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DOI: 10.4324/9781003111474-11
Introduction
In this chapter, we will focus on how the quest for certainty drives cognition
and thereby affects knowledge formation and usage. Traditionally, this quest has
been linked to closed-minded cognition, that is, to forming rigid knowledge
and belief systems resistant to change (Kruglanski, 1989). Closed-mindedness
leads people to believe they are in possession of an absolute truth, which is
why they uncritically ignore, discount, or reject evidence that is discrepant with
their important beliefs (usually linked to identity). This usually drives inaccurate
and biased cognition and implies a tendency to maintain in one’s mind a single
perspective along with the conviction of its unquestionable correctness, which
results in the rejection of other perspectives. This also leads to knowledge resist-
ance, that is, a failure to accept available and established knowledge.
The motivation to achieve certainty is however not always associated with
closed-minded (and biased) cognition, and in this chapter, we will put forward
an alternative view to account for this. More specically, we claim that the quest
for certainty is a goal that can be attained by various means. They may be cho-
sen from among a range of means, either biased, identity-protective, or accura-
cy-oriented cognitive strategies, depending on how useful (i.e. instrumental)
these means are perceived to be for the overarching goal of epistemic certainty.
Epistemic certainty about the past and present state of the world refers to what
we know. Epistemic uncertainty however arises because of what we do not know
but could know in theory (e.g. uncertainty due to limitations of the sample or
methodology) (van der Bles et al., 2019). When identity-protective strategies are
adopted, the beliefs that a person holds remain unchanged, or even strengthened
due to rejection of claims with good evidence against one’s view or endorse-
ments of claims with no credible evidence that support ones’ beliefs/identity.
However, when accuracy-oriented strategies are adopted, existing beliefs may be
altered by the incoming information. This implies the capacity to retain diverse
perspectives in one’s mind, to accept their diversity and their critical overview. In
consequence, it becomes possible to change one’s beliefs and judgements when-
ever new and more credible information is revealed.
Striving for Certainty
Epistemic Motivations and
(Un)Biased Cognition
Małgorzata Kossowska, Gabriela Czarnek,
Ewa Szumowska and Paulina Szwed
11
208 M. Kossowska, G. Czarnek, E. Szumowska, et al.
Cognition is Motivated1
The construction of new knowledge is a persistent human activity. For activ-
ities ranging from the relatively simple and mundane to the highly complex,
new knowledge is essential to assure condent decisions and reasoned actions.
Given the prevalence of the knowledge formation process, and its essential psy-
chological relevance to human thoughts, feelings, and actions, understanding
how knowledge is formed and changed, is a task of considerable importance
for psychological science (Kruglanski, 2004). According to Lay epistemic the-
ory (Kruglanski, 1989), contrary to popular belief, individuals do not gather
information in a chaotic and random manner. Research has rather shown that
knowledge formation is a process of hypothesis generation and validation, which
is quite orderly and follows logical rules, such as “if – then”, from premise to
conclusion (Kruglanski et al., 2009). The conclusion is knowledge, an opin-
ion, a belief, or a judgement. This process occurs regardless of the quality of
the information acquired (evidence may be reliable or unreliable). It also occurs
regardless the engagement of the person involved (one may wish to know what
the truth is, or simply to conrm their initial expectations). It emerges in each
case when an individual learns of something that is sufciently important to
initiate the motivational process that underlies cognition.
Kruglanski et al. (2009) demonstrate that the manner in which people gen-
erate hypotheses is reliant on cognitive resources. These may be modied by
exhaustion and by people’s readiness to engage in cognitive activity. The more
cognitive resources available, the more alternative hypotheses could be gener-
ated. However, cognitive exhaustion (e.g. several activities are being conducted
at once, too much similar information is being given, or even information chaos
is present) or high epistemic motivation (i.e. the desire to develop and maintain
a rich and thorough understanding of a situation) usually limit the scope of the
hypothesis generation process. As a result, people tend to bring up a low number
of hypotheses about the event.
However, the process of hypothesis validation depends on prior knowledge
and its level of activation, plus the quality and strength of evidence available.
These factors work together in shaping the processes of selection and evalua-
tion of information, and in effect, the adoption or rejection of a hypothesis,
and thus the formation of knowledge. A further factor that plays a crucial role
here is epistemic motivation. This factor affects the degree of condence in
one’s knowledge and inuences the propensity to continue or stop searching
for information. It also impacts decisions concerning which information can be
considered “evidence”. It shapes readiness to update one’s beliefs in the light of
emerging new evidence (Kruglanski et al., 2009). This epistemic process may
manifest in knowledge resistance or openness to its update based on credible
evidence.
Epistemic motivation is usually initiated under uncertainty, i.e. when there
is a lack of information (or there is access to merely low-quality, incomplete or
conicting information) about whether, where, when, how, or why an event has
Striving for Certainty 209
occurred, or will occur (Knight, 1921). Uncertainty could be reduced by means
of the acquisition of precise, unambiguous knowledge of the specic content
of one’s beliefs and preferences (or regardless of their specicity). Thus, this
type of motivation inuences different epistemic behaviors, including the active
search for information that is subjectively considered relevant and valid. Such
information could serve as “evidence”. The behaviors initiated under epistemic
motivation can also encompass the active avoidance of information subjectively
considered nonrelevant or nonvalid. In addition, epistemic motivation itself can
generally be classied into two kinds: the need for nonspecic certainty, and the
need for specic certainty (Kruglanski, 1989). Whereas the former reects the
need to possess any certain answer on a topic (e.g. whether vaccination against
Covid-19 is safe and effective), the latter refers to the need to attain a concrete
judgement, opinion, and/or assessment (e.g. that the vaccination against Covid-19
is indeed safe and effective). The need for specic certainty has an inuence on
cognition which has often been interpreted as a directional bias toward a favored
conclusion (e.g. anti-vaccination advocates can interpret the side effects of vaccine
as proof that they were right). Much classic motivational work in attribution (e.g.
Miller, 1976) as well as cognitive dissonance (Cooper & Fazio, 1984) has been
the focus of this particular motive.
Moreover, the primary assumption of a great deal of traditional work on moti-
vated reasoning is that the whole process of knowledge formation is motivated by
prior beliefs (Kunda, 1990). It has been suggested that people form their current
beliefs based both on prior beliefs and the cogency of the new relevant evidence
(Kruglanski et al., 2020). In this view, prior beliefs serve as (internal) models of
(external) reality, and are used to make predictions about the world. However,
any actions or perceptions are subject to optimization, and the explanations
accounting for the new evidence need to be accurate as possible. Consequently,
there are two ways of accounting for the new evidence: (1) updating one’s model
or (2) acting on and sampling evidence so that it ts with the model (Kruglanski
et al., 2020). Taking the rst of these paths, people construct mental models
that enable them to predict and interpret subsequent experiences. It also pro-
vides them with a sense of understanding, even meaning (Proulx, Inzlicht, &
Harmon-Jones 2012). Once adopted, people are committed to the models, but
may also change them. This process is dened as a change of expectations toward
new stimuli that renders them consistent with what was already known. In turn,
the second process involved is one of accounting for new evidence which entails
people tending to search for, interpret, favor and recall information in such a way
as to conrm their preexisting beliefs or hypotheses (Nickerson, 1998). In this
way, people may start out overcondent in an initial belief, fail to give proper
consideration to alternative hypotheses, or interpret ambiguous information in
favor of a rmly held belief (Klayman, 1995).
We now turn to the second class of epistemic motivation, the need for non-
specic certainty which reects the need to arrive at any conclusion whatsoever
that would serve the focal goal to achieve certainty (Kruglanski, 1989). In other
words, the need for nonspecic certainty drives the possession of any opinion,
210 M. Kossowska, G. Czarnek, E. Szumowska, et al.
judgement, beliefs, regardless of their content. This knowledge needs to provide
a sense of certainty, adequacy, and be subjectively sufcient to understand a
given phenomenon. This type of epistemic motivation boils down to such things
as (1) reducing the scope of information processing and hypothesis generation,
(2) concentrating the process of seeking information on prototypical rather than
diagnostic parameters, and (3) using the rst available information. All these
lead to the tendency to focus on evidence or facts that are presented earlier than
others (primacy effect), and then to determine the other information from it
(anchoring), as well as the activation of stereotypical content, and a preference
for consensual and general knowledge (for an overview, see Roets et al., 2015).
According to Kruglanski et al. (2020), by taking into account the need for
specic or non-specic certainty, we are in a position to explicate diverse epis-
temic phenomena, such as seeking, avoiding, biasing new information, and
revising and updating, or protecting, one’s beliefs when confronted with new
evidence. These processes are crucial to understanding knowledge formation
and its usage.
Cognitive Effects of the Need for Specic Certainty
One of the most documented effects of the need for certainty are conrma-
tion or myside bias and disconrmation bias (for an overview, see Nickerson,
1998). The rst phenomenon occurs when people accept evidence conrming
their (important) beliefs without criticism, whereas the latter occurs when peo-
ple try to undermine the evidence contrary to their beliefs. It follows that one
type of evidence that might be perceived as supporting one’s stances is mixed
ndings. In a classic study, Lord et al. (1979) found that people were more skep-
tical toward research that presented conclusions which were inconsistent with
their beliefs (about the efcacy of the death penalty as a deterrent to murder).
Specically, people perceived the studies presented as more reliable and convinc-
ing, when the results therein were in support of their own stance on the topic
compared to those that were not. Intriguingly, the study methods themselves
were presented to participants after the procedures were completed. The authors
called this process biased assimilation. They concluded that, as a result of this
process, when people are provided mixed, inconclusive, or random evidence,
biased assimilation leads to a further polarization of opinions. Similarly, in a
study by Ditto and Lopez (1992; Studies 2–3), when people were presented with
the undesirable (vs. desirable) results of a medical test, it took them longer to
decide whether their test result was complete, they were more likely to retest the
validity of their result, and rated test accuracy lower. This indicates that people
were less skeptical of evidence that was provided to them with desirable vs. unde-
sirable information. Another study looking at the effects of mixed evidence was
that of Bastardi et al. (2011), who analyzed responses to scientic evidence from
would-be parents who deemed home care to be superior to day care with regards
to a child’s future prospects. They compared two groups: conicted parents (who
were planning to use day care, although convinced that home care is superior)
Striving for Certainty 211
and unconicted ones (who were planning to use home care only). Participants
were presented with two studies with different research designs (either randomly
assigned, or statistically matching the sample) showing evidence for the supe-
riority of one form of childcare or the other. The parents’ evaluation of the
studies’ methodology favored the study that supported their desire (day care for
the conicted; home care for the non-conicted) but the effects were stronger for
the conicted group. Also, people in the conicted group changed their beliefs
about day care dramatically on being provided with the (mixed) evidence. Those
in the non-conicted group changed their opinion only slightly. The authors
concluded that “evaluations of purported scientic evidence were shaped more
by what participants desired to be true than by what they had initially believed
to be true” (p. 732).
These ndings illustrate how prior beliefs inuence knowledge formation.
However, not all beliefs are valued to the same extent. Hence, not all beliefs
exercise the same power to drive cognition. The sorts of beliefs that especially
inuence the way people search for and process information are those that
are directly linked to their identity, both personal and social. Indeed, there is
mounting evidence to suggest that identity-relevant beliefs are more than just
tools to achieve external goals. Rather, these beliefs are a source of value in
and of themselves, such that people are motivated to hold particular beliefs.
For example, people generally prefer to believe they are correct rather than
incorrect, they prefer to believe the future is bright rather than dark, and they
prefer to hold beliefs with certainty rather than uncertainty. The researchers
propose that the more identity-relevant a perception of behavior, the more
likely functional these beliefs are, thus, the more successful self-regulation
will occur. It is worth highlighting here that there is an overlap of brain regions
involved in self- related and reward processing, which is in line with a suggestion
that behavior or information that is self- or identity-relevant would have high
subjective value (Berkman et al., 2017).
A vast body of research has demonstrated that beliefs related to social identity
hold greater subjective value than beliefs irrelevant to this identity (Ellemers
et al., 2002). This stems from ndings that while personal identity informs the
beliefs that are important to oneself (for instance, related to being tall, belief in
one’s prociency in foreign languages or intelligence), social identity refers to a
person’s knowledge pertaining to their belonging to a social category or group
(Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The social categorization of self and others gener-
ates a sense of in-group identication and belonging. It regulates perception,
inference, feelings, behavior, and interaction to conform to the best representa-
tion of a given category (to prototype-based knowledge) one possesses about
one’s own group, and relevant outgroups. Moreover, because group prototypes
and representation are shared (“we” are like this, “they”‘are like that), one’s
world view and self-concept are consensually validated by the overt and verbal
behavior of fellow group members. Social categorization thus makes one’s own
and others’ behavior predictable, and allows one to avoid harm, plan effective
action, and know how one should feel and behave. Thus, under uncertainty,
212 M. Kossowska, G. Czarnek, E. Szumowska, et al.
being motivated by the specic need for certainty, people become more involved
in identity defensive cognitions (e.g. the right-wing adherents tend to be stricter
and surer about abortion ban when uncertainty is present). This is especially the
case when taking into consideration evidence that is suffused with culturally
divisive meanings. In these circumstances, the pressure to adhere to group-con-
gruent beliefs will often dominate over ‘the right answer’ standpoint (Kahan,
2017). Thus, espousing and holding beliefs that are aligned with one’s social
identity is a higher priority than achieving accuracy. The latter is too inconse-
quential a motive to affect the level of risk that a person faces, or to determine
the outcome of any public debate. However, the consequences of getting the
‘wrong answer’ in terms of what is expected by members of the afnity group,
are much more serious for the person, ranging from a loss of trust among peers
to stigmatization within their community. Indeed, Kahan (2017) claims that
social incentives for holding and expressing beliefs that are congenial to ones’
group are almost invariably of higher value than producing accurate responses
in most instances.
Still, it is worth noting that uncertainty itself, and various sorts of threats
posed to one’s identity, make the protection of identity-relevant beliefs stronger.
An interesting example comes from a study by Rothmund et al. (2015), show-
ing that when an important value is put in jeopardy (e.g. by informing pacists
about real-life violence), people are more likely to believe in scientic and polit-
ical claims regarding any further threat to this value (e.g. that violent games are
harmful). Colombo et al. (2016) looked into the role of morality in the perception
of scientic hypotheses. They found that when a scientic hypothesis is offensive
to one’s moral values (e.g. hypotheses that attending religious services makes
people healthier could be offensive to those who are dogmatic atheist, or that
growing up with non-heteronormative parents lead to developmental disorders –
to members of LGBT+ communities), then the assessment of the hypothesis is
biased. Of interest is the fact that providing incentives (money) for more accurate
evaluations did not improve subjects’ accuracy, and these effects held even after
controlling for the prior credibility of the hypothesis (e.g. when informed that
the scientic community meets the scientic consensus about given hypothesis).
Furthermore, Washburn and Skitka (2018) asked participants to interpret the
results of the scientic evaluations of a public policy (e.g. CO2 vehicle emission
standards) and its conclusion. Although participants were informed about the
correct interpretation afterwards, their ratings of agreement with these interpre-
tations, the perception of being knowledgeable, and trust in the research’s inter-
pretation depended on their own political ideology. Signicantly, both liberals
and conservatives were not in agreement with interpretations of the scientic
ndings that contradicted their own beliefs. Also, Kossowska et al. (2017), stud-
ying religious orthodoxy, demonstrated that the threat posed by value-violators
(e.g. atheists) leads to negative attitudes toward these groups among highly reli-
gious people. In this case, experienced threat for the outgroup was operational-
ized by cardiovascular reactivity, i.e. heart rate (HR); the higher the HR index,
the higher the threat. The results found that people who hold high (vs. low)
Striving for Certainty 213
levels of orthodox belief responded with increased HR after they were exposed
to atheistic worldviews. However, the authors observed decreased HR after the
expression of prejudice toward atheists among highly orthodox participants
compared to the control condition. They did not nd this effect among people
holding low levels of orthodox belief. Thus, the researchers revealed that preju-
dice, in fact, may serve as an efcient strategy to protect oneself from sources of
threat. This reasoning is consistent with research suggesting that prejudice and
discrimination directed toward members of groups that violate important values,
norms, and traditions can be used to diminish (or resist) these groups’ informa-
tional inuence on the person. This further bolsters one’s cultural worldview,
and thus reduces threat levels (for an overview, see Burke et al., 2010). In a sim-
ilar vein, across three studies, Kossowska et al. (2020) showed that ideology is
linked to the misperception of politically sensitive facts (e.g. What percentage of
all people who died in Auschwitz were Jews? or What percentage of Polish soci-
ety are LGBT?). This was especially true under conditions conducive to a higher
salience of political identity (i.e. during the outbreak of the Covid-19 pan-
demic). The researchers explain this effect by positing that politically-relevant
facts, especially highly politicized facts which are associated with membership
in a political group, trigger the goal of protecting one’s identity. As with other
social-identity processes, ideology powerfully motivates perceptual processes
toward making assessments in line with beliefs held by one’s group (and resist-
ing, i.e. ignoring or discounting, information in opposition to the beliefs held
by the group). Other researchers also claim that shared ideological commitments
intertwined with membership in groups furnish these individuals with impor-
tant forms of support – emotional and psychological as well as material (e.g.
Green et al., 2002). If a proposition about some policy-relevant fact comes to be
commonly associated with membership in such a group, the prospect that one
might form a contrary position can threaten one’s standing within the group.
Thus, these individuals may be motivated to resist empirical assertions (e.g. that
gun control reduces or does or does not reduce crime), if they run contrary to
the dominant belief within their groups. Thus, individuals may display the facts
as negligible in their impact provided that the assessments (however wrong) are
in line with their group commitments. Of note is the nding that the effects of
identity on information processing are observed under uncertainty conditions
which are conducive to a higher salience of political identity. Uncertainty may
lead individuals to display a strong tendency to conform their understanding
of different issues, especially complex ones, in accordance with the position of
the authorities, or groups that they support or belong to (e.g. Kahan, 2017).
This stems from the fact that uncertainty (threat, anxiety, and related negative
feelings) causes ideological identity to become more salient, and in that fashion,
identity-related beliefs shape social perception. Erroneousness that individuals
may display regarding the facts is seen as negligible in its impact provided that
the assessments (however wrong) are in line with their group commitments.
Of note is the nding that the effects of identity on information processing
are observed under uncertainty conditions which are conducive to a higher
214 M. Kossowska, G. Czarnek, E. Szumowska, et al.
salience of political identity. Uncertainty may lead individuals to display a strong
tendency to conrm their understanding of different issues, especially complex
ones, in accordance with the position of the authorities, or groups that they
support or belong to (e.g. Kahan, 2017). This stems from the fact that uncer-
tainty (threat, anxiety, and related negative feelings) causes ideological identity
to become more salient, and in that fashion, identity-related beliefs shape social
perception.
Although most of the studies demonstrated the negative effects of identity
protective cognitions on accurate perception, judgments, and attitudes, it should
be pointed out that there is some evidence showing that, under certain condi-
tions, identity bias can be reduced or even overcome. For example, prompt-
ing an accuracy goal to reach a correct conclusion can elicit greater cognitive
effort toward that goal, which can be translated into accurate cognition (e.g.
Baumeister & Newman, 1994). Other studies show that identity-biased cogni-
tion is reduced when people are asked to form accurate opinions about a policy
(Bolsen et al., 2014). Also, curiosity toward science was shown to reduce par-
tisan polarization around science. Hence, people with high levels of curiosity
about science were willing to consume news that was not in line with their
political identity (Kahan, 2017). Similarly, helping people to realize their own
ignorance about policy details – known as the explanatory depth illusion – can
reduce political polarization; by contrast, derogating your political opponents
tends to increase polarization (Fernbach et al., 2013; Suhay et al., 2018). Finally,
Porter and Schumann (2018), investigating intellectual humility (i.e. recogniz-
ing the limits of one’s knowledge and appreciating others’ intellectual strengths),
experimentally demonstrated that this factor could contribute to disagreements
becoming more constructive. Specically, it turned out that making salient a
growth mindset of intelligence (i.e. by asserting that intelligence can be devel-
oped) boosted intellectual humility and in turn, openness to opposing views.
Cognitive Effects of the Need for Non-specic Certainty
The need for non-specic certainty implies the search for a rm, precise answer
to a question, regardless of its specic content. Thus, under this motivation
one just wants to know, rather than conrm a specic belief. Many studies have
demonstrated that the motivation to attain certainty can psychologically mani-
fest in the vigilance used to detect threats and opportunities. It also unfolds in
impulsive reactions, wherein a person responds rapidly, with little deliberation
(e.g. one makes a decision based on scarce, readily available information instead
of engaging in a more extensive search). It also manifested in the capture of any
immediate benets, even when greater benets could be obtained later (Jonas
et al., 2014). This gives rise to a number of cognitive, motivational, and behavio-
ral implications, including risk aversion, attentional biases, and impaired perfor-
mance on a variety of working memory and decision-making tasks (e.g. Jameson
et al., 2004). It also leads to narrow, selective attention focused on threaten-
ing stimuli that, under many circumstances, results in suboptimal performance
Striving for Certainty 215
(Easterbrook, 1959; Kossowska, 2007). For example, a sizeable majority of pre-
vious studies have demonstrated that motivation to reduce uncertainty promotes
simplistic cognition relying mainly on stereotypes and heuristics, that is, simple
rules that lead to fast, yet at times suboptimal decisions (Kruglanski, 2004).
Some studies have shown that people who are highly motivated to reduce uncer-
tainty make more stereotypical judgments, prefer homogeneous over diverse
groups, prefer consistent over inconsistent images, prefer realistic over abstract
art, and prefer normative over deviant stimuli. Moreover, this motivation is
related to heightened resistance to altering conclusions once drawn and greater
reliance on the default mode of decision-making (for a review, see Roets et al.,
2015). To conclude, under motivation to non-specic certainty, knowledge sys-
tems became rigid, closed to new evidence, resistant to change, and biased in the
face of fragmented information.
While research clearly demonstrates the link between uncertainty and sim-
plistic cognition, leading to biases and neglect of a large portion of important
evidence, there are some contradictory ndings, revealing that this motivation
may also drive people to complex, effortful, and unbiased cognitions. For exam-
ple, there is substantial evidence that people attend to novel, unexpected events
that might disconrm their expectancies but only when these events are relevant
to their goals (e.g. when individuals desire to understand the event and be accu-
rate in their cognition). Other studies have also shown that disconrmations
of important expectancies lead to increased attention to and processing of the
inconsistent information. Additionally, people are willing to consider and incor-
porate new information in order to improve their predictive ability. This moti-
vation can also foster an exploratory mode in which people tend to be open to,
seek, and incorporate new information so as to be accurate or to avoid mistakes.
These effects are reviewed by Kossowska et al. (2018).
A Goal (Versus Means) Perspective on the Quest for Certainty
So far, we have outlined the cognitive effects of the quest for certainty (specic
or non-specic) that can be usually described as limiting openness for new evi-
dence and thus biasing cognition. However, we have mentioned that this epis-
temic motivation, may also lead to more open-minded and unbiased cognition
(i.e. all evidence is processed, regardless of their consistency with one’s views).
This dichotomy presents us with the challenge of distinguishing the conditions
under which the quest for certainty leads to open-minded and when to simplis-
tic, bias-prone cognition. Given the seeming necessity for theoretical renement
in this area, we have proposed a framework that allows for the re-examination of
the abovementioned ndings.
Specically, we take a goal-means perspective and differentiate between
the cognitive goals and means (i.e. actions) undertaken to satisfy these goals
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). Goals represent desirable states of affairs to which
attainment one is personally committed, and means are instrumental actions
serving attainment of one’s goals. We posit that the need for certainty (whether
216 M. Kossowska, G. Czarnek, E. Szumowska, et al.
specic or non-specic) is no different from any other goal. In this case, people
aim to achieve certainty, they seek an answer to an important question, they
desire to uphold a certain belief, and/or they wish to make condent decisions.
These motivational states may initiate various epistemic actions to fulll these
underlying motives. For instance, people may consult other people’s opinions
to obtain external validation of their views, or they may simply depend on their
own epistemic authority to form a condent judgment (Kossowska et al., 2018).
Moreover, they may thoroughly scrutinize the attributes of all the available
alternatives before making a decision, or they may be satised with choosing
the rst option that passes their personal threshold (Schwartz, 2004). While
people will sometimes act skeptically and seek out information that contradicts
their own knowledge, in other cases, they will actively avoid information if that
helps them to protect a valued belief (Golman et al., 2017). Lastly, while they are
sometimes ready to reach accurate conclusions, very often they form biased but
identity-protective judgements (Kahan, 2017).
The above shows that even when the goal stays the same, (one wants to attain
certainty (either specic or non-specic)), the means (cognitive strategies) can
differ and, on some occasions, people select “closed-minded” means whereas, at
other times, they opt for “open-minded” ones. And it is the distinction at the
level of means, rather than goals, that determines whether people will resist the
new or contradictory facts or let them inuence their belief systems. This prop-
osition has important theoretical and practical implications, as it allows for iden-
tifying conditions under which certainty-seeking individuals – otherwise prone
to knowledge resistance – are more open to processing belief-inconsistent facts.
To this end, Kossowska et al. (2018) proposed that processing strategies, or
means, are chosen according to their perceived instrumentality in accomplishing
a particular goal, and their relations with other means and goals (Kruglanski
et al., 2002). Instrumental means are ones that afford high probability (expec-
tancy) of attaining a given goal with them (e.g. studying is an instrumental
means to the goal of passing an exam, whereas partying is not) (Bélanger et al.,
2016). In addition, a means is less likely to be chosen if it can be substituted
by other means (i.e. equinality), and is more likely to be selected if it serves
additional coactivated goals (i.e. multinality). A parallel line of research, in the
cognitive neuroscience of motivation (e.g. Berridge et al. (2009), found that
goal-directed behavior is associated with neuro-psychological states linked to
wanting and seeking, and the activation of areas of the brain associated with
reward processing (e.g. the cortico–basal ganglia–thalamic loop), as well as sym-
pathetic nervous system reactivity (Gendolla et al., 2019). Together, these func-
tions optimize goal striving and effort.
Following this thread of reasoning, Kossowska et al. (2018) proposed a model
that allows clear predictions to be made about when and why people, epistem-
ically motivated to reduce (non-specic) uncertainty, tend to perceive open-
minded cognitive strategies as more instrumental than closed-minded strategies
for reaching their goal of certainty. Specically, the researchers suggested that
this may happen when: (a) cues present in a situation suggest that open-minded
Striving for Certainty 217
means are more useful for attaining the goal, (b) the closed-minded means are
unknown or unavailable, or (c) general trust in closed-minded options is under-
mined. In an extensive research program, the researchers found support for
these assumptions. For example, Jaśko et al. (2015) investigating decision-mak-
ing processes, demonstrated that people motivated to achieve certainty searched
for more information (i.e. they open more boxes with relevant information) before
they made a decision and spent more time on decision-making than did those not
in search of certainty, which attests to their openness to new information. What is
more, it turned out that when a clue appeared in the task informing the participant
of techniques conducive to its completion, people needing certainty followed it
more frequently than those low in this need. In particular, when there was a clear
rule by which seeking a greater amount of information turned out to be more ben-
ecial in terms of goal achievement (i.e. participants were told that the majority of
people open most boxes to attain high results), people highly motivated to achieve
certainty engaged in information-seeking to a greater degree. These ndings have
important implications for understanding how certainty-seeking individuals pro-
cess information more generally. Specically, it suggests that they can be more
open or closed (i.e. resistant) to new facts, depending on the situation. When, in a
given context, there is a clue suggesting that certainty could be best attained when
engaging in unbiased, more extensive information search (e.g. nudges prompting
fact-checking or verifying information with different sources), people motivated to
attain certainty will exhibit more “open” epistemic behaviors, even when this may
lead to a change in their initial view.
A further example of a condition inducing open-minded cognition among
people epistemically motivated to achieve certainty comes from the classic study
by Kruglanski et al. (1991). The experiment they conducted showed that when
the initial certainty of participants as to their decisions was high, the need for
certainty was indeed associated with a lower amount of information being sought
by the participants. However, when participants were not certain as to their ini-
tial decision, this epistemic motivation expanded the scope of data sought out.
An illustration of cognition occurring under conditions where general trust
in closed-minded options is undermined comes from studies by Kossowska &
Bar-Tal (2013). In this study, the researchers demonstrated that low trust in
one’s own capacity to achieve certainty may lead to cognition that is typically
associated with openness, such as reduced bias in the formulation of impressions
of others, the taking of complex decisions rather than simple ones, and reduced
stereotyping. In addition, studies in which one’s condence in the previously
obtained knowledge was experimentally undermined, these open-minded
effects were also found (Dragon & Kossowska, 2019). In these situations, indi-
viduals lost faith in themselves and their knowledge, which, in turn, resulted in
this knowledge (i.e. opinions, beliefs, stereotypes) no longer serving as the basis
for formulating judgements, and ultimately led to it shedding its potential for
guaranteeing certainty. As a consequence, the individuals were forced to employ
alternative strategies to achieve certainty. Such a situation turns out to be particu-
larly difcult for people for whom certainty plays a fundamental role. On the one
218 M. Kossowska, G. Czarnek, E. Szumowska, et al.
hand, they feel a strong need to obtain certainty, while on the other, they are
deprived of their existing means of achieving it. This leads to them potentially
being more motivated to revise their previous expectations and views, and to
look for new information on a given subject. In other words, they can be more
epistemically motivated to engage in open-minded cognition, and thus counter-
acting resistance to new and inconsistent facts.
Final Thoughts
The research mentioned above reveals that open-minded cognition is preferred
(a) when a situation provides clues that “open” strategies are likely to be the most
effective in achieving certainty, (b) when simplied inference is not possible, or
(c) when people begin to doubt their previous modes of inference, whether this
is a result of a threat to the self, the experience of a loss of power or control over
the situation, or also when encountering credible (and by the same token impos-
sible to ignore) information that is inconsistent with the individual’s existing
knowledge and previous experiences.
However, the focus of these research efforts was mostly devoted to describing
fundamental cognition (and measured this at physiological and neuropsycholog-
ical levels). Thus, the open cognition that the researchers focused on refers to
the readiness to select more complex, difcult, and effortful cognitive activity.
It may include: seeking out new information, posing new hypotheses, taking
care to meet the standards given in instructions, forming an impression about
others based not on stereotypes, but rather on non-stereotypical information,
received in “real time”. While all of the abovementioned examples referred to
the non-specic motivation to reduce uncertainty, we feel that this model could
also be fruitfully applied to the cognition motivated by the specic epistemic
motivation. Moreover, traditionally researchers focus on identity-relevant cog-
nitions as the best means to achieve certainty. However, there are many accuracy -
oriented means that may also serve this goal (see Jonas et al., 2014). For example,
for particular groups (e.g. journalists, scientists, etc.) ensuring accuracy may help
obtain certainty in an improved manner (van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). The value
of accuracy-oriented (i.e. open-minded, extensive, and effortful) strategies as a
means of achieving certainty can be accomplished with incentives, and through
education systems that cultivate curiosity, accuracy, and accountability. We
believe, this eventually could lead to less tribe-like and polarized discussions
that many societies experience nowadays.
Finally, we here focused on processing strategies rather than on knowledge
per se. However, it is information selection and processing that leads to forming,
changing, or maintaining existing beliefs (i.e. knowledge). If one accesses only
a limited number of pieces of information, most likely restricted only to those
consistent with one’s beliefs, there is a weak chance that these beliefs will be
revised if incorrect. Furthermore, one’s views may further solidify, which will
make them more resistant to change in the future. Therefore, it is so crucial to
identify conditions which will prevent that from happening.
Striving for Certainty 219
Note
1 Recent literature uses the terms motivated cognition or motivated reasoning in a
narrow sense. That is, when one’s prior beliefs act to bias information process-
ing so as to make any conclusions congenial to these beliefs. It suggests that
motivated implies biased and precludes rational (e.g. Druckman & McGrath,
2019). However, this is also related to the old but ongoing debate on whether
biases in reasoning are due to motivation or cognition. We take the position
that any cognitive and motivational inuences prevail in virtually any epis-
temic activity. Thus, any cognitive activities are motivated by their very nature
(see Kruglanski et al. 2020).
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