mr. Hatch conducted a poll
of 100 Ukrainian adults that left the country before the outbreak of war.
82% of respondents cited ongoing corruption and public leadership challenges preventing
material high-value job growth as primary reasons for leaving the country.
84% of respondents noted they have some form of tertiary education (slightly above the
Ukrainian national tertiary education participation rate of 82.6%)
Ukraine is losing the key asset the country needs for transformative economic Growth: The
workforce.
18,000,000
19,000,000
20,000,000
21,000,000
22,000,000
23,000,000
24,000,000
25,000,000
40,000,000
42,000,000
44,000,000
46,000,000
48,000,000
50,000,000
52,000,000
54,000,000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Ukrainian Population and Labor Force
Population, total Labor force, total
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 53
Employment
Although slightly below comparative models, Ukraine's labor force participation and
unemployment rates are not statistical outliers.
Figure 15: Labor Force Participation Rate (ILO)
Figure 16: Unemployment Rate (ILO)
67% 73% 78%
67% 74% 69% 71%
47%
73% 72%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
World
United States
United Kingdom
Ukraine
Russian Federation
Romania
Poland
Moldova
European Union
Central Europe and
the Baltics
2019 Labor Force Participation Rate
8.88%
5.01% 5.17%
3.37% 3.96%
7.04%
4.50%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
10.00%
Ukraine Russian
Federation
Romania Poland Moldova European
Union
Central
Europe and
the Baltics
2019 Unemployment
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 54
Using data preceding the COVID-19 Pandemic, Ukraine's 2019 unemployment and labor force
participation rates have reasonably returned to levels predating Euromaidan and the following
war in the Donbas region.
Figure 17: Ukrainian YOY Labor Force Participation Rate & Unemployment (ILO)
65.00%
65.50%
66.00%
66.50%
67.00%
67.50%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
20 Year Ukrainian Labor Force Participation & Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Rate Labor Force Participation Rate
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 55
Labor Cost
Although Ukraine's workforce is lower-cost than major Western economies, Ukraine is not a low-
cost labor market given a global context. Ukraine's average salaries for high-demand talent are
materially higher than counties such as India.
Figure 18: Java Developer Salaries (glassdoor.com 2022)
Labor costs in Ukraine for high-demand talent will affect how Ukraine commercializes the
workforce. Ukraine cannot compete on a cost-basis value proposition. Ukraine must develop a
higher value proposition to be competitive. Fortunately, changes in the workforce value
proposition stemming from the rise of 4th Industrial Revolution technologies place lesser emphasis
on labor costs.
$518.84 $603.14
$2,004.02
$3,000.00
$3,709.92
$5,518.70
$9,277.33
Pakistan India Romania Ukraine Poland Germany United States
Average Monthly Salary of a Java Developer
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 56
Economy
GDP & GDP Per Capita
Limiting the analysis before the COVID-19 Pandemic, two primary events have heavily disrupted
the Ukrainian economy.
1. The global financial crisis in 2008-2009 materially affected the Ukrainian economy in line with
peer nations.
2. The Euromaidan protests and following war in the Donbas region had a larger negative effect
on the Ukrainian economy than the global financial crisis.
Figure 19: Ukrainian YOY GDP & GDP Per Capita (IMF)
$0.00
$50,000,000,000.00
$100,000,000,000.00
$150,000,000,000.00
$200,000,000,000.00
$250,000,000,000.00
$0.00
$500.00
$1,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,000.00
$2,500.00
$3,000.00
$3,500.00
$4,000.00
$4,500.00
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Ukraine GDP & GDP Per Capita
Ukraine GDP Per Capita Ukraine GDP
1
2
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 57
Ukraine's GDP Per Capita is low against all comparative economies.
Ukraine's 2019 GDP Per Capita rate of $3,661.4 is the lowest in the region- almost $20,000 less
than the regional leader Czech Republic ($23,660.15)
$23,660.15
$19,303.55
$16,735.66
$15,732.20
$12,899.35
$11,685.42
$9,879.27
$6,837.72
$4,491.69
$3,466.91
$0.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$15,000.00
$20,000.00
$25,000.00
Czechia
Slovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Bulgaria
Belarus
Republic of Moldova
Ukraine
2019 Eastern Europe GDP Per Capita
Figure 20: Ukrainian GDP Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 58
Figure 21: GDP Per Capita by Tertiary Education Rate Quintile (IMF, WB, UNESCO)
With a Tertiary Education Participation Rate of 82.7%, Ukraine ranks above the median for the
top Tertiary Education Rate Quintile.
Ukraine is significantly underperforming against peer economies - almost $31,000 less than the
top Tertiary Education Rate Quintile average.
$35,002.33
$17,179.06
$12,052.48 $11,545.91 $11,391.98
$3,466.91
$-
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$15,000.00
$20,000.00
$25,000.00
$30,000.00
$35,000.00
$40,000.00
Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile Ukraine
2019 GDP Per Capita by Education Rate Quintile
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 59
Figure 22: GDP Per Capita & Tertiary Education Rate by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF, UNESCO)
Ukraine falls within the 4th Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Against peer countries in the 4th
quintile, Ukraine underperforms. Ukraine's GDP Per Capita is over $400 below the quintile
average of $4,084. Of great concern, Ukraine's Tertiary Education Participation Rate of 82.6% is
well above even the top CPI quintile.
Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Ukraine's Economy
Although the global pandemic negatively affected the global economy (a loss of $2.8 trillion from
2019 into 2020), Ukraine generated economic growth. Ukraine's GDP rose from $153.9 billion in
2019 to $155.5 billion in 2020- an increase of $1.62 billion.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
$-
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$15,000.00
$20,000.00
$25,000.00
$30,000.00
$35,000.00
$40,000.00
$45,000.00
$50,000.00
Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Ukraine 5th Quintile
GDP Per Capita & Tertiary Education Rate by Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI) Quintile
Tertiary Education Rate GDP Per Capita
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 60
FDI & Access to Capital
Ukraine has not been able to translate its highly educated workforce into material domestic and
foreign investment into the country. Total venture capital, private equity, corporate investment,
etc., values trail peer economies on a per capita basis.
Working capital is highly risk-averse, having the strongest correlation to Corruption Perceptions
Index than any other modeled indicator. Ukraine's ongoing challenges with corruption and
growing geopolitical risk preceding Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are demonstrated in data.
An analysis demonstrating Ukraine's underperformance will be limited to Gross Capital Formation
and Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows, allowing competitive analysis against peer economies
using validated and consistent data.
Figure 23: Ukrainian Gross Capital Formation & FDI Net Inflows (IMF)
1. Ukraine's peak Gross Capital Formation and Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows peaked in
2008, preceding the global financial crisis.
2. Like most countries, the financial crisis in 2008-2009 materially affected Ukraine's access to
working capital. Gross Capital Formation declined 60% YOY.
3. Ukraine's access to working capital plummeted following Euromaidan in 2013 and the
outbreak of war in the Donbas region.
-$2,000,000,000.00
$0.00
$2,000,000,000.00
$4,000,000,000.00
$6,000,000,000.00
$8,000,000,000.00
$10,000,000,000.00
$12,000,000,000.00
$0.00
$10,000,000,000.00
$20,000,000,000.00
$30,000,000,000.00
$40,000,000,000.00
$50,000,000,000.00
$60,000,000,000.00
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Working Capital
Gross capital formation (current US$)
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 61
4. Lastly, the COVID-19 Pandemic further tightened Ukraine's working capital access (as with
most countries).
Using pre-pandemic performance, Ukraine lags behind peer economies:
Figure 24: GFC & FDI Net Inflow Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF, WB)
Ukraine's FDI net inflow and Gross Capital Formation rates are the lowest in the Central and
Eastern European region.
$10,051.70
$1,007.52
$418.00
$443.69
$380.22
$221.42
$318.42
$135.17
$190.15
$130.58
$4,765.00
$6,533.16
$4,534.35
$3,103.30
$3,048.10
$2,659.50
$2,074.44
$1,993.19
$1,138.62
$516.24
$-
$2,000.00
$4,000.00
$6,000.00
$8,000.00
$10,000.00
$12,000.00
Hungary
Czechia
Slovakia
Poland
Romania
Russian
Federation
Bulgaria
Belarus
Republic of
Moldova
Ukraine
GCF & FDI-Net Inflow $ Per Capita
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) Gross capital formation (current US$)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 62
Figure 25: GFC & FDI Net Inflow Per Tertiary Education Rate Quintile (IMF, UNESCO)
Ukraine ranks below the lowest Tertiary Education Rate Quintile.
$1,605.58
$875.55
$758.03
$564.38
$118.43
$130.58
$8,578.91
$4,258.08
$3,020.76
$1,938.51
$1,425.89
$516.24
$0.00
$1,000.00
$2,000.00
$3,000.00
$4,000.00
$5,000.00
$6,000.00
$7,000.00
$8,000.00
$9,000.00
$10,000.00
Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 4th Quintile 3rd Quintile Bottom Quintile Ukraine
GCF & FDI-Net Inflow $ Per Capita By Tertiary Education Rate Quintile
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) Gross capital formation (current US$)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 63
Figure 26: GFC & FDI Net Inflow Per Capita by CPI Quintile (IMF, TI)
The strongest correlation between a country's ability to generate foreign and domestic investment
is the country's level of risk. Ukraine's low Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score stemming
from ongoing corruption, public-sector efficiencies, and geopolitical risk preceding the invasion of
Russia in 2022 places Ukraine within the 4th (second to bottom) CPI Quintile.
Of concern, Ukraine is performing below the average of peer economies in the 4th CPI Quintile.
$1,596.05
$1,653.71
$597.89
$136.07
$130.58
$71.06
$11,847.44
$3,037.90
$1,822.12
$1,083.04
$516.24
$401.98
$0.00
$2,000.00
$4,000.00
$6,000.00
$8,000.00
$10,000.00
$12,000.00
$14,000.00
Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Ukraine Bottom Quintile
GCF & FDI-Net Inflow $ Per Capita By Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
Quintile
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) Gross capital formation (current US$)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 64
Effect of Euromaidan and Resulting War in Donbas on Working Capital
Figure 27: FDI Net Inflow Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF, WB)
The outbreak of war in the Donbas region of Ukraine following Euromaidan in 2013 introduced
material geopolitical risk that can be widely seen in econometrics. This conflict greatly reduced
Ukraine's access to working capital. However, Ukraine was experiencing a decline in Gross
Capital Formation and Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows Per Capita starting in 2012
(preceding the Euromaidan protests).
The outbreak of war in Donbas following the Euromaidan protests negatively affected Ukraine's
access to capital and global investment position. However, Ukraine's greatest challenge
preceding the invasion of Russia in 2022 was Ukraine's ongoing CPI challenges.
For Ukraine to transition into a higher income category following the end of the Russian invasion,
Ukraine will need to address ongoing corruption and public efficiency issues.
$(100.00)
$-
$100.00
$200.00
$300.00
$400.00
$500.00
$600.00
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
YOY FDI Net Inflows Per Capita
Belarus Romania Russian Federation Republic of Moldova Ukraine
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 65
Exports
Like comparative economies with a similar sized population and within the CEE/CIS region,
Ukraine relies heavily on exports for economic performance. Ukraine's total exports of $81.76
billion in 2021 are slightly below half of Ukraine's GDP of $164.52. Given the importance of
exports in overall GDP, the overall economic growth strategy should be export-centric.
Figure 28: Ukraine YOY Exports (IMF BOP)
Ukraine's total export peak performance was reached in 2012. Euromaidan and the following war
in Donbas negatively affected overall exports, although Ukraine has materially recovered in both
goods and service exports in 2021. If Russia's current war in Ukraine had not happened, Ukraine
would likely have generated more exports in 2022 than any previous year.
$-
$10.00
$20.00
$30.00
$40.00
$50.00
$60.00
$70.00
$80.00
$90.00
$100.00
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Ukraine Exports ($b)
Goods Exports Service Exports
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 66
Figure 29: Ukrainian Exports Growth Rates (IMF)
Growth rates for goods exports exceeded service exports for the previous 15-years and from 2015
to 2021 (lowest export performance post-Euromaidan and the war in Donbas).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
15 Year Growth 2015-2021 Growth
Ukrainian Goods & Services Growth Rate
Goods Exports Service Exports
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 67
Table 1: Top Ukrainian Exports (IMF, UN COMTRADE, Hatch)
Export
2021 ($B)
Growth
from
2015
15 Year
Growth
Job
Displacement
Risk
Iron and steel
$13.14
63%
-21%
Cereals
$11.84
96%
1451%
Other Services
$10.84
127%
269%
ICT Services
$7.11
238%
1847%
Ores, slag and ash
$7.03
217%
536%
Animal or Vegetable Fats
$6.90
109%
302%
Electric Machinery
$3.17
60%
41%
Other Business Services
$3.07
70%
137%
Nuclear Reactors, Parts, etc.
$2.12
8%
-23%
?
Oil Seeds
$2.12
43%
217%
Wood and Wood Articles
$1.94
75%
134%
Food industries, residues and wastes
thereof; prepared animal fodder
$1.73
73%
410%
Iron or steel articles
$1.24
36%
-57%
Furniture
$1.03
159%
259%
Plastics and articles thereof
$0.95
178%
35%
Inorganic chemicals
$0.95
-2%
-18%
Meat and edible meat offal
$0.83
119%
687%
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products
$0.74
52%
-72%
Fertilizers
$0.63
18%
-52%
Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering
materials, lime and cement
$0.50
27%
-7%
Paper and paperboard; articles of paper
pulp, of paper or paperboard
$0.45
-15%
-35%
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco
substitutes
$0.45
28%
145%
Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk;
pastrycooks' products
$0.41
51%
143%
Dairy
$0.39
0%
-38%
Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or
melons
$0.34
118%
138%
Out of Ukraine's top 25 exports (goods and services), only four are considered high-IP exports.
Over the next decade, all exports but three (general services, business services, ICT services)
have a high risk of job displacement due to the rise in adoption of 4th Industrial Revolution
technologies.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 68
ICT Service Exports, the 4th largest export accounting for $7.11 billion in 2021, is Ukraine's fastest
growing export with a 15-year growth rate of 1,847% and a 2015-2021 growth rate of 238%.
Export
2021 ($B)
2015 - 2021
Growth
15 Year
Growth
ICT Services
$7.11
238%
1847%
Cereals
$11.84
96%
1451%
Meat and edible meat
$0.83
119%
687%
Ores, slag and ash
$7.03
217%
536%
Food industries, residues and wastes thereof; prepared
animal fodder
$1.73
73%
410%
Table 2: Fastest Growing Ukrainian Exports (IMF BOP, UN COMTRADE)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 69
High-IP Exports
Export
Indicator Code
Type
2021
2015 2021
Growth
15-Year Growth
Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof
HS88
Goods
$0.07
-65%
-74%
Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property
BXSORL_BP6_USD
Services
$0.07
-19%
30%
Other Business Services
BXSOOB_BP6_USD
Services
$3.07
70%
137%
Other Business Services,
Technical, Trade-related, and Other
Business Services
BXSOOBTT_BP6_USD
Services
$1.57
65%
230%
Other Services, Credit
BXSO_BP6_USD
Services
$10.84
127%
269%
Telecommunications, Computer, and
Information Services
BXSOTCM_BP6_USD
Services
$7.11
238%
1847%
Telecommunications, Computer,
and Information Services,
Computer Services
BXSOTCMC_BP6_USD
Services
$6.94
316%
3779%
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts
thereof
HS85
Goods
$3.17
60%
41%
High-technology goods exports (2020)
TX.VAL.TECH.CD
Goods
$1.18
-21%
ICT goods exports (2020)
TX.VAL.ICTG.ZS.UN
Goods
$0.33
13%
-38%
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and
mechanical appliances; parts thereof
HS84
Goods
$2.12
8%
-23%
Optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking, medical or surgical
instruments and apparatus
HS90
Goods
$0.17
7%
-17%
Pharmaceutical products
HS30
Goods
$0.30
94%
133%
Photographic or cinematographic goods
HS37
Goods
$0.00
-11%
-78%
Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock
and parts thereof; railway or tramway track
fixtures
HS86
Goods
$0.29
38%
-84%
Ships, boats and floating structures
HS89
Goods
$0.16
56%
-25%
Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and
accessories thereof
HS95
Goods
$0.11
56%
60%
Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling
stock, and parts and accessories thereof
HS87
Goods
$0.16
-8%
-84%
Table 3: High-IP Ukrainian Exports (IMF BOP, UN COMTRADE)
Of special note, Ukraine's Computer Service Exports (a subcategory of ICT Service Exports)
achieved a 3,779% 15-year growth rate with the highest YOY growth rate in Ukraine's history from
2020 to 2021.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 70
High-Value Exports Per Capita Analysis
Figure 30: High-IP Exports Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF, UN, WB)
Dividing high-IP goods and services exports by population allows comparative analysis between
economies. While Ukraine's high-IP service industries are growing, per-capita performance is
lower than global and regional peer economies.
Figure 31: High-IP Service Exports Per Capita Regional Comparative (IMF BOP, WB)
Limiting the analysis to high-IP service exports (removing Ukraine's low high-IP goods exports
rate) continues to show a general underperformance against peer economies.
$22,915.24
$18,886.68
$17,438.18
$14,277.67
$12,021.64
$10,236.54
$10,034.95
$9,748.77
$9,638.92
$9,442.68
$7,685.72
$6,977.36
$6,487.50
$5,901.44
$4,340.41
$4,247.99
$4,025.48
$3,306.76
$2,494.49
$2,095.79
$1,873.72
$1,084.49
$662.32
$485.43
$415.40
$0.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$15,000.00
$20,000.00
$25,000.00
Switzerland
Netherlands
Belgium
Israel
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
United Kingdom
Estonia
Austria
Germany
Norway
Czechia
Bahrain
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Slovakia
Poland
Romania
Bulgaria
Belarus
Ukraine
Republic of Moldova
Russian Federation
High IP Goods & Service Exports Per Capita
$19,529.14
$14,456.57
$13,890.35
$12,871.23
$10,309.65
$9,235.69
$8,437.26
$8,021.18
$7,649.89
$6,860.74
$6,214.85
$5,492.96
$3,280.94
$3,088.37
$2,785.51
$2,478.32
$1,967.65
$1,866.88
$1,733.10
$1,563.09
$999.02
$614.21
$485.08
$478.21
$369.58
$-
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$15,000.00
$20,000.00
$25,000.00
Switzerland
Belgium
Netherlands
Israel
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Estonia
Austria
Iceland
Norway
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Czechia
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Romania
Bulgaria
Belarus
Lebanon
Ukraine
Republic of Moldova
Russian Federation
High-IP Service Exports Per Capita
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 71
ICT Exports
Information, computer, and telecom (ICT) services are forecasted to have high job growth globally
and represent Ukraine's fastest-growing export industry.
Breaking ICT exports down into service and goods exports demonstrates that Ukraine's tech
hardware export industry is materially trailing service exports. The result is not unexpected. ICT
hardware exports (goods exports) are highly sensitive to a country's risk profile- including
corruption rates.
Figure 32: Ukrainian YOY ICT Exports Per Capita (IMF BOP, WB)
$-
$20.00
$40.00
$60.00
$80.00
$100.00
$120.00
$140.00
$160.00
$180.00
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Ukrainian ICT Goods & Service Exports Per Capita
Tech Goods Exports Tech Service Exports
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 72
ICT Service Exports
Within ICT service exports (IMF BoP code BXSOTCM_BP6_USD for measurement in US dollars),
there are three subcategories:
1. Computer service exports (IMF BoP code BXSOTCMC_BP6_USD)
2. Information service exports (IMF BoP code BXSOTCMM_BP6_USD)
3. Telecommunication service exports (BXSOTCMT_BP6_USD)
Comparative analysis will primarily be performed using the top category (including all three
subcategories). For analysis, "Computer Service Exports" will be synonymous with "ICT Service
Exports." The reasoning is as follows:
1. Numerous countries do not report at the subcategory level.
2. Not all countries report subcategories the same way.
3. Computer service exports are the largest component of ICT service exports. In many cases,
computer service exports are materially equal to the value of the parent category.
ICT Service
Exports Total
($B)
Computer
Services ($B)
Telecom
Services ($B)
Information
Services ($B)
Computer
Services %
Telecom
Services %
Information
Services %
India
$119.52
$116.11
$3.07
$0.35
97.14%
2.57%
0.29%
Israel
$41.23
$40.98
$0.25
$0.00
99.39%
0.61%
0.00%
Belgium
$17.79
$13.42
$3.54
$0.82
75.47%
19.89%
4.64%
Poland
$11.58
$10.33
$0.64
$0.61
89.17%
5.56%
5.27%
Ukraine
$7.11
$6.94
$0.12
$0.05
97.69%
1.63%
0.68%
Romania
$8.25
$6.03
$1.03
$1.19
73.09%
12.44%
14.47%
Portugal
$3.89
$3.41
$0.41
$0.07
87.67%
10.54%
1.79%
Belarus
$3.22
$3.02
$0.17
$0.03
93.85%
5.31%
0.84%
Estonia
$2.08
$1.65
$0.25
$0.18
79.41%
11.83%
8.76%
Latvia
$1.13
$0.72
$0.35
$0.06
64.09%
30.87%
5.05%
Table 4: ICT Service Exports Subcategories (IMF BOP)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 73
ICT Service Exports Per Capita
Although Ukraine's ICT Service Exports have rapidly grown in recent years, Ukraine
underperforms against all peer economies and reference models.
Figure 33: ICT Service Exports Per Capita Regional Comparatives (IMF BOP, WB)
Figure 34: ICT Service Exports Per Capita by Region (IMF BOP, WB)
$4,393.32
$2,703.12
$1,654.59
$1,555.69
$1,531.23
$1,513.07
$1,264.00
$1,161.17
$624.40
$596.31
$576.01
$565.32
$528.20
$499.60
$491.02
$430.13
$393.98
$356.97
$344.01
$305.30
$303.00
$301.16
$163.50
$154.76
$50.23
$-
$500.00
$1,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,000.00
$2,500.00
$3,000.00
$3,500.00
$4,000.00
$4,500.00
$5,000.00
Israel
Finland
Sweden
Estonia
Belgium
Switzerland
Denmark
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Latvia
Czechia
Bahrain
Lithuania
Norway
Germany
Romania
Bulgaria
Slovakia
Belarus
Poland
Qatar
Hungary
Ukraine
Republic of Moldova
Russian Federation
Comparative Economies ICT Service Exports Per Capita $
$4,580.04
$1,993.56
$559.14
$511.88
$346.43
$307.61
$286.74
$196.08
$163.50
$137.63
$73.96
$59.29
$53.56
$26.27
$22.07
$14.24
$10.54
$4.22
$-
$500.00
$1,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,000.00
$2,500.00
$3,000.00
$3,500.00
$4,000.00
$4,500.00
$5,000.00
Northern Europe
Western Europe
Western Asia
Northern America
South-eastern Asia
Eastern Europe
Southern Europe
Australia and New
Zealand
Ukraine
Eastern Asia
Latin America and
the Caribbean
Polynesia
Micronesia
Southern Asia
Melanesia
Northern Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central Asia
ICT Service Exports Per Capita by Region
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 74
Figure 36: ICT Service Exports by ICT Graduate % Quintile (UNESCO, IMF BOP, WB)
$2,068.79
$579.92
$287.53 $205.90 $284.70 $163.50
$-
$500.00
$1,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,000.00
$2,500.00
Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Bottom Quintile Ukraine
ICT Service Exports Per Capita by ICT Graduate % Quintile
$1,616.04
$353.75
$163.50
$51.64 $36.17 $45.64
$-
$200.00
$400.00
$600.00
$800.00
$1,000.00
$1,200.00
$1,400.00
$1,600.00
$1,800.00
Top Quintile 2nd Quintile Ukraine 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Bottom Quintile
ICT Service Exports Per Capita by Tertiary Education Rate Quintile
Figure 35: ICT Service Exports Per Capita by Education Quintile (IMF, UNESCO, WB)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 75
$2,187.00
$338.70
$163.50 $117.56 $23.28 $6.65
$-
$500.00
$1,000.00
$1,500.00
$2,000.00
$2,500.00
Top Quintile 2nd Quintile Ukraine 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Bottom Quintile
ICT Service Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile
Figure 37: ICT Service Exports Per Capita by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF BOP, WB)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 76
ICT Service Exports Growth
Ukraine had a material increase in the ICT Service Export and ICT Service Export Per Capita
growth rate from 2020 to 2021. Ukraine's growth rate ranks among the highest economies that
have reported IMF BoP data in 2021. Although Ukraine's growth rate increase is notable:
1. Numerous countries have increased total ICT Service Exports value YOY well above Ukraine.
Israel is an example. Ireland's ICT Service Exports Per Capita by $8.83 thousand from 2020
to 2021.
2. Some countries have increased growth rates and total ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ value
YOY from 2020 to 2021. Of special note, Estonia had a higher growth rate (84%) and ICT
Service Exports Per Capita $ of $710.62.
Figure 38: YOY ICT Service Exports Growth Rate Regional Comparative (IMF, WB)
$60.26
$710.62
$80.77
$54.57
$11.45
$46.11
$61.75
$105.24
$139.04
$102.94
$39.22
$80.51
$94.87
$8,827.12
$57.04
$56.59
$812.04
$9.04
$253.65
$56.14
$241.50
$48.83
$65.80
$86.38
$85.62
$56.81
$364.79
$63.66
$136.72
$-
$1,000.00
$2,000.00
$3,000.00
$4,000.00
$5,000.00
$6,000.00
$7,000.00
$8,000.00
$9,000.00
$10,000.00
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
Samoa
Estonia
Montenegro
North Macedonia
Albania
Ukraine
Republic of Korea
Portugal
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Republic of Moldova
Serbia
Uruguay
Ireland
Spain
Poland
Israel
Russian Federation
Switzerland
Belarus
Belgium
Croatia
Romania
Czechia
Latvia
Slovenia
Finland
Germany
Denmark
2020 - 2021 YOY ICT Service Exports Per Capita Growth Rate
YOY Growth $ YOY Growth %
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 77
Figure 39: ICT Service Exports YOY Growth % by Region (IMF BOP, WB)
Comparing Ukraine's 2020-2021 YOY growth in ICT Service Exports $ against all global regions
demonstrates Ukraine's overall success. Ukraine's growth rate of 39% is well above the Eastern
European average of 22%.
Ukraine's 2020-2021 ICT Service Exports Per Capita YOY growth rate overperformed by every
reasonable model.
95%
39%
27% 24% 23% 22% 22% 20% 12% 9% 9% 8% 7% 4% 1%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Polynesia
Ukraine
Southern Europe
Eastern Asia
Northern Europe
Southern Asia
Eastern Europe
Australia and New
Zealand
Western Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Asia
Latin America and
the Caribbean
Northern America
South-eastern Asia
Central Asia
ICT Service Exports Per Capita YOY Growth % by Region
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 78
Figure 42: ICT Service Exports Growth Rate by ICT Grad % Quintile
ICT Service Exports Per Capita YOY Growth % by ICT Graduate %
39%
19% 17%
13% 12%
7%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Ukraine Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Bottom Quintile
ICT Service Exports Per Capita YOY Growth % by Tertiary Education Rate
Quintile
39%
19% 16% 15% 15%
1%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Ukraine 4th Quintile Top Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile Bottom Quintile
ICT Service Exports Per Capita YOY Growth % by CPI Quintile
Figure 40: ICT Service Exports Growth Rate by Education Quintile (IMF BOP, UNESCO, WB)
Figure 41: ICT Service Exports YOY Growth % by CPI Quintile (TI, IMF, WB)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 79
While Ukraine's 2020-2021 ICT Service Exports YOY Growth is notable, it is not an anomaly.
Ukraine has been climbing the global ranks in total ICT Service Exports $ and ICT Service Exports
Per Capita $ global rankings for over twenty years. Ukraine's global rankings did not significantly
decline following Euromaidan and the outbreak of war in Donbas.
Figure 43: ICT Service Exports $ Global Rank (IMF BOP)
Figure 44: ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ Global Rank (IMF BOP)
37 34 34 33 33 33 29 28 29 27
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
ICT Service Exports Industry Value $ Global Rank
Poland Romania Russian Federation Ukraine
Belarus Estonia Lithuania Latvia
85 82
74 74 71 76 71
63 57 50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ Global Rank
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Romania
Belarus Poland Ukraine Russian Federation
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 80
Figure 45: Ukraine Forecasted ICT Service Export Growth (IMF BOP, Hatch)
Pre-war, Ukraine would have likely reached the $16.5 billion ICT Service Export value noted in
President Zelensky's Diia City announcement mid-year 2026.
$-00
$5,000,000,000.00
$10,000,000,000.00
$15,000,000,000.00
$20,000,000,000.00
$25,000,000,000.00
$30,000,000,000.00
$35,000,000,000.00
$40,000,000,000.00
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
Ukraine Forecasted ICT Service Export Growth
Values Forecast Lower Confidence Bound Upper Confidence Bound
Diia City $16.5 b target
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 81
Causality
For this paper, Ukraine's ICT Service Exports Per Capita were modeled against all peer
economies using the following primary and secondary variables.
Secondary Model Variable
Primary Model Variable
Brand Awareness
Ease of Doing Business
Corruption
Country Reputation
Crime Rates
Confidence in Gov
Equality
Existing SEZ
ICT Graduate %
Labor Cost
MNC Involvement
National Dev. Plan
Population
Regional Comparatives
STEM Graduate %
Talent Flight Rate
Tertiary Education Rate
Workforce Reputation
Working Capital
Brand Awareness
Ease of Doing Business
Corruption
Country Reputation
Crime Rates
Confidence in Gov
Equality
Existing SEZ
ICT Graduate %
Labor Cost
MNC Involvement
National Dev. Plan
Population
Regional Comparatives
STEM Graduate %
Talent Flight Rate
Tertiary Education Rate
Workforce Reputation
Working Capital
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 82
Figure 46: Ukrainian IT Industry Underperformance Correlations
The sparsity of data in some models prevents from making direct causality statements. However,
enough data exists to indicate the root cause for Ukraine's low ICT Service Exports Per Capita
score.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 83
Confidence Crisis Cycle
Data indicates low ICT Service Exports Per Capita performance is rooted in a significant crisis in
confidence among the Ukrainian population.
With high corruption rates, a lack of a cohesive industry development plan matured to levels seen
in peer nations, and no material involvement from international employers, the greater Ukrainian
population has not believed in the potential of the technology industry. Without faith, Ukrainians
have left the country in near-record numbers preceding the Russian invasion in February 2022.
With a high talent flight rate, Ukraine has difficulty creating the critical mass of elite talent needed
for the technology industry to thrive.
Ukraine's 2021 ICT Service Exports growth may have indicated that the greater population was
beginning to believe. Ukraine may have been entering a transitionary phase with higher growth
rates on the horizon. However, the Russian invasion in February 2022 likely set back the
confidence of the Ukrainian population for well over a decade.
Figure 47: Ukraine ICT Service Exports Underperformance Causality (Hatch)
1
3
2
Corruption
No MNCs
Confidence
Crisis
4
Talent Flight
5
6
No Critical Mass
7
Cycle Repeats
No Cohesive Strategy
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 84
Ukrainian
Potential
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 85
Growth Industries
Twenty-four out of Ukraine's 25 top exports will likely be supply constrained by 2030. Ukraine's
total exports within each will be limited by the country's ability to produce. While most exports
have a material opportunity for growth in total value, only high-value service exports have a low
threat of job displacement from automation and other new technologies.
Ukraine's ICT Service Exports industry has the greatest chance for transformative industry value
and job growth among high-value service exports.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 86
Export
2021 ($B)
Growth from 2015
15 Year Growth
Job Displacement
Risk
Iron and steel
$13.14
63%
-21%
Cereals
$11.84
96%
1451%
Other Services
$10.84
127%
269%
ICT Services
$7.11
238%
1847%
Ores, slag and ash
$7.03
217%
536%
Animal or Vegetable Fats
$6.90
109%
302%
Electric Machinery
$3.17
60%
41%
Other Business Services
$3.07
70%
137%
Nuclear Reactors, Parts, etc.
$2.12
8%
-23%
?
Oil Seeds
$2.12
43%
217%
Wood and Wood Articles
$1.94
75%
134%
Food industries, residues and wastes thereof;
prepared animal fodder
$1.73
73%
410%
Iron or steel articles
$1.24
36%
-57%
Furniture
$1.03
159%
259%
Plastics and articles thereof
$0.95
178%
35%
Inorganic chemicals
$0.95
-2%
-18%
Meat and edible meat offal
$0.83
119%
687%
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products
$0.74
52%
-72%
Fertilizers
$0.63
18%
-52%
Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials,
lime and cement
$0.50
27%
-7%
Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of
paper or paperboard
$0.45
-15%
-35%
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes
$0.45
28%
145%
Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk;
pastrycooks' products
$0.41
51%
143%
Dairy
$0.39
0%
-38%
Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons
$0.34
118%
138%
Table 5: Ukrainian Exports
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 87
Within ICT Service Exports, comparative economies indicate Ukraine's potential for growth.
1. Israel generates $4,393.32 ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ with a 2027 forecast of
$8,648.69, given Israel's 5-year growth rate.
2. Estonia generates $1,555.69 ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ with a 2027 forecast of
$5,525.91, given Estonia's 5-year growth rate.
3. The average ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ for the Eastern European region is $307.61,
with a forecasted value of $698.33 in 2027.
4. Ukraine currently generates $163.50 ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ after a significant YOY
growth into 2021. Given Ukraine's current 5-year growth rate, Ukraine's forecasted 2027 value
would have been $520.84, excluding the current war. Ukraine's Diia City announcement called
for a total ICT Service Exports industry value of $19.5 billion- or $396.16 given a static 2021
population. Ukraine's natural growth rate would have taken the ICT Service Export industry
past Diia City's forecast by 2027 if Russia had not invaded the country in February 2022.
Given:
1. Ukraine's tertiary education rate,
2. The threat of job displacement in 22 out of Ukraine's 25 top exports,
3. The risk tolerance of ICT Service Exports industries,
4. Demonstrated willingness from MNCs to invest in and facilitate large-scale workforce
development programs,
5. And speed to scale ICT Service Exports,
Ukraine should set the ICT Service Export industry as a national strategic priority with a higher
target than the current stated policy (CSP) and noted Diia City targets. Given comparative
economies, Ukraine's 10-year post-war ICT Service Exports Per Capita target should be $1,500.
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 88
Targets
Given the growth in demand for technical services as the world transitions through the 4th
Industrial Revolution, ICT Service Exports will continue to rise.
The table below lists each comparative economy's current ICT Service Exports Per Capita and
forecasts its 2027 value given the 5-year growth rate specific to the economy.
Comparative Economies
Current (2021)
ICT Service
Exports Per
Capita $
5 Year Growth
Forecasted
2027 Value $
Northern Europe
$5,018.97
216%
$10,850.06
Israel
$4,393.32
197%
$8,648.69
Estonia
$1,555.69
355%
$5,525.91
Finland
$2,703.12
187%
$5,043.75
India IT Cities
$2,000.00
150%
$3,000.00
Europe
$1,633.71
192%
$3,139.54
Top Tertiary Education Rate Quintile
$1,616.04
183%
$2,963.10
Lithuania
$528.20
458%
$2,420.66
Belgium
$1,531.23
157%
$2,408.53
Denmark
$1,264.00
176%
$2,223.75
Ukraine $1,500 Target
$1,500.00
Latvia
$596.31
199%
$1,184.22
Czechia
$576.01
187%
$1,079.56
Bulgaria
$393.98
258%
$1,017.72
Romania
$430.13
227%
$975.51
Belarus
$344.01
281%
$966.40
Eastern Europe
$307.61
227%
$698.33
Poland
$305.30
218%
$665.01
Ukraine
$163.50
319%
$520.84
Ukraine Diia City
$396.16
Hungary
$301.16
153%
$462.14
Table 6: Ukraine ICT Service Exports Targets (Hatch)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 89
Multiplying the comparative ICT Service Exports Per Capita $ rate against Ukraine's 2021
population indicates Ukraine's potential ICT Service Exports total industry value.
Model
Ukraine's ICT
Service Exports
($b) 2021 Model
Ukraine's ICT
Service Exports
($b) 2027 Model
Northern Europe
$209.04
$451.90
Israel
$182.98
$360.22
Estonia
$64.79
$230.15
Finland
$112.58
$210.07
India IT Cities
$83.30
$124.95
Europe
$68.04
$130.76
Top Tertiary Education Rate Quintile
$67.31
$123.41
Lithuania
$22.00
$100.82
Belgium
$63.78
$100.32
Denmark
$52.65
$92.62
Ukraine $1,500 Target
$62.48
Latvia
$24.84
$49.32
Czechia
$23.99
$44.96
Bulgaria
$16.41
$42.39
Romania
$17.91
$40.63
Belarus
$14.33
$40.25
Eastern Europe
$12.81
$29.09
Poland
$12.72
$27.70
Ukraine
$7.11
$21.69
Ukraine Diia City
$16.50
Hungary
$12.54
$19.25
Table 7: Forecasted ICT Service Exports Value (Hatch)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 90
Achieving these targets translates to the following job growth. Of special note:
1. Ukraine would need to match Finland's 2027 forecasted ICT Service Exports Per Capita rate
of $5.5k before total technology jobs created in Ukraine would clear a point of materiality in
resolving the forecasted shortage of 85 million tech and tech-enabled jobs by 2030.
2. Without adjusting the ICT Service Exports value per worker, Ukraine would have 1.79 million
tech workers by reaching the $1,500 per capita target. Using 2021 populations, 1.79 million
developers would place Ukraine between Hyderabad and Israel in developer density within
the greater population.
Model
Total Tech Jobs
(Thousand) 2021
Model
Total Tech Jobs
(Thousand) 2027
Model
% Forecasted
Skilled Talent
Shortage 2021
Model
% Forecasted
Skilled Talent
Shortage 2027
Model
Northern Europe
5,973
12,912
7.03%
15.19%
Israel
5,228
10,292
6.15%
12.11%
Estonia
1,851
6,576
2.18%
7.74%
Finland
3,217
6,002
3.78%
7.06%
India IT Cities
2,380
3,570
2.80%
4.20%
Europe
1,944
3,736
2.29%
4.40%
Top Tertiary Education Rate Quintile
1,923
3,526
2.26%
4.15%
Lithuania
629
2,881
0.74%
3.39%
Belgium
1,822
2,866
2.14%
3.37%
Denmark
1,504
2,646
1.77%
3.11%
Ukraine $1,500 Target
1,785
2.10%
Latvia
710
1,409
0.83%
1.66%
Czechia
685
1,285
0.81%
1.51%
Bulgaria
469
1,211
0.55%
1.42%
Romania
512
1,161
0.60%
1.37%
Belarus
409
1,150
0.48%
1.35%
Eastern Europe
366
831
0.43%
0.98%
Poland
363
791
0.43%
0.93%
Ukraine
220
620
0.23%
0.73%
Ukraine Diia City
471
0.55%
Hungary
358
550
0.42%
0.65%
Table 8: Forecasted Job Growth (Hatch)
2022 © Phil Hatch
Akholi.com
Page 91
Target Justification
Naturalized Growth
Figure 48: Ukraine YOY University Graduates (UNESCO)
To achieve a target of $1.5 thousand ICT Service Exports $ Per Capita, Ukraine would need to
add 1.57 million technology workers (up from 220,000). Using standardized data from UNESCO
UIS, Ukraine generates 92.66 thousand STEM graduates per year (2020 performance). In a
perfect model without talent flight or an increase in STEM graduation rates, Ukraine likely would
hit this target within a 15 to 18-year timeframe- or well within a 20-year development cycle.