Necessary Existence and Monotheism: An Avicennian Account of the Islamic Conception of Divine Unity
Abstract
Avicenna believes that God must be understood in the first place as the Necessary Existent (wâǧib al-wuǧûd). In his various works, he provides different versions of an ingenious argument for the existence of the Necessary Existent—the so-called Proof of the Sincere (burhân al-ṣiddîqîn)—and argues that all the properties that are usually attributed to God can be extracted merely from God's having necessary existence. Considering the centrality of tawḥîd to Islam, the first thing Avicenna tries to extract from God's necessary existence is God's oneness. The aim of the present Element is to provide a detailed discussion of Avicenna's arguments for the existence and unity of God. Through this project, the author hopes to clarify how, for Avicenna, the Islamic concept of monotheism is intertwined with the concept of essential existence.
... In any event, failure to recognize many-to-one causation gives rise to serious problems in cases where the effect is a composite entity. As a specific example of such problems, let us look at an interesting recent work by Zarepour (2022). He takes no account of the possibility of many-to-one causation, and as a consequence, he is compelled towards (what I view as) counterintuitive conclusions. ...
... But this seems counterintuitive, as G1 + G2 depends both on G1 and on G2 for its existenceat least in the context of Avicenna's philosophy as the backdrop of Zarepour's discussion, every whole is conditional on its parts. Interestingly, in a footnote, he finds it quite plausible that 'the existence of a whole should be explanatorily posterior to the existence of its parts', but ultimately he counts G1 + G2 as independent (Zarepour (2022), 41). The reason why he is compelled towards this position is his failure to take account of many-to-one causation. ...
In his The Salvation and The Remarks and Admonitions, Avicenna presents a well-known argument for the existence of God as a necessary being by itself. I will suggest, first of all, that the two pivotal notions employed in the argument, namely those of a necessary being by itself and a contingent being by itself, can be construed in different ways, leading to different versions of Avicenna's argument. I then turn to a specific version of the argument which seeks to show that there is at least one independently existing entity. This version constitutes the core of other versions of Avicenna's argument. Next, I shall explore how one might move from the existence of an independently existing entity to that of a necessary being by itself (variously construed). Finally, I will argue that the Avicennian argument for an independently existing entity suffers from a severe problem in that it fails to take account of the possibility of many-to-one causal relation.
... Religions may be segmentized into four key components, which are social organization, practices, mythology, and beliefs. Muslims believe in one God, and are often known as monotheists (Zarepour, 2022). ...
This study has investigated the impact of personal religiosity on individuals’ decision on real estate investment opportunities in Pakistan. The Islamic religiosity has been operationalized into its four determinants including religious knowhow, current religious issues, sensitive input for goods and services, and Islamic financial instruments. Primary data has been collected from the individual real estate investors in Pakistan capital city, Islamabad. Analysis of the data reveals that religious knowhow negatively impacts the investing decisions, knowledge of current religious issues and views about the Islamic financial instruments impact the investing decision positively. While opinion about sensitivity of the inputs into to goods and services does not impact the investing decisions. The stakeholders including the investors, developers, and the regulators in the real estate sector are recommended to allow due weightage to the elements of religiosity while investing, developing, and regulating real estate investments.
Discussing various versions of two medieval arguments for the impossibility of infinity, this Element sheds light on early stages of the evolution of the notion of INFINITIES OF DIFFERENT SIZES. The first argument is called 'the Equality Argument' and relies on the premise that all infinities are equal. The second argument is called 'the Mapping Argument' and relies on the assumption that if one thing is mapped/ superposed upon another thing and neither exceeds the other, the two things are equal to each other. Although these arguments were initially proposed in the context of discussions against the possibility of infinities, they have played pivotal roles in the historical evolution of the notion of INFINITIES OF DIFFERENT SIZES.
This article investigates the proof of God’s existence within Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical framework, particularly addressing the concepts of divine simplicity and the problem of modal collapse. It commences by positioning Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics in contrast to Aristotle’s, emphasizing the dynamic and evolutionary nature of Ibn Sīnā’s engagement with metaphysical inquiry. The article highlights Ibn Sīnā’s distinctiveness in redefining metaphysical exploration beyond physicalist presuppositions and establishing metaphysics as foundational for other scientific disciplines. Central to this exploration is the elucidation of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments for God’s existence, primarily through his concept of modality—encompassing the necessary, contingent, and impossible—and his unique argument known as The Proof of the Sincere (Burhān al-Siddiqīn). These arguments demonstrate Ibn Sīnā’s belief in the necessity of a being whose existence and essence are identical, countering Kantian critiques by emphasizing an ontological foundation rather than rational judgments alone. However, the assertion of the identity of existence and essence in the Necessary Being introduces the issue of divine simplicity and the potential for modal collapse—a challenge whereby distinctions between possible states of affairs are nullified. The article proposes that Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between general and special existence, alongside his theory of tashkīk al-wujūd (gradation of existence), offers avenues to navigate this philosophical challenge. Additionally, it suggests that Frege’s distinction between meaning and reference could further elucidate the discussion. The conclusion posits that while Ibn Sīnā’s arguments for God’s existence exhibit significant persuasive power, they also prompt further inquiries into divine simplicity and modal collapse. The exploration of these themes underscores the relevance of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical contributions to contemporary philosophical debates, advocating for a nuanced understanding of his work beyond traditional Aristotelian or Cartesian interpretations.
What connects the phenomenon of music as an art with the belief in one indivisible God? What has music, a non-linguistic medium, to say about the personal, loving, communicative God of Scripture and the Prophets, or the omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, transcendent God of the Philosophers and can it bring these 'concepts of God' together? To answer these questions, this book takes divine Creation as its starting point, that the God of monotheism must be the Creator of all that is. It thus argues that anything which instantiates and facilitates communication within the created realm has been enabled to do so by a God who communicates with His Creation, and who wishes that His Creation be communicative. Indeed, it will argue that the communication allowed by music, and aesthetic experience in general, is the very raison d'être of Abrahamic monotheism and might thus allow an opportunity for dialogue between monotheistic faiths.
A meta-theology makes claims about the structure of theological claims: it identifies a single, fundamental claim about God, and shows how other theological claims are derivable from the fundamental claim. In his book Depicting Deity and other articles, Jon Kvanvig has identified three distinct meta-theologies: Creator Theology, Perfect Being Theology, and Worship-worthiness Theology. In this article, we argue that the medieval Islamic philosopher Avicenna's views about God have the structure of a meta-theology, and that it is distinct from the three projects Kvanvig identifies. This view is Necessary Existent Theology.
In the present paper, the three most prominent formulations of the ontological argument will be analysed, namely the classical argument which renders existence a perfection, Norman Malcom’s modal version of the argument which labels not existence but necessary existence a perfection, and Alvin Plantinga’s modal version of the argument which appeals to the possible worlds semantics to prove the necessity of God’s existence. According to Kant’s objection, the ontological argument takes existence to be a predicate that adds up a further perfection to the concept of God and thereby entails either a reference problem between the actual object and its concept or infers God’s actual existence in a tautological way. Despite its impact, Kant’s objection to the argument has been criticised for his ambiguous employment of the notion of existence as well as for being irrelevant to the ontological argument and to the modal ontological argument by Plantinga. In the present study, I aim first to show that Kant’s objection is not only relevant to the classical version of the argument but also to the modal formulations of it as opposed to Plantinga’s claim. In doing so, I argue that it is not Kant’s use of the notion of existence that is ambiguous, but it is the classical and modal versions of the ontological argument which gain their apparent strength from their ambiguous employment of the notion of existence. Second purpose of the paper is to give an alternative analysis of the notion of existence based on Avicenna’s metaphysics and thereby to point towards an alternative ground for a possible reformulation of the ontological argument, which could avoid Kant’s objection.
Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna’s views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of ‘empty intentionality’. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental representation of that thing, and (3) a direct relation to the essence of that thing. Empty intentionality does not involve the first element. Moreover, depending on the nature of the non-existent we are thinking about, the third element may not be involved either. Thus, the necessary element of being in an intentional state towards something is to be related to a mental representation of that thing. The nature of this representation may vary depending on the nature of the non-existent towards which our thought is directed.
Avicenna believed in mathematical finitism. He argued that magnitudes and sets of ordered numbers and numbered things cannot be actually infinite. In this paper, I discuss his arguments against the actuality of mathematical infinity. A careful analysis of the subtleties of his main argument, i. e., The Mapping Argument, shows that, by employing the notion of correspondence as a tool for comparing the sizes of mathematical infinities, he arrived at a very deep and insightful understanding of the notion of mathematical infinity, one that is much more modern than we might expect. I argue, moreover, that Avicenna’s mathematical finitism is interwoven with his literalist ontology of mathematics, according to which mathematical objects are properties of existing physical objects.
Both the Muslim exegetical tradition and most Western scholarship have posited that the term islām in the Quran means “submission”, i.e. to God, and that it refers to the religion brought by the prophet Muhammad. This paper argues that neither of these assertions is correct. Rather, the abstract noun islām as used in the Quran means “tradition”. It is underlain by the Aramaic mashlmānūtā , which in turn was the term generally used to translate the Greek paradosis . That the Greek usage had a direct impact on Arabic is also considered. The wide range of meanings given paradosis by Greek and Syriac authors is surveyed. A close reading of Quran verses in which the word islām appears shows that it refers to the prophetic tradition of monotheism rather than the surrender of an individual to God. It is synonymous with the Logos of Abraham, in which all the monotheistic religions participate.
Classic perfect being theologians take ‘being perfect’ (or some careful variant thereof) to be conceptually necessary and sufficient for being God. I argue that this claim is false because being perfect is not conceptually necessary for being God. I rest my case on a simple thought experiment inspired by an alternative I developed to perfect being theology that I call “functional theology.” My findings, if correct, are a boon for theists since if it should turn out that there is no perfect being, there could still be a God.
A standard conception of metaphysical modality accepts that (i) Some de re modal claims are true, (ii) These should be understood in terms of a possible worlds semantics, and (iii) There is trans-world identity. For instance, it seems true that Humphrey could have won the election. In possible worlds speak, we say that there exists a possible world where Humphrey wins the election. Furthermore (given trans-world identity), had that possibility been actualized instead of this one, Humphrey—our Humphrey, the very same man—would still have existed. Here, I argue that this way of understanding de re modal claims, in conjunction with certain other plausible assumptions, entails that The World (i.e., the enormous object which has both you and I as proper parts) is a necessary being.
This article examines the distinctive characteristics of Avicenna’s doctrine of the Necessary Being, arguing that Avicenna developed his doctrine under the influence of Aristotle’s metaphysical thinking, but, unlike Aristotle he does not proceed from the distinction between form and matter. Instead, Avicenna has established his doctrine on essence-existence dichotomy. The article also investigates Avicenna’s view on God’s knowledge of particulars in light of his doctrine of the Necessary Being. The article begins by discussing Aristotle’s analysis of the meaning of the prime cause and its simplicity. It will then examine the simplicity of the Necessary Being in light of Aristotle’s metaphysics.
This paper presents a new cosmological argument based on considerations about grounding. I argue that, by assuming three plausible principles about grounding, we can construct a cosmological argument for the existence of a unique ungrounded being that ultimately grounds everything else. At the end of the paper I consider two possible objections, and offer my replies to them.
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
This is a critical comment on Adamson and Benevich (2018), published in issue 4/2 of the Journal of the American Philosophical Association . I raise two closely related objections. The first concerns the objective of the flying man: instead of the question of what the soul is, I argue that the argument is designed to answer the question of whether the soul exists independently of the body. The second objection concerns the expected result of the argument: instead of knowledge about the quiddity of soul, I claim the argument yields knowledge about the soul's existence independently of the body. After the objections, I turn to the masked man fallacy, claiming that although the Adamson-Benevich interpretation does save the argument from the fallacy, this comes at the cost of plausibility. I then give a more modest interpretation that both avoids the fallacy and is plausible. The paper concludes with a remark about the metaphysical possibility of the flying man.
W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Puryear claims, because there can be no justification for the claim that actual infinite magnitudes are impossible. I argue, against Puryear, that there can be such a justification. I claim, nevertheless, that, for reasons entirely different from Puryear’s, the finitude of the past cannot be established based either on the impossibility of actual infinite multitudes or on the impossibility of actual infinite magnitudes. My arguments in this paper draw on insights from al-Kindī and Avicenna.
If epistemology is roughly the study of knowledge, justification, warrant, and rationality, then religious epistemology is the study of how these epistemic concepts relate to religious belief and practice. This Element, while surveying various religious epistemologies, argues specifically for Plantingian religious epistemology. It makes the case for proper functionalism and Plantinga's AC models, while it also responds to debunking arguments informed by cognitive science of religion. It serves as a bridge between religious epistemology and natural theology.
No argument from the Arabic philosophical tradition has received more scholarly attention than Avicenna's ‘flying man’ thought experiment, in which a human is created out of thin air and is able to grasp his existence without grasping that he has a body. This paper offers a new interpretation of the version of this thought experiment found at the end of the first chapter of Avicenna's treatment of soul in the Healing . We argue that it needs to be understood in light of an epistemological theory set out elsewhere by Avicenna, which allows that all the constitutive properties of an essence will be clear to someone who understands and considers that essence. On our reading, this theory is put to work in the ‘flying man’: because the flying man would grasp that his own essence has existence without grasping that he has a body, connection to body cannot be constitutive of the essence.
Perfect being theism is a version of theism that says that God is the greatest possible being. Although perfect being theism is the most common form of monotheism in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition, its truth has been disputed by philosophers and theologians for centuries. Maximal God proposes a new, game-changing defence of perfect being theism by developing what the book calls the 'maximal concept of God'. Perfect being theists typically maintain that God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being but, according to Maximal God, God should be understood rather as a being that has the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power, and benevolence. The book argues that once we accept the maximal concept, we can establish perfect being theism on two grounds. First, we can refute nearly all existing arguments against perfect being theism simultaneously. Second, we can construct a novel, strengthened version of the modal ontological argument for perfect being theism. The book concludes that the maximal God concept provides the basis for a unified defence of perfect being theism that is highly effective and economical.
This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading and emerging scholars that address issues relating to the view that has come to be known as metaphysical foundationalism, and explore possibilities regarding its alternatives. According to the foundationalist, reality is hierarchically arranged with chains of entities ordered by metaphysical dependence relations that terminate in a fundamental ground populated by consistent and contingent entities. Each essay in this volume addresses some aspect or other of at least one of these core commitments. Must there be anything fundamental? Is reality hierarchically structured? Why should we be foundationalists? Is metaphysical infinitism possible? Is metaphysical coherentism possible? What does reality look like if we allow inconsistent fundamentalia? These are the sorts of pertinent questions seldom asked in the current literature, and exactly the kinds of questions addressed in this volume. The volume, then, aims to open up a much broader perspective on metaphysical dependence than currently exists, and point to ways of exploring new avenues of thought on the subject.
A necessary being is a concrete entity that cannot fail to exist. An example of such a being might be the God of classical theism or the universe of necessitarians. Necessary Existence offers and carefully defends a number of novel arguments for the thesis that there exists at least one necessary being, while inviting the reader to a future investigation of what the neccessary being(s) is (are) like. The arguments include a defense of a classic contingency argument, a series of new modal arguments from possible causes, an argument from abstract objects, and a Gödelian argument from perfections. Furthermore, arguments against the possibility of a necessary being are critically examined. Among these arguments are old and new arguments from conceivability, a subtraction argument, problems with causation, and an argument from parsimony. Necessary Existence also includes a defense of the axioms of S5 modal logic, which is a framework for understanding several arguments for necessary existents.
Divine Foundationalism (DF) is the thesis that God is the existential source of all things apart from God hirself. In this paper, I provide some contemporary structure to a debate over DF. I first discuss what the thesis is more exactly, before I discuss some main arguments for and against it.
I present a new First Cause argument that builds on modal notions to derive causal finitism, the thesis that all causal chains are of finite length. An independent uniqueness argument is then supplemented to establish the existence of a unique First Cause.
In this paper, I reply to Hamri's (Int J Philos Relig. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9625-2, 2017) new kind of cosmological argument for the ultimate ground of being by blocking the argument in more than one place.
Divine necessity is the thesis that God must exist. In this paper, I give a brief survey of what the thesis is more exactly, the main arguments for it, and the main arguments against it.
This paper presents a characterization of the ontological dependence relation between an existent and its sustaining cause, which allows to straightforwardly deduce that the being of any dependent existent is grounded on an independent one. Furthermore, an argument is given to the conclusion that there is a unique independent existent, which is therefore the ultimate ground of being.
Some authors have proposed that Avicenna considers mathematical objects, i.e., geometric shapes and numbers, to be mental existents completely separated from matter. In this paper, I will show that this description, though not completely wrong, is misleading. Avicenna endorses, I will argue, some sort of literalism, potentialism, and finitism.
Avicenna wrote extensively on the syllogism, and in this chapter I examine aspects of what he had to say on the subject in his last work, Pointers and Reminders. I focus my attention on Pointers because it is a manageable length, it states a decisive position on every matter of importance, and it exercised extraordinary influence over the logicians responding to Avicenna in the three centuries after his death (one of whom, Na?ir al-Din al-?usi, wrote a magisterial commentary on it). Many would argue that Pointers is not the best introduction to Avicenna's work on the syllogism, and I consider these arguments in section VI. I limit myself mainly to one text for another reason. Avicenna shifted in his logical views over time, and it is unclear that we can take doctrines from a number of his texts and assume that they will combine coherently. I do not want to exaggerate the shift, but it is there and can be a hazard in coming to grips with Avicenna's logic. Logic is presented in Pointers as both a science in itself and an instrument for the other sciences. This has two consequences for the manner of its presentation. Because it is a science, logic is most properly developed by setting out primary principles for which no argument can be given; these principles are then used to derive further results. Because it is an instrument, Avicenna is interested above all in those operations in logic which have an application for the other sciences. So the exposition of logic in Pointers moves from principles to derived conclusions, and gives as its examples propositions with terms taken from the various sciences for which it is the instrument - among others, geometry, medicine, physics and metaphysics.
This study examines a number of different answers to the question: where does Avicenna demonstrate the existence of God within the
Metaphysics of the Healing
? Many interpreters have contended that there is an argument for God's existence in
Metaphysics of the Healing
I.6–7. In this study I show that such views are incorrect and that the only argument for God's existence in the
Metaphysics of the Healing
is found in VIII.1–3. My own interpretation relies upon a careful consideration of the scientific order and first principles of the
Metaphysics of the Healing
, paying attention to Avicenna's own explicit statements concerning the goals and intentions of different books and chapters, and a close analysis of the structure of the different arguments found in the relevant texts of the
Metaphysics of the Healing
. I conclude that Avicenna's explicit goal in I.6–7 is to establish the properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence, which consists, not in a demonstration of God's existence, but in a dialectical treatment of the first principles of metaphysics.
WHENCE THE NEED FOR PROOF? The problem of whether or not belief in God should be founded in reason has a complex history in Islam. Both kalām exponents and philosophers showed a keen interest in advancing arguments for the existence of God, which was born of diverse motives, chiefly the need to establish this most crucial doctrine within their broader metaphysical systems, to respond to physicalist atheism, and to support and enrich the belief and piety of believers. Yet the epistemological view that rational proof is needed to recognise the existence of God was not held universally: while some propounded discursive reasoning, others advocated fundamentally non-rational “methods” (sing. tarīqa) to this end, such as spiritual discipline, said to provide direct, experiential knowledge of God. Some, moreover, maintained that only one correct method should be followed exclusively, whereas others allowed for a hierarchy of different methods. Related to this was the question of whether lay people must follow essentially the same route as theologians, or whether, if they are incapable of doing so, they may adhere to simple, uncritical belief instead. Let us first briefly consider some historical solutions to this complex of questions.
Can it be justifiable to commit oneself 'by faith' to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed epistemologies of religious belief, this book defends a modest fideism that understands theistic commitment as involving 'doxastic venture' in the face of evidential ambiguity: practical commitment to propositions held to be true through 'passional' causes (causes other than the recognition of evidence of or for their truth). It is argued that the justifiability of religious faith-ventures is ultimately a moral issue - although such ventures can be morally justifiable only if they accord with the proper exercise of our rational epistemic capacities. The book canvasses issues concerning the ethics of belief and doxastic voluntarism. William James's 'justification of faith' in The Will to Believe is extended by requiring that justifiable faith-ventures should be morally acceptable both in motivation and content. The book conducts an extended debate between fideists and 'hard line' evidentialists, who maintain that religious faith-ventures are never justifiable. It concludes that, although neither fideists nor evidentialists can succeed in establishing their opponents' irrationality, fideism may nevertheless be morally preferable, as a less dogmatic, more self-accepting, even a more loving, position than its evidentialist rival.
Avicenna is the greatest philosopher of the Islamic world. His immense impact on Christian and Jewish medieval thought, as well as on the subsequent Islamic tradition, is charted in this volume alongside studies which provide a comprehensive introduction to and analysis of his philosophy. Contributions from leading scholars address a wide range of topics including Avicenna’s life and works, conception of philosophy and achievement in logic and medicine. His ideas in the main areas of philosophy, such as epistemology, philosophy of religion and physics, are also analyzed. While serving as a general introduction to Avicenna’s thought, this collection of critical essays also represents the cutting edge of scholarship on this most influential philosopher of the medieval era.
The aim of the present work is threefold. One, it intends to place the thought of Avicenna within its proper historical context, whether the philosophical-scientific tradition inherited from the Greeks or the indigenous influences coming from the medieval Islamic world. Thus, in addition to a substantive introductory chapter on the Greek and Arabic sources and influences to which Avicenna was heir, the historical and philosophical context central to Avicenna's own thought is provided in order to assess and appreciate his achievement in the specific fields treated in that chapter. Two, the present volume aims to offer a philosophical survey of Avicenna's entire system of thought ranging from his understanding of the interrelation of logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, and medicine. The emphasis here is on how, using a relatively small handful of novel insights, Avicenna was not only able to address a whole series of issues that had troubled earlier philosophers working in both the ancient Hellenistic and medieval Islamic world, but also how those insights fundamentally changed the direction philosophy took, certainly in the Islamic East, but even in the Jewish and Christian milieus. Three, the present volume will provide philosophers, historians of science, and students of medieval thought with a starting point from which to assess the place, significance, and influence of Avicenna and his philosophy within the history of ideas.