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Vol.:(0123456789)
Environment, Development and Sustainability (2023) 25:9417–9438
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-022-02441-0
1 3
Does accountability audit ofnatural resource promote
corporate environmental performance? Anexternal
supervision perspective
CailouJiang1,2· RongLiu1· JieHan1
Received: 15 March 2022 / Accepted: 8 May 2022 / Published online: 4 June 2022
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022
Abstract
By taking the pilot policy of Accountability Audit of Natural Resource (AANR) as a quasi-
natural experiment, this paper examines the impacts of AANR on corporate environmental
performance (CEP). The moderating effects of media supervision and the rule of law are
also examined from an external supervision perspective. The results indicate that AANR
significantly promotes CEP. Media supervision significantly weakens the promotion effects
of AANR on CEP, and a higher level of rule of law significantly enhances the promotion
effects of AANR on CEP. On further analysis, the impacts of AANR on CEP are found
significant in coastal regions and in heavily polluting enterprises.
Keywords Accountability audit of natural resources· Corporate environmental
performance· Media supervision· Rule of law
1 Introduction
The reform and opening up of China’s economy has made remarkable achievements, but
the subsequent rapid growth model has caused serious environmental problems. How to
marry the targets of economic growth and environment protection has been a key issue
during China’s economic transformation. Local officials in China play a key role in this
economic growth through the allocation of large quantities of resources. Since GDP has
been used as a key indicator for developmental achievements (Li & Zhou, 2003), local
officials have paid more attention to economic growth than environmental protection, often
resulting in both excessive consumption of natural resources and high pollutant emis-
sions of enterprises. Additionally, due to the frequent asymmetric information structures
between government agencies, local officials may conceal fake environmental pollution
data to avoid accountability (Chao & Ma, 2020). This may indulge those enterprises that
* Cailou Jiang
jcL@nuist.edu.cn
1 Business School, Nanjing University ofInformation Science andTechnology, Nanjing210044,
China
2 Research Institute forEnvironment andHealth, Nanjing University ofInformation Science
andTechnology, Nanjing210044, China
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