No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
1. Introducing Small State Foreign Policy
... Although Serbia is not a typical example of a military-neutral state, it has been committed to this principle in its foreign policy since 2007, with the approval of the Serbian Parliament. Hey (2003) and Simpson (2020) also share the belief that small states are usually military neutral. Moreover, in Keohane's view (1969), their foreign policy is influenced by domestic factors. ...
... In light of the aforementioned definitions, the authors of this study consider that a small state is a territorial unit with fewer than 15 million people. The current research builds on Hey's (2003) concept of "small state foreign policy", which provides some essential insights. Hey has identified 10 characteristics that inform the behavioural patterns of the small states in international relations. ...
... The limited scope of our study has not allowed us to cover all of them. Hence, we have focused on three key aspects of their foreign policy: i.e., military neutrality, the efforts to join international organisations whenever possible, and the commitment to respect international law (Hey, 2003). These aspects and the way we tackled them in the empirical part of the study are further explained and justified. ...
The small states' foreign policy has long been a neglected topic in academic circles because the very definition of "small state" was discussed after World War II. However, in the accelerated dynamics of the global security, foreign policy of small states is gradually gaining importance. This study aims to clarify Serbia's foreign policy orientation in the context of the security developments related to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which has forced many states to reassess their security policy. Using a case study approach, the authors seek to highlight if Serbia's foreign policy is built on the general premises of the small states' foreign policy, and how its specific features enable Serbia's balancing act. For this purpose, three characteristics of the small states' foreign policy have been selected: military neutrality, efforts to join international organisations, and the commitment to fully respect international law. Based on expert interviews and the analysis carried out, the authors conclude that Serbia contradicts two theoretical assumptions about the foreign policy of these states, a fact that paradoxically helps Belgrade maintain close relations with both Brussels and Moscow. However, due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, an easier path to the EU opens for Belgrade, and this type of foreign policy could therefore come to an end.
... Ecuador es también un Estado "periférico" (Bonilla, 2002;Zepeda, 2010;Long, 2010) y "dependiente", cuyo rasgo más significativo es el alineamiento -foreign policy alignment-a los objetivos definidos por la potencia hegemónica, lo que incluye tanto el consentimiento como el consenso, en cuanto a valores compartidos de las élites locales con dicha potencia hegemónica (Hey, 1995;2003). Adicionalmente, es un Estado "pequeño" (Martz, 1996;Bonilla, 2002;Hey, 2003;Zepeda, 2010;Sánchez, 2011), aclarando que esta última categoría no hace referencia solo a una dimensión geográfico-territorial, sino que tiene implicaciones en su comportamiento en la arena internacional. ...
... Ecuador es también un Estado "periférico" (Bonilla, 2002;Zepeda, 2010;Long, 2010) y "dependiente", cuyo rasgo más significativo es el alineamiento -foreign policy alignment-a los objetivos definidos por la potencia hegemónica, lo que incluye tanto el consentimiento como el consenso, en cuanto a valores compartidos de las élites locales con dicha potencia hegemónica (Hey, 1995;2003). Adicionalmente, es un Estado "pequeño" (Martz, 1996;Bonilla, 2002;Hey, 2003;Zepeda, 2010;Sánchez, 2011), aclarando que esta última categoría no hace referencia solo a una dimensión geográfico-territorial, sino que tiene implicaciones en su comportamiento en la arena internacional. Como Estado "pequeño" ha sido vulnerable y débil internacionalmente; su política exterior ha sido reactiva a los inputs del exterior, e internamente ha estado poco cohesionado por la fragilidad de su aparato institucional (Bonilla, 2002). ...
... Como Estado "pequeño" ha sido vulnerable y débil internacionalmente; su política exterior ha sido reactiva a los inputs del exterior, e internamente ha estado poco cohesionado por la fragilidad de su aparato institucional (Bonilla, 2002). Hey (2003) ha propuesto varias características dentro de la categorización de los Estados "pequeños", de las que recuperamos cuatro para situar el caso ecuatoriano: i) preferir posiciones basadas en la neutralidad; ii) confiar su protección, asociación y recursos a países con mayor peso relativo; iii) temáticas de política exterior limitadas y reducidas, y iv) una baja participación en los asuntos mundiales. ...
La política exterior ecuatoriana ha estado determinada por sus condiciones de Estado “dependiente”, “periférico” y “pequeño”. El país andino ha tenido un histórico comportamiento neutral, plegado al multilateralismo, y de promoción de la integración subregional. A partir de 2007, la aprobación de un nuevo texto constitucional y la planificación en esta área de gobierno determinaron una serie de rupturas y continuidades, a la vez que potenciaron cierto liderazgo en el impulso de la integración regional, así como el respaldo de nuevas ideas —desde la perspectiva coxiana— que sirvieron de marco de relación con el resto de actores del sistema internacional. Este análisis tiene por objetivo analizar cuáles son las perspectivas históricas y actuales de la (des)integración regional de Ecuador, sus principales hitos, y las decisiones institucionales de continuidad y ruptura. Para ello se revisan sus documentos de planificación en política exterior y relaciones internacionales, así como los principales posicionamientos de sus líderes.
... En este trabajo se analizará a los Estados pequeños a partir del segundo enfoque, coincidiendo con algunos autores en la afirmación de que el tamaño pequeño no se traduce automáticamente en vulnerabilidad en el ámbito internacional (ej. Gigleux 2016;Browning 2006;Hey 2003a;Moolakkattu 2005). Así, en el caso de Ecuador las percepciones propias y de las partes sobre su condición de pequeño pueden explicar por qué fue aceptado para ser garante del proceso. ...
... Para el estudio de los Estados pequeños no es fácil hallar una sola definición. Hey argumenta inclusive que "una definición precisa no es necesaria, apelando a lo contingente" (Hey 2003a). Sin embargo, como se explicó anteriormente, las definiciones de teorías positivistas son limitadas en su explicación. ...
... Primero, la literatura tradicional sugiere que los Estados pequeños están controlados por las estructuras internacionales, aunque resulta evidente que también hay una influencia desde la estructura nacional y el líder de turno. Segundo, la prominencia de la teoría realista y su concepto de seguridad no reflejan las prioridades de los Estados pequeños (Hey 2003a). Con esta segunda premisa coincide Wilcox (1967) al señalar que la política mundial contemporánea demuestra que no existe una clara correlación entre la riqueza y fuerza militar y la capacidad de influir. ...
Este trabajo de investigación busca comprender la conducta de un Estado pequeño ante un Estado vecino y un grupo armado no estatal en una coyuntura de búsqueda de paz. Además, permite analizar cómo los roles de política exterior de un Estado se configuran en un doble sentido a través de las motivaciones nacionales y de las percepciones de los actores involucrados. Este estudio confirma el argumento avanzado por muchos autores de que los Estados pequeños, al no tener capacidades materiales prominentes, utilizan la facilitación de paz como herramienta de política exterior para acrecentar su influencia en el sistema internacional. En este caso se encuentra además que la seguridad interna es otra motivación que tuvo el Ecuador para participar como garante en el proceso de negociaciones de paz entre el gobierno colombiano y el ELN, debido a que se espera que la firma de la paz del gobierno colombiano con los actores armados del país vecino contribuya a una mejora de su seguridad en las fronteras. Asimismo, el refugio colombiano en el Ecuador fue otro motivo para que el país estuviese interesado en facilitar una salida pacífica al conflicto armado en Colombia, pues este, además de ser un problema de seguridad, involucra costos económicos importantes. Este rol, a más de partir de una concepción nacional, fue aceptado por otros actores como el gobierno colombiano, el ELN y la sociedad ecuatoriana, los cuales percibían que el rol de garante era adecuado para el Ecuador.
Palabras clave: Estados pequeños, proceso de paz, roles, Ecuador, Colombia
... Small state definitions explain variables based on objective and subjective elements. The objective elements are quantitative and material attributes of a state including geography, landscape, natural resources, military and nuclear capabilities (Galal, 2020;Hey, 2003). Subjective elements compare states with other small, medium and great powers based on the size, population and GDP; consider the domestic and external perception of a state's role in the international hierarchy and external behavior (Galal, 2020;Hey, 2003). ...
... The objective elements are quantitative and material attributes of a state including geography, landscape, natural resources, military and nuclear capabilities (Galal, 2020;Hey, 2003). Subjective elements compare states with other small, medium and great powers based on the size, population and GDP; consider the domestic and external perception of a state's role in the international hierarchy and external behavior (Galal, 2020;Hey, 2003). In this regard, the size of a nation is relative to other great powers which are categorized as powerful on the basis of resources, defence, military and nuclear weapons. ...
China and India's competition and power struggle in the Indian Ocean is the new geopolitical reality. The arrival of an extra-regional power and India's concern of a Chinese presence has given Sri Lanka leverage in realizing its domestic and foreign policy goals, and relative bargaining power in convincing New Delhi to realize its interests. Meanwhile China card has posed challenges. Colombo’s strategy vis-à-vis this dynamic is influenced by domestic and international compulsions. By adopting bandwagon, balancing and strategic hedging strategies of small states, this paper evaluates how Sri Lanka navigated the power struggle during 2005–2019. This period marks a major shift in the international attention towards the Indian Ocean and therefore to the island nation. The paper concludes that as power struggle has intensified India and China's engagement in Sri Lanka, it has also allowed Sri Lanka to realize its own goals and objectives.
... Este número especial presenta algunos avances del ape en Colombia e introduce una nueva generación de analistas de la política exterior "más allá del Norte global", retomando la iniciativa analítica iniciada por autores como Hey (2003), Braveboy-Wagner y Snarr (2003) y Brummer y Hudson (2015). Su valor principal se halla en brindar a los lectores artículos de análisis de la política exterior colombiana, centrados en la aplicación de niveles de análisis, perspectivas teóricas y métodos de investigación. ...
... Küçük devletlerin varlığından bahsedilirken, 'küçük devletler nerede başlarlar ve biterler' tartışması da ortak bir karara bağlanabilmiş değildir. Bu bakımdan, uluslararası ilişkilerde küçük devlet kavramını kendilerine bir referans noktası alan araştırmaların, küçük devletten ne anladıklarını ortaya koydukları sürece, bu yaklaşımı bir tanımlama ve analiz birimi olarak kullanmalarının Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin zenginleşmesine katkıda bulunan bir unsur olarak ortaya çıktığı söylenebilir (Hey, 2003). Küçük devletleri tanımlama çabalarının ortaya çıkarttığı en genel manada bu devletleri tanımlarken referans alınabilecek ortak özellik ve niteliklerin siyasi, ekonomik ve yönetim sistemlerinin kısıtlı bir kapasiteye sahip olmalarıdır. ...
Küçük devletler, uluslararası alanda dış politikalarını rahat yürütebilmek ve güvenliklerini sağlamak için bireysel kısıtlı kapasitelerinin ötesinde etki sahibi olmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Bu doğrultuda küçük devletler, dış ilişkilerini yürütmek ve güvenliklerini sağlamak amacıyla kendilerinden güçlü devletler ile müttefik olma, ya da çoktaraflı ittifaklara dahil olma eğilimindedirler. Küçük devletler sınırlı imkanları dahilinde uluslararası konjonktürün getirdiklerini kendileri için en iyi şekilde değerlendirmek ve yapısal zayıflıklarının üstesinden gelerek varlık göstermeye çalışmaktadırlar. Bu makalede, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinin gelişimi çerçevesinde küçük devletlerin tarihsel olarak kavramsallaştırılması ve kuramsal çerçeveye oturtularak incelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda makale, küçük devletlerin güncel dış politika şekillendirme ve güvenlik sağlama eğilimlerinin odağına dengeleme ve ittifak oluşturma yaklaşımlarını alarak değerlendirme yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, küçük devlet çalışmalarına güncel bir analitik araç katkısı olarak geliştirilen ‘korunak arayışı’ yaklaşımı farklı küçük devlet vakaları üzerinden tartışılarak güncel konjonktürde küçük devletlerin uluslararası alandaki varlıkları ve sürdürdükleri politikaların boyutlarının daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkı sağlanması da hedeflenmektedir.
... This was largely reflective of the dominance of realism in Cold War era International Relations work; the structural impact of the distribution of power was seen as a key driver of small states' foreign policy orientation. In the post-Cold War era a growing body of work has acknowledged the importance of state-level considerations (Hey, 2003;Cooper & Shaw, 2009;Al-Mezaini & Rickli, 2017;Miller & Al-Marri, 2022;Long, 2022). Hey (2003, p. 9) claimed that the state-level was the least examined question in comparative foreign policy of small states yet a key factor in understanding international political decisions. ...
... Wendt 1992). According to this understanding 'small states' and 'great powers' cannot be deduced from objective (material) criteria but depend upon how decision-makers and population of the small state, as well as of other states, perceive the position, challenges and opportunities of the state (Hey 2003;Thorhallsson 2006). This creates an altogether more malleable understanding of small states, leaving more room for optimism with regard to their ability to influence international affairs, but brings also the risk of overestimating the opportunities and influence of small states and overlooking the effects of material inequality (Baldacchino and Wivel 2020a: 6). ...
The chapter aims to discuss what is meant by a ‘small state’ and outline a set of coping strategies that small states can use to address their vulnerabilities. It maps the conceptual and theoretical landscape evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of definitions of small states and discusses the strategic menu of small states in crises. The authors provide a theoretical overview, which takes account of internal and external features of small states in order to examine their methods to meet the challenges of crisis. The attention is on how small states cope with crises in terms of policy, resources and focus. Hence, the chapter provides an analytical anchor for unpacking coping strategies of small states in the case studies of the book. The motive is to initiate a discussion on how small states have responded to the migration crisis, what have been the constraints and advantages of small scale and how they can become better equipped, domestically and externally, to deal with crises in the future.
... As a result of these definitional challenges, it has become something of a cliché for small state researchers to note and opine on the lack of definitional clarity when it comes to their object of study, and most small state research begins with a fairly lengthy discussion of how the author has arrived at a particular definition (for example : Crowards, 2002;Dumieński, 2017;Hänggi, 1998;Hey, 2003;Kelly, 2013;Maass, 2009;Neemia-Mackenzie, 1995;Neumann and Gstohl, 2006;Ólafsson, 1998;Prasad, 2009). As a consequence, there is a fragmentary quality to the small state IR literature, and even today, small states remain an ill-defined and vaguely conceptualized category of political actor. ...
Mainstream international relations (IR) literature has long treated small states as marginal actors who exist on the periphery of global affairs. For many years, scholars have struggled to conclusively define the category of small statehood. Additionally, IR’s privileging of the theoretical paradigms of realism and neorealism when analyzing small state issues, has meant that, until recently, small states have been conceptualized as actors that struggle to make proactive foreign policy choices on their own terms. Despite this, small states, and particularly small island states in the Pacific region, appear to have many opportunities to engage in vibrant foreign policy endeavours in the present day. This article offers a review of small state IR literature, with a particular focus on small state foreign policy issues. It begins by reviewing the various approaches to defining small statehood, before turning to a review of how small state issues have been treated in broader IR. It posits that the small state IR literature can usefully be broken down into three distinct time periods—1959–1979, 1979–1992, and 1992–present—and reviews the literature within that framework, drawing out the theoretical through lines present in each distinct era.
... Moreover, the scope of actions and decisions that can lead to injurious consequences in small-state relations is not exhausted on issues of war and peace. Small states play a different game from that played by great powers, especially when it comes to defining what is and what is not a matter of core national interest (see for example Elman 1995;Hey 2003). The point here is to problematise what 'injurious effect' means and how it can have different manifestations in different contexts, whether they are measured against great power politics, asymmetric power relations, or symmetrical relations between small states. ...
... In addition, small states survived the imminent threats from big countries through balance of power [10,19,20,23,33]. The Portuguese colonial administration in Macau was ready to make occasional concessions to China and Taiwan but decline some of their demands in order to balance the two powers, avoid conflict escalation, and antagonize both sides too much. ...
Macau is a window to understand the struggle between China and Taiwan in foreign territories. Located at the doorstep of a giant nation, the Portuguese administration in Macau was once successful in striking a balance between Taiwan which maintained diplomatic relations with Portugal until 1975 on the one hand, and China, a communist regime that Portugal opposed on the other. The overspill of Cultural Revolution to Macau in 1966 and 1967 destructed the delicate balance. The 1966 “December 3 incident” and the aftermath were celebrated by pro-Beijing social elites as a victory of patriotic movement against oppressive colonialism. This came at a cost of Macau’s isolation from the major Chinese communities outside China, namely Taiwan and Hong Kong. The political radicalization was followed by expulsion of the pro-Taiwan elements, eviction of British and Hong Kong establishments and erosion of Portuguese sovereignty over Macau. The impact on Macau’s political social development lingered for decades.
... Some scholars question why small states matter, while others claim they play a more important role in international relations now than ever. 151 There is considerable complexity associated with labeling a state "small" due to an elusive definition of power in political science. Agreement does not exist on how to ultimately define a small state, 152 or how to measure their power and influence. ...
... Thus, a small state is 'the weak part in an asymmetric relationship' as noted in Steinmetz and Wivel [10]. 9 For discussions of this type of explanation of small state foreign policy behavior, see Browning [11], Hey [12], and Elman [13]. this type of explanation, we need to understand the historical and institutional peculiarities of a small state in order to understand its foreign policy. ...
This article asks why Denmark and Estonia have eagerly attempted to ‘punch above their weight’ in the transatlantic relationship since the end of the Cold War and shows how they differ in their strategies to do so. Using neoclassical realism as a theoretical point of departure, the article explains how a combination of changing constraints in the strategic environment and elite interpretations of how these changes affected national security resulted in ‘super atlanticist’ alliance policies in the two countries. Following this analysis, we discuss the future of super atlanticism.
... The widely recognized structural factor is systemic configuration, which is usually described in terms of the number of contending greater powers that engenders room for maneuvering by small states in between and the sizes of the small and medium states in the system that favor collective actions (Baldacchino 2012, Fox 1959, Midlarsky & Park 1991. The domestic conditions of small states in question are equally important, which are often related to their historical backgrounds, policy-making frameworks, participation of populations, (Hey 2003) and levels of economic development (Amstrong et al. 1998). However, cases seem contingent upon idiosyncratic factors. ...
Major IR theories, which stress that actors will inevitably only seek to en- hance their own interests, tend to contrive binaries of self and other and ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. By contrast, this book recognizes the general need of all to relate, which they do through various imagined resemblances be- tween them.
The authors of this book therefore propose the ‘balance of relationships’ (BoR) as a new international relations theory to transcend binary ways of thinking. BoR theory differs from mainstream IR theories owing to two key differences in its epistemological position. Firstly, the theory explains why and how states as socially-interrelated actors inescapably pursue a strategy of self-restraint in order to join a network of stable and long-term relation- ships. Secondly, owing to its focus on explaining bilateral relations, BoR theory bypasses rule-based governance. By positing ‘relationality’ as a key concept of Chinese international relations, this book shows that BoR can also serve as an important concept in the theorization of international rela- tions, more broadly.
... 11 The widely recognized structural factor is systemic configuration, which is usually described in terms of the number of contending greater powers that engenders room for maneuvering by small states in between and the sizes of the small and medium states in the system that favor collective actions. 12 The domestic conditions of small states in question are equally important, which are often related to their historical backgrounds, policy-making frameworks, participation of populations, 13 and levels of economic development. 14 However, cases seem to offer divergent wisdom. ...
This study seeks to explain how a weaker party could decide on its own to confront a stronger party. The weaker party relies on relational turn in international relations to provide an alternative to the realist view. On the basis of relational turn, which stresses the importance of discovering the processual mechanisms of behavior instead of the structure or corelationship among variables, this study offers an empirically based speculation of the plausible psychological mechanisms that enable a weaker party in Taiwan to resort to confrontation against a stronger party in China. These psychological mechanisms are arguably necessary processes that lead to confrontational policy. This study argues that a small party is epistemologically equal to its stronger counterpart in relational coupling. This assumption is based on prior understandings that constitute the identities of both parties. The former exerts agency for confrontation when acting upon the senses of efficacy, determination, and/or legitimacy that are embedded in relational coupling.
Lüksemburg 2586 km2’lik nüfusu ve 660.000 kadar olan nüfusuyla Avrupa’nın kalbinde yer alan küçük bir devlettir. Bu küçük devlet, NATO, Avrupa Konseyi, AGİT, BM gibi birçok uluslararası örgütün kurucu üyesidir ve bunlara ‘uluslarüstü’ bir yapı olan Avrupa Birliği de dahildir. Coğrafi ve tarihsel koşullarla açıklanabilecek bu üyelikler, ülkenin kamu diplomasisi faaliyetleri açısından da önem taşır. Lüksemburg günümüzde AB nezdinde kamu diplomasisi faaliyetlerini AB kurumları ve başarılı diplomatlar üzerinden gerçekleştirmektedir. Bunun da ötesinde birliğin ‘kurucu üyelik’ statüsü Lüksemburg’a uluslararası sistemde ayrı bir prestij kazandırmış durumdadır. Çalışma küçük devlet dış politika eğilimlerinden hareketle Lüksemburg’un AB kurucu üyeliği ve bu üyeliğin bir kamu diplomasisi aracına dönüşme nedenlerine odaklanmaktadır.
From the Summit of South American–Arab Countries (ASPA) created in 2005, UAE–South American relations have continued to develop based on a combination of pragmatism, threat perception, political support and expanding economic interests. We argue that the strength of UAE engagement in this region is consistent with its attempts to build, deploy and benefit from soft power globally through economic statecraft in a mutually reinforcing series of bilateral and multilateral relationships. These include forums such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the expanding BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The article draws on primary and secondary data in English, Portuguese and Spanish, focusing mainly on UAE relations with Brazil and Venezuela. We find that through a myriad of growing investment relations and first‐mover advantage on arms and industrial cooperation, the UAE is well positioned vis‐à‐vis other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to benefit from the economic, diplomatic and security ties that could boost its relational autonomy in a competitive and uncertain regional and international environment.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinforced Estonia’s long-held worldview and strategic posture rather than bringing about any principled foreign policy change. There was a remarkable change, though, in Estonia’s international visibility. The turbulent security environment created an opportunity for small state leadership especially in the framework of regional organisations. During the two first years of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Estonia’s foreign and security policy focused on shaping the policies of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union with a view to providing maximum support to Ukraine and increasing the cost of aggression for Russia. Estonia acted as a leader through shaping the public narrative, setting the agenda, leading by example, building coalitions and orchestrating the desired outcomes. Through analysing the Estonian experience, the article addresses the broader puzzle of how small states can overcome their relative lack of power and take leadership in matters of international security, usually dominated by great powers.
This article analyzes the strategy of self-exclusion in the foreign policy of small states, considering their goals and expected results of this strategy, that is, the main conditions for its implementation, the main determinants, and also identifies and characterizes its varieties and practical manifestations. In this context, global transformations also cause changes related to the positions and roles of small states in world politics and international relations. At the same time, global transformations change the understanding of the security of small states, which in turn leads to an increase in the number of studies in this area. Together, these factors become the rationale for the relevance of studying the security problems of small states in modern conditions. In conclusion, the results of the analysis are summarized, the features of the strategy of self-exclusion, common features and differences in its varieties are shown.
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
This chapter argues that realism offers important insights for the study of small states. By looking into four iconic realist works, we show that the popular view that small states defy realist expectations because these states can ‘punch above their weight’ is mistaken. Realists do not dismiss the ability of lesser powers to overachieve under certain systemic or state-specific circumstance. In contrast, realists specify how small states can overachieve under certain systemic or state-specific circumstances such as intense competition among great powers, possession of assets of value to great powers, national morale and character, high-quality diplomacy and a good reputation. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we map current debates in the study of small states in international affairs identifying central positions and lacunas in the literature. Second, we present a reading of iconic realist works showing how they help us to fill the lacunae of current debates. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of implications for the study of small states and international relations.
This paper analyses how Maldives’ close ties with Saudi Arabia have affected its relations with other countries from Middle East Asia. Following the footsteps of Saudi Arabia, Maldives severed its diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016 and with Qatar in 2017. The paper discusses the economic investments Riyadh has made to develop civic infrastructure in the island nation. However, more than diplomatic ties and economic investments, close relations between Malé and Riyadh have affected the Island state’s society. There is a spread of religious obstructionism in Maldivian society, for which several outside scholars and Maldivians blame Saudi Arabia. Finally, the paper briefly discusses Maldives’ ties with Middle East countries other than Saudi Arabia.
Giriş
Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Soğuk Savaş
sonunda 1990’lı yıllarda bağımsız oldukların-
da bu bölgeye yönelik Rusya ve Çin yanın-
da Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ilk kez dış ve
güvenlik politikaları oluşturmaya başlamıştır.
11 Eylül Terör Saldırıları öncesinde ABD dış
ve güvenlik politikası daha çok jeo-ekono-
mik ve enerji politikaları üzerinden yürütül-
müştür. Washington yönetimi beş Orta Asya
Cumhuriyeti’nin bağımsızlığı ve egemenli-
ğine vurgu yaparken öte yandan demokrasi,
hukukun üstünlüğü, insan hakları ve serbest
pazar ekonomisinin yerleşmesine dönük po-
litikalar izlemiştir. 11 Eylül sonrası Küresel
Terörle Mücadele politikası gereği, Washin-
gton’un güvenlik öncelikleri yüzünden özel-
likle Afganistan’daki askeri müdahalesi sonu-
cu Kırgızistan gibi ülkelere dönük politikası
yüz seksen derece değişmiştir. İyi yönetişim
konuları yerine ABD lojistik askeri üsleri ve
terörizmle mücadele amacıyla Kuzey Dağıtım
Ağı’nı 2009’da hayata geçirmesinin ardından
Özbekistan ve Kırgızistan’da Amerikan as-
keri üsleri kurulması yanında beş Orta Asya
Cumhuriyeti değişik derecelerde Amerika ile
Multilateralism opens avenues for small states in the global arena, but to play a relatively significant role, they must develop a new type of diplomacy. Taking the example of small countries from the Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Montenegro (WB5)—this chapter argues that if the smalls want to adapt to new global trends, they need to create professional, cost-effective, non-orthodox diplomacy—also known as “smart” diplomacy. Although all the five countries have made several diplomatic successes, they are often the result of “intuitive diplomacy” that relies on the expertise, skills, and knowledge of several professionals rather than a well-thought-out strategy. Hence, from a small countries’ perspective, the creation of a “smart” diplomatic service is a necessity rather than a policy luxury.
Trade challenges arising from international markets can affect all countries differently, even if they are similar in size and face similar or equal challenges—small states in particular. Because no two small states are the same, their responses to such economic challenges may differ. Domestic conditions and reform have always relied on effective democratic consensus and social coherence to address such challenges. Since the nature of economic challenges is unknown, this social consensus may be the only trade policy that any small state should strive for. This paper aims to look at how Iceland and Latvia coped with the common 2008 and 2009 economic and financial crises. Both experienced similar severe financial market challenges, resulting in an economic downturn. Nonetheless, their perspectives on the crises, international institutions, and actors from the standpoint of domestic responses differed. The outcomes of these responses and decisions in Iceland and Latvia had an impact on democratic consensus and social coherence in both cases. Furthermore, these responses and decisions had long-term consequences for Iceland’s and Latvia's prospects for social coherence and democratic consensus in dealing with future trade challenges.KeywordsTrade PolicyIcelandLatvia
Proxy wars are an increasingly common feature of great power competition in the 21st century. In this context, the role of the small states is less clear and has not been properly addressed in the academic literature. Although states of this type have often been chosen as battlegrounds for such wars and have even acted as proxies for the superpowers, this article argues that they are also capable of conducting proxy warfare themselves. Since the start of the 2014 conflict in Donbas, Eastern Ukraine, this country has experienced proxy interventions from many external actors, both large and small, that provided resources to both conflict parties. One of the smallest states which has been trying to affect the course of this conflict in support of the Ukrainian government is Lithuania. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with the security and defence policy-makers in Vilnius, the article aims to explain why Lithuania is punching above its weight and interfering with this conflict from backstage. The empirical evidence points to an almost perfect alignment of interests between the current governments in Kiev and Vilnius in that they both see Russia as their long-term ‘enemy’ which makes Ukraine a surprisingly suitable proxy for Lithuania to exploit.
After three decades of US unipolarity, the international system may be on the brink of transformation. Although the combined capabilities of the United States remain stronger than those of any other state in the international system and the United States remains unrivalled in defence spending and research and development, the American superpower no longer has the same ability to set agendas and impose preferences as in the immediate post-Cold War era. This chapter provides an overview of existing knowledge of links between different types of polarity and the challenges and opportunities of small states. We use this overview of existing knowledge as starting point for a comparative discussion of small state strategy under continued (weakened) unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity and non-polarity. We argue that in a world dominated by US- and China-led bounded orders, small states must choose their battles wisely, prioritize their resources and build networks with like-minded small states.
l objetivo de este trabajo radica en analizar cómo un Estado pequeño como Bolivia ha enfrentado las mutaciones del mapa político regional en el transcurso del presente siglo considerando el fervor del denominado ciclo progresista y luego, su decaimiento. Se emplea un abordaje cualitativo para comprender el fenómeno y su contexto, el cual pone a dialogar aportes teóricos-conceptuales sobre la noción de Estados pequeños y referencias empíricas sobre el caso en cuestión, provenientes de fuentes documentales, bibliográficas y estadísticas. En términos de resultados, se sostiene que los constreñimientos propios de su condición direccionaron una política exterior pragmática orientada a capitalizar las posibilidades de crecimiento, sobre todo en materia económica, más allá de las diferencias político-ideológicas que pudieran presentarse.
The Internet is defined as interactive network systems that enable quick communication
through computer connection and network and allow the person to send and receive the
number of information that they want to multiple recipients. The TCP/IP protocol
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), comprised of international network words,
and the Internet, which is connected by many computer networks, is a worldwide
communication system that is developing and growing continuously. Rapid progress and
change in science and technology; facilitated the fulfilment of the need for direct, fast and
secure access to information. The Internet, the most important innovation of information
technology, which is easy for almost everyone from children to adults, has quickly influenced
people. So, one has become a mass media that affects family and social life in
multidimensional terms.
The increasing developments, particularly of mass media over the last two centuries,
demonstrate how technology has entered the everyday lives of individuals and, over time,
modern mass media have become virtually indispensable elements. Internet use has become
an important part of daily life in our country as well as in the world. This study aims to
investigate the factors affecting the frequency of Internet use by individuals living in Turkey.
The study used a micro data set from the 2021 Information and Communication Technology
Usage Survey in Households conducted by Turkey Statistical Institute. The research's
sampling method is a 2-stage stratified cluster sampling. The study uses generalized ordered
logistics regression analysis to identify factors associated with the frequency of Internet use of
individuals.
Aile içi şiddet küresel bir sorundur ve şiddetin bireylerde uzun vadeli olumsuz etkileri
olabilmektedir. Bu bağlamda şiddetin travmatik etkilerini iyileştiren terapiler hem birey hem
de toplum ruh sağlığı açısından önem kazanmaktadır. Göz Hareketleriyle Duyarsızlaştırma ve
Yeniden İşleme (EMDR) yaklaşımı aile içi şiddet olgularında travmanın etkilerini azaltmada
etkin rol alabilir. Araştırmanın amacı; EMDR terapi yaklaşımının, aile içi şiddetin sonucu
olarak kadın danışanda ortaya çıkan travma tepkilerini iyileştirmedeki etkisini incelemektir.
Çalışmada, olgu sunum yöntemi kullanılmıştır. 34 yaşındaki aile içi şiddete maruz kalmış,
psikiyatrik tanı varlığı bulunmayan kadın danışan ile sekiz EMDR seansı yapılmıştır.
Seansların ardından bir de kontrol seansı yapılmıştır. Terapi öncesi ve sonrası yapılan
ölçümler kıyaslandığında terapi sonrasında danışandaki TSSB ve depresyon puanlarında
kayda değer miktarda iyileşme saptanmıştır. EMDR terapisi; aile içi şiddetin travmatik
etkilerini iyileştirmede ruh sağlığı uzmanları tarafından uygulanabilir. Ruh sağlığı
profesyonelleri EMDR terapi yaklaşımı konusunda bilgilendirilebilir ve eğitilebilirler.
Europe’s security situation has evolved somewhat over the past few years, causing national defence policies to be reviewed and strengthened. Being members of Nato and the European Union, the Benelux countries of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg have been changing their defence policies to face complex military and non-military threats. The potential threat from Russia is one factor which has been behind their closer military cooperation, supported by the process of rebuilding national military capabilities. Progress has been especially visible after 2014 most especially due to Russian aggression against Ukraine, along with hybrid threats and terrorists attacks. All three countries tend to cooperate with each other while also enjoying ever-closer relations with Nato and other EU members, while the USA has a special place in this arrangement. All of these connections and areas of cooperation will be covered in this article. The author utilises the qualitative research approach which involves one or more case studies, along with institutional and behavioural analysis, deskbound research, analysis, and synthesis methods.
As a small state, Cambodia viewed the ASEAN and China as almost equally important pillars of its foreign policy. Amid the intense strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Cambodia faced the dilemma of how to maintain the ASEAN centrality without diplomatic cost to its key ally China, and how to balance its national interest with regional interest. In this context, the article aimed to explain the importance of the ASEAN as a cornerstone of Cambodia’s foreign policy, examine the motivations of Cambodia’s deep political embrace of the Asian giant, and underline its implications for the Indo-Pacific from the lens of small state foreign policy. The article was based on qualitative, empirical analysis that comprises primary and secondary data pertinent to the current topic. The article concluded that Cambodia leaned more towards China than it did towards the ASEAN, thus weakening its centrality in driving the broader regional architecture and that domestic politics was the primary driving force of Cambodia’s foreign policy towards that direction. At this juncture, Cambodia should step back from the present degree of its strategic engagement with China and look for ways to diversify its relations with other major powers while getting back on the democratic path and upholding human rights.
The literature examining small states as norm entrepreneurs focuses predominantly on Scandinavian countries. In contrast, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Small Vulnerable Economies (SVE) in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries are largely excluded from this analysis of norm transmission: there is little work investigating whether these overlapping sub-categories of small states have successfully created norms in areas of interest to them, particularly in multilateral trade. Using the constructivist 'norm life cycle' model, this paper proposes four major reasons why SIDS, and SVEs specifically within the SIDS category, outside the Least Developed Country (LDC) group, have so far been unable to establish their eligibility for, and thereby establish adoption of, the norm that they become permanent recipients of special and differential treatment (SDT) and of preferences in global trade politics, despite significant norm entrepreneurship since the 1990s when non-reciprocal free trade lost favour.
This chapter introduces the new concept of “Awkward Powers”. By undertaking a critical re-examination of the state of International Relations theorising on the changing nature of the global power hierarchy, it draws attention to a number of countries that fit awkwardly into existing but not up-to-date categories such as “great power” and “middle power”. It argues that conceptual categories pertaining to the apex of the international hierarchy have become increasingly unsatisfactory, and that new approaches focusing on such “Awkward Powers” can both rectify shortcomings on power theorising whilst shining a much-needed theoretical spotlight on significant but understudied states. The chapter also introduces the book’s broad range of empirical case studies, which include both established and rising powers across a global scale. Through such a novel process, it argues that a better appreciation of the de facto international power hierarchy in the 21st century can be achieved.
Traditionally, Belgium is considered as a small power. However, the definitions of small power have been refined over time and a number of new states, smaller than Belgium, have appeared throughout the last centuries. As a result, the qualification of Belgium as a small power appears to suffer from a lack of relevance. Its high GDP, its “not so small” population or its international influence illustrate that the Belgian traditional status needs to be rethought. Nevertheless, Belgium still remains too small to be considered as a middle power. This chapter looks at the Belgian case with middle powers theories and demonstrates the limits of these theories and explains why Belgium does not fit the definition of middle power. The case for Belgium as an awkward middle power is reinforced as we apply small power theories and conclude that Belgium is not a small power either.
The twenty-first century peacekeeping landscape is defined by the multiplicity of institutional frameworks under which international operations are deployed. Small states with limited resources cannot meet every demand for troop contributions and face the inevitable dilemma of choosing whose ‘flag’ to carry. For the first decade after joining NATO and the EU, the Baltic States gave a clear priority to NATO and U.S.-led military operations, but since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis gradually shifted their focus to the UN framework. Drawing on interviews with policy-makers in the three Baltic countries this article aims to explain this recent shift. It reviews the main theoretical assumptions about troop contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations and burden-sharing behaviour among NATO allies, and suggests that the recent troop deployment decisions of the Baltic States are best explained by a realist focus on national security concerns. The seemingly ‘internationalist’ context of UN peacekeeping operations simply happened to be most suitable for a bilateral exchange with their European allies, namely Germany and France, that in turn contributed troops to NATO's Baltic flank.
Since its creation in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received ample attention in the media and from government officials and scholars. Many different, and often polarising, views exist on BRI. While some view it as China’s grand strategic goal of remaking the world in its own image, others perceive it as consistent with the international system. Using interviews conducted in Cambodia and an examination of press sources, this article draws from the selectorate theory to examine both why the Cambodian government is siding with China regarding economic ties, specifically regarding BRI, and the impact that is having on popular perception in Cambodia. The small coalition in Cambodia that Hun Sen seeks to placate results in a negative view among a significant segment of the Cambodian populace regarding Cambodia’s relations with China, and Chinese investments in particular.
La présente thèse dont le thème est « La Guinée Équatoriale face au couple Cameroun-Gabon en Afrique Centrale (1960-2012) : Histoire d’un petit État en quête d’émancipation et de puissance », a pour objet de retracer l’histoire des relations entre le couple Cameroun-Gabon et la Guinée Équatoriale dans le processus d’intégration régionale en Afrique Centrale en insistant sur la quête de puissance de la Guinée Équatoriale dans la sous-région. Cette thèse a pour ambition de répondre à la question principale suivante : en quoi l’attitude et les actes de la Guinée Équatoriale en Afrique Centrale relèvent-ils d’une quête d’émancipation et de puissance vis-à-vis du couple Cameroun-Gabon ? Cette thèse utilise une approche interdisciplinaire basée sur une analyse qualitative et de contenu de diverses sources.De 1960 à 1979, les relations entre la Guinée Équatoriale et le couple Cameroun-Gabon ont oscillé entre coopération, aide et conflictualité. À la suite d’un coup d’État renversant Macías Nguéma, Obiang Nguéma Mbasogo apaisa les relations avec ses deux voisins francophones, ce qui conduisit à l’adhésion de son pays à l’UDEAC. Étant très pauvre, la Guinée Équatoriale ne disposait d’aucun poste de responsabilité de haut niveau, n’abritait aucune institution communautaire et n’en revendiquait pas. En 1990, la découverte et l’exploitation du pétrole en Guinée Équatoriale ont changé le visage de ce pays dans la sous-région et lui ont permis de revendiquer et d’avoir la réforme institutionnelle de la CEMAC. Cette réforme institutionnelle a permis à la Guinée Équatoriale de s’adjuger des postes de responsabilité de haut niveau dans la CEMAC au grand dam du couple Cameroun-Gabon. La thèse conclut que malgré toutes les manœuvres entreprises par la Guinée Équatoriale en zone CEMAC à propos du leadership, elle ne dispose pas de tous les critères lui permettant de devenir la première puissance de la sous-région.
El presente artículo se enmarca en el área de relaciones internacionales, en la subárea de seguridad, pues aborda las actividades que realizan los militares en asuntos humanitarios, específicamente relacionados con desastres naturales. El argumento principal sostiene que los ejércitos, por su naturaleza, no son una institución humanitaria, debido a que su misión es la defensa y la seguridad de los Estados. Sin embargo, estos, basados en sus objetivos estratégicos, utilizan a sus ejércitos en asuntos humanitarios y reformulan sus intereses nacionales, gracias al paraguas de los derechos humanos y la importancia del ser humano frente al Estado. Para el efecto, los conceptos de seguridad y poder de la teoría realista son aplicados al caso ecuatoriano en la experiencia de las misiones de ayuda para la reconstrucción en el Caribe: Marhec, Marcec y Mahrgec.
In diesem Artikel wird von der Prämisse ausgegangen, dass, erstens, Kleinstaaten wie Armenien ein besonderes außenpolitisches Verhalten haben und, zweitens, die wichtigsten Herausforderungen für ihre Sicherheit aus dem internationalen (insbesondere, aus dem regionalen) System kommen. Dementsprechend sollen die Theorie Regionaler Sicherheitskomplexe (RSK) und das Konzept der Kleinstaaten die konzeptionelle Grundlage für das methodische Vorgehen bilden. Im weiteren Verlauf des Artikels soll geklärt werden, welche Merkmale des außenpolitischen Verhaltens für Kleinstaaten charakteristisch sind und welche dieser Strategien in Armeniens Außenpolitik verwendet werden.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the perceptions of Qatar’s suitability to act a successful sports event host and, in doing so, look ahead to some of the key organisational challenges facing Qatar leading up to the World Cup in 2022. This paper is framed around the perceptions of nation branding and soft power and draws on the experiences of various key demographics who offer valuable insight into Qatar’s World Cup.
Design/methodology/approach
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with football journalists, experienced tournament staff and volunteers, football supporters and expatriates working in the Gulf region. The paper is longitudinal in nature, with data collected between January 2010 and June 2018 including seven FIFA and FIFA-affiliated confederation events, namely, the 2011 Asia Cup in Qatar, the 2011 Gold Cup in USA, the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, the 2015 Copa America in Chile, the 2016 European Championships in France, the 2017 African Cup of Nations in Gabon and the 2018 World Cup in Russia.
Findings
The paper uncovers several concerns and considerations connected to hosting a first Middle Eastern World Cup in Qatar in 2022. The findings demonstrate some of the key organisational challenges facing the event which were found to include supporter access, security and the fan experience.
Originality/value
This paper examines Qatar in the context of the 2022 World Cup and its connection to soft power and nation branding. This particular event is so significant, not simply because it is the showcase tournament of the globe’s most popular sport from both a spectator and participation perspective, but because it represents such a notable divergence from previous editions. The majority of preceding World Cups have/will be hosted by highly populated countries with relatively developed football traditions and/or infrastructures. As a change to this pattern, the unique position of Qatar’s World Cup renders it as an important case study. This paper, which examines informed perspectives relating to access, security and diplomacy, provides a number of issues for Qatar’s World Cup organisers to consider.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.