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Disentangling radical right populism, gender, and religion: an introduction

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This Special Issue provides diverse multidisciplinary entry points that convey the multi-layered complexity of the interactions between radical right populism, gender issues, and religious questions. It fills a gap in the scholarship dealing with the political and social manifestations of radical right populism. From a theoretical point of view, the connections between radical right populism and gender and between radical right populism and religion, respectively, have received growing scholarly attention. The present Special Issue bridges these separate lines of inquiry, concentrating on how issues of gender and religion are jointly addressed in radical right populist discourses. The articles in this Special Issue provide the first in-depth and comparative understanding of the entanglements of gender and religion in radical right populist ideology, explore the active role of religion in the populist discourse, and invite to combine the analysis of the political sphere with the analysis of occurrences in the broader society.
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Global Studies in Culture and Power
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Disentangling radical right populism, gender, and
religion: an introduction
Ov Cristian Norocel & Alberta Giorgi
To cite this article: Ov Cristian Norocel & Alberta Giorgi (2022): Disentangling radical right
populism, gender, and religion: an introduction, Identities, DOI: 10.1080/1070289X.2022.2079307
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2022.2079307
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Disentangling radical right populism, gender, and
religion: an introduction
Ov Cristian Norocel
a
and Alberta Giorgi
b
a
Department of Gender Studies, Lund University, Lund, Sweden;
b
Dipartimento di Lettere,
Filosofia, Comunicazione, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy
ABSTRACT
This Special Issue provides diverse multidisciplinary entry points that convey
the multi-layered complexity of the interactions between radical right popu-
lism, gender issues, and religious questions. It lls a gap in the scholarship
dealing with the political and social manifestations of radical right populism.
From a theoretical point of view, the connections between radical right popu-
lism and gender and between radical right populism and religion, respectively,
have received growing scholarly attention. The present Special Issue bridges
these separate lines of inquiry, concentrating on how issues of gender and
religion are jointly addressed in radical right populist discourses. The articles in
this Special Issue provide the rst in-depth and comparative understanding of
the entanglements of gender and religion in radical right populist ideology,
explore the active role of religion in the populist discourse, and invite to
combine the analysis of the political sphere with the analysis of occurrences
in the broader society.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 14 April 2022; Accepted 13 May 2022
KEYWORDS Gender; radical right populism; religion; Global North; Global South
Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed the growing rise to prominence of
radical right populist forces. Examples include the signicant electoral vic-
tories registered by radical right populist parties across Europe such as the
(Northern) League in Italy, the Sweden Democrats in Sweden and the rise of
Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. The 2010s in particular were a decade when these
political forces moved from the peripheries into the political mainstream. In
radical right populist discourses, gender – and the particularly biological and
binary conception thereof – has been employed to reclaim a position of
hegemony for the heterosexual masculinity embodied by the leader, such
as Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s statement that he is ‘proudly
CONTACT Ov Cristian Norocel ov_cristian.norocel@genus.lu.se Department of Gender Studies,
Lund University, Lund, Sweden
IDENTITIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2022.2079307
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
homophobic’.
1
In the European context also, such constructions of native
masculinities are in opposition to migrants’ masculinities, which are con-
ceived of as dangerous, subaltern and a threat to ‘our women’. Women’s
bodies become, yet again, the sacred place of the nation and subject to male
competition and control. This enables a discursive articulation of anti-
immigration stances as concern for (especially native) women’s rights and
feminism, the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, and defence of the (native)
majority’s religion or apparent lack thereof.
Radical right populist parties across Europe apply a seemingly incongruent
twofold political strategy. On the one hand, they proclaim their commitment
to protecting and promoting traditional ‘family values’, understood as vehe-
ment anti-feminist policies, and opposition to protecting and extending
further social and political rights to the LGBTQ+ community. On the other
hand, they claim to be interested in defending existing gender equality and
LGBTQ+ rights, assimilated into a growingly secularized worldview, against
the slowly growing (Muslim) migrant population who are resolutely
described as archaically patriarchal, fervently religious, and violently intoler-
ant. Illustratively, the French National Rally under the leadership of Marine Le
Pen proclaimed its commitment to defending women’s rights. In the
Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom warned that the ‘freedom that
gay people should have – to kiss each other, to marry, to have children is
exactly what Islam is ghting against’.
2
These processes of co-opting the
gender equality endeavours and the struggle for LGBTQ+ rights revive the
longstanding racializing discourse of White nations pitted against ‘uncivilized
Others’, which is underpinned by a particular understanding of their Judaeo-
Christian roots.
At the same time, in these discourses, religion – Christianity in particular –
is often framed as constitutive of national identity. In Italy, the League’s chair
Matteo Salvini mobilized Catholicism discursively on various occasions, such
as brandishing a rosary during a rally on the eve of the 2019 European
Parliament elections
3
or demonstratively kissing a crucix during a debate
in the Italian Parliament when accused of ‘undermining the principle of
secularism of the modern state’.
4
In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats’ chair
Jimmie Åkesson admitted in a speech in July 2015 that while his party
succeeded in convincing men to vote for the party’s socially conservative
agenda ‘with regard to defence policy, immigration policy, in terms of crim-
inal policy’
5
the party was still avoided by women because ‘its eorts and
vision for a secure and prosperous society’ focused too much on protecting
them from Muslim men and did not pay enough attention to women’s
specic welfare concerns.
With these empirical illustrations in mind, the present Special Issue pro-
vides diverse multidisciplinary entry points that convey the multi-layered
complexity of the interactions between radical right populism, gender issues,
2O. C. NOROCEL AND A. GIORGI
and religious questions. Consequently, it lls a gap in the scholarship dealing
with the political and social manifestations of radical right populism. Indeed,
from a theoretical point of view, the connection between radical right popu-
lism and gender and, respectively, between radical right populism and reli-
gion has received growing scholarly attention. The present Special Issue
bridges these separate lines of inquiry, concentrating on how issues of
gender and religion are jointly addressed in radical right populist discourses.
Radical right populism and gender/religion: conceptual
juxtapositions and clarications
At present, there have been some scholarly attempts to systematize knowl-
edge on the intersections between radical right populism, gender, and
religion, although most of them comprise standalone articles (Ben-Porat
et al., 2021; Singh and Féron 2021). We identied six Special Issues and edited
volumes, which focus expressly on gender and radical right populism in its
various labelling, such as ‘radical right’ (Erzeel and Rashkova 2017; Spierings
et al. 2015); ‘radical and extreme right’ (Miller-Idriss and Pilkington 2017); ‘far
right’ (Köttig, Bitzan, and Petö 2017); or simply ‘global Right’ (Gra, Kapur, and
Walters 2019) or ‘right-wing’ (Dietze and Roth 2020). Of these, three contain
mainly contributions from political science, one from the education sciences,
and one from gender studies. In addition, one Special Issue has explicitly
addressed the issue of religion and ‘populism’ (DeHanas and Shterin 2018),
and one edited volume examined the issues of populism, gender, and reli-
gion (Fitzi, Mackert, and Turner 2019).
The earliest Special Issue was published in Patterns of Prejudice (Spierings
et al. 2015). Establishing its point of departure in the chapter titled
Männerparteien (Mudde 2007), this Special Issue acknowledged the pioneer-
ing work of some scholars that examined the relationship between the
extreme right and women (Amesberger and Halbmayr 2002), how radical
right populist discourses in Northern Europe are gendered (Meret and Siim
2013; Norocel 2010), and the relationship between gender and Islam in the
party programmes (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Betz and Meret 2009). The
issue collected seven articles that attempted to map the complex relationship
between radical right populism and gender. A second Special Issue was
published in Gender and Education (Miller-Idriss and Pilkington 2017). As
points of departure, the authors took the empirical ndings that radical
right populist parties seem to attract more women than men, with a strong
underrepresentation of women among these forces (Mudde 2014, 10), whilst
acknowledging that the women active in these parties are oftentimes over-
looked by researchers (Blee and Deutch 2012, 1). The editors aimed to capture
the changing relationship between radical right populism and gender, high-
lighting the educational implications this may have. A third such eort was
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES IN CULTURE AND POWER 3
a Symposium published in West European Politics (Erzeel and Rashkova 2017).
It collected four articles, which examined whether these political forces are
still Männerparteien and aimed to map the role that gender plays in radical
right populist politics in European democracies. More interdisciplinary in
nature, the fourth Special Issue was published in Signs (Gra, Kapur, and
Walters 2019). Instead of focusing exclusively on radical right populism, the
editors argued that the ‘global Right is political and ideological, and it lends
momentum to – though it is by no means synonymous with – recent populist
movements. Its politics are deployed in diverse historical, economic, cultural
and religious contexts. It emerges as a misogynist, racist, antifeminist attack in
online social networks [. . .]; it is articulated in the antigender ideologies of the
Vatican [. . .]’ (Gra, Kapur, and Walters 2019, 542). Published most recently,
the edited volume Right-Wing Populism and Gender includes 14 chapters
dealing with what the editors dene as the right-wing populist ‘obsession
with gender and sexuality’ (Dietze and Roth 2020, 7). The book focuses on the
right-wing populist ‘complex’, which includes political actors as well as media
discourses, narratives and forms of action. The volume explores the intersec-
tions of right-wing populism with race, religion, class, and emotions. It also
analyses the reasons for the success of ‘gender’ in right-wing populist meta-
politics as an aective bridge or glue. Several chapters focus specically on
how Catholicism and religious fundamentalism are articulated in relation to
gender.
In contrast, to date, there are rather few explicit analyses of the relation-
ship between radical right populism and religion. One notable example is the
Special Issue published in Religion, State & Society (DeHanas and Shterin
2018). Acknowledging the scarcity of such analyses, the issue takes its point
of departure from an edited volume that made an early attempt at such
analysis (Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy 2016) and identies a conceptual
exploration of Christianity as an important factor in the civilizational politics
of populism (Brubaker 2017). The editors argued that religion plays
a preponderantly identitarian and negative role in radical right populism in
the sense of identifying what distinguishes Western ‘civilized’ societies from
‘barbaric’ Muslims. They maintained that ‘populist politicians evoke
a reinvented Christian past to warn about the existential threat of its loss in
the face of invading Muslims robbing it from the present. “The people”
therefore must expel these Muslims from the nation’s future to guarantee
its survival’ (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 178). The editors noted however that
outside the Western world, it is ‘secularists’, ‘communists’ and Westerners
themselves who constitute the antithetical category of ‘others’ who threaten
the livelihood and cultural heritage of ‘the people’. This Special Issue collects
six articles. Finally, the edited volume, which is the third instalment in a series
dealing with Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, makes explicit its interest
in matters pertaining to ‘migration, gender, and religion’ (Fitzi, Mackert, and
4O. C. NOROCEL AND A. GIORGI
Turner 2019). The volume collects an introduction and 10 chapters, which
examine the three articulations of populism and migration, populism and
gender, respectively, populism and religion. Their starting point is acknowl-
edging the demographic context in the Western world. The declining fertility
rates and ageing native populations become a source of anxiety which is
exploited by populist actors to articulate the presence of the (Muslim)
migrant other as a threat, both through their alleged uncontrolled fertility
and the risk they may represent to the safety and autonomy of the women
part of the ethnic majority populations. As such, gender is positioned cen-
trally in the populist ideological universe, but combines seemingly contra-
dictory positions. This ideological universe generally embraces misogyny and
anti-feminist attitudes ercely opposing gender equality endeavours. The
preoccupation with women’s presence and autonomy in the public eye
mirrors a developing crisis of masculinity, enmeshed with growing unem-
ployment and uncertain or declining social status. Religion becomes impor-
tant in this context, as the family and traditional motherhood are seen as
essential to the reproduction of both nation and religion. Consequently,
Christendom is identied as the ultimate line of defence against Islam for
both the nation and the entire Western civilization.
Overview of the present special issue
With this critical mapping of the eld in mind, we consider that a Special Issue
disentangling radical right populism, gender, and religion is a timely aca-
demic endeavour. To begin, a few conceptual clarications are necessary. We
adopt an ideational understanding of radical right populism (Mudde 2007,
2014; Norocel 2013; Pirro 2015), whereby its key tenets are:
strong nativism, which combines ethnic nationalism with either coded
or more overt xenophobia;
authoritarianism and social conservatism with economic protectionist
undertones; and
a Manichaean opposition between a sovereign and unitary people, often
narrowly tting the boundaries of national ethnic majorities, and
a corrupt elite, removed from popular needs and representing the forces
of globalization.
By adopting such a focused denition, we emphasize the role played by
ideology in the articulation and understanding of populist politics. Of interest
to us is how populism as a thin ideology (Stanley 2008) is juxtaposed with
a radical understanding of social conservatism. Consequently, we do not
consider populism as a mere discursive style, which is manifest through
a specic communication manner that hinges on the distinction between
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES IN CULTURE AND POWER 5
elites and ‘the people’, whom these parties claim to represent (Mott 2016).
Neither do we treat it as a political project with a variable ideological
anchoring (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro 2019).
This notwithstanding, we argue it is critically necessary to add a gender
lens to such theorization. In this manner, we can account for the gendered
conceptions of power, collective agency and subjectivity at work in radical
right populism (for a detailed critique see, Maiguashca 2019). Concomitantly,
we argue in this Special Issue that a stricter understanding of the ‘global
Right’ as radical right populism does not preclude identifying the deployment
of fear, violence, and threats in gendered constructions opposing women’s
and LGBTQ+ rights (for analyses of the European contexts, see Kantola and
Lombardo 2019; Keskinen 2013; Norocel 2013, 2017; Norocel et al. 2020;
Wodak 2015). These gendered constructions ‘are invariably directed at pur-
ging women of sexual agency, degrading sexual diversity, banishing overt
expressions of sexuality, and asserting particularly muscular and virile forms
of masculinity’ (Gra, Kapur, and Walters 2019, 545). Following this line of
reasoning, we argue that particularly radical right populist political forces
have played a key role in elevating the discussion about ‘family values’ to the
top of the political agenda. They have even succeeded in enlisting themselves
as ghters against a progressive agenda of both women, under the guise of
‘femonationalism’ (Farris 2017), and LGBTQ+ community representatives,
conceptualized as ‘homonationalism’ (Puar 2007).
We factor in the religious aspect as the elevation of the ‘sovereign people’
to a sacred status, whereby the sacred is understood as ‘what people collec-
tively experience as absolute, non-contingent realities which present norma-
tive claims over meaning and conduct of social life’ (Lynch 2012, 29) rather
than in conventional sense. This status is underpinned by people’s alleged
moral righteousness and purity, which places them in a position of superiority
towards their ‘others’, be they corrupt elites, (Muslim) migrants or sexual
minorities (such as the LGBTQ+ community). Their sacred status also justies
the array of instruments designed by radical right populist forces to ‘save the
people’ no matter how violent (symbolically or physically) these instruments
may be (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 180). Furthermore, the unitary aspect of
the ‘people’ enables the polarizing activation of a ‘parochial altruism’ (in-
group solidarity – out-group enmity) underpinned by a ‘static religion’ to
stabilize social order. These elements feed on the Manichaean ‘us versus
them’ formula and encourage references to people’s ‘religious traditions to
strengthen nationalism and other types of cultural separations’ (Palaver 2019,
23–24). In exploring the role of religion in the populist discourse, scholars
point out that cultural Christianity Christian religious symbols, heritage, or
roots – has been discursively mobilized to dierentiate ‘natives’ from ‘immi-
grants’ in a national, European, or Western perspective (Brubaker 2017;
DeHanas and Shterin 2018; Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy 2016).
6O. C. NOROCEL AND A. GIORGI
An important factor in this context is ‘the politics of fear’ (Wodak 2015),
which the radical right populist forces resort to, and which have a clear
gendered aspect, and manifest through two interconnected processes. On
the one hand, they are scapegoating foreign ‘others’, accused of being
a source of fear themselves as potential rapists of ‘people’s women’, or
endangering people’s moral unity. On the other hand, they exacerbate the
fear of potential extinction, by stoking fears of a ‘demographic race’ resulting
in the replacement of the native ethnic and religious majority (Norocel 2013).
With this in mind, in this Special Issue, we have collected seven articles,
which provide useful insights on the interplay between radical right popu-
lism, gender and religion both from comparative perspectives (Norocel and
Pettersson 2022; Öztürk, Serdar, and Giritli Nygren 2022) and in single country
case studies (Giorgi 2022; Martinez 2022; Sauer 2022; Tranć 2022). Although
these articles are preponderantly focused on the Global North, there is one
article exclusively examining a case study from the Global South (Martinez
2022), and another one analysing a digital community at large (Dickey,
Spierings, and van Klingeren 2022).
The rst contribution examines how gender and religion are employed for
ideological purposes in the discourses of radical right populist parties in
Sweden and Finland (Norocel and Pettersson 2022). The analysis is anchored
in the complexity of these societies as paragons of social welfare and gender
equality, with Lutheran Christianity discreetly underpinning their largely
secularized character. It unveils how appeals to gender equality strengthen
and legitimize the separation between ‘the people’ and racialized Others.
References to religion rank the racialized Others as ‘less than’ the secular and
modern ‘people’, and oppose alleged inquisitorial attempts from their poli-
tical opponents. The second contribution explores the discourse of the radical
right populist Freedom Party of Austria in relation to female Muslim body-
covering (Sauer 2022). It explores the intersections between a biopolitical
discourse, focusing on the ‘Austrian people’ and the female body, and
a necropolitical discourse that constructs migrants as non-belonging, exclud-
able and erasable. Boundary work combines gender and religion in disciplin-
ing the religious and secular gendered bodies and constructing other
religious bodies as disposable. In contrast to previous articles, the third
contribution focuses on the role of the Catholic Church in articulating popu-
list discourse by analysing the case of Croatia (Tranć 2022). Bringing ‘gender
ideology’ to the populist master frame, in some cases including locally
relevant argumentation strategies based on anti-communist and nationalist
themes, the Catholic Church manages to articulate traditionalist stances on
morality policies, and can be analysed as an inuential source of the populist
master frame. Focusing on religious agency, the contribution helps improve
theories rooted in secular politics, which neglect churches as important
sources of populist mobilization. The fourth contribution combines political
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES IN CULTURE AND POWER 7
and cultural sociology to explore the heuristic limitation of the frame of
populists’ ‘instrumentalization of religion’ in a post-secular context in which
the criticisms against the clergy and the transformations of religious autho-
rities are in fact broader trends characterizing contemporary Christianity
(Giorgi 2022). By focusing on the Instagram comments and discussions
among the followers of Matteo Salvini, the League’s chair, the contribution
analyses how populists react and respond to the accusation of instrumenta-
lization of religion and whether and how gender is discursively mobilized in
relation to religion. The fth article focuses on Damares Alves, Brazil’s Minister
of Women, Family, and Human Rights, showing how she contributed to
building the gender narrative in Bolsonaro’s political project (Martinez
2022). It analyses the articulation of religion and gender in Brazilian populism.
The study explores Alves’s discursive strategies to attack feminism, and to
legitimize herself and Bolsonaro’s political project as pro-women. The sixth
contribution brings us to the Reddit digital environment (Dickey, Spierings,
and van Klingeren 2022). It examines a homonationalist subreddit to explore
how gender and religion are activated to construct the boundaries between
LGBT right-wing identities and other religious, or LGBTQ+ outgroups. The
nal contribution analyses comparatively radical right-wing parties’ interven-
tions into the veil debate, by exploring the intersections of gender and
religion in Turkey, Sweden, and France (Öztürk, Serdar, and Giritli Nygren
2022). Although characterized by dierent understandings of legal and nor-
mative secularism, ndings show that these parties capitalize on gender,
religiosity, and secularity. The veil is exploited in drawing boundaries
between both the ‘People’ and ‘non-People’, and the ‘People’ and the
‘Elites’. In this way, the meanings attributed to the veil are used as
a mechanism of exclusion and of drawing the boundaries through gendered
narratives of who belongs to the ‘People’.
Overall, these articles provide the rst in-depth and comparative under-
standing of the entanglements of gender and religion in radical right populist
ideology, explore the active role of religion in the populist discourse, and
invite to combine the analysis of the political sphere with the analysis of
occurrences in the broader society. Moreover, they show the relevance of
adopting gender lenses to analyse populism. To conclude, when we
embarked on this project, we were aware of the high standards of intellectual
rigour in the eort of challenging oppression and ghting racism and
inequalities. During the years, Identities has published much needed Special
Issues, which have either interrogated ‘the contemporary provenance of
racist “populist” nationalism’ (Meer 2019, 502) or have vigorously questioned
the reication of certain identities along such categories as gender, race, and
locality in order to challenge oppression and inequities (Glick Schiller 1998,
297). Many stand-alone articles also testify to the ongoing debate on popu-
lism taking place in Identities (Mondon and Winter 2019; Norocel 2016; Soare
8O. C. NOROCEL AND A. GIORGI
and Tuş 2021; Thorleifsson 2021). We can only hope that the readers will
consider the contributions reunited in this Special Issue just as committed to
advancing knowledge on these pressing issues.
Notes
1. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/20/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-
homophobic-outburst-corruption-scandal
2. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/orlando-is-pushing-lgbt-
rights-and-immigration-towards-colli#.saA37YW1n1
3. https://cruxnow.com/church-in-europe/2019/05/italys-catholic-establishment-
faults-salvini-for-rosary/
4. https://www.euronews.com/2019/08/20/salvini-kisses-rosary-after-conte-
criticism-over-religious-symbols
5. https://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/566,690?programid = 3227
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
Norocel’s work for this project was supported by the Swedish Research Council
(Vetenskapsrådet) [2019-03363].
ORCID
Ov Cristian Norocel http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7349-4000
Alberta Giorgi http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2188-2682
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12 O. C. NOROCEL AND A. GIORGI
... These women may also support traditional family households while themselves being divorced/separated from their male partners, such as Marine Le Pen and Giorgia Meloni, or even married lesbians, such as Alice Weidel, co-chair of the Alternative for Germany party (Sauer, 2020). The attitude of these women who have reached the top of radical-right chauvinist parties is chameleonic, to say the least, with regard to women's positions in society (de Giorgi et al., 2023;Duina & Carson, 2020;Norocel & Giorgi, 2022). Further, behind the need to market a sexy/maternal image, they must not forget to nurture an image of a martial leader on certain occasions. ...
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... 'Gender is a central issue across the complex landscape of the far right' (Blee, 2020, p. 417), and there is a growing body of work at the intersection of (anti-)gender and far-right or rightwing populist politics (Coffé, 2018;Graff and Korolczuk, 2022;Köttig et al., 2017;Norocel and Giorgi, 2022;Paternotte and Kuhar, 2018;Reinhardt et al., 2023;Segers and Eslen-Ziya, 2023;Stögner, 2022). Far-right ideologies and anti-gender mobilization are connected in multiple, interrelated ways: Not only is the opposition to equality and the embracement of allegedly natural hierarchies between human beings defined by factors such a race, birthplace, gender, and others, the principal marker of (far-)right ideology (Bobbio, 1996). ...
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... The gender ideology frame has favored the transnationalization of anti-gender politics (Corredor 2019) by allowing them to overcome local cultural differences that constrain the transnational diffusion of movements (della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 1999), facilitating cooperation among heterogeneous actors (Kováts and Põim 2015). Altering the progressive meaning of gender and feminism developed in gender and sexuality studies by vilifying gender knowledge as ideological indoctrination, the Roman Catholic Church has invented the gender ideology frame to actively promote an unholy alliance (Chappell 2006) between fundamentalist religious groups, Christian (catholic, evangelical, pentecostal, protestant) and Islamic, as well as political parties and governments defending authoritarian and conservative views on gender and society (Norocel and Giorgi 2022;Graff and Korolczuk 2022). The aim is to install traditional agendas in gender and family roles and oppose gender equality policies (Corredor 2019;Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). ...
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Populism is a key feature of contemporary democratic politics, and is on the rise across the world. Yet current approaches to populism fail to account for its shifting character in a rapidly changing political and media landscape, where media touches upon all aspects of political life, a sense of crisis is endemic, and where populism has gone truly global. This book presents a new perspective for understanding populism, arguing that it is a distinct ‘political style’ that is performed, embodied and enacted across a number of contexts. While still based on the classic divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, contemporary populism’s reliance on new media technologies, its relationship to shifting modes of political representation and identification, and its increasing ubiquity has seen the phenomenon transform in new and unexpected ways. Demonstrating that populism as a political style has three central features – appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’; ‘bad manners’; and crisis, breakdown or threat – the book uses a performative framework to examine its key actors, stages, audiences and mise-en-scène. In doing so, it draws on illustrative examples from across the globe, moving beyond the usual cases of Western Europe and the Americas to also take in populism in the Asia-Pacific and Africa. Working across the fields of comparative politics, media communications and political theory, it seeks to account for populism’s complex relationship to crisis, media and democracy, ultimately offering an important and provocative new approach for understanding populism in the twenty-first century.
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Aiming to contribute to the debates on the entanglements among the far-right and anti-feminism Latin America, this article seeks to shed light on the performance of Damares Alves as Brazil’s Minister of Women, Family and Human Rights. Regarding Alves’s conservatism along her political career, particularly during the 2018 presidential run, this study provided an analysis on the reasons behind her prominence to the ongoing bolsonarism, and on how she contributed to building the gender knowledge that anchors the populist narrative in Bolsonaro’s political project. Concerning anti-feminist project’s foundations, as well as Alves’s performance as a Christian-conservative woman, a set of her speeches in the first 19 months of her term was scrutinised, by adopting the FCDA as methodology and using the thematic analysis as a method. The pointing of Alves’s discursive strategies revealed her attacks on feminisms, and the aim of legitimising herself and Bolsonaro’s political project as pro-women.
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This paper explores the role of the Catholic Church in the articulation of populist discourse. By analysing the frames in Catholic doctrines and their dissemination by the Croatian clergy, I make three contributions. Firstly, in contrast to research on the populist radical right, which demonstrates the manipulation of religion committed by secular actors, I identify the Church as an influential source and producer of the populist master frame. Secondly, I demonstrate how the bridging of the ‘gender ideology’ frame to this populist master frame allows the national Church to articulate traditionalist stances on morality policies. Thirdly, I identify the local-level argumentation strategies, empowered by frame bridging with anti-communist, nationalist, and sovereignist themes typical of radical-right populism. Focusing on religious actors’ agency allows us to improve theories rooted in the secular world of populist politics that neglect churches as important sources of populist discourse and mobilisation.
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In the Manichaean discourse of the radical-right populist parties, both religion and gender play a role in the discursive process of ‘othering’. At the same time, on some occasions, populist discourse also mobilises Christianity and gender equality against immigrants, which has been interpreted through the frames of hijacking or instrumentalization. In this paper, I advance two arguments: first, I illustrate the relevance of the literature on secularisation to finetune the analysis of the entanglements of populism, religion and gender, to overcome the ‘hijacking’ frame; second, I make a plea for a socio-constructivist perspective, which pays attention to how the actors make sense of their religious-political engagement and try to avoid paternalistic interpretations. Empirical analysis focuses on the discourse of the supporters of Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Italian radical-right populist party Lega Nord, on Instagram, showing the intersections of religion and gender.