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The Rohingya Crisis⎯ Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority in Bangladesh

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Abstract

Bangladesh has shown a great level of generosity by opening its door for the Rohingya ethnic minority, which is sadly lacking in many parts of the world, including in this particular region of South Asia. Bangladesh hosts nearly 1.1 million Rohingyas who have fled the persecution in Myanmar. Among these, the majority took shelter in the last few years of massive oppression directed by the Myanmar military forces. Further, they live in cruel conditions in the camps and need severe help. The fate of the Rohingya refugees in the camps of Cox’s Bazar is insecure and uncertain. This article aims at highlighting the two most critical issues about the Rohingya crisis, which are: one of the most critical aspects of the crisis ‘the repatriation process’, which did not come into sight until now, and the delay of the repatriation process, which add another new dimension in this crisis ‘Bangladesh’s plan to relocate 100,000 Rohingyas in an island called Bhashan Char’.
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI, pp 523-541, ISSN 2306-3920
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the
Rohingya Ethnic Minority in Bangladesh
Mostakim Bin Motaher
[Abstract: Bangladesh has shown a great level of generosity by
opening its door for the Rohingya ethnic minority, which is sadly
lacking in many parts of the world, including in this particular
region of South Asia. Bangladesh hosts nearly 1.1 million
Rohingyas who have fled the persecution in Myanmar. Among
these, the majority took shelter in the last few years of massive
oppression directed by the Myanmar military forces. Further,
they live in cruel conditions in the camps and need severe help.
The fate of the Rohingya refugees in the camps of Cox’s Bazar is
insecure and uncertain. This article aims at highlighting the two
most critical issues about the Rohingya crisis, which are: one of
the most critical aspects of the crisis ‘the repatriation process’,
which did not come into sight until now, and the delay of the
repatriation process, which add another new dimension in this
crisis ‘Bangladesh’s plan to relocate 100,000 Rohingyas in an
island called Bhashan Char’.]
Keywords: Rohingya ethnic minority, Rohingya crisis, Relocation,
Repatriation, Human Rights, Safety, Natural disaster,
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhashan Char.
1 Introduction
Violence against the Rohingya ethnic minority is not a new phenomenon; it
can be traced from the different periods of 1978, 1991, 1992, 2012, 2016,
and 2017 (Habib et al., 2018; OCHA, 2020). As the outcome of these
periods of violence, a mass number of refugees were generated, who took
Mostakim Bin Motaher is an assistant professor at the department of
International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh. He received
B.A. and M.A. degree from the same department where he is currently
teaching. He obtained another Master’s degree on Peace and Development
Work from Linnaeus University, Sweden. Mr. Mostakim can be reached at
mostakim@juniv.edu.
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI
shelter in many countries, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabi, Pakistan, and UAE (Motaher, 2019; Al
Jazeera, 2018; Alam, 2019). Among these countries, Bangladesh alone
provided shelter to around 1.1 million Rohingya refugees at the camps of
Cox’s Bazar, where they lived in inhumane conditions (UNHCR, 2019c;
IOM, 2019; MSF, 2018). It has been a while since Bangladesh is striving
for successful repatriation for the Rohingyas at their homeland in the
Rakhine state. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) attempted the
repatriation process several times before. Based on the data of Refugee
Relief and Repatriation Commissioner’s Office, some involuntary
repatriations were seen (the refugees who escaped from the violence of
1978, 1991, and 1992) from 1992-2005 (Ahmed 2010 as cited in Azad and
Jasmin, 2013:30). However, no effective repatriation process occurred,
particularly for the violence of 2012, 2016, and 2017 which created around
723000 Rohingya refugees (UNHCR, 2019c; ECHO, 2018; SIDA, 2019).
Currently, regarding the Rohingya issue, along with the effort of GoB
1
and GoM
2
, UN bodies and many other Human Rights Groups principally
contemplating the repatriation process. Several attempts, including bilateral
attempts (between GoB and GoM), trilateral attempts (among UNDP,
UNHCR, and GoM), and joint mechanism efforts (among Bangladesh,
Myanmar, and China) were proceeding on for successful repatriation
(UNHCR, 2020; Bhuiyan, 2019). However, no effective repatriation
process is followed until now. Further, the delay or failure of the
repatriation process adds a new dimension to the current crisis, which is
GoB’s plan to relocate the Rohingya refugees who reside in the camps in
Cox’s Bazar. The GoB planned to relocate 100,000 Rohingyas to an island
called Bashan Char which is not considered as a safe place due to the high
chances of natural disaster (Motaher, 2019; Amnesty International, 2017;
HRW, 2018; Adams, 2019; Anik and Raju, 2019; BBC, 2017; Siddiqui,
2019). The Rohingya refugees widely oppose the plan, and it is also
condemned by the Human Rights Groups, who warn the island is vulnerable
to rising sea levels and storm surges (Palma, 2020; AFP, 2019; Ratcliffe,
2020). Additionally, this step may have a negative impact on the
repatriation process.
1.1 Research Objective and Research Questions
The overall objective of this study is to the discussion about the Rohingya
crisis. The primary objective is to address the uncertain future of the
Rohingya ethnic minorities, especially those who are staying in Bangladeshi
1
. GoB: Government of Bangladesh
2
. GoM: Government of Myanmar
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic
territory. Based on this aim, this paper emphasizes on two particular issues
mainly. One is related to Bangladesh’s decision to relocate some Rohingyas
in Bashan Char, and another is related to the never-ending repatriation
process.
To achieve the objectives of the study, it is framed by the following
research questions:
1. Will it be a wise decision to relocate the Rohingyas in Bhashan
Char?
1.1. If so, how safe is Bashan Char in terms of natural disaster?
2. Through the relocation process taken by the GoB, what message is
particularly conveyed to Myanmar?
2.1. Will this decision affect the repatriation process?
1.2 Methodology
This research is conducted as a qualitative abductive desk-study based on
the “Text Analysis” method. It is an applicable method to describe the
content, structure, and functions of the messages contained in texts (McKee,
2003:1; Frey et al., 1999:225). In this research, the textual analysis
approach is used to critically review the secondary data sources to
understand the Rohingya crisis from neutral perspectives. This study deals
with a current topic, and therefore, it is crucial to use the latest data and
analysis of up-to-date publications. Secondary sources such as books,
journals, reports, newspaper articles, and existing literature were used to
acquire a comprehensive and more objective insight into the Rohingyas
repatriation process and relocating decision. Notably, the nature of this
research required field visits in Rakhine state and Bhashan Char, but after
not getting any response from the respective authorities, it was not possible
for the researcher to collect the data directly from the fields.
1.3 Structure of the paper
The paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 demonstrates the paper’s
objectives, research questions, and methodology. The second section
provides the existing information about Bhashan Char, the Government of
Bangladesh’s plan, and arrangements for Rohingyas’ relocating process.
Also, it discusses the stance of GoB and aid agencies regarding the
relocating process and safety concerns for the Rohingyas. Section three
emphasizes the current status of the Rohingya repatriation process and the
necessity of the repatriation process for the Rohingyas. Finally, section four
suggests some recommendations and brings together the conclusions from
the analysis.
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI
2 Relocating the Rohingyas in Bhashan Char
Around 1.1 million Rohingya refugee lives in the vast and teeming camps
and settlements that have sprung up in Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh,
close to the border with Myanmar. A smaller number lives in the nearby
area of Teknaf and Ukhia (UNICEF, 2020). According to the GoB, these
camps in Cox’s Bazar are overcrowded with refugees, and some of these
densely populated camps are at the risks of disasters such as floods,
landslides, and cyclones (Yuriko, 2020; McClean, 2019). Besides, the GoB
also claimed it is hard for the law enforcing agencies to ensure security at
the camps in such circumstances (Rahman et al., 2017). So, to alleviate the
crowd and to ensure better conditions for the Rohingya refugees, GoB took
the initiative of relocating 100,000 Rohingyas on an island named Bashan
Char (Amnesty International, 2017; BBC, 2017). Notably, 1642 Rohingyas
were brought to Bhashan Char on December 3 (Abrar, 2020). And another
300 Rohingyas have already lived in Bhashan Char. These 300 Rohingyas
were headed for Malaysia but prevented from docking in and stranded at
sea for several weeks and later rescued by Bangladesh Navy in early May
after floating adrift in the Bay of Bengal (Ratcliffe, 2020; Beech, 2020).
2.1 Government of Bangladesh’s plan
The plan of relocating the Rohingyas in Bhashan Char was first proposed in
2015 by the GoB (Rahman et al., 2017). Following that discussion, in
November 2017, GoB took a 23.12-billion-taka project named Asrayan-3 to
temporarily accommodate 100,000 Rohingya people from the camps of
Cox’s Bazar. The Executive Committee of the National Economic Council
(ECNEC) approved the project (Khokon, S.H., 2017; Acharjee, D., 2019).
With the guidance of the Prime Minister’s office, the Bangladesh Navy
developed this project (The Financial Express, 2017).
However, regarding the matter of relocation, there was an apparent
contradiction between the statement of government officials and many aid
agencies workers who talked directly to the Rohingyas. On the one hand,
Bangladeshi government officials are claiming that 6000-7000 Rohingyas
have agreed to relocate on the island. In the meanwhile, a US-based
advocacy group named Fortify Rights, who interviewed 14 Rohingyas at
three camps, found that the GoB notified none of these Rohingyas before
about this decision, and they did not want to go willingly (The Asean Post,
2019). The same kind of information came out from the interviews of
Refugee International, another organization that is working at Rohingya
camps. In an interview with Refugees International, a Rohingya community
leader expressed his view in such words, “we don’t want to go there. It is an
island where no one has lived before” (Refugees International, 2019). Phil
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic
Robertson, the deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, said
“The Rohingya have repeatedly stated they do not want to be moved to
Bhashan Char, but that is precisely what the Bangladesh government is
forcing this group to do.”
Moreover, according to the foreign minister of Bangladesh Ak Abdul
Momen, Bhashan Char is a nice place that offers many opportunities. He
further added that the refugees would be able to engage in economic
activities on the island. He said, “The island has a vast area and they
[Rohingyas] will be able to do agricultural works what they used to do in
Rakhine. But in the tinny camps in Cox’s Bazar, there are no such
opportunities” (TBS, 2020). Similarly, the State Minister of Disaster
Management and Relief, Dr. Md. Enamur Rahman said that Bhashan Char
is among the safest places to relocate the Rohingyas (Acharjee, 2020).
2.2 Bhashan Char
Bhashan Char is a tiny island around 30000 hectares in size in the Bay of
Bengal, made of accumulated silt (Westcott and Pokharel, 2017). To be
more specific, it is situated near Hatiya upazila in Noakhali district (Adams,
2019). The island is located around 30 km away from the mainland, and the
only mode of commute for residents is by boat, and it takes almost three
hours from the nearest island (Anik, 2020). The meaning of Bhashan Char
is ‘floating island’ (Nebehay, 2019). It is also known as Thengar Char to the
local people (Kullab, 2017). Notably, the island did not exist a few decades
ago. A few years back in 2006, it first arose from the sea and wrapped in a
shroud of grass and mangrove trees. Local people around the island used it
for cattle grazing. (Anik and Raju, 2019).
2.3 GoB’s Arrangements in Bhashan Char
The government officials of Bangladesh claimed that the Asrayan-3 project
has all the necessary facilities for the Rohingyas, including land
development, shore protection work, construction of embankment, houses,
shelters, places of worship, water supply, and sewerage system. A 5461
square feet pond has been dug for alternative water sources along with the
facilities of rainwater harvesting in all cluster houses (Acharjee, 2019;
Khokon, 2017; Illius, 2019). Most importantly, to provide shelters to the
Rohingyas, a total of 1440 barrack houses and 120 shelter stations in 120
cluster villages were built, which can accommodate 103,200 people
(Acharjee, 2019; Khokon, 2017). According to Bangladesh Navy, each
barrack house has 16 rooms, which can accommodate 16 families (one
family comprises of four persons), two shared kitchens, six toilets, and four
bathrooms. For internal communication, 42 kilometers road has been
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI
constructed. Also, Bangladesh Navy is thinking about potential ways of
livelihood for the Rohingyas in Bhashan Char. The viable ways of earning
can be fishing, poultry farming, sheep and cattle rearing, cultivation of rice
and vegetables, carpentry, handicrafts, tailoring, and providing different
community services (Illius, 2019). Especially for maintaining the security
of the project area, Bangladesh Navy, who is responsible for security, also
built offices and residential houses. Further, to ensure law and order of the
residents of Bhashan Char, a police station is in its way of construction
(Bhuiyan, 2020). Besides, helipad, boat landing site, mobile towers, radar
station, CCTVs, solar panels, and power sub-station were also set up
(Khokon, 2017). The following figure 1 shows the new home for the
Rohingyas in Bhashan Char.
Figure 1: Bhashan Char
Source: Anik and Raju, 2019.
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic
2.4 From the Aspect of Safety
Bangladesh is considered as one of the world’s most vulnerable countries in
aspects of the impacts of climate change. Natural disasters like cyclones and
floods struck Bangladesh very frequently (GFDRR, 2020). From 1990 to
2018, Bangladesh endured 70 storms, which makes it one of the regions
worst affected by tropical storms (Chowdhury, 2019). Data from the India
Meteorological Department (IMD) shows that the number of cyclones in the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal has increased by 32% in the last five
years (Hindustan Times, 2020). As natural disasters like cyclones and
storms occurred suddenly, it did not give much time for evacuation. In this
case, the GoB’s decision to relocate 100,000 Rohingyas to Bhashan Char is
a substantial number to evacuate in a short time. Moreover, the place is
separated from the mainland, making the evacuation process more complex
and challenging if such a natural disaster occurs. However, the government
official claimed they built a 13 km flood defense embankment and 120
cyclone shelters to protect the Rohingyas in Bhashan Char for such
circumstances (The Asean Post, 2019; Acharjee, 2019; Khokon, 2017).
2.4.1 The Stance of GoB
From the viewpoint of the GoB, Bhashan Char is a safe place for the
Rohingyas. The island is secure, and all the essential safety measurement
has already been taken. The chief architect of the project asserted that a 13
km flood defense embankment would protect the island and its cyclone
centers with a height of 3.5-meter (11 feet), which makes Bhashan Char
much safer than the other coastal regions in Bangladesh (The Asean Post,
2019). Besides, 120 cyclone shelters that had been built can protect the
refugees from tidal surges up to a height of 14 feet. The cyclone shelter's
ground floor is four feet above the ground, and the first floor is 10 feet
above the ground floor (Anik and Raju, 2019).
However, it can be observed from the recent past that cyclones that
struck in Bangladesh were very dangerous and had a devastating impact. In
2007 cyclone Sidr (category 4) hit on the southwest coast of Bangladesh. It
created tidal waves up to 5-6 meters high (16 to 19 feet), which breached
coastal and river embankments, flooded low-lying areas, and caused
extensive physical destruction (Relief Web, 2008). Similarly, in 2009
cyclone named Aila (category 1) struck in the south-western coast of
Bangladesh, which surged between 3-4 meters (10 to 13 feet) high (Roy et
al., 2009). And recently, in 2020, Cyclone Amphan hit the eastern coast of
India and Bangladesh, which is one of the most severe storms in the Bay of
Bengal since 1999 (Al Jazeera, 2020; Hindustan Times, 2020).
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI
Sea level rising is a major concern for Bangladesh. Moreover, the
geographical position of Bhashan Char is vulnerable (right-side map,
figure:2). According to Climate Central’s latest research, sea-level rise
could affect the red denote areas of Bangladesh (left-side map. figure:2). It
can be observed from the above discussion that the climate is changing
rapidly and putting Bangladesh at risk of sea-level rising, cyclones, storm
surges. In the matter of relocation of the Rohingyas on an island like
Bhashan Char, more scientific assessments are required. Most importantly,
the GoB has to remain more careful about making this decision. The
following figure 2 show land projected to be below the annual flood level in
2050 and the location of Bhashan Char.
Figure 2: Land projected to be below annual flood level in 2050 and
location of Bhashan Char.
Source: Climate Central, 2020.
2.4.2 The Stance of Aid Agencies
‘It would be a terrible mistake to relocate the Rohingya refugees to an
uninhabitable island that is far from other refugee settlements and
vulnerable to flooding’ said by Biraj Patnaik, Amnesty International’s
South Asia Director (Amnesty International, 2017). UN and many aid
agencies also raised their concern about this decision of GoB. According to
them, the island is isolated, flood-prone, and would be dangerous for the
Rohingyas because of cyclones and tidal surges (Palma, 2020; AFP, 2019).
Devastating cyclones regularly hit the island. During the monsoon period
(June-September) mostly, the island was submerged. According to the local
people from nearby Hatiya Island, some part of the island is eroded, and
one individual told Human Rights Watch, “In that time, we never dare go to
that island, so how will thousands of Rohingya live there?” (Adams, 2019).
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic
Speaking on condition of anonymity, one land department officer of GoB
said, “During the high tide the whole island goes under several feet of
water. The land is extremely unstable. It’s impossible for the Rohingyas to
set up any type of shack or house and live here,” (Rahman et al. 2017).
Additionally, the trafficking routes converging around the island are
notorious for pirates. (The Asean Post, 2019; Kullab, 2017).
The deputy director of the Asia division of Human Rights Watch, Phil
Robertson, said the plan of relocating the Rohingyas threatened a human
rights catastrophe and a humanitarian disaster. He stated, Bangladesh
should be looking for ways to better protect the Rohingya rather than
coming up with punitive plans that will put their lives at risk” (Rahman et
al. 2017). Similarly, the U.N. special rapporteur on Myanmar, Yanghee
Lee, said, “Ill-planned relocation, and relocations without the consent of the
refugees concerned, have the potential to create a new crisis” (Nebehay,
2019). Based on the aid agency’s concern about the relocation plan, the
GoB said resettling the Rohingyas is an internal matter and blamed NGOs
for raising safety and sustainability concerns (Adams, 2019). The following
table 1 shows government initiatives in Bhashan Char.
Table 1: Government initiatives in Bhashan Char.
Also known as
Thengar Char
Project name
Asrayan-3
Size
30000 hectares (40 sq. km)
Exact location
Hatiya Upazila in Noakhali district
Distance
30 km away from the mainland
Project implemented by
Bangladesh Navy
Project cost
USD 350 million approximately
Accommodation and facilities
Number of people can stay
103,200 people
Cluster village
120 cluster villages
Barrack House
1440
Rooms
16
Hospital
2
Community clinic
4
Safety and security
Embankment
13 km flood defence embankment with a
height of 3.5-meter (11 feet high)
Shelter station
120 cyclone shelter stations
Responsible for security
Bangladesh Navy
Police station
Under construction
Source: Compiled by author (Acharjee, 2019; Bhuiyan, 2020; Illius, 2019; The
Asean Post, 2019; Westcott and Pokharel, 2017; Khokon, 2017; Abrar, 2020).
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI
3 Rohingya Repatriation Process
Successful repatriations are largely dependent upon the behavior of both the
host and the country of origin (Faulkner and Schiffer, 2019:3). Though the
country of origin embedded with most of the responsibilities but others
have responsibilities as well. The UN Handbook on Voluntary
Repatriation clearly outlines the responsibilities of both host and country of
origin for the refugees (UNHCR, 1996)
3
. According to the UN handbook,
“The country of origin should allow its nationals to return in safety and with
dignity without any fear of harassment, discrimination, arbitrary detention,
physical threat or prosecution on account of having left or remained outside
the country, and should provide guarantees and/or amnesties to this effect.
It should also take all measures to ensure the restoration of full national
protection” (UNHCR, 1996). Like the country of origin, the responsibilities
of the host country are vital too. According to the UN handbook “The
country of asylum is obliged to continue to treat refugees according to
internationally accepted standards as long as they are on its territory”
(UNHCR, 1996). According to Bradley (2014), the involuntary nature of
repatriation by the host country has been identified as the equivalent to
‘acquiescing to ethnic cleansing’ (cited in Faulkner and Schiffer, 2019:3).
Also, the lack of third-party involvement or the over-involvement of
international organizations has been notable contributors to repatriation
failures (Kendle, 1998 as cited in Faulkner and Schiffer, 2019: 3).
In the case of the Rohingya crisis, the process of repatriating Rohingya
refugees in Myanmar was witnessed before. A total of 223,599 Rohingyas
repatriated during the periods of 1992-2005, according to the Refugee
Relief and Repatriation Commissioner’s Office (Ahmed 2010 as cited in
Azad and Jasmin, 2013:30). Although it was involuntary and both the
governments and UNHCR were involved in this process (Azad and Jasmin,
2013:30). The following table 2 shows the year wise repatriation of the
Rohingya refugees.
3
. It is important to note that neither Bangladesh nor Myanmar is a party to the
UN Convention on Refugees (UNHCR, 1996).
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic
Table 2: Year wise repatriation of Rohingya refugees.
Year
Number of Refugees
1992
5962
1993
46129
1994
82753
1995
61504
Year
Number of Refugees
1996
23045
1997
10073
1998
106
1999
1128
2000
1323
2001
283
2002
760
2003
3231
2004
210
2005
92
Total
223,599
Source: Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner’s Office, Ministry
of Food and Disaster Management, Dhaka (Ahmed 2010 as cited in Azad
and Jasmin, 2013:30)
3.1 Status of the Rohingya Repatriation Process
The progress of successful repatriation of the Rohingyas to Myanmar is
very low. In the matter of the Rohingya's successful repatriation to
Myanmar, the progress is very little. It has been a while that the GoB (host
country) is trying to repatriate the Rohingyas. But, the Rohingyas do not
agree to voluntarily go back to Myanmar until the Myanmar government
(country of origin) guarantees their security and changes the discriminatory
laws (Wake and Yu, 2018:2; Martin et al., 2017:1). Moreover, the
conditions (limited movement, forced labor, and arbitrary arrest) of the
remaining Rohingyas in the Rakhine state particularly demotivated the
refugees to return (Yarnell and Sullivan, 2019). Further, the government of
Bangladesh and the government of Myanmar agreed on a repatriation deal
in October 2017, which is supposed to be implemented from November
2018, but after the denial of Rohingyas and opposition by many
international organizations, including UNHCR and Rohingya refugee
Committee; Bangladesh government had to stop the initiative (ICG, 2018:2-
3, HRW, 2019). Due to amid protest at the camps in November, the plan of
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI
sending 2200 Rohingya refugees as the first batch of the repatriation
process was failed as Bangladesh vowed not to force anyone to return
(Siddqui, Z. 2019). However, after the failure of the first attempt, the GoM
embarked upon a new plan to begin repatriating the Rohingyas in August
2019, which failed again due to the denial of the Rohingyas (Kurlantzick,
2019).
Furthermore, a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
was signed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the Myanmar Ministry of Labour,
Immigration, and Population in June 2018. The purpose of this MoU
was to help create a conducive environment for the voluntary, safe,
dignified and sustainable repatriation of Rohingya refugees from
Bangladesh as well as to support recovery and resilience-based
development for the benefit of all communities living in the three
northern townships of Rakhine State. However, due to the unwillingness of
the Myanmar government to establish a framework for the voluntary
return of ethnic Rohingyas to their homes, UN bodies extended the MoU
in May 2020 (UNHCR, 2020). According to Andrew Gilmour, UN
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights said, “The Government of
Myanmar is busy telling the world that it is ready to receive Rohingya
returnees, while at the same time its forces are continuing to drive them into
Bangladesh,” He added, “Safe, dignified and sustainable returns are of
course impossible under current conditions. The conversation now must
focus on stopping the violence in Rakhine State, ensuring accountability for
the perpetrators, and the need for Myanmar to create conditions for return”
(OHCHR, 2018).
In this situation, the chance of successful repatriation is doubtful
until the international community (third-party) put extreme pressure on
Myanmar to change the discriminatory laws against the ethnic Rohingyas
and take real measures to bring them back. A light of hope was that, in
January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the primary judicial
organ of the United Nations, ordered Myanmar to take all measures in its
power to prevent genocide against the Rohingya people (Brody, 2020). The
court indicated some specific “provisional measures” in this regard until
the final verdict is delivered (Choudhury, 2020). It seems like a great
victory for the Rohingyas. Though GoM rejected the verdict of ICJ and
claimed that its own commission, the Independent Commission of Enquiry,
found no genocide in Rakhine state (BBC, 2020). International Criminal
Court (ICC) is also investigating this matter. However, both the ICJ and
ICC lack the mandate to enforce their judgments. Only the UN security
council can enforce this, which is unlikely to happen because of
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic
Myanmar’s greatest ally China and Russia (Choudhury, 2020; Scheffer,
2020). The most recent development on this matter is the planning of
Foreign Minister-level tripartite talks between Bangladesh, Myanmar, and
China. After the new government formed in Myanmar, Bangladesh is
hopeful about this tripartite talk, which will likely be held in Beijing (The
Daily Star, 2020b).
3.2 Necessity of the Rohingya Repatriation
The Rohingya people in the refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar are living in
inhumane conditions as they are illegal residents with no status (Motaher,
2019; Uddin, 2015:63). The Rohingya refugee camps are one of the most
crowded places on Earth, with 40,000 people per square kilometer. It is
impossible to ensure freedom of movement, access to public services,
education, and livelihoods in the camps. It is not also suitable for refugee
children as they are at high risk of disease, including malnutrition, as well
as physical abuse and violence (World Vision, 2020).
Alarmingly, Civil Society groups based in Cox’s Bazar have raised
massive concern over the Rohingya crisis and called on the international
community to redouble efforts for quick repatriation of Rohingyas as
Bangladesh is facing multiple challenges induced by the Rohingya influx.
Local people of Cox’s Bazar nearby the Rohingya refugee camps are not
pleased with the overall situation. Many have lost their jobs, and their
income has suddenly dropped due to Rohingyas. Rashed Mohamad Ali, UP
chairman of Hnila-2 in Teknaf, responded, “For the last three years, local
fishermen are almost failing to catch fish as the Rohingyas are involved in
fishing. Thus, fishermen’s income has dwindled in Teknaf” (The Daily Star,
2020a). Further, the Rohingyas were also involved in violence. Rohingya
refugee camps in Kutupalong became battlegrounds in October 2020 in a
clash between registered camp refugees and non-registered camp refugees
(Rahman, 2020). Some Rohingyas were also directly involved in drug
trafficking. Law enforcement agencies caught some of them during
smuggling Yaba, worth millions of Takas (Roy, 2018; Aziz, 2020). Sadly,
the anti-Rohingya sentiment is developing gradually among the local
Bangladeshi people due to the loss of jobs, falling daily wages, increasing
violence in the camps, and involvement in drug trafficking.
4 Recommendations and Conclusion
The Rohingyas have always been neglected in the matter of having justice
for their own life. It can be seen in the past when the Government of
Myanmar imposed discriminatory citizenship laws (The Burma Citizenship
Act of 1982) against them, and inequality can be seen now when the
Government of Bangladesh decided to relocate some refugees to the island
The Jahangirnagar Review, Part-C, Vol. XXXI
called Bhashan Char. Though they are refugees or internally displaced
persons who take shelter in Bangladesh, they still have some rights.
Regarding the Rohingya issue, all can hear about is that what the actors
(Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, and the aid agencies) want for Rohingyas,
not what the Rohingyas want for themselves. On the basis of the detailed
discussion, the author wishes to make the following recommendations for
the key actors to set reasonable and humane policies for the Rohingyas.
1. Currently, Bangladesh provides shelter to around 1.1 million Rohingya
refugees. Bangladesh is not a signatory to the UN Convention on
Refugees, though they should follow the internationally accepted
standards as long as the Rohingyas are on its territory. Relocating these
traumatized people on Bhashan Char to face another threat to their
survival is not a durable solution. Moreover, it will not be wise for
Bangladesh now to risk undermining the protection of the Rohingya
and squandering the international goodwill it has earned. Most
importantly, GoB should not put the life of Rohingyas at such risk.
2. Apart from this humanitarian concern, there is another issue.
Relocating the Rohingyas in Bhashan Char might send a wrong
message to the Myanmar government. It could be perceived by the
GoM that GoB accepts the Rohingyas in their land. Moreover, it could
be seen as that Bangladesh is tolerable and reluctant on the Rohingya
issue, and it might end up in the failure of the ongoing repatriation
process and pushback of the remaining Rohingyas who currently reside
in the Rakhine state.
3. Unfortunately, Bangladesh failed to draw the expected support from
China, India, USA, Russia, Japan as well as the ASEAN for successful
repatriation. Instead of the relocation plan, GoB should focus more on
the successful repatriation process only. Although, in this situation,
successful repatriation is unlikely to happen without third-party
intervention. In that case, Bangladesh should take advantage of ICJ’s
decisions and the initiative of ICC’s more and more to keep the
pressure on Myanmar. Only effective negotiation with the GoM can
solve this crisis permanently.
4. Due to fund constraints and security reasons, it was not possible to
collect more information on the realities of field visits in Rakhine state
and Bhashan Char. Consequently, this study has limited empirical
perspectives on the issues; hence further study needs to address these
limitations significantly better to have field studies in Rakhine state
regarding the repatriation process, and Bhashan char regarding the
relocation process and also face to face interviews with the Rohingyas
to understand their perceptions.
The Rohingya Crisis Uncertain Future of the Rohingya Ethnic
In conclusion, the following claims can be made. The Rohingya ethnic
minority demand justice for what had been done to them and their families.
They also need justice for their future generations. They deserve to go back
to their home, and it much depends on the goodwill of Myanmar mainly as
well as China, India, Russia, USA, and the international and regional
organizations. Without changing the discriminatory laws of Myanmar, it
will not be possible or either safe for the Rohingyas to go back. Moreover,
it will not be possible without putting extreme diplomatic pressure on
Myanmar. Instead of arguing who should provide shelters to these
Rohingyas, actors (especially Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, India, Russia,
USA, and international and regional organizations) should concentrate on
the successful repatriation process.
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For Rohingya, Bangladesh's Bhasan Char 'Will Be Like a Prison
  • B Adams
Adams, B. (2019) For Rohingya, Bangladesh's Bhasan Char 'Will Be Like a Prison', HRW, 14 March, 2019. [Online].