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Proceedings of 10th International Multidisciplinary Conference on
Economics, Business, Technology and Social Sciences
Date: 11-12 June, 2022
Venue: Colosseum Marina Hotel, Batumi, Georgia (In-person and Online)
Conference Academic Committee
Prof. Shakir Ullah, University of Maryland Global Campus
Prof. Valentin Molina-Moreno, University of Granada
Prof. Arzuhan Burcu Gultekin, Gazi University
Prof. Cem Karadeli, Ufuk University
Prof. Nazira Kakulia, Tbilisi State University
Prof. Manuel Rios de Haro, University of Granada
Prof. Siwapong Dheera-aumpon, Kasetsart University
Prof. Vakhtang Chkareuli, Business and Technology University
Prof. Mesut Unlu, Ufuk University
Prof. Tsotne Zhghenti, Business and Technology University
Prof. Janardan Krishna Yadav, Jindal Global Business School
Prof. Erkan Erdil, Middle East Technical University
Prof. Jaan Masso, University of Tartu
Conference Organizational Committee
Prof. Tsotne Zhghenti, EIRD
Prof. Vakhtang Chkareuli, EIRD
© European Institute for Research and Development
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International Factors Influencing the National Security Strategy of the South Caucasus
David Peikrishvili
PhD student, Faculty of Social Sciences, at Caucasus International University
E-mail: david.peikrishvili@ciu.edu.ge
Abstract
Discussion of the section for the countries of the South Caucasus region is very relevant. As you
know, the reason for this lies in the existing unresolved conflicts, which hinder the joint efforts of
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
It should be noted that if the countries of the South Caucasus fail to develop a national security sector,
they will lose much of their support from the international community. This, in turn, will lead to a
significant decrease in the international commitment to resolve the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.
Therefore, the three countries of the South Caucasus region need to develop a new agenda that will
help them build a stable democracy. The main efforts for this should be made by Armenians,
Azerbaijanis and Georgians. However, the international community, and especially the US, the
European Union and Russia must join their political forces to promote the development of free
societies in these three countries, which we will discuss in more detail in this article.
Using the method of comparative analysis, I will try to identify international factors influencing the
national security strategy of the South Caucasus. The article will be considered through the prism of
the basic concepts of international relations.
Keywords: Regional Security, Stability, South Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan.
Introduction
In the last decade, the foreign policy of all three countries of the South Caucasus has been much more
dependent on regional security than it is now. As you know, despite the similarities in history, size,
location and political systems, due to their involvement in interstate and intrastate military conflicts,
the three states of the South Caucasus have chosen different paths of a foreign political union. Their
multi-vector foreign policy strategies have strengthened the positions of non-regional actors. They are
witnessing increasingly tense relations between Russia and the West in foreign policy.
The small and essentially weak states of the South Caucasus, experiencing protracted ethno-territorial
conflicts with a sense of insecurity about their larger neighbours, are looking for allies with external
regional actors to ensure their survival and security.
B. Buzan and O. Wæver define the regional security complex as a set of actors whose securitization
and de-securitization are so intertwined that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed
independently of each other
1
.
A closer examination shows that the South Caucasus does not have the general characteristics that
would qualify it as such. Although the South Caucasus does not have many of the attributes of a
region, there is one major common denominator - the interconnected security risks. The main security
threats perceived by these states come from the region, even from its immediate vicinity. Any security
dynamic that significantly affects one of the three countries has a clear impact on the other two. Thus,
the South Caucasus qualifies as a separate regional security complex.
B. Buzan and O. Wæver also talk about the South Caucasus as a separate security division
1
. Svante
Cornell, one of the leading researchers of the South Caucasus, also argues that without the "variable
security" the South Caucasus can hardly be called a full-fledged region
2
.
1
Barry Buzan & Ole Wæver (2003), Regions and Powers: The Struture of International Security, Cambridge
University Press, p. 44
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The South Caucasus is very rich in deep historical enmity and friendship, such as the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict, the military actions of Armenia against Turkey, the Georgian separatist conflict
with national minorities, and the friendship of Azerbaijan and Armenia with Turkey and Russia,
respectively. The roots of this enmity and friendship date back to the early 1900s, especially during the
period of independence of 1918-20, which was characterized by wars and massacres - the inevitable
result of the sharp intersection of territorial claims and hopeless mixing of the population. This short
historical period, outside of direct Russian imperial rule, "now occupies a place of honour in the
nationalist narratives of all the peoples of the South Caucasus as a hotbed of resentment and identity"
3
.
Speaking of the European factor, we can start with the EU project in 1993, when the Europe-
Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) transport corridor project was launched. It is important to note that the
purpose of this project was to connect Europe with the South Caucasus and Asia, bypassing the
territory of Russia. Subsequently, the EU established the Eastern Partnership to deepen relations with
Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and other countries.
In addition to EU-led projects, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) - the organization's
three-member countries - is also seen as a common framework for bridging economic gaps and
working together to bring stability to the region
4
.
As in the CIS, GUUAM is perceived as a subgroup of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
5
subgroup, and the regional interests of powerful member states (Russia, Turkey and Greece) often
conflict with each other, hindering the success of cooperation
6
.
It is noteworthy that the EU is interested in cooperation with Azerbaijan on natural resources, as it sees
Azerbaijan's oil and gas as an alternative to Russian energy sources. At the same time, Georgia's main
foreign policy priority is accession to the European Union. In June 2014, Georgia signed an
Association Agreement with the European Union, which provided for the creation of a deep and
comprehensive free trade area between them. Armenia also seeks to strengthen cooperation with the
EU and signed an Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 2017.
As for the influence of the United States, after the collapse of the USSR, they developed relations with
the countries of the South Caucasus and strengthened their positions in the region. The United States
has established a strategic partnership with Georgia, whose concept of national security includes
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All this is contrary to the interests of
Russia, which is trying to contain the expansion of NATO along its borders. Russia sees this as a
challenge to national security.
The fact is that Georgia paid dearly for cooperation with the United States, losing control over
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region because Moscow recognized them as independent states, in
response to the recognition of Kosovo's independence. As for Armenia and Azerbaijan, the US
established relations with them in 1992. It should be noted that Armenia is a military ally of Russia, so
the agenda of relations between Armenia and the United States is limited. It is noteworthy that the
American company invested in oil and gas production facilities in the country, and the US military
used Azerbaijan as a springboard for operations in Afghanistan.
1
Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear; The National Security Problem in International Relations, (Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1983), p. 106
2
Svante Cornel (2001), Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus,
RoutledgeCurzon, p. 383
3
Kevork Oskanian (September 2010) “Weaving Webs of Insecurity: Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-
Soviet South Caucasus”, PhD dissertation, London School of Economics, p. 25
4
A. Rondeli, “The Reflections of Globalization on the Security and Strategies of the Caucasus”, op cit., p.246
5
W. Schneider-Deters, “GUUAM: The Need for a Raison d’etré”, Insight Turkey, 3/4, 2001, p.115.
6
T. Pataria and D. Darchiashvili, op cit, p.159
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Interestingly, Russia still sees the South Caucasus in its sphere of influence. Armenia is a military ally
of Russia, and Moscow has a military base in Gyumri, Armenia's second-largest city, and an airfield in
the capital, Yerevan. Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Armenia needs Russia to protect its western
borders with Azerbaijan's main ally, Turkey, while Russia needs Armenia as a buffer to thwart the
plans of some Turkish politicians to create a pan-Turkish state that includes Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Central Asia and Xinjiang.
In light of current events, Turkey has gained strong political, economic, and military influence in the
South Caucasus. It will remain tied to Azerbaijan for a long time due to its special relationship and
growing influence. After the restoration of independence, Georgia established good relations with
Turkey. The two countries have signed a free trade agreement and Turkey is Georgia's main trading
partner.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Azerbaijan came together to cooperate in the
political, military, economic and energy fields. Both states share a common language and culture.
Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan is enormous, as Ankara strongly supports Baku in its conflict with
Armenia, unilaterally closing the Turkish-Armenian border. Turkey's participation in the 44-day war
for Artsakh was crucial as Turkish military intelligence and air power helped Azerbaijan defeat the
Artsakh-backed Armenian army, which was largely equipped with old weapons.
It is also important that China seeks to develop relations with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan within
the framework of its Global Infrastructure Exhibition "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR). China has
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Georgia and Azerbaijan, which are members of the Beijing-
led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Azerbaijan received a $600 million loan to build a
trans-Anatolian gas pipeline, while Georgia received a $114 million loan to build a bypass road.
Given the growing economic influence of China in the South Caucasus and its neighbours, the
countries of the region are very interested in implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR). This
seems to highlight how time is working for China, and Beijing's growing economic presence will also
give it more political influence shortly.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say that from the point of view of cooperation, the South Caucasus is ideally
located. The region includes small countries that can provide significant assistance to each other. They
have the opportunity to economically strengthen each other in terms of security and defend themselves
against the aggression of other states. On the contrary, the South Caucasus has experienced many
separatist conflicts and interstate wars.
Due to internal regional conflicts and inherent weaknesses of the state, the region is subject to the
influence of larger neighbours, which plays an important role in shaping the dynamics of regional
security. The fact is that membership or orientation towards conflict unions intensifies intra-regional
disagreements, which further reduces the chances for a peaceful resolution of conflicts in the South
Caucasus.
The fact is that the EU has long supported the countries of the South Caucasus in their efforts to
implement economic and social justice and public administration reforms. In particular, organizations
and institutions have emerged in Armenia and Georgia that protect human rights and freedom of
speech, link the two countries with the values of the EU and democratically transform them.
The US continues to fund and support political parties in the region, helping to weaken Russia's
influence and bring countries into the camp of the West. The countries of the South Caucasus continue
to develop ties with the United States to maintain a balance of power in the region.
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Bibliography
• Buzan B., & Wæver O., (2003), Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security,
Cambridge University Press
• Buzan B., (1983) People, State and Fear; The National Security Problem in International Relations,
(Brighton: Wheatsheaf)
• Cornel S., (2001), Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus,
RoutledgeCurzon
• Oskanian K., (2010) “Weaving Webs of Insecurity: Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-Soviet South
Caucasus”, PhD dissertation, London School of Economics
• Pataria T., and Darchiashvili D., (2003) “Security Regime Building in the South Caucasus”, in Graeme
P. Herd and Jennifer D.P. Moroney (eds.), “Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc”, London:
Routledge Curzon
• Rondeli A., (2003) “The Reflections of Globalization on the Security and Strategies of the Caucasus”,
in the Proceedings of the First International Symposium on “Globalization and International Security”,
The Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate (SAREM), Ankara: The
Turkish General Staff Printing House
• Schneider-Deters W., (2001) “GUUAM: The Need for a Raison d’etré”, Insight Turkey, 3/4
