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The effect of lying on memory and metamemory when deception is repeated and volitional.
... Even though participants predicted their memory performance to be lower for lies than the truth, their actual memory performance showed the opposite pattern, with higher memory performance for fabricated lies than the truth, producing a metacognitive illusion. In a study with lies about simple actions, Dianiska and Meissner (2022) also showed lower memory predictions for lies than the truth. ...
... The current project had three main aims: The first aim was to investigate whether memory predictions were affected by lie fabrication manipulation. Prior work yielded that lying produces lower memory predictions than truth-telling for both episodic (Dianiska & Meissner, 2022) and semantic information (Besken, 2018). We assessed whether this effect was also valid for personal semantic information. ...
... First, participants should take longer to respond deceptively compared to responding truthfully, as also found in previous research (Besken, 2018;Verschuere et al., 2011;Vrij et al., 2008;Walczyk et al., 2003;Williams et al., 2013). Second, participants should produce lower JOLs for lies than in truth trials (Besken, 2018;Dianiska & Meissner, 2022). Regarding the second aim of the current project, we investigated the effects of experience-based processes on JOLs. ...
Research shows that people lie on online dating sites often but might fail to remember this information subsequently. This study investigated participants' predicted and actual memory performance for personal semantic information after telling the truth versus a lie in two experiments in a setup similar to online dating sites. In Experiment 1, participants responded to open-ended questions either truthfully or fabricated lies in a within-subjects design, followed by predictions for remembering their responses. Subsequently, they recalled their responses through free-recall. Using the same design, Experiment 2 also manipulated the type of retrieval task by using a free- or cued-recall test. The results showed that participants consistently had higher memory predictions for truthful than deceptive responses. However, the actual memory performance did not always produce similar results to their predictions. The results suggest that the difficulties during lie fabrication, measured through response latencies, partially mediated the relationship between lying and memory predictions. The study has important applied implications for lying about personal semantic information in online dating contexts.
Research has demonstrated that deceptive responses can undermine item and source memories. However, previous studies have often randomly assigned participants to an honest or deception group and asked them to respond in specific ways in an interview, rather than providing them a choice of what response to give. Moreover, little attention has been given to destination memory in previous research. Using a daily life paradigm, we investigated the effects of deception on memory. After completing a mock shopping task, participants were told that someone would ask them questions about their shopping lists. The participants voluntarily chose to tell the truth or lie in the interview and were encouraged to respond as they would in their daily lives. An item memory test, source memory test and destination memory test were given 48 h after the interview. Source and destination memories but not item memories were impaired for participants who chose to lie. Specifically, liars forgot the things about which they lied and mistakenly believed that they lied about many things that they did not, and they also did not remember to whom they lied. We conclude that deception can disrupt memory in daily life.
In the current experiment, we investigated the impact of repeated lying on memory. Specifically, we were interested in the effects of lying (i.e., false denial or fabrication) on memory when deceptive strategies were repeatedly executed. Participants (n = 121) watched a video (i.e., electrician who committed a burglary) and immediately after and during the following ten days, they were instructed to either falsely deny, fabricate, or answer honestly to certain details of the video. Some details were discussed (i.e., denied, fabricated, or honestly answered) either once, or four times. Other details were never discussed. Finally, all participants received a memory test, in which they were asked whether they either discussed the details during the interview or saw the details during the video. Although, overall, repeated lying did not undermine memory for having discussed certain details, repeated falsely denying led to an impairment of the memory for the original event. Our
findings show that lying can adversely affect memory and that repeated lying can even increase this effect.
The Palgrave Handbook of Deceptive Communication unravels the topic of lying and deception in human communication, offering an interdisciplinary and comprehensive examination of the field, presenting original research, and offering direction for future investigation and application. Highly prominent and emerging deception scholars from around the world investigate the myriad forms of deceptive behavior, cross-cultural perspectives on deceit, moral dimensions of deceptive communication, theoretical approaches to the study of deception, and strategies for detecting and deterring deceit. Truth-telling, lies, and the many grey areas in-between are explored in the contexts of identity formation, interpersonal relationships, groups and organizations, social and mass media, marketing, advertising, law enforcement interrogations, court, politics, and propaganda. This handbook is designed for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academics, researchers, practitioners, and anyone interested in the pervasive nature of truth, deception, and ethics in the modern world.
The goal of the present experiment was to examine the effect of certain (deceptive) strategies (e.g., false denial) on memory. Specifically, participants were shown a traumatic virtual reality (VR) video of an airplane crash. Following this, participants (N= 94) received questions concerning details from the VR scene in a baseline memory task. Then, participants could choose from 3 options how to cope in response to having experienced the VR scene: tell the truth, falsely deny, or fabricate. The majority opted to tell the truth (n = 81). A subsample of truth tellers were instructed to falsely deny having seen certain details. One week later, all participants received a source monitoring task in which they were asked (1) whether they remembered talking about these details during an interview, and (2) whether they remembered seeing certain details during the VR experience the week before. Participants had to tell the truth during this task. Participants who were instructed to falsely deny showed impaired memory for presented details that had previously been discussed (i.e., denial-induced forgetting) and seen in the VR scene. Also, the presentation of certain details in the baseline memory task seemed to inoculate participants who were instructed to falsely deny from experiencing memory impairment. The current experiment suggests that false denials can have adverse ramifications for memory for what is discussed and seen.
A common measure of memory monitoring——judgments of learning (JOLs)——has recently been shown to have reactive effects on learning. When participants study a list of related and unrelated word pairs, they recall more related than unrelated pairs. This relatedness effect is larger when people make JOLs than when they do not make them. Evidence is mixed concerning whether this increased relatedness effect arises because JOLs help memory for related pairs, hurt it for unrelated pairs, or do both. In three experiments, we investigated (1) the nature of the increased relatedness effect (i.e., does it arise from positive reactivity for related pairs, negative reactivity for unrelated pairs, or both?) and (2) the mechanisms underlying the effect. Participants studied cue–target word pairs and either did (or did not) make immediate JOLs and then completed a cued-recall test. When participants studied a mixed list consisting of related and unrelated pairs, the increased relatedness effect was largely driven by positive reactivity. When participants studied pure lists consisting solely of related or unrelated word pairs (Experiment 2 only), the increased relatedness effect was minimized. These and other findings suggest that making JOLs helps learning more than hurts it, and that this reactive effect partly occurs because making JOLs changes people’s learning goals.
The ability to deceive others relies on the use of cognitive processes to construct a believable falsehood and maintain that lie over time. In this chapter, we discuss research that documents how the act of lying can influence the content of liars’ memories for the occasions when they lied and memories of the original experience. In addition, we describe how an understanding of memory processes can be a tool for uncovering deception. For instance, the content of memories of actual and fabricated events differ in characteristic ways, and people can be trained to utilize these features to discriminate between them. Furthermore, it possible to magnify differences in the reports of liars’ and truth-tellers’ to increase detection. Memory can play a critical role in catching liars.
In the legal field, victims and offenders frequently lie to avoid talking about serious incidents, such as past experiences of sexual abuse or criminal involvement. Although these individuals may initially lie about an experienced event, oftentimes these same people eventually abandon their lies and are forthcoming with what truly happened. To date, it is unclear whether such lying affects later statements about one’s memory for the experienced event. The impetus of the present review is to compile the current state of knowledge on the effects of lying on memory. Based on existing literature, we will describe how deceptive strategies (e.g., false denials) regarding what is remembered may affect memory in consequential ways, such as forgetting of details, falsely remembering features that were not present, or a combination of both. It will be argued that the current literature suggests that mnemonic outcome is contingent on the type of lie and we will propose a theoretical framework outlining which forms of lying likely result in certain memory outcomes. Potential avenues of future research also will be discussed.
Lie detection techniques are frequently used, but most of them have been criticized for the lack of empirical support for their predictive validity and presumed underlying mechanisms. This situation has led to increased efforts to unravel the cognitive mechanisms underlying deception and to develop a comprehensive theory of deception. A cognitive approach to deception has reinvigorated interest in reaction time (RT) measures to differentiate lies from truths and to investigate whether lying is more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Here, we provide the results of a meta-analysis of 114 studies (n = 3307) using computerized RT paradigms to assess the cognitive cost of lying. Results revealed a large standardized RT difference, even after correction for publication bias (d = 1.049; 95% CI [0.930; 1.169]), with a large heterogeneity amongst effect sizes. Moderator analyses revealed that the RT deception effect was smaller, yet still large, in studies in which participants received instructions to avoid detection. The autobiographical Implicit Association Test produced smaller effects than the Concealed Information Test, the Sheffield Lie Test, and the Differentiation of Deception paradigm. An additional meta-analysis (17 studies, n = 348) showed that, like other deception measures, RT deception measures are susceptible to countermeasures. Whereas our meta-analysis corroborates current cognitive approaches to deception, the observed heterogeneity calls for further research on the boundary conditions of the cognitive cost of deception. RT-based measures of deception may have potential in applied settings, but countermeasures remain an important challenge.
Little is known about the cognition of deception (Gombos, 2006). We propose a cognitive account of serious lying (i.e., deception involving high stakes) in response to a solicitation of a truth: Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). Built on the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of answering questions deceptively ( Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003), the theory elaborates on the roles of executive processes, theory of mind, emotions, motivation, specifies cognitive processing thoroughly, and considers the rehearsal of lies. ADCAT's four processing components are (a) activation of the truth, the (b) decision whether and how to alter deceptively the information shared, (c) construction of a deception, and (d) action [acting sincere while delivering a lie]. Core constructs are “theory of mind” and “cognitive resources”. Specifically, throughout serious deception, individuals are inferring the current or potential mental states of targets and taking steps to minimize the allocation of cognitive resources during delivery to appear honest and lie well.
Although memory performance benefits from the spacing of information at encoding, judgments of learning (JOLs) are often not sensitive to the benefits of spacing. The present research examines how practice, feedback, and instruction influence JOLs for spaced and massed items. In Experiment 1, in which JOLs were made after the presentation of each item and participants were given multiple study-test cycles, JOLs were strongly influenced by the repetition of the items, but there was little difference in JOLs for massed versus spaced items. A similar effect was shown in Experiments 2 and 3, in which participants scored their own recall performance and were given feedback, although participants did learn to assign higher JOLs to spaced items with task experience. In Experiment 4, after participants were given direct instruction about the benefits of spacing, they showed a greater difference for JOLs of spaced vs massed items, but their JOLs still underestimated their recall for spaced items. Although spacing effects are very robust and have important implications for memory and education, people often underestimate the benefits of spaced repetition when learning, possibly due to the reliance on processing fluency during study and attending to repetition, and not taking into account the beneficial aspects of study schedule.
Reports on 5 experiments with 96 undergraduates, comparing memory for words that were generated by the Ss themselves with the same words when they were simply presented to be read. In all cases, performance in the Generate condition was superior to that in the Read condition. This held for measures of cued and uncued recognition, free and cued recall, and confidence ratings. The phenomenon persisted across variations in encoding rules, timed or self-paced presentation, presence or absence of test information, and between- or within-Ss designs. The effect was specific to the response items under recognition testing but not under cued recall. A number of potential explanatory principles are considered and their difficulties enumerated. It is concluded that the generation effect is real and that it poses an interesting interpretative problem. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Proposes a framework for the conceptualization of a broad range of memory phenomena that integrates research on memory performance in young children, the elderly, and individuals under stress with research on memory performance in normal college students. One basic assumption is that encoding operations vary in their attentional requirements. Operations that drain minimal energy from limited-capacity attentional mechanisms are called automatic. Automatic operations function at a constant level under all circumstances, occur without intention, and do not benefit from practice. Effortful operations, such as rehearsal and elaborative mnemonic activities, require considerable capacity, interfere with other cognitive activities also requiring capacity, are initiated intentionally, and show benefits from practice. A 2nd assumption is that attentional capacity varies both within and among individuals. Depression, high arousal levels, and old age are variables thought to reduce attentional capacity. The conjunction of the 2 assumptions of the framework yields the prediction that the aged and individuals under stress will show a decrease in performance only on tasks requiring effortful processing. Evidence from the literature on development, aging, depression, arousal, and normal memory is presented in support of the framework, and 4 experiments with 301 5–40 yr old Ss are described. (5½ p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This study aimed at extending the deception literature by examining lie-telling strategies given by persons with criminal experience. In interviews taking place in prisons, offenders (n = 35) provided lie-telling strategies in a free narrative style. In an inductive content analysis, we coded both all strategies provided as well as one principal strategy for each participant. In total, 13 strategies were identified, which were grouped into three broader category groups: general verbal, general nonverbal, and specific interview strategies. The most often stated strategies were Close to truth, Eye contact, and No strategy. The most often stated principal strategies were Close to truth, Not giving away information, and No strategy. Some participants provided strategies, such as not giving away information at all in interviews/interrogations, which showed a sophisticated understanding of the police interview situation and the task of the police and prosecutor. Overall, the participants showed great diversity in preferred lie-telling strategy. The results are partly in line with previous research from student samples and provide new insights into the criminally experienced individuals' lie-telling strategies. The results are discussed with regard to impression and information management and police interrogation practice. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
G*Power is a free power analysis program for a variety of statistical tests. We present extensions and improvements of the version introduced by Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner (2007) in the domain of correlation and regression analyses. In the new version, we have added procedures to analyze the power of tests based on (1) single-sample tetrachoric correlations, (2) comparisons of dependent correlations, (3) bivariate linear regression, (4) multiple linear regression based on the random predictor model, (5) logistic regression, and (6) Poisson regression. We describe these new features and provide a brief introduction to their scope and handling.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that exposure to misinformation about a witnessed event can lead to false memories in both children and adults. The present study extends this finding by identifying forced confabulation as another potent suggestive influence. Participants from 3 age groups (1st grade, 3rd/4th grade, and college age) viewed a clip from a movie and were "forced" to answer questions about events that clearly never happened in the video they had seen. Despite evidence that participants would not have answered these questions had they not been coerced into doing so, 1 week later participants in all age groups came to have false memories for the details they had knowingly fabricated earlier. The results also showed that children were more prone to this memory error than were adults.
One of the most important reasons to investigate human metacognition is its role in directing how people study. However, limited evidence exists that metacognitively guided study benefits learning. Three experiments are presented that provide evidence for this link. In Experiment 1, participants' learning was enhanced when they were allowed to control what they studied. Experiments 2a-d replicated this finding and showed contributions of self-regulated study to learning. Experiments 3a and 3b showed that, when forced to choose among items they did not know, participants chose the easiest items and benefited from doing so, providing evidence for the link between metacognitive monitoring/control and learning, and supporting the region of proximal learning model of study-time allocation.
By questionnaire, 631 police investigators reported on their interrogation beliefs and practices-the first such survey ever conducted. Overall, participants estimated that they were 77% accurate at truth and lie detection, that 81% of suspects waive Miranda rights, that the mean length of interrogation is 1.6 hours, and that they elicit self-incriminating statements from 68% of suspects, 4.78% from innocents. Overall, 81% felt that interrogations should be recorded. As for self-reported usage of various interrogation tactics, the most common were to physically isolate suspects, identify contradictions in suspects' accounts, establish rapport, confront suspects with evidence of their guilt, and appeal to self-interests. Results were discussed for their consistency with prior research, policy implications, and methodological shortcomings.
In two experiments, we tested the hypotheses that (a) the difference between liars and truth tellers will be greater when interviewees report their stories in reverse order than in chronological order, and (b) instructing interviewees to recall their stories in reverse order will facilitate detecting deception. In Experiment 1, 80 mock suspects told the truth or lied about a staged event and did or did not report their stories in reverse order. The reverse order interviews contained many more cues to deceit than the control interviews. In Experiment 2, 55 police officers watched a selection of the videotaped interviews of Experiment 1 and made veracity judgements. Requesting suspects to convey their stories in reverse order improved police observers' ability to detect deception and did not result in a response bias.
The authors used paired-associate learning to investigate the hypothesis that the speed of generating an interactive image (encoding fluency) influenced 2 metacognitive judgments: judgments of learning (JOLs) and quality of encoding ratings (QUEs), Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that latency of a keypress indicating successful image formation was negatively related to both JOLs and QUEs even though latency was unrelated to recall. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when concrete and abstract items were mixed in a single list, latency was related to concreteness, judgments, and recall, However, item concreteness and fluency influenced judgments independently of one another. These outcomes suggest an important role of encoding fluency in the formation of metacognitive judgments about learning and future recall.
Manipulations that induce disfluency during encoding generally produce lower memory predictions for the disfluent condition than for the fluent condition. Similar to other manipulations of disfluency, generating lies takes longer and requires more mental effort than does telling the truth; hence, a manipulation of lie generation might produce patterns similar to other types of fluency for memory predictions. The current study systematically investigates the effect of a lie-generation manipulation on both actual and predicted memory performance. In a series of experiments, participants told the truth or generated plausible lies to general knowledge questions and made item-by-item predictions about their subsequent memory performance during encoding, followed by a free recall test. Participants consistently predicted their memory performance to be higher for truth than for lies (Experiments 1 through 4), despite their typically superior actual memory performance for lies than for the truth (Experiments 1 through 3), producing double dissociations between memory and metamemory. Moreover, lying led to longer response latencies than did telling the truth, showing that generating lies is in fact objectively more disfluent. An additional experiment compared memory predictions for truth and lie trials via a scenario about the lie-generation manipulation used in the present study, which revealed superior memory predictions of truth than of lies, providing proof for a priori beliefs about the effects of lying on predicted memory (Experiment 5). The effects of the current lie-generation manipulation on metamemory are discussed in light of experience-based and theory-based processes on making judgments of learning. Theoretical and practical implications of this experimental paradigm are also considered. (PsycINFO Database Record
We examined the mnemonic effects of false denials. In a previous experiment (Otgaar, Howe, Memon, & Wang, 2014), false denials resulted in participants denying that they talked about details with the experimenter when in fact they did. This denial-induced forgetting (DIF) was further examined. In Experiment 1, participants received pictures and their belief and memory for details were tested. In the false denial group, participants had to falsely deny in response to each question. In the external denial group, an experimenter falsely denied to the participants that certain details were present. The control group had to answer the questions honestly. We found evidence for DIF. In Experiment 2, we used a video and again found DIF. Moreover, when the experimenter provided external denials, nonbelieved memory rates increased. Together, our experiments suggest that false denials undermine memory while external denials appear to reduce belief.
The current experiment was designed to assess the mnemonic consequences of false denials and forced confabulations. Children (aged 6–8 and 10–12 years) and adults viewed a video and then their memory and belief about the event were tested. Participants were then divided into three groups. In the “cued recall” condition, participants were asked to answer true- and false-event questions, but could choose not to respond if they did not know the answer. In the “forced confabulation” group, participants received the same set of questions, but were forced to answer all of them. In the “false denial” group, participants were instructed to falsely deny in response to each question. One week later, participants received a source memory test, and they had to provide memory and belief ratings once more. Forced confabulations resulted in false memories in the youngest group. Moreover, our analyses showed that repeated false denials led children and adults to be highly inclined to falsely deny that they had talked to the experimenter about certain presented details, when in fact they had done so. Furthermore, false denial and non-believed memory rates were more pronounced in younger than in older children and adults. Our results imply that denying experienced events is not a good strategy in an interviewing setting, as it adversely affects memory statements about the interview. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
We investigated how telling different types of lies may impact memory. Participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and new objects once or multiple times by describing them or by denying they had seen them. Forty-eight hours later, participants were tested on their source memory. Results revealed that participants had good memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but relatively poor memory for having falsely denied seeing a studied object. These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a person more likely to forget having lied. In addition, repeated truthful denials of having seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it. Thus, telling the truth does not always prevent the possibility of memory distortion.
Source monitoring refers to the discrimination of the origin of information. Multinomial models of source monitoring (W. H. Batchelder & D. M. Riefer, 1990) are theories of the decision processes involved in source monitoring that provide separate parameters for source discrimination, item detection, and response biases. Three multinomial models of source monitoring based on different models of decision in a simple detection paradigm (one-high-threshold, low-threshold, and two-high-threshold models) were subjected to empirical tests. With a 3 (distractor similarity) × 3 (source similarity) factorial design, the effect of difficulty of item detection and source discrimination on corresponding model parameters was examined. Only the source-monitoring model that is based on a two-high-threshold model of item recognition provides an accurate analysis of the data. Consequences for the use of multinomial models in the study of source monitoring are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Conducted 3 paired-associate learning experiments with a total of 120 male and female undergraduates. Under some conditions, a-b learning was facilitated when ss chose responses to be learned on a subsequent a-b list. Ss who chose their a-b responses and were subsequently forced to learn a competing set of material (a-c) showed a relatively greater disruption of learning than ss who did not have the opportunity to choose either a-b or a-c. All of these effects required that when ss chose their responses, the choosing occurred in the presence of their respective stimuli. Simply choosing responses in the absence of the stimuli produced performance which was not different from that resulting when ss were denied the opportunity to choose their responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Studies of text comprehension have amply demonstrated that when reading a story, people seek to identify the causal and motivational forces that drive the interactions of characters and link events (e.g., Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995), thereby achieving explanatory coherence. In the present study we provide the first evidence that the search for explanatory coherence also plays a role in the memory errors that result from suggestive forensic interviews. Using a forced fabrication paradigm (e.g., Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008), we conducted 3 experiments to test the hypothesis that false memory development is a function of the explanatory role these forced fabrications served (the explanatory role hypothesis). In support of this hypothesis, participants were more likely to subsequently freely report (Experiment 1) and falsely assent to (Experiment 2) their forced fabrications when they helped to provide a causal explanation for a witnessed outcome than when they did not serve this explanatory role. Participants were also less likely to report their forced fabrications when their explanatory strength had been reduced by the presence of an alternative explanation that could explain the same outcome as their fabrication (Experiment 3). These findings extend prior research on narrative and event comprehension processes by showing that the search for explanatory coherence can continue for weeks after the witnessed event is initially perceived, such that causally relevant misinformation from subsequent interviews is, over time, incorporated into memory for the earlier witnessed event. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
The current research looked at the effects of lying about a false childhood event on the liar's memory for the event. Participants attempted to convince researchers that false events had actually happened to them. In Experiment 1, participants showed a Fabrication Inflation Effect in that they were more likely to increase their beliefs in the lied-about events than control events. Individual differences such as scores on the Dissociative Experience Scale, frequency of lying, and self-reported feelings of discomfort while lying were related to rates of fabrication inflation. In Experiment 2, participants also showed fabrication inflation and were more likely to inflate their likelihood ratings when the lie was created during a separate session from the posttest. Results from both studies support the idea that Source Monitoring failures may cause participants to increase their likelihood ratings of lied-about events. These results suggest that intentional lying may lead some participants to increase their beliefs in their own fabrications. Applications to the legal field are discussed.
Generation effects (better memory for self-produced items than for provided items) typically occur in item memory. Jurica and Shimamura (1999) reported a negative generation effect in source memory, but their procedure did not test participants on the items they had generated. In Experiment 1, participants answered questions and read statements made by a face on a computer screen. The target word was unscrambled, or letters were filled in. Generation effects were found for target recall and source recognition (which person did which task). Experiment 2 extended these findings to a condition in which the external sources were two different faces. Generation had a positive effect on source memory, supporting an overlap in the underlying mechanisms of item and source memory.
Fluency - the subjective experience of ease or difficulty associated with completing a mental task - has been shown to be an influential cue in a wide array of judgments. Recently researchers have begun to look at how fluency impacts judgment through more subtle and indirect routes. Fluency impacts whether information is represented in working memory and what aspects of that information are attended to. Additionally, fluency has an impact in strategy selection; depending on how fluent information is, people engage in qualitatively different cognitive operations. This suggests that the role of fluency is more nuanced than previously believed and that understanding fluency could be of critical importance to understanding cognition more generally.
Type of lie differentially influences forgetting and false memory
- R E Dianiska
- S M Lane
- D K Cash
Dianiska, R. E., Lane, S. M., & Cash, D. K. (2016, March). Type of lie differentially influences
forgetting and false memory [Conference presentation].
JASP (Version 0.16.2)[Computer software
- Jasp Team
JASP Team (2022). JASP (Version 0.16.2)[Computer software].