Available via license: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
Content may be subject to copyright.
TITLE PAGE
Title:
Neurofeminism: feminist critiques of research on sex/gender differences in the neurosciences
Authors:
Kassandra Friedrichs1, Philipp Kellmeyer2*
1 – University College Freiburg, Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg, Bertoldstr. 17, DE-
79098 Freiburg i. Br. (Germany)
2 – Human-Technology Interaction Lab, University Medical Center Freiburg, Department of
Neurosurgery, Breisacher Str. 64, DE-79106 Freiburg i. Br.
Phone: +49 761 203 97446
ORCID: 0000-0001-5538-373X (Philipp Kellmeyer)
* corresponding author
Acknowledgments and funding:
The work of author P.K. was partially supported by a grant (00.001.2019) of the Klaus Tschira
Foundation, Germany.
Running title
Sex/gender difference brain research
Keywords: neuroscience; neuroimaging; brain imaging; sex and gender differences
Word count: 7481 (excl. title, abstract, references), 9870 (incl. title, abstract, references)
Figure count: 0
2
Abstract
Over the last three decades, the human brain, and its role in determining behavior have been
receiving a growing amount of attention in academia as well as in society more generally.
Neuroscientific explanations of human behavior or other phenomena are often especially
appealing to lay people. Therefore, neuroscientific explanations that can affect individuals,
groups, or social relations in general should be formulated in a careful and responsible way.
One field in which especially feminist scholars request more caution is the neuroscientific
examination of sex/gender differences. Feminist scholars have described various ways in which
sexist bias might be present in neuroscientific research on sex/gender differences. In this
context, they coined the term ‘neurosexism’ to describe the entanglement between
neuroscientific work and sexist ideology, and ‘neurofeminism’ as a response to that. Here, we
aim to give an overview over the contemporary neurofeminist literature. In the first part,
common levels of analysis in the neurofeminist literature are presented and the research level
is explored in more detail. In the second part, some common developments in more recent
neurofeminist scholarship are discussed. For this, we review recent publications with the aim
to provide neuroscientists with a solid understanding of neurofeminist criticism so that they
may evaluate neuroscientific claims about on sex/gender differences from this critical
perspective.
3
Introduction
In 1990, the sitting U.S. president George H. W. Bush signed a proclamation that declared the
following decade as the “Decade of the Brain” (Roy, 2016a). The goal of this proclamation was
to stress the importance of brain research and to foster collaborations between federal agencies
and private companies for joint brain research programs. In this context, the first “Human Brain
Project” (“The Human Brain Project,” 2021), a multi-center research program to promote the
development of progressive software for innovative brain research, was launched. It was
followed up by other largescale brain research projects, such as the U.S. “BRAIN Initiative”
(“Brain Initiative,” 2021), the EU-based “Human Brain Project” (“The Human Brain Project,”
2021) and the Swiss “Blue Brain Project” (“Blue Brain,” 2021). According to Schmitz &
Höppner (2014a), these programs appear to promise to eventually provide an “all-explaining
knowledge framework with which to explain ‘the human’” (p. 6).
This exciting promise from brain research has captivated many researchers in the
neurosciences and computer sciences and led to a surge in the popularization of neuroscience
research in the media and in society more generally. As a result, neuroscience-based
explanations of human behavior and mental characteristics enjoy a special epistemic authority
(Weisberg et al., 2008; Fine, 2012). This means that lay people find explanations about
psychological phenomena more convincing when they contain neuroscientific information,
even if that information is not logically relevant to explaining the appropriate phenomena. This
is illustrated by the abundance of references to neuroscientific findings or applications thereof
in newspapers and the great amount of popular neuroscience literature (Weisberg et al., 2008).
Weisberg et al. (2008) describe this public interest in neuroscientific facts and explanations and
the tendency to view explanations as more satisfying when they contain neuroscientific
information as the “seductive allure” (p. 470) of neurosciences. The authors highlight that this
phenomenon entails a certain responsibility and caution when using neuroscientific facts to
support a claim, as these might influence the opinion of people more than what would be desired
or reasonable.
This seductive allure of theories based on neuroscientific findings can differ for the type
of phenomenon to be explained. Especially (pseudo-)neuroscientific theories that aim to explain
purported behavioral and mental differences between women and men receive increased
attention. Countless popular neuroscience books on this topic have been published. Even though
some of these books have been criticized for being stereotype-laden and using the
4
neuroscientific literature in a careless, misleading, or even clearly incorrect manner, these lay
books enjoy quite an extensive popularity (Fine, 2008).1
This fascination with SGDs in popular neuroscience books is not arbitrary. While
numerous neuroscientists nowadays actively distance themselves from the bold claims of these
books and their often-inadequate use of neuroscientific findings, the neurosciences themselves
have a long tradition of trying to demonstrate how the brains of women and men are different
and that these differences are predominantly in accordance with common sex/gender
stereotypes. For example, during the latter half of the 19th century, neuroscientists vigorously
tried to demonstrate that the brains of women were smaller than those of men, and that, as a
result, women were less intelligent than men (Kaiser et al., 2009; Bluhm, 2012). This practice
of using neuroscientific research and its results to promote sexist ideas has been termed
“neurosexism” (Fine, 2008; see also Bluhm, 2012; Fine, 2013; Hoffman & Bluhm, 2016). Or
as Fine (2008) phrases it, neurosexism can be defined as “the ugly rush to cloak old-fashioned
sexism in the respectable and authoritative language of neuroscience” (p. 69). Feminist scholars
from various disciplines have carefully examined possible sexist tendencies in the
neurosciences, from their predecessors like phrenology, to modern-day neuroscientific
research. They have argued that even contemporary neuroscience research is influenced by and
reproduces sexist biases in various ways. The work aimed at critically analyzing and responding
to this entanglement between sexist ideology and neuroscience can be subsumed under the term
neurofeminism, a phrase which Bluhm et al. (2012) first popularized. Due to the seductive allure
of neuroscientific ‘facts’, neurofeminist work is of great importance to limit the dissemination
and uncritical acceptance of neurosexist claims.
During the late 1970s, scholars began to critically examine the foundations of modern
science from a feminist perspective (Leavitt & Gordon, 1988; Rosser, 1989; Harding, 1991;
Roy, 2016b). Drawing on approaches that were established in the social sciences, humanities,
and the women’s movement, these scholars developed a discipline now referred to as feminist
science studies. The central effort of feminist science studies scholars has been to “carefully
explore the myriad ways in which sexist biases [affect] the nature and practice of science”
(Tuana, 1989). According to Bluhm et al. (2012), feminist neuroscientists were among the first
to analyze their own field’s theories and practices of knowledge production through a feminist
1 For example, Louann Brizendine’s book The Female Brain (Brizendine, 2007) is a “New York Times Bestseller”,
has been translated into 21 languages and newspapers, magazines and TV shows around the world discussed it.
This can be seen as evidence for a widespread desire to be able to explain observed or purported sex/gender
differences (SGDs) in behavior, performance of certain tasks, and mental states (Fine, 2008).
5
lens. Ruth Bleier was one of these revolutionary scholars and contributed significantly to a
critical examination of the foundations of modern biology and neuroscience. According to her,
“the most publicized arena for demonstrating women's inferiority” (Leavitt & Gordon, 1988)
during the 1980s was her own area of research, the neurosciences. As a result, Bleier and other
feminist scholars examined how the neurosciences and its preceding and associated disciplines
have been instrumentalized to demonstrate that women are inferior to men.
Today, neuroscientific research on SGDs mainly employs functional neuroimaging
techniques to measure brain function and not just structure. The main techniques used are
positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).1
This paper aims to provide an overview over neurofeminist scholarship produced over
the last two decades.
Methodological approach
In the following, we aim to provide an overview of contemporary neurofeminist
critiques of the research on SGDs in the neurosciences, specifically using functional
neuroimaging techniques. Firstly, we aim at illustrating common levels of criticism and
outlining the neurofeminist argumentations on one of these levels, with its three sublevels, in
more detail. Secondly, we intend to show how this criticism has developed over the last two
decades. For our analysis of neurofeminist critiques in these two parts, we chose to focus on
publications from the NeuroGenderings Network. This is motivated by the fact that
neurofeminist voices appear in several disciplines and contexts, and therefore, it is difficult to
fully map the literature. For instance, the papers by Joel et al. (2015) and Alon et al. (2020)
which we will later identify as important contributions to feminist neuroscience, do not include
any mention of neurofeminism or even ‘feminist critique’ in their texts. As a result, an online
search with the keywords ‘neurofeminism’ or ‘feminist criticism’ would be unable to detect
these articles, despite the authors being members of the NeuroGenderings Network and their
works are used to further neurofeminist goals. As the NeuroGenderings Network can be seen
as an important agent in the realm of neurofeminist critique due to its structuring, systemizing
1 One prominent actor in neurofeminist discussions and approaches today is the NeuroGenderings
Network. It was formed at a conference titled ‘NeuroGenderings: Critical Studies of the Sexed Brain’ at Uppsala
University in March 2010 (“The NeuroGenderings Network,” n.d.).
6
and creative role, we chose the work of the network as the focus. We additionally confined the
analysis to work that is directly or indirectly relevant to the research on SGDs in the
neurosciences, especially concerning studies using neuroimaging techniques, as this kind of
research has become increasingly popular and influential during the last two decades (Kaiser et
al., 2009).
For the first part of our analysis, the identification of common levels of neurofeminist
criticism, we mainly focus on the two anthologies published by the network: ‘Neurofeminism:
Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science’, published in 2012, and
‘Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses’,
published 2014. Apart from the articles in the anthologies, we also incorporated frequently
referenced articles into our analysis. Initially, to provide a general overview over the different
levels, we focus on a review by Schmitz & Höppner (2014a). The review is a modified version
of their introduction to the latter anthology (Schmitz & Höppner, 2014b) and nicely outlines the
different themes, directions, questions, problems, and goals that underly the work of the
NeuroGenderings Network and its members. After having established an overview over the
general levels of neurofeminist work, we identify three levels that are especially common in
neurofeminist discourses. These levels are: 1) conceptual criticism, 2) methodological criticism,
and 3) criticism about theory building. We outline the most dominant neurofeminist
argumentations for each of these levels.
In the second part of the paper, we provide an analysis of how the neurofeminist critique
has changed during the last years by reviewing articles of members of the NeuroGenderings
Network published after the review by Schmitz & Höppner (2014a). We chose the publication
of the review as a ‘cutoff-point’ because the review is, to our knowledge, the first systematic
overview of neurofeminist work conducted by the NeuroGenderings Network. Therefore,
reviewing and analyzing the literature published after the review is an attempt to update and
expand on the review. We identified the articles included in our analysis from the website of
the NeuroGenderings Network (“Publications,” 2014) and screened them for relevance to our
paper. More specifically, we only included papers that demonstrate some relevance to
neuroscientific research on SGDs. Furthermore, we especially focused on those publications
that seemed to relate to the three levels that we analyzed in detail in the first part of our paper.
7
Results
A multilevel approach to classifying neurofeminism scholarship
For classifying different levels of criticism in neurosexism and neurofeminism research, we
follow a multilevel approach similar to the one proposed by Schmitz & Höppner (2014a).
Firstly, according to Schmitz & Höppner (2014a), neurofeminist scholars reflect how
assumptions and norms about gender and intersected categories enter contemporary brain
research (research level). This can occur on several sublevels: A) on the conceptual level, where
feminist scholars critically examine the definitions of sex/gender used. B) on the
methodological level, where they highlight the inconsistencies of findings and methodological
issues. And c), on the level of theory building, where neurofeminists critically assess underlying
ideologies, such as biological determinism. Secondly, scholars also discuss the impact this
research has on the gendered social order and gendered culture (sociocultural level). In the
discussion of the impacts of neuroscientific research on society, particular attention is devoted
to the role of popular science publications and media. For example, feminist scholars analyze
how scientific findings are referenced in popular media to legitimize social hierarchies. Another
part of neurofeminist work is the development of approaches for a “more gender adequate
neuroscientific research” (Schmitz & Höppner, 2014a). Schmitz & Höppner (2014a) refer to
this kind of work as “feminist neurosciences” (p. 2). Lastly, neurofeminist scholars also
consider the uses and misuses of their own discussions and concepts (sociopolitical level). For
instance, while the plasticity paradigm is regarded as a highly valuable concept for overcoming
neurodeterminism by some feminist scholars, others point to its possible problematic
consequences, such as using it for neuro-enhancement in a neoliberal fashion (Schmitz &
Höppner, 2014a).
The work on these levels is of course often closely related and intersects. For instance,
feminist scholars have observed how certain methodological features are due to a belief in a
strong sex/gender essentialism (research level) and how these methodologies then further
reinforce the belief in sex/gender essentialism in the public (sociocultural level). As a
consequence, feminist scholars call for a change of these methodological practices (in the sense
of ‘feminist neuroscience’).
In the following, given constraints of scope and space, we mostly address the research
level of neurofeminist work and its three sublevels (conceptual, methodological, theory-
building).
8
Research Level I: Conceptual criticism
Feminist scholars of the NeuroGenderings Network have argued that stereotypical
preconceptions about sex/gender can influence research already at the level of study design,
especially with the choice of categories to be compared. Feminist scholars criticize that the
operationalization of the variable ‘sex/gender’ and interpretations about it are characterized by
a strong commitment to sex dimorphism in most research on SGDs (Dussauge & Kaiser, 2012;
Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012; Meynell, 2012; Fine, 2013; Fine et al., 2013; Joel, 2014;
Kaiser, 2014). Sex dimorphism describes the idea that sex/gender presents itself in two distinct
forms, without overlap between those forms. Feminist scholars argue that a general sex
dimorphism applies neither to human behavior, nor to brain structure and function – even
though SGDs in behavior and brain structure/function are found in neuroscientific studies.
Furthermore, these scholars point out the consequences that an underlying commitment to sex
dimorphism can have on the results and interpretations of research on SGDs.
According to Joel (2014), a sex dimorphic view of the brain and behavior follows from the
incorrect assumption that the characteristics that underlie 3G-sex, which defines sex in terms of
a person’s genetic, gonadal, and genital make-up, also hold true for other domains. The majority
of people fall into one of two categories in each aspect of 3G-sex. Additionally, this system of
categorization exhibits a high degree of “internal consistency” (Joel, 2014), meaning that a
person qualifying as ‘female’ in one aspect of 3G-sex likely also exhibits the female form of
another feature of 3G-sex. Therefore, 3G-sex can be viewed as highly dimorphic. These
characteristics of 3G-sex are, however, not applicable to gendered behavior and the brain, as
several authors argue (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012; Joel, 2014). These authors point out that
SGDs in brain activation patterns can only be found at the population level, are rather distributed
along a continuum, and show a considerable amount of overlap. Accordingly, when comparing
the brain activation patterns of several women and men during a task X, women might display
a significantly different activation in a certain brain area Y. However, this does not mean that
all women would exhibit a similar ‘female’ activation in brain area Y during task X, but rather,
many women might actually show a ‘male’ or an intermediate activation pattern (Joel, 2014).
Additionally, Joel (2014) discusses evidence from animal research against the idea that SGDs
in the brain are highly internally consistent. Accordingly, neurofeminists argue that claims
presenting SGDs in brain activation in a sexually dimorphic way, such as assertions about
‘female’ and ‘male’ brains found in popular science books and the media, are misleading. In
addition, these claims perpetuate sociocultural preconceptions that then help to normalize and
9
justify further neuroscience research on sex/gender dimorphism (Jordan-Young & Rumiati,
2012; Meynell, 2012; Joel, 2014).
Despite the evidence against brains being sexually dimorphic, feminist scholars have
outlined how a substantial amount of research on SGDs still presupposes this sex dimorphism
in brains and behavior (Dussauge & Kaiser, 2012; Meynell, 2012; Fine, 2013; Kaiser, 2014).
Some authors point to, for instance, certain methodological constraints as evidence for a strong
underlying conceptual assumption of sex dimorphism. Meynell (2012) argues that the only way
that small sample sizes could be justified in SGDs research (which is a common phenomenon,
see later discussion) is “if you are already committed to a strong sex dimorphism” (p.25).
Research Level II: Methodological criticism
Feminist scholars have argued that neuroimaging research on SGDs tends to have
various methodological shortcomings that result in sexist biases in research, e.g., by
emphasizing neurobiological differences rather than similarities (Bluhm, 2012; Dussauge &
Kaiser, 2012; Fine, 2012, 2013; Grossi & Fine, 2012; Hoffman, 2012; Jordan-Young &
Rumiati, 2012; Meynell, 2012; Roy, 2012). These sexist biases can become apparent in each
phase of experimentation, including data gathering, analysis and interpretation, and
presentation. According to Hoffman & Bluhm (Hoffman & Bluhm, 2016) some methodological
issues are so severe as to constitute a “violation of accepted scientific practice” (p. 721). Of
course, ‘bad science’ can affect any area of research. However, neurofeminists have argued that
some instances of neurosexism they describe are not just ‘bad science’, as the methodological
issues primarily seem to support one type of reasoning: the identification and interpretation of
SGDs in accordance with existing stereotypes (Fine, 2013). In the following, we summarize the
methodological issues most commonly outlined by feminist scholars on each level of research.
Research Level IIa: Criticism of research design, data collection and analysis practices
Concerning research design, one important aspect of neuroimaging study design that has
been highlighted in recent years is the consideration of statistical power. Scientific research on
differences between groups requires a large number of participants so that any random variation
within the population is “wash[ed] out” (Meynell, 2012). This reduces the chance of committing
a false-positive error, so finding a difference between the two groups where no difference
actually exists. Button et al. (2013) also refers to this issue as “power failure” (p. 365), which
is of substantial concern in cognitive neuroscience. According to Wallentin (2009),
10
neuroimaging studies are especially vulnerable to being underpowered because an adequate
number of participants is needed to balance out nuisance variables that affect the imaging signal.
Therefore, Thirion et al. (2007) recommend a sample size of at least 20 participants per group.
Yet, several scholars have shown that the number of participants in studies on SGDs is often
lower than that (Kaiser et al., 2009; Fine, 2010, 2013; Meynell, 2012; Rippon et al., 2014). For
example, an analysis by Fine (2013) of 39 fMRI studies on sex differences, published in 2009
and 2010, revealed that, for a sample of 22 studies that made only sex comparisons (the other
studies also had sex-by-group comparisons which require larger sample sizes), the mean number
of males was 13.5 and of females 13.8. Consequently, these studies are especially prone to being
underpowered and producing false-positive results.
Closely intertwined with the criticism on the assumption of sex dimorphism in
neuroscientific research at the conceptual level is the criticism on how sex/gender is registered
in studies involving human participants. Dussauge & Kaiser (2012) criticize the “monolithic
character” (p.139) of the sexes/genders studied, as sex/gender is usually assessed by the “simple
checking of the F or M box” (Kaiser, 2014).
Concerning data analysis, neurofeminist scholars have pointed out that findings about
SGDs can be influenced by the methods used to identify them (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Kaiser et
al., 2009; Bluhm, 2012; Dussauge & Kaiser, 2012; Fine, 2013). For example, Anne Fausto-
Sterling (2000) analyzed the extensive body of research on SGDs in the corpus callosum and
discovered that whether or not scientists found an SGD seemed to be affected by the methods
used. For instance, the way scientists measured the corpus callosum was inconsistent between
studies and produced different results. Furthermore, Kaiser et al. (2009) point out that the
employed threshold for statistical significance might determine whether an SGD in language
processing can be found. In one of their own studies, Kaiser et al. (2007) found that both men
and women exhibited a lateral activation of an area associated with language processing at a
threshold of p<0.05 (Bonferroni [Bonf.] corrected), while at p<0.01 (Bonf. uncorrected), men
showed a bilateral activation and women did not. As some researchers employ uncorrected p-
levels in their analysis of SGDs (Piefke et al., 2005; Clements et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007)
while others use corrected ones (Haller et al., 2005, 2007), Kaiser et al. (2009) stress the
importance of uniform conventions to avoid a possible skewing of results.
Besides criticizing inconsistencies in the use of methods, feminist scholars have also
argued that some neuroscientific researchers use certain methods in misleading ways or draw
impermissible conclusions from them. One instance of this is the critique of the use of and focus
11
on within-group analyses instead of between-group analyses (Bluhm, 2013a; Fine, 2013;
Rippon et al., 2014; Hoffman & Bluhm, 2016). Specifically, neurofeminists claim that some
researchers focus only on the results of within-group analyses in their discussion, despite
performing both kinds of analyses (Shirao et al., 2005; e.g. Hofer et al., 2006). Or that, in less
frequent cases, researchers do not even conduct or report on between-group analyses (e.g. Lee
et al., 2002). Within-group analyses compare the BOLD signal strength of a particular brain
area X during the task of interest with the BOLD signal strength of X during a control task for
men and women separately. The outcome of such a within-group analysis could, for example,
be that women show significantly higher activity in X during the task than during the control
condition while men do not. Neurofeminist scholars claim that some researchers conclude that
this demonstrates a neurofunctional SGD for this specific task. However, Bluhm (2013a) points
out: “Even if there is an average difference in activity between the groups, if there is also a lot
of variability within the groups […], the difference between the groups might not be statistically
significant.” (p. 323). As a result, neurofeminist scholars criticize the use of within-group
analyses to demonstrate differences between groups, such as SGDs.
Regarding the interpretation of data analyses, neurofeminist scholars state that there is a
tendency in neuroscientific research on SGDs to insufficiently formulate precise hypothesis
about the expected differences to be found before the experiment is run. This, as neurofeminists
argue, leaves room for the problematic practice of ‘HARKing’ (‘hypothesizing after results are
known’) which may facilitate the use of stereotypes (Bluhm, 2012, 2013a; Fine et al., 2013). In
an analysis of 39 fMRI studies on SGDs, Fine (2013) categorized almost half of them as being
either exploratory, so making no prior predictions, or as making only vague predictions. As Fine
(2013) criticizes, this practice of not formulating precise a priori hypotheses leave room for
“untested, stereotype-infused speculations about the functional significance of neurological
findings” (p. 380). This demonstrates the need to develop and test complex neuro-cognitive
models that account for the brain areas involved in a specific mental process and the connections
between these areas (Bluhm, 2013b, 2013a; Fine, 2013).
Research Level IIb: Presentation of data and results
A widespread critique by feminist scholars is that research results on SGDs tend to be
presented in an overconfident, exaggerated manner. To be specific, Kaiser et al. (2009) argue
that SGDs are emphasized and generalized. For example, they outline a study by Shaywitz et
al. (1995) that found an SGD in one aspect of language processing (phonological processing)
12
but no differences in the two other aspects measured. However, in the studies’ title, this finding
is presented “as evidence for the sex/gender related organization of the brain for language”
(Kaiser et al., 2009) in general. Fine (2013) agrees that “the confidence with which [findings
about differences] are presented by some experts seems premature” (p. 375). Additionally,
some feminist scholars have called attention to the citation practices in research on SGDs: For
instance, Fine (2013) analyzed 75 papers that cite the Shaywitz et al. (1995) study mentioned
above. Even though two meta-analyses have found that, overall, no reliable SGDs seem to exist
(Sommer et al., 2004, 2008), more than half of the examined papers did not cite any
counterevidence to the claim that there are SGDs in language processing, as voiced by Shaywitz
et al. (1995). From the remaining studies, only about a third cited Sommer et al. (2004, 2008)
in a fully informative way, meaning the authors mentioned that they are meta-analyses and
therefore resume an epistemic advantage over any single study (Fine, 2013). Neurofeminist
scholars voice the concern that these kinds of incorrect, partial, or selective citation practices
might further the impression that the SGDs described are empirically more supported than they
actually are (Kaiser et al., 2009; Fine, 2013).
However, the problem might already start before citation practices can skew the picture
of the evidence in a particular direction, as it is likely that fewer studies on sex/gender
similarities get published. This publication bias may be based on a general bias in science
publishing not to publish any null results, meaning studies reporting to have found no
differences between groups (Hoffman & Bluhm, 2016). Nevertheless, feminist scholars argue
that this bias is especially problematic for studies about SGDs as it accentuates the sexist biases
already present in research (Kaiser et al., 2009; Dussauge & Kaiser, 2012; Meynell, 2012; Fine,
2013).
Lastly, feminist scholars have criticized the pictorial presentations of neuroimaging
findings. Meynell (2012) claims that fMRI images often obscure how much groups overlap and
how much variance the data contain. Similarly, Kaiser et al. (2009) point out that “dissimilar
images quickly lead to the assumption of difference” (p. 54), even though there might not be a
difference, which can be the case for findings produced by within-group analyses. To many
people, these images appear as “the most natural, immediate, and intuitive method” (Fitsch,
2014) of producing knowledge about the brain. According to Fitsch (2014), this neuroimagery
causes an objectification and essentialization of knowledge about the brain and a “re-
implementation of gendered stereotypes in brain images” (p.
102).
13
Research Level III: Criticism on the level of theory building
Much criticism from feminist scholars has been directed towards the “’hardwiring’
paradigm” (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012). This paradigm describes the idea that sex-
differentiating prenatal hormones, especially testosterone, organize SGDs in brain structure and
function in a fixed and permanent way. Or, as Fine et al. (2013) put it, it is the idea “that there
is a unidirectional, causal pathway from genes to behavior via hormones and brains” (p. 550).
Accordingly, ‘hardwired’ means that researchers regard SGDs as either permanent, innate,
meaning genetically determined, or both (Hoffman, 2012). This paradigm is also known as the
“brain organization theory” (Fine et al., 2013), which was first proposed by Phoenix et al.
(1959) to account for rodent sexual differentiation and reproductive behavior and was later
extrapolated to humans (Grossi & Fine, 2012). According to Fine et al. (2013), the brain
organization theory has been the dominant doctrine in explaining sexual differentiation of the
brain. It has been the backdrop for many theories about SGDs in behavior, such as the influential
“Empathizing/Systemizing (E/S) hypothesis” (Grossi & Fine, 2012) by Simon Baron-Cohen
(2003).
Many feminist scholars argue that the hardwiring paradigm is unscientific as well as
socially, politically, and ethically problematic (Dussauge & Kaiser, 2012; Grossi & Fine, 2012;
Hoffman, 2012; Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012; Fine, 2013; Fine et al., 2013). The evidence
for the hardwiring paradigm has been criticized on many levels: Firstly, feminist scholars have
critically assessed the evidence from animal, as well as human studies that aim to support the
brain organization theory. Secondly, they have uncovered theoretical flaws in the hardwiring
paradigm, and thirdly, they draw attention to the plasticity of the brain and the influence of the
environment on it.
As mentioned above, the brain organization theory was developed in the context of
rodent research and then extrapolated to human sexual differentiation. Accordingly, research
findings on rats and other animals were used as support for the brain organization theory
applying to humans. For example, Baron-Cohen (2003) references studies on maze performance
in rats and toy preferences in monkeys as evidence for his E/S hypothesis. However, according
to Grossi & Fine (2012), many researchers have argued that it is unlikely that rodent and human
sexual differentiation are substantially similar and that it is therefore not possible to extrapolate
from rats to humans. Additional to animal studies, efforts have been made to prove the brain
organization theory in human studies. Since it is obviously unethical to expose human fetuses
to certain levels of a specific hormone to study its influence, research has focused on the
14
development of individuals that were naturally exposed to unusual levels of hormones
prenatally in cohort studies (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012). According to Fine et al. (2013),
these studies often found no support for any “causal links between high absolute levels of
testosterone and masculine characteristics” (p. 550). Similarly, Jordan-Young & Rumiati (2012)
argue that the data produced by these studies does not support the hardwiring paradigm. For
instance, no behavioral differences were found in women who were exposed to high levels of
the ‘masculinizing’ hormone diethylstilbestrol in utero.
Dussauge & Kaiser (2012) also argue that the innatism that underlies the hardwiring
paradigm cannot explain the “differentiation and changing character of gender […] in
individuals and populations” (p. 136). Moreover, the authors find innatist claims weak unless
scientists explicitly uncover the mechanism by which a certain, innate structure causes a specific
gendered behavior.
As an alternative paradigm to hardwiring neurofeminist scholars have emphasized the
importance of findings about neuronal plasticity. Neuronal plasticity describes the observation
that the brain’s architecture is malleable structurally and functionally (Hoffman, 2012; Fine,
2013; Fine et al., 2013). This plasticity on the neural and synaptic level is the neuronal basis for
learning and memory in the central nervous system (Schmitz & Höppner, 2014a). Therefore,
rather than being determined before birth and remaining fixed, the organization of the brain can
more accurately be described as a “continuous and dynamic process that persists throughout
one’s life” (Fine et al., 2013). Accordingly, the concept of plasticity is irreconcilable with the
idea that any SGDs are permanent, as well as completely innate since plasticity accounts for an
influence of the environment on the brain. As a result, several feminist scholars argue that any
SGDs in brain function might actually be due to the gendered environment in which the
examined individuals live or to an interplay between environment and genes, rather than solely
to prenatal hormones (Grossi & Fine, 2012; Hoffman, 2012; Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012;
Fine, 2013; Fine et al., 2013). The concept of plasticity is in accordance with and can account
for behavioral findings such as sex/gender-typed behaviors being “dramatically modified or
even reversed by simple and relatively short-term behavioral interventions such as neonatal
handling” (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012). Even abilities that were believed to show robust
SGDs, such as mental rotation ability, were demonstrated to be eliminated or even reversed
through training (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012). Despite the plasticity paradigm’s wide
acceptance in the neurosciences (Magee & Grienberger, 2020), many feminist authors argue
that the methodology and the way that findings are presented in research on SGDs are rather in
line with the hardwiring paradigm.
15
Apart from the scientific shortcomings of the hardwiring paradigm that feminist scholars
have pointed out, some of them have also voiced concerns about the ethical implications of
viewing SGDs in the brain as fixed and permanent. These scholars worry that research
performed along the lines of the hardwiring paradigm will negatively influence the public
perception of gender and gender stereotypes (Fine, 2012, 2013; Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012;
Fine et al., 2013).
Discussion
The emergence of ‘new neurofeminism’
As we chose the review by Schmitz & Höppner (2014b) as a starting point for our
analysis, we especially focus on the neurofeminist literature that was published after the review
to reveal more recent trends of the neurofeminist discourse. When outlining the results of our
analysis of the ‘newer’ neurofeminism, we mirror the structure we used when outlining the more
detailed criticism on the three levels of focus. However, we restrict our findings to the
conceptual and methodological level, as the discussions and developments on the level of theory
building are so diverse and far-reaching that they go beyond the scope of this paper.
Conceptual considerations: Sex/gender as a variable
At the conceptual level, a clear trend towards developing and refining arguments against
the idea that brains are sexually dimorphic can be noted. In this context, two concepts from
gender scholarship have received increased attention in newer neurofeminist discourses:
overlap and mosaicism. Multiple papers refer to these key principles to argue against sex/gender
dimorphism and essentialist notions of the relationship between sex/gender and the brain.
Additionally, scholars use these concepts as a starting point for developing frameworks on how
to include the variable sex/gender in neuroscientific research in a more sensitive, neurofeminist-
informed way.
Bluhm (2012) argues that sex/gender should be treated as a “complex, multilevel,
hierarchical structure” (p. 551) in research. The first concrete proposition to register sex/gender
in a more complex, multiparametric way comes from Kaiser (2014). She proposes seven
different sex/gender markers, social as well as biological ones, to segregate and register many
different aspects of what is “simplistically called ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ in experimental settings”
(Kaiser, 2014). Furthermore, Kaiser (2014) develops ideas on how to operationalize a
16
sexed/gendered variable in an experiment in a non-essentialized way, based on two exemplary
conditions. These ideas are, as the author herself points out, “only first thoughts” (p. 57) for
accounting for a more complex, unfixed, and changeable definition of sex/gender. In her paper,
she defines some next working steps for explicating the multiparametric registration of gender
further.
The concept of overlap, as already touched upon above, describes the idea that the
distribution of ‘male’ and ‘female’ brain phenotypes is highly overlapping. Most feminist
scholars now refer to this idea with the term “mosaicism” (e.g. Rippon et al., 2014), as they
believe the human brain to be a mosaic of “male-typical and female-typical features” (Fine,
Joel, et al., 2019, n.p.). According to Rippon et al. (2014), neuroscientists have recognized the
concept of brain mosaicism for decades. However, many feminist scholars find the application
of this concept to neuroscientific research on SGDs unsatisfying or lacking (Rippon et al., 2014;
Hoffman & Bluhm, 2016; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Bentley et al., 2019a; Bryant et al.,
2019; Hyde et al., 2019; Jordan-Young et al., 2019; Eliot et al., 2021). As a result, feminist
scholars have increasingly engaged with the phenomenon of mosaicism, and in this context
often also with the concept of overlap, so that these concepts arrive in the mainstream
neuroscience research on SGDs. Firstly, feminist neuroscientists conducted empirical research
to investigate whether the findings from animal studies actually apply to the human brains as
hypothesized and if so, how common mosaicism and overlap in the brain are (Joel et al., 2015;
Hyde et al., 2019; Alon et al., 2020; Eliot et al., 2021). Secondly, neurofeminists worked out
the implications these empirical findings have for future research on SGDs (Rippon et al., 2014,
2017; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Bentley et al., 2019b; Hyde et al., 2019; Alon et al., 2020).
As mentioned above, Joel (2014) backed up her initial arguments against the internal
consistency of brains with findings from animal studies only. In order to advance her claims,
Joel et al. (2015) conducted a study to evaluate the degree of internal consistency of structural
features in human brains, using MRI data of more than 1400 brains from four different data
sets. The data were retrieved from several different imaging techniques and the authors analyzed
them with various methods, ensuring that the outcomes were generalizable across imaging
techniques and methods of analysis. A similar study was conducted by Alon et al. (2020). The
authors analyzed 23,935 brain scans of females and males in different MRI-derived measures
to test the masculinization hypothesis. This theory assumes that “specific features in the brains
of males are masculinized away from a default female form” (Alon et al., 2020) by sex-related
factors, forming two distinct, sexually dimorphic population of brains. Furthermore, two
syntheses on the evidence for brain mosaicism exist (Hyde et al., 2019; Eliot et al., 2021).
17
Firstly, Hyde et al. (2019) synthesized research that challenges the sex/gender binary from five
different fields. Secondly, Eliot et al. (2021) summarized the evidence for SGDs in many areas
of brain research, namely structural and functional SGDs, differences in lateralization and
interhemispheric connectivity, and connectome differences.
The outcome of this empirical work underlines previous claims about overlap and
mosaicism of SGDs in the brain. Firstly, the research highlights that structural as well as
functional SGDs in the human brain are often statistically small and that there is a substantial
overlap (Rippon et al., 2014; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Alon et al., 2020; Eliot et al., 2021).
As a result, sex/gender is found to assume only a minor role in explaining the variability in
human brain structure and function (Alon et al., 2020; Eliot et al., 2021). Secondly, these studies
have provided substantial evidence against the idea that brain features are internally consistent
within individual human brains and therefore for the concept of brain mosaicism in human
brains (Joel et al., 2015; Hyde et al., 2019; Alon et al., 2020; Eliot et al., 2021).
According to Bryant et al. (2019), the mosaic model has “greater explanatory power for
understanding the relationship between sex/gender and brain organization” than a dichotomous
understanding of sex/gender (Rippon et al., 2014; see also Bentley et al., 2019a; Hyde et al.,
2019). This criticism of defining sex/gender in the traditional, dichotomous way has already
been present in the first wave of neurofeminist scholarship and was discussed above. As a result,
the more recent neurofeminist discussions have increasingly focused on the question of how to
move away from a dichotomous framework of comparing men and women, and how to
operationalize the variable sex/gender in neuroscientific research in a more informative way
(Rippon et al., 2014, 2017; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Bentley et al., 2019b; Bryant et al.,
2019; Gungor et al., 2019; Hyde et al., 2019; Shattuck-Heidorn & Richardson, 2019). In the
following, we summarize the most common considerations and recommendations proposed by
the ‘newer’ neurofeminism.
Recommendations for neuroscience research from neurofeminist scholarship
According to Bryant et al. (2019), there is no “solid alternative measurement to
comparing women and men” yet. Other neurofeminist authors seem to agree with this statement
as they call for further research on this matter (Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Bentley et al.,
2019b; Alon et al., 2020). For instance, Joel & Fausto-Sterling (2016) request more research on
the relationship between sex/gender and the brain and on the question of when to include the
sex/gender category as a variable and when not to. Until more information about these questions
exists, some authors outline situations in which the sex/gender category should be included. For
18
instance, Bentley et al. (2019b) suggest that using a binary sex/gender category might be useful
to conduct “bridge projects” and follow up on existing research. Furthermore, Joel & Fausto-
Sterling (2016) regard the sex/gender variable valuable for the study of brain pathologies that
show a different prevalence in males and females. At the same time, some authors advocate for
replacing the sex/gender category by social and psychological variables that might correlate
with sex/gender (Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Hyde et al., 2019) or supplementing it with these
variables (Rippon et al., 2017; Bentley et al., 2019b; Hyde et al., 2019). Additionally, some
authors suggest that demographic data about the test subjects should be collected to reflect the
“entangled complexity of their psychological, physical, and material experiences” (Rippon et
al., 2014; see also Bentley et al., 2019b). Furthermore, Bentley et al. (2019b) and Rippon et al.
(2014) recommend exploring the context in which sex/gender differences appear and disappear.
This practice would enable a deeper analysis of a purported relationship between sex/gender
and brain function, for example by being able to investigate whether this relationship is
mediated or moderated by (an)other variable(s) (Rippon et al., 2017).
Lastly, feminist scholars also discuss how gender can be registered in a neuroscientific
experiment. Some authors stress the multidimensionality of the variable, meaning that gender
is comprised of different levels, such as the levels of societal norms, structural forces, and
patterns, and sets of internal beliefs (Shattuck-Heidorn & Richardson, 2019; see also Bentley et
al., 2019a; Hyde et al., 2019). They propose a “multiparametric registration of sex/gender”
(Rippon et al., 2014), similar to the approach by Kaiser (2014) mentioned above. The authors
suggest that gendered personality dimensions, gender attitudes and self-attributed gender norms
should be assessed, for example through the use of questionnaires (Rippon et al., 2014; Bentley
et al., 2019b). Furthermore, Hyde et al. (2019) advocate for the conceptualization and
measurement of gender in nonbinary ways. To implement this, researchers could provide more
options (e.g., genderqueer), ask open-ended questions and use continuous measures (Hyde et
al., 2019).
As described above, early neurofeminism devoted great effort towards critically
assessing the underlying assumptions of neuroscientific SGD research and the ways in which
sexist biases can enter this research. While neurofeminists precisely outlined the different
methodological flaws that distorted the evidence for SGDs in the brain, they were reserved in
proposing other, better ways to capture the relationship between sex/gender and the brain. Of
course, one might deduce from the earlier criticism how or what not to do, and proposals for
better research designs and presentation of results were already beginning to emerge before
2014. However, the dedication to developing and applying feminist interventions rather than
19
just criticizing the status quo in the newer neurofeminist literature sets it apart from older
neurofeminism.
An important part of this endeavor is to develop, adapt and outline “feminist tools”
(Bryant et al., 2019, n.p.) that are supposed to ensure that SGD research is conducted in “the
most informative and useful way” (ibid.). One quite popular suggestion in newer neurofeminist
writings is the pre-registration of protocols (Rippon et al., 2014, 2017, 2021; Hoffman &
Bluhm, 2016; Bentley et al., 2019b). This practice requires that a research protocol, with all the
details of a planned study, such as which comparisons are going to be made and what the
hypotheses are, is submitted and peer-reviewed in advance. This way, reviewers can comment
on the research design before it is carried out and draw attention to possible methodological
flaws. Additionally, this practice addresses the problem of publication bias since researchers
must report the outcomes of all registered analyses. Also, the pre-registration of research
protocols restrains the practice of reverse inferences, i.e. hypothesizing after results are known
(‘HARKing’). However, the practice of pre-registration does not address all methodological
issues raised by feminist scholars, such as whether results are presented in an essentialist
framework (Bentley et al., 2019b). Accordingly, additional “feminist tools” (Bryant et al., 2019,
n.p.) are necessary.
Other common requests by feminist scholars are the inclusion of effect sizes (Rippon et
al., 2014, 2017; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Bryant et al., 2019) and other measures of
overlap, such as the “Index of Similarity” (Rippon et al., 2017; see also Bryant et al., 2019;
Rippon et al., 2021). In general, feminist scholars call for a greater focus on similarity. Some
authors, for instance, request an “institutionalization of sex/gender similarity” (Rippon et al.,
2014) in databases (see also Hoffman & Bluhm, 2016). Lastly, several different scholars have
proposed an array of different statistical analyses that go beyond standard parametric tests and,
for example, allow for the inclusion of several variables and the measurement of their
interrelationship (Rippon et al., 2014, 2017; Bentley et al., 2019b; Bryant et al., 2019; Hyde et
al., 2019).
As an outcome of these considerations on how to make the research on SGDs more
feminist, some authors have developed guidelines or templates for future research (Rippon et
al., 2014, 2017; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Bentley et al., 2019b; Bryant et al., 2019). For
instance, Bentley et al. (2019b) developed an “advisory framework” for the research on spatial
cognition. A further example is the set of guidelines developed by Rippon et al. (2014) to ensure
that neuroimaging research on SGDs has addressed key principles from sex/gender scholarship.
20
Bryant et al. (2019) went one step further and implemented many of their proposed feminist
methodological interventions in a case study.
Reaching out: The reception of neurofeminist works and neurofeminist engagement
A second theme that stand out in more recent neurofeminist scholarship is the increased
focus on disseminating neurofeminist scholarship on SGD research and engage in bidirectional
communication with the public and stakeholders in neuroscience. For example, some
neurofeminist articles have been translated into Spanish, making neurofeminist debates
accessible to a broader audience (Bovet et al., 2013; Kaiser, 2018; Fine, Jordan-Young, et al.,
2019). Furthermore, one overview by Fine, Joel et al. (2019) is an educational text on how to
interpret putative SGDs obtained by neuroscientific research, written explicitly for people with
no background in neurosciences. Neurofeminist scholars have also reached out to their
colleagues from the neurosciences to move the debate about a more critical, gender-sensitive
neuroscientific research on SGDs into ‘mainstream’ neuroscience discourses (Rippon et al.,
2017; Gungor et al., 2019).
Outlook for further research
From our perspective, it would be of great interest to further investigate how
neurofeminist critiques were received in the mainstream neurosciences in more detail. To this
regard, some of the following questions could be explored: Are the ‘mainstream’ neurosciences
aware of these critiques? If yes, do they respond to them or ignore them? If they answer, what
is the content of these answers? What are points of agreement and disagreement? As this paper
has only evaluated one side of the debate, it is important to also look at other perspectives. This
could help to interpret neuroscientific findings of SGDs in a more informed way, which would
be a vital next step for advancing neurofeminist scholarship and its dissemination in the
neurosciences.
21
Statement regarding potential conflicts of interest
The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.
Author contributions
Kassandra Friedrichs: literature research, first draft, editing
Philipp Kellmeyer: conceptualization, research design, co-writing, editing
Data accessibility
The paper provides a narrative review, no quantitative data were gathered for the study.
List of abbreviations
3G genetic, gonadal, genital
Bonf. Bonferroni
E/S hypothesis empathizing/systemizing hypothesis
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging
HARKing hypothesizing after results are known
SGD sex/gender differences
p. page
PET positron emission imaging
References
Alon, N., Meilijson, I., & Joel, D. (2020) Testing the masculinization hypothesis in a sample of
23,935 human brains (preprint). Neuroscience.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2003) The Essential Difference: Men, Women and the Extreme Male Brain.
Allen Lane, London.
Bentley, V., Kleinherenbrink, A., Rippon, G., Schellenberg, D., & Schmitz, S. (2019a)
Improving Practices for Investigating Spatial “Stuff”: Part I: Critical Gender
Perspectives on Current Research Practices. S&F Online,.
Bentley, V., Kleinherenbrink, A., Rippon, G., Schellenberg, D., & Schmitz, S. (2019b)
Improving Practices for Investigating Spatial “Stuff”: Part II: Considerations from
Critical NeuroGenderings Perspectives. S&F Online,.
22
Blue Brain [WWW Document] (2021) . URL https://www.epfl.ch/research/domains/bluebrain/
Bluhm, R. (2012) Beyond Neurosexism: Is It Possible to Defend the Female Brain? In Bluhm,
R., Jacobson, A.J., & Maibom, H.L. (eds), Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of
Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science, New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive
Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 230–245.
Bluhm, R. (2013a) New Research, Old Problems: Methodological and Ethical Issues in fMRI
Research Examining Sex/Gender Differences in Emotion Processing. Neuroethics, 6,
319–330.
Bluhm, R. (2013b) Self‐Fulfilling Prophecies: The Influence of Gender Stereotypes on
Functional Neuroimaging Research on Emotion. Hypatia, 28, 870–886.
Bluhm, R., Jacobson, A.J., & Maibom, H.L. (2012) Introduction. In Bluhm, R., Jacobson, A.J.,
& Maibom, H.L. (eds), Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory
and Cognitive Science, New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave
Macmillan, London, pp. 1–10.
Bovet, É., Kraus, C., Panese, F., Pidoux, V., & Stücklin, N. (2013) Neurociencias a la prueba
de la clínica y de las ciencias sociales. Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances, 7, I–
XV.
Brain Initiative [WWW Document] (2021) . URL https://braininitiative.nih.gov/
Brizendine, L. (2007) The Female Brain. Bantam Press, Great Britain.
Bryant, K., Grossi, G., & Kaiser, A. (2019) Feminist Interventions on the Sex/Gender Question
in Neuroimaging Research. S&F Online,.
Button, K.S., Ioannidis, J.P.A., Mokrysz, C., Nosek, B.A., Flint, J., Robinson, E.S.J., &
Munafò, M.R. (2013) Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability
of neuroscience. Nat Rev Neurosci, 14, 365–376.
Chen, C., Xue, G., Dong, Q., Jin, Z., Li, T., Xue, F., Zhao, L., & Guo, Y. (2007) Sex determines
the neurofunctional predictors of visual word learning. Neuropsychologia, 45, 741–747.
Clements, A.M., Rimrodt, S.L., Abel, J.R., Blankner, J.G., Mostofsky, S.H., Pekar, J.J.,
Denckla, M.B., & Cutting, L.E. (2006) Sex differences in cerebral laterality of language
and visuospatial processing. Brain and Language, 98, 150–158.
Dussauge, I. & Kaiser, A. (2012) Re-Queering the Brain. In Bluhm, R., Jacobson, A.J., &
Maibom, H.L. (eds), Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and
Cognitive Science, New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave
Macmillan, London, pp. 121–144.
Eliot, L., Ahmed, A., Khan, H., & Patel, J. (2021) Dump the “dimorphism”: Comprehensive
synthesis of human brain studies reveals few male-female differences beyond size.
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 125, 667–697.
Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000) Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality.
Basic Books.
Fine, C. (2008) Will Working Mothers’ Brains Explode? The Popular New Genre of
Neurosexism. Neuroethics, 1, 69–72.
Fine, C. (2010) From Scanner to Sound Bite: Issues in Interpreting and Reporting Sex
Differences in the Brain. Curr Dir Psychol Sci, 19, 280–283.
Fine, C. (2012) Explaining, or Sustaining, the Status Quo? The Potentially Self-Fulfilling
Effects of ‘Hardwired’ Accounts of Sex Differences. Neuroethics, 5, 285–294.
Fine, C. (2013) Is There Neurosexism in Functional Neuroimaging Investigations of Sex
Differences? Neuroethics, 6, 369–409.
Fine, C., Joel, D., & Rippon, G. (2019) Eight Things You Need to Know About Sex, Gender,
Brains, and Behavior: A Guide for Academics, Journalists, Parents, Gender Diversity
Advocates, Social Justice Warriors, Tweeters, Facebookers, and Everyone Else. S&F
Online,.
23
Fine, C., Jordan-Young, R., Kaiser, A., & Rippon, G. (2013) Plasticity, plasticity,
plasticity…and the rigid problem of sex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17, 550–551.
Fine, C., Jordan-Young, R., Kaiser, A., & Rippon, G. (2019) Plasticidad, plasticidad,
plasticidad… y la rigidez del problema del sexo. S&F Online,.
Fitsch, H. (2014) What goes around comes around: visual knowledge in fMRI and its
implications for research practice. In Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer
Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses. Zaglossus, Vienna, Austria, pp. 89–107.
Grossi, G. & Fine, C. (2012) The Role of Fetal Testosterone in the Development of the
“Essential Difference” Between the Sexes: Some Essential Issues. In Bluhm, R.,
Jacobson, A.J., & Maibom, H.L. (eds), Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of
Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science, New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive
Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 73–104.
Gungor, N.Z., Duchesne, A., & Bluhm, R. (2019) A Conversation around the Integration of Sex
and Gender When Modeling Aspects of Fear, Anxiety, and PTSD in Animals. S&F
Online,.
Haller, S., Klarhoefer, M., Schwarzbach, J., Radue, E.W., & Indefrey, P. (2007) Spatial and
temporal analysis of fMRI data on word and sentence reading. European Journal of
Neuroscience, 26, 2074–2084.
Haller, S., Radue, E.W., Erb, M., Grodd, W., & Kircher, T. (2005) Overt sentence production
in event-related fMRI. Neuropsychologia, 43, 807–814.
Harding, S. (1991) Feminism Confronts the Sciences. In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?,
Thinking from Women’s Lives. Cornell University Press, pp. 19–50.
Hofer, A., Christina, M.S., Ischebeck, A., Retenbacher, M.A., Verius, M., Felber, S., &
Fleischhacker, W.W. (2006) Gender differences in regional cerebral activity during the
perception of emotion. NeuroImage, 32, 854–862.
Hoffman, G. (2012) What, If Anything, Can Neuroscience Tell Us About Gender Differences?
In Bluhm, R., Jacobson, A.J., & Maibom, H.L. (eds), Neurofeminism: Issues at the
Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science, New Directions in Philosophy
and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 30–55.
Hoffman, G. & Bluhm, R. (2016) Neurosexism and Neurofeminism. Philosophy Compass, 11,
716–729.
Hyde, J.S., Bigler, R.S., Joel, D., Tate, C.C., & van Anders, S.M. (2019) The future of sex and
gender in psychology: Five challenges to the gender binary. Am Psychol, 74, 171–193.
Joel, D. (2014) Sex, Gender, and Brain: A Problem of Conceptualization. In Gendered
Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses, Volume
2. edn, Challenge GENDER: Contemporary Challenges Of_within Gender Theory.
Zaglossus e.U., Vienna, pp. 169–186.
Joel, D., Berman, Z., Tavor, I., Wexler, N., Gaber, O., Stein, Y., Shefi, N., Pool, J., Urchs, S.,
Margulies, D.S., Liem, F., Hänggi, J., Jäncke, L., & Assaf, Y. (2015) Sex beyond the
genitalia: The human brain mosaic. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 112, 15468–15473.
Joel, D. & Fausto-Sterling, A. (2016) Beyond sex differences: New approaches for thinking
about variation in brain structure and function. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 371.
Jordan-Young, R.M., Grossi, G., & Rippon, G. (2019) Introduction: Fifty Shades of Grey
Matter. S&F Online,.
Jordan-Young, R.M. & Rumiati, R.I. (2012) Hardwired for Sexism? Approaches to Sex/Gender
in Neuroscience. In Bluhm, R., Jacobson, A.J., & Maibom, H.L. (eds), Neurofeminism:
Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science, New Directions in
Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 105–120.
Kaiser, A. (2014) On the (Im)possibility of a Feminist and Queer Neuroexperiment. In Schmitz,
S. & Höppner, G. (eds), Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer Perspectives on
24
Current Brain Discourses, 2nd edn, Challenge GENDER: Contemporary Challenges
Of_within Gender Theory. Zaglossus e.U., Vienna, pp. 41–66.
Kaiser, A. (2018) Estudios de género y producción del género por las neurociencas. In Mora,
C., Kottow, A., Ceballos, M., & Osses, V. (eds), Investigación, Políticas y Programas
de Género. pp. 37–50.
Kaiser, A., Haller, S., Schmitz, S., & Nitsch, C. (2009) On sex/gender related similarities and
differences in fMRI language research. Brain Research Reviews, 61, 49–59.
Kaiser, A., Kuenzli, E., Zappatore, D., & Nitsch, C. (2007) On females’ lateral and males’
bilateral activation during language production: a fMRI study. Int J Psychophysiol, 63,
192–198.
Leavitt, J.W. & Gordon, L. (1988) A Decade of Feminist Critiques in the Natural Sciences: An
Address by Ruth Bleier. Signs, 14, 182–195.
Lee, T.M.C., Lieu, H.-L., Hoosain, R., Liao, W.-T., Wu, C.-T., Sluyen, K., Chan, C.C.H., Fox,
P.T., & Gao, J.-H. (2002) Gender differences in neural correlates of recognition of
happy and sad faces in humans assessed by functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Neuroscience Letters, 333, 13–16.
Magee, J.C. & Grienberger, C. (2020) Synaptic Plasticity Forms and Functions. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci., 43, 95–117.
Meynell, L. (2012) The Politics of Pictured Reality: Locating the Object from Nowhere in
fMRI. In Bluhm, R., Jacobson, A.J., & Maibom, H.L. (eds), Neurofeminism: Issues at
the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science, New Directions in
Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 11–29.
Phoenix, C.H., Goy, R.W., Gerall, A.A., & Young, W.C. (1959) Organizing action of prenatally
administered testosterone propionate on the tissues mediating mating behavior in the
female guinea pig. Endocrinology, 65, 369–382.
Piefke, M., Weiss, P.H., Markowitsch, H.J., & Fink, G.R. (2005) Gender differences in the
functional neuroanatomy of emotional episodic autobiographical memory. Hum Brain
Mapp, 24, 313–324.
Publications (2014) . NEUROGENDERINGS,.
Rippon, G., Eliot, L., Genon, S., & Joel, D. (2021) How hype and hyperbole distort the
neuroscience of sex differences. PLOS Biology, 19, e3001253.
Rippon, G., Jordan-Young, R., Kaiser, A., & Fine, C. (2014) Recommendations for sex/gender
neuroimaging research: Key principles and implications for research design, analysis,
and interpretation. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 8, 650.
Rippon, G., Jordan-Young, R., Kaiser, A., Joel, D., & Fine, C. (2017) Journal of neuroscience
research policy on addressing sex as a biological variable: Comments, clarifications,
and elaborations. Journal of Neuroscience Research, 95, 1357–1359.
Rosser, S.V. (1989) Feminist Scholarship in the Sciences: Where Are We Now and When Can
We Expect a Theoretical Breakthrough? In Feminism & Science, Race, Gender, and
Science. Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, pp. 3–14.
Roy, D. (2012) Neuroethics, Gender and the Response to Difference. Neuroethics, 5, 217–230.
Roy, D. (2016a) Neuroscience and Feminist Theory: A New Directions Essay. Signs: Journal
of Women and Culture in Society, 41, 531–552.
Roy, D. (2016b) Science Studies. In The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory. Oxford
University Press, New York, USA, pp. 832–851.
Schmitz, S. & Höppner, G. (2014a) Neurofeminism and feminist neurosciences: a critical
review of contemporary brain research. Front. Hum. Neurosci., 8.
Schmitz, S. & Höppner, G. (2014b) Catching the Brain Today: From Neurofeminism to
Gendered Neurocultures. In Schmitz, S. & Höppner, G. (eds), Gendered Neurocultures:
Feminist and Queer Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses, Volume 2. edn,
25
Challenge GENDER: Contemporary Challenges Of_within Gender Theory. Zaglossus
e.U., Vienna, pp. 9–37.
Shattuck-Heidorn, H. & Richardson, S.S. (2019) Sex/Gender and the Biosocial Turn. S&F
Online,.
Shaywitz, B.A., Shaywitz, S.E., Pugh, K.R., Constable, R.T., Skudlarski, P., Fulbright, R.K.,
Bronen, R.A., Fletcher, J.M., Shankweiler, D.P., Katz, L., & Gore, J.C. (1995) Sex
differences in the functional organization of the brain for language. Nature, 373, 607–
609.
Shirao, N., Okamoto, Y., Mantani, T., Okamoto, Y., & Yamawaki, S. (2005) Gender differences
in brain activity generated by unpleasant word stimuli concerning body image: an fMRI
study. Br J Psychiatry, 186, 48–53.
Sommer, I., Aleman, A., Bouma, A., & Kahn, R. (2004) Do women really have more bilateral
language representation than men? A meta-analysis of functional imaging studies.
Brain : a journal of neurology, 127, 1845–1852.
Sommer, I., Aleman, A., Somers, M., Boks, M.P., & Kahn, R.S. (2008) Sex differences in
handedness, asymmetry of the Planum Temporale and functional language
lateralization. Brain Research, 1206, 76–88.
The Human Brain Project [WWW Document] (2021) . Center for Interdisciplinary Brain
Sciences Research,. URL https://cibsr.stanford.edu/tools/human-brain-project.html
The NeuroGenderings Network (n.d.) . NEUROGENDERINGS,.
Thirion, B., Pinel, P., Mériaux, S., Roche, A., Dehaene, S., & Poline, J.-B. (2007) Analysis of
a large fMRI cohort: Statistical and methodological issues for group analyses.
NeuroImage, 35, 105–120.
Tuana, N. (1989) Preface. In Tuana, N. (ed), Feminism & Science, Race, Gender, and Science.
Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, pp. vii–xi.
Wallentin, M. (2009) Putative sex differences in verbal abilities and language cortex: A critical
review. Brain and Language, 108, 175–183.
Weisberg, D.S., Keil, F.C., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E., & Gray, J.R. (2008) The Seductive Allure
of Neuroscience Explanations. J Cogn Neurosci, 20, 470–477.
