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Why Antibias Interventions (Need Not) Fail

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Abstract

There is a critical disconnect between scientific knowledge about the nature of bias and how this knowledge gets translated into organizational debiasing efforts. Conceptual confusion around what implicit bias is contributes to misunderstanding. Bridging these gaps is the key to understanding when and why antibias interventions will succeed or fail. Notably, there are multiple distinct pathways to biased behavior, each of which requires different types of interventions. To bridge the gap between public understanding and psychological research, we introduce a visual typology of bias that summarizes the process by which group-relevant cognitions are expressed as biased behavior. Our typology spotlights cognitive, motivational, and situational variables that affect the expression and inhibition of biases while aiming to reduce the ambiguity of what constitutes implicit bias. We also address how norms modulate how biases unfold and are perceived by targets. Using this typology as a framework, we identify theoretically distinct entry points for antibias interventions. A key insight is that changing associations, increasing motivation, raising awareness, and changing norms are distinct goals that require different types of interventions targeting individual, interpersonal, and institutional structures. We close with recommendations for antibias training grounded in the science of prejudice and stereotyping.
https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916211057565
Perspectives on Psychological Science
2022, Vol. 17(5) 1381 –1403
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DOI: 10.1177/17456916211057565
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ASSOCIATION FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Events in recent years have initiated a collective conver-
sation about how our social, corporate, and governmen-
tal institutions approach issues of diversity, equity, and
systemic bias. The #MeToo movement increased aware-
ness of sexual harassment, mass grave sites at Canada’s
residential schools drew greater attention to the geno-
cide of indigenous peoples, and worldwide protests in
2020 called for action to address persistent racial injus-
tice. What form said action should take has been subject
to some debate; efforts to change policies and structures
that contribute to systemic biases have at times been
pitted against educational efforts to eradicate (implicit)
biases in the minds and actions of individuals. As antibias
trainings are easier to implement than structural change,
it is perhaps unsurprising that they have risen in popu-
larity. Increasingly, those in positions of power, including
police officers, educators, C-level executives, and hiring
managers, are asked to undergo training aimed to make
them less biased. The stated purpose of many trainings
is to raise employees’ awareness of unconscious or
implicit bias, under the assumption that such bias need
only be brought into awareness to be vanquished.
Alongside the proliferation of antibias trainings, peo-
ple have expressed skepticism that such trainings may
be ineffective or even counterproductive (e.g., Green &
Hagiwara, 2020). Political opposition to antibias train-
ings has also grown; for example, in September 2020,
former U.S. president Donald Trump issued an executive
order banning many forms of diversity training as being
anti-American (Exec. Order No. 13,950, 2020). Antibias
trainings—and whether they are necessary or effective—
have become a “hot-button” issue, one that psychologi-
cal science is ideally positioned to address.
Despite advances in our scientific understanding of
how and when stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes can
shape judgment and behavior, there is a profound gap
between this research and its practical application. This
gap is exacerbated by a common misunderstanding of
what implicit bias is and a failure to distinguish between
1057565PPSXXX10.1177/17456916211057565Schmader et al.Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5)
research-article2022
Corresponding Author:
Toni Schmader, Department of Psychology, University of British
Columbia
Email: tschmader@psych.ubc.ca
Why Antibias Interventions (Need Not) Fail
Toni Schmader , Tara C. Dennehy , and Andrew S. Baron
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia
Abstract
There is a critical disconnect between scientific knowledge about the nature of bias and how this knowledge gets
translated into organizational debiasing efforts. Conceptual confusion around what implicit bias is contributes to
misunderstanding. Bridging these gaps is the key to understanding when and why antibias interventions will succeed
or fail. Notably, there are multiple distinct pathways to biased behavior, each of which requires different types of
interventions. To bridge the gap between public understanding and psychological research, we introduce a visual
typology of bias that summarizes the process by which group-relevant cognitions are expressed as biased behavior.
Our typology spotlights cognitive, motivational, and situational variables that affect the expression and inhibition of
biases while aiming to reduce the ambiguity of what constitutes implicit bias. We also address how norms modulate
how biases unfold and are perceived by targets. Using this typology as a framework, we identify theoretically distinct
entry points for antibias interventions. A key insight is that changing associations, increasing motivation, raising
awareness, and changing norms are distinct goals that require different types of interventions targeting individual,
interpersonal, and institutional structures. We close with recommendations for antibias training grounded in the
science of prejudice and stereotyping.
Keywords
implicit bias, stereotyping and prejudice, diversity training, microaggressions
1382 Schmader et al.
reducing the implicit associations people have formed
and regulating the degree to which those associations
influence behavior. A primary objective of this article
is to introduce a heuristic typology that articulates how
biased outcomes result from implicit or explicit pro-
cesses that are distributed among individuals in a social
context. This typology then allows us to distinguish
between implicit and explicit (or intentional) forms of
biased behavior. Why should this matter? As scientists,
a common typology and set of terms afford greater
precision in comparing findings and approaches across
lines of research. For practitioners, we need greater
conceptual clarity in operationalizing interventions
aimed at counteracting bias.
Toward these aims, we first begin with a critical
review of some pitfalls of existing antibias training before
providing a primer on how dual-process approaches
bring greater clarity to the nature of bias. Our typology
will reveal key distinctions between different forms of
biased expression, enabling practitioners and theoreti-
cians to identify distinct bias pathways as well as critical
entry points to improve the efficacy of antibias trainings.
Our focus on targeting interventions to counteract dif-
ferent pathways to bias is intended to complement other
recent discussions of how best to mitigate bias in orga-
nizations (Carter etal., 2020).
Flawed by Design: Six Pitfalls of
Antibias Training
The public appetite for evidence-based solutions to
mitigating bias has never been larger. McKinsey esti-
mated in 2017 that $8 billion dollars are spent each year
by companies on some form of antibias training
(Kirkland & Bohnet, 2017). That number is likely to be
larger in the wake of 2020’s mass protests for racial
justice and the #MeToo movement. In light of this
increasing public and corporate commitment to antibias
goals, it is imperative that we correct any misapplications
of psychological science that can undermine the effec-
tiveness of antibias training. In short, we believe anti-
bias trainings are often flawed by design because of
several pitfalls of existing approaches both in the field
and in the lab (see Table 1).
First, less than 1% of all research on the topic of
prejudice reduction uses experimental methodology
carried out with adults in field-based settings (Paluck
etal., 2020). Most of the training in organizations is
conducted by private consulting firms or resident diver-
sity specialists who might have no expertise on the
science of bias (Zelevansky, 2019). The dearth of pub-
lished research suggests the evaluation of antibias train-
ing is rarely shared or submitted for independent
review. Thus, the first critical misstep of antibias train-
ing is the failure to conduct rigorous peer-reviewed
research aimed at evaluating and improving the effec-
tiveness of these trainings in the field.
Second, academic research paints a less than opti-
mistic picture about the potential for antibias training
to create organizational change. This may in part be due
to organizations’ desire to merely reduce their legal
liability in discrimination lawsuits or to advertise claimed
values to consumers without necessarily fostering
broader inclusion and diversity among staff. After all,
people assume that companies with diversity policies
in place are less likely to discriminate against employees
(Kaiser etal., 2013). Dobbin and Kalev (2016) reported
that although voluntary training programs can be some-
what effective in boosting the hiring rates of ethnic
minorities into management positions, these efforts can
spark backlash when training is made mandatory. Their
research revealed a 5% decrease in Asian women and
a 9% decrease in Black women in management positions
over 5 years when diversity trainings were made manda-
tory. In another meta-analysis offering a more optimistic
perspective, Bezrukova et al. (2016) suggested that the
backlash to mandatory training may be limited to peo-
ple’s attitudes toward the training itself given evidence
Table 1. Six Pitfalls of Antibias Training
1. Antibias training is rarely subjected to rigorous peer-reviewed research aimed at evaluating
and improving the effectiveness of such interventions.
2. Antibias training is not always conducted with broad organizational buy-in or the assurance
that management and employees have a genuine motivation to foster inclusion.
3. Antibias training too often assumes that the primary objective is to change people’s implicit
associations (stereotypes or attitudes).
4. Antibias training is not always constructed with a clear definition of what implicit bias is or
grounded in the science of how bias unfolds.
5. Antibias training too often assumes that making people aware of their own stereotypes or
prejudices will eliminate biased behavior.
6. Antibias training often focuses on educating an individual without considering the broader
cultural context in which the individual lives, works, or learns.
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1383
that training can actually debias behavior. Nonetheless,
an ideal approach would foster equity, diversity, and
inclusion without inciting large-scale backlash (Emerson,
2017). Therefore, the second pitfall of antibias training
is failing to cultivate genuine motivation to foster inclu-
sion by either management or employees.
Third, antibias trainings often have a narrow goal to
change people’s implicit associations (specifically their
stereotypes and attitudes). This peculiar focus is a by-
product of the popular attention received by the Implicit
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald etal., 1998) and Proj-
ect Implicit (https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/). By
using sets of speeded categorizations, the IAT assesses
the strength of one’s cognitive association between two
categories in a way that is distinct from self-reported
beliefs and attitudes. Although the IAT has been vali-
dated as a measure of individual difference (Greenwald
etal., 2009), too often the terms “implicit associations”
(the strength of the associations between concepts in
the mind, measured indirectly by the IAT) and “implicit
bias” (disparate treatment that can result from one’s
implicit associations with social groups) are used iso-
morphically (cf. De Houwer, 2019). This conceptual
confusion creates the impression that changing implicit
associations is the best way to reduce implicit bias.
However, research offers little hope that this is feasible.
Although some manipulations reduce implicit negative
associations with African Americans (Lai etal., 2014),
these effects are short-lived (Lai etal., 2016), and Baron
(2015) suggested that by adulthood it may be too late
to efficiently change these associations. Thus, antibias
trainings should not maintain a dominant focus on
changing underlying implicit associations when biased
behavior, as we discuss below, is driven by a multitude
of factors. The third pitfall of antibias training is to
assume that the primary objective should be to change
people’s implicit associations.
The fourth pitfall, related to the last, is a fundamental
lack of clarity on what implicit bias is. Terms such as
implicit bias, implicit associations, unconscious bias,
systemic bias, and microaggressions are often used
interchangeably in public discourse with little under-
standing of the scientifically grounded process by
which bias unfolds. This confusion is not limited to the
public; theoreticians also debate the meaning of these
terms. Recent critiques highlight the vagueness and
utility of the term “microaggression” (Lilienfeld, 2017);
there is also a push to move beyond understanding
implicit bias as an individual-difference variable and
toward viewing it as a reflection of the broader social
context (De Houwer, 2019; Gawronski, 2019; Payne
et al., 2017). One of our goals is to expand these
debates by outlining how a clear conceptualization of
bias as an outcome resulting from a distributed process
can inform antibias interventions. To that end, we
define implicit bias as the disparate judgment or treat-
ment of an individual or group resulting from one’s lack
of awareness or ability to effectively regulate activated
stereotypes or attitudes. In this way, biased outcomes
can result from a set of either implicit (e.g., lacking
awareness) or explicit (i.e., lacking motivation to be
unbiased) processes.
A fifth pitfall is to assume that awareness of one’s
implicit stereotypes and attitudes will eliminate them.
Well-designed field studies have directly tested the
effectiveness of increasing awareness among actual
employees of a large professional services firm about
the effects of implicit associations on decision-making
(Chang etal., 2019). In this study, employees viewed
an hour-long educational video covering either the sci-
ence of gender bias, biases more generally, or open-
communication practices that have nothing to do with
gender or bias. Chang and colleagues discovered that
learning about implicit biases in general or gender bias
more specifically (compared with a control condition),
along with strategies for controlling those biases, did
in fact lead to increased support for women and
acknowledgment that gender bias is a problem, as well
as the intention to support inclusion initiatives. Unfor-
tunately, however, these increases in bias awareness
and intentions did not translate into changes in behav-
ior. When later given the opportunity to mentor new
employees or nominate someone for recognition, peo-
ple who underwent the online antibias training were
not more likely to act in supportive ways toward women
in their organization. Thus, a fifth pitfall of antibias
training is to assume that increasing one’s awareness
and understanding of implicit bias is enough to reduce
its effects on behavior. Awareness might be a necessary
component, but it is far from sufficient.
Finally, a sixth common pitfall is that many training
programs focus on educating an individual without
considering the broader cultural context in which that
individual lives, works, or learns. If biased outcomes
result from a process that unfolds over time, we must
also acknowledge that the social norms of the surround-
ing context shape that process (Crandall & Eshleman,
2003). Even if training programs successfully educate
individuals about the existence of bias, including those
they personally possess, these broader cultural norms
and the systems in which they are ensconced are likely
to counteract these efforts. Thus, any training program
must be deployed in tandem with work by organiza-
tional leadership to change policies and practices that
reduce structural biases, in part by fostering more inclu-
sive norms.
To sum up, these six critical pitfalls of antibias train-
ing programs point to a growing need for a more
1384 Schmader et al.
precise conceptualization of bias that can help scaffold
interventions to reduce biased outcomes and foster
inclusion. This conceptualization needs to be easy to
understand by nonspecialists but grounded in theory
and evidence. With that need in mind, we introduce a
typology of bias that uses a dual-process approach
to identify distinct pathways to biased expression.
Although we focus initially on the biased behavior of
individuals, we assume that individually held stereo-
types and attitudes are perpetuated by and help to
perpetuate broader cultural norms and systems of
inequality and underrepresentation that must also be
addressed within organizations and institutions. We
conclude by using our typology to reveal how antibias
interventions can target different types of bias by focus-
ing on the distinct pathways of biased behavior. With-
out differentiating these distinct pathways, antibias
interventions will be flawed.
Biased Outcomes Unfold as a Dynamic
and Contextualized Process
The dual-process approach
The traditional dual-process approach to stereotyping
and prejudice asserts that biased outcomes unfold from
a process in which the activation of stereotypes and
attitudes in individual minds, when unregulated, lead
to behavioral reactions that discriminate against others
on the basis of their group membership (Devine, 1989;
Greenwald & Banaji, 2017). Thus, there are multiple
routes by which bias-relevant cognitions in the mind
can lead to biased behavior resulting from both auto-
matic and controlled components of mental processing
(Kunda & Spencer, 2003; Payne, 2001). Stereotypic
beliefs and prejudicial attitudes are first activated auto-
matically (i.e., brought to mind quickly, and often with-
out conscious intent, when one encounters a socially
devalued group; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), but the activa-
tion of stereotypes or attitudes does not necessarily
lead to biased expression; they can be deliberately
controlled or downregulated, often depending on one’s
chronically accessible goals, motivations, and inten-
tions, to be egalitarian or situational constraints on
enacting biases (Plant & Devine, 1998). Conventional
antibias trainings, however, often conflate the existence,
measurement, or activation of stereotypes or negative
attitudes with evidence for biased outcomes.
One key takeaway from the dual-process literature is
that bias is not a static trait in an individual’s mind but
rather the outcome of a process that is dynamic over
time and embedded within a social context. For example,
social-neuroscience studies have revealed that although
the activation of prejudice happens automatically, this
response can be perceived as conflicting with one’s egali-
tarian goals (Amodio etal., 2004), triggering prefrontal
downregulation of this initial response (Cunningham
et al., 2004). For example, awareness of policies or
norms prohibiting the use of racist or sexist language
might lead people to inhibit an insensitive question or
comment that might have come to mind spontaneously.
However, this downregulation is less likely to occur if
other environmental cues seem to justify the activated
stereotype (Forbes etal., 2012).
A second key takeaway is that bias often results from
a motivated process (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999). Because
stereotypes in particular are heuristics we use to test
hypotheses about other people’s actions and intentions,
they are strategically activated to help us make sense of
our social surroundings (Darley & Gross, 1983). Our
motivation to find common ground can lead us to
suppress automatically activated stereotypes (Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990). In contrast, the motivation to bolster our
sense of self, the in-group, or the status quo can justify
using biases to shape decisions and behavior that facili-
tate those goals (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Fazio &
Towles-Schwen, 1999). For example, although stereo-
types and prejudices once activated can fade as individu-
als become better acquainted, encountering a point of
disagreement can lead stereotypes to be reactivated
(Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Understanding the role of
motivation in bias is central to developing effective inter-
ventions to counteract biased behavior. And yet, antibias
trainings often overlook the role of one’s motivations to
be egalitarian, as noted above.
A clearer definition of what implicit
bias is
The notion that bias can be implicit first emerged when
researchers began highlighting the distinction between
the automatic activation of learned stereotypes and atti-
tudes and the more controlled process of regulating the
expression of these thoughts and feelings to be in line
with our goals and values. This distinction between
activation and expression set the stage for researchers
to develop new measures of implicit stereotypes and
attitudes as something distinct from explicit beliefs that
can be self-reported on questionnaires (Greenwald &
Banaji, 2017). Scholarly work grounded the notion of
implicit cognition within our associative networks—
integrated webs of concepts that form over time through
repeated exposure and learning (Smith & DeCoster,
2000). Research advanced significantly after the emer-
gence of methods for measuring implicit associations,
such as the IAT.
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1385
Pinpointing exactly what we mean by implicit bias
is a challenge. Is implicit bias the negative association
that has the potential to be activated automatically? Is
it the automatic process by which these associations
are activated as a mental state? Or is it the discrimina-
tory behavior that results from the activation of implicit
associations? We are not the only ones to point out how
imprecision in such terminology can stymie both theo-
retical and practical advances (e.g., Corneille & Hütter,
2020; De Houwer, 2019).
With the goal of improving the precision of antibias
training, we focus on social biases as the outcome of
a set of processes by which the activation of group-
relevant cognitions (e.g., stereotypes or attitudes) lead
to, or influence, one’s behavior toward a member(s) of
that group. Implicit bias results from a lack of aware-
ness or ability on the part of an otherwise egalitarian-
motivated perceiver to effectively regulate behavior.
The same outcome would be labeled explicit, or inten-
tional, bias if the perceiver is unmotivated to counteract
how their stereotypes or prejudices affect their behav-
ior. Notably, our focus here is on social biases; the
broader literature on cognitive biases falls outside the
scope of this article.
To be clear, it is useful to say a few words about what
implicit bias is not: It is not necessarily unconscious
(Gawronski, 2019). It is also not merely what an implicit
measure such as the IAT assesses, because conflating
the two obscures the distinction between measurement
and construct. Rather, we assume that individuals and
cultures vary in the strength of associations they hold
toward a given group of people. When these associa-
tions are activated in working memory, they have the
potential to be expressed in one’s behavior toward a
group and its members. Implicit associations and explicit
beliefs in the minds of perceivers are the inputs to this
process but are unwieldy labels. Thus, within this article,
we use the acronym BIASes (beliefs and implicit atti-
tudes and/or stereotypes) to refer to the mental con-
structs that can lead people to act or react in ways that
adversely affect targeted individuals or groups. Although
individuals vary in the strength of these BIASes, our
focus is on expressions of bias as situational events and
not on individuals who are dispositionally biased. Nor
are we focused here on the process by which those
BIASes are formed in the first place.
A Typology of Bias
The antecedents of BIAS expression
and regulation
Our bias typology summarizes when and how BIASes
are expressed in behavior to better inform antibias
training interventions. More concretely, interventions
must be mindful of the fact that the expression of
BIASes in behavior depends on three particularly key
ingredients: perceivers’ underlying motivation to con-
trol bias, awareness that control is needed, and the
ability to successfully regulate their responses.
Motivation. First, the motivation to be unbiased or
egalitarian is critical to the control of biased outcomes.
Although people can be extrinsically motivated to inhibit
their BIASes (i.e., motivated to control their beliefs,
implicit attitudes, and stereotypes out of fear of negative
consequences if they do not; Plant & Devine, 1998), we
focus on times when people feel internally motivated
to control their BIASes because they feel this is the
appropriate response and/or one consistent with their
egalitarian values. Although interventions and proscrip-
tive policies can activate an external motivation, we focus
on how interventions might elicit or increase one’s inter-
nal motivation to be egalitarian or target social norms
that bypass the need for individual motivation.
Awareness. Second, awareness refers to an acknowl-
edgment of one’s BIASes and their potential to shape
behavior in a given context (Hahn etal., 2014). Indeed,
active regulation of BIASes requires not only an aware-
ness that the associations exist but also acknowledgment
that those BIASes have the potential to affect behavior
and do harm in that given moment. Norms in a setting
can also modulate people’s awareness of their BIASes.
Regulation. Third, regulation refers to a person’s ability
and effort in the moment to control their behavior and/
or the cognitive processes relative to the demands of a
situation. Notably, although stereotyping and prejudice
research often focuses on people’s abilities to downregu-
late a negative belief or attitude that has been activated,
when people feel that their BIASes are justified, they
might also upregulate their negative response to others
(Forscher etal., 2015). Thus, when discussing regulation,
we refer to one’s ability to regulate their behavior and
whether the type of regulation used is actually effective
at reducing harm to others.
In sum, the expression of BIASes is not inevitable,
but successful regulation depends on the joint posses-
sion of motivation, awareness, and the skills to regulate
behavior. The absence of one or more ingredients can
lead to distinct pathways for our BIASes to influence
behavior in harmful ways (see Fig. 1). Although we
articulate these pathways as a typology, we recognize
that human psychology does not conform to types. That
said, this parsimonious representation has pragmatic
value for those interested in translating the basic sci-
ence of bias into interventions. Finally, our focus on
1386
Bias-Relevant Event
Authentically
Unbiased
Regulated
Unbiased
Unintentional
Bias
Unconscious
Bias
Apathetic
Bias
Hostile
Bias
Yes
Yes
Yes
DownN/A
N/A
N/A
Effect on Behavior
What is the consequence on behavior?
Effort to Regulate
BIAS Awareness
Egalitarian Motives
Presence of BIASes
YesYes/NoNo
No No UpFailed
No
No
Bias ExpressedBias Not Expressed
Forms of Unbiased Behavior Implicit Forms of Bias Intentional Forms of Bias
Process of Bias
Does the person hold beliefs or implicit
attitudes or stereotypes about the group?
In the moment, is there a motivation to
be egalitarian?
In the moment, is the person aware of their
BIAS and the harm it can do?
Does the person make an effort to regulate
their BIAS (none, up, down, or failed attempt)?
Fig. 1. The bias typology: pathways to bias produce different types of bias expression. This figure can be read from top to bottom as a decision tree. Each color represents a different
type of bias, each distinguished with a unique label. BIAS = beliefs, implicit attitudes, and/or stereotypes.
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1387
biased outcomes as distinct events that unfold as part
of a dynamic and contextualized process means that
the presence or absence of a given factor (awareness,
motivation, regulation) refers to its presence or absence
in that moment. The same individual could in different
settings express or control the same BIAS toward oth-
ers. In addition, as discussed later, norms can stabilize
these processes by justifying or policing biased out-
comes, representing another critical factor for the
implementation and evaluation of antibias training
programs.
Pathways to intentional bias:
Motivation or the lack thereof
We begin with the most blatant forms of bias—intentional
biases. Expressions of intentional bias come in two forms:
hostile and apathetic. Instances of hostile bias result from
a motivation to enact or upregulate the expression of
BIASes on behavior (bias by commission), whereas
instances of apathetic bias result from a lack of motiva-
tion to control or downregulate the expression of BIASes
on behavior (bias by omission). These are intentional
biases because the outcome aligns with one’s motivations
regardless of whether that outcome results from action
or inaction.
Hostile bias. In our typology, hostile bias results from
the intentional upregulation of BIASes on one’s actions.
Because hostile bias implies that a person feels justified in
holding their attitudes and stereotypes and are motivated to
express them, biases of this type are not implicit—they are
explicit and deliberate. This kind of bias is often called
“old-fashioned prejudice” to contrast it with modern or
symbolic forms less directly aimed at their targets (Gaertner
& Dovidio, 2000; Sears & Henry, 2005). Research has shown
that some people are in fact motivated to express prejudice
against out-groups (Forscher etal., 2015).
Self-reported prejudices and stereotypes against
many groups (although not all) have been declining
over the past several decades. In recent years, people
report having less negative beliefs and stereotypes
about racial and sexual minorities, but negative atti-
tudes toward those who are overweight have not
declined (Charlesworth & Banaji, 2019). These varying
changes in attitudes likely reflect different norms that
allow people to feel justified not just in having but also
in expressing their BIASes about some groups and not
others (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).
Despite these general declining reports of hostile
bias, the resurgence of right-wing populism, national-
ism, and xenophobia in many countries has embold-
ened some people to express hostile bias as a badge
of honor, wield it as a weapon, or amplify it in the name
of free speech (Crandall etal., 2018; Forscher & Kteily,
2020). For example, when a White woman in Central
Park called the police to make a false claim that a Black
man was threatening her (he had merely asked her to
leash her dog in accordance with park rules), she made
a conscious decision to mention his race as if that justi-
fied her perception of the situation as a threat (Ransom,
2020). Likewise, the proliferation of anti-Asian hate
crimes as the COVID-19 pandemic hit North America
points to ways in which the physical threat of infection
emboldened some to express their racial biases (Gover
etal., 2020). And when right-wing supporters of Trump
stormed the U.S. capitol building on January 6, 2021,
many did so while displaying overtly racist parapher-
nalia (Simon & Sidner, 2021).
Apathetic bias. Apathetic bias occurs when people
who are aware of their BIASes are unmotivated to control
them. As a result, they make no attempt to monitor the
situation or their own behavior or to downregulate their
BIASes in the moment. The lack of motivation felt when
someone is apathetic to bias can result from different fac-
tors. First, apathetic bias can occur when someone is
unmotivated to care about or make an effort to regulate
a given form of BIAS. For instance, a professor who is
privately irritated by a nonbinary student’s pronouns may
be successful at using more inclusive language in their
large lectures but knowingly misgender the student in a
private conversation with a colleague. In this case, they
might feel unmotivated to exert the extra effort to regu-
late their language.
Second, apathetic bias can occur in situations in
which other motivations for self-or group interest com-
pete with a person’s chronically held egalitarian motives.
This often happens in political contexts in which broader
support for egalitarian policies breaks down when those
policies affect someone personally. Consider an exam-
ple in which a family supports the racial integration of
schools in principle but then opposes having their own
child bussed to another school.
Finally, a third form of apathetic bias reflects uncriti-
cal compliance with a prejudiced norm. When people
fail to engage in critical self-reflection, they may
thoughtlessly reproduce harm stemming from cultural,
structural, and systematic prejudice (Salter etal., 2018).
For example, apathetic bias might lead instructors to
make no attempt to diversify their syllabi, hiring com-
mittees to assume that their gender-imbalanced appli-
cant pool is only a pipeline problem, or researchers to
adopt practices that exclude or misrepresent more
diverse populations. Apathetic bias can be—and quite
often is—enacted by people whose chronic egalitarian
motives are high. And yet situations can cue other com-
peting motivations, including a basic desire to conserve
1388 Schmader et al.
energy or conform to others’ inaction, or to avoid self-
criticism that temporarily reduces the likelihood that a
person expends the necessary effort to downregulate
the degree that their BIASes bleed into behavior. The
harm to targets might feel too small, distant, or abstract
to cue a motivation to regulate their behavior in the
moment. Nonetheless, apathetic bias contributes to per-
petuating norms of biased behavior that causes real
harm to targets of those expressions.
Pathways to implicit bias: failures of
awareness and regulation
Implicit bias, we assert, is the expression of discrimina-
tory actions or judgments against a person or group
that result from BIASes that the perceiver was either
unaware of (i.e., unconscious bias) or unable to effec-
tively regulate (i.e., unintentional bias) in that moment.
In our typology, we define implicit bias not by the size
or subtlety of the behavior1 or the relative impact or
harm to a targeted person or group but rather by the
absence/failure of awareness or regulation.
Unconscious bias. In our typology, unconscious bias
refers to discriminatory behavior or judgment that occurs
when people are unaware or fail to realize the effect of
their BIASes on their behavior in a given situation. This
definition, with its focus on awareness of the expression
of discriminatory behaviors, is distinct from a popular
conception of “unconscious bias” as people lacking
awareness of the mental contents of their mind. It is also
distinct from the notion that implicit associations reveal
hidden prejudice and stereotypes that people are unwill-
ing to admit even to themselves. In fact, people can, to
some degree, accurately estimate their implicit associa-
tions (Gawronski, 2019; Hahn etal., 2014).
Critically, even if people have insight into the implicit
associations in their mind, they might not be aware of
how or when those associations affect their behavior
in a given context. Their awareness can be influenced
by cues in the context, the nature of the specific BIAS,
and their own expertise in recognizing the effects of
BIASes. For example, a well-meaning hiring manager
may explicitly value diversity, but if they also assign
value to whether a given candidate seems like a “cul-
tural fit,” their ultimate hiring decisions may reflect a
preference for homophily (Rivera, 2012) and, by exten-
sion, be biased against minority candidates. The same
individual might not exhibit a similar bias against pro-
moting an already successful minority colleague.
A key aspect of unconscious bias is that regardless
of whether people have insight into their stereotypes
and prejudices, it is harder to be aware in the moment
of how those cognitions shape action (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). Without this awareness, even the most well-
intentioned person will exhibit biased behavior. To
rectify unconscious bias, people need to become aware
not only of their own BIASes but also of the contexts
in which BIASes affect behavior.
Unintentional bias. Unintentional bias occurs when
people who are aware of and motivated to control their
BIASes nonetheless fail to successfully regulate their biased
behavior. Instances of unintentional bias can be carried out
by egalitarian-minded people who have insight into and
disdain for their own implicit stereotypes and attitudes and
who are quite aware of the contexts in which these asso-
ciations could bias their actions. Nonetheless, they might
lack effective strategies for breaking the link between their
implicit associations and behavior.
Unintentional bias can happen when regulatory
abilities are insufficient or overwhelmed by the other
demands of the context. Consider “foot-in-mouth dis-
ease,” in which someone’s biased utterance is accom-
panied a second later by a wince and apologies. For
example, a White supervisor who, in the midst of a
group presentation, momentarily confuses the names
of her two Asian women employees. Even when imme-
diately corrected, confusing two people of the same
race often reflects an out-group homogeneity effect
(Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992), the tendency to more eas-
ily confuse other-race individuals. In a more relaxed
setting, she might have regulated this bias, but regard-
less of her intention, the consequence of this behavior
is that the supervisor’s Asian employees may feel oth-
ered or isolated because of their race.
A second type of regulatory failure is when people
effectively control the content of what they say but fail
to regulate the manner in which they express it. For
example, people’s explicit motivation to be nonpreju-
diced predicts the extent to which they express nonbi-
ased statements, but their implicit racial attitudes are still
telegraphed nonverbally (Dovidio etal., 2002). Likewise,
a person with implicit antigay attitudes may be unaware
that they maintain greater physical distance from a gay
coworker relative to their straight colleagues.
Finally, unintentional bias can also occur from using
a well-meaning strategy that is unintentionally harmful.
For example, White Americans who claim to not “see
race” might intend to signal that they believe in racial
equality without realizing that this color-blind ideology
fails to appreciate the important role that race plays in
people’s identity and lived experience (Apfelbaum
etal., 2008). Another example is when efforts to express
a positive impression convey a stereotyped lens, such
as when a White faculty member describes a Black
student as articulate, betraying low expectations for
minority students. Well-meaning advice also falls under
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1389
this umbrella, such as when people earnestly ask
whether their chronically ill friend is exercising and
eating right, conveying an attribution of illness to con-
trollable lifestyle choices.
Pathways to unbiased behavior:
when motivation, awareness, and
regulation align
Regulated unbiased behavior. Biased expression is
not inevitable; people can and often do exhibit regulated
unbiased behavior when they successfully downregulate
or inhibit the expression of these biases (Fazio & Towles-
Schwen, 1999; Plant & Devine, 1998). In fact, regulated
unbiased behavior is the realistic goal of antibias training.
However, when left to the individual, the successful reg-
ulation of BIASes is contingent on people having the
awareness, motivation, and ability to deploy effective
strategies to counteract their BIASes.
There are many cases in which people can success-
fully regulate the influence of BIASes on their behavior.
For example, those who are internally motivated to
respond without sexism are less likely to laugh at or
make sexist jokes (Klonis etal., 2005), although they
likely hold implicit sexist attitudes or beliefs. Regulated
unbiased behavior need include not only the inhibition
of BIASes that come to mind but also active efforts
toward creating unbiased outcomes. In 2019, Francis
S. Collins, the director of the National Institutes of Health,
tweeted the following: “Ending the #manel begins at
the top. Starting now, I expect a level playing field at
public speaking events with a diversity of ideas or I
will decline to participate. I challenge other leaders to
do the same” (Box, 2019). With an awareness that all-
male panels (manels) reflect bias, Collins provides a
clear example of regulating his own behavior to be
unbiased while creating a norm for others to do the
same, a topic we return to below.
Authentically unbiased behavior. The idealistic goal
of antibias training is to equip people to become authen-
tically unbiased. Unfortunately, this is not likely to be
realistic. Authentically unbiased behavior can imply that
individuals have no implicit associations that would lead
them to disadvantage one group over another. This most
commonly occurs when a bias is either not present or is
irrelevant in a given context. For instance, a North Ameri-
can with little knowledge of the Indian caste system may
not have preexisting attitudes or stereotypes about the
Dalit caste who have been historically oppressed in India.
Can people be authentically unbiased when they are
exposed to cultural stereotypes or have a strong auto-
matic tendency to positively evaluate the in-group?
Given that implicit associations are present by 1 year
of age (Pun etal., 2018), we might often assume the
presence of implicit stereotypes or attitudes about a
variety of social groups. That said, a key question
becomes not whether certain people harbor implicit
associations but rather how strongly they hold those
associations. Some people will have no strong negative
out-group associations because of a personal history
of positive experiences with or exposure to out-group
members who contradict negative stereotypes (Aron
et al., 2004; Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004; Pettigrew &
Tropp, 2006).
In addition, certain people might not easily develop
negative associations of any kind. Livingston and
Drwecki (2007) backward-engineered the authentically
unbiased person by identifying White college students
who exhibited no implicit or explicit racial prejudice
(i.e., low on external motivation and high on internal
motivation to be unbiased) and were nominated by
Black peers to be racially unbiased. Compared with
other White students who did not meet these criteria,
the authentically unbiased White students were less
susceptible to learning negative associations to neutral
stimuli and somewhat more likely to learn positive
associations. Thus, a general insensitivity to evaluative
conditioning might explain who is likely to be authenti-
cally unbiased toward a range of different social groups.
Young children may fall into this category. Although
childhood represents a critical period for the develop-
ment of BIASes (Baron, 2015; Bigler & Liben, 2006),
there is variability in which social categories children
represent, whether they have formed positive or nega-
tive associations with those groups, and the relative
importance of those intergroup evaluations. For exam-
ple, children tend to categorize others on the basis of
gender and language before race, and positive evalua-
tions of the in-group emerge before negative evalua-
tions of the out-group (Rhodes & Baron, 2019). Such
findings suggest that negative out-group BIASes may
form only after protracted social learning (Baron, 2015;
Pun etal., 2018).
Although we have focused on people without BIASes,
it is worth noting that even people who hold such
BIASes can behave in an unbiased way if the context
never brings those cognitions to mind. For example,
race may become less salient if an intergroup competi-
tion makes team affiliation more relevant to the context
(Kurzban etal., 2001). Thus, a person with BIASes does
not always engage in biased behavior; a necessary but
not sufficient prerequisite is that the context makes
such BIASes relevant
Summary. Our bias typology specifies how in-the-moment
awareness, motivation, and efforts to regulate behavior
jointly shape the translation of individuals’ BIASes into
1390 Schmader et al.
behavior within a given context. By visually representing
the different pathways of bias expression, we can see the
distinction between intentional/explicit forms of bias,
unintentional/implicit forms of bias, and situations in
which behavior is unbiased. However, to this point, we
have described the process by which BIASes in a per-
son’s mind are expressed versus regulated as “slices” of
time within a specific context, largely considering indi-
viduals as independent actors. Contextual factors and
social norms also shape these processes through the
minds of interdependent actors.
Systemic Bias: From Individual Minds
to Cultural Norms
Interventionists often assume that they can change
organizational culture by changing the hearts and
minds of individuals in that organization. Yet what tar-
gets of bias often report is not a series of unrelated
biased episodes but episodes that reveal patterns of
BIASes embedded in a culture and perpetuated by
social norms (Markus & Kitayama, 2010), albeit enacted
by a minority of people (Campbell & Brauer, 2020).
Thus, efforts to counteract biased behavior at scale
hinge on changing the cultural context.
In this section, we expand the traditional dual-
process model to include norm-based processes that are
dynamically distributed between the minds of interde-
pendent actors. We review the impact that norms can
have on attitudes and behavior, introducing the notion
of a distributed dual-process model. Because bias
unfolds within cultural contexts, we explain how the
norms of that setting can reinforce and accentuate biases
over time, leading to more trait-like modes of thinking
about and interacting with others. In addition, we con-
sider the effects of these norms on the ways in which
targets interpret and are affected by instances of bias.
The distributed dual-process model
of bias
Norms are potent vehicles for social change. Research
from both the lab and the field reveals that norms influ-
ence the expression of BIASes (Paluck, 2011; Paluck
etal., 2016; Stangor etal., 2001; Sechrist & Stangor,
2001). Norms can shape behavior by changing people’s
attitudes (Murrar etal., 2020). But norms can also influ-
ence behavior without conscious endorsement by those
whose behavior they shape (Nolan etal., 2008). That
norms can affect behavior independently of attitudes
has led some to suggest that changing norms—or at
least the perception of norms—may be a more viable
strategy for cultural change than changing attitudes
(Paluck, 2011; Prentice & Paluck, 2020).
We expand the traditional dual-process approach to
consider the person in context, in which the process of
activating and regulating BIASes is distributed dynami-
cally among the minds of interdependent actors (a dis-
tributed dual-process model). Norms are thus affordances
in the environment that enable or inhibit the expression
of BIASes. For example, Crandall and Eshleman’s (2003)
justification-suppression model (JSM) suggests that peo-
ple express their true prejudicial beliefs about groups
when they feel that the norms in the surrounding con-
text justify those prejudicial attitudes (i.e., hostile biases
in our typology that people feel motivated to express
and even intentionally upregulate). In contrast, when
the collective norms support equality and inclusion,
people actively suppress their biased beliefs and atti-
tudes (this suppression, if successful, is what we have
labeled “regulated unbiased behavior”). As in the JSM,
we consider how norms can affect biased expressions.
We posit that norms not only shape an individual’s
behavior in a top-down, deliberative way but also affect
activation, motivation, and regulation efforts.
First, the real or imagined presence of prejudiced
others may activate BIASes people neither endorse nor
are aware they harbor. Vial et al. (2019) demonstrated
that people make biased and discriminatory hiring deci-
sions that go against their own beliefs if they believe
their supervisor is prejudiced. Although they may do
so out of a fear of punishment, desire to curry favor,
or motivation for conformity, it is plausible that the
mere presence of prejudiced others could itself increase
the likelihood that BIASes are activated. Likewise, the
presence of egalitarian others might inhibit the activa-
tion of those BIASes.
Second, others in the setting can also cue a motiva-
tion to suppress the effects of BIASes on behavior.
Consider how the expression of BIASes can change
when people are making decisions in diverse groups.
Diverse juries produce less racially biased verdicts, in
part because White jurors are more motivated to avoid
relying on stereotypes as heuristics in favor of a careful
review of the evidence (Sommers, 2006). In this context,
the presence of diverse others cues people to take into
consideration other members’ points of view, motivat-
ing them to regulate their BIASes as they attempt to
objectively evaluate evidence.
Finally, others in the setting might play an active part
in coregulating each other’s biased expressions. For
example, Régner et al. (2019) examined whether the
average implicit stereotypes held by members of evalu-
ation committees predicted a change over time in the
gender balance of hiring decisions for elite science
positions. Among committees whose members rejected
the notion that women face barriers to success, implicit
stereotypes predicted hiring decisions that favored men
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1391
over women. But among committees whose members
explicitly acknowledged that biases might be a prob-
lem, implicit stereotypes did not predict more disparate
hiring outcomes for women. Committees explicitly con-
cerned about biased selection decisions might have
been more likely to deliberately discuss these concerns
and work to collectively to set aside and thus regulate
their implicit stereotypes.
Admittedly, the examples above suggest rather than
provide precise evidence for the mechanisms by which
the social context or surrounding norms influence the
exact point in the process by which biased outcomes
unfold. In reality, multiple mechanisms might be at play
and the effect of social norms on these processes might
operate in either explicit or implicit ways. However,
such findings are consistent with a distributed dual-
process model of bias.
This distributed dual-process model can lead to both
stability and change in the expression of bias. In the
aggregate, one sees stability in biased expression both
over time and across individuals who are subjected to
those same norms. For example, Payne and colleagues
(Payne etal., 2017; Vuletich & Payne, 2019) have sug-
gested that implicit associative measures of prejudice
tap into the bias of the surrounding culture as much if
not more than individual differences in attitudes. Their
research suggests that the network of BIASes manifest-
ing through norms in the culture is more stable than
the BIASes measured in individual minds. If this “bias-
of-the-crowds” view is accurate, then trying to change
the implicit associations or the biased behaviors of indi-
viduals is bound to be ineffective without changes to
the broader culture. Furthermore, because people tend
to self-select into situations with like-minded others
(Schmader & Sedikides, 2018), the homogeneity within
the cultural context will only reinforce and stabilize
patterns of bias expression. As a result, polarization
and stabilization of BIASes and their expression
becomes even more potent over time.
The broader point is that an individual’s motivation
to regulate their BIASes can be influenced by the real or
imagined attitudes of others in the social context. The
presence of shared beliefs in equality makes it easier to
automatically inhibit the activation of BIASes or down-
regulate them once activated (Moskowitz etal., 1999).
There is clearly a need for more research that specifically
tests how norms in the surrounding context form and
shape activation, motivation, and regulation as distinct
components of the pathways to how bias is expressed.
The target’s dilemma
Our bias typology identifies distinct pathways to biased
behavior toward the goal of identifying entry points to
disrupt biased behavior. As such, it is more useful as a
guide for intervention rather than for characterizing
what it is like to be on the receiving end of different
types of bias expressions. In an isolated encounter,
targets of bias face a dilemma in that they (or other
observers) cannot readily distinguish between each
type of bias (e.g., unintentional and apathetic bias).
That actors’ intentions can be a cipher should be unsur-
prising given that actors themselves lack introspective
insight into the processes that guide their action (Nisbett
& Wilson, 1977). In all but the most hostile forms, a
given biased expression is not diagnostic of any one
process or pathway. For instance, if a White teacher
tells a Black student, “Everyone can succeed in this
society, if they work hard enough” (Williams, 2020),
their utterance could be an intentional jibe reflecting a
belief that Black people are lazy (hostile bias), could
reflect ignorance (unconscious bias) that espoused
meritocracy beliefs disregard systemic issues leading to
unequal opportunities, or could stem from a genuine
belief (even if misguided) that focusing on hard work
is a way to motivate members of disadvantaged groups
(unintentional bias).
This attributional ambiguity leaves targets (and other
observers) in the difficult position of having to decode
an actor’s intentions without reliable indicators of their
true motives (Major etal., 2013). This task is more difficult
if people’s declared egalitarian motives mask underlying
BIASes. And yet the mere uncertainty of ambiguous
expressions of bias can create physiological stress—
arising from constant vigilance and a lack of control over
outcomes (Derks & Scheepers, 2018; Salomon etal.,
2015). In this way, the general ambiguity of the pathway
to biased behaviors from the perspective of targets adds
to their allostatic load, which has implications for weath-
ering and health consequences across the life span (Major
& Schmader, 2018; Simons etal., 2018). Implicit and
ambiguous expressions of bias can cause equal degrees
of harm to targets of bias (Jones etal., 2013), although
observers construe implicit bias as less problematic
(Daumeyer etal., 2019).
Targets can and do experience harm from implicit
bias, but the attribution(s) a target makes can also
shape the harm they incur (Major & Dover, 2016). In a
single ambiguous encounter, it is adaptive for targets
to ascribe negative experiences to another person’s
prejudice rather than to themselves (Crocker etal.,
1991). However, when biases are recognized as being
systemic, attributing one’s treatment to discrimination
is more harmful to mental and physical health (Dolezsar
etal., 2014; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009; Schmitt
etal., 2014).
We propose that targets decode ambiguous interac-
tions, in part, by looking to the norms of the current
1392 Schmader et al.
context. When BIASes are assumed to be minimal and
genuine egalitarian motives prevalent, targets might
ascribe an individual actor’s biased action to implicit
rather than intentional bias. Even if the behavior is
coded as intentional, broader norms for inclusion might
foster resilience to the biased expression coming from
a singular prejudiced actor. However, if norms condone
the expression of bias, then targets will likely assume
that the same action reflects apathetic if not hostile bias.
For example, a person who compliments an Asian
American for his unaccented English allows a stereo-
type to inform their impression. If other people in that
same context are perceived to be genuinely egalitarian,
this one-off encounter might be ascribed to the singular
prejudiced actor or potentially interpreted as a verbal
slip representing implicit bias, neither of which neces-
sarily herald a persistent threat to inclusion in that
context. However, in the context of broader norms of
cultural prejudice, the same interaction serves as a pow-
erful reminder that Asian Americans are not fully
accepted by the majority group and may reasonably be
used as a barometer to forecast their future treatment
(Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010). Thus, norms not only
shape how bias is expressed by actors but also how it
is perceived by targets, which has implications for the
harm that is experienced. Interventions that succeed in
creating more inclusive cultural norms will thus not
only reduce the likelihood of biased actions but also
potentially reduce the experienced harm when expres-
sions of implicit bias do occur.
In sum, although it is difficult to discern which path-
way has led to a specific biased event, when an episode
of bias is seen as a signal of broader cultural devalua-
tion, either intentional or not, it is more likely to take
a toll on targets’ health, well-being, trust, and perfor-
mance. Our typology provides a theoretically and
empirically grounded framework for understanding bias
and, importantly, developing effective interventions to
disrupt the pathways that lead to biased behaviors.
However, it is essential that interventions take into con-
sideration the impacts on targets as well as the larger
cultural context in which the interventions take place.
How the Bias Typology Informs
Interventions
Having outlined the BIAS typology and the role of
norms in perpetuating systemic biases, we can now
identify entry points to successfully mitigate or prevent
biased outcomes. Although existing training efforts
have a poor track record of changing such outcomes
(Dobbin & Kalev, 2016), highlighting pathways to bias
can better inform intervention efforts by shifting the
focus away from a one-size fits all approach. Toward
this end, organizations should begin by identifying the
type(s) of biases and cultural norms that are of key
concern. By identifying which pathway to target, this
framework provides greater precision to inform which
type of approach might be best suited to mitigating that
bias. We next highlight research that points to effica-
cious strategies if not bona fide interventions for each
approach.
Changing minds and nudging
behavior: achieving authentically
unbiased behavior
To achieve authentically unbiased behavior, one can
aim to change the degree to which individuals hold
BIASes in the first place. The hard way to do this is by
changing the implicit associations themselves; an easier
strategy is to render them irrelevant to the task at hand.
Reducing BIASes: interventions to change implicit
associations. Although implicit associations can change,
they are stubbornly resistant to intervention efforts. On
the one hand, over the past 13 years, race, gender, and
sexual orientation stereotypes and attitudes have shifted
toward more egalitarian views, whereas negative attitudes
toward the elderly and disabled have not (Charlesworth &
Banaji, 2019). These data reveal that changes are happen-
ing but do not reveal how such associations can be
changed or the optimal conditions for engendering that
change. Interventions would ideally bring about changes
in implicit associations that are qualitative (i.e., negative
associations become positive) and enduring (i.e., more
than a fleeting occurrence).
Such interventions benefit from understanding when
and how implicit associations form. Evidence shows
that implicit associations form rapidly, a seemingly
mindless outcome when patterns of covariation are
detected (Gonzalez etal., 2016; Gregg etal., 2006).
Although implicit associations are quick to form, they
are slow to change. Meta-analytic reviews (Forscher
etal., 2019; Lai etal., 2016) have shown that implicit
associations can be temporarily changed by experimen-
tal manipulations, but these associations return to pre-
intervention levels hours or days later.
Notably, some strategies hold more promise. In lab
studies, exposure to out-group members who contradict
group stereotypes and attitudes is relatively more mean-
ingful (Kurdi & Banaji, 2019), and effects are stronger
with larger doses of counter-attitudinal information
(Rydell etal., 2007). Field studies reveal that positive
role models reduce implicit racial bias. For example,
medical students who have greater positive contact with
a racial out-group show reduced negative implicit atti-
tudes toward that out-group (Van Ryn etal., 2015).
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1393
Likewise, watching a female avatar communicate a sci-
ence lesson reduced implicit male = STEM stereotypes
among girls and boys (Plant et al., 2009; see also
Gonzalez etal., 2017). These studies provide encourag-
ing evidence of successful interventions to change
implicit associations.
Institutional policy changes (e.g., public diversity state-
ments) and diversity or bias workshops are unlikely to
directly change people’s implicit stereotypes or attitudes.
Nonetheless, an organization might incrementally change
people’s implicit associations by having a sustained com-
mitment to recruit, reward, and retain positive role mod-
els in positions of prestige and leadership (Dasgupta
& Asgari, 2004). Stereotypes and attitudes might shift as
a result of sustained investment in outreach, hiring, and
promotion programs to foster diversity.
The advantage to trying to change implicit associa-
tions is that if negative associations can be changed,
then perceivers can more easily achieve authentically
unbiased behavior or at the very least find it easier to
successfully regulate weaker implicit associations.
Another advantage of targeting change at this level is
that it need not require structural changes to the orga-
nization. Creating programs to foster exposure to posi-
tive role models can be implemented virtually, globally,
and fairly inexpensively. The disadvantage is that
implicit associations are difficult to change, reflecting
the many years of experience that have shaped them.
Thus, interventions might target changes in childhood
when associations are more malleable (Baron, 2015;
Gonzalez etal., 2021). To achieve lasting change in
implicit associations, intensive interventions require sus-
tained effort, which can be plagued by higher rates of
attrition. Finally, interventions that do change implicit
associations among individuals are highly unlikely to
produce organization-wide cultural change in biased
expression without other structural changes.
Removing temptation: interventions to make implicit
associations less relevant. Given the difficulty in chang-
ing BIASes, efforts to make BIASes less relevant may hold
more promise. In some cases, situations can be structured
to avoid activating BIASes in the first place. In one often
cited example, orchestras hired more women for top posi-
tions after switching to blind auditions in which evalua-
tors did not know the gender of the performer (Goldin &
Rouse, 2000). In other contexts, making reviewers unaware
of applicants’ gender has led to more women astronomers
being granted telescope time (Johnson & Kirk, 2020) and
more women coders having their open source code
accepted (Terrell etal., 2016).
Granted, it is not always possible to mask applicants’
identities, but other structural changes can still reduce
the likelihood that implicit associations are activated.
In one study of grant awards (Witteman etal., 2019),
the framing of the reviewer instructions had a large
effect on the gender ratio of awardees. Women and
men were awarded a proportional number of grants
when the reviewers were instructed to focus primarily
(75% of the total score) on the quality of the ideas in the
proposal. However, when reviewers were instructed to
focus primarily (75% of the total score) on the leadership
record of the principal investigator (for a different type
of grant), women were significantly underrepresented in
awardees. A simple change in the review criteria dramati-
cally affected gender disparities in outcomes.
A third example of framing effects comes from
research on the meritocracy paradox, wherein decision
structures that emphasize meritocracy justify biased
decision-making. The stereotype that men are more
brilliant than women can make men seem like a better
fit to positions of intellectual excellence (Bian etal.,
2017). Managers asked to assign bonuses to equally
productive men and women award higher bonuses to
men when the task is framed as rewarding the best
performers (Castilla & Benard, 2010). When it is merely
framed as a regular performance evaluation, there is
no gender gap in bonuses offered. Similar prompts to
imagine an “ideal worker” increase racial biases (Brown-
Iannuzzi etal., 2013).
The advantage to interventions that structure the
situation is to reduce the expression of bias without
needing to know much about the variation among indi-
vidual actors in their motivation or awareness. By locat-
ing change in the situation rather than in people,
organizations can hopefully sidestep potential backlash
against these efforts and foster authentically unbiased
outcomes. The disadvantage is that this requires chang-
ing all situations in which bias might occur. Such efforts
will not capture all manifestations of intentional or
implicit bias.
Counteracting implicit forms of bias
Our typology also provides a foundation for counteract-
ing implicit biases in both its forms. To reduce uncon-
scious biases, trainings should focus on raising people’s
awareness of the BIASes they possess, explicitly iden-
tifying contexts likely to lead to bias expression and
creating plans for the active regulation of behavior. To
reduce unintentional biases, interventions should train
people how to effectively regulate their BIASes. Several
programs of research are highlighting ways to achieve
each of these goals.
Raising bias awareness: interventions to counter-
act unconscious bias. Many current antibias training
sessions are aimed at increasing people’s awareness of
1394 Schmader et al.
their own BIASes and how they might affect their behav-
ior. Because these sessions are often carried out by for-
profit companies or in-house by human resources staff, it
is difficult to know how well they reflect the relevant
science. Nonetheless, research is beginning to suggest
that diversity training can be at least somewhat effective
for raising awareness (Bezrukova etal., 2016; Dobbin &
Kalev, 2016).
Researchers have investigated different strategies for
raising people’s awareness of their own BIASes. Many
efforts involve having people learn their score on an
IAT, for example, by visiting Project Implicit. A useful
aspect of the IAT is its ability to help people become
aware of their own implicit stereotypes and attitudes,
which they might otherwise be motivated to deny (Morris
& Ashburn-Nardo, 2010). Efforts to increase BIAS
awareness have the potential to reduce unconscious
bias, although the risk of unintentional bias remains.
Another effective strategy is to teach people how to
identify implicit bias when it occurs. Moss-Racusin and
colleagues (2018) compared people’s reactions to two
different kinds of videos on gender bias in STEM: one
that featured expert summaries of bias research and a
second set in which these gender biases were portrayed
in engaging fictional narratives. Both types of videos
raised people’s awareness of and accuracy in detecting
gender bias. Faculty members were especially per-
suaded by the expert interviews to increase their sup-
port for gender-inclusion efforts, and the narrative
videos increased empathy, an emotion that cues bias
regulation efforts. The value of expertise in raising
awareness extends beyond the lab. San Francisco’s
Police Chief credited the social psychologist Jack Glaser
in inspiring him to implement policy changes to combat
implicit bias in policing (Giuliani-Hoffman, 2020).
Another method of raising awareness is to use inter-
active games. Shields et al. (2011) created the Workshop
Activity for Gender Equity Simulation that allows play-
ers to experience firsthand the injustice of having the
deck literally stacked against them. People who play
the game exhibit greater awareness of gender bias and
the problem it creates for gender disparities (Cundiff
etal., 2014).
Although raising awareness is a clear and necessary
prerequisite to fostering self-regulated unbiased behav-
ior, awareness alone does not change a culture. In
addition to the awareness that BIASes exist, people
must also be aware of when the BIASes they hold are
activated and expressed. One fruitful direction for
research is to examine whether awareness interventions
are more effective when participants also identify the
circumstances under which their BIASes are expressed.
People can be taught to regulate (i.e., use top-down
control over) their implicit stereotypes and attitudes
when encountering an out-group member (Mendoza
etal., 2010). That said, a person who is motivated to
be egalitarian and who is aware of their BIASes might
still fail to regulate them to avoid harm (i.e., uninten-
tional bias). Thus, successful antibias trainings must
help people develop skills for effective regulation.
Skill development: interventions to counteract un -
inten tional bias. Even when people are intrinsically
motivated to control their BIASes, they can still be unsuc-
cessful in regulating them, leading to unintentional bias.
In a meta-analysis of 260 samples, awareness-based train-
ing was effective at changing people’s attitudes but not
changing their behavior (Bezrukova et al., 2016). The
most effective trainings combined efforts to increase
awareness of BIASes with strategies for changing one’s
behavior. Thus, to mitigate unintentional bias, interven-
tions must provide people with effective strategies for
disrupting the influence of BIASes on behavior.
One successful example is an intervention by Devine
and colleagues that presents bias as a habit to be bro-
ken. Their evidence-based training teaches participants
to debias themselves using strategies such as (a) replac-
ing stereotypic thoughts with neutral thoughts, (b)
imagining people who contradict the stereotype, (c)
actively taking the perspective of those from other
groups, and (d) increasing one’s opportunities for posi-
tive interactions with other groups (Devine etal., 2017).
This training has been effective in boosting not just
participants’ awareness of implicit bias but also their
self-efficacy and reported efforts to counteract their
BIASes (Carnes etal., 2015). Two years later, the aca-
demic science, engineering, and medicine departments
at which the training took place increased their rate of
hiring women by 18 percentage points, a marginally
significant but preregistered effect in a small sample
(Devine etal., 2017). The same intervention led par-
ticipants to speak out publicly against racism 2 years
after the training took place (Forscher etal., 2019).
Providing motivated people with tools to increase their
awareness and efficacy for regulating BIASes may be a
useful strategy for changing people’s behavior.
One disadvantage is that this level of intervention needs
to be structured over a longer period of time and inte-
grated into other general training programs, and it might
not be easily scalable using multimodal efforts (Bezrukova
etal., 2016). Training on “what to do” also assumes that
people are motivated to change their practices (Devine
etal., 2012). If an organization is plagued by intentional
forms of bias, other interventions are called for.
Change of heart: Mitigating
intentional forms of bias
When an organization suffers from intentional forms of
bias, efforts should target people’s underlying motivations
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1395
for equality and the norms that lead people to feel justi-
fied in expressing their BIASes toward others.
A key challenge to moving people from intentional
bias to self-regulated forms of unbiased behavior is the
difficulty in changing people’s motivations. The typical
challenges of changing any behavior are compounded
by people’s tendencies to deny one’s biases, favor one’s
in-group (Brewer, 1999), and justify the social hierarchy
(Jost etal., 2004; Norton & Sommers, 2011; Radke etal.,
2020). That these core motivations develop in early
childhood (Baron & Banaji, 2009; Newheiser etal.,
2014) likely makes them difficult to change. Neverthe-
less, interventions can use a mix of strategies aimed at
reducing threats that trigger these motivated processes,
appealing to shared values to be egalitarian, and extol-
ling the benefits that diversity and inclusion bring. In
the end, changing norms might be most influential in
changing people’s internal motivation to interrogate
and counteract their BIASes.
Antibias training can elicit resentment and reactance
by those who are not internally motivated to care about
diversity and inclusion efforts (Legault etal., 2011). An
example of this resentment was on full display when
former President Trump banned antibias training for
government agencies, declaring it un-American and
paradoxically fueling the existence of bias in America.
Likewise, recent objections to and prohibitions of teach-
ing critical race theory in the United States have also
revealed strong resentment to the idea that systemic
bias is real and that discussions of it are both unhealthy
and un-American. Although mandatory training pro-
grams can be effective in changing attitudes and some-
times behavior (Bezrukova etal., 2016), people have
more negative reactions to such programs. Affirmation
strategies that encourage people to first reflect on their
deeply held values (Steele, 1988) may help mitigate
reactance. When people reflect on their core values,
they are more open to finding common ground with
others, process information in a less biased way, and
show a reduction in intergroup prejudice (Badea &
Sherman, 2019; Sherman etal., 2017).
Second, concerns for moral fairness predict how one
responds to observed bias expression (Goodwin etal.,
2020). Thus, tying broadly shared moral concerns, such
as fairness, to more focused issues of diversity and
inclusion could enhance people’s motivation to support
such initiatives. Promoting a social-justice case for
diversity efforts (as opposed to a business case) reduces
social-identity threat and improves interview perfor-
mance for women and minorities in business settings
(Georgeac etal., 2018). Future work is needed to exam-
ine whether a social-justice case for diversity also
increases organizational buy-in.
Another way to increase motivation is to sell the ben-
efits of achieving diversity and inclusion rather than the
costs of avoiding bias. Diversity can boost creativity, inno-
vation, and more accurate decision-making (Galinsky
etal., 2015; Sommers, 2006). Encouraging a growth mind-
set to improve diversity and value multiculturalism can
increase one’s intrinsic motivation (Murphy etal., 2011)
and reduce intergroup biases (Plaut etal., 2018; Richeson
& Nussbaum, 2004). People who are intrinsically moti-
vated tend to enter intergroup situations with a goal to
learn rather than to avoid seeming biased (Plant etal.,
2010). Emphasizing the value of multiculturalism along-
side merit is especially effective for instilling a sense of
inclusion, trust, and acceptance for both minority and
majority groups (Gündemir etal., 2017). Finally, boosting
feelings of acceptance plays a causal role in increasing
people’s internal motivation to be egalitarian (Kunstman
etal., 2013).
The advantage of interventions that successfully
change motivation is to truly move people away from
intentional biases (either hostile or apathetic). But with-
out increasing their awareness of when BIASes might be
activated or giving them the skills and ability to down-
regulate these automatic reactions, they might still express
bias. The largest disadvantage in trying to change motiva-
tion is that it is quite challenging to counteract people’s
motivated reasoning, tap into shared values, and per-
suade both advantaged and disadvantaged groups that
diversity and inclusion can bring benefits for everyone.
Changing the culture: scaffolding bias
control with changes to policies and norms
Interventions designed to retrain implicit associations,
increase awareness, impart regulatory skills, and spark
motivation help individuals control their own BIASes.
However, individual training programs should be imple-
mented within a broader strategy of cultural change
(Carter etal., 2020). Organizations can scaffold affor-
dances at three levels where biases can manifest: the
individual level, where one’s own BIASes affect judgment
and decision-making; the interpersonal level, wherein
people can subtly or explicitly coregulate each other’s
actions; and the institutional level, when one combats
more systemic forms of bias built into programs and poli-
cies (Schmader etal., 2020). Thus, we next consider inter-
ventions aimed at interpersonal and institutional change.
Building bridges: harnessing the power of inter-
personal relationships. People’s interpersonal rela-
tionships in organizations are critical to their feelings of
fit and inclusion (Hall etal., 2019; Schmader & Sedikides,
2018). Thus, antibias training will be more effective if it
1396 Schmader et al.
changes how people interact with one another. For exam-
ple, training can focus on the most effective ways to con-
front stereotyping and prejudice (Ashburn-Nardo et al.,
2008). Confrontation is effective in reducing biased behav-
ior, although the people confronted initially feel resentful
(Czopp etal., 2006).
Confrontation is a form of allyship that is reactive to
the presence of some inciting act. But given that mar-
ginalized groups often feel a lack of fit and belonging
in organizations that have been designed for and by
members of the majority (Schmader & Sedikides, 2018),
allyship efforts should also be proactive. Training peo-
ple to take proactive action entails motivating changes
in behavior, policies, or practices aimed at increasing
a sense of inclusion and respect for those at risk of
feeling marginalized (De Souza & Schmader, 2022).
Among women in STEM, conversations with male (but
not with female) colleagues that signal acceptance pre-
dict women’s feelings of inclusion (Hall etal., 2019).
Thus, interventions can train members of the advan-
taged group to engage in active efforts to foster greater
inclusion by both reacting to bias when it occurs and
proactively signaling respect to those who might feel
marginalized.
Ideally, such interventions are successful in changing
norms in social networks. In one unique experiment,
Paluck (2011) partnered with the Anti-Defamation
League to provide antibias peer training to select stu-
dents in some schools but not others. Students in both
schools were later asked to nominate their peers most
likely to confront prejudice and were invited to publicly
support marriage equality. Results revealed the spread
of antibias norms throughout the student networks.
Students in the treatment schools recognized that the
peer trainers were more likely to confront prejudice,
and friends and acquaintances of these peer trainers
were more likely to sign a marriage-equality petition.
These promising findings suggest that the peer trainers
put their training into practice, modeling a norm that
spread to other students in their network.
In sum, efforts to change the hearts and minds of
individuals are strengthened by distributing efforts for
awareness, regulation, or motivation throughout a net-
work. Other people can cue us to regulate our bias and
even inspire in us the intrinsic motivation to proactively
promote inclusion. These effects can be explicit (e.g.,
when someone is confronted with their biased behav-
ior) but can also operate more heuristically by harness-
ing the power of social norms to change behavior
outside of direct awareness or intention.
Setting the course: communicating norms and val-
ues through leadership. Finally, institutions create the
scaffolding to help people and their networks counteract
their own and each other’s BIASes. Although short-term
intervention efforts are unlikely to change or reverse
people’s implicit associations or intentional biases, orga-
nizational leadership can help foster a sufficiently broad
shift in cultural mindsets. Because BIASes not only exist
in the minds of individuals but are also distributed across
social networks, fostering an environment that reduces
their activation and increases regulatory control is a pow-
erful way to curtail the expression of bias. Indeed, a criti-
cal mass of actively egalitarian perceivers can motivate
each other to be vigilant to and downregulate the expres-
sion of bias. How can organizations spark these efforts?
First, organizational messages can signal a shared
value for diversity and inclusion. Prodiversity sentiments
cue feelings of identity safety and attract more diverse
applicants (Chaney etal., 2016; Purdie-Vaughns etal.,
2008). The caveat is that mission statements cannot
replace accountability. People assume that discrimination
is less likely to occur in organizations with salient diver-
sity statements or awards (Kaiser etal., 2013), although
minority candidates still face discrimination from osten-
sibly prodiversity employers (Kang etal., 2016). Thus,
prodiversity messaging from leadership needs to be
paired with policies and practices that hold people
accountable for biased actions, implicit or intentional.
Second, inclusive policies and practices may play a
role in fostering inclusive interpersonal norms. In a study
of professional engineers (Hall etal., 2018), women
working for companies with more gender-inclusive poli-
cies and practices reported having more supportive inter-
actions with their male colleagues, which then predicted
lower levels of social-identity threat and workplace
burnout. Independent of the policies themselves, others’
perceived support of these policies further predicted
women’s (but not men’s) organizational commitment
(Hall etal., 2021). Thus, as long as there is broad support
for having these policies in place, inclusive policies
might shape inclusive social norms.
This prior point suggests that organizations should
assess, track, and communicate changes in the culture
of an organization over time. People tend to underes-
timate how much the advantaged majority supports
inclusion initiatives (De Souza & Schmader, 2022), thus
communicating that these beliefs can correct this plu-
ralistic ignorance. In fact, changing people’s percep-
tions of the normative support for diversity and
inclusion increases marginalized students’ experience
of peer respect, sense of belonging, and an inclusive
climate, as well as then benefiting their health and
academic performance (Murrar et al., 2020). These
effects of communicating normative beliefs (imple-
mented easily via shared videos) were significantly
more beneficial than providing educational information
about bias.
Perspectives on Psychological Science 17(5) 1397
The greatest benefit to changing norms is that it does
not require buy-in from everyone in an organization.
Social groups tend to rapidly adopt a new or minority
behavior once uptake exceeds 25% (Centola etal.,
2018). This suggests that organizations can focus on
getting norm adoption over this critical threshold. Thus,
even if interventions are initially effective only with
those who are highly motivated, many bystanders will
eventually sign on and help to regulate if not reform
those with more entrenched and intentional biases.
The clear advantage to changing broader cultural
norms is to create long-term cultural shifts. Even if
norms lead some people to initially change behavior
as a result of external accountability efforts, these pat-
terns of behavioral change might become internalized
over time as intrinsically motivated actions that are
consistent with core values. The challenge is that dura-
ble change at this scale can require strategic planning
and a commitment of resources to track metrics over
time and adjust one’s approach as needed.
Conclusion
There is a high demand for theoretically derived and
evidence-based interventions aimed at fostering equity,
diversity, and inclusion. Those developing and facilitat-
ing antibias trainings face an essential challenge in truly
increasing people’s awareness, changing negative atti-
tudes and stereotypes, and fostering antibias and inclu-
sive behavior. This challenge is exacerbated by confusion
(even among scientists) over what exactly implicit bias
is. We take the position that biased intergroup outcomes
unfold as a process by which BIASes—in the minds of
individuals as well as distributed across their social net-
works—lead to discriminatory behavior toward others.
BIASes can be cued automatically or acted on intention-
ally, but they can also be downregulated or set aside if
one has the awareness, motivation, and ability to do so.
These mental processes of the individual are supported
by the social norms in the context. Although individuals
can vary in the BIASes they hold, situations play a key
role in cuing or counteracting people’s behavior.
Drawing on insights from 3 decades of social-
psychological research, we have provided a typology
of bias that identifies different pathways by which social
biases unfold. People exhibit intentional biases when
they are aware of their stereotypes and prejudices but
either have little motivation to control them (apathetic
bias) or are motivated to express them (hostile bias).
People exhibit implicit biases when, despite any moti-
vations to be egalitarian, they are either unaware of the
need to counteract their own prejudices or stereotypes
(unconscious bias) or engage in ineffective strategies
to regulate them (unintentional bias). Interventions
aimed at educating people about the nature of bias are
unlikely to make them authentically unbiased but can
have the more modest goal of helping people success-
fully regulate their biased behavior. Complicating efforts
to reduce bias through self-regulation is that surround-
ing social norms can support, justify, and dynamically
regulate the mental processes of individuals. Indeed,
understanding how this occurs is a key insight missing
in many intervention efforts.
Our typology can be used to effectively target inter-
ventions at the problem pathway for a given context.
Organizations need to first identify the prominent types
of bias occurring in that setting and choose interven-
tions aimed at changing social norms, fostering inclusive
interactions, increasing personal motivation for antibias
efforts, increasing awareness of when biases are
expressed, and/or training people to counteract their
own or others’ biases. Training aimed at one process
(successful regulation) will be ineffective if the problem
lies in another pathway (a lack of motivation; broader
norms against equity, diversity, and inclusion efforts).
Our closing note is that, in implementing any inter-
ventions, it is crucial to consider that those who experi-
ence bias face the predicament of attributional ambiguity,
often making it impossible to discern whether a given
outcome results from one pathway or another. Broader
cultural norms for inclusion are likely to inform targeted
group members’ attributions for—and resilience to—
encounters with biased behavior, which has implications
for their health and well-being. The most effective inter-
ventions create partnerships across identity lines, when
a critical mass of people within an organization or com-
munity work together toward the shared goal of creating
an inclusive culture that reduces the harm that bias can
cause and fosters well-being for all.
Transparency
Action Editor: Laura A. King
Editor: Laura A. King
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of
interest with respect to the authorship or the publication
of this article.
Funding
This work was partially supported by Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council Grant 895-2017-1025 (to
T. Schmader and A. S. Baron).
ORCID iDs
Toni Schmader https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4815-7483
Tara C. Dennehy https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3124-1419
Andrew S. Baron https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4202-8250
1398 Schmader et al.
Acknowledgments
We thank Yingchi Guo for her help proofing the manuscript
and Rebekah Parker for her help creating Figure 1.
Note
1. Less-than-blatant bias expressions are sometimes labeled
“micro aggressions,” originally defined as “brief, everyday
ex changes that send denigrating messages to people of color
because they belong to a racial minority group” (Sue et al.,
2007, p. 273). We agree that such everyday bias is harmful to
targets, but we also agree that the microaggression construct is
“excessively fuzzy,” making it difficult to examine scientifically
(Lilienfeld, 2017). For example, the lack of clarity over whether
intentionality is a defining feature of all or some forms of micro-
aggressions makes it difficult for us to place the term within the
typology we have outlined.
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