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5 Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective
... Both the opportunity and the motive perspectives are focusing on economic, political and social structural features to explain individuallevel decisions associated with joining a rebel or terrorist organization or not. The greed perspective, focuses on structural conditions that provide opportunities for a rebel or radicals group to wage war against a government (Collier, 2000;. These are conditions that provide the rebel group with the financial means to fight, or factors that reduce the cost of rebellion, such as unusually low recruitment costs for rebel soldiers. ...
... According to opportunity and the motive perspectives the economic, political and social structural features explain individuals joining a rebel or (radical) terrorist organization or not. The opportunity perspective (the greed perspective) focuses on structural conditions that provide opportu nities for a rebel or (violent radicals) group to wage war against a government (Collier, 2000;. ...
... Youth refugees with high low self-control and who confronted high strains found more radicals. This psychological trait consisted with radicalization as a construct in its essence composed of a ruthless, imprudent, and violent behavior.Findings can be interpreted in the light of the General Theory of Crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), Heise's Ecological model (1998), Greed theory (Collier, 2000; and Grievance theory (Gurr, 1970). All these theories focus on the structural macro forces that push refugees to be radical. ...
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between strains and youth radicalization among Syrian refugees in Jordan. Moreover, it aims to describe the prevalence and causes of Syrian refugees' radicalization in Jordan. A sample of 714 (65% males and 35% females) Syrian youth refugees, both males and females, was selected. Findings of the present study showed an alarming average percentage (46.7%) of the prevalence of radical thought, beliefs and intentions among the refugees. Around a third of the sample were victims of violence, a fifth had been perpetrators of violence against others, and around half of the sample had participated in a fight. More than half of the sample feel inequity and around half of them feel unjust. A significant positive relationship was found between radicalization and general stains, unemployment, victims of violence, perpetrators of violence and low self-control. Moreover a significant positive relationship was found between low self-control and radicalization, and a negative relationship was found between radicalization. Three major causes of radicalization were identified: (1) Personal causes: age, religion, prayer, religion effect, religious compliance, anger, fear, low self-control, and use of force. (2). Family causes: Family size, number of employed persons in the family, father's education, mother's education, and mother's job. (3). Societal causes: lack of feeling equity, low life satisfaction, and life stress events. Findings raised the attention to the youth refugees pose threats and security's vulnerabilities. Moreover, it calls the attention to the take in account encountering radical beliefs dissemination among youth refugees. Policy and security measures are discussed.
... Also focusing on the troublesome idealism of the young, it is important to understand that large youth groups can cause conflict because they are more easily attracted toward new ideas and religions and thereby challenge existing forms of authority. (Collier, 2000). ...
... These conflict situations are not just limited to within their borders, but often involve engaging in conflict in neighboring countries. (Collier, 2000). ...
The abstract contains a discussion on when youth grievances and dissatisfaction reached a high level make countries more unstable in general and thus more susceptible to youth restiveness and especially so under conditions of economic stagnation, which can be explosive.
... Several authors (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998), (Collier, 1999), (Collier, 2000) identify variables that explain crime activity from the level of development existing in a country or in certain regions. Therefore, this document sug-gests proxy variables that relate the level of crime to regional development, to indicate that differences in development conditions explain regional violence (Akçomak & Weel, 2012), (Fox & Hoelscher, 2012). ...
... Several authors suggest variables to show the excess and concentration of youth population in the regions (Vinasco-Martínez, 2019), (Urdal, 2004), (Urdal, 2005), (Urdal, 2006), an event that allows analyzing the effect of this population on crime and the risk of internal conflict (Collier, 2000), (Goldstone, 2002), (Huntington, 1996), (Barakat & Urdal, 2009) given by the population cohort between 15-24 years in relation to the total population. This leads the population to participate in the prevention of crime associated with youth, as indicated by broken window theory (BWT) (Ren, Zhao & He, 2019), (O'Brien, Farrell & Welsh, 2019), (Browning, Soller & Jackson, 2015), (Chappell, Monk-Turner & Payne, 2011), (Hinkle, & Yang, 2014) and with this prevent the youth recruited by gangs from being punished with measures such as jail, which is not always the best alternative and ends up harming their futures (Coimbra & Briones, 2019), (Aizer & Doyle Jr, 2015), (Landersø, 2015), (Eren & Mocan, 2017), (Bhuller, Dahl, Løken & Mogstad, 2020). ...
In some countries, the increase in the youth population is connected to greater criminal activity. In the case of Colombia, different studies support the idea of providing socio-economic possi-bilities for young people to avoid being linked to illegal and criminal activities. Based on these precedents, this document examines whether the increase in the youth population in Colombia is directly connected to municipal crime during 2000-2010, a period in which those born in the 1990’s reached their teenage years and could participate in urban crime. For this study, economic and other variables of total and juvenile population are constructed for youth between the ages of 15-24, as well as variables in population density and political polarization incorporating the crime index proposed by (Durán, López, & Restrepo, 2009). The proposed model estimates that youth population density, population growth, conflict actions and political polarization are asso-ciated with an increase in crime. Also, greater development and political polarization can lead to an environment of less crime.
... Thankfully, other theories soon emerged, each derived from different ontological assumptions. Some, like Collier (2000) starting from an ontology of individual economic rationality see atrocity and looting as the means of "doing well in war" (Collier 2000). Others posit a group-level strategic rationalityatrocity and terror constitute the means of prosecuting war by the militarily weak (Kaldor 2006), or by the socio-politically discontented in what Richards portrays as "devilishly well-calculated" dramaturgical displays of deeply ingrained anger and resentment (1996). ...
... Thankfully, other theories soon emerged, each derived from different ontological assumptions. Some, like Collier (2000) starting from an ontology of individual economic rationality see atrocity and looting as the means of "doing well in war" (Collier 2000). Others posit a group-level strategic rationalityatrocity and terror constitute the means of prosecuting war by the militarily weak (Kaldor 2006), or by the socio-politically discontented in what Richards portrays as "devilishly well-calculated" dramaturgical displays of deeply ingrained anger and resentment (1996). ...
This draft is one of two chapters that engage with the work of Robin DiAngelo, namely her book, White Fragility. Both chapters are from my book length manuscript -- "In Defense of the Vulnerable: White Fragility, Peace and Conflict Studies, and the Interdisciplinary Production of Knowledge -- under final revisions for review at Palgrave Pivot. This chapter is a rejoinder to an increasingly uncharitable chorus of critics I have referred to elsewhere as the Anti-Anti- Crowd, those who work diligently to find fault with anti-racists, or anyone who dares oppose the forces of hate: National Review, which sees the alleged greed motive as the only redeeming quality in the fight against bigotry, Aero magazine, masters in the art of academic misconduct and of picking on the little guy (and girl), and the alt-lite Quillette, founded by alt-right Islamophobe Claire Lehmann. (See, "It’s Always what Comes After the “But,” Newest to Join the Anti-Anti-Racism Crowd Reveals the Same Irrational Hatred of Robin DiAngelo," Medium.org). My other chapter engaging with DiAngelo's number 1 bestseller, offering my own critique of her work, will be uploaded soon.
... Según la primera, los jóvenes son más propensos a integrar un grupo armado rebelde porque son más baratos de reclutar. Esto se debe a que su costo de oportunidad es menor (o incluso, en ciertas ocasiones, podría decirse que es casi inexistente) que el de otras poblaciones mayores (Collier, 2000). Además, para los jóvenes puede ser incluso beneficioso, económicamente hablando, unirse a la rebelión armada: en los grupos insurgentes pueden encontrar una forma rápida de hacer dinero. ...
En la teoría demográfica del conflicto, la composición de una población puede ser causa de violencia. En Colombia, este enfoque ha sido poco abordado, a pesar de que el conflicto se intensificó en los años noventa y, paralelamente, el país entró en un período de bono demográfico (poblaciones jóvenes y en edad de trabajar muy numerosas). Para determinar si esa particular estructura poblacional influyó en la evolución del conflicto, se escogieron municipios de cuatro regiones diferentes y se analizaron algunas variables de población, conflicto y condiciones socioeconómicas entre 1973 y 2005. No se encontró una relación automática población joven numerosa = conflicto, pero todos los municipios más violentos tenían poblaciones jóvenes y en edad de trabajar importantes y condiciones de vida deficientes, lo que invita a continuar investigando la relación entre bono demográfico y conflicto.
... It demonstrates the existence of a connection between the hypothesized explanatory variable and the measured response. Collier (2000) conceded that the likelihood of young men joining the insurgency is influenced by their access to alternative sources of money. Young people will join insurgencies to make money if they see no other way out of unemployment and poverty. ...
The aim of this study is to find out the connection between youth bulge and social unrest. As the government and development donors increase their youth spending more and more, youth issues are hotly debated. Due to the youth bulge and its possible consequences, as well as the fact that there are more young people than adults in the country, youth issues have become national priorities. However, youth drinking is a population component that causes problems for society as a whole. The youth bulge is a common phenomenon in many emerging countries. It is often due to a stage of development where a country manages to reduce infant mortality but has a high birth rate. The demographic change currently underway in Pakistan may last until 2048. Pakistan has 165 million citizens, making it the sixth most populous nation in the world. Youth constitute a significant part of Pakistan's population pyramid, and when the state does not provide them with job opportunities or use their talents and energy for growth, the youth become frustrated and turn to conflict, unrest and violence as a result. The aim of the study is to "investigate the causes of youth bulge and analyze its impact in Pakistan". This study was conducted with this objective in central Punjab, Pakistan. A random sample was selected from 300 respondents. The technique of data collection was a carefully arranged interview schedule. SPSS version 22 was used to make the analysis. According to the results of the analysis, Pakistan has a large youth population due to the country's high birth rate. Lack of employment opportunities, economic recession, inadequate youth empowerment programs, and lack of youth participation in development projects have all contributed to the problem of youth bulging, which encourages youth to engage in violent behavior and conflicts that undermine Pakistan's socio-cultural and physical infrastructure.
... These are then compared with "grievance" "proxies": (1) ethnic or religious hatred; (2) economic inequality; (3) lack of political rights; and (4) government economic competence. The conclusion is that the results overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agendas: greed as opposed to grievance (Collier, 2000a, andCollier, 2000b). Therefore, conflicts seen from this perspective are reduced to greed which is why rebels take up arms. ...
In African States, which are multi-ethnic, with multiple religions and vast natural resources, social conflicts have reigned for decades. Religion and ethnicity are intricately interwoven in African conflicts. This Book illustrates that in the past, religion has been used as a uniting factor. Therefore, what are the root causes of conflicts in these African States? In answering this question, we use Nigeria as a case study; we examine the Sharia-law, the Niger Delta, and the Boko-Haran conflicts amongst others. We argue that religion, ethnicity, natural resources, and culture are factors in Nigerian conflicts, but that the frustration of basic human needs (BHNs) is actually what is at the root of its conflicts. We examine Fr. Francis Liberman’s religious peacebuilding “Project for the Blacks” (1846) whose virtue of humility and love was based on the satisfaction of BHNs and conclude that a similar project is likely to bring sustainable peace in Nigeria and elsewhere. This book is intended for students and practitioners of conflict resolution and anyone interested in how religion can help resolve conflict in the African States.
... The DRC conflict is a vivid example of that. The failure of state institutions and the race for resources, in addition to the barbarous aspects of war including rape and torture have been seen to be the underlying issues ( Collier 2000 ;Collier and Hoeffler 2000 ;Kaplan 2000 ;. According to the state-failure and resource-wars theses, countries in the region, elites and politicians in the DRC as well as ruthless militias have entered into conflict to battle for the control of resources, making it impossible for the DRC to develop politically and economically. ...
Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making addresses debates on liberal peace and the policies of peacebuilding through a theoretical and empirical study of resistance in peacebuilding contexts. Examining the case of ‘Africa’s World War’ in the DRC, it locates resistance in the experiences of war, peacebuilding and state-making by exploring discourses, violence and everyday forms of survival as acts that attempt to challenge or mitigate such experiences. The analysis of resistance offers a possibility to bring the historical and sociological aspects of both peacebuilding and the case of the DRC, providing new nuanced understanding of these processes and the particular case.
... Specifically, previous studies had shown the role of natural resources in shaping the conditions for peace and conflict. They examined how competition over natural resources can either be a source of conflict or an opportunity for cooperation (e.g., Brock 1991;Collier 2000;Conca 2001;Le Billon 2001). While these studies explained the potential of environmental factors to ignite conflict or build peace, this chapter will focus on sustaining peace by merging positive peace and sustainable development. ...
... El objetivo general es argumentar de manera rigurosa la siguiente tesis: «La posibilidad de resolver pacíficamente un conflicto armado crece cuando los actores moderados priman sobre los extremistas» (Chinchilla, 2021, p. 38). Su indagación busca resolver una cuestión provocadora y poco explorada por los estudiosos del tema, si bien existen trabajos interesantes que se centran en fenómenos como los «saboteadores de procesos de paz» (Stedman, 1997), las nuevas guerras y la codicia de los actores armados opositores según la perspectiva económica (Collier, 2000) y otros. La inmensa mayoría de los trabajos que han puesto la lupa en las élites de los actores que deciden negociar la paz no ahondan en el factor no monolítico de estos, haciendo de las denominadas líneas extremistas o duras, y líneas moderadas o blandas un asunto poco relevante o secundario de análisis. ...
El libro gira en torno al presupuesto de que en las guerras civiles no existen actores completamente monolíticos y que, por tanto, si se analiza la estructura de poder de estos es posible identificar líneas duras o extremistas, y líneas blandas o moderadas. La tesis del autor señala que la posibilidad de resolver pacíficamente un conflicto armado crece cuando los actores moderados priman sobre los extremistas. Entre los aportes centrales de la obra se encuentra el análisis de los cuatro casos abordados extensamente mediante trabajos de campo —Angola, El Salvador, Colombia y Mozambique—, para lo cual se diseñaron herramientas analíticas que permitieron sopesar, a modo de comparación, cuáles fueron las líneas que prevalecieron para el éxito o fracaso de diferentes procesos de paz.
... Specifically, previous studies had shown the role of natural resources in shaping the conditions for peace and conflict. They examined how competition over natural resources can either be a source of conflict or an opportunity for cooperation (e.g., Brock 1991;Collier 2000;Conca 2001;Le Billon 2001). While these studies explained the potential of environmental factors to ignite conflict or build peace, this chapter will focus on sustaining peace by merging positive peace and sustainable development. ...
In this chapter, we identified a myriad of factors that bolster the peace-sustainability nexus. There has been a growing recognition of the relationship between peace and sustainability in both academic and policy circles. However, the current understanding of the peace-promoting potential of sustainability and the sustainability-promoting potential of peace remains limited. This chapter contributes to this knowledge lacuna by merging positive peace and sustainability into a conceptual framework that can guide future research and policymaking. Informed by a systematic review of literature on the peace-sustainability nexus, we discuss the five dimensions of sustainability – economic, social, political, institutional, and environmental – in relation to the pillars of positive peace. We then make a case for the integration of environmental sustainability into the pillars of positive peace.
... Dünyanın farklı ülkelerinde meydana gelen iç savaşlarla ilgili yapılan bilimsel çalışmalarda doğal kaynakların çatışma üzerindeki etkileri değerlendirilmiştir. Konuyla ilgili yapılan literatür çalışmasında elde edilen en önemli bulgulardan biri; doğal kaynaklar iç çatışmaya dahil olan farklı tarafları finanse ederek onları, hedeflerine ulaşmalarında motive etmekte, barış görüşmelerinin/anlaşmalarının başarısız olmasına ve savaşın süresinin uzamasına yol açmaktadır (Buhaug, Gates ve Lujala, 2009;O'Loughlin ve Witmer, 2005;Gilmore, vd., 2005;Ross, 2001;Collier, 2000;Humphreys, 2005;Ohmura, 2018;Ross, 2004). Diğer bir bulgu ise, savaşın yaşandığı ülkede farklı silahlı gruplar arasında doğal kaynak alanları üzerinde kontrolü ele geçirmek için kaynak savaşları ortaya çıkmakta ve çatışmanın yoğunluğunun artmasına yol açmaktadır (Weinstein, 2007;Lujala, Rød ve Thieme, 2007;Buhaug ve Lujala, 2005;Le Billon, 2008;Lujala, 2009;Ross, 2004). ...
Çalışmanın amacı, Suriye’nin petrol ve doğal gaz rezerv alanlarının iç savaş üzerindeki rolü ve etkisini değerlendirmektir. Bu nedenle çalışmada, hidrokarbon kaynak alanlarının Suriye iç savaşına dâhil olan ülke ve grupların izledikleri savaş stratejilerine etkileri, rezerv alanlarındaki enerji mücadelesinin savaş sürecini nasıl etkilediği, petrol ve doğal gaz kaynak alanlarının savaşan gruplara finansal tesiri ve çatışma yoğunluğu ile zayiatları arttırmadaki rolü tartışılacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, konu ile ilgili kapsamlı bir literatür çalışması yapılmış, bilimsel yayınlar ve uluslararası enerji kuruluşlarının raporlarından yararlanılmıştır. Suriye enerji kaynaklarının ve savaşa dâhil olan grupların dağılımı haritalarla verilmeye çalışılmış, iç savaşa müdahil olan tarafların neden olduğu can kayıplarının tespiti için UCDP veri seti kullanılmıştır. Suriye petrol ve doğal gaz alanları, iç savaşta kontrolü ele geçirmek isteyen aktörler arasındaki çatışma düzeyinin artmasına yol açmakla kalmamış aynı zamanda illegal örgütlerle Suriye’deki savaşa müdahil olan ülkeler arasında iş birliklerinin yapılmasında da etkin rol oynamıştır. Suriye’de DEAŞ, PYD/YPG/SDG gibi terör örgütleri, rejim güçleri, farklı gruplara destek veren ülkeler ile muhalif gruplar arasındaki çatışmalar özellikle enerji kaynak sahalarının olduğu yerlerde daha yoğun yaşanmıştır. Suriye petrol ve doğal gaz kaynak alanları, yaşanan iç savaşın süresini uzatmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda çatışmanın daha fazla şiddetlenmesine neden olmuştur. Rezerv/üretim alanları, ülkedeki savaşan farklı gruplar için önemli finans kaynaklarından biri haline gelmiştir.
... Past estimates of YCS by leading theorists (e.g. Collier 2000) had been done with the total population as the denominator. Urdal (2004) argues, however, that such an approach to estimating YCS is fraught with challenges because it underestimates youth bulges in countries with fast growing under-15 years populations, since they are typically overrepresented in such fast-growing populations. ...
Do the relative numbers of young people in the adult population affect their extent of participation in electoral politics? The answer to this question remains elusive in both the theoretical and empirical literature on youth political participation. In this study, we test the hypothesis that young people’s cohort size has a significant effect on their electoral participation. Using individual level data from the World Values Survey and country level data from the United Nations Population Division, we ran a series of multinomial logistic regression analyses with 29 democratic countries. The findings show that youth cohort size exerts a negative effect on young people’s electoral participation. The study finds this effect to be stronger for young people whose main source of information are their peers. The results of this study represent a major step towards improving our understanding of the effect of cohort size on cohort political behaviour; a topic so far neglected within the literature on youth political participation.
... Diferentes estudios han encontrado una falta de vínculo entre la desigualdad y la violencia, una relación lineal o una relación en forma de U. 2 Parte del debate tiene que ver con la unidad de análisis seleccionada. Mientras que Collier (2000a;2000b) argumentó en contra del papel de la desigualdad, la pobreza y los agravios en el inicio de la guerra civil, Cramer (2005) y Østby (2013) sugirieron que el vínculo entre desigualdad y conflicto no debe probarse a nivel nacional, con coeficientes de Gini y regresiones entre países. En cambio, están a favor de bajar la escala del análisis para mirar los niveles subnacionales y utilizar medidas de desigualdad distintas. ...
Este artículo propone el nuevo concepto de disputa territorial en guerras civiles para preguntarse qué hace un lugar más propenso a ser disputado e indaga por las causas de la disputa territorial en el conflicto armado colombiano. Sugiero que hay una correlación entre la desigualdad de la tierra y la capacidad estatal. Tanto el proceso de producción de desigualdad como la capacidad estatal resultante proveen los motivos, incentivos y oportunidades de la disputa territorial. Testeo mi teoría con una base de datos compuesta por 200 municipios colombianos y un periodo de cinco años. Mis resultados sugieren que la desigualdad de la tierra conduce a mayor capacidad estatal y la capacidad intermedia del estado se correlaciona con la disputa territorial. Los hallazgos de este artículo confirman la existencia de un nexo entre la desigualdad de la tierra y el conflicto en Colombia a través de la capacidad estatal. Este hallazgo tiene implicaciones para la estrategia de expansión de la presencia estatal durante el posconflicto.
... Around the year 2000, after a decade of civil wars, pessimism about the future of sub-Saharan Africa was widespread among international commentators. 1 An expanding population was failing to find enough productive work to generate social cohesion, and the region was succumbing to irregular youth militia armed with Cold War-surplus semi-automatic weapons deployed in pursuit of plunder not politics (Collier, 2000;Kaplan, 1994). ...
Rural‐based insurgencies disrupted the forest margins of Upper West Africa in the 1990s. A subsequent return to peace was accompanied by strong growth in small‐scale trade in foodstuffs and other agrarian produce in high demand in towns. Motor cycle taxis are a feature of this increased rural–urban market integration. It was a mode of transport pioneered by ex‐combatants. Where rural women were once attacked by rural young men without job prospects press ganged into fighting for the rebels, bike taxi riders now carry them to rural periodic markets, many of which are new since the end of conflict. The study provides an analytical account of these developments, drawing on discussions with villagers in three heavily war‐affected localities of Sierra Leone. The evidence indicates that communities divided by conflict have quietly built new cooperative links conducive to peace based on local agricultural production and petty trade.
... Another cause of intractable conflict is the greediness of selfish warlords who benefit from the political economy of violence by means of arms sales, smuggling and other illicit commercial transactions (Crocker et al, 2005). Indeed, Paul Collier (2000), makes it clear that "conflict pays" both in monetary and political terms. The chief beneficiaries of the war economy may reap so much profit that they have a strong desire to perpetuate the conflict; the Sierra Leone and Angola civil wars are cases where people have profited from the wars. ...
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the long standing conflicts in human history. Many have given their accounts of the conflicts including the warring parties both either claiming victim or vector. This article interrogates the various dynamics of the conflicts and the interpretations given by both sides.
Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.
This chapter explores the intricate relationship between mineral exploitation and violence, challenging the traditional notion that violence connected to mineral exploitation is solely associated with armed conflicts. It highlights that conflicts related to mineral exploitation extend beyond wars, encompassing social conflicts arising from disputes between communities and mining entities. The chapter argues that the term ‘conflict minerals’ is inadequate, as it implies a narrow focus on war financing and overlooks the broader spectrum of human rights violations. The analysis delves into cases of both armed and social conflicts linked to mineral exploitation, emphasizing the need for a nuanced understanding. The chapter aims to demonstrate that human rights violations in mineral-related conflicts are a complex, global phenomenon, urging a reevaluation of international frameworks to address these multifaceted challenges. The traditional concept of ‘conflict minerals’ is critiqued for its limitations and disconnect from the broader goal of human rights protection, advocating for a more inclusive and context-aware approach in policy discussions and future regulations.
This book explores the challenges faced by international law in addressing violence related to mineral exploitation. It progresses from analysing the specific relationship between minerals and human rights to a systemic examination of how international economic regimes interact with human rights measures. The introductory chapter sets the theoretical framework and provides a global overview of the interplay between mineral exploitation, human rights, and international law. It delves into the negative impacts of mineral exploitation, the systemic nature of international law, and the manifestations of fragmentation. The final section explores the author’s structural bias and rationale for adopting a human rights perspective.
The contamination of large water bodies through crude oil production led the people of Nigeria’s oil-bearing Niger Delta to seek new means of livelihood away from aquaculture. This led some of their youths to engage in distillation of crude oil using locally fabricated equipment in what is known as artisanal refineries. In order to supply their makeshift refineries with crude oil, they illegally tap into pipelines and other petroleum infrastructures which traverse the region. Both their refining activities and their method of obtaining crude oil are adjudged illegal and so were criminalized by the Nigerian state. To enforce their criminalization, the government resorted to the deployment of joint military taskforces and other kinetic measures. But rather than quell the practices, the government’s responses appear to have aggravated the situation. This paper uses a variety of sources, including focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), and field observations to investigate how the criminalization of artisanal oil refining operations has contributed to worsening the security environment of petroleum production in Nigeria. Our findings show that artisanal oil refining, though instigated by the deplorable economic and environmental challenges in the oil-bearing communities, has attracted a complex web of actors whose capacity for clandestine activities is immense. As such we found the government’s responses inadequate for dealing with the problem due to its failure to both unravel the web of interests and address the root causes of the problem. We then prescribe a dynamic problem-solving approach for resolving oil activism in Nigeria holistically.
Africa is home to millions of displaced persons–IDPs and refugees–a trend that has its genesis in the pre-independence armed struggles and is currently perpetuated by internal conflicts that plague most parts of the continent. Although the challenge has been a permanent phenomenon since the days of the Organisation of African Unity, the continental organization, now the African Union, has failed to craft a response strategy that addresses both forced displacement and the conundrum of protracted refugee situations. This article argues for a policy reformulation that situates the problem of displacement within the core of Africa’s peace and security framework (the APSA). It posits that this approach addresses both causes of forced displacement and the welfare of the displaced. At a policy level, the approach permeates good governance, peace, security and economic strategies of the Union.
Recent scholarship claims that group grievances due to political exclusion and discrimination drive civil wars. The grievance perspective suggests that socio-psychological factors allow groups to overcome collective action problems. We argue that the grievance perspective (over)focuses on the ends and not means , which are critical to explain how groups survive state sanction, allowing contention to escalate to civil war. We suggest that inclusive economic governance reduces investment in state-evading infrastructures for quotidian economic reasons, leading to the buildup of rebellion-specific capital. Physical and human infrastructures of state evasion form the logistical bases for survival against state sanction. Our analyses show that group-grievance-generating political factors are poorer predictors of civil war compared with economic freedoms measured as free-market friendly policies and the private ownership of economies, which should reduce economic rents accruing to state-evading shadow markets. Our results are robust to several alternative models, data, and estimating method. Theory that ignores the means explain the main causes of costly violence only partially, or mistake symptom for cause. Freedom and inclusiveness, which should reduce grievances, are intrinsically valuable, but they are hard to obtain when violence is waged successfully for more narrower ends.
In this chapter, the scope of terrorist groups active in the Mexican political fray that have attacked commercial interests is much narrower than in India. Mexican terrorist organizations chronicled between 2007 and 2018 conducted a very few terrorist events against business targets. Those ranged from anti-government terrorist groups such as the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), to “single issue” terrorist organizations, such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Two incidents conducted by Choi and Tzeltol Indians were also recorded.
This paper examines the nature, impact, ramifications, and root causes of the corporate-community resource conflict in Anambra’s oil-bearing communities. It approaches this objective from the standpoint that such a conflict may be appropriately termed “a legacy of oil transnational corporations” in Nigeria, given their antecedents in the Niger Delta region. Unlike the existing literature that blames such conflicts for the most part on environmental, socio-economic, and political factors, with limited emphasis on the legal factors, this paper takes the position that an unhealthy legal apparatus of the Nigerian state and regulatory gaps in Nigeria’s oil industry provide the enabling environment that makes the conflict inevitable. Essentially, this paper tweaks the “resource curse” theory as espoused by mainstream political economists by demonstrating that, apart from greed and grievance, the “curse” is equally underpinned by inept legal structures and regulatory gaps that show little regard for good governance and the well-being of the local people in host communities. But two possible solutions are proffered. One is the institutionalization of a statutory scheme for consultation with the local communities before appropriation of their lands for oil production projects, and the other is encouraging the participation of indigenous peoples or indigenous entities in the development of their natural resources, following the example of Orient Petroleum Resources Plc.
This paper seeks to address the connection between economic opportunities and violence prevention, through an in-depth study of the National Youth Service ( NYS ) Community Cohorts Programme – the biggest youth empowerment programme in Kenya’s recent history. Using field data, it seeks to answer the following question: To what extent did the National Youth Service Community Cohorts Programme in Kenya contribute to violence prevention in the low-income neighborhoods of Mathare and Kibera? Empirically, using the NYS as a case study, the paper will provide new data on the impact of youth programs that simultaneously seek to promote livelihoods and economic opportunities towards dealing with the challenges of violence and exclusion. It will also explore the impact of such projects in reducing violence at the local level. Theoretically, the study will contribute to broader scholarly discussions on youth and violence in Africa, as well as the economic incentives and motivations argument in preventing and reducing violence. Redesigned in 2013, the NYS programme sought to reach thousands of youth in poor urban areas, and by offering them jobs to improve their neighborhoods, the goal was to provide them with a new sense of purpose in their life, and potentially, steer them away from deviant behavior. The NYS initiative is the most ambitious jobs and economic opportunities project for urban and rural youth in Kenya. Given its scale and the resource commitment from the Kenya government, the NYS initiative will continue to be a reference for other youth-focused initiatives and, thus, provides a useful case for the study of the economic opportunities-violence nexus.
Prior to the Nixon administration, environmental policy in the United States was rudimentary at best. Since then, it has evolved into one of the primary concerns of governmental policy from the federal to the local level. As scientific expertise on the environment rapidly developed, Americans became more aware of the growing environmental crisis that surrounded them. Practical solutions for mitigating various aspects of the crisis—air pollution, water pollution, chemical waste dumping, strip mining, and later global warming—became politically popular, and the government responded by gradually erecting a vast regulatory apparatus to address the issue. Today, politicians regard environmental policy as one of the most pressing issues they face. The Obama administration has identified the renewable energy sector as a key driver of economic growth, and Congress is in the process of passing a bill to reduce global warming that will be one of the most important environmental policy acts in decades. The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy is a work that covers all aspects of environmental policy in America. Over the past half century, America has been the world's leading emitter of global warming gases. However, environmental policy is not simply a national issue. It is a global issue, and the explosive growth of Asian countries like China and India mean that policy will have to be coordinated at the international level. The book therefore focuses not only on the U.S., but on the increasing importance of global policies and issues on American regulatory efforts. This is a topic that only grows in importance in the coming years.
Este artigo busca chamar a atenção para alguns elementos necessários para se compreendera formação e a dinamização do conflito violento, buscando consolidar tais elementosimportantes para a análise deste fenômeno. De modo a delinear tais elementos, este artigoestá dividido em três seções. A primeira seção trata do campo de estudo de Resolução deConflitos, chamando a atenção para seus elementos. A segunda seção discute a concepção daviolência e a relação com o conflito. Por fim, a terceira seção delineia elementos importantesa serem considerados ao se realizar a análise de um conflito violento, chamando a atençãopara a necessária multidimensionalidade desta análise.
The link between natural resources and conflict has raised numerous questions in extractive industries, especially in developing countries in the post-cold war (Ruben in Will De Jong, Deanna, Donovan, Ken Ichi Abe, Extreme Conflict and Tropical Forests, Springer 2007:37–56, 2007; Hamid et al. 2022; Hamid and Cederman 2022; Jesse in The Palgrave Handbook of African Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020; Alexis 2022). The discussion has even intensified given the consistent and higher demands for natural resources globally (Joshua et al. 2017; Olarenwaju 2020). Given this link, it has raised several questions.
The causes of the disintegration of states are primarily based on the erosion of some of the central functions of that institution which, in the context of the spheres of political science research, can no longer guarantee genuine goods such as security, the exercise of the monopoly on the use of force, state services or the provision of infrastructure, education and health. In the sense of social constructivism, consequential phenomena occur, such as the fact that the prevailing economic order develops only marginal radiance to define the relations of economic subjects with each other and undermines a national economy based on transactions. The dysfunctionality of state institutions is also accompanied by the delegitimisation of political elites, which manifests itself in the lack of loyalty of citizens to the state and the regime and a lack of social cohesion of society and the state. From this mix of loss of control over a geographically demarcated area and the break-up of the monopoly of necessary enforcement mechanisms of the legislature, perpetuating forms of decaying states can emerge. External factors would be the escalation of the global order conflict between liberal democracies and autocratic regimes, which is also being carried out in the various conflict regions and the refugee crisis as well. Anyway: the aftermath of conflict would be the same-state failure.
Four theories are used to explain the causes and dynamics of violent conflict along the Oromia–Somali Border in eastern Ethiopia. Of these, political economy (greed versus grievance) and political ecology theories are instrumental in understanding the main drivers of violence. Politicization of ethnicity and the self-centered behavior of political elites have increased the complexity of the conflict. Fekadu Kenee demonstrates that peacebuilding efforts require respect for the outcomes of referendums on the disputed territorial units and revitalization of customary systems, among others. While customary institutions can resolve conflicts at least temporarily, sustained community dialogue needs to be part of the political reform to build lasting inter-regional peace.
As the year 2020 dawned, the world underwent a paradigmatic shift that impacted all aspects of life. While it is axiomatic that the coronavirus pandemic left an indelible effect on all age groups, the author is especially interested in analysing the impressions that the pandemic can leave on the lives of youth. With history providing anecdotes of contagions having led to political violence and widespread massacres, this chapter will explore how the current pandemic can lead to youth radicalisation in an age of social media and in countries witnessing youth bulge. This study will be carried out at the intersection of international relations, international security, and political psychology and within the parameters of youth bulge, social-psychology, and radicalisation. In doing so, the author will propose a prognostic approach to provent youth radicalisation rather than prevent it in retrospect.
The relationship of the natural environment to war has long been the subject of study, but its connection to atrocity crimes in particular has received far less attention. This chapter explores the rich literature on the role natural resources play in shaping violence, examining it through two broad areas of focus that define the scholarship: scarcity and abundance. In doing so, it provides an overview of the key thematic debates linking resources to violence, ranging from early Malthusian concerns over demographic pressures to more recent discussion of the potential (and perhaps already realized) cataclysmic impacts of climate change and urbanization.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the US Coalition forces, is amongst the most politically and culturally significant events of the twenty-first century. Much research across disciplines has been dedicated to explaining the War, with a significant body of work in the social sciences illuminating the role of oil in fuelling war and ongoing instabilities in the region. Less attention has been paid, however, to the ways that resource conflicts in Iraq expand beyond physical militarized clashes, bleeding into social and cultural realms that are purportedly unconnected to oil. This paper attends to a particularly significant one of these realms: the passive and active destruction of the material cultural heritage of Iraq and the immaterial social, cultural, and political consequences of this on the Iraqi people, including the violent colonial ecologies of plunder-based conflict curation. Using a critical, multidisciplinary array of secondary sources, this paper links oil, conflict, and culture against a (neo)colonial backdrop to illustrate that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a resource war that targeted not only natural but also cultural resources, leading to the parallel extraction and displacement of oil and heritage. Reframing the Iraq War through the lens of culture reveals how the conflict and following instability dispossessed the Iraqi people of their autonomy and capacity for political mobilization, with the broader purpose of establishing a stable regime of extraction to mitigate the demands of resource dependency. This analysis presents a new reading and conceptualization of oil, and a broader understanding of how resource dependency creates holistic spheres of violence and dispossession that work to reproduce and reinforce colonial and imperial power relations.
Malešević offers a novel sociological answer to the age-old question: 'Why do humans fight?'. Instead of focusing on the motivations of solitary individuals, he emphasises the centrality of the social and historical contexts that make fighting possible. He argues that fighting is not an individual attribute, but a social phenomenon shaped by one's relationships with other people. Drawing on recent scholarship across a variety of academic disciplines as well as his own interviews with the former combatants, Malešević shows that one's willingness to fight is a contextual phenomenon shaped by specific ideological and organisational logic. This book explores the role biology, psychology, economics, ideology, and coercion play in one's experience of fighting, emphasising the cultural and historical variability of combativeness. By drawing from numerous historical and contemporary examples from all over the world, Malešević demonstrates how social pugnacity is a relational and contextual phenomenon that possesses autonomous features.
Questions on power exercise by natural resource actors and inherent conflicts have gained traction in scientific and policy circles in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), although there is virtual neglect of harmful convictions embedded in the exercise of power. To bridge this gap, this paper explores power and convictions around land and linked natural resources in Cameroon. Data was generated through focus group discussions (N ¼ 14), key informant (N ¼ 44) and expert interviews (N ¼ 19). The analysis drew from the actor-centered power lens employing thematic and content analysis. The results indicate the following: First, while gender-based and elitism-based harmful convictions significantly shape land and linked natural resource access, region/ethnic-based and religion-based convictions were less significant. Second, actors championing gender-based convictions employ more coercive approaches, while elitist and political actors make use of incentives. This study informs the actor-centered power (ACP) approach, with emphasis on the convictions embedded in the exercise of power during natural resource acquisition.
n recent times, insurgency has pervaded some regions of Nigeria. The militants hold sway in the South-South, the secessionists in the SouthEast and the Boko Haram in the NorthEast. Unveiling the sources of funding of these insurgent groups continue to be shrouded in secrecy. African in diaspora are said to be sending over 40 billion US dollars in remittance to Africa every year. For what purposes? This study examines the role of diaspora cash inflows in poverty alleviation and probable funding of festering insurgencies in Nigeria. The study used descriptive survey method by drawing data from secondary sources obtained through the documents of World Bank, Central Bank of Nigeria and other financial research institutions as well as scholarly and research articles. Data drawn from primary sources include the authors' close observations of events in Nigeria and oral inputs from other academics. Findings revealed that while cash inflows from Nigerians in diaspora have helped in alleviating poverty in many instances, some of the funds are unaccounted for and have been used to fund insurgencies. Brinkmanship anchored on grudges, primordial sentiments, irredentism and feelings of marginalization of kinsmen has driven some Nigerian diaspora away from the task of nation building and national integration. It is recommended that greater searchlight is beamed on funding of insurgency, the political class should address poverty by providing enabling environment for job creation, and provide alternative narratives on religion to reduce fundamentalism.
Conventional literature associates large youth cohort size (YCS) with increased risk of political violence in countries with such demographic profiles. Key questions which remain unanswered, however, are whether YCS is also associated with young people’s proclivities toward more peaceful forms of protests, and whether structural socioeconomic conditions influence such a relationship? Using multilevel binary logistic regression techniques on pooled individual level data for 51 democratic countries purposively sampled from World Values Survey Waves 3 to 6, and country level data from World Bank, and UN Population Division, I show that YCS demonstrates a positive relationship with young people’s participation in peaceful demonstrations. This relationship is, however, moderated by structural factors such as education and unemployment, which end up reducing young people’s likelihood of participation. I argue that resource limitation, as predicted by the Civic Voluntarism Model, better explains the relationship between YCS and individual youth protest behavior in democratic societies, more than socioeconomic grievance, as suggested by grievance theory. An important implication of this finding is that participation in elite-challenging behaviors such as peaceful protests, can be expected to be more common among young people in affluent democratic societies, than their peers elsewhere in the democratic world.
Although the relationship between high-value minerals and civil conflict has been heavily theorized in recent years, the connection between low-value minerals and civil conflict has received less attention. This chapter draws on micro-level evidence from North-Western Zambia to determine whether the booming copper mining industry provokes significant grievances among the local population, and whether such grievances engender ethnic mobilization, tension and clashes. Specifically, the chapter teases out distributive, migration, political and environmental grievances introduced in the theoretical chapter and demonstrates how they can emerge in the context of low-value resource extraction.
In this essay I examine the representations of child soldiers in Yuri Suhl’s Uncle Misha’s Partisans and Emmanuel Dongala’s Johnny Mad Dog. While Suhl’s novel recreates the historical fact of Jewish children’s involvement in the organized group of resistance fighters – called the Jewish Partisans – during the Second World War and in that sense serves to recreate the history of Jewish child soldiering, Dongala’s narrative portrays a conflict in which children are instrumentalized as soldiers in a war propelled by mere avarice, the fighters as ideologically barren, and the children involved as mainly innocent victims of adults’ myopia. In comparatively examining these two narratives, I argue that, whereas Suhl offers a positive portraiture of Jewish child soldiers as patriotic beings with agency and voice and constructs a far more nuanced perspective of childhood innocence, Dongala in his own work represents African child soldiers in familiarly negative light.
This paper systematically maps the field of scholarly works on the theme of youth and violent conflict in Africa. It reviews the evidentiary base of the nexus between youth and violent conflicts in Africa by interrogating the conceptual, methodological, and empirical foundations of the different explanations adduced for why and how youth participate in armed conflicts. It observes that the evidence base linking youth vulnerability and exclusion with violence is generally mixed across the board; each extant perspective offers some useful insights within its narrow conceptual and methodological contours. In addition, the social agency of youth and the power context of society are crucial to understanding the link between youth and violence, and the risk of violence in Africa. Social agency speaks to why and how youth encounter, process, interpret and act on social phenomena, including violence. It highlights the need for further research into the dynamic nature of how youth identities interact with new trends in violence and insecurity such as violent riots and protests and post-election violence, among others.
En este artículo examino el reclutamiento militar de los jóvenes urbanos en África Occidental y analizo su involucramiento en los conflictos como una “navegación social”. Propongo una perspectiva acerca de la juventud que asume que esta categoría generacional es a la vez un proceso social y una posición. El artículo ilustra cómo los jóvenes urbanos navegan sus vínculos sociales y las opciones que surgen de las situaciones bélicas para escapar de la muerte social que de otra manera caracteriza su situación. Al describir a la juventud como un tiempo de estancamiento y desgarramiento de la existencia social de los jóvenes en Bisáu, Guinea-Bisáu, queda claro cómo la guerra se convierte en un área de posibilidades, en lugar de ser un espacio de muerte solamente. Así, el concepto de navegación social nos ofrece miradas penetrantes acerca del juego cruzado entre las estructuras objetivas y la iniciativa subjetiva. Esta perspectiva analítica nos permite dar sentido a las formas oportunistas, a veces fatalistas, y tácticas con que los jóvenes luchan para ampliar sus horizontes de posibilidad en un mundo de conflictos, agitación y recursos decrecientes, y nos deja ver cómo el enfrentamiento del conflicto se vuelve una cuestión de equilibrios entre la muerte social y las oportunidades violentas de vida.
This article examines how the environmental protection of national parks can impact negatively both conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This research focuses on the Arly National Park, integrated into the W., Arly and Pendjari (WAP) peacebuilding and development initiative, one of the two main sources of insecurity in Burkina Faso. By excluding local social-ecological systems, Arly Park’s top-down environmental
protection program leads to conflict situations rather than peacebuilding opportunities. This paper is based on field research carried out in Burkina Faso between October 2018 and April 2019. Forty interviews conducted with security actors, international observers, government officials, European Union officials and inhabitants of the Arly Natural Park reveal that both exogenous environmental regulation and poorly designed international development projects create a fertile breeding ground for conflicts. This field study investigates how the inadequate design of the initial initiative and personal agendas retard development and peacebuilding opportunities. It also highlights how
national authorities seize the opportunity to attract development funding and use environmental regulation as a tool for the distribution of central power and authority in peripheral areas. Furthermore, it demonstrates how greed and looting linked to environmental regulation create a causal chain resulting in environmental degradation and conflicts. Finally, this article stresses the strong interconnection and
interdependence of ecological and sociological systems, which embed ecological regimes of knowledge and practices that sustain an ecosystem’s preservation and perpetuation. Discounting this particular and holistic understanding when designing environmental regulations or, worse, emphasizing its exclusion,
exacerbates in the end both environmental degradation and conflict.
Partindo do mapeamento das principais linhagens de produção de conhecimento sobre o crime nas Relações Internacionais (RI), este artigo busca compreender a política dos critérios na construção desse objeto no campo disciplinar. Primeiramente, sustentamos que os trabalhos sobre “novas guerras” e “crime organizado transnacional” entendem o crime como objeto das RI apenas quando este extrapola a fronteira nacional. Em seguida, o artigo percorre as abordagens sobre policiamento global e nexo segurança-desenvolvimento e argumenta que tais análises ainda preservam a extrapolação do doméstico como critério de objetificação. O artigo então lança mão de linhagens que exploram a fronteira guerra-crime e as tecnocracias transnacionais para repensar tanto a fronteira interno-externo que organiza o campo das RI como os agentes investidos em processos de criminalização. Partindo de uma leitura sobre Estado, aparato penal e o internacional, argumentamos que o controle de populações é condição de possibilidade do internacional, e vice-versa. Com isso, o artigo confronta o apagamento daquilo que o aparato penal faz “dentro do Estado” como algo que não diz respeito à disciplina de RI e encoraja o engajamento com estudos críticos de criminologia como janela para interpretar processos de criminalização e suas conexões com práticas de inclusão/exclusão na política global.
Using contemporary and historical approaches, this paper empirically interrogates the recent and current trajectories of the statebuilding and peacebuilding processes and politics of southern Somalia (recognised as a state) and Somaliland (unrecognised as a state). To understand how the (post-)violent politics has preconditioned the form and face of becoming a Weberian state, the paper traces the internal dynamics and external dimensions of the two entities. In so doing, it offers empirical and theoretical contributions as to why the attempts at statebuilding and peacebuilding conversations in southern Somalia fail from time to time while Somaliland by contrast appears to be different. Although comparisons and contrasts between the two entities have been varied from the outset, there are similarities as well as differences in terms of structural differences, state differentiations, competing actors, different stakes and similar practices of clan politics. If evaluating institutions and actors in the longue durée approach suggests why a state is a state in Somaliland but not in southern Somalia, assessing both the state structures and the stakes involved reveals why power struggle and resource competition have become violent in one entity but not the other. Based on research data collected mainly in southern Somalia and Somaliland, the paper contributes to the research on the political conflicts in fragile and failed states in Africa, post-war Somali reconstruction and statebuilding and peacebuilding processes in war-torn societies.
The study focuses on community crimes and insecurity challenges in Tiv and Jukun communities of Taraba State, Nigeria. The history of the two communities and the land-owner groups is laced with aggressions and grievances, which have resulted in crimes at various times. The last one, from January to July 2019, witnessed massive deaths, destruction of lives and property and led to forced displacement of persons. Quite a number of works have emerged on the causes and consequences of community land ownership-related crimes. However, the aftermath of community peace agreements, particularly in respect of tensed relations, community protection and safety in the area is yet to be sufficiently interrogated. This study investigates the state of relations between the Tiv and Jukun as well as the community peace processes in the area after the last inter-communal clashes. Also, it identifies a number of factors causing inter-communal-clashes between the two. Furthermore, the study also reveals complex community protection, safety, and peace processes involving the state, community, land owners, community leaders and land ownership gangs. Specifically, at the moment, the peace in the communities is sustained by the leaders of the gangs. This study answers the following questions: How sustainable is this arrangement? What is the state of relations in the communities? What roles do the actors play? The study made use of both primary and secondary data. Fieldwork for the study was carried out between August and September 2019 in Tiv and Jukun communities of Taraba State. The main method of data collection was unstructured interview, which was conducted with 150 people, made up of all traditional rulers, local, political, religious and youth leaders. Secondary data was sourced from texts, newspapers, magazines, official gazettes, archival materials and the Internet.
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