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Crimea, Crimean Tatars and Russian Invasion of Ukraine

May 2022

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Filiz Tutku Aydin

Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi

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April 2022

ISSUE no. 2

To receive a free copy,

Grigory

Yavlinsky

Crimea: Eight

years later

Viola von

Cramon-Taubadel

Before Putin’s war

with bombs, there

was a war with

disinformation

Mykhailo

Gonchar

Oshore motive

for the occupation

of Ukraine’s

Crimea

special issue on

ukraine/crimea

Valentyn

Nalyvaichenko

The ght for the

future

The Pan-European Institute publishes the

Baltic Rim Economies (BRE) review which deals

with the development of the Baltic Sea region. In

the BRE review, public and corporate decision

makers, representatives of Academia, as well as

several other experts contribute to the discussion.

ISSN 1459-9759

Editor-in-Chief | Kari Liuhto

(responsible for writer invitations)

Technical Editor | Sonja Lavonen

University of Turku

Turku School of Economics

Pan-European Institute

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Tel. +358 29 450 5000

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Pan-European Institute

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

expert articles

Valentyn Nalyvaichenko 4

The ght for the future

Viola von Cramon-Taubadel 6

Before Putin’s war with bombs, there

was a war with disinformation

Grigory Yavlinsky 7

Crimea: Eight years later

Mykhailo Gonchar 8

Oshore motive for the occupation of

Ukraine’s Crimea

Neil Kent 9

Orthodoxy, the Kremlin and Ukraine

James Sherr 10

The Putin obsession and the problem

of Russia

Steven Pifer 12

Why Putin went to war against Ukraine

Yana Prymachenko 13

Ukraine is not Russia vs One Nation:

political prose as the prelude to the

Russo-Ukrainian War

Eleanor Knott 14

From annexation to war

Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik 15

Debunking the constructed war

against Ukraine: Evidence from the

pre-invasion Crimea and Donbas

Ihor Hurak 17

"Policy of appeasement" as one of

the factors of Russia's aggression

against Ukraine

Evhen Tsybulenko 18

War of civilizations

Roman Martynovskyy 19

The logic of barbarism and human

rights

Yordan Gunawan 21

The legitimacy and recognition of

Crimea: A conundrum

James Rodgers 22

Russia and Ukraine: War and media

Victor Liakh & Ilona Khmeleva 23

Ukrainian resistance to Russian

aggression: What can civil society

representatives do?

Deborah Sanders 24

The Russian invasion of Ukraine:

Implications for the Black Sea

Kristian Åtland 26

Russia’s maritime expansionism in

the Black Sea region

Borys Babin 27

Legal assessment of Russian

ongoing aggression in the Black and

Azov Seas

Sajal Kabiraj 31

Russia-Ukraine conict and its

impact on global supply chains

Maksym Palamarchuk 32

Occupation of Crimea: Strategic

consequences

Kestutis Kilinskas 33

Hybrid warfare: An orientating or

misleading concept in analysing

Russia’s military actions in Ukraine /

in Crimea?

Julia Kazdobina 34

Push for Crimea’s liberation despite

the war

Andrii Ryzhenko 35

Russian Crimean Bastion and its

role in the ongoing invasion in Ukraine

Maksym Kyiak 37

Crimea will be free

Riana Teifukova 38

The geopolitical implications of

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

Mehmet Seyfettin Erol 39

Meanings of Crimean geopolitics

in regional-global politics

Oleksandr Sukhodolia 41

The Ukrainian Crimea and the clash

of liberal democracy and autocracy

Dmitry I. Uznarodov 43

Socio-economic development of

the Republic of Crimea in 2018-2020

Yevheniia Horiunova 44

Social changes in Crimea occupied

by Russia

Eskender Bariiev 46

Violation of the collective rights of

the Crimean Tatar people is a crime

against humanity

Filiz Tutku Aydın 48

Crimea, Crimean Tatars and the

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Natalya Belitser 50

Crimean Tatars and occupation

of Crimea

Veikko Jarmala 51

Crimean Estonians

Serhii Hromenko 52

Putin misuses the history of Crimea

in the war against Ukraine

Nikita Lomagin 53

Russia's historic relations with Crimea

Sergei V. Moshkin 54

Why did Khrushchev transfer Crimea

to Ukraine?

Olena Snigyr 56

Crimean narratives of Russian

historical memory

Elena Kayukova 57

Fresh water of the Crimean Peninsula

Aleksander Panasiuk & Halyna Zubrytska 58

Crisis situation of the tourism

industry in Crimea

Maria Piechowska 59

Cultural heritage under threat

in Ukraine

Elmira Ablyalimova-Chyihoz &

Denys Yashnyi 60

Colonization through destruction

and distortion: the case of the

Bakhchisaray Khan’s Palace

Inga Zaksauskiene 62

Enemies and traitors: The role of

Ukraine in the Soviet Union dissolution

Kari Liuhto 63

A paranoid war with absurd

justications

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Valentyn Nalyvaichenko

The ght for the future

n February 24th 2022 Russia ruthlessly bombed and

invaded Ukraine. Russian military encroached into

peace and freedom of Ukraine, killing innocent people,

destroying cities and threatening the security of the

entire civilised world.

They called it a military operation, having fabricated and continuing

to fabricate pretexts for such invasion and seizure of our land.

But this is a real, bloody, brutal, cynical war started by a mad

dictator, a war criminal putin.

The russian aggressor has already killed 150 innocent Ukrainian

children. And that's just according to the ocial information. And how

many more children tortured by the russians died in the temporarily

occupied cities?

Russian soldiers mercilessly shoot columns of civilian Ukrainians

escaping from the hell of the so-called liberators.

Russian missiles and bombs wipe the entire cities o the map.

The whole world already knows Mariupol as a martyr city. Almost

everything is destructed there, its citizens are in real hell!

Why is this happening now? Why is the system of collective

security in Europe and the world so vulnerable today? Why did one

mad dictator make such signicant progress in his invasion plans?

I have one answer. The Western world's policy on pacication of

putin has led to such outcome.

Three surrenders of the Ukrainian Crimea

Actually, the war for Ukraine, for our independence and our belonging

to the European family, and not to the putin-russian empire, began not

on February 24, 2022.

This all began in 2010. It was the rst surrender of our Crimea

Yanukovych signs an agreement with the Russian Federation on

extending the basing of the Russian Navy Black See Fleet in the

Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol until 2042 (!) —

these are the so-called Kharkiv Agreements ratied in April 2010 by

the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

This was when Yanukovych returned the russian secret services

to the Crimea. It should be noted that according to my decisions as the

Head of the Security Service of Ukraine in 2009, these secret services

were expelled from the peninsula, and the agreement on cooperation

with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was

denounced. Let me also recall that even before 2009, during my

rst chairmanship in the Security Service of Ukraine, I initiated and

defended the termination of the agreement on the Russian Navy

Black Sea Fleet basing, closure of the russian military bases and

complete withdrawal of the russian troops and secret services from

Crimea. I have repeatedly warned the Ukrainian leadership of the risk

and threats posed by the continued presence of the russian troops

and Navy the Black Sea Fleet in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The second surrender of Crimea lasted from May 2010 to

January 2014

Then President Yanukovych, his party together with the Communist

Party seized all decision-making positions in the parliament and

government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Yanukovych

assigned russian-oriented ocials and agents of the Russian

Federation as heads of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry

of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Aairs and other law enforcement

agencies in Kyiv and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. They

resumed cooperation with the Federal Security Service of the Russian

Federation and returned its ocers to Crimea.

The third surrender of Crimea was in February 2014. It was a

historic period for Ukraine – a violent confrontation between security

forces and protesters, the nal stage of the Revolution of Dignity. As

a result of these events, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dismissed

the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, on February 22 and

scheduled pre-term presidential elections for May 25th 2014.

President Yanukovych, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine

Yakymenko and his deputies, as well as other security ocers,

defected to the russian aggressor. First from Kyiv to Simferopol

and Sevastopol. In Sevastopol they stayed at a military base of the

Russian Federation.

Later, Yanukovych was hiding in Rostov and submitted a signed

letter to the President of the Russian Federation with a ‘request’ to

send troops. Security ocers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea

(ARC) assigned by Yanukovych, 70% of the Security Service of

Ukraine's personnel in the ARC and the Crimean Centre of Special

Operations ‘A’ (Alpha) in full betrayed the oath and defected to the

aggressor, and the head of the Sevastopol Department of the Security

Service of Ukraine entered the service in the Federal Security Service

of the Russian Federation.

All three surrenders of Crimea are the russian occupation project

that has been prepared for many years.

An attack on Ukraine, on which putin has not stopped

The unpunished annexation of Crimea gave rise to putin's big and

ambitious plan to conquer Ukraine.

This was followed by his attack on the East of Ukraine, occupation

of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the creation of controlled

republics — Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.

And what was the response of the civilised nations to the

annexation of our territories, to the open military occupation of a

part of Ukraine, to terrorism against our people in the Donbas, to the

capture and torture of the Ukrainians?

We've heard the world leaders' ‘deep concern’ about the ongoings

in Ukraine, and the package of sanctions imposed against the russian

leader and his henchmen by our American and European partners

was obviously pitiful, and certainly did not stop putin from his desire to

impose pressure on the West and destroy Ukraine.

Today, the world stands with Ukraine

We feel the support of the entire world today. The Armed Forces

of Ukraine courageously and professionally counter the russian

aggressor.

We have already undermined putin's ambitious plans to seize the

capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, in a matter of hours. And Kyiv condently

holds the line. The Armed Forces and the Territorial Defense Forces

kill russian invaders, already accounting to more than 16,000 killed

soldiers of the aggressor. Our military massively and ruthlessly

Expert article • 3193

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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destroy the russian military hardware.

The Parliament continues to work in wartime and adopts dozens of

laws which Ukraine requires for its protection and defensive capability.

What else does Ukraine need to end the war victoriously and to

stop the insatiable dictator?

Closed sky and humanitarian corridors

We are calling upon every international organisation and foreign

government to urgently act and help civilians in Ukraine.

The most vital and time-pressing decision is to be made by NATO

- to declare a No-Fly Zone over Ukraine. We all understand the risks

in making this decision, but we are also clear that the risks are much

higher, if such a decision is not made at the right time, which is NOW!

We all see and understand that Russia specically targets civilians

in Ukraine, ring bombs and missiles. Russia’s cruel intention is to

break and kill the Ukrainian people.

Under a No-Fly Zone civilians and assailable areas in Ukraine will be

protected.

We urge for a No-Fly Zone to be immediately declared to create

protected areas for civilians.

We urge to stop the genocide of the Ukrainian nation, to preserve

critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plants, gas and chemical

industry to avoid a large-scale technogenic disaster.

We urge to protect objects of cultural heritage under the protection

of UNESCO.

Along with a No-Fly Zone, air-space humanitarian corridors

should be established to rapidly transport injured people and deliver

humanitarian aid.

International humanitarian organisations such as the Red Cross

should take a lead in this. Such an ‘air bridge’ successfully worked in

the West Berlin in 1948 saving almost 3 million people that the Soviet

Union tried to starve to death. Just like then, rescue and support

emergency aircrafts should land every 3 minutes!

It is time to establish a No-Fly Zone in Ukraine and stand united

against Russian aggression!

 Iftheworldtodaydoesnotsucientlycounteractthefurious

dictatorwhodirectsthedestructionofourstatefromhisbunker,

thenwhatwillhappennext?

 BoththeBalticpartnercountriesandourPolishneighbours

feel already threatened by the possible immense growth of

putin's ‘hunger’: to seize and ‘liberate’ their independent and

successfulEuropeancountries.

Expert article • 3193

Valentyn Nalyvaichenko

Member of Parliament

Со-Chair of the Inter-parliamentary group

of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on inter-

parliamentary relations with the Republic of

Finland

Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee

for Ukraine’s integration into the EU

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3194

In June 2020, the European Parliament decided to combat

disinformation by foreign actors and set up a “Special Committee on

Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European

Union, including Disinformation”, more aptly abbreviated as INGE.

18 months later, the ndings of the Committee, in which I was

rapporteur for the Greens/EFA Group, proved to be unambiguous:

There is an overwhelming lack of awareness in all bres of society

within the EU when it comes to the severity of threat posed by

authoritarian regimes and their disinformation attempts. For too long,

the EU and its Member States have turned a blind eye to increased

attempts of foreign interference in the information space and have

underestimated, how impactful threats of disinformation are.

Since February 24 2022, Putin’s unprovoked and unjustiable war

of aggression against Ukraine has provided undeniable testimony

for INGE’s existence. As part of its myriad tactics of hybrid warfare,

Putin’s regime ghts not only with guns, but also with words. It

actively weaponises energy, economic ties in the EU and especially

information. The Kremlin’s large-scale, coordianated information

manipulation and disinformation campaigns have reached dystopian

levels:

Russia was actively spreading disinformation during the height of

the COVID-19 pandemic in multiple EU countries and its neighbours.

When it claimed victory by announcing the half-baked vaccine Sputnik

V, its disinformation machine supported by Russian state media

broadcasting abroad and troll factories started attacking the vaccines

developed in the west.1

As for the current developments, the propagation of ridiculous

narratives about a Nazi Regime in Ukraine led by a President with

Jewish roots and starting a senseless war branded as a “special

military operation” was carefully prepared through selected fabrications

of history. Putin himself published an essay that disregards historic

facts and questions the ethnic and state sovereignty of Ukraine. His

complete reversal of cause and eect, of aggressor and defender, is

based on the denial of Ukraine’s right to exist. In this way, the Kremlin

has prepared the ideological ground for the annexation of Crimea, the

war in Donbass and eventually its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The war thus undoubtedly makes clear: Disinformation has

devastating real-life ramications; it can cost the lives of thousands

of civilians. This is reinforced by the fact that Russian disinformation

is spread without being challenged in certain third countries that have

so far failed to condemn or even facilitated Putin's war of aggression

against Ukraine. It encourages mercenaries to ght against the

democratically elected government of Ukraine and aids Putin’s regime

to evade the justly imposed Western sanctions.

The fact that we see a stronger recognition, discussion and

contextualisation of the nexus between disinformation and the course

of the war in recent weeks is important. Beyond this, however, it must

also become clearer: There is an urgent need for rm and resolved

action by the EU to increase its resilience as well as support Ukraine in

the ght against disinformation. The European Parliament’s earlier call

1 We have commissioned a study on this subject that can

be accessed here: https://violavoncramon.eu/wp-content/

uploads/2021/11/Sputnik-V_FINAL_EN.pdf

for deterrence tools, particularly sanctions, has proven to be on spot

through the dramatic events. As the underlying problem persists, the

European Parliament’s urge to introduce an eective legal sanctions

regime against foreign actors spreading disinformation remains valid:

Actors such as Russia or China will continue to act with impunity as

without deterrence their disinformation campaigns within the EU face

an attractive calculation of very low costs and high rewards.

While continuous eort is needed to tackle this problem, the

EU needs to take further steps in the short-term to counter Russian

disinformation. The EU-wide ban of RT and Sputnik as well as

sanctions against crucial gures of government propaganda (among

them Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and RT editor-in-chief

Margarita Simonyan) was a necessary action. Without contesting that

media bans are far-reaching measures that should never be decided

lightly and as any other action to counter disinformation must itself

respect fundamental freedoms of expression, we must communicate

clearly: What we face aren’t dierences in opinions, but blatant lies

and conspiracy theories disguised as journalistic reporting as part of

the Russian regime’s disinformation machinery supporting its war of

aggression in Ukraine.

Beyond that, the implementation of other measures that INGE

calls for in principle must be accelerated in the face of the war. The

EU must use and extend its institutional resources to combat foreign

interference. Until more comprehensive legal regulatory mechanisms

are in place, we must urge social media platforms, which are easy

targets for manipulation by foreign hostile actors and play a crucial

role in spreading disinformation, to actively contain lies used for

political ends. Moreover, the EU must advocate for the best possible

protection of the journalists, xers and other media personnel active

on the ground in Ukraine. Since information is the best antidote to

disinformation, independent, fact-based journalism within and outside

the EU is crucial. Let me also emphasize, that although our access

is further limited by Putin’s crackdown on civil society, the EU must

engage in tackling disinformation within Russia too, as we observe

that the Kremlin is stepping up its propaganda campaign on its

domestic audience given its military failures.

It is self-evident that neither this nor any other war can be won

only by ghting propaganda. Nevertheless, the EU’s comprehensive

support for Ukraine against Putin’s aggression must also encompass

its cooperation in combatting Russian disinformation in the short-,

medium- and long-term. Too long treated as a hollow platitude, the

war in Ukraine is a painful reminder that disinformation not countered

undermines the core of democracy and constitutes a serious threat to

our security and sovereignty.

Viola von Cramon-Taubadel

Before Putin’s war with bombs, there

was a war with disinformation

Viola von Cramon-

Taubadel

Member of the European Parliament

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Grigory Yavlinsky

Crimea: Eight years later

The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 laid the

foundation for the current "special military operation in

Ukraine”, or rather, aggression against an independent and

democratic state. Watching the unfolding tragedy, we must

remember this step as the rst clear violation, when Russia

ceased to comply with universally recognized laws and standards,

and brute force played a decisive role.

The seizure of the territory of a neighboring country was

presented in ocial propaganda as a major "geopolitical victory" and

the restoration of historical justice”" In fact, it marked the moment

when Russia began to separate from the modern world, broke with

reality and began to rudely destroy relations between the Ukrainian

and Russian peoples.

What has happened in Crimea since 2014? According to various

estimates, by the beginning of 2022, direct investments under

the Federal Target Program "Socio-economic development of the

Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until 2022" exceeded

1.3 trillion rubles ($11.1 billion as on March 8, 2022). Crimea also

receives annual aid from the Russian budget in the amount of

more than 700 billion rubles ($ 6.3 billion), and Sevastopol - 140

billion rubles ($ 1.2 billion). Major infrastructure projects have been

implemented: the Crimean Bridge, the Tavrida highway, two power

plants, an airport terminal in Simferopol, an energy bridge to Crimea,

reconstruction of social infrastructure, etc. Approximately 70% of the

regional budget of Crimea and Sevastopol comes from the federal

budget of Russia. The region is among the ve most subsidized in

Russia. And yet Crimea has not become the gold standard for resorts,

or a hotbed of innovative technologies, or even a gambling mecca that

local politicians have been touting for so long.

Meanwhile, world-famous Crimean wine brands are being sold

for a song to the Kremlin elite as a reward for loyalty. Similarly,

state sanatoriums are distributed to oligarchs for the construction of

private resorts, especially since more and more Russian ocials and

businessmen are blacklisted.

Politically, the regime implements three proven strategies in the

"Russian Crimea".

Politics and the media were eradicated: even the loyal articial

opposition, acting as "courtiers", was sometimes allowed to utter

only meaningless statements. The work of an objective press, not to

mention independent media, is impossible, while hundreds of public

activists are constantly harassed by law enforcement agencies and

receive prison sentences.

The border region is being militarized: according to open sources,

the concentration of military formations and weapons has increased

many times compared to the period before 2014. Crimea has turned

into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier."

Even by Russian standards, the complete incompetence of

Crimean ocials stands out (which is conrmed by the numerous

resignations of ”ministers" of the Crimean "government" – some

positions changed hands seven times in eight years), as well as

the level of corruption, conrmed by regular reports of the arrest of

ocials for bribery or abuse of oce - and I mean here only the last

four months of 2021.

One could say that Russia has completed the assimilation of the

region, although it is very doubtful that the population of Crimea

expected such integration.

What's going on now? Since the beginning of the "military

special operation in Ukraine” Crimea is moving from a "gray zone"

to a black one - a territory that will never attract investment and new

technologies. After losing the opportunity to travel freely around the

world in 2014, now its residents will have to wait forever to do so.

The Russian authorities demand that the Ukrainian leadership

recognize Crimea as part of Russia as one of the key conditions

for ending the "special operation". Most likely, this will not happen,

because Kiev will not succumb to direct political pressure and threats

from Russia. Any other scenarios crystallize a single act: eight years

later, the "Crimean issue" is still unresolved; Russia's public separation

from the whole world only exacerbates the problems created in

2014 and leads to a dead end. In fact, current events will postpone

the decision indenitely. However, the answer must be found. The

solution of the "Crimean issue" with due consideration for the interests

of the local population depends on holding a special international

conference and making a decision that will not only set a precedent

for Crimea and Sevastopol, but also serve as a roadmap for resolving

similar issues between other countries.

However, what is crucial now is how the current tragic so-called

"special military operation" will end. A lot depends on this, and not only

for Crimea.

Expert article • 3195

Grigory Yavlinsky

Russian United Democratic Party “Yabloko"

Professor

Higher School of Economics

Moscow, Russia

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3196

The renewed Russian military invasion of Ukraine on Feb

24, 2022 goes along with the war on the sea. The activity of

Russia`s eet poses a threat not only to Ukraine, but also

to other neighboring countries bordering the Black Sea. In

particular, this concerns oshore gas exploration projects.

Minelaying in the north-western sector of the Black Sea is aimed at

blockage of the Ukrainian ports. Another threat is that mines drift

towards the Bosphorus through the Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish

sectors, where the oshore exploration by investors takes place.

The most extensive oshore exploration took place in the Ukrainian

sector. The rst Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) were signed

between the Ukrainian Government and companies from the US and

the EU at the beginning of 2010`s. One of them related to the Black

Sea shelf. The development of the Ukrainian Black Sea sector could

fully provide country's demand for natural gas. Ukraine was estimated

to possess natural gas reserves around 2.3 trillion cubic meters. A

consortium comprising ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, OMV Petrom

has won a tender on extraction of hydrocarbons within the Scythian

gas area in the Black Sea.

According to American IHS CERA forecast made in 2012, by 2030

Ukraine`s gas production could have surpassed (!) 70 bcm annually.

This is comparable to gas production of all EU member-states. In

such circumstances, this domestic gas production could not only have

met Ukraine`s needs, but also be exported to the neighboring EU

countries, displacing Russian gas.

American forecast regarding Ukraine`s prospects to increase gas

production as well as strong international consortium and purchase

of two modern drilling rigs by Naftogaz in Singapore have not

gone unnoticed in Russia. Moscow considered that such scenario

could lead to the loss of the Ukrainian market for Gazprom, which

additionally may lose its EU market share.

The occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and exclusive economic

zone of Ukraine gave Russia an opportunity to put an end to ambitious

gas development projects of American and European investors in the

Black Sea region and simultaneously displace western competitors

to Russian state companies. This has also made Ukraine`s access to

the majority of oshore gas elds impossible.

Captured in March 2014 Ukrainian extraction platforms and drilling

rigs still remain under Russian control. The illegal economic activity

on the Ukraine shelf is covered-up by the eorts of the Russian Black

Sea Fleet and missile boats of the FSB Coast Guard. The drilling rigs

are under constant guard of Russian Special Forces and Navy.

Russians illegally extract gas. They have already extracted about

15 bcm in the oshore gas elds since the occupation. Ukraine has

respectively appealed to the international judicial institutions.

Despite the dicult security situation in the north-western sector

of the Black Sea, the Ukrainian government has made an attempt to

continue exploration and attract investors to oshore projects. Taking

into account high military and political risks, it was dicult to hope

for serious foreign investments. Consequently, in 2020 Naftogaz of

Ukraine received permission for exploration and production. However,

the new wave of Russian aggression undermines these plans to

develop oshore elds.

In August 2020, Turkey announced discovery of the largest-

ever Black Sea gas eld Tuna-1. If Turkey manages to put it into

operation in 2023, the country will be able to slash Russian gas

imports. The Russian Federation will make every eort to not allow

success of Ukrainian oshore projects and complicate oshore gas

extraction in Turkey and Romania. Creating unacceptable military

risks for investors - one of the reasons why Russia is intensifying the

militarization of the Black Sea.

Another reason for further militarization is the protection of

Russia's energy and transport infrastructure, which is allegedly under

threat coming from Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO. The pipelines Blue

Stream, TurkStream, underwater energy bridge and gas pipeline from

Russian Taman to Ukrainian Kerch as well as the bridge across the

Kerch Strait are meant.

The conclusion, made by the Center for Global Studies Strategy

XXI and Center for Defense Strategies within the joint project aimed at

assistance to the Crimea Platform, is that with militarization of Crimea

and the Black Sea, Russia tries to transform it into the ‘Russian lake’

and displace NATO and the EU from it.

In order to counteract Russia`s military plans, it is necessary to

create A2/AD in north-west sector of the Black Sea from Constanta

(Romania) to Skadovsk (Ukraine). NATO should increase its military

presence in the Black Sea, rst of all the U.S. and the UK, providing

naval and air patrols from the Bosphorus to Constanta, Odesa and

Ochakiv.

Mykhailo Gonchar

President

CGS Strategy XXI

Ukraine

Chief Editor

Black Sea Security Journal

Ukraine

Mykhailo Gonchar

Oshore motive for the occupation of

Ukraine’s Crimea

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Neil Kent

Orthodoxy, the Kremlin and Ukraine

The Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has shocked

most of the world by reason of its extreme brutality, an

event taking place at this very moment in the bosom of

Europe. Like the invasion of Sudetenland by Hitler and

Nazi Germany, it’s raison d’etre is two fold: the pretense of

coming to the aid of one’s racial brothers, said to be persecuted by

others amongst whom they live in the same state, but, in reality, an

attempt to recreate a deceased empire, a political entity loathed by its

neighbours and buried over a generation ago in ignominy. However,

whereas the ideology of Nazi Germany was based on an atheistic

deication of the German nation, this one is based on a messianic

ideology of Holy Mother Russia, wedded to the Russian Orthodox

Church. It purports to see itself in a life and death struggle with an alien

and hostile ideology in the west, one in which atheistic secular values,

amongst the most scandalous of which is toleration of sexual diversity

and a rejection of traditional Christian values. This is why, in part, in

2012, Patriarch Kirill, the primate of the Russian Orthodox Church,

notoriously praised President Vladimir as a saviour of Russia. Others,

however, like the late Vladimir Sharov in his novels, lament this. As

the Moscow liberal commentator Mikhail Epstein has written an essay

on Sharov, translated by Oliver Ready, Putin’s sees a nuclear war in

messianic terms, of the saints versus the sinners: “We’ll go to heaven

as martyrs, while they’ll just die”. If this is true, then President Putin

has much in common with modern Islamists.

Yet a closer examination of the Kremlin presents a rather

dierent picture than one of Russian holy men promoting ancient and

venerated Orthodox values to the decadent West. After all, many of

the most prominent members of the Kremlin are in long and short

term relationships with mistresses, some with ospring. According to

the teachings of Orthodoxy this is a grievous commission of the sin of

adultery, but in these cases nobody seems to mind. Also, strange is

the fact that the ospring of many live and have much of their wealth

in the very same western countries excoriated for their decadence.

They even send their children there to school - a seeming paradox!

Moreover, in the territories of Russia’s closest allies, North Korea,

Eritrea and Venezuela, for example, none have set up residence.

Yet in Ukraine the Russian military bomb and set re to entire cities,

wreaking a devastation not seen in Europe since the Second World

War, making the bombing of Serbia by NATO during the 1990s seem

like a few mosquito bites in comparison, a military action, if must be

said, now generally regretted in the West. Interestingly, however,

whereas in Russian imperial days, before the Revolution, members of

the imperial family and others of the higher nobility frequently fought

and died in their wars, this seems never to be the case with Russia’s

current ruling and economic elite who leave it to the poor to ght and

die.

Of course, the threat of NATO increasing its forces on Russia’s

western littoral is also seen as a major reason for war by the Kremlin.

However, the logic of the invasion seems faulty. Not only has the

so-called ‘operation’ left both patient and doctor severely wounded

but it has led to the creating of unied NATO not seen in decades

and one which is rearming, including formerly more or less pacist

Germany, to an extraordinary degree. Thus, the eect of Russia’s on-

going invasion has achieved the opposite to what was the desired

goal. Moreover, it has devastated the economy of an already feeble

Russian economy to a degree that was undreamed of a few months

ago. Furthermore, if the goal of the promotion of Orthodox values

was paramount, it has led to the almost complete destruction of the

Moscow led Church in Ukraine, with even the most conservative and

formerly loyal prelates of the country heaping opprobrium upon the

patriarch, not only there but worldwide. In late September, just before

the invasion began, Metropolitan Hillarion of Volokolamsk, the second

most senior prelate in the Moscow-led Russian Orthodox Church,

warned on the Patriarchal Internet Site that war in Ukraine should be

avoided at all costs, not least because its outcome could turn out very

dierently to what was desired. How sad then that his wise words -

crying in the wilderness - found no resonance at the time in either the

Kremlin or the Patriarchal Palace itself.

Expert article • 3197

Neil Kent

Professor

University of Cambridge

Baltic Rim Economies

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In the early 1990s a great lady asked me, “why do you disagree

with me about Yeltsin?” My reply provoked a pronounced pause:

“I don’t disagree with you about Yeltsin; I disagree with you about

Russia”. “What do you mean to say?”, she asked. My answer

then is one that I would repeat now: “If Yeltsin cannot change the

interests and outlook of the elites and institutions that govern Russia,

he will fail, however reformist or radical his aims are”.

On the face of it, the rise of Putin’s autocracy vindicated my

prognosis. But it also reproduced the mythology it sought to discredit.

Today ‘Putin’ has displaced ‘Russia’ in public discourse. The view that

everything in Russia is decided by one man is endlessly repeated. To

those transxed by images of Security Council members quivering

before the President, it is self-evident. Yet the perspective is deeply

awed.

Vladimir Putin is not an existential phenomenon, but the product

of a historical experience and an institutional milieu. That his outlook

and methodology were shaped by the KGB is widely accepted. Yet he

also is the product of the ‘chaos’ of the 1990s (which he excoriates)

and a member of the ‘new class’ that it produced: monied, self-

condent, nationalistic, ‘pragmatic’ (which in Russia is synonymous

with ‘unprincipled’) and freed from any nostalgia about Communism.

And like much of this milieu, he is also in fair part a product of Russia’s

criminal world (as Alexei Navalny’s videos amply demonstrate).

Moreover, he was what Russians call a ‘project’. Listen to

Metropolitan (now Patriarch) Kirill’s speech to the military collegium

in January 1992, well before the all-powerful Putin was known even

to himself. There you will hear the leitmotifs of ‘his’ political theology:

the Motherland, erected on the pillars of ‘Orthodoxy, army and state’,

obshchnost’ (the ‘historical communion’ of its peoples) and not least,

the ‘common baptism of Kiev’. To say that Putin was ‘specially

selected’ as perestroyka and the USSR were collapsing and Russian

democracy barely established is not to deny him agency or even the

power at his disposal. But it does explain how he became president of

Russia, and it helps to explain the consolidation of his authority from

that moment onwards. For want of a simple alternative, the author

devised the term ‘the collective Putin’: ‘the Russia of grievance,

ambition and resentment…that was born the day the Soviet Union

died’. In the view of the Russian historian Andrey Zorin, its seeds were

planted well before, during the era of Brezhnevite ‘stagnation’.

Therefore, to understand ‘Putin’, we need to understand the

diverse establishments and elites that make up the Putin system, and

we need to understand a large portion of Russian society as well.

This contention stands in marked contradiction to a second myth,

articulated by President Biden in his Warsaw speech: the myth of

‘the Russian people’. Yet these people are not an ‘anti-Putin’. As

Igor Gretskiy has painstakingly documented, they are in the main

subservient supporters of ‘strong’ leadership and a ‘strong’ Russia’,

but they also embrace a diverse assortment of interests, aspirations

and apprehensions, with pronounced divergences across social

and generational lines. Moreover, as Biden doubtless knows, these

people nd themselves in a psychotropic information environment.

Where, then, does Biden’s faith in ‘the Russian people’ come from?

Given this assortment of factors, we are obliged to ask what

‘regime change’ actually means. The fullment of Biden’s wish —

‘this man cannot remain in power’ — would represent an essential

prerequisite of regime change, but a great deal more would have to

take place before its consummation. Well before the USSR collapsed,

the Soviet elite had become frayed and demoralised. Yet under Putin,

the opposite has occurred; elites have been pruned, purged, narrowed

and consolidated. Only that part of the business establishment that

derives its wealth from the West diverges from the premises of the

reconsolidated Putin system that emerged after 2012 — and far from

all of them.

Today of course, views regarding Ukraine are especially salient.

Putin’s views are little more than a doctrinal restatement of the

ideology formulated by advisers to Nikolay I and Aleksandr II. Some

of the tenets of Putin’s orthodoxy are word-for-word plagiarisms. Yet

there is a dierence between the views of these tsarist advisers and

those of Putin. In the nineteenth century, not to say the eighteenth,

the ‘common’ identity of Ukrainians and Russians had to be created.

Catherine the Great’s absorption of the territory that became known

as Novorossiya was, like many of Russia’s imperial wars, what we

have called ‘a war of narratives and arms’. As she dened it, the aim

of the war was to ‘eradicate from memory’ the period of the Hetmans.

But by the time of Gorbachev’s perestroyka, this ‘common’ identity

was taken for granted by the Russian establishment. From this

ideational and ‘moral’ perspective, the views of Yeltsin and Putin are

indistinguishable. As Yeltsin stated in 1997: “We cannot get it out of

our system that Ukrainians are the same as we are … It is in our hearts

that Ukrainians are our own people. Our identities are inseparable.”

It will be objected that by then, Ukraine was recognised

internationally (and by Russia itself) as an independent state.

Nevertheless, Yeltsin’s reformists assumed (in the words of his State

Secretary, Gennadiy Burbulis), that ‘there is a logic’ that would lead

Ukraine to pursue close integration with Russia, and that the West

would encourage this process. By the end of Yeltsin’s tenure, he

understood that this ‘logic’ would not prevail without pressure and

‘independence’ from the West itself. From the outset, Putin was

resolved to make this pressure irresistible. Nevertheless, its ‘logic’ did

not produce submission but resistance. By 2014, the only tool left in

Russia’s tool box was war.

Therefore, the view that Putin’s departure will produce ‘normal’

relations with Ukraine is possibly the greatest fallacy of them all.

History from the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav, perhaps Russia itself,

would have to be reinvented for this prognosis to make any sense. To

be sure, a case can be made — and the author has made it himself

— that a dierent successor to Yeltsin, and a dierent leadership

group, might have gradually accepted Ukraine’s independence with

James Sherr

The Putin obsession and the problem

of Russia

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3198

disgruntled civility; indeed, in these circumstances, Ukraine might

have had no need to abandon the ‘multi-vector’ policy that Leonid

Kuchma made his own. But on the morrow of Putin’s departure, we

will be left with his leadership group and the elites they empowered:

autocratic, predatory, messianic and embittered. The ‘logic’ in this

case does not point towards a comforting ‘normality’ but a new time

of troubles and strife. At the least, as we wrote in 2013, Russia’s

internal order will remain ‘in a state of tension with its international

surroundings’. The West will need a policy for Russia as well as its

leaders.

James Sherr

OBE, Senior Fellow

Estonian Foreign Policy Institute,

International Centre for Defence and

Security

Tallinn, Estonia

To receive a free copy,

Pan-European Institute

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Vladimir Putin laid out the Kremlin’s rationale for going to

war against Ukraine early on February 24, just as Russia’s

armed forces invaded its neighbor. He justied the

invasion by citing NATO enlargement and false charges

of genocide, neo-Nazis and nuclear weapons. None of

those reasons were true.

In reality, the Kremlin launched this war because it feared that

Ukraine was slipping irretrievably out of Moscow’s orbit. Domestic

political concerns provided a second key motivating factor. Finally,

there was Putin’s badly distorted view of Ukraine.

What threat?

To be clear, Ukraine posed no security threat to Russia. Active duty

personnel in Russia’s armed forces number four times as many as in

Ukraine’s military, and the Russian military enjoyed a defense budget

ten times larger. By 2021, the Russian military had almost completed

a large-scale modernization of its conventional ground and air forces.

Moreover, Russia has 4,400 nuclear weapons in its active

stockpile. Ukraine has none. In the early 1990s, Ukraine had on its

territory the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. However, it gave

up the nuclear weapons—in large part because Russia committed to

respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to not use or

threaten to use force against Ukraine.

This was no war of necessity. It was a war of choice. Putin’s

choice.

NATO enlargement

In explaining his decision to go to war, Putin pointed to NATO

enlargement and the movement of its military infrastructure toward

Russian borders. However, the last NATO member that borders

Russia or the Kaliningrad exclave to join the Alliance did so in 2004,

more than 17 years ago. NATO maintained virtually no ground forces

on the territory of the new member states until 2014, when it deployed

small multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland

following the Russian military’s seizure of Crimea and involvement in

the conict in Donbas.

Putin did not always regard NATO enlargement as a problem.

In May 2002, he joined a summit with NATO leaders and signed a

declaration entitled “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality.” He did

so despite knowing that the Alliance later that year would issue a new

round of membership invitations, most likely including to the Baltic

states.

While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s attitude toward

NATO membership has evolved from ambivalence to strong support,

virtually everyone knew Ukraine had no near-term prospects. With

Russian forces occupying Ukrainian territory, Ukraine’s entry would

have raised immediate Article 5 considerations, and allies were not

ready to go to war with Russia.

More falsehoods

Putin oered a string of outright lies to justify war. He claimed that

Kyiv was committing genocide in eastern Ukraine. The murder of six

million Jews during World War II was genocide. The death of some

14,000 Ukrainians in an eight-year conict in Donbas sparked and

sustained by Russia is a tragedy but certainly not genocide.

Putin charged that neo-Nazis were in charge in Kyiv. Zelensky,

who won a run-o election with 73 percent, is Jewish, as is the former

prime minister. Like many countries, Ukraine has a far-right element,

but far-right candidates collectively received less than two percent of

the vote in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections.

Putin claimed without evidence that Ukraine aspired to acquire

nuclear arms. True, many Ukrainians regret giving up a nuclear arsenal

in the 1990s, but they do not seek nuclear arms now. If they did, Putin

could have pointed to a facility to enrich uranium or reprocess spent

nuclear fuel to extract plutonium. He did not and could not.

Motives for war

Three reasons explain why Russia attacked Ukraine. First, the inner

circle in the Kremlin wants Ukraine in Moscow’s sphere of inuence

but feared Ukraine was irretrievably moving away from Russia and

toward the West. That was true, but nothing has done more to push

Kyiv away from Moscow and toward the West than Russia’s seizure

of Crimea and the Donbas conict. In 2010, the Rada (Ukraine’s

parliament) adopted a law on non-bloc status. At that time, less than

20 percent of Ukrainians favored joining NATO. In late 2014, the Rada

overturned the law in light of Russian actions in Crimea and Donbas.

Earlier this year, just before Russia invaded, polls showed that as

many as 62 percent supporting NATO membership.

A second major driver behind Russia’s war is fear of a successful

neighboring state. A European-oriented, democratic and economically

robust Ukraine poses a nightmare for the Kremlin. Russians might well

ask why they could not have the same political voice and democratic

rights as Ukrainians. This war is in part about regime survival for the

Kremlin.

The third factor is Putin himself. He wrote a lengthy essay

on Ukraine in July 2021 that all but denied a right for a sovereign

Ukrainian state to exist and presented a history of the country that few

historians would recognize. Ukraine and its stubborn desire to set its

own foreign and domestic policy course draw emotional, even angry,

responses from the Russian president.

The Kremlin has tried to construct a narrative justifying its

unjustiable attack on Ukraine. It is a false narrative that seeks to hide

the real and illegitimate reasons for this tragic war.

Steven Pifer

William J. Perry Fellow

Stanford’s Center for International Security

and Cooperation

USA

Former U.S. ambassador to

Ukraine

Steven Pifer

Why Putin went to war against

Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Yana Prymachenko

Ukraine is not Russia vs One Nation:

political prose as the prelude to the

Russo-Ukrainian War

In September 2003, the publishing house Vremya in Moscow

published a book with the eloquent title Ukraine Is Not Russia.

The author of the book was Leonid Kuchma who was nishing his

second term as president of Ukraine. The book was written in the

genre of political prose and presented views of Ukraine’s second

president on the events of the twentieth century as well as dierences

between Russians and Ukrainians. Kuchma concluded that most

Russians, even highly educated, perceived Ukraine as “historically

an inseparable part of Russia, ceded only through some strange

misunderstanding or even crankiness, as just a lost child. Russians

see Ukrainians as village kinsfolk. But these nice kinsfolk let some

‘Banderites’ confuse them...”

Kuchma did not mistake the Russian perception of Ukraine,

but he believed that this misunderstanding was caused by “lack of

knowledge, not excessive arrogance”. His optimism can be explained

by the fact that in 2003 the Weimar Syndrome of post-Soviet Russia

was not so obvious. Kuchma’s attempt to present Ukrainians as a

separate nation with their own history, culture, and language found

response neither among Russian elites nor among ordinary Russians.

A 2005 Russian opinion poll showed that 74% of Russians felt

ressentiment for the loss of the great power status, while in 2007

Russians supported economic and political pressure of the Russian

Federation on the former Soviet republics as a method of restoring

Russian inuence. The instrumentalization of this ressentiment

turned into a new Russian “national idea”. In 2008 another opinion poll

showed that 81% of Russians supported the idea of the annexation of

Crimea as “an act of restoring historical justice”.

The Weimar Syndrome had become clearly outlined with the

creation of the “Russian world” idea in 2007. Based on the concept of

common cultural identity, the “Russian world” had to extend Russian

neo-imperial ambitions not only in the post-Soviet space but also all

over the world. According to this concept, Ukrainians were treated like

a “fraternal nation” that has been deceived and duped by the West.

The idea of the “Russian world” reached its climax during the

Revolution of Dignity, when Russian media narratives divided

Ukrainians into the good and the bad ones (the mythological neo-

Nazis and direct descendants of “Banderites”), who allegedly installed

a “fascist junta” to eliminate the Russian-speaking people. Of course,

neither of that was true. But these narratives were used to justify the

annexation of Crimea and the aggression in Donbas.

Before subjecting the Ukrainian population to indiscriminate

shelling since 24 February 2022, the Russian “special military

operation” to “denazify” Ukraine was preceded by two articles signed

by Vladimir Putin. They were written in the pseudo-political prose

genre and signaled the upcoming war.

The rst article, “The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of

World War II”, was published in June 2020 in The National Interest,

the American conservative magazine published by the American-

Russian political scientist Dmitry Simes. Putin used standard

arguments of Soviet historiography, which placed the primary

responsibility for World War II incitement on Western countries. In

particular, the emphasis was on the “Munich Betrayal” – the 1938

Munich Agreement that liquidated Czechoslovak statehood.

It is no coincidence that Putin draws parallels between the Red

Army, which fought against Nazism, and modern Russian soldiers

who are “ghting international terrorism” in the North Caucasus and

Syria. As experts rightly note, Putin used historical arguments to bring

UN Security Council members to the negotiating table and divide

the world again. It was an invitation to Yalta-2 that Western powers

ignored.

In July 2021, a new article has appeared directly on the Kremlin

website. This time it was published in Russian and Ukrainian and had

an eloquent title “On the Historical Unity of Russian and Ukrainian

Peoples”. The key message of the article is that Ukrainians and

Russians are one nation separated due to the inuence of external

factors. The modern Ukrainian state was presented as nationalistic

and Russophobic. Putin accused the West of turning Ukraine into

a barrier between Europe and Russia. He stated that “the time

inevitably came when the concept of ‘Ukraine is not Russia’ was no

longer satisfactory. An ‘anti-Russia’ was needed, which we will never

accept”.

Thus, Putin openly declared the destruction of independent

Ukraine as a Russian policy objective. It was also called “the nal

solution of the Ukrainian question” in February 2022 Russian

propagandistic materials. This statement has shown that the neo-

imperial ambitions of the Russian elites will have never allowed them

to accept the fact that Ukraine is an independent sovereign state, as

well as that Ukrainians even are a separate nation. So, the only way

for Ukraine to remain a state and avoid incorporation into Russia or

a puppet statelet is to win this war. Otherwise, Ukrainians will face

genocide and forced conversion into “one nation”.

Expert article • 3200

Yana Prymachenko

Senior Researcher

Institute of history of Ukraine, National

Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Ukraine

yana.prima@gmail.com

Baltic Rim Economies

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Eleanor Knott

From annexation to war

With Russia seeking to invade, “neutralise”, and wage

war against Ukraine in 2022, it is also eight years

since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. It is

eight years since Russia occupied Crimea’s streets

with “little green men” as part of the “Operation Polite

People”. It is eight years since Russia claimed it was saving Crimea

from the alleged horrors of Ukrainization of language and culture, and

a supposed Kosovo-like massacre.

Before annexation, ethnic Russians and Russian speakers faced

no such threat. In Crimea, they could speak Russian freely, work in

Russian freely, and receive education in Russian freely. One Crimean

resident told me in 2012 that there was neither a “gagging” of Russian

language nor “strangulation” of Russian culture. Indeed, Ukrainian

and Crimean Tatar languages were less protected by local legislation.

Pro-Russian or corrupt?

Arguments that Crimeans were threatened and discriminated against

by Ukrainization were made only by those on the pro-Russian fringe

of Crimean politics, by politicians like Sergei Aksenov. Prior to

annexation, Aksenov headed Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity) – a

party that only received 4% of votes in Crimea’s 2010 parliamentary

elections. In 2014, Aksenov would be catapulted into power by his

support for annexation and remains Crimea’s republican leader since

annexation.

But one cannot talk about Aksenov’s pro-Russian credentials

without mentioning his criminal past (and present). Known also as

“Goblin”, Aksenov has been highly implicated in organised crime and

corruption schemes as a member of Crimea’s renowned “Salem”

gang.

While the 1990s was a period of conict between Crimea’s rival

gangs, the 2000s was about their transition to semi-legitimacy as

suit-wearing businessmen-come-politicians. As Mark Galeotti argued

in 2014, “gangsters-turned-businessmen” like Aksenov came to

dominate Crimea because such a transformation oered “protection

and privileged access to upperworld and underworld resources”.

Crimean residents across the political spectrum explained to me

how pro-Russian politicians and organisations in Crimea were little

more than “professional Russians”. They saw such pro-Russian

organisations, like Russkoe Edinstvo and its cultural sister Russkaia

Obshchina Kryma (Russian Community of Crimea), as corrupt and

nepotistic laundering schemes for money from Russia.

The grim realities of annexation

On the one hand, annexation caused little ghting and few deaths,

partly because Ukrainian forces – following orders from Kyiv – did

not resist in order to avoid escalation and protect mainland Ukraine.

On the other hand, annexation brought a new violent reality: armed

occupation, arrests, repression and human rights abuses, especially

for dissident and Crimean Tatars.

For example, it is also eight years since the Putin regime claimed

Crimean Tatars – a community of pacicist and largely secular

Muslims native to Crimea – were extremist and needed to be policed

as such, including banning the Mejlis.

It is eight years since 50,000-60,000 left their homes in Crimea as

formally and informally internally displaced people (IDPs) for mainland

Ukraine ¬– both Crimean Tatars and other Ukrainian citizens – afraid

and disgusted by the new and violent realities of annexation. As

the journalist Ayder Muzdabaev wrote in 2016, for Crimean Tatars

residing in Crimea: “There are no barbed-wire fences in this new

hybrid ghetto of Vladimir Putin’s – yet. Instead of wire there is hate-

lled TV propaganda, total surveillance and constant harassment.”

Annexation forced Crimea’s residents to choose under duress:

remain and become a Russian citizen, or register as a foreigner.

Those who refused Russian citizenship lacked equality before the

law. Meanwhile, Russia breached the Geneva Convention by making

several thousand state employees in Crimea forcibly renounce

Ukrainian citizenship.

Annexation, conict, war

It was not long after annexation that Russian-sponsored conict

spread to the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Such conict included

the downing of the MH17 plane, an act for which the Putin regime is

culpable.

It is important to remember these acts of pertained conict since

2014 because Russian-sponsored violence never went away in

Ukraine.

Moreover, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent

militarisation of the peninsula no doubt facilitated their engagement in

conict in Syria. Would the scale and scope of Russia’s engagement

in Syria have been possible without annexation of Crimea?

While many forgot about Russia’s conict in Crimea, Donetsk and

Luhansk in the last eight years, would Russia’s war against Ukraine

be possible without these acts? If the EU, Canada, US, and UK had

reacted more strongly than targeted sanctions to Russia’s illegal

actions since 2014, would Ukraine be facing an invasion?

Lastly, we must remember the violence wrought against Crimean

Tatars, a community that was deported en masse and decimated in

1944 for propagandic and false claims they were “Nazi collaborators”.

Crimean Tatars were only able to return to Crimea in the late 1980s.

Many now live in exile again. Chillingly, Russia is coming once again

with renewed force against Crimean Tatars, claiming they are the very

“Nazis” that Russia is seeking to “de-Nazify” Ukraine of.

Expert article • 3201

Eleanor Knott

Assistant Professor

London School of Economics

Author of Kin Majorities: Identity and

Citizenship in Crimea and Moldova

(forthcoming, MQUP).

Baltic Rim Economies

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Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik

Debunking the constructed war

against Ukraine: Evidence from the

pre-invasion Crimea and Donbas

It has been over a month now since the Russian Federation started

its unprovoked premeditated war against Ukraine. Cities across

the country are being bombed, causing growing civilian casualties

among adults and children, destroyed infrastructure, and

demolished residential areas. According to the UN, 10.5 million

people (which is more than a quarter of the Ukrainian population)

have been forcibly displaced, among those nearly 6.5 million IDPs

and more than 4 million refugees.

The Russian list of ceasere conditions is transforming now

from a paradoxical demand for Ukraine to be ‘de-Nazied’ and

‘demilitarized’ to ‘keeping non-aligned’ status (something which was a

part of Ukraine’s geopolitical doctrine for a long time but, apparently,

failed to provide long-term security and peace nearby the neighbor

whose leadership publicly denies the country’s right for sovereignty).

Yet, the two cornerstones are being kept as the main alleged pretext

for escalation and as a last resort to give some meaning to this war:

it is ‘defense’ of Crimea and ‘liberation’ Donbas ‘suering genocide of

the Russian-speaking population’.

During the years of escalation, the myth of the ‘primordially

pro-Russian and anti-West’ regions, poorly studied but willingly

exploited in discussions, inltrated public perceptions, both locally

and internationally. As a result, the vague usage of the terms “civil

war”, “conict”, “separatists insurgency” in the context of the ongoing

war have been widely legalized not only by Russian ocials but,

occasionally, by the international community (including the UN high

representatives, politicians, foreign observers and scholars). Sadly,

such false reality paved the way to the other blatant lie, blaming

Ukrainian authorities for being ‘fascists’ and physically threatening

Russia itself.

The ongoing escalation of February-March 2022 should be seen

and understood in a context of a longer-term Russian conquest

scenario based on the distorted picture of the historical legacies.

Punishing and dismantling the Ukrainian state which does not t the

colonialist design of the Russian totalitarian project, has become an

idée xe for the Russian dictator. For decades, it has been dispersed

by the blaring propaganda machine and, as the Russian public polls

demonstrate, is widely supported by the domestic public. Those

who resist totalitalization and brainwashing face intimidation and

extermination.

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea in February-March 2014

(as the rst phase of aggression) and the creeping occupation of

Donbas from April 2014 onwards (second phase), Russia has used

its diverse yet habitual military, political, and informational tactics to

construct false justications for its imperialistic expansion in the post-

Soviet space. Construction of a parallel social reality as a pretext

for its predatory revisionism at the expense of the sovereign states

involved, among other tools, the violation of the human rights of the

local population (including widely reported illegal detentions, forced

displacement, kidnapping, persecution, tortures, and murders of

Ukrainian citizens, including the representatives of ethnic minorities

and religious groups, who refused to cooperate); deployment of shock

troops made of mercenaries, paramilitary detachments and other

hybrid forces as well as the regular army playing assigned roles in

a way that ignores the international legal standards for humanitarian

treatment in war; and, on and on, massive disinformation, censorship,

and punishment to disloyal.

Such oppressive policies leave little room for objective analysis:

social consequences of the war and attitudes of the occupied areas

remain hard to study. However, what can be analyzed is the pre-

war situation in Crimea and Donbas before the Russian invasion,

which during those years was anything but unanimous anti-West

and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. First, during the 1991 referendum, the

call for Ukraine’s National Independence was supported, although

with a dierent enthusiasm, by a majority of the local population in all

‘disputed’ now regions: 84% of the voters in the Donetsk and Luhansk

oblasts, 57% in Sevastopol, and 54% in the Autonomous Republic

of Crimea said ‘yes’ to the sovereign Ukrainian state (compare this

to 76% in Kharkiv, another largely Russian-speaking border region

in the east, and 90% national average). The results of the social

surveys conducted in Ukraine prior to 2014 were a reection of the

uneasy but progressive democratic processes marked over the

years with the uctuating public trust in the government and local

authorities and a high pluralism of thoughts (with some ‘drops and

downs’ during the pro-Russian Yanukovych’s rule, though). Although

a need to shape regional consciousness in Donbas and Crimea as

an integral part of the Ukrainian political nation has never become

a priority, neither for the local nor for the central authority (at least

not until the Russian aggression in 2014), the available Ukrainian

Society Survey data (conducted by the Institute of Sociology annually

from the early 1990s) showed a colorful picture of changing public

attitudes that confronts the black-and-white Russian narratives.

Besides a signicant role of local mindsets, Ukrainian political identity

(in a hierarchy of other personal identities, “being a citizen of Ukraine

rst”) has been increasing in all regions over time, including Donbas

and Crimea. Although it remains the lowest as compared to the other

macroregions, the progress over the decades was rather impressive.

In Donbas, it has grown from 27% in 1992 to 37% in 2012 (in 2021 in

the government-controlled areas (GCA) of Donbas it reached 57%).

In Crimea, the Ukrainian identity has increased from 27% in 1992

to 34% in 2012 (no data were available since the annexation). The

pro-EU attitudes have been steadily strong since the early 2000s,

with 49% of supporters in Donbas and 47% and Crimea in 2000 (in

Expert article • 3202

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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2012, during the Yanukovych period, it dropped to 27% in Donbas

and 37% in Crimea). In 2000, 13% of respondents in both regions had

positive attitudes toward Ukraine joining NATO. Due to the massive

anti-NATO rhetoric in the Yanukovych-time media, this dropped to 6%

in both regions in 2012 (and increased to 27% in Donbas GCA in

2021; while no data are available for Crimea since then). Importantly,

before the annexation of Crimea and occupation of Donbas, the

number of respondents who reported that they would leave their

place of residents because of the langue issue remained below the

signicance level (from 0,3 to 0,6%).

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues and is getting closer

to the West, the international community should nally learn the bitter

lessons of the rst two phases of aggression in Crimea and Donbas,

which have been poorly digested so far. Apparently, Russia plays

similar conquest scenarios across other regions of Ukraine now (from

Mariupol in the east to Kherson and other cities in the south, north

and center of Ukraine) and, likely, will go beyond (to the Baltic states,

Poland, etc.), using the same ‘constructed’ pretexts and justications.

Will the international actors accept that? What should be done now to

prevent this catastrophic scenario(s)? The rst essential step involves

stopping being trapped in the imposed Kremlin’s narratives and

developing a critical perception of the Russian state that can never

again be treated and heard as usual while its constructed wars are

spreading across the world.

A view from the author’s window in Kyiv after the Russian rocket hit

the residential building on Saturday morning, 26 February 2022.

Expert article • 3202

Kateryna Ivashchenko-

Stadnik

Dr., Senior Research Fellow

Institute of Sociology, National Academy of

Sciences

Ukraine

katya_iva@yahoo.com

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Ihor Hurak

"Policy of appeasement" as one of the

factors of Russia's aggression against

Ukraine

Shortly after the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine,

Western ocials, diplomats, and experts have voiced

concerns that V. Putin may soon order an attack on an EU/

NATO country. As the incumbent Russian president has

crossed a number of "red lines" over the past twenty years,

such a development is quite possible. In the context of the threats

outlined above, the article focuses on the steps the West has taken to

heighten the Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions and indirectly contribute

to what is happening in Ukraine.

For a long time, politicians and diplomats of the leading Western

countries did not understand or pretended not to understand the

threatening trends in Russia's development. Back in 2004, having

analysed Russian internal changes under Putin's rule, Z. Brzezinski

called him the "Moscow Mussolini". Putin's words that the collapse of

the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century

(2005) made political scientists and experts suspect him of seeking

to restore the Soviet Union1. In February 2007, the Russian president

delivered the infamous "Munich speech", which is considered a

turning point in Russia's foreign policy. The above-mentioned steps of

the ocial Kremlin did not receive a proper reaction from the West.

Western leaders also failed to respond adequately to Russia's

illegal actions against Georgia in August 2008. Leaders of the leading

EU countries blocked the granting of MAP to Ukraine and Georgia in

April 2008, yet during the EU-Russia summit in November 2008 they

have expressed their support for the Russian Federation, including

plans to build new foundations for European security together with

Moscow. In July 2009, Presidents B. Obama and D. Medvedev

ocially launched a policy of "reset", and in September 2009 the US

President announced that the United States was abandoning plans to

build radars and missile interceptors bases in Poland and the Czech

Republic. In November 2009, the European Union and the Russian

Federation launched the Partnership for Modernization initiative. In

October 2010, the leaders of Germany, Russia and France discussed

the creation of a united area of cooperation in the eld of economy

and security. Such steps of the West gave the Kremlin leadership

condence and they were one of the reasons why Putin ordered to

invade and occupy Crimea in February 2014.

For several months after the Russian blitzkrieg in Crimea, the

West continued to pursue the “policy of appeasementˮ. The situation

changed after the plane on an MH-17 ight was shot. Then Russia

faced sectoral sanctions, it was excluded from the G8, the EU refused

to hold summits with Russia and suspended negotiations on a new

agreement, the Russian delegation was denied access to the PACE.

In democracy, such restrictions would become a severe blow to its

leadership and force it to renounce illegal actions. However, Putin's

authoritarian regime, strengthened by petrodollars and systematic

1 It is worth noting that a number of Putin's allegations and

actions indicate that he prefers the Russian Empire with

its unitary system over the formally federal USSR.

propaganda, has coped with them. However, it is important to state

that the restrictions were not aimed at Russia's leadership directly, the

government managed to evade many sanctions, while sanctions on

the Kremlin's important energy bloc had little eect2.

The limited sanctions policy has proved ineective, and the

West has been willing to restart the dialogue with Moscow instead of

stepping up in response to further Russian violations and misconduct.

This was the pattern created mainly by the idea of the President

of France to build a new security and defense architecture" (2018)

together with Russia ", the return of the Russian delegation to full

participation in PACE (2019), the US President's proposal to return

Russia to the G7 (2019). Russia saw such initiatives as manifestations

of the West's weakness, and in February 2022, Putin ordered a large-

scale invasion of Ukraine. In response to this move, leading Western

powers have imposed an unprecedented list of sanctions against

Russia. Economic experts agree that sanctions pressure could lead

to Russia's default in the near future. Combined with the negative

eects of the military campaign in Ukraine, this could potentially lead

to the disappearance of Russia as it is now from the modern world

map.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the "policy of appeasement"

that the leading Western capitals have long demonstrated toward

Russia has not been a key factor in Russia's aggression against

Ukraine. At the same time, such a misguided approach certainly

played a negative role. Now there is a need for right conclusions. The

current events around Ukraine marked the beginning of the formation

of a new world order. In this context, it is fundamentally important

to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine that

renounced nuclear weapons back in 1994 and became the object of

aggression later. To form a sustainable "coordinate system" on the

European continent, the United States and the EU must change their

approach to addressing issues in Eastern Europe. Along with nancial,

humanitarian and military assistance, Ukraine should receive at least

the EU candidate status. Ukrainians also deserve a MAP. On the other

hand, given Russia's barbaric treatment of Ukraine, the question of

Russia's role in the UN Security Council must be raised. It should be

borne in mind that the current UN Charter lists the USSR, not Russia,

among the ve permanent members of this body.

2 The EU has not imposed restrictions on

Gazprom, which since Putin's presidency has

been and remains the nancial base and

instrument of inuence for his team.

Expert article • 3203

Ihor Hurak

Associate Professor

Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National

University

Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Evhen Tsybulenko

War of civilizations

This article was submitted for publication in the middle of

March. I do not know what the current situation on the fronts

of the Russo-Ukrainian war is, but I am absolutely sure –

Ukraine will never surrender, and Russia will be defeated.

Russia's attack on Ukraine is not merely a local

high-intensity armed conict. This is not Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria.

A full-scale invasion of independent Ukraine, with the use of its full

arsenal, alongside Russia's demonstrable grave breaches of all

possible rules and customs of war, is in fact an attack on the whole of

Europe.

The fact that Russian missiles and bombs are not hitting Suomi

just yet, should not mislead you. Hybrid warfare is always followed

by a kinetic phase. The hybrid war reached its climax in the Euro-

Atlantic world. The choice that Europeans are facing is very simple – it

is either to fall victim or resist.

How does this aect Finland, a non-NATO nation? The Ukrainian

example shows that no informal status, like the one laid down in the

Budapest Memorandum, can in practice protect a country from a

Russian attack.

Therefore, what is the ominous prospect for the Finns? Russia is

rapidly turning into North Korea. That is, it will soon close its markets.

In particular, Russian raw materials will no longer be supplied to

Finland.

The rapid deterioration of Russia’s economy will lead to an outow

of economic refugees to neighbouring countries, where they could

hypothetically be accepted. We all know what a Russian tourist is.

Now, there will be economic refugees with their infamous customs

and claims. The need for the de-Putinization of Russian society,

similar to the denazication of Germany after WWII, is imperative,

as the brainwashed Russian population is a dangerous mixture of

nazism, fascism, communism, religious obscurantism and imperial

ambition.

Russia's seizure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and

attacks on other nuclear facilities, including missile attacks on nuclear

reactors, make the prospect of a nuclear fallout look terrifyingly

realistic. It should also be remembered that in Ukraine, the winds

traditionally lead the airows from the southwest in the northerly

direction. We will thus be forced to forget about the world’s long-term

ght for a clean environment as it is just hot air for Russia.

Now that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has nally revealed a

deep systemic crisis in international relations in the political, economic,

and social spheres, it has called into question the existing outlines

of global security. A similar situation was observed in regard to the

League of Nations before WWII. Today, however, the devastating

eects of Russia's war will hit all nations, at all levels. Everyone will be

aected by this shock wave, and now it is only a matter of time.

Russia's infamous objective is to re-establish the USSR. The

military tools of this re-establishment are aimed at not only seizing

territory, but also at blackmailing the West. Russia has long considered

European democracies its geopolitical periphery. To this end, Moscow

has been for years corrupting European politicians and planting

its agents of inuence. And now it has resorted to an act of armed

aggression, which it is prepared to pursue until it gains the required

concessions.

The oensive potential of the Russian army is currently being

exhausted. Serious tactical blunders and a lack of human and material

military resources were exposed during the initial period of hostilities.

Russia is now demonstrating preparations for a protracted, positional

war of attrition. At the same time, the Kremlin simply is not ready for

this – either mentally or physically.

Therefore, scorched earth tactics are being applied, aimed at the

total destruction of civil infrastructure and residential areas. Artillery

shelling and air strikes have led to massive civilian casualties,

accompanied by ever increasing cases of extrajudicial executions

of unarmed civilians out in the streets. This, in turn, increases the

already massive outow of internally displaced persons to the western

regions of Ukraine and refugees – to the EU. NATO is reluctant to

introduce a no-y zone and confront Russia, even if Russia does

not have either the economic, or military capacity to confront NATO.

Innocent Ukrainian civilians, women, and children die from Russian

bombs, and it is a growing source of shame for the Western allies.

Russia sees no other solution to a problem, than the use of force.

Europe will soon face the largest inux of refugees since World War II

and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

The scale of this war will only continue to grow. This will inevitably

hinder the spring sowing campaigns of Ukrainian farmers. Russian

farmers will also be aected. Food and feed grain shortages will soon

hit global markets. Europe and the Middle East, as well as parts of

China, could face a major food crisis.

The war that Russia is waging in Ukraine is a war of civilizations.

It is a frontier between the past and the future. The path the world will

have to walk now depends on all of us.

Expert article • 3204

Evhen Tsybulenko

Ph.D., Professor

Kyiv International University

Kyiv, Ukraine

Senior Lecturer

TalTech Law School

Tallinn, Estonia

evhen.tsybulenko@taltech.ee

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3205

Human rights today are a product of the civilized

development of mankind. At the same time, any rights

are, after all, just a declaration if their implementation and

observance are not protected by special mechanisms that

provide adequate protection. They need to be constantly

improved or substituted in the spirit of the times.

In conditions of armed conict, human rights continue to be

observed but in conjunction with international humanitarian law, based

on the principle of lex specialis. This is explained by the nature of IHL,

based on the principle of humanism, which is also characteristic of

human rights in general.

In the recent eight years, the world community has witnessed how

the Russian Federation ignored almost all the obligations imposed on

it by IHL and violated human rights on a massive scale in the territory

of occupied Crimea. All attempts to use the existing mechanisms for

the protection of human rights not only did not bring a positive result

but also convinced the “international bully“ of complete impunity for

their massive violations, including war crimes.

Impunity became the reason for the subsequent large-scale

armed aggression against Ukraine, which the Russian Federation

resorted to from February 24, 2022.

After the Second World War, most countries of the world adopted

fundamental acts of peaceful coexistence of various systems.

They created appropriate mechanisms for their maintenance and

observance, including acts in the eld of human rights protection. By

the end of the 70s - the beginning of the 90s, the world, or rather, its

civilized part, began to perceive human rights as a value. The paradox

of the situation lies in the fact that at the same time, the number of

conict situations in the world, which resulted in large-scale violations

of human rights, has increased markedly.

The behaviour of the leaders of the countries that are pacesetting

in terms of the scale of such violations t into the logic of barbarism.

They execute seizure, suppression, enslavement, plunder, and

humiliation. These goals, in essence, are the antipodes of such

a value as human rights. The logic of barbarism, which forms the

basis of their domestic policy, cannot eventually exist only within its

framework and therefore extends to the sphere of foreign policy. This

sooner or later leads to wars, destruction, and large-scale human

suering. The names of Milosevic, Hussein, Gadda as well as Assad

and Putin, who joined them, evoke horror and disgust throughout the

civilized world.

At the turn of the rst and second decade of the 21st century,

it turned out that the existing mechanisms cannot protect against

gross violations of human rights generated by regimes based on the

logic of barbarism. Judicial decisions proved powerless in the face of

behaviour based on such logic.

The problem is that unlike the situation with an ordinary thief,

murderer, or rapist, it is impossible to negotiate with a kleptomaniac,

a serial killer, and a serial rapist since their behaviour is often based

on the motive of barbarism that they realize and internally justify. Any

conversations with them lead only to the loss of time and strengthen

them in their impunity. Obviously, the main goal in such cases should

be the isolation of the “bully”, a harsh collective reaction to such

behaviour, and the creation of safe living conditions for others.

Today, the leader of the Russian Federation, who adheres to the

principles of barbarism and who has questioned the very existence

of the Ukrainian nation and state, gives orders for the massacres of

civilians in Ukraine, the destruction of its economy, its historical and

cultural values. This behaviour is also reinforced by threats of the use

of nuclear weapons.

It is quite obvious that the previously accumulated problems with

the eectiveness of the mechanisms used to protect human rights, as

well as the unjustied and brutal aggression of the Russian Federation

towards Ukraine, should result in a revision of these mechanisms

and the current system of world security. The ultimate goal of this

revision should be to achieve the greater eciency of the existing

mechanisms and to create new ones that can inuence the behaviour

of “troublemaking states”, keep the world within a civilized framework,

and oppose the logic of barbarism. This thesis is also conrmed by the

publicly announced intentions of the Russian Federation to withdraw

from the system of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In this regard, the expansion of methods of collective coercion

and severe nancial sanctions seems preferable, capable of cooling

hot heads.

The March vote in the UN General Assembly on the issue of

condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine indicates the

existence of a universal consensus regarding the role of the Russian

Federation in the armed conict as an aggressor in relation to Ukraine,

and a complete rejection of the use of force as a method of resolving

disputes.

The existing consensus provides a unique opportunity to put the

following issues on the international community’s agenda, which

could strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and human

rights protection.

Firstly, the issue of the permanent membership of the Russian

Federation in the UN Security Council, the role of the Council itself

as a whole, and the principles of its design and functioning should

be reconsidered. The right of veto has long become a vestige of

the past – the fate of mankind should not depend on the will of one

state, especially in conditions when this state itself poses a threat to

humanity.

Secondly, more attention needs to be paid to the enforcement of

decisions of regional and international judicial bodies by the countries

to which they concern. Justice is done not when the decision of the

court is announced but when it is executed. All coercive mechanisms

to enforce the decisions should be activated as soon as the deadline

for voluntary enforcement expires. It is not worth wasting human and

material resources on the generation of decisions that cost nothing.

Roman Martynovskyy

The logic of barbarism and human

rights

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3205

Thirdly, the methods of collective coercion and the application of

nancial sanctions for human rights violations should be expanded.

The funds received from the application of such sanctions could go to

a special fund. It could be used both to pay compensation to victims

of violations and to nance activities to promote respect for human

rights.

In the modern world and in the world of the future, there can be no

place for the behaviour based on the logic of barbarism. And it doesn't

matter where it is coming from, a third world state or a state that is still

a member of the UN Security Council.

At the same time, a society that is ready to get rid of dictators

and tyrants that has embarked (or returned) on the path of civilized

development should not be subjected to an unbearable burden for the

mistakes of the past. Punishment should not turn into an instrument

of humiliation and destruction. Otherwise, a humiliated society may

eventually return to the path of dictatorship and war.

Roman Martynovskyy

Lawyer, Leading Expert

NGO “Regional Centre for Human Rights”

Ukraine

Member

Working Group on the Reintegration of

Temporarily Occupied Territories of the of

the Legal Reform Commission under the

President of Ukraine

Member

Interdepartmental Working Group under the

Oce of the Prosecutor General on Crimes

Committed in the Conditions of Armed

Conict (International Advisory Board of

Experts on War Crimes)

Member

Interdepartmental Commission on the

Application and Implementation of IHL

Rules under the Ministry of Reintegration

of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of

Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

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Expert article • 3206

The Crimean Peninsula was an autonomous territory of

the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic in October 1921,

as part of the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative

Socialist Republic. By a unilateral decision from the highest

Soviet Presidium in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet

leader at the time, transferred the Peninsula to the Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic. Such issue hardly mattered until the Soviet Union

broke up in 1991. Following the referendum on independence held

by Ukraine at the end of the year, Crimea agreed to remain part of

Ukraine, but with signicant autonomy, including its own constitution

and legislature.

Due to nancial problems faced by Ukraine in 2013, the State

tried to work out a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),

but Russia oered them a $15 billion bailout and subsidies for oil. The

majority of people in Ukraine wanted to work with the European Union

(EU). The Ukrainian Government, however, opposed working out

the trade deal with the EU and took side with Russia instead on the

grounds Ukraine did not have its own independent source for oil and

had been dependent on Russia to provide it. Such decision then was

protested by a lot of people. The protests which were peaceful turned

violent and even escalated the urgency of the crisis. Accordingly, the

Government negotiated with the protestors.

The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, who was establishing

a post-communist Eurasian Union at the time was enraged since it

meant that Ukraine would switch its allegiance from Russia to the

European Union and the IMF. Even though Putin had earned support

for the Union in other post-communist States, the protests in Ukraine

might undo some of his gains. Moreover, such situation could deter

potential post-communist States from joining the Union. In response,

he exerted military pressure to ensure that the protests would not leak

to the other Eastern European States. Subsequently, Russian forces

dramatically escalated the stando between the two States. Russia’s

military interventions started with sending troops to two military

bases in Crimea. Following that, about 150 Russian troops and more

than 20 military vehicles were reported to be dispatched around the

Perevalnoe base, where a heated stando was taking place.

International law generally recognizes a “defense of nationals”

concept, under which one State may enter another State without

consent in order to protect its nationals against an imminent threat,

at least where the territorial State is unwilling or unable to protect

those nationals itself. Although the use of armed force in conducting

humanitarian intervention may be acceptable, the use of such

intervention shall be conducted as the last resort. Therefore, Russia’s

humanitarian intervention through aggression against Ukraine is

considered a breach of international law. It is due to the fact that Article

2 (4) of the UN Charter states there is a rm prohibition to not using

force or other means that fundamentally would violate the territorial

integrity or political independence of a State. Consequently, the

armed forces identied as Russian Special Forces that took over the

Crimean Peninsula were considered a breach of territorial integrity.

Moreover, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 also emphasized that

the signatories, including the Russian Federation, should respect the

independence and sovereignty of Ukraine’s territory.

Furthermore, Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter also prohibits any

State to intervene in domestic aairs such as politics, law, economics,

social, and culture of other States. Nevertheless, there is an exception

for the non-intervention principle i.e., the Security Council or State,

either individually or collectively, may conduct the use of armed force

based on the authorization of all members of the Security Council.

The intervention, however, cannot be done unilaterally and it also

should be applied in the case of Russian aggression. Since the United

States, as one of the members of the Security Council, condemned

Russia's action and did not authorize Russia to intervene in the

sovereignty of Ukraine, Russia's intervention was considered against

Article 2 (4) and Article 2 (7) of UN Charter.

In addition to the use of force authorized by the UN Security

Council, Article 51 of the UN Charter permits the use of armed force

in the form of self-defense against armed attacks from other States.

Thereof, Ukraine as a member of the UN is entitled to the right to

self-defense against the armed attack that was conducted by Russia.

In fact, Ukraine had asked for the help from North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) to look at all possible means to help in protecting

its territorial integrity, sovereignty, people, and nuclear facilities within

Ukrainian territory. Even so, Ukraine is only allowed to use armed

force to defend itself until the Security Council takes the necessary

actions to preserve and maintain international peace and security.

Yordan Gunawan

Senior Lecturer

Faculty of Law, Universitas Muhammadiyah

Yogyakarta

Indonesia

Chairman

Association of International Relations Oce

of Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah Higher

Education

Indonesia

yordangunawan@umy.ac.id

Yordan Gunawan

The legitimacy and recognition of

Crimea: A conundrum

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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James Rodgers

Russia and Ukraine: War and media

The ill-advised boast from the then Russian Defence

Minister, Pavel Grachev, in late 1994 that a single regiment

of paratroopers could capture Grozny in two hours came

back to haunt him. In fact, the army took heavy casualties

as it sought to subdue the rebellious city at Russia’s

southern edge.

Thereafter, the Russian military started to learn lessons: both

in the need to adapt its Soviet-era forces to the changing demands

of modern warfare, and in improving the ecacy of its engagement

with the news media. In our 2021 paper, ‘Russia’s rising military and

communication power, from Chechnya to Crimea’ my co-author Dr

Alexander Lanoszka and I argued that since that rst war in Chechnya

in the mid-1990s, ‘Russia has developed its military and media policies

in a coordinated manner: learning from its mistakes and failures as it

went along, and becoming more ecient each time.’

In particular, we considered the war against Georgia in the

summer of 2008—over the separatist territories of South Ossetia

and Abkhazia—and the 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.

We wrote that the campaign in Georgia ended in a strategic victory

for Russia, even if that victory was delivered, ‘ultimately by dint of

enjoying signicant numerical superiority over an adversary in a

conventional war.’

Unless you are inside President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle—or

perhaps even inside his head—it is impossible to know whether the

opening stages of the invasion of Ukraine went according to plan. It

is reasonable to speculate, though, that it has not gone according to

schedule. Surely this was supposed to be over in a matter of days: the

Ukrainian government capitulating, and Russian troops greeted as

liberators by a signicant section of the population. Neither happened,

of course.

On February 28th, the respected scholar of Russia and the

Caucasus, Thomas de Waal, shared on Twitter a remarkable news

story prepared by the RIA Novosti news agency, and apparently

published in error, with a date of 0800 on February 26th (around 48

hours, in other words, after the start of the invasion). The author of the

extraordinary article hailed, ‘A new world being born before our eyes,’

and went on to praise the achievements of the ‘military operation.’

Things did not turn out that way. Two days after the Russian

army launched the invasion, the world was instead waking up to the

reality of Ukrainian resistance in the face of much larger and more

powerful enemy. Questions about the Russian army’s capabilities had

already started to creep in, though. Opening my copy of the British

newspaper The Times in the early days of the war, I saw a photograph

that recalled the decade of sometimes violent chaos that followed

the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two very young-looking Russian

soldiers—presumably hapless conscripts who had not expected

their compulsory military service to involve invading a neighbouring

country—stared into the photographer’s lens. They had been captured

by the Ukrainian army—their part in the war over almost as soon as it

had begun.

The picture took me back to the most terrifying day of my 20 years

in journalism: a cold day in the Chechen capital Grozny, in January

1995. That day, Chechen ghters brought out young conscripts they

had captured to show the news media. Shortly afterwards, Russian

warplanes attacked the square where we stood. We were lucky to

escape. Others close by were killed in the strike. I reected that

the young men I saw in the paper in February this year would not

even have been born that day—yet perhaps, in respect of the use of

conscripts in major combat operations, not everything had changed in

the intervening 27 years.

That rst Chechen campaign was the low point of Russia’s post-

Soviet military history. The second Chechen war, beginning in the fall

of 1999, changed Russia in many ways. Firstly, it provided Putin—

then prime minister—with the opportunity to take a tough line with the

restive region—and that in turn helped him to victory in the presidential

election in March 2000. It also marked the start of the rebuilding of

the Russian military—slowly at rst—accompanied by a determined

attempt to control the narratives that would shape public perceptions

of future campaigns in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea in 2014, and in

Syria from 2015.

Looking back, all these campaigns may be seen as preparation

for the invasion of Ukraine. In the same way, the chaotically free news

media of Russia in the 1990s have been brought under control, or

even—in the case of Radio Ekho Moskvy or TV Rain, Russia’s last

two proudly independent broadcast voices—simply closed down. All

combatants since the dawn of time have tried to tell the stories of war

the way they want them told. In our media-saturated age, it seems to

have become even more of a priority.

The Kremlin has launched the kind of war that Europe hoped it

had left back in history. It was not supposed to happen in the 21st

century. The Kremlin is also trying to defy conventional wisdom about

our age by controlling information in the era of the smartphone.

Expert article • 3207

James Rodgers

Ph.D., Associate Professor of International

Journalism

City, University of London

United Kingdom

james.rodgers.2@city.ac.uk

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Victor Liakh & Ilona Khmeleva

Ukrainian resistance to Russian

aggression: What can civil society

representatives do?

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began in 2014.

Crimea, as well as part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts

were occupied. Thousands of Ukrainians were killed,

thousands of our citizens became internally displaced

persons or refugees. Political persecutions, large-scale

human rights violations, and torture have become commonplace in

the occupied territories.

In accordance with the right to self-defense, enshrined in the

Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Ukrainian armed forces have been

defending our country since 2014. From the very beginning of the

international armed conict, the occupying army of the Russian

Federation has been neglecting international humanitarian law,

committing crimes against humanity and war crimes.

At the same time, Ukraine has consistently sought to resolve

the conict through diplomacy. Respecting the principle of peaceful

settlement of international disputes (which is a peremptory norm of

international law / jus cogens), Ukraine tried to hold negotiations at

various levels. In particular, the Minsk process (negotiations in the

Normandy format) began, and the Minsk arrangements were signed.

However, the aggressor state did not adhere to any agreements.

The most important part of the Minsk arrangements was the security

component. Unfortunately, these provisions were never implemented

due to the position of the Russian Federation.

With a view to increasing the eectiveness of the international

response to the ongoing Russian aggression and achieving de-

occupation of Crimea and full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty

over the peninsula, the Crimea Platform (as a new consultative and

coordination format) was initiated by Ukraine. The Crimea Platform

was launched at its inaugural summit on August 23, 2021, in Kyiv, and

became one of the biggest diplomatic successes of Ukraine.

It is important that the Crimea Platform was based on several

levels (governmental, parliamentary, expert). In fact, civil society has

become the driving force behind this initiative, and the synergies of

dierent levels of the Platform have made this initiative unique. That

is why it was crucial for East Europe Foundation to join this process.

In particular, the Crimea Platform Support Program was established,

ensuring cooperation between state institutions, civil society, and

international partners of Ukraine. The main goal of the Program

was to provide support to the Crimea Platform Expert Network

activities. The Program included such areas: 1) expert research; 2)

expert diplomacy; 3) capacity building of the Crimea Platform Expert

Network; 4) communication support to the Crimea Platform.

Unfortunately, ecient implementation of the Program was

stopped by the Russian invasion. February 24, 2022 is a date

that changed Ukraine forever. Russia has launched a full-scale

aggression, bombing Ukrainian peaceful cities, killing civilians and

destroying infrastructure. Thousands were killed and millions were

forced to ee their homes. At the same time, Russian aggression

united the entire Ukrainian people, and civil society became a reliable

assistant and support for the Ukrainian army. Humanitarian aid,

organization of arms supplies, documentation of Russian crimes –

these are just a few of the areas in which civil society helps the state.

East Europe Foundation also keeps working to support the country in

these hard times. The Shelter Project, aimed at supporting IDPs (safe

spaces, psycho-social support, reintegration, etc.) was launched.

East Europe Foundation is also focused on the following areas: 1)

building community resilience (the needs assessment and outline are

under development); 2) introducing e-tools for community mobilization

and emergency communication; 3) developing e-learning materials

on the emerging issues. All Ukrainian civil society is united as never

before. Our goal is the victory of Ukraine, as well as its successful

development.

It can be predicted that after the war the civil society will focus its

eorts on the following areas:

– implementation of the legal responsibility of the aggressor state,

ensuring justice, assisting Ukrainian authorities in preparing the

appropriate legal framework for post-conict settlement;

– Taking an active part in community mobilisation activities during

the recovery and development phase, namely:

• facilitation of the restoration of destroyed infrastructure;

• control (oversight and scrutiny) over the use of nances provided

to Ukraine by international partners;

• helping in establishing the best business environment in

Ukrainian communities;

• creation and promotion promoting the development of new small

businesses and social entrepreneurship;

• Continue to promote volunteering at various levels.

In general, civil society is making a vital contribution to Ukraine’s

future victory. Today, Ukrainian civil society activists protect not only

democracy in Ukraine, but also the freedom of Europe and the world.

Expert article • 3208

Ilona Khmeleva

Ph.D., Program Coordinator

East Europe Foundation

Ukraine

ikhmeleva@eef.org.ua

Victor Liakh

President

East Europe Foundation

Ukraine

vliakh@eef.org.ua

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3209

The war President Putin is ghting in Ukraine isn’t the war

he expected, or, as we have seen, planned for. Russia

expected a quick and decisive ‘special military operation’

that would seize key political centres and decapitate the

Ukrainian government. They assumed that Ukrainian

morale would be quickly broken, and resistance would evaporate

without requiring extended and costly military operations. What

Russia has actually faced on the ground, however, is a protracted and

attritional campaign. Where Russian forces have had some success,

however, is on Ukraine’s coast, although Ukrainian resistance is

notable here as well as in major cities. Given that Russia has seized

swathes of Ukraine’s coastline what does this mean for the Black

Sea?

Starting with Ukraine, it is clear that Kyiv has lost all access to the

Sea of Azov. This was always likely to be a prime Russian objective in

any conict. Over the last few years, Russia has engaged in aggressive

action to limit Ukraine’s access to the sea, including building a bridge

to Crimea which limits the height of maritime transport into the area,

imposing an inspection regime on all commercial vessels transiting

the Kerch Straits heading to Ukrainian ports, actually attacking and

then capturing three Ukrainian naval vessels and its sailors in 2018,

and, perhaps most signicantly, closing o the Sea of Azov to all

maritime trac under the pretext of military exercises.

Russia has long wanted a land bridge linking Crimea to Russia

and due to its success in seizing Ukrainian territory it is now on the

verge of obtaining one. The loss of key Ukrainian ports in the Sea

of Azov, in particular Berdyansk and Mariupol, will have a damaging

eect on the Ukrainian economy as Ukraine is highly dependent on

exports and much of its grain and sunower oil goes by sea – these

losses will, of course, aect Ukraine’s ability to rebuild economically

after the war.1

The recent demands by Russia that Ukraine accept the

independence of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk

as part of any ceasere agreement will also reinforce the loss of

Ukraine’s access to the Sea of Azov, its commercial ports, and

planned new naval base there. The constitutional border of Donetsk

oblast, as opposed to the former line of contact that Ukrainian forces

held against the separatists, includes Mariupol.2 Working closely with

the UK, Ukraine was looking to build a new Ukrainian naval base in

the Sea of Azov; this clearly is no longer an option and the Ukrainian

navy, or at least what remains of the navy after this conict, will be

forced to relocate to the Black Sea.3

1 ‘Explainer: Will Ukraine lose Sea of Azov to Russia?’, 20

July 2018, as reported on BBC Monitoring, monitoring.

bbc.co.uk/.

2 ‘Ukraine: The line’, The International Crisis Group, Brieng

number 81, 18 July 2016.

3 Claire Mills, ‘Military assistance to Ukraine’, House of

Commons Library Research Brieng, 7135, 14 February

2022.

Picking up on the previous point, Ukraine will forfeit the progress it

has made in restructuring its maritime forces. Navies are dicult and

costly to construct, and Ukraine has faced many challenges rebuilding

its capabilities since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.4 The

scuttling of the Ukrainian agship, Hetman Sahaidachny (U130),

was a huge psychological blow to the navy and a clear sign of the

immense challenges small navies face when confronted by reality of

the application of superior maritime power.5 Ukraine’s ability to rebuild

its navy will ultimately be dependent on the outcome of the conict

and what ‘ceasing military action’ and ‘neutrality’ (two key demands

Russia has made to end hostilities) actually mean in practise.6

The Russian Federation has moderated its initial stated war

objective of ‘demilitarising’ Ukraine and more recently President

Putin has settled for ‘ceasing military action’. It is not clear at the

moment what the relationship is between these two objectives.

The demilitarisation of Ukraine would aect the type of maritime

capabilities and assets Ukraine could be allowed to retain or be

able to acquire in the near future. Whereas ‘ceasing military action’

suggests that Ukraine will be allowed to retain whatever is left of its

maritime power (albeit in truncated form) and will be able to continue

to operate and protect its interests in the maritime domain. Ukraine’s

ability to protect its interests in the maritime domain and address what

are also pressing non-traditional maritime security challenges in the

Black Sea will be severely aected if it does not retain its navy.7

A change to the Ukrainian constitution to enshrine neutrality could

have a pernicious eect on the ability of the Ukrainian government

to rebuild its military forces, including its navy and coastal defence

systems. The Ukrainian navy has beneted enormously from capacity

building, most notably with the UK, from the donation of maritime

platforms from the US and from the Ukrainian navy’s participation

in NATO maritime training and maritime security operations. It is

not clear if any of these options will be allowed to continue under

Moscow’s interpretation of what constitutes a ‘neutral state’ on its

border. While neutral states, such as Finland, do actively engage with

NATO training exercises, it is worth remembering that neutrality was

not imposed on Helsinki by a larger more powerful neighbour and

Finland is not Ukraine.

4 Deborah Sanders, ‘Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy’, in

Robert McCabe et al, Europe, Small Navies and Maritime

Security, (Routledge, 2020), 168-184.

5 Tyler Rogoway, ‘The Ukrainian navy’s agship appears to

have been scuttled’, The War Zone, 3 March 2022.

6 Holly Bancroft, ‘Russia issue four key demands Ukraine

must follow to halt invasion ahead of peace talks’, The

Independent, 8 March 2022.

7 Deborah Sanders, ‘Maritime Security in the Black Sea:

Out with the new, In with the Old’, Mediterranean

Quarterly, 28/2 Autumn 2017, 4-29.

Deborah Sanders

The Russian invasion of Ukraine:

Implications for the Black Sea

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3209

So what are the wider implications for the Black Sea from the

Russian invasion of Ukraine? If Russian ceasere demands are met

and Ukraine is forced to recognise Crimea as Russian, then Romania

will share a maritime border with Moscow. As Romania and Bulgaria,

like Ukraine, operate what can best be described as small navies and

have limited coastal defence capabilities, they will be forced to develop

more advanced land-based options to substitute and augment their

limited maritime power, creating an even more militarised maritime

domain. Suggestions have included looking at how Bulgaria, Romania

and Turkey, enhance their coastal defence systems and their ability to

counter Russian sea control with overlapping Coastal Defence Cruise

Missile coverage.8 There is also highly likely to be a further increase

in NATO, and in particular US, forward presence in Romania and

Bulgaria to send a very clear message about what NATO’s red lines

are in the Black Sea.

Further Russian advances along Ukraine’s coastline in the west,

including the seizure of Odesa, will also give Russian control of both

the western and eastern side of the Black Sea, in essence giving it

sea control over the whole of the Black Sea. While Russia’s ability to

project power in the Black Sea has increased signicantly since the

illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, control over the western side of

the Black Sea could make this enclosed sea a no-go area for NATO

ships.

More widely, and whatever the outcome of the current conict,

the enmity that now characterises Russia’s relationship with the West

will make the Black Sea an even more hostile environment for the

operation of NATO maritime forces, with even the most peaceful of

deployments likely to result in dicult confrontations.

8 Brian Harrington, ‘The US and NATO must counter

Russia’s dominance in the Black Sea’, The Hill,

4 November 2021.

Deborah Sanders

Dr., Reader in Defence and Security Studies

Defence Studies Department, King's

College London

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3210

The geopolitical landscape in Europe’s southeastern corner

has undergone dramatic changes in the more than eight

years that have passed since the Russia’s illegal occupation

and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in February-

March 2014. The country’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine,

which started on 24 February this year, has further contributed to a

deterioration of the security situation in this and other parts of Europe.

Europe’s second largest country, Ukraine, has become the victim

of an unprovoked and unjustiable war of aggression. Russia’s

territorial expansionism, on land as well as at sea, has already had a

devastating eect on Ukraine’s economy and security. Russia, for its

part, is being faced with an international sanctions package, which will

soon bring the Russian economy to its knees.

Much has been said and written about the underlying causes of

the Russia-Ukraine conict and the way in which it has played out in

the period between 2014 and 2022. In short, the situation has gone

from bad to worse at every possible opportunity, particularly in the

winter of 2021–2022. At every crossroad, Russia chose escalation

over de-escalation, and ignored all possible “o-ramps” that could

have been taken. Putin was dead set on invading Ukraine.

The long-term geopolitical impacts of this invasion are hard

to assess at this point. The humanitarian repercussions of the war

are certainly massive, with large numbers of civilian and military

casualties, refugees, and internally displaced people. The amount

of damage done to Ukraine’s infrastructure and civilian property is

also horric, particularly in the northern, eastern, and southern parts

of the country. And, perhaps most importantly, the war has caused

irreparable harm to the bilateral relationship between Russia and

Ukraine, not to mention Russia’s relationship with the West.

Within the maritime domain, Ukraine currently nds itself in a

blockade-like situation. Ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea

in 2014, Russia has strengthened its military presence in the region

and sought to assert dominance over the maritime spaces of the Azov-

Black Sea basin. Massively violating the Law of the Sea Convention

and previous bilateral agreements with Ukraine, Russia has not only

taken control of most of Ukraine’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) o

the coast of Crimea, but also eectively strangled much of Ukraine’s

sea-born foreign trade through the Azov Sea ports of Mariupol and

Berdyansk. The Russia-controlled Kerch Strait, which connects the

Black Sea with the Sea of Azov, has become an almost impenetrable

choke point for Ukrainian and third-country merchant and naval

vessels.

In order to get a better understanding of the driving forces behind

Russia’s maritime expansionism in the northern part of the Black Sea

region, and how it has aected Ukraine and the four other coastal

states (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Georgia) in the past eight

years, we have to go back to the annexation of Crimea. Russia’s

post-2014 quest for regional dominance in and around the Black

Sea has been – and remains – a multidimensional endeavor. Backed

by military and economic power, eorts have been made to replace

the previously functioning legal order of the region with a new order,

dened and enforced by Russia.

Russia does not share what seems to be the prevailing view

among Western scholars and political leaders, namely that the

country’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was “unlawful and therefore

invalid”. Exercising de facto authority over the peninsula, Russia

claims that a legal transfer of the territory has taken place, implying

that Crimea is no longer a part of Ukraine, and that the legal status

of the maritime zones o the coast of the peninsula has changed

because of this.

West of Crimea, Russia’s illegally claimed EEZ is now directly

adjacent to the EEZ of Romania. In this area, Ukraine and Romania

had earlier agreed on a maritime boundary, established with the

help of the International Court of Justice. In Ukraine’s view, the 2009

delimitation agreement with Romania is still in force, and Ukraine still

holds a legal claim to this and other parts of its pre-2014 EEZ.

East of Crimea, Russia has since March 2014 been in control of

both sides of the Kerch Strait. This has made it easier for Russia to

impose restrictions on the commercial ship trac between the Black

Sea and the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait, which is an important

export route for Ukrainian coal, steel, and agricultural products. As

demonstrated during the “Kerch Strait clash” in November 2018,

Russia has also taken forcible measures to restrict Ukrainian naval

vessels’ ability to transit the strait. Thus, the transit restrictions in this

area has clearly also become a security issue for Ukraine.

As regards the economic dimensions of Russia’s maritime

expansionism in the Black Sea, it seems to have been an important

strategic objective for the Kremlin to get access to petroleum deposits

on the Ukrainian continental shelf. By annexing Crimea, tripling the

length of its Black Sea coastline, expropriating Chornomornaftogaz

(the Crimean arm of Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company

Naftogaz), and pushing Russia’s maritime boundaries well into

the Black Sea, Russia has been able to signicantly increase its

economic potential in the region and deal a devastating blow to

Ukraine’s hopes for energy independence. By pursuing its revisionist

objectives through the use of military force, Russia has also upended

the security environment in – and well beyond – the Black Sea region.

Kristian Åtland

Senior Research Fellow, PhD

Norwegian Defence Research

Establishment (FFI)

Norway

Kristian Åtland

Russia’s maritime expansionism in

the Black Sea region

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Borys Babin

Legal assessment of Russian ongoing

aggression in the Black and Azov

Seas

Until 2022, domestic and foreign experts have repeatedly

written about the excessive militarization of Crimea by the

aggressor since 2014, primarily in expanding the capacity

of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The aggressor’s eet was

saturated with new weapons and ships throughout the

years of occupation of Crimea, and before invading mainland Ukraine

in February 2022, Russia concentrated an unprecedented group of

ships in the Black Sea – more than 40 units, including more than 10

landing ships.1

It is crucial for the aggressor state to take full control of the entire

coast of the Sea of Azov. Under such conditions, aggressor state

prepared for new encroachments on the territorial integrity of Ukraine

in a covert form. As for the Kherson Region, these criminal intentions

are currently considered by the aggressor in a criminal “alternative”:

either in forms of forming another fake “people’s republic”, or in an

attempt to “join” these territories to the Russia-controlled so-called

“Republic of Crimea”2. The occupied Crimean peninsula is used by

Russian troops as a key bridgehead for military operations at sea.

The aggressor uses ‘Tu-22’ bombers to bomb mainland

Ukraine, which maneuver over the sea3. The Russian Navy’s 636.3

‘Varshavyanka’ submarines, which launch ‘Caliber’ missiles, were

also used for rocket attacks to hit mainland Ukraine's facilities,

including civilian infrastructure,4 and Russia actively uses Black Sea

Fleet bombing and ghter aircraft where the Russian army suers

signicant losses also5. For operations in the sea, the Russians are

actively using surface ships, with occupied Sevastopol as the basis

of their base6. In particular, on March 15, a group of the Russian eet

red missiles at settlements in the Belgorod-Dniester region, which

caused casualties, and the aggressor state continues to prepare for

landing operations in Odessa and Mykolaiv regions of Ukraine7.

Russia continues to store weapons on the maritime oil platforms

of ‘Chornomornaftogaz’ and at the same time Russian troops prepare

them for destruction in the event of a change in the strategic situation.

The occupiers are also urgently calculating the logistics of a signicant

increase in the capacity of the Kerch Strait for military needs, and

are working on blocking all approaches to the Strait for commercial

shipping. The aggressor’s navy captured the Ukraine’s Zmiiny island

in Black Sea and ensures the blockade of Ukrainian ports and the

capture of individual merchant ships that came out of them8, using

anchored and oating mines.

The Russian aggressor threatened several merchant ships ying

Ukrainian ags, such as the AFINA bulk carrier IMO number 8029272

1 https://arc.construction/26835

2 https://arc.construction/27359

3 https://arc.construction/26820

4 https://arc.construction/26809

5 https://arc.construction/27007

6 https://arc.construction/27077

7 https://arc.construction/27274

8 https://arc.construction/26797

and the PRINCESS NIKOL bulk carrier IMO number 8319392, and

it promised to destroy the ships with missile weapons. The military

authorities of the aggressor announced a so-called “anti-terrorist

operation” in the Black Sea region adjacent to mainland Ukraine,

where any merchant ship could be destroyed by the aggressor’s navy

and aviation. Maritime looting is taking place, for example, on March

13, the occupiers took a oating dredger and two merchant ships from

the part of Berdyansk to occupied Kerch, and then the tug “Korets”

also9.

Russia’s aggressive military actions are causing signicant

environmental damage, including an unprecedented number of

dead dolphins killed o the coast of the Western Crimea, which were

apparently damaged during active Russian naval operations in the

Northwestern Black Sea. In addition, ornithologists noted that the

traditional annual migration of birds did not take place through the

Crimea as birds chose other routes from south to north10.

The aggressor state also began broadcasting propaganda

statements through maritime communication channels from

Novorossiysk, intended for navigational messages. Examples include

the coastal warning from the Russian Federation AA89, which does

not contain specic information for merchant shipping, but states the

alleged “genocide of the civilian population of Donbass, which was

carried out by Ukraine for eight years”, and it also points on Russia’s

military operation on alleged “denazication and demilitarization of

Ukraine” since February 24.

In particular, the AA89 warning of the aggressor’s maritime

administration provides information about the alleged losses of Ukraine

during the conict, and thus Russia uses maritime communications

for its propaganda, designed exclusively to ensure maritime security.

It is noteworthy that the aggressor claimed in the corresponding

warning AA89 and other broadcasts on maritime security channels

about the alleged “genocide”, disinformation about which has already

been considered by the UN International Court of Justice at the suit

of Ukraine. The aggressor also points out in the warning about the

“military” and not about the “special” operation against Ukraine11.

Thus, the escalation of Russian aggression since February 24

has radically worsened the state of maritime security in the Black

Sea region. Under such conditions, the Maritime Administration of

Ukraine, trade unions, expert and human rights structures appealed

to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and called on almost

all foreign administrations and shipping registers to stop cooperating

with the shipping companies of the aggressor state.

9 https://arc.construction/27204

10 https://arc.construction/26843

11 https://arc.construction/27077

Expert article • 3211

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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The Association of Reintegration of Crimea also appealed to

the IMO and its member states to suspend Russia’s membership

in the organization, to stop any cooperation between the IMO and

the aggressor, including nancial, and it recommend the maritime

administrations to not recognize documents. issued by Russian

classication societies. Similar appeals were addressed to the

world’s leading maritime administrations12. On March 16, the Minister

of Defense of Ukraine Oleksiy Reznikov addressed the residents

of Crimea and Sevastopol whom the occupiers are involving in

aggression at sea, including forcibly conscription13.

On February 27, Turkey approved a decision to apply a wartime

regime to the Black Sea straits, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

This means, according to the Montreux Convention, which Turkey

declares to be a key normative act in this area, that it may prohibit

military trade in Black Sea14.

Also, the current Russian aggression has led to the collapse of

the entire OSCE system, formed in the 1970s, and to the destruction

of relevant security mechanisms in Europe, particularly at sea. In

particular, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, which

had a mandate and oces in Odesa, Kherson and Mariupol, was

suspended on 7 March15.

These crimes violate the requirements of international

humanitarian law, including the Hague and Geneva Conventions, as

well as the requirements of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

and International Law on Saving Human Life at Sea and Preventing

Marine Pollution. This led to the response of international structures, in

particular, taking into account the appeals of the Ukrainian authorities,

human rights and expert structures.

For example, due to Russian aggression, the UN Human Rights

Council (HRC) on March 4, 2022 adopted Resolution 49/116. In this

resolution, the UN HRC called for the rapid and controlled withdrawal

of Russian troops and Russian-backed armed forces from all over

Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and territorial

waters to prevent further human rights abuses and abuses and

violations of international humanitarian law. UN HRC stressed

the urgent need for an immediate cessation of hostilities against

Ukraine17. Those demands were totally ignored by Russia.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) held an

extraordinary session of its Council on March 10 and 11 to consider

the impact of the situation in the Black and Azov Seas on merchant

shipping and seafarers18. At this session, the IMO Council adopted

resolution C/ES.35, which strongly condemned Russia’s violation

12 https://arc.construction/26782

13 https://arc.construction/27341

14 https://arc.construction/26765

15 https://arc.construction/26892

16 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Regular

Sessions/Session49/Pages/ResDecStat.aspx

17 https://arc.construction/27122

18 https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriengs/

pages/ECSStatement.aspx

of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, which extends to its

territorial waters, contrary to the principles of the UN Charter and IMO

principles, and poses a serious threat to life and safety of navigation

and marine environment. The IMO expressed regret over Russia’s

attacks on commercial vessels, their seizures, including search

and rescue vessels, which endangered the safety and well-being of

seafarers and the marine environment19.

The IMO Council called on Russia to cease its illegal activities to

ensure the safety and well-being of seafarers, as well as the safety

of international shipping and the marine environment in all aected

areas, and to honor its obligations under relevant international treaties

and conventions. The IMO also emphasized the crucial importance

of maintaining the safety and well-being of seafarers and called on

IMO Member States and observer organizations to provide maximum

assistance to seafarers in conict.

The IMO Council stressed the need to maintain the security of

international shipping and the maritime community, as well as supply

chains supported by other countries, including those that provide the

population of Ukraine with essential food and medicine. The IMO

expressed serious concern about the side eects of hostilities in

Ukraine on global shipping, logistics and supply chains, including the

impact on the supply of goods and food to developing countries and

the impact on energy supply; the organization stressed that ships,

seafarers and port workers engaged in legitimate trade should not be

side victims of the political and military crisis.

The IMO reminded that Ukraine has the right to exercise without

delay all its rights to implement the documents adopted under the IMO,

as ag state, port state and coastal state. The IMO also requested its

committees to consider ways to strengthen the eorts of own Member

States and observer organizations to support aected seafarers and

commercial vessels, and to consider the implications of this situation

for the implementation of IMO instruments.

The IMO Council agreed to encourage the establishment, as a

temporary and urgent measure, of a blue safe maritime corridor to

allow the safe evacuation of seafarers and ships from high-risk areas

and aected areas in the Black and Azov Seas to a safe place to

protect seafarers’ lives and commercialize navigation of vessels

intending to use this corridor, avoiding military attacks, as well as

protecting and securing the maritime economy.

The IMO Council welcomed the proposal to take a number of

steps to reduce the suering of seafarers and their families, and

noted that ships should be allowed to leave Ukrainian ports as

19 https://arc.construction/27053

Expert article • 3211

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

soon as possible without the threat of attack. The IMO stated that

humanitarian corridors should be established for those ships that

could not leave immediately, or where this would be dangerous due

to the presence of sea mines or other dangers, to ensure the safety of

seafarers, allowing them to leave the conict zone and return home if

necessary; and seafarers aected by the conict should be given free

access to contact with their families.

The IMO stated in the resolution that if port State control ocers

are presented with overdue documentation, a pragmatic approach to

the inspection should be taken, given the exceptional nature of the

situation.

In response to the violations described above, on March 9,

the European Union imposed sanctions on the Russian Maritime

2022/394. This not only means corresponding restrictions on Russian

commercial shipping and shipbuilding, but also deprives Russia of

at least tens of millions of dollars in direct revenue each year. It also

destroys the network of Russian special services that operated under

the umbrella of “oces” of the register in many European countries20.

Also on March 11, the International Association of Classication

Societies, after relevant appeals from the state authorities and the

expert community of Ukraine, expelled RMRS from its membership21.

After the beginning of the broad Russian aggression against

Ukraine, the authorized state authorities, non-governmental

organizations, including our Association, reasonably appealed to

the Danube Commission to assess Russia’s participation in this

organization, incompatible with the principles of international law,

maritime and river safety and interstate transport.

On March 17, the twelfth extraordinary session of the Danube

Commission took place in connection with Russia’s military aggression

against Ukraine, at which a special decision was made. The Danube

Commission rejected the powers of any Russian representative on

the Commission, as well as any of their deputies, and it removed

Russian representatives from all meetings of the Danube Commission

and its working bodies until the restoration of peace, sovereignty and

territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized

borders.

The Commission asked the Contracting States to begin

preparations for the revision of the Belgrade Convention with a

request to examine whether Russia, as a state without the Danube,

could continue to be a Contracting State to the Convention. Danube

Commission also instructed the Director-General of its Secretariat to

draw up proposals for the implementation of Article 9 of the Belgrade

Convention in order to prepare for the dismissal of all Russian

Secretariat sta in compliance with the Rules of Procedure and

existing employment agreements22.

20 https://arc.construction/26989

21 https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/

LL1140123/Russian-class-expelled-from-IACS

22 https://arc.construction/27407

Thus, Russia's aggression on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov is

another gross violation of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of

the Sea, the International Convention on Training and Certication

of Seafarers and Watchkeeping, 1978, the International Convention

on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, and the Agreement on

Cooperation regarding Maritime Search and Rescue Services among

Black Sea Coastal States, 1998, the Memorandum of Understanding

on Port State Control in the Black Sea Region, the V, VI, VII and

IX Hague Conventions of 1907, the II Geneva Convention of 1949.

Russia’s actions mean the aggressor’s disregard for the San Remo

Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conict at Sea,

1995 and Russia’s waiver of all bilateral agreements on the status

of the Sea of Azov, including the 2003 Agreement on Cooperation

in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and the 1993

Interdepartmental Agreement on Fisheries in the Sea of Azov.

These violations have already received legal assessment from the

International Maritime Organization, the Danube Commission, the EU,

UN agencies and civilized maritime nations. Such recommendations

to the authorities of Ukraine seem to be important. Denunciation of

the 2003 Agreement on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov

and the Kerch Strait and the 1993 Interdepartmental Agreement on

Fisheries in the Sea of Azov must be done.

Ukraine must commence proceedings against Russia at the

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on captured, damaged

and destroyed merchant vessels ying ag of Ukraine and other

relevant states. Initiation of similar proceedings by third countries

under whose ag the vessels have been damaged, blocked or seized

is also important.

Interaction with the maritime administrations of all civilized

countries of the world on the strict implementation of IMO Resolution

C/ES.35 and the decision of the Danube Commission to suspend

membership of the Russian Federation must be hold. Ukraine and

other states must enforce the cooperation with EU countries on the

implementation of sanctions against Russia in the maritime sector

against Russian shipping and insurance companies and RMRS,

promoting the spread of these sanctions.

Discussion of Russia's aggression at sea, with the adoption of

relevant resolutions by specialized UN agencies such as FAO (on

violations of the rights of Ukrainian shermen), ILO (on violations of

the rights of Ukrainian seafarers) and the World Telecommunication

Union (on violations of maritime communications) communication

and communication systems) and the Paris Memorandum of

Understanding on Port State Control must be started; immediate

Ukraine’s ratication of the UN Maritime Labor Convention is important

for this.

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Ukraine’s ocials, trade unions and experts should inform the

Oce of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court about

Russian war crimes at sea committed in violation of the requirements

of V, VI, VII and IX Hague Conventions of 1907, II Geneva Convention

of 1949. Lobbying for humanitarian “blue” corridors to the ports of

Ukraine under the ags of the UN and the ICRC for the delivery of

humanitarian goods, including basic necessities and food, medicines

must be iniciated by the civilized nation and intergovernmental

agencies, maritime labour and business associations.

Expert article • 3211

Borys Babin

Doctor of Law, Professor, Expert

Association of Reintegration of Crimea

Ukraine

babinb@ukr.net

To receive a free copy,

Pan-European Institute

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3212

Supply chains are likely to be disrupted causing system

inecacies, disrupting production and delivery schedules

due to the Russia-Ukraine conict and the need of the

hour is to build supply chain resilience. The conict has

emphasized the importance of having crisis plans when

uncertain times occur, as humanitarian logistics will take the center

stage to compensate signicant losses. The supply chains must be

designed based on an adaptive modelling technique with RIA viz;

Response – Speed of delivery, Impact – Lives of people impacted per

population density and Assessment – Economic damage assessment

and monitoring as future supply chain tactics.

Ukraine is a top exporter of corn, wheat, barley, and rye. Exports

are likely to be aected, which would cause food security issues

across the globe, especially in Middle East and African countries.

Crops that could have a potential impact are sunower and rapeseed,

which will also escalate cooking oil prices. Procurement spending

would increase as would government spending toward supply chain

expenses, resulting in reduced competitiveness.

Supply disruption on oil markets from the conict would result in

surging crude prices across the EU. Russia caters to about 30% of

oil and 35% of natural gas demand of Europe and 50% of Germany's

natural gas supply. More than 40% of the gas supply to the EU from

Russia runs through pipelines, many passing through Ukraine. This

would be cut o if the conict escalates, which will manifest as higher

oil and gas prices at the wholesale level. Long term eect may persist

if the EU imposes sanctions on Russian gas. The Russian economy

relies heavily on the oil and gas industry and hence complete supply

disruption to the EU is undesirable. The main buyers of Russian crude

include EU countries like Germany, Hungary, and Italy, which will try

to secure supplies through advance procurement thereby increasing

prices. Reduced gas supplies from Russia will lead to higher input

cost and transporting natural gas from the USA to EU is feasible only

via specialized LNG tankers, which will involve higher freight costs,

once again escalating price pressures.

Due to sanctions, Russia will not be able to access the payment

mechanisms, which in turn will reduce exports and imports, thereby

impacting its economic growth. Russia being a major producer and

exporter of fertilizers such as ammonia, potash, urea, and phosphates,

the conict could aect Russian exports of fertilizers, which would

cause global supply shortages, aecting crop production in countries

like Australia. Similarly, the metals market would be heavily impacted,

which will aect exports of raw material and intermediate goods

for manufacturing industries, lead to supply constraints for semi-

conductors and cause price hikes in kitchenware, mobile phones,

medical equipment, vehicles, electronics, construction materials,

and metal packaging products. Base metals, like aluminum, copper,

and nickel will be impacted due to higher commodity prices, thereby

aecting downstream manufacturing sectors like automobile,

machinery, and equipment manufacturing.

Supply Chain Strategy should be designed so that global supply

chains can respond to these sorts of uncertain or unfortunate

situations, and countries are prepared and have a crisis plans for

addressing the needs of the people at the Bottom of the Pyramid.

Humanitarian logistics operations are measured by number of human

lives saved. The EU strategy should incorporate more supply routes

to assist disaster management and build supply chain capacity to

think together. There would be some trade-os to make between risks

and rewards.

Supply chain tactics that EU countries might use to achieve the

supply chain strategy would be to devise a crisis plan for unpredictable

situations, like collaborative replenishment methods with competitors,

potential transportation methods, rerouting, cross docking or re-

analyzing the stocks. The tactics with a clear purpose will aid the

strategy and provide a nite timeline for economic recovery. Proper

supply tactics will bring the EU economies closer to achieving the

supply chain strategy.

The immediate impact of the conict on Europe generally will

aect consumer economic growth and supply chains of consumer

goods, such as clothing, general supplies, electronics, furniture etc.

Shortages on products will lead to extension in their order times. It

is advisable to form shorter supply chains and evaluate short term

inventory requirements focusing on tactics rather than long term

requirements. Strategic sourcing with key suppliers, encouraging

onshoring of key raw materials, preparing to switch to alternative

sourcing and make to order deliveries would help mitigate the supply

chain risks for economies as well as EU companies.

Sajal Kabiraj

Principal Lecturer of Strategy and

International Business

School of Entrepreneurship and Business,

Häme University of Applied Sciences Ltd.

(HAMK)

Finland

Sajal Kabiraj

Russia-Ukraine conict and its impact

on global supply chains

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3213

The unilateral declaration by the Russian Federation of its

sovereignty over Ukraine`s Crimean peninsula has had

three main strategic consequences. The rst and the most

obvious: it was an attempt to alter national borders by force,

which is extremely dangerous for the rule-based world

order.

Second: the illegal occupation of Crimea violated the agreements

that Russia signed to safeguard the territorial integrity of Ukraine and

created an iteration of the Alsace–Lorraine question in Ukraine-Russia

relations, which implanted a deep mistrust of Russia in Ukrainian

society.

Last but not least: the occupation of the Autonomous Republic

of Crimea and Sevastopol emerged as an essential factor in the

escalation of Russia’s hostile policy towards the West. By waging

armed conict in Donbas, by fueling Syria’s refugee crises, by

interfering in election campaigns in western countries or by massing

troops along the Ukrainian border, the Kremlin has always gotten

one positive result for itself. The USA and its allies tend to negotiate

with Russia the more urgent crises rather than such intractable and

relatively less pressing issues as Crimea.

The perceived “Western threat” is an apt way to explain to

Russian citizens why they should make sacrices for the occupation

of a region, where they always used to be welcomed and honored

guests. This is also a useful tool for other aspects of the Kremlin’s

internal policy. The Russian regime may be more cooperative toward

West to some limited degree only in return for concessions including

at least tacit consent for the new status quo in Crimea.

However, for the Kremlin, Crimea and even all of Ukraine is not

enough. The “security guarantees” demanded by the Russian Foreign

Ministry in December 2021 imply Russian military domination on the

European continent.

The threat of a chain reaction of armed territorial conicts in

Europe and other parts of the world was contained but not defused

in the period starting from March 2014. Russia has paid a very

substantial but not prohibitive price for the occupation of foreign land.

The costs however have a tendency to accumulate over time. So far,

nobody has tried to repeat this precedent of attempted annexation.

Nevertheless, if the Kremlin succeeds at some point in turning

the Western response to the Crimean occupation into something

like the US non-recognition policy toward Soviet occupation of the

Baltic States in 1940-1991, it could change the calculus for other

international players. Some autocratic regimes may believe that

tolerating international sanctions and condemnation for some

period of time is a fair price for consolidating their power. From this

perspective, sending troops to grab a disputed territory from a weaker

neighbor would appear a viable option.

The current Russian regime has no exit strategy for Crimea. It

simply could not aord any major foreign policy defeat because this

would undermine one of the regime’s essential pillars. The Russian

people should believe that the Kremlin will always prevail, can, or lest

they themselves dare to challenge its grip.

But no political regime is forever. And the issue of Crimea will not

go away. That is why the Crimea Platform so important. It is Ukraine’s

responsibility to take every possible step to restore its territorial

integrity and, by extension, the international order and, ultimately,

pave the way for normalizing its relations with its larger neighbor.

The Crimea Platform may not bring about a fast solution. But

the necessity for the Russian Federation to engage with it pushes

Russia’s elites to acknowledge the fact that the illegal possession

of the peninsula is a liability. Only after such acknowledgement the

Platform could transform itself from an instrument of pressure to a

space for negotiation.

The natural course of events as well as deliberate actions by the

Russian state, including anti-Ukrainian propaganda, the conscription

of Ukrainian citizens in Crimea into the Russian military and the

resettlement of Russian citizens in the occupied territories, even

now makes a return to the status quo ante the occupation hardly

achievable.

It will be an enormous task to reconcile restoring Ukrainian

sovereignty over Crimea and Sevastopol with saving face for Russia.

No Russian government would be able to survive an unconditional

surrender of a territory irrespective of whether or not it would politically

appropriate. A change of the status-quo should be accepted by the

Russian electorate. Or process simply could not proceed further.

To prevent recurring crises a negotiated plan should combine

protecting human rights and honoring the aspirations of the local

population, including the currently oppressed Crimean Tatars, while

ensuring political and economic sustainability. The Belfast Agreement

of 1998 on Northern Ireland or the provision of the autonomous status

to Åland by Finland in 1920 gives us hope that even the long lasting

disputes can still be resolved when the moment is ripe.

Maksym Palamarchuk

Ph.D. (Political Science), Head

Center of Foreign Policy Studies, National

Institute for Strategic Studies

Ukraine

maksym.8019@gmail.com

Maksym Palamarchuk

Occupation of Crimea: Strategic

consequences

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Kestutis Kilinskas

Hybrid warfare: An orientating or

misleading concept in analysing

Russia’s military actions in Ukraine /

in Crimea?

Hybrid warfare is perhaps the most frequently used concept

in seeking to explain and dene Russia‘s military actions

in Ukraine in 2014. This article thoroughly analyses

the development of the theory of hybrid warfare and

circumstances of its formation, draws a line between

hybrid warfare and hybrid threats, and discusses the perception of

hybrid warfare in the armies of Western states and Russia. Actions

of the Russian army in Crimea are analysed on the grounds of

the provisions of the theory of hybrid warfare formulated by Frank

Homan through revealing the impact on a military operation not

only of the changing warfare tendencies but also of political, cultural,

demographic and military conditions that existed on the Crimean

peninsula.

Geopolitical changes in the world that occurred at the end of the

20th century essentially transformed the security environment and

forced Western states to get involved in a new type of asymmetric

military conicts with non-state actors, terrorist organizations and

criminal syndicates. New-type threats, variety of military conicts

and the search for an eective response require reconsideration,

generalization, and assessment of the most recent military

experience and formulation of theoretical concepts that would help

prepare and operate eectively within the zone of military conicts.

These conditions led to the formulation and establishment of new

military theories, including the theory of hybrid war. The theory of the

hybrid war developed by Homan includes four aspects: conventional

forces, non-regular tactics, terrorism and criminal acts within a single

battle space.

The concept of the hybrid war was created and established in the

USA in 2005–2011, and its formation was determined by the aspiration

of the USA to explain the threats that the US army had encountered

while ghting the “global war on terrorism“. It should be pointed out

that NATO does not use the term hybrid war concept; however, on

the basis of the experience acquired in the Afghanistan War, it names

new-type hybrid threats. The text written by a high-ranking Russian

military ocials such gen. Valery Gerasimov conrms the fact that on

the basis of the experience of Western states, high military command

of Russia reects on and perceives the changing nature of warfare

but doesn’t mean that they integrated in military doctrine. In academic

circles of warfare researchers, there is a general consensus that

Russia’s military actions in Crimea were dierent from the Russo-

Georgian War that took place in 2008; however, the question arises

whether the military actions of Russia in Crimea can be called a hybrid

war?

Having analysed Russia’s military actions on the basis of Homan’s

concept of the hybrid war, we can state that actions executed by Russia

completely correspond to two aspects of the theory of the hybrid

war as formulated by Homan: the activity of conventional military

forces and irregular military formations. Meanwhile, the character

of the activity of non-regular criminal groups and poor evidence of

terrorist activity in Crimea diered from the provisions established in

Homan’s concept of hybrid war. This means that the theory of the

hybrid war can only partly explain the actions of the Russian army

during the occupation of Crimea.

During the military operation, Russia employed conventional

military forces and non-regular military formations, but the character

of crimes committed by criminal actors as well as scarce evidence

of terrorist actions diered from those dened in Homan’s theory.

Our comprehensive study of Russia’s military actions in Crimea raises

doubts about the analytical value of Homan’s theory of hybrid war,

since the essential fact in choosing the mode of military operation was

the specic conditions characteristic of the Crimean peninsula, taking

advantage of which the military operation was executed. Therefore,

in attempting to forecast possible military conicts in the post-Soviet

space and seeking to better understand future threats, we should

analyse not only the newest warfare theories, but also thoroughly

study political, economic, social and military conditions and Russian

historical traditions of warghting that can provide a basis for the

opponent to make military interventions or destabilize the situation in

the Baltic States. At the same time initial observations from Ukrainian

and Russian war in 2022 also initiation thinking that Russian military

operations are based more on operational tradition and technical

availability that on the newest warghting theories.

Expert article • 3214

Kestutis Kilinskas

Dr., Assistant Professor

University of Vilnius

Lithuania

kestutis.kilinskas@if.vu.lt

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3215

February 24, 2022 marks the beginning of the Russian

aggression for those who have not followed the situation in

Ukraine. For Ukrainians, however, the aggression started

8 years ago with the Russian invasion and attempted

annexation of Crimea followed by the hybrid Russian

occupation of several districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions under

the guise of separatism. Lessons learned over the years indicate

that no amount of mediation and negotiations is able to resolve the

deliberately muddled conict. Which, unfortunately, means that the

score will have to be settled on the battleeld with the winner dictating

its conditions to the loser. And all eorts both symbolic and material

have to be aimed at making sure that the principles underpinning

peaceful coexistence are restored.

Although the occupation of Crimea and the situation in the

Donbas had the same roots, namely covert aggression of the Russian

Federation, it was the situation in the Donbass that attracted most

attention. This was only natural because Crimea had been captured

very quickly with the weakened central Ukrainian government unable

to put up any resistance. The situation in Donbass, on the other hand,

had escalated into a full-edged armed conict. This created urgency

for the international community and the Ukrainian government to

stop the bloodshed by applying the standard approach to conict

resolution, namely impose a ceasere and work out a diplomatic

settlement.

The result, however, was a trap. Russia has learned to game

the system by making nonsensical and illegitimate demands backed

up by its ability to escalate. And while the parties battled over the

unresolvable provisions of the muddled deal, Russia proceeded to

move towards its goals of Crimea’s militarization, ruthless elimination

of resistance, russication of the population and integration of the

occupied territories. Simultaneously it made sure the Donbas wound

was bleeding just enough to keep everyone’s attention focused.

Disinformation played a key role. Destructive narratives depicting

the Revolution of Dignity in Kyiv as a Nazi coup that posed a threat

to the predominantly Russian speaking regions became dominant

on the Russian state media. They were widely watched in the east

and south of Ukraine at that time. The ight of President Yanukovych

created a window of opportunity and the Russian operatives were sent

in to foment and lead the unrest creating the image of separatism.

Russian arms backed up the groundless demands for federalization

of Ukraine, special status for Luhansk and Donetsk regions and for

the Russian language in Ukraine. A major escalation preceded both

rounds of the Minsk negotiations to make the Russian position even

more “convincing”.

In the current situation the playbook did not change too much.

Lies of the Ukrainian genocide in the Donbass region have been

widely circulated in the Russian media to justify the invasion. Request

of the so-called separatist republics for protection was a pretext. The

narrative of the “Nazi regime” in Kyiv carried over from 2014 and this

time was accompanied by demand of denazication. To anybody

familiar with the situation in Ukraine it makes absolutely no sense and

cannot be met in principle. Demands for disarmament and reduction

of the size of the Ukrainian military are clearly untenable given the

scale of the Russian threat to Ukraine’s existence as an independent

state.

Demands to recognize Crimea as a Russian territory, recognize

independence of the so-called republics within the boundaries of the

entire Luhansk and Donetsk regions, to protect the Russian language

in Ukraine and to make sure Ukraine does not join NATO are as

groundless. However, they have wider implications. Their goal is to

make it acceptable to violate borders of another state by force and

for an outside power to dictate another state’s foreign and domestic

policies. That is, to call into question those fundamental principles that

underpin peaceful coexistence between states.

Another dierence from 2014 is that Russia is no longer hiding

behind the backs of proxies. It’s now a clear and overt aggression.

Russia continues to openly destroy Ukraine to bomb and torture it

into submission. And hopes the west will help by putting pressure

on Ukraine to go again for conict resolution, i.e. to look for middle

ground between reality and lies, to meet nonsensical demands that

undermine not only the future of Ukraine but also the very principles

of peaceful coexistence.

Although it’s clear that any war ends though negotiations it

matters what is on the table and what kind of settlement is reached.

Just like Minsk, the current situation does not have a middle of the

road solution. Any attempt to look for compromises will produce a

mix of unacceptable provisions because Russian demands are based

in lies and lack legitimacy. Also, just like in Minsk, Russia will still

preserve ability to escalate in the absence of a credible deterrent.

Minsk situation has also demonstrated the Russia has the ability

to wait and make another move when it decides to do so. And this

makes its defeat a necessary condition for the lasting peace.

Defeating Russia will take a lot of eort both symbolic and material.

While Ukrainians are ghting and the West is helping them with arms

and sanctions additional steps should be taken. Continuously pushing

for the liberation of Crimea is one of those steps. It is important not

only to demonstrate to Putin that his intimidation does not have the

desired eect but also to restore the principles undermined by the

Russian occupation of Crimea.

One way to do it is for one or several of NATO countries to organize

a meeting of the Crimea Platform. Initiated last year, the Platform was

supposed to have annual meetings to discuss the situation and to

push for liberation of Crimea. For understandable reasons Ukraine is

unable to organize anther summit this year. However, for the sake of

pace in Europe, the initiative should continue and produce a statement

that for Europe to be safe, Russia has to be defeated, de-Putinized,

de-Stalinized, Crimea should be returned to its rightful owner and thus

the rules underpinning peaceful coexistence respected and restored.

Julia Kazdobina

Head

Ukrainian Foundation for Security Studies

Ukraine

julia.kazdobina@gmail.com

Julia Kazdobina

Push for Crimea’s liberation despite

the war

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3216

Since the early 2000s Russian political elite activated

neo-imperialistic campaign to restore the Soviet empire.

Ukraine has become a territory of key importance for

Russia. Dominance over Ukraine has ideological and

symbolic signicance for Russia. It constantly strives to

maintain and strengthen political and economic inuence, and to

stop Ukraine’s rapprochement with the West. The leasing of Crimea

to the Russian Federation in 1997 became part of the strategy for

the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia's intensive militarization

of Crimea from 2014 to 2022 changed the balance of power in the

Black Sea region in favor of Russia. Crimea gained the features of a

Soviet-era military base, whose forces are directed against NATO and

individual members of the Alliance, primarily against the United States

and Great Britain. Crimean Bastion plays a critical role as a power

projector for Russians during an invasion of Ukraine that started on

24th February 2022.

In September 2016, the Chief of the General Sta of the Russian

Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, announced the creation

of the A2/AD zone in the Black Sea, known as the Crimean Bastion.

At the end of 2019, the formation of a deep-tiered A2/AD zone was

completed. It consists of the main area around the Crimean peninsula

and three mobile zones - around the occupied platforms in the Black

Sea, the Kerch Strait, and the Eastern Mediterranean (o the coast

of Syria). Moscow is improving the capabilities of these components

of the Crimean Bastion and its Command and Control system. The

echeloned approach of the Russian A2/AD system is based on the

principle of forming a "fortress of the eet".

The major threat from Crimean Bastion was the capture of

territories in southern Ukraine by landing, amphibious or airmobile

operations. By 24th February 2022, Russians concentrated 25

dierent battalion tactical groups from the 22nd Army corps, 810th

naval infantry brigade (both belong to Black sea Fleet), and 58th Army,

for oensive operations in southern Ukraine (Kherson and Mykolaiv

district). Notably, the 35,000-strong group of Russian troops located

in Crimea is larger in number than the armed forces of most Balkan

countries. Russian troops in Crimea had some modern or upgraded

weapons, including combat aircraft, missiles, MLRS, tanks, and

artillery. After 24th of February 2022, additional 12-15 battalion tactical

groups from the 49th Army and 7th Airborne division were deployed to

southern Ukraine via Crimea to enforce the creation of a land corridor

from Crimea to Russia along the Azov sea coast. Most of these units

were deployed by land, alternative ways to deploy using railways

and the seaport of Berdyansk (Azov sea) were denied by Ukrainian

troops’ re. On 26th of February 2022, Russian troops projected

from Crimean Bastion captured critical water supply infrastructure of

the North Crimean Canal and established full control over the canal,

starting from the city of Tavriysk (Kherson region). The dam blocking

the ow of water to Crimea was exploded. On 15 March 2022 Russian

authorities reported that stolen from Ukraine water reached central

Crimea.

This major threat of the Crimean Bastion was realized completely

in March 2022 during the rst week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia took under their control 100 kilometers width strip of land from

Kherson to Krasnodar district (Russia).

Another threat of Crimean Bastion is signicant missile strike

potential against Ukraine and European countries. There are four

ground-based and ve naval-based missile systems in occupied

Crimea. Additionally, Russian strike aircraft (Tu-22M3, Su-30, Su-

24, MiG-29) carry various missile weapons. The total volley already

exceeds 800 missiles, designed to re at sea, air targets, and on land.

The most serious danger is posed by missiles with a nuclear warhead,

in particular up to 48 Caliber-PL missiles. They can be red from the

Project 636.3 submarines from a submarine (underwater) position.

With a radius of 2,500 km (potentially 4,500 km), they can reach most

cities on the European continent. During the invasion in February-

April 2022 Russian submarines, surface warships, strike aircraft, and

ground missile systems launched at least 400 missiles on Ukraine. All

of them are based in the Crimean Bastion. On only 3rd of April 2022

Russians launched from sea and western Crimea around 50 missiles

on Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kremenchuk, and Ochakiv. Crimea Bastion’s Air

Defense and Electronic Warfare assets aimed to defend mentioned

before oensive capabilities against possible counterstrikes.

From the beginning of the war, Russian Black Sea Fleet blocked

any economic activities of all Ukrainian ports located on Black and

Azov seas. Few vessels were attacked by missiles or artillery from

Russian warships for attempts to go. Vessel Helt under Panama ag

was sunk on 3rd March 2022 after an attack by 2 missiles from a

Russian missile boat. It happened within 14 miles of the port of Odesa

(Ukraine). Russians always keep 1-4 warships on blockade patrol in

the vicinity of Serpent Island which they captured on 25th February

2022. Between 60 to 90 commercial vessels are still in Ukrainian

ports unable to leave due to the Russian threat.

Russia still plans to conduct a major amphibious landing on the

Ukrainian coast in the Odesa area. Three attempts of landing were not

successful on 1st, 13th , and 22nd of March 2022. After approaching

to Ukrainian coast at a distance of visual contact, Russian warships

turned around and ceased landing operations. At least during one

landing attempt on 1st of March, the mutiny of Russian naval infantry

(810th brigade from Sevastopol) aboard was reported. 6-7 Landing

warships still are in readiness to conduct landing with 1-2 battalion

tactical groups aboard. Another 10-12 warships and auxiliaries are

standing by to support amphibious operations (re support, mine

countermeasures, search and rescue).

Ukrainian primary sea denial capability against Russian attacks

from sea is performed by coastal artillery 152 mm, MLRS, UAVs,

and sea mines. The maximum eective range is limited to 15-20 km.

As of 3rd of April, Ukraine reported destruction/damage of 3 landing

ships (1 destroyed and 2 damaged), 3 destroyed Raptor amphibious

boats, and one damaged missile ship. Ukraine conducted a unique

operation on 24th of March 2022 during which the Saratov landing ship

Andrii Ryzhenko

Russian Crimean Bastion and its role

in the ongoing invasion in Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3216

(Alligator class) was destroyed with 2000 tons of military cargo. Two

Ropucha class landing ships were damaged. Ukraine also deployed

a defensive mine laying close to its coastline from Odesa to Skadovsk

to counteract Russian amphibious landing forces. Merchant mariners

were informed about closed navigation areas.

Crimean Bastion has many common features in tasks, capabilities,

and structure with Baltic Bastion (Kaliningrad area) and Barents

Bastion (Cola Peninsula area). Ukrainian experiences with Crimea

Bastion in 2014-2022 and lessons from the Russian invasion using

power projection from Crimea have to be considered seriously to

deter possible aggression.

Andrii Ryzhenko

Retired Captain of Ukrainian Navy

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Maksym Kyiak

Crimea will be free

This February has marked the eighth anniversary since

Russian forces seized government buildings in Crimea

and occupied the Crimean peninsula. Immediately after

the events of February 27, 2014, Russia signicantly

strengthened its military control over Crimea by illegally

deploying more troops and further forcing out the Ukrainian military.

The events 2014 divided not only the history of the present-

day independent Ukraine into “before” and “after” the temporary

occupation, but also have led to the Russian full-scale war on Ukraine

in 2022.

During eight years, Russian authorities have committed

numerous human rights violations. According to Ukrainian human

rights organizations, at least 140 Ukrainian citizens, the majority of

which are Crimean Tatars, are being held in prison as part of politically

motivated criminal proceedings. Due to the Federal Security Service

of the Russian Federation accusing Ukrainian citizens of sabotage,

storing weapons and spying for the Ukrainian special services, at

least 18 people have been imprisoned in trumped-up cases. Among

them, there is Vladyslav Yesypenko, a sentenced Ukrainian journalist,

freelance correspondent of Radio Svoboda. In September 2021 it

has been already 2 years since the last release of political prisoners.

Since the last exchange in September 2019, the Russian Federation

has not released a single political prisoner from Crimea.

One of the latest detentions took place after the inaugural summit

of the Crimean platform that had been held in Kyiv on August 23.

Based on the Summit results, the heads of 46 delegations adopted

a Declaration on the establishment of the Crimean Platform as a

consultative and coordination format to end peacefully the Russian

Federation’s occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol and to restore

Ukraine’s control over the territory in full compliance with international

law. Russia has repeatedly stated that it will not allow the Crimean

Platform to become operative, blackmailing and threatening countries

that supported the Summit.

Given that for the years of occupation of the peninsula, Russia

has developed a system of politically motivated persecution of all

those who disagree with the occupation of Crimea, the persecution of

Crimean residents for their support of the Crimean platform could be

a new wave of fabricated criminal cases. Illegal searches, abductions,

and a steady increase in the number of political prisoners in Crimea

show that eorts by Ukraine and the international community turned

out to be insucient to end arbitrariness on the occupied peninsula.

Russia continues to despise international law, and therefore the

restoration of the rule of law and respect for human dignity in Crimea

can happen only if the peninsula has been de-occupied.

Russian Federation is systematically ruining cultural heritage and

national identity of ethnic groups in the temporary occupied Crimea.

The militarization of youth in the Crimea is another crucial part of

a purposeful policy of colonization of the peninsula, changing the

national identity of Ukrainian children and promoting the cult of war by

the Russian Federation. Today, Crimea has 25 regional headquarters

of the Yunarmy (a military movement for youngsters in the Russian

Federation). 5 thousand 628 children aged 8 to 18 years have already

taken the oath of oce in the ranks of the Yunarmy in Crimea.

There are at least 109 cadet classes and 88 school military-oriented

museums in Crimea In total, approximately 8,500 thousand children

are involved in the Yunarmy movement in Crimea today.

For deoccupation of Crimea, the abovementioned Crimea

Platform as an international consulting and coordination format

of communication and cooperation of government, parliamentary

representatives and experts was established. Within the expert

dimension, the Expert Network of the Crimea Platform was created,

which is a coalition of individual Ukrainian and foreign experts,

Ukrainian, foreign and international non-governmental organizations,

individual initiatives, associations, think tanks and scientic institutions.

The next step in the work of the Network is to develop cooperation with

experts from dierent countries on certain issues where international

experts are more than welcome.

Eight years ago, a pearl Crimea has been brutally stolen from us.

We in Ukraine always say that it is occupied only temporary and this

means that in the upcoming Crimea will return home and that it nally

will be free.

Expert article • 3217

Maksym Kyiak

Ph.D., Senior Researcher

Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism",

Kuras Institute

Kyiv, Ukraine

maksymkyiak@gmail.com

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3218

Russian armed aggression has radically changed the

military-political situation both around Ukraine and on

the European continent. The occupation of Crimea has

become the dominant component of Russia’s inuence

on Ukraine in terms of the level of military threat due to

a powerful Russian military build-up. Russia has set a precedent

for violating international stability, where a new agreement on the

redistribution of disputed territories became possible between

powerful geopolitical players, as was the case with the Molotov-

Ribbentrop pact before the outbreak of World War II. International

security structures have revealed their unpreparedness for the current

developments in Ukraine.

Most geopolitical concepts have dened a specic role for

Ukraine as an important player, ensuring a balance between the main

geopolitical actors being a security buer for the entire European

continent. The geopolitical pivot represented by Ukraine can serve

as a protective shield for the entire Baltic-Black Sea region. The

existence of a Ukrainian geopolitical pivot had important political

and cultural implications for a more active neighbouring geostrategic

player, as Russia never could be a Eurasian empire without Ukraine

as the heartland, and the gateway region of Eurasia.

The Russian Federation uses the principle of political realism in

its foreign policy; therefore, it could initiate implementation of Dugin

and Primakov concepts. The Russian geopolitical doctrine is based

on the “Russkiy Mir” idea, which is an ideological ground for the

new geostrategic formation of the “New USSR”. Such a common

civilizational space is based on three pillars - Orthodoxy, Russian

language, and common historical memory. The most important

component of this project was supposed to be the absorption of

Ukraine, or its southeastern regions and Crimea.

The inadequate perception of Ukrainian realities by the Russian

leadership and the unwillingness to accept Ukraine’s aspirations to

be a modern democratic European state, instead of the Kremlin’s

alternative of becoming an appendage of a dictatorial regime following

the example of Belarus, destroyed rationality in Putin’s actions.

Discussions about the invented oppression of ethnic Russians and

the Russian language, ambiguous and distorted interpretations of

common history are proof of this.

The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, after the eight-year war

in the Donbas, is Putin’s last hopeless chance to create an “Orthodox

Russian Empire.” The mass repressions of the Crimean Tatars in

the territory of the occupied Crimea, the destruction of the civilian

population of Ukraine since 2014, conrm the extremist component

of Putin’s policy. To achieve its goals, Russia threatens the world with

nuclear war, even if this outcome will sacrice the Russian population.

Dictators are constantly covering up their aggressive plans with

peaceful rhetoric. Hitler’s speeches used to start with the words “We

want peace.” It is known that Germany fought for so-called peace

and used military force only to protect itself from all sorts of external

threats. Putin’s rhetoric has nothing to do with Russia’s real foreign

policy, because during his presidency he committed war crimes on

the territory of many countries, justifying those with noble intentions

enshrined in the military and foreign policy doctrines of the Russian

Federation. The international community’s passive reaction to all the

Russian state’s illegal actions for many years fuelled the regime and

created the conditions for a sense of permissiveness.

Today, Russia’s act of invasion, which started from the Crimean

occupation destabilized the entire geopolitical order. The world has

returned to a kind of block-battle period, only the frontiers of the

Western bloc have moved eastwards juxtaposed to the Cold War era.

Trust in Russia, which constantly infringes international agreements

and postulates of the world order, has been destroyed. It will take

decades to restore it.

Although the rumblings of the war are noted all over the world,

they resonate most strongly in Europe. The invasion turned the idea

of a whole, free, and peaceful continent upside down. It seems that

in some parts of Europe, the post-1990 order is in shambles - mostly

for countries in between, countries that are not yet part of NATO or

the European Union. This will likely mean that European borders with

Russia’s sphere of inuence will become militarized. These trends are

already observed in Scandinavian and Baltic countries.

The new wave of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24,

2022, has made the world less secure. Countries are now in a situation

where military power is increasingly dominating political relations. The

civilized world is at risk that Russia’s provocation of international order

could have a volatile impact on other regions, where problematic

areas are bound by fragile agreements and guarantees from other

great powers.

Riana Teifukova

Ph.D. International Relations

Gazi University

Crimea, Ukraine

r.teifukova@gmail.com

Riana Teifukova

The geopolitical implications of

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3219

With Russia’s military intervention against Ukraine on

February 24, 2022, the status quo in Crimea, which

it annexed in violation of international law in 2014,

has once again come to the agenda of international

public opinion. As much as the geopolitical-strategic

importance of Crimea in international-regional power struggles, its

symbolic meaning that emerged in the new world order-building

processes has begun to be refreshed in historical memories.

First of all, Crimea, with its geopolitical-strategic location, is far

beyond connecting the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea, extending over

the “Five Seas”, which we can describe as “Caspian-Caucasus-Black

Sea-Eastern Europe-Balkans-Anatolia-Mediterranean” and one of

the key points of the “Great Basin” that forms the intersection areas

of Europe and Asia. Crimea, which has the potential to signicantly

change the geopolitical balances and has an important place in the

transition from regional to international power, therefore has a meaning

and importance far beyond being a peninsula and a gateway.

Crimea, which is in a remarkable position due to its advanced

science and technology industry, its proximity to rich agricultural

regions and its rich natural resources in its territorial waters, has

historically been Russia’s descent to the Black Sea and from there

to the south; In other words, it has been a part of the strategy of

opening to warm seas and thus to the Mediterranean. In this process,

Crimea, the Ottoman-Western geopolitical balance against Russian

expansionism; In other words, it was also considered as the key to

European security. In this context, the Crimean War (1853-1856) is a

turning point.

As a matter of fact, the Crimean War began to have a symbolic

meaning for Russia and Europe in terms of the European world’s aim

to keep Russia out of Europe and the Mediterranean. After the war in

question, Russia could not return to European aairs for a long time,

and it was seen as an “undesirable” country in Europe. Therefore,

in the context of Europe, Crimea has become an address where

the “other/enemy” perception towards Russia has become stronger.

Moreover, Russia’s “other/hostile” situation has started to show itself

not only in the European context, but also in the Slavic World.

Therefore, Crimea is not only a part of or the beginning of the

Russia-Ukraine War in its current dimension. Crimea has played a

vital role in international political relations throughout history. It is

necessary to read this role correctly in military and political terms.

Therefore, any interpretation that does not consider the role of Crimea

by considering the security of the wider Black Sea geopolitics and

even the Eurasian geopolitics will be incomplete and make the issue

incapable to understand.

Because Crimea, as it was partly stated above, it is a strong center

of gravity stretching from Eastern Europe to the Balkans and from

the Caucasus to the Caspian and including a part of Russia. For this

reason, it can be stated that Crimea is in a very critical position in terms

of security and cooperation processes in the geography stretching

from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. In other words, while a

stable and secure Crimea opens the door to regional cooperation

processes; instability can push the entire region into chaos. For this

reason, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 turned from being an

issue between Ukraine and Russia to an international issue in which

the West is at the center.

This geopolitical role of Crimea in a strategic sense has drawn

attention throughout history. As a matter of fact, Crimea has been at

the center of historical trade routes, especially the “Silk Road” and

“Spice Road”. Today, the security of Crimea draws attention as an

important issue that also has transportation and energy security

dimensions. The issue in question also causes Crimea to become

one of the playgrounds of the global power struggle. In this sense,

Crimea is the new address of the power struggle that will determine

the actors, ideological structure and content of the international

system, especially the name, in the process of building the New World

Order. In this sense, Crimea is the new address of the power struggle

that will determine the actors, ideological structure and content of the

international system, especially the name, in the process of building

the New World Order.

In other words, Crimea is one of the main zones of the “New Great

Game”. Therefore, the developments in Crimea are not only a war

or a power struggle between Russia and Ukraine; It is necessary to

evaluate it as a matter of the construction process of the New World

Order. In this direction, according to the Kremlin, the road to “Greater

Russia” passes through the achievement of the goals in the “Near

Abroad Doctrine”, known as the Primakov Doctrine, which envisions

Russia to be the dominant power by maintaining its inuence in the

former Soviet geography. In this aim, it can be said that Crimea has

a strategic meaning. Because historically, Russia has reached the

position of great power after taking Crimea.

Crimea was the place where Moscow, trying to reassert itself

as a great power after the Cold War, drew its red lines to the West

and the Western states. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 has great

signicance because of this. This meaning points to the framework

of Turkey-Russia-Western relations and, accordingly, the security of

Turkey-West relations. Therefore, the choices made by the parties at

the point of Crimea are very decisive for the future of the New World

Order in general and the countries of the region in particular. In other

words, the situation in Crimea may direct the future of the Black Sea

and then the Eurasian geography.

In this context, it is essential for the Black Sea countries to create

a vision of the future that takes into account the realities of the 21st

century. The vision in question is not only for the welfare, stability

and security of the Black Sea region, at the same time, it is of great

importance in terms of global peace and security. Because the

Crimea-centered Russia-Ukraine Crisis brought the nuclear balance

of terror and the 3rd World War scenarios to the agenda for the rst

time after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In short, the developments over

Mehmet Seyfettin Erol

Meanings of Crimean geopolitics in

regional-global politics

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3219

Crimea and the choices made have reached a level that threatens

the global security environment. Therefore, the Russian-Ukrainian-

centered developments in Crimea come to the fore with the dimension

of triggering geopolitical faults in the process leading to the New World

Order.

As a result, Crimea, which was accepted as one of the starting

addresses of the Cold War, where the bipolar world was shaped at

the Yalta Conference/Crimean Conference (4-11 February 1945),

appears as the symbolic address of the “New Cold War” or “Cold

Peace” in terms of the discourses/targets of the “unipolar-bipolar-

multipolar world”. Crimea has once again become the symbol of the

iron curtain being drawn between Russia and the Western world.

Therefore, Crimea is a tool for Russia to impose the “Yalta Order” once

again. In other words, it stands out as a place where Russia’s eorts

to transform into an international power center are observed, while

the international community reminds it of its limits and limitations, just

like in the 19th century.

Mehmet Seyfettin Erol

Professor, President

Ankara Center for Crises and Policy Studies

(ANKASAM)

Ankara, Turkey

mserol@gmail.com

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3220

Now Ukraine is on the front pages of world news, but

Russia's aggression is not breaking news at all. The hybrid

Russian war against Ukraine has been going on for much

longer, than February 27, 2014, the day when Russia

captured the Ukrainian Crimea.1 This aggression has also

revealed a range of issues that go far beyond the conict between the

two neighboring countries. Russia violated fundamental norms and

principles of international law, bilateral and multilateral agreements,

actually challenging the liberal international order.

Firstly, military aggression was just one element of the Russian

hybrid warfare. Illegal occupation of Crimea was executed through

a combination of the dynamic action of regular Russian army forces

together with illegal armed groups and criminal elements whose

activities were coordinated by the only plan and supported with

vigorous employment of propaganda based on lies and falsications,

sabotage, and terror.

Secondly, the targets of Russian actions became not only military

bases of the Ukrainian army or governmental buildings but also

critical infrastructure, especially transport and energy. For example,

in an energy sector, Russian paratroopers captured critical gas

infrastructure: gas production platforms on the Black Sea shelf (Odesa

eld); and gas compressor station (pumping gas from Strilkovo eld in

the Sea of Azov) in the administrative territory of the Kherson region

of Ukraine.

In result of aggression, Ukraine lost not only people, territory,

critical infrastructure. Ukraine lost the prospect of increasing oil and

gas production on the shelf of the Black and Azov Seas, estimated at

300 billion USA dollars at the time.

In addition, the insidious Russian occupation of Crimea

revealed the West's unpreparedness to challenge the open attack

on international order. The liberal democratic world demonstrated a

weak response to Russian blatant violation of international law and its

commitments to guarantee Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity

(Budapest Memorandum, not mentioning the range of bilateral

agreements). Proponents of the autocratic style of governance

become excited to proceed in eorts to revenge and defeat liberal

democracy. Putin's ratings of support have risen signicantly, and not

just among Russians. Autocratic feelings in dierent countries, even

within the camp of liberal democracies, became stronger. Autocrats

became condent that advertised by liberal democracy move to the

"end of history" is not only stopped but could be reversed.

1 The day of eective control over the territory of Crimea

according to the European Court of Human Rights.Grand

Chamber Admissibility Decision in the case of Ukraine v.

Russia (re Crimea) (app nos 20958/14 and 38334/18),

ECLI:CE:ECHR:2020:1216DEC002095814 , Council

of Europe: European Court of Human Rights,

14 January 2021, available at: https://www.refworld.org/

cases,ECHR,60016bb84.html [accessed 9 February 2022]

The further developments around Crimea have demonstrated the

signs of even bigger problems. The weakness of liberal democracies'

policy towards Russian hybrid aggression can destroy their

foundations. The West’s policy has not prevented Russia, from using

occupied Crimea, to increase its inuence in the Black Sea region and

projecting its power wider.

In response to the occupation of Crimea, the world community

imposed sanctions. However, the weakness of the sanctions and the

lack of control over them did not stop Russia. The construction of the

bridge across the Kerch Strait became an act of Russian occupation

of the Sea of Azov, creating the tool to block free navigation and

blockade of maritime trade routes and ports of Ukraine. Importantly,

and unfortunately, some Western companies took part in the project

development and implementation.

The ban on the transfer of technology and investment in Russia's

energy projects in Crimea also did not work out. Rapid implementation

of the project to build gas power plants in Crimea would not have

happened without the participation of western companies. Russia,

not having the required technology to build power plants, utilized

Germany's friendly position towards Russia. Ignoring warnings

on Russia's intentions to build power plants in Crimea, Siemens'

technology has been delivered and installed. The publicity and

accusations that Siemens violated EU sanctions resulted in the

dismissal of the local director in the Russian Siemens oce. Soon,

newspapers reported that the company signed new contracts with

the Russian government on the supply of gas turbines and achieved

agreements to increase the level of localization of the technology in

Russia.

The captured oil and gas elds of the Black Sea became not only

a source of rent exploitation of Ukrainian deposits by Russia but also

a military outpost in the western part of the Black Sea. The captured

gas drilling rigs near the mainland of Ukraine became in fact military

bases with a permanent presence of Special Forces units and under

patrolling of the Russian Black Sea Navy. The rigs are equipped with

military reconnaissance equipment for underwater, surface, and air

surveillance. Russia is constantly conducting training activities in the

region, blocking maritime trade routes and eectively occupying part

of the Black Sea.

For Ukraine, this situation creates risks of blocking the sea's

energy supply routes (coal and oil supplies), especially in the event of

further Russian aggression. However, such Russian behavior creates

challenges for other Black Sea countries as it threaten the security

of trade routes. However, there is still no agreed Western position on

Russia's actions in the Black Sea basin. There is no answer on the

response to further aggressive actions of Russia, threatening Ukraine

or other countries of South-Eastern Europe.

Let us emphasize once again that this is not just about Ukraine.

Since 2014, Russia has been pursuing a policy of ousting the West

from the Black Sea basin, using Crimea as an outpost and base for

wider expansion into the Middle East, Africa, and the Mediterranean.

Oleksandr Sukhodolia

The Ukrainian Crimea and the clash

of liberal democracy and autocracy

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3220

The occupation of Crimea is only part of Russia's policy of revenge,

but very successful from the Kremlin’s point of view. It demonstrates

that, instead of a decisive policy and an adequate response to Russia's

actions, the West is retreating. This only inspires autocrats to continue

and expand aggressive action against democracy in other parts of the

world. The question is much broader, even existential: when liberal

democracy nds its readiness to deter revival of autocracy, will it

remember the basic principles of existence enshrined in its values?

And if not, won't the losses be too high?

The continuation of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, to

defeat a society that has been ghting for the values of democracy for

8 years and resisting the expansions of autocracy, is not only a threat

to one country. The lack of support for Ukrainian society and the policy

of aggressor appeasement may be the historical turning point, after

which the era of liberal democracy will end as inecient.

Oleksandr Sukhodolia

Ph.D., Professor, Head of Critical

Infrastructure, Energy and Ecological

Security

Center of Security Studies, National Institute

for Strategic Studies of Ukraine

Ukraine

sukhodolia@gmail.com

To receive a free copy,

Pan-European Institute

Baltic Rim Economies

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Expert article • 3221

Currently, the process of integration of the Crimean

Peninsula into the Russian economic system cannot be

called fully completed. Now the level of socio-economic

development in the Republic of Crimea is still not high.

This is evidenced by many statistical indicators. For

example, in terms of Gross regional domestic product (GRDP), the

Republic of Crimea ranks only fth in the Southern Federal District,

ahead of only such subjects as the Republic of Adygea and the

Republic of Kalmykia. For comparison, the GRDP of the Krasnodar

region exceeds the GRDP of the Republic of Crimea by ve times

(Department of the Federal State Statistics Service for the Republic

of Crimea and Sevastopol. URL: https://crimea.gks.ru/folder/27544).

If we talk about such an indicator as GRDP per capita, then the

Republic of Crimea occupies the last position among all the subjects

of the Southern Federal District. In addition, it is necessary to pay

attention to other important statistical indicators, which also indicate

the rather dicult situation of the economy of the Crimean peninsula

at the present time.

The Republic of Crimea continues to be the leader among all

subjects of the Southern Federal District in terms of food prices. The

dierence in prices between other subjects of the Southern Federal

District averages around 36-40%, depending on the category of

goods, but for a number of goods the dierence reaches up to 60-

80%. The reason for higher prices in Crimea is primarily due to the

fact that large federal retail chains do not want to consider Crimea

as a platform for their development. The main problem is the cost of

renting retail space in the Republic of Crimea, which is several times

higher than, for example, in the Krasnodar region.

An important problem for the Republic of Crimea is also the

prices of utility taris. The growth rates of electricity tari prices are

particularly high. In general, the rates of tari growth in the Republic

of Crimea are the highest of all the subjects of the Southern Federal

District. For example, in 2018, compared to 2016, the increase in

electricity taris was 55%1, and in the period from 2018 to 2020 – by

22.78%.

As a positive point, it can be noted that over the past four years,

wages in municipalities of the republic have increased by an average

of 5-7 thousand rubles. At the same time, over the past few years,

especially over the past 2020, there have been certain trends in some

areas to reduce other socio-economic indicators.

Currently, there is a certain stratication between the northern and

southern parts of the republic in terms of socio-economic development.

1 Reference table of electricity taris for the population of

the Republic of Crimea for 2016. URL: https://energo-24.

ru/taris/electro/2016/11010.html; Reference table of

electricity taris for the population of the Republic of

Crimea for 2018. URL: https://energo-24.ru/taris/

electro/2018-elektro/12881.html

Most municipalities with the most favorable socio-economic situation

are located in the southern part of the republic. Similar municipalities

include the urban districts of Alushta, Yevpatoria, Kerch, Simferopol,

Feodosia, Yalta, and Bakhchisarai district. These municipalities

occupy the rst places in terms of the average salary of the population,

as well as leading positions in terms of the lowest unemployment rate

and a lower coecient of tension in the labor market.

The least economically developed municipalities are located

mainly in the northern part of the peninsula, in particular, they include

Dzhankoy, Krasnoperekopsky, Pervomaisky and Razdolnensky

districts. In addition, municipalities with increased social tension

include several districts of the central and southern part of the Crimean

Peninsula, namely, Nizhnegorsky, Kirovsky, Krasnogvardeysky and

Saki districts (Department of the Federal State Statistics Service for

the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Ocial website. The labor

market and employment of the population. URL: https://crimea.gks.

ru/folder/27542 ).

In 2020, due to the pandemic of the new coronavirus infection

COVID-19, which caused numerous socio-economic problems around

the world, in the Republic of Crimea, as in other regions of Russia,

there was a signicant increase in the unemployment rate, which

at the end of the year was 9.2 times, which is the highest indicator

among all subjects of the Southern Federal District. In general, the

indicators of unemployment growth in Russia look somewhat less

large-scale: by the end of 2020, the unemployment rate in the country

increased by 24.7% and, according to ocial data, amounted to 5.9%

(URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/10572707).

So, turning to conclusions, it should be noted that currently there

are a number of unresolved problems that have a negative impact

on the socio-economic development of the Republic of Crimea.

Such problems include a low GRDP per capita, high prices for food

products, too fast growth rates of utility prices, signicant dierentiation

of municipalities of the republic (between the most lagging northern

regions and the most developed southern ones) in terms of average

wages of the population and the unemployment rate. In addition, a

serious problem is the growth rate of the unemployment rate over the

past two years in a number of municipalities of the Crimea, caused

by a massive decline in economic indicators due to the coronavirus

pandemic that began in 2020.

Dmitry I. Uznarodov

Candidate of Political Sciences, Researcher

Laboratory of Sociology, Federal Research

Centre the Southern Scientic Centre of the

Russian Academy of Sciences

Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation

uzn-dmitrij@yandex.ru

Dmitry I. Uznarodov

Socio-economic development of the

Republic of Crimea in 2018-2020

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3222

The Russian occupation of the Autonomous Republic

of Crimea (ARC) and Sevastopol has led to signicant

changes on the peninsula due to population replacement

and aggravation of the social and economic situation.

Population replacement

During the occupation period, serious demographic transformations

took place in Crimea: the number of residents was rapidly declining,

while Russians were coming on the peninsula en masse.

In 2014-2021, 347.9 thousand people, which is 15% of the

peninsula’s population before the occupation, died in Crimea.

According to Russian sources, about 200 thousand people left

Crimea during the same period. If we add those who left Crimea but did

not cancel their Crimean registration (the occupational administration

continues to count them as peninsula’s residents) to these migrants,

from 250,000 to 300,000 people (10-12% of the peninsula’s population

before the occupation) left the peninsula. Accordingly, due to natural

causes and forced migration, the local population has decreased by

25-28% during the occupation period.

However, according to Russian sources, the total population of

the Autonomous Republic of Crimea has hardly changed and is about

1.9 million people. At the same time, according to ocial gures, the

number of residents in Sevastopol increased by 27% (up to 529.9

thousand). Experts estimated that the population has almost doubled

– up to 700,000 people.

As the birth rate has fallen by an average of 24% after the

annexation of Crimea, external migration became the main source

of human resources. According to Russian sources, in 2014-2021,

353.2 thousand people (15% of the peninsula’s population before

the occupation) moved to Crimea. The vast majority of migrants

were from the Russian regions (60-70%). The Russian authority

encouraged the relocation of Russians to Crimea by various means:

reduced-rate real estate mortgages, cheap loans, material support,

etc.

In addition to ocial migrants, there are a large number of the

Russian military and representatives of other law enforcement

agencies on the peninsula. The migration services do not take into

account these categories. Accordingly, Ukrainian experts estimated

that from 600 thousand to 1 million people moved to Crimea. Thus,

the Russian government has already replaced from 25 to 40% of the

population.

Socio-economic development

Before the annexation, Russia has promised Crimeans an increase in

wages and pensions. In 2015, the average wage in Crimea increased

by 68 euros (up to 330 euros) compared to previous Ukrainian wages.

Over the next period, the average earnings of Crimeans increased

to 452 euros, but they have declined to 423 euros since 2020. The

modal wage (received by the vast majority of the working population)

is about 300 euros. Almost 18% of Crimeans receive a wage of less

than 172 euros.

The situation with pensions is similar: the average pension was

slowly growing during the occupation period and reached 166 euros

in 2021. However, this gure does not correspond to the real situation

due to the signicant number of retired military who have actively

settled on the peninsula after the annexation and have a signicantly

higher pension. So, the real pension coverage for most Crimean

pensioners is not more than 130 euros.

Along with the transition to Russian wages and pensions, Crimea

applies Russian prices for goods and services that are signicantly

higher than the Ukrainian ones. Accordingly, prices increased by 43%

(for products – by 53%) in 2014, and by another 28% (by 23% for

products) in 2015. In the following years, ination rates slowed to

5-7% per year, but in 2021, food ination was 11% in the Autonomous

Republic of Crimea and 14% in Sevastopol.

Russia has invested signicant funds in Crimea (more than 17

billion euros during the occupation period), but most of this money

was spent on large-scale infrastructure projects (“Crimean Bridge”,

Taurida highway between Kerch and Sevastopol) and the military

industry.

At the same time, other companies have faced economic

diculties due to the breakdown of established economic ties, lack

of adequate credit policy (large Russian banks didn’t operate on the

peninsula because of sanctions), and decline in exports by 25 times

(from over a billion dollars to 40 million). As a consequence, more

than 40% of companies are unprotable in Crimea.

As a result of the occupation, serious challenges were faced by

small and medium-sized businesses that have reduced their activities

due to the Russian bureaucratic system of permits and reports,

credit nancing problems, and rent increases. Only 6% of Crimeans

received income from business activities in 2019.

The ocial unemployment rate ranges between 5-6%, although in

fact, there are much more people who can’t nd jobs. This is primarily

because high-paying positions are given to migrants from Russia

(ocials, law enforcement agency sta, bank employees, etc.). As a

consequence, most young people leave Crimea for work opportunities.

As a result, in Sevastopol, only 40% of the total population works, the

rest are children and retirees.

Due to this socio-economic situation, the occupied peninsula

is among the outsiders of Russian socio-economic rankings. For

example, Crimea is one of the ten most disadvantaged regions in

terms of the nancial status of the population; it ranks 78th out of

85 regions in terms of consumer demand, and Crimeans need to

save money from 10.5 (Autonomous Republic of Crimea) to 15.5

(Sevastopol) years to buy own homes. The Autonomous Republic

of Crimea and Sevastopol also rank last in the mortgage availability

ranking.

Yevheniia Horiunova

Social changes in Crimea occupied by

Russia

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3222

In 2020, the Audit Chamber of Russia acknowledged that the

federal targeted development program for Crimea and Sevastopol,

under which the bulk of investments was allocated, would not

allow bringing the living standards of the population to the Russian

average. In such a way, the social situation in Crimea will continue to

deteriorate.

Yevheniia Horiunova

Associate Professor

V.I. Vernadsky Taurida National University

Kyiv, Ukraine

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Eskender Bariiev

Violation of the collective rights of

the Crimean Tatar people is a crime

against humanity

The Crimean Tatar people historically formed in Crimea

and in the Northern Black Sea region along with small

related peoples such as Karaites and Krymchaks. Crimean

Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks belong to the indigenous

population of the Crimean peninsula. They are ocially

recognized as indigenous peoples in Ukraine.

The Crimean Tatar people became a numerical minority in their

homeland, as a result of deliberate policy of genocide after the

liquidation of statehood and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in

1783, the apogee of which was the total forcible deportation of the

Crimean Tatar people.

So in 1944, 238 thousand people were deported, about 110

thousand died in the rst years of deportation, which is 46%.

The regime of a special settlement lasted until 1956, when

people were deprived of the right to free movement, for more than 50

years a policy of denying the existence of the Crimean Tatar people,

assimilation of the language and culture, falsication of historiography

was carried out. Secondary deportations in the 70s and 80s of the

20th century, when people seeking to return to Crimea were forcibly

taken out of Crimea by their whole families and thrown into the eld.

It is impossible not to recall the act of self-immolation of Musa Mamut,

committed by him in 1978, only after that his family was allowed to live

in Crimea.

The policy of racial discrimination and assimilation of the Crimean

Tatars has been going on since 2014, the occupiers are replacing

the population of Crimea. The indigenous Crimean Tatar people are

systematically intimidated and purposefully squeezed out of Crimea

as part of the population disloyal to the aggressor. More than six

hundred thousand Russians have already been brought from Russia

to Crimea, while tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars were forced to

leave it.

And everyone who refuses to accept the yoke of fake "Russian

citizenship" is deprived of the right to private property by the occupiers,

discriminated against in labor and social rights, or even deported from

Crimea.

Impunity breeds new crimes. Therefore, an important factor

in deterring crimes against humanity, minimizing all forms of

discrimination and violence on the temporarily occupied peninsula

should be the recognition by all civilized countries of the world of the

deportation of 1944 as a genocide of the Crimean Tatar people.

Today, it is important for the International Court of Justice and the

European Court of Human Rights to make fair decisions condemning

the current racial discrimination against Crimean Tatars by the

occupiers.

According to the Crimean Tatar Resource Center during the

occupation period of Crimea, 238 political prisoners and those

prosecuted in criminal cases, 169 of whom are representatives of

the indigenous people. 82 were convicted and are serving terms in

colonies on the territory of Russia, 57 of whom are Crimean Tatars,

and 42 are in a pre-trial detention centers, 36 of whom are Crimean

Tatars; 58 are dead, 27 of whom are representatives of the Crimean

Tatar people; 21 victims of violent abductions, 15 of whom are the

representatives of the Crimean Tatar people.

Despite the fact that the Russian authorities of Crimea "ocially"

recognized the Crimean Tatar language as one of the state languages,

the scope of its use is very narrow, there have been cases of threats

to dismiss workers for speaking their native language, which is a

violation of articles 2, 8 and 17 of the UN Declaration on rights of

indigenous peoples.

Before the occupation, there were 15 schools and 384 classes

in Crimea with the Crimean Tatar language of instruction. According

to the data of the de facto authorities, for 2021 there are 7 schools

with the Crimean Tatar language of instruction, 3 with Russian and

Crimean Tatar and 119 classes, which is a violation of Articles 8, 13

and 14 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Items of cultural heritage of the Crimean Tatars were taken out of

Crimea after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 1783.

Since 2014, the Russian government has been falsifying the

historiography of Crimea, including in school history textbooks,

conducts excavations without the consent of the representative body

of the indigenous people, and exports artifacts to Russia. This violates

Article 15 of the UNDRIP.

Under the guise of "restoration" authentic materials of the

Bakhchisaray historical and cultural reserve "Khan's Palace" are

destroyed, articles 8, 11, 15, 31 of the UNDRIP.

Violating articles 8, 25, 26, 27 of the Declaration, the Russian

authorities illegally use the natural resources of Crimea. Biological

resources and minerals are being extracted, the Black Sea shelf is

being developed. Quarrying has led to the destruction of the Crimean

landscape and has a negative impact on the traditional economy of the

Crimean Tatars. The rivers dried up, juniper forests were destroyed.

Due to explosions, houses of local residents are destroyed. As a

result of the construction of the Tavrida highway in Crimea, more than

237,000 trees and shrubs have been destroyed.

In Crimea, the Russian authorities are building military bases and

importing military equipment. Military exercises are held regularly.

These actions violate articles 29, 30 of the UNDRIP.

The FSB is persecuting human rights activists of the indigenous

peoples of Crimea. In 2016, the Supreme Court of Russia banned the

representative body of the Crimean Tatars - the Mejlis of the Crimean

Tatar people, accusing it of extremism, thus violating the right of the

indigenous people to manage their representative institutions. Russia

did not comply with the Interim Decision of the UN ICJ dated April 19,

2017 on lifting the ban on the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.

Expert article • 3223

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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The occupying authorities forbid holding meetings of the

representative body of the Crimean Tatars to make important

decisions for the people.

Armed people carry out systematic mass detentions of Crimean

Tatars, collect personal data from people, take saliva for DNA analysis,

ngerprints. This is a direct violation of Article 12 of the UNDRIP.

Despite the coronavirus pandemic and in violation of the Fourth

Geneva Convention, a mass conscription into the ranks of the Russian

Armed Forces is being carried out, and if people refuse, then criminal

proceedings are opened against them.

The actions of the Russian Federation are criminal, politically

motivated, grossly violating international law.

The families and more than 200 children of political prisoners

and the missing persons need support, and any reaction from the

civilized world inspires and gives hope for the release and return of

their parents.

We are condent that only with active joint opposition to the gross

violation of human rights in Crimea and the unprecedented aggression

of Russia, we will be able to protect not only the indigenous people

of Crimea - the Crimean Tatars and Ukraine, but also Europe and the

whole world.

Expert article • 3223

Eskender Bariiev

Head of the Board

Crimean Tatar Resource Center

Ukraine

Member

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people

Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

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Expert article • 3224

Putin’s “annexation” of Crimea was both a precursor and a

model of the current wholesale invasion of Ukraine. The

Crimean Tatars, the indigenous people of Crimea, fervently

opposed the “annexation” of Crimea because they were

aware that the “annexation” would be tantamount to

the destruction of their nation. The Russians undertook policies of

Russication in Crimea and later Donbas, and there is no doubt that

Putin will implement the same policy if Russia occupied Ukraine for

a longer time.

We should also notice the pattern of Russian history from Ivan

the Terrible to Stalin and Putin: messianic imperialism, which aims

to destroy all smaller nations and impose its own cultural vision and

identity over others. Unlike other nations such as Germany and

Japan, Russia never accepted its crimes and repented, therefore it is

bound to repeat its mistakes.

The invasion, “annexation”, and consequent occupation of

Crimea was a precursor and small-scale model of a contemporary

full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia uses the same tactics over and

over again and the West manages to be surprised each time. First of

all, Putin laid the groundwork for invasion. He supported pro-Russian

politicians in the regional government of Crimea, the local Russian

maa, the local Russian radical and fascist organizations and

paramilitary forces, a pro-Russian chauvinistic media which published

and showed anti-Crimean Tatar and anti-Ukrainian content daily, all

of which proved extremely useful during the invasion. The Black Sea

Fleet was maintained as a Trojan Horse. During the EuroMaidan

Revolution Ukraine fell into chaos and had neither a government nor

much military force. Putin pressed the button for the second stage of

the ‘hybrid’ invasion of Crimea. FSB staged a coup in the Crimean

government while the 40,000 soldiers without insignia occupied all

strategic points of Crimea. Thirdly, Russia organized a hasty and

illegal referendum, which was undertaken completely unlawfully with

practices such as armed soldiers carrying boxes from home to home

and no option for staying with Ukraine being given in the questions

of the referendum. Despite coercion, the turnout was very low, and

the approval rate was even lower. The fourth aspect of occupation

was terrorizing the society for obedience. The dissidents, particularly

Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, were silenced by imprisonment,

disappearances, killings, house searches, and all democratic and

ethnic institutions were abolished or banned. The lack of appropriate

reaction to the Crimean occupation is one of the causes of Ukraine’s

full-scale invasion. For, Putin was encouraged due to the lack of

consequences for the occupation of Crimea. The Western economic

sanctions were quite limited, European countries continued to buy

oil and natural gas from Russia, Russian corrupt money easily found

ways to Western and o-shore nancial institutions, economy, and

politics, and manipulative Russian media continued to broadcast to

western societies.

Russia also intervened in Donbas two months later, organizing

a separatist movement. The western powers, mainly France and

Germany made another mistake of excluding the Crimean question

from the Minsk process that aimed to solve the Donbas conict.

However, appeasement did not work once again, and today Russia

launched a full-edged invasion of Ukraine, using the same ‘hybrid’

tactics. It is imperative to stop Putin and take him and all of his

accomplices to justice.

The Crimean Tatars established an Islamic civilization and a

strong state for 300 years in Crimea before there were any Russians

in the peninsula. The Russian colonization of the peninsula began

after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783, victimizing its native

population, thereby forcing them to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire in

large numbers. Despite the exodus of a large part of their population,

the Crimean Tatars were able to declare their independent state, only

to be crashed by Bolsheviks and leaders of their nation to be killed

or exiled. However, the most signicant crime against the Crimean

Tatars was the deportation of the whole nation from their homeland.

On 18 May 1944, Stalin ordered the deportation of the Crimean Tatars

to Central Asia and Siberia en masse on the pretext of collaboration

with Nazis. This was the most unjust accusation as all the young

males were serving in the Soviet army, and many Crimean Tatars

joined or helped Soviet partisans. The women, elderly, and children

were given fteen minutes to prepare belongings, loaded in cattle

cars, and after three weeks of travel, were unloaded to Central Asian

desserts, Ural Mountains, or Siberian taiga to try to survive in poverty

and misery. On the way to places of deportation and shortly afterward,

the Crimean Tatars lost at least 40% of their population.

The Crimean Tatars were suciently resilient and returned

collectively after 50 years, yet they were once again devastated by

the occupation of Crimea in 2014. Since the annexation of Crimea,

Russia unleashed its policy of re-colonization and Russication

of Crimea. While forcing Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians to leave,

at least 850 000 Russians were settled in the peninsula. What the

Russian government has done in Crimea and Donbas is beyond

human rights violations. Russia committed crimes against humanity

and war crimes, for it is responsible to implement Geneva Convention

in its occupied territories. The case of Crimea also demonstrates

clearly what will happen if Ukraine is occupied by Russia for a longer

period.

Crimea does not belong to Russia in the rst place despite Putin’s

historical narrative. Russia’s only historical relation to Crimea is one

of the colonizers’ to colonized. Russia lost any right to Crimea through

acts of terror perpetrated against its indigenous population several

times in its history. Crimea belongs to Ukraine, a democratic and

pluralist country that recognizes and respects the indigenous rights

of the Crimean Tatars. Most of all, Crimea belongs to its indigenous

people, Crimean Tatars. The international community must not regard

Filiz Tutku Aydın

Crimea, Crimean Tatars and the

Russian invasion of Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3224

Crimea as a bargaining chip in the post-war settlement with Russia

but instead insist on the restoration of the whole territorial integrity of

Ukraine.

Putin, while claiming the legacy of Russian polities, culture,

and achievements in the past, rejects the historical crimes Russian

Empire or the Soviet Union perpetrated, among which are Crimean

Tatar deportation and Holodomor. After the war, a transitional justice

process must be initiated for Russia to redress its historical injustices

instead of adding new ones, as the war in Ukraine shows forgetting

almost guarantees the repetition of crimes.

Filiz Tutku Aydın

Assistant Professor

Social Sciences University of Ankara

Turkey

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Expert article • 3225

Although there is abundant literature on Crimean Tatars

(CTs), especially about about their tragic fate related to

the genocidal deportation of May 1944, some aspects of

the CTs case, less known and poorly understood by the

international community, need to be claried.

One of the points is their ’indigenousness’. CTs identify

themselves as an indigenous people –not just one of the numerous

national minorities of Ukraine – from the very beginning of the

repatriation to their Homeland in late 80-s of the 20th century. Indeed,

they fully comply with all ‘indigenous peoples’ denitions enshrined

in the international law. For CTs, the Crimean Peninsula is not simply

a geographical area where their ethnogenesis took place or the

land they traditionally cultivate; they have strong spiritual ties with

the Crimea and its nature. This territory is inextricably linked to the

unique Crimean Tatar identity which they have never lost, despite all

attempts by the Russian and Soviet Empires to deny it through either

assimilation or not separating from a larger Tatar ethnos.

CTs demanded such a status to be ocially recognised, but this

did not happen until occupation of Crimea by the RF in 2014. Only on

March 20, 2014 Verkhovna Rada issued Decree N 1140-18l followed

on 1 July 2021 by the long-awaited law on CTs as an indigenous

people of Ukraine, and the Mejlis as their main representative-

executive body.

During occupation of the peninsula CTs proved to be the

main politically and socially organised force that persistently but

peacefully resisted it. For this and generally pro-Ukrainian position

they were ‘punished’ by persecutions and repressions including

illegal searches, detainments, abductions, ‘disappearances’ never

properly investigated, and arrests under false charges of ‘terrorism’

and ‘extremism’ – without any proven evidence of crimes committed

or even wrongdoings breaching the RF-imposed Russian legislation.

In all cases, international HR law and vast majority of articles of

the 4th Geneva convention (1949) – the basis of the international

humanitarian law – have been brutally violated.

Although persecutions on political and religious grounds are

widespread on the occupied peninsula, there are CTs who suer the

most and constitute the lion share among all victims of the oppressive

regime. At the end of 2021, 162 out of 230 persons repressed by the

occupants, were CTs (while they make up only 13 – 15% of the Crimean

population). In 2016 Mejlis was banned as an ‘extremist organisation’,

two Deputy Heads arrested (Akhtem Chiygoz in January 2015, Ilmi

Umerov – in May 2016; on 25 October 2017, both were saved by the

President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who swapped them for

two Russian spies). Nariman Dzhelyal, the only CT leader remaining

in Crimea, was arrested on 4 September 2021 on absurd charges

of ‘sabotage’ – in fact, due to his participation in the inauguration

summit of Crimean Platform in Kyiv on 23 August. Criminal cases

were also initiated against the Head of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov

and charismatic people’s leader Mustafa Djemilev; both men were

prohibited from entering the peninsula. Now the Mejlis oce functions

in Kyiv, whereas many active members of the community moved to

mainland Ukraine in 2014 – 2015 and some of them joined the ranks

of Ukrainian Army as volunteers or under contract.

Attempts to intimidate CTs and force them to stop their peaceful

struggle against the occupiers have failed. All cases of political

persecution continue to be covered, and support for the repressed

and their families provided. An outstanding role in the information

ow from the occupied Crimea to mainland Ukraine, used also by

international organisations, belongs to the public movement ‘Crimean

Solidarity’ (CS). Although many coordinators and civic journalists from

the CS have been arrested and sentenced, its activities and growing

popularity are not suppressed, and the number of the CS members

and supporters is on the rise. First appeared in 2018 as a reaction to

the persecutions of Crimean Tatar Muslims, it gradually transformed

into the genuinely ‘all-Crimean’ initiative uniting and consolidating

people of dierent ethnicities and religious denominations. Its

eectiveness is also determined by a ‘horizontal’ networking structure

not depending on a single leader. This amazing example of a non-

violent counteraction to the occupying power shouldn’t come

unheeded by the international community. It is especially topical after

peaceful protests in Russia and Belarus were crushed and almost

ceased to exist, thus undermining the validity of the concept of non-

violent resistance described and promoted by Gene Sharp in his

famous pamphlet ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy”. After the large-

scale military invasion of the RF into Ukraine on February 24, 2022,

many CTs, who settled in the southern regions bordering Crimea,

experienced the second wave of occupation. Some of them ed to

safer places or become refugees. Men with military training re-joined

Ukrainian troops, hoping that victory in this crucial phase of the eight-

year war would help de-occupy Crimea and enable them to return to

their Homeland.

Natalya Belitser

Expert/Senior Researcher

Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy

Ukraine

belitser.n1@gmail.com

Natalya Belitser

Crimean Tatars and occupation of

Crimea

Baltic Rim Economies

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Veikko Jarmala

Crimean Estonians

Crimea is well known for its culturally diverse and rich

history. The most dominant civilisations in the history have

been Graeco-Roman and Turkic-Islamic (Tatar) cultures

whilst Russian dominance forms only about 6 percent of

the whole history. However, the era of Russian Empire

brought also new smaller minorities in the peninsula, e.g. Estonians,

who have been remarkably living there already 160 years ago despite

all the hardships, repressions and wars.

In the beginning Russian colonization actually meant even

further diversifying of the population in the peninsula. The Russian

Empress Catherine II preferred colonisation of Crimea by European

settlers, especially Germans, being of that background herself. After

the Crimean war (1855-1856) the Russian policy turned towards

Russication and deportations. During this period the Russian

population quadrupled from 7 to 29 percent, while the Tatars were

deported to Turkey. The share of the native main population, the

Tatars started to diminish rst to the half after the Crimean war and

by the end of the 19th century they had lost their place as a majority.

This trend of Russication and de-Tatarisation continued through the

Imperial and Soviet times culminating with the total deportation of all

Crimean Tatars to Central Asia in 1944.

The imperial government in St. Petersburg had a need to resettle

the emptied Tatar lands. Also bringing other non-Russian population

from other parts of the vast empire in to the Russian-speaking

environment would contribute further to their Russication.

With this context in the background, began the settling of Estonians

in Crimea. Estonians lived in two gubernias (governorates), Estonia

and Livonia, which were under the Baltic German semi-autonomous

minority rule recognised by the Imperial government. The population

surplus of Estonian governorates, the railway connections, the

example of others, the aim to get better life somewhere else and

religious movements were among the reasons why Estonians for their

part saw the possibility to leave for Crimea. In the case of Crimea,

the latter reason was especially important. Juhan Leinberg, so called

Prophet Maltvets, was a layman leader of Lutheran sect called

Maltvetsian. During the autumn of 1860, Leinberg got an idea to move

to Crimea with his successors, as he had heard that the Emperor

needed settlers for the empty settlements left from the deported

Tatars. For his successors, Crimea would be the Biblical Promised

Land and Prophet Maltvets would be the new Moses. In January 1861

the Emperor granted an Imperial permission for Maltvetsians to move

for Crimea.

The First Estonian settlers, ve families, arrived at Crimea at the

beginning of autumn 1861. During the next spring, 700 Maltvetsians

arrived at Crimea. However, the Maltvetsian movement did not

thrive and the Prophet himself returned back to Estonia with his

family in 1865, but the foundation for the Estonian settlement in

Crimea had been laid. Despite the hardships of the early phase,

hardworking and co-operative Estonians survived and re-established

the old Crimean Tatar settlements of Zamruq (Beregovoye) (1861),

Kara-Kiyat (Grushevoe) (1862), (Pervomaiskoe) (1863), Dzurchi

(Pervomaiskoe) (1863), Konchi-Shavva (Krasnodarka) (1863),

Syrt-Karakchora (1864), Kiyat-Orka (Upornoe) (1864) and Uchkuyu

Tarkhan (Kolodeznoe) (1879). Yapunca (Vypasnoe) was mentioned

in 1864 census as Estonian-Tatar mixed village and mixed population

had also Dzhaga-Kushchu (Okhotnikovo). The last Novaya Estoniya

(Novoestonia) was mentioned for the rst time in 1926.

The preceding and subsequent years of the First World War

were the heydays of Crimean Estonians. When the Estonian writer

Eduard Vilde visited local Estonians in 1904, he could only praise the

settlements. The Estonians had the highest literacy rate, as they had

immediately at the very beginning established schools and churches,

their houses were built of stone and they were wealthier than other

inhabitants.

When the Crimean ASSR was established in 1921, there were

2367 Estonians with the share of 0.4% of the population; this made

them as the seventh largest ethnic group of the peninsula. There were

31 Estonian villages or settlements. A total of 1,570 Estonians (with

97% procient in the Estonian language) lived in the rural settlements,

while 524 Estonians lived in the cities (276 in Simferopol, 218 in other

cities). The Leninist oppression started to diminish Estonian population

from the beginning of the Soviet rule. As the Estonian population was

classied as too wealthy, they lost their election rights. Even though

there were no real elections in Soviet Russia/Union, meant losing the

voting rights also other socio-economic problems. The worst was to

become when the Stalinist purge and repressions started in the latter

half of the 1930’s.

In 1939 there were 1,900 Estonians, 1,291 in 1970, 1,048 in

1979 and 985 in 1989. During the Soviet times, some new Estonians

moved to Crimea, especially to Simferopol, but the main tendency

of the Soviet era was Russication of Crimean Estonians and the

dominance of the Russian language. Nowadays there are 500-600

Estonians and about one third of them can speak Estonian. Additional

2000-5000 Crimeans have Estonian roots too.

The only Estonian village left today is Krasnodarka, which is

also the place for Estonian Cabin and museum. Before Russian

occupation of Crimea in 2014, there were three Estonian cultural

societies in Crimea. At least two of them are still working, one in

Sevastopol. In Aleksandrovka (Oleksandrivka in Ukrainian) there was

an Estonian school (2002-2014) that was also popular among other

nationalities. Estonian Foreign Ministry sent there an Estonian teacher

on the basis of an agreement with Ukraine, but after the occupation

and annexation by Russian Federation, all ocial relations between

Estonian state and Crimean Estonians ceased.

Currently there is a small conict of interests between Crimean

Estonians and Republic of Estonia. The former have an interest

to survive also in the current situation; at least ocially they have

recognised the new Russian rule. However, the latter needs to hold on

the principles of international justice and maintain the policy of state

integrity of Ukraine. There has been discussion how Estonians and

Estonia could support Crimean Estonians without endangering the

rights of Ukraine. Recently through a fundraising in Estonia, Estonian

Cabin (Eesti Tare) was renovated in Krasnodarka, which was kind of

example how the support could be organised through civil society.

However, it needs to be remembered that civil society does not freely

exist in Russia, and Kremlin usually tries to lead it to support its own

politics. Also it needs to be ensured that the cultural activity is real and

not just showing national costumes as the ocial minority policy of

Russian Federation tends to be.

Expert article • 3226

Veikko Jarmala

M.Soc.Sc., Doctoral Candidate in

Contemporary History

University of Helsinki

Finland

veikko.jarmala@helsinki.

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3227

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops on February 24,

2022, is a continuation of the dramatic Russian-Ukrainian

confrontation that began on February 20, 2014, with

the occupation of Crimea. The reasons why this small

peninsula is of such great importance to Vladimir Putin

are well known. Firstly, it is a "natural aircraft carrier" that allows one

to keep the Black Sea basin under control, and secondly, Crimea

is an important "memory space" in Russian culture. That is why, to

justify the attempted annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin used alleged

"historical" arguments as understandable to the majority of Russians.

Let's take them in turn.

1. According to the supposed "canonical" version of the myth, Crimea

was allegedly inhabited by Slavs for a long time, and only with the

arrival of nomads, they were forced out of the peninsula. A cursory

glance at the modern ethnographic map of the peninsula, 60% of

whose population are ethnic Russians, adds weight to this statement.

There is, in fact, no archaeological evidence of the presence of

a permanent Slavic population on the peninsula until the 11th-13th

centuries. Even later in some cities, there were only separate quarters

for Rus` merchants. There is also no evidence of a permanent

Russian population in the era of the Crimean Khanate. During the

eviction (de facto deportation) of Christians from the peninsula by

order of Catherine the Great in 1778, Russians (and Ukrainians)

were not recorded among 33,000 of Christian exiles. By the time of

the Russian Empire’s rst annexation of Crimea in 1783, there were

barely 2000 immigrants from Russia.

The transformation of Russians from a minority into an absolute

majority of Crimean residents was the result of Russia's purposeful

policy – both imperial and Soviet. On the one hand, the Center created

unfavorable conditions for the Crimean Tatar population, mainly

due to land fraud, forcing Crimean Tatars to emigrate en masse to

the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, this policy stimulated the

resettlement of Russians from the central regions of the country to

Crimea in every possible way.

Even under these conditions, only at the beginning of the twentieth

century, the number of Russians exceeded the number of Crimean

Tatars, and only after the deportation of the indigenous people of

Crimea of 1944, Russians turned into the absolute majority of the

population of the peninsula.

2. Another argument that Russia justies the seizure of the Crimean

Peninsula with is Crimea’s supposedly eternal belonging to Russia.

From this point of view, the events of 2014 do not look like the seizure

of someone else's territory, but instead the so-called "restoration of

historical justice" and "return to their native harbor."

In particular, there are claims that part of the Kerch Peninsula

belonged to the old Russian Tmutarakan principality and that the

ancient Chersonese, taken by Prince Vladimir, fell into the sphere

of inuence of Russia. Thus, Moscow's claims to the alleged "Old

Russian heritage" are legitimized.

In fact, many years of excavations have proved that modern Kerch

and its surroundings have never been part of Russia. Professional

historians of both Ukraine and Russia agree on this. Similarly,

Chersonesos, after being captured by Vladimir, was returned to

Byzantium and did not remain subject to Kyiv. Nevertheless, school

textbooks and atlases simply replicate false information about

Crimea’s history fabricated by Moscow’s propaganda machine.

Thus, there can be no question of any ancient possession of

Crimea by Russian princes. Under these conditions, the real "Russian

period" in the history of the peninsula began in 1783 with the rst

annexation of Crimea and ended in 1954 after its transfer to Ukraine.

Against the background of the 3,000-year written history of the

peninsula, the time of Russian power over it lasted formally 171

years or 5.5%. For comparison, the Crimean Khanate existed on the

peninsula for exactly twice as long.

3. On March 18, 2014, Putin said that when the USSR collapsed in

1991, the residents of Crimea were not asked if they wanted to live

in an independent Ukraine, but were granted to the new state "like a

sack of potatoes." Allegedly only Putin himself asked the opinion of

the Crimeans at the "referendum".

In fact, on December 1, 1991, an absolutely legitimate national

referendum on the attitude to the declaration of independence of the

country was held throughout the territory of Ukraine. On it, 54% of

residents of Crimea and 57% of residents of Sevastopol supported

the independence of Ukraine. Thus, Putin simply lied.

The so-called "Crimean referendum" on March 16, 2014, was

completely illegitimate, so its results were not recognized by anyone

in the world, except Russia itself.

So, Putin, Russian ocials, and even, unfortunately, some

professional historians have lied or manipulated the facts when

it comes to Crimea and continue to do so. Unable to justify the

occupation with legal arguments, Moscow resorts to historical – or

rather, quasi-historical ones.

You can read more in my book "#CrimeaIsOurs. History of the

Russian Myth" (Kyiv, 2017), which is legally available on the Internet.

Serhii Hromenko

Ph.D., Expert

The Ukrainian Institute for the Future

Ukraine

Serhii Hromenko

Putin misuses the history of Crimea in

the war against Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Nikita Lomagin

Russia's historic relations with Crimea

The Crimea plays a very important role in Russian history and

identity. Victory over Ottoman Empire in two wars (1768-74,

1788-1792) secured the territory north of the Black Sea as

far west as the Dniester river, including the vital agricultural

and mineral resources of southern Ukraine, an area that

became known as New Russia. In the process, Russia annexed the

Crimea in 1783. As long as the Crimea remained independent, Russia

could have no navy in the Black Sea – the Sea of Azov freezes over

from November to April and its exit was too shallow for large warships.

Thus, Russia’s future as a naval power in the Black Sea depended on

a settlement of the ‘Crimean question’.1

The Black Sea ports of Crimea provide quick access to the Eastern

Mediterranean, Balkans and Middle East. The nearby Dnieper River is

a major waterway and transportation route that crosses the European

continent from north to south and ultimately links the Black Sea with

the Baltic Sea.

Russia’s domination in the region ended by humiliating defeat in

the Crimean War of 1853-56. This war was about the control of the two

decisive points, the Turkish Straits and the Khyber Pass. The British

government decided to claim control over the mouths of the Danube,

the Dniepr, and the Don. In January 1853, it drew a line along the

right bank of the Danube beyond which a Russian advance would be

met with declaration of war, and it pledged to defend any Turkish port

in the Black Sea against a Russian attack. Russia has fought alone

against Turkey, France, and Great Britain.

The war turned into a series of far-ung naval operations unlikely

to settle anything. Only in the Crimea did a large allied forces launch

a major operation but the siege of Sevastopol lasted until September

1855. In December 1854, when the siege was tightening, the foreign

secretary Lord Clarendon set forth another Britain’s goal – the

demolition of Sevastopol and other Russian fortresses on the eastern

coast of the Black Sea to shake Russia’s hold on the Caucasus, the

elimination of Russia’s naval installations in that sea, the reduction

of its navy to four ships, and a revision of the Straits Convention to

allow Britain and France to maintain the same number of warships

in the Black Sea. The Treaty of Paris, signed on March 30, 1856,

moderated these radical demands by reasserting the old rule that

British and French warships would not be allowed into the Black Sea

in peacetime but it forced Russia to accept the neutralization of the

Black Sea and retrocede to Turkey the mouth of Danube and part of

Bessarabia, won from the Turks almost half a century earlier. Also,

the friendship treaty between Turks and the two maritime powers

guaranteed that in the event of the war the sultan would allow their

warships to cross into the Black Sea to attack a defenseless Russia.

The Crimean defeat signied the end of Russia’s status as the

supreme land power in Europe and made fundamental reforms

unavoidable. The Paris settlement was a great humiliating geopolitical

loss for Russia which created preconditions for taking revenge.

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Crimea became an

autonomous republic within the Russian SFSR in the Soviet Union.

During the Second World War the peninsula was invaded by Nazi

Germany and Romanian troops in summer 1941. Following the

capture of Sevastopol after severe battles on 4 July 1942, Crimea

was occupied until German and Romanian forces were expelled in an

oensive by Soviet forces ending in May 1944. The Nazis murdered

around 40,000 Crimean Jews.

1 LeDonne, John P. (1997). The Russian Empire and the

World, 1700-1917. The Geopolitics of Expansion and

Containment. New York, Oxford. Oxford U. Press, p. 106.

During the Second World War, Crimea was downgraded to the

Crimean Oblast and the entirety of one of its indigenous populations,

the Crimean Tatars, were deported to Central Asia. In 1954, the Soviet

leader Nikita Khrushchev, transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR

from the Russian SFSR. The year 1954 happened to mark the 300th

anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, which was signed in 1654 by

representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate and Tsar Alexis

of Russia.

By 1991, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, headquartered in Sevastopol,

had 100,000 personnel and 835 ships. With the collapse of the Soviet

Union, Ukraine was reestablished as an independent state, and most

of the peninsula was reorganized as the Autonomous Republic of

Crimea, and the city of Sevastopol retained its special status within

Ukraine. In 1992-95, Russia supported Yuri Meshkov, the head of

the Crimean provincial government, who was a proponent of holding

a referendum on succession of the peninsula from the rest of the

country. In 1995, amidst the rst war between Russia and Chechnya,

the Ukrainian national parliament dismissed Meshkov and annulled

the autonomous status of Crimea.

As Russian identity is concerned, as a result of disintegration of

the Soviet Union, numerous sacred symbols of old imperial Russia

(e.g., Kiev and Narva) and twentieth-century Soviet Russia (e.g. the

Baikonur Cosmodrome and the Brest fortress) were displaced beyond

the borders of the Russian Federation almost overnight. Sevastopol

was a symbol of glory of both imperial and Soviet Russia.2 Alongside

Kiev and Odesa, Sevastopol was awarded the status of 'hero-city'

to commemorate the heroism of their defenders during the Second

World war.

A Treaty of ‘Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership’ sealed by

Boris Yeltsin and the Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma in May

1997 set aside the territorial issue over Crimea. Separate agreements

partitioned the Black Sea eet, with Moscow buying out much of the

Ukrainian’s share in exchange for debt relief, and provided a 20-year

lease on the naval base in Sevastopol and the right to billet 25,000

sailors, aviators and marines there. Ukraine extended Russia's lease

of the naval facilities under the 2010 Kharkiv Pact in exchange for

further discounted natural gas.

In late February 2014, following the regime change in Ukraine that

ousted the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, the Republic of

Crimea declared its independence from Ukraine following a disputed

referendum on 16 March, deemed illegal by Ukraine and most

countries, which was held on the issue of reunication with Russia; its

ocial results showed over 90% support for reunication, but the vote

was boycotted by many loyal to Ukraine. Russia formally annexed

Crimea on 18 March, incorporating the Republic of Crimea and the

federal city of Sevastopol as the 84th and 85th federal subjects of

Russia.

2 Serhii Plokhy, ‘The City of Glory: Sevastopol

in Russian Historical Mythology’, Journal of

Contemporary History, Vol. 35, No. 3

(Jul., 2000), pp. 370-371

Expert article • 3228

Nikita Lomagin

Professor

European University

St. Petersburg, Russia

lomagin@eu.spb.ru

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3229

Why did Khrushchev transfer Crimea to Ukraine in

1954? Historians do not have any uniform opinion

about that. This fact is mostly attributed to the well-

known extravagance of the First Secretary of the CC

of the CPSU (Central Committee of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union) or to his desire to atone for his guilt towards

the Ukrainians because of the mass repressions in which Khrushchev

was involved in the past. Meantime, we believe that the reply is to be

found elsewhere – in the history of construction of the North Crimean

Canal.

The fact is that water resources in Crimea are among the poorest

in Europe. According to the statistical data, in 1864, fresh water was

not suitable for drinking in half the settlements of the peninsula.

Naturally, crop farming would be next to impossible there without

additional irrigation.

First projects to bring the water from the Dnieper River appeared

as early as in the middle of the 19th century; then there were some

projects at the beginning of the 20th century. None of them were

supported due to lack of funds. It was after the Second World War

only that the real chance to build a canal appeared. On September

21, 1951, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued the decree ‘On

construction of the Kakhovka HPP on the Dnieper River, the South

Ukrainian Canal and the North Crimean Canal and on irrigation of land

in the South regions of Ukraine and the North regions of the Crimea’.

The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) of the USSR calculated the

cost of work, and surveys began. The scope included construction

of the Kakhovka Reservoir on the Dnieper River (and moving out

of dozens of settlements), the Kakhovka HPP, dozens of pumping

stations, hundreds of kilometers of power lines and highways, and

excavation of millions of tons of soil. The design length of the North

Crimean Canal alone was over 402 kilometers, while the total length

of its water networks exceeded 5,000 kilometers. Needless to say,

the construction would require thousands of workers, a great number

of building and road machinery. The construction of the Kakhovka

Reservoir including the HPP and the system of canals became the

largest infrastructural project in the post-war USSR.

It was at that moment that the question was raised: who exactly

would manage the giant construction project? The fact is that

ministries in the USSR were subdivided into the Union ministries

and the Republican ones. The rst types were in charge of issues

of the whole country, while the second – those on the level of the

Republics. However, actual execution of the Union-level projects

was the responsibility of ministries of those Republics, in which such

projects were implemented.

As far as the Kakhovka HPP and the South Ukrainian Canal were

concerned, everything was clear. They were built in the territory of

Ukraine, and their construction was, accordingly, under direct control

of the Council of Ministers of the UkSSR (the Ukrainian SSR). For that

purpose, the Republic established a company called ‘Ukrvodostroi’;

besides, there was 'Dneprostroi’ Company, which had built the

Dneproges (Dnieper Hydroelectric Station) during 1927-1932.

The construction of the North Crimean Canal was a more

complicated matter. It would start in the territory of the UkSSR, from

the Kakhovka Reservoir, and would end in a branched irrigation

system in Crimea, in the territory of the RSFSR (the Russian Soviet

Federative Socialist Repulic). But managing of any projects within the

territory of the RSFSR by the Council of Ministers of the UkSSR (just

as vice versa) had been unheard of in the Soviet history. And it would

be stupid to build the canal up to the boundary of Crimea, and then

hand it over to be operated by the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.

It was clear even from plain reckoning that management of the

vast construction project spread over the territory of the two Republics

would be easier from a single center, and, better still – from Ukraine: it

was adjacent to Crimea, and besides, majority of the work scope was

carried out within its territory.

And then Khrushchev had an idea how to x the whole package

of these administrative and economic problems: Crimean Region

along with the responsibility for construction of the Crimean portion of

the canal should be transferred to the Republic that was closer, and

that was already involved in the construction of the irrigation system,

i.e., the Ukrainian SSR. The First Secretary of the CC of the CPSU

thought: at the end of the day, it did not really matter who Crimea

would formally belong to, because the Soviet Union was unbreakable,

and would exist forever. And in order to decorate somehow the fact

of the transfer, a matching date was selected – the forthcoming

300th anniversary of Pereyaslav Council (1654) as the symbol of the

Russian and Ukrainian unity.

On February 19, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of

the USSR issued the Decree ‘On transfer of Crimean Region from the

RSFSR to the UkSSR’. Note the statement of reason in this resolution:

‘Considering the common economies, the adjacent territories and the

close economic and cultural links between Crimean Region and the

Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet the RSFSR

hereby resolves that…’. It was the economic reasoning that prompted

Khrushchev’s decision. On April 26 of the same year, the Supreme

Soviet of the USSR approved the decree of its Presidium and made

the respective amendments to the Constitution of the USSR. From

now on, the Council of Ministers of the UkSSR was fully responsible

for the construction of the North Crimean Canal named after the

Komsomol of Ukraine (that was the name given to the Canal), as

well as for any other improvements in Crimea including the previously

unprecedented construction of the multi-kilometer mountain trolleybus

line Simferopol-Alushta-Yalta. The rst phase of the Canal was

commissioned on October 17, 1963; the ceremony was attended by

N.S.Khrushchev himself. The construction was completed after his

death, in 1975.

Sergei V. Moshkin

Why did Khrushchev transfer Crimea

to Ukraine?

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Expert article • 3229

Hence, it appears that Khrushchev’s decision to transfer Crimea to

Ukraine has not been dictated by the international feeling of friendship

between peoples (although one cannot deny that, either), nor by his

guilt complex towards the Ukrainian people, and certainly not by the

romantic desire to make a luxury gift to his Ukrainian wife, as it was

then rumored. The destiny of Crimea in 1954 was determined by a

pragmatic and seemingly simple economic decision to build a canal

between the two Union republics that were at that time friends.

Sergei V. Moshkin

Doctor of Political Science, Senior

Researcher

Institute of Philosophy and Law, Department

of Philosophy, Ural Branch of the Russian

Academy of Sciences

Ekaterinburg, Russia

To receive a free copy,

Pan-European Institute

Baltic Rim Economies

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Expert article • 3230

The ongoing Russian war against Ukraine began due

to doctrinal narratives imposed on Russian society by

Russian propaganda. Crimea possesses a special place

in the Russian historical memory - it has absorbed most of

the unifying historical narratives. Also for a modern Russian

identity, Crimea acts as a cultural frontier. Thus, the Russians perceive

Crimea not only as a symbol of a naval power for protecting the

empire’s borders but also as an outpost of Soviet (cultural) heritage.

Virtually the entire legitimizing discourse on the occupation and

annexation of Crimea is built through references to the past and

presents this event as a correction of historical injustice and previously

committed illegal acts.

The historical continuity of the relationship between Crimea

and Russia is marked by the signicant state-building and military

narratives:

– the baptism of Prince Volodymyr in Chersonesus is presented as

a symbol of Russia’s succession to Byzantium and as a symbol

of the state act that laid the foundations for future Russian

statehood;

– the goal of the military contests for Crimea in the 18th century

was to strengthen Russia’s presence in the Black Sea and gain

the right to enter the Mediterranean, and the peninsula itself is

seen as a “fair trophy;”

– the Russians associate Crimea in the 20th century primarily with

hostilities and casualties during World War II, and therefore the

peninsula is closely linked to the historical narrative of the Great

Patriotic War and victory.

The leitmotif of the Crimean theme in Russian historical memory is

the concepts of “justice” and “truth”. “Truth” is understood in Russian

culture as a synthesis of law and justice, law and morality. In this

sense, “‘truth’ is the highest expression of justice that is inherent in

Russian civilization” and is opposed to “law as a limited expression of

justice that is inherent in Western civilization”.

In referencing historical events, the “justice” of Russia’s ownership

of Crimea is being justied by the duration of its ownership of the

peninsula, its sacred signicance for the Russian state and spirituality,

and the blood shed for this territory. The historical narrative of the

continuity of Russian statehood since the baptism of Volodymyr the

Great in Crimea turns further contests for Crimea into Russia’s “fair”

desire to keep “what rightly belongs to it,” which naturally reinforces

the military dimension of historical memory. Therefore, it is logical

that Russian scientic discourse is given to the historical military

background: military glory gained during the wars for Crimea in the

18th century, stories of heroism and sacrice of the Great Patriotic

War, and so on.

In this context, certain rhetorical and comparative techniques

used in the Russian public space deserve attention. In addition to the

above-mentioned terms “truth” and “justice,” the symbol of the mother

is widely used, which strengthens the ethical arguments by showing

the inseparable link between Russia and Crimea and emphasizing

Russia’s duty to protect the peninsula. The use of the mother image is

considered a traditional method of military propaganda, designed to

convince of the purity of a state’s intentions and the just nature of the

war on its part.

The Kremlin and representatives of pro-government scientic

discourse regard the inhabitants of the occupied peninsula, in

particular the Crimean Tatars, with distrust, which is expressed

in certain interpretations and emphasis on the specics of inter-

ethnic relations when describing the Soviet and post-Soviet periods

of Crimean history. The Russian focus is on the destructive role of

the Crimean Tatars as collaborators during World War II and the

the Crimean Tatars as the possible source of modern international

terrorism.

The other focal points of Russian propaganda are “the rights”

of the Russian Federation to make “peacekeeping interventions”

in Crimea, the “illegitimacy” of Ukrainian claims to Crimea, and the

legitimacy and legality of the Russian Federation’s actions. These

narratives are constructed mainly by manipulative interpretations of

legal documents, processes and events. For example, Russia fails to

recognize the relevance of these internationally binding agreements

and obligations concerning Crimea (e.g. the CSCE Helsinki Final Act

of 1975 is called by Russian side irrelevant because it consolidated the

political and territorial results of World War II as of 1945 when Crimea

was part of the RSFSR) and the legality of Russian intervention in

Crimea and policy towards Ukraine.

It can be said that the topic of Crimea in the policy of the Russian

Federation is a special instrument, by which the Russian government

uses/crafts historical memory to strengthen its domestic and foreign

policy actions.(so far, in the eyes of its own population). Russian

citizens unequivocally support the illegal annexation of Crimea as

an act committed for the sake of “truth,” “justice,” and “memory of

the heroic past” – categories that, in the opinion of most Russians,

outweigh all other considerations. Such support, in turn, gives these

categories a special power – the power to legitimize other illegal

actions in the eyes of their society if they are interpreted and explained

accordingly. The desire of Russian politicians and scholars to make

these conceptual approaches acceptable in the eld of international

relations is part of the general destabilizing inuence of Russia on the

international legal order, considering the vast (false) narratives/ ideas

and myths that can stem from Russian historical memory.

Olena Snigyr

Ph.D., Head

Department of Informational and Analytical

Support, Ukrainian Institute of National

Remembrance

Ukraine

Olena Snigyr

Crimean narratives of Russian

historical memory

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

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Elena Kayukova

Fresh water of the Crimean Peninsula

The water resources of Crimea are one of the leading

factors for the stable development of the region. After

the reunication of the Republic of Crimea with Russia in

March 2014, the relations with Ukraine becoming more

complicated. This aected all spheres of interaction,

including water management.

Until 2014 Crimea provided itself with about 20% of its own

fresh water resources. So, on average in 1990-2000 the total water

resources of the Crimea were: water from the Dnieper River through

the North Crimean Canal - 78.3%; natural river ow (ponds and

reservoirs) – 11.8%; groundwater - 7.8%; marine waters – 2.1%. That

is, Crimea received about 80% of fresh resources from the Dnieper

water supplied through the North Crimean Canal.

The North Crimean Canal is a unique hydrotechnical complex

(its main channel is 402.6 km long). The canal provided Crimea with

water for more than 50 years. The cut o the water supply through

the North Crimean Canal immediately aected the general balance of

water resources, as a result of which the Water Management Complex

of the Republic of Crimea faced the problem of nding additional

sources of water. Since 2014 it has been necessary to focus on the

internal capabilities of the peninsula (natural river and underground

ows).

Climate is the principal factor in the formation of Crimean fresh

waters. Atmospheric precipitation is the main source of accumulation

and renewal of fresh water, evaporation plays the role of a regulator in

the redistribution of water reserves.

Crimean rivers, despite their small size and the fact that most of

them dry up in summer, still contribute much to the water balance.

Fresh drinking water is distributed extremely unevenly across the

territory of the Crimean peninsula.

The total own river runo resources of the Crimea average are 1

km3/year, of which 85% are in the Mountain Crimea and 15%, in the

Lowland Crimea and Kerch Peninsula. The contribution of river water,

with natural-runo reservoirs taken into account, is about 10%.

Natural runo is not constant, depending on the

hydrometeorological conditions of the area. The distribution of

runo, obeying the landscape-climatic zonality, corresponds to the

distribution of precipitation. The altitudinal zonality of the Crimean

Mountains ensures an increase in the average annual precipitation

and a decrease in surface air temperatures with height. Characterized

by natural uctuations in water availability with a period of 4-7 years,

when dry and watery periods alternate.

Thus, before 2014 the Crimean Peninsula had provided itself

with its own fresh resources by about 20%, however, after the North

Crimean Canal was blocked, the water collapse did not occur,

because in 2015 precipitation was 20% above the climatic norm.

After 2015, a ve-year period began, leading to serious water

problems in 2020, when precipitation fell only 70% of the climatic

norm. At the same time, during the previous 5 years, there was a

trend towards an increase in the average annual values of surface air

temperature and a decrease in the average annual precipitation (by

2С and 11 mm per year, respectively).

In 2021, a favorable period began - atmospheric precipitation fell

130% of the climatic norm, which made it possible to ll the reservoirs

of natural ow.

After 2014, the problem of water supply was solved by transferring

water from reservoirs of natural ow to the eastern part of the

peninsula, as well as by equipping new artesian water intakes -

Prostornensky, Nezhinsky and Novogrigorevsky (Dzhankoysky and

Nizhnegorsky regions of Crimea).

The artesian waters of the peninsula are an important strategic

reserve in case of emergencies, and artesian wells should be operated

with caution (since the reserves of these waters are not unlimited).

Excessive abstraction can lead to a decrease in the level

of groundwater, the formation of depression funnels and the

deterioration of water quality. Thus, in the North Sivash artesian

basin, mineralization has increased by 1-4 g/dm3 from the moment of

operation to the present.

It is impossible to solve once and for all the problem of Crimea's

water supply at the expense of its own resources. The population

of the Crimean peninsula is steadily growing and, accordingly, the

number of consumers of water resources is increasing. At the same

time, there are global climate changes that negatively aect the

formation of natural runo.

Dry years, such as 2020, in some regions of Crimea can lead to a

humanitarian catastrophe. Without the Dnieper water, Eastern Crimea

turned into a desert. The North Crimean Canal was built by the people

of the entire Soviet Union, and then they could not imagine how much

the population of Crimea, the peoples of Russia and Ukraine would

have to endure.

At the end of February 2022, as a result of the use of force by the

Russian Federation the dam was destroyed. In March Dnieper waters

again began to ow into Crimea through the North Crimean Canal.

Expert article • 3231

Elena Kayukova

Assistant Professor

Department of Hydrogeology, Saint

Petersburg State University

Russia

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3232

Due to its unique natural features, historical monuments and

rich cultural heritage, Crimea could be a real pearl among

other tourist destinations of the Black Sea. However, the

events of 2014 led to the complete international political,

economic and transport isolation of the peninsula. As a

result, the tourism industry, which previously formed the basis of the

Crimean economy, found itself in a deep and protracted crisis. Since

the quality of life of a signicant part of the population of the peninsula

was also aected, the Crimean tourism industry has become an

important element of the socio-economic policy of Russia. At the

same time, Russia was faced with the need to solve the vital problems

of transport, energy and water supply to Crimea, which required

huge nancial costs. All this greatly impeded the restoration of the

peninsula's tourism industry and the implementation of the plans

announced by the Russian government to bring it out of the crisis.

In these conditions, the Russian government has chosen an

information strategy of denying the existence of a crisis in the tourism

industry in Crimea. For this purpose, the possibilities of all mass

media were used to the maximum. The total expenditures of the state

budget of Russia for the implementation of this information policy in

the period from 2015 to 2020 amounted to more than 142 bln rubles

(1.8 mln USD). This amount of funding allowed the Ministry of Resorts

and Tourism of Crimea only in 2018-2019 to provide direct provision

of 7,510 news for various online publications, 859 publications in print

media, 962 news stories on TV, 66 interviews, 51 thematic programs

on TV and radio, and also 12 press conferences. The total number

of news reports in the Russian media, caused by these informational

occasions, was up to 100 thousand per year. However, numerous

distorted reports about allegedly record tourist ows to Crimea, hid

the real problems of the tourism industry. Real tourist ows to the

peninsula were signicantly overestimated. At the same time, striving

to keep the tourist ow, state organizations and enterprises of Russia

began to provide their employees with vouchers to Crimea in 2014

(Rosneft, RusHydro, Russian Post). Also, free vouchers to the

Crimean sanatoriums began to be included in the compulsory medical

insurance programs for the population of Russia.

Over the past years, Russia has solved the complex transport and

energy problems of the peninsula. However, more than two-thirds of

the Crimean budget still comes from the federal budget.

The main problems of the tourism industry in Crimea have

been and remain: high seasonality (100-120 days a year); low

competitiveness in relation to other Russian and foreign resorts

(high prices, low level of services); low investment and international

isolation. Also new serious challenges are the catastrophic shortage

of drinking water in the summer and the growing militarization of the

peninsula.

The coronavirus pandemic and the associated with it travel

restrictions have contributed to the development of domestic tourism

not only in Russia. The non-recognition of Russian vaccines by the

World Health Organization, as well as the temporary suspension by

Russia of direct air links with Turkey, Tanzania, and Egyptian resorts

led to an unprecedented load of Crimea and other Russian resorts

in 2021. At the same time, in the speech at the tourism session of

the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (06/05/2021), the

representative of the Russian hotel holding Safmar Plaza, Tatyana

Weller, noted that “all the key parameters for creating a product that

are determined by the state, – land use conditions, scal burden, the

cost, terms and conditions of the loan are signicantly higher than

foreign ones. Therefore, any attempts to do something comparable

in price and quality with foreign proposals make projects unprotable

already at the stage of developing a nancial model”.

However, the true indicator of the real state of the tourism industry

in Russia as a whole was the restoration of direct ights with Turkey

on June 22 and the resorts of Egypt on August 1, 2021. The volume

of sales of travel packages to Turkey in June exceeded indicators

of 2019 by 29%. At the same time, the share of Russian resorts fell

to 15%. The same opening of Egyptian resorts in August led to an

increase in demand for tourist tours to Egypt by 10 times, which is 5

times higher than in 2019. Moreover, the price of a tourist package in

Crimea for tourists from Russia is even 50% higher than in Turkey.

All this conrms the impossibility of a successful exit of the tourist

destination and the industry as a whole from the crisis under conditions

of strict government regulation, in which the real advantages of the

tourist destination and a competitive price-quality ratio are replaced

by an information strategy of denying the existence of the crisis.

Aleksander Panasiuk

Professor., Ph.D., D.Sc., Tourism and Sport

Management Chair

Institute of Entrepreneurship, Jagiellonian

University in Krakow

Poland

aleksander.panasiuk@uj.edu.pl

Aleksander Panasiuk & Halyna Zubrytska

Crisis situation of the tourism industry

in Crimea

Halyna Zubrytska

M.Sc., Lecturer, Researcher

Institute of Entrepreneurship, Jagiellonian

University in Krakow

Poland

halyna.zubrytska@uj.edu.pl

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3233

In Ukraine, millions of people have been forced to ee their homes,

while the Russian Armed Forces continue to bombard cities and

civilian infrastructure. However, Russia’s military operations in

Ukraine also pose a threat to the country’s historical, cultural,

and natural heritage. The very rst days of the invasion saw the

destruction of the Ivankiv Historical and Local History Museum, near

Kyiv, which housed dozens of works by Maria Prymachenko. Born at

the beginning of the 20th century, Prymachenko was a Ukrainian folk

artist who worked in the naïve art style. Her drawings were displayed

at the 1937 International Fair in Paris. Prymachenko’s dreamlike

paintings, full of nonexistent creatures and plans, were admired by

such artists as Pablo Picasso.

Ukraine is home to seven UNESCO World Heritage Sites. The

ones currently under the greatest threat are those located in Kyiv:

the Pechersk Lavra and the Saint-Sophia Cathedral. The latter dates

back to the early 11th century, and contains examples of stunning

frescoes and mosaics that have survived from the 11th and 12th

centuries. Kyiv is one of the main targets attacked by the Russian

Armed Forces, and the city is being shelled on a regular basis.

In addition to the sites located in Kyiv, the UNESCO list includes

the Old Town in Lviv, the Wooden Tserkvas of the Carpathian Region,

and the Residence of Bukovinian and Dalmatian Metropolitans in

Chernivtsi, among others. These sites are some distance away from

current hostilities, but it is dicult to predict how the war in Ukraine will

progress.

Furthermore, the ocial tentative UNESCO list (sites that may be

nominated for inclusion in the main list) contains additional locations

in Ukraine. Among them are sites that are now directly in the zone of

active hostilities, such as the historic center of Chernihiv, the Kamyana

Mohyla archaeological site, the constructivist Derzhprom building in

Kharkiv, completed in 1928, and the Askania-Nova biosphere reserve

in the Kherson Oblast.

These sites are under serious threat. On February 28, Russian

bombardment of Chernihiv destroyed buildings in the direct vicinity

of the Transguration Cathedral. The cathedral survived the Mongol

invasion, but will it survive Russian aggression? Another city currently

under bombardment is Kharkiv, where the regional administration

building, located near Derzhprom, was destroyed. Similarly, sites in

Mykolaiv, Odesa, and other cities are under grave threat.

A range of eorts are being undertaken in Ukraine to protect

the country’s material culture. Where possible, objects such as

free-standing monuments are shielded with protective and re-

retardant materials, while historical ttings and museum collections

are removed and stored in bomb shelters. The Ukrainian Institute of

National Remembrance has announced the creation of the Ukrainian

Cultural Heritage Rescue Team, whose main objectives include the

protection of museum collections.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (MCIP)

has assured that it remains in contact with cultural institutions and

that the exhibits and collections are being moved to secure locations.

Additionally, the MCIP has asked the public not to disseminate the

methods used to secure museums or the locations where collections

are stored, due to security concerns. Since the start of the invasion,

UNESCO has called for the protection of Ukraine’s cultural heritage.

The organization is working with Ukrainian authorities to mark the

country’s most important sites with a Blue Shield, the international

symbol used to protect cultural property during armed conict.

The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy has also launched

a dedicated website for the purpose of documenting damage.

Individuals who have witnessed the destruction of cultural heritage

sites can upload photographic evidence, which will then be veried

and submitted to the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

The protection of cultural heritage is regulated by the 1954 Hague

Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed

Conict and its two protocols. The document ensures the inviolability

of cultural property that has been granted special protection. But will

Russian forces, who do not hesitate to attack regular people, hesitate

to attack a church or a museum?

Maria Piechowska

Analyst

Polish Institute of International Aairs

Poland

Maria Piechowska

Cultural heritage under threat in

Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Elmira Ablyalimova-Chyihoz & Denys Yashnyi

Colonization through destruction

and distortion: the case of the

Bakhchisaray Khan’s Palace

The most glaring example of a violation of international

humanitarian law in the eld of cultural heritage protection

is the situation in the Bakhchisaray Khan’s Palace (Palace

of Crimean Khans), the main residence of the Crimean

Khanate’s rulers (from the rst third of the XVI up to the

end of the XVIII century), unique monument of Crimean Tatars’ palace

architecture, the only palace complex of the Chingizid dynasty in the

world preserved up to date.

Over the past 8 years since the occupation of the Crimea by

Russia the human rights defenders have been consistently recording

gross violations of human rights in this territory. Even today Russia, as

a legal successor to the USSR and the Russian Empire, conducts a

discriminatory policy towards the Crimean Tatars, who are indigenous

people of Ukraine, aimed at suppressing the will, the dignity of the

nation, at their forced relocation and further assimilation.

According to the provisions of the Convention for the Protection

of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conict (1954) (hereinafter

referred to as the “Convention”), the State which carried out the

occupation is obliged to ensure the proper protection of and respect for

cultural property. Article 4 hereof prohibits the use of such valuables,

facilities for their protection and directly adjacent areas for purposes,

which can lead to these values’ destruction or damage, and includes

a provision to prevent any acts of vandalism against cultural property.

The monuments of the complex certainly required restoration. But

it should have been carried out with the aim of preserving its historical

authenticity and the authenticity of its components and elements, with

the most complete preservation of its artistic, historical, scientic value,

as well as its interconnectedness with the surrounding architectural

and landscape environment. The transformation of a monument or

the substitution of its original parts with new parts shall be allowed

only provided it is the only possibility of preserving the monument or

if the transformation does not diminish the cultural historical, artistic,

scientic value of the monument.

The following two factors play a decisive role here:

1. The application of basic principles of the restoration works' scientic

nature, of the reasonableness of the determining of the restoration

method, of the principle of reversibility of the performed work.

2. The use of the authentic building materials and technologies,

which allows perseveration of the authenticity of the object as much

as possible.

These factors are ultimately important, because authenticity is

fundamental in many ways. An ancient building, replaced by a new

copy, loses its value as a historical witness of the past, retaining only

the value of a visual illustration. It no longer exists as a monument of

material culture.

What has been happening at the Khan’s palace in Bakhchisaray

(Crimea, Ukraine)?

Since 2016 the work has been being carried out, that have nothing in

common with restoration works and the aforementioned principles of

restoration. The scale of destruction is truly appalling:

– all the works have been being conducted without any thorough

and comprehensive scientic research that must be done prior

the restoration works and be a rationale for any restorative

interferences.

– the Great Khan’s Mosque (“Buyuk Khan Jami”), the oldest

monument of the complex (1533), was the one on which the

occupation authorities began the works that not only caused

the outrage of Crimean activists, but also became the subject of

relevant reports of the United Nations Educational, Scientic and

Cultural Organization. The XVIII-XIX centuries roof complex of

the Mosque was destructed in autumn - winter 2016-2017. The

authentic oak beams of the roong were dismantled and sawn;

they were then replaced with modern building materials, namely

composite beams made using OSB technology with a reinforced

concrete belt. According to the so-called project, 100% of the

artisan old roof tiles (historically called “Tatarka”) were replaced

with Spanish factory-made antique-stylized tiles. At the same

time, the ancient technology of putting the tiles on clay was

completely destroyed and modern mounts were used instead.

– the works are carried out using heavy construction equipment

with the use of jackhammers, which led to vibrations and loss of

part of the decoration and paintings of the walls.

– as a rule, roof dismantling work at the objects of complex

are conducted at autumn - winter season, when the level

of precipitations is raising. Due to the lack of a system that

would protect from precipitation, the moisture penetrates the

monuments.

– all of the aforementioned violations and the additional load

on the walls and the base of the buildings have already led to

deformations. As a result, in 2018 the stained-glass windows

shattered and numerous gaps and cracks appeared on the

northern facade of the Mosque, the facade of the Retinue

Building. There is also a crack on the tilted East Minaret.

– in 2018 a steel canopy was installed over the Khan Palace main

building without any necessary research including geological

survey. Experts have already spoken about the threat of a

possible tilt of this steel canopy.

– at the beginning of February 2022, the reasons that were written

above and the dismantling of hard surface and soil that has been

being carried out in immediate proximity to the ancient buildings

led to the subsidence and horizontal movement of soils. As a

Expert article • 3234

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

result, the north-eastern corner of the Retinue building was torn

o from the complex wall, which was accompanied by spiral

deformation and appearance of wide and deep cracks.

– to date, the so-called "restoration work" has been targeted at

almost all objects of the complex.

– today Khan Palace is a complex of architectural and historical

monuments and archeological objects. As a monument of

the archeology, Khan Palace can cover a larger area than

the area of the museum, which was founded on the basis of

architectural and historical monuments. But the existence of the

archaeological heritage of the complex is not recognized by the

occupation authorities. It leads to carrying out of the building

works without archeological excavation and the losses of cultural

treasures that are hidden in the soil that are thrown away without

any control.

Experts at the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation

and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) in Ukraine concluded

that the works carried out by the Russian Federation in the complex

are not of a restorative nature; they are typical of a new construction

and have led to disgurement, as well as irreparable loss of authentic

elements of the ancient architecture that is part of the unique complex

"Khan’s Palace", which is included in the UNESCO World Heritage

Tentative List.

The careful concealment by the Russian occupation authorities of

all the circumstances connected with the works on the territory of the

Khan Palace further strengthens the suspicions of the experts that

a real threat of destruction is hanging over the unique historical and

architectural monument of The Crimean Tatar people.

Despite the eorts and active actions of the concerned Crimean

activists, of Ukrainian diplomats, who put this issue on the agenda of

the United Nations Educational, Scientic and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO) in March 2018 and included it to a report on the worsening

situation with the protection of cultural heritage in Russia-occupied

Crimea, the work on the territory of the Bakhchisaray Palace has not

stopped.

Monuments at all times were destroyed and demolished for

ideological reasons, in order to destroy the symbolism of the hated

past.

After the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944, their culture

was completely destroyed: “toponymic repressions” were carried out

on the peninsula, the Soviets destroyed Crimean Tatar monuments

and cemeteries, burned manuscripts and books, turned mosques

into movie theaters and shops. Large-scale falsication of the history

of the peninsula, which led to the emergence and existence to this

day of many myths, continues even now, aiming to justify the criminal

decisions of the Soviet regime.

After such an almost total elimination, the miraculously preserved

Bakhchisaray Khan's palace became for the Crimean Tatar people,

especially during and after their return to their homeland, not only a

conrmation of their origin and development of their statehood on this

territory, but also a sacred symbol of revival on their native land.

The Russian Federation, as the successor of the former USSR

and the Russian Empire, again resorted to manipulation and

direct lies, trying to justify the occupation with allegedly “historical

arguments”, most of which are misinformation and propaganda.

Modern-Russia’s humanitarian policy in the occupied territory aims

to destroy the historical and cultural ties between the peninsula and

mainland Ukraine, and to include Crimea in the Russian ideological

paradigm.

Among those desperately needing protection are the objects of

Crimean Tatar history and culture that “do not t” into the Russian

ideology; the true, unfalsied history of Crimea and the Crimean

Tatar people, the historical memory of the indigenous people of the

peninsula about their statehood.

Expert article • 3234

Elmira Ablyalimova-

Chyihoz

Project Coordinator

Crimea Institute of Strategic Research

Ukraine

Denys Yashnyi

Dr., Leading Researcher

Department of Art Heritage Studies,

National Kiev-Pechersk Historical and

Cultural Preserve

Ukraine

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Inga Zaksauskiene

Enemies and traitors: The role

of Ukraine in the Soviet Union

dissolution

Communication analysis of the information disseminated

in the context of the USSR dissolution 30th anniversary

revealed major tools and narratives adopted for information

campaigns by pro-Kremlin media. Implementing its long-

time tradition to manipulate information Russian regime

used the anniversary of the Soviet Union collapse to once again

inject historical narratives demonizing the role of the former Soviet

republic Ukraine in the nal dissolution of the Union. Opensource

monitoring tool developed by DebunkEU.org enabled a massive

analysis of the Russian language media textual and audio-visual

content automatically collected in the digital landscape during the

period of August 2021 and January 2022. The retrieved information

content was automatically attributed to quantitative DebunkReach®

parameters (a combined number of the size of the readership of the

domain, social interactions and backlinks) and was then reviewed

manually by analysts Agn Eidimtait and Magdalena Wilczyska

in order to identify qualitative parameters of the information such

as sentiment, narratives and messages. The results of information

analysis demonstrated that Russian media particular techniques

applied more often than others while undermining historical facts

related with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Pro-Kremlin media

used hyperbolization in presenting harmful content in exaggerated

manner or providing two deliberately exacerbated opposite sides. The

two other prevailing techniques adopted in Russian media selection

(presenting selected, specic information out of context, intentionally

omitting important aspects of the situation) and association (entailing

using quotes/conrmations/endorsements of well-known gures,

among other methods). These disinformation techniques applied by

Kremlin media helped to program the narratives avoiding overwriting

of history. In example, articles undermining referendum in the Baltic

states blamed national governments holding illegal pols based on the

Soviet law. However, media on purpose omit information regarding

existing national constitutions and judgements of national supreme

courts in the Baltic states.

The analysis shows that Russian media presented the collapse of

the USSR as the result of foreign powers and elites’ actions, ignoring

the objective facts regarding de facto economic, political and social

situation in the country. In analysed potentially harmful pro-Kremlin

media content several false claims on responsibility of many countries

and governments were detected. Media presented the United States,

Ukraine and the Baltic States as the major traitors and enemies of the

dissolving Soviet Union. Almost all post-Soviet states in the context

of the USSR dissolution are presented are traitors of idea of Union

in pro-Kremlin media. Although Ukraine attracted more focus in the

media coverage of 1991 events in the USSR than others.

The rst widespread narrative disseminated in Russian media

focuses to accusations of the Soviet elites of Ukrainian background

for the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g. "Soviet authorities started

the deconstruction process before USSR collapse" keeping in mind

Khrushchev’s generous gift of Crimea to Ukraine). The second

narrative focuses on the consequences of the collapse of the USSR,

putting the blame on the post-Soviet states and the wide range of

social and economic tragedy their exit from the USSR caused. Only

in the case of Ukraine the pro-Kremlin media applied and circulated

a specic historical narrative focusing on independence movement in

the post II WW years. Under this message Ukraine’s independence

movement entitled as fascists movement that followed (and still

follows) Bandera's "Nazi" ideology. Historical narratives in pro-Kremlin

media aimed to present Ukraine as a failing state that was not able to

survive without Russia and was wrongly convinced that it could exist

as independent state. Another common narrative detected in Russian

media undermined Ukraine as a sovereign state. Media messages

attempted any problems appearing in modern Ukraine - political,

energy or economical – to portray in the context of Soviet Union

dissolution. Ukraine is presented as a weak state lead by irrational

and incompetent politicians.

Worth to mention that similarly to the case of Ukraine, the Baltic

States in pro-Kremlin media messages were also blamed for the

collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the most prevailing narratives

and sub-narratives focused on the situation in the Baltic countries

after the dissolution of the USSR. Major part of articles focused on

presenting the Baltic States as socially and economically failing

countries (i.e., deteriorating energy safety after the collapse, social

inequalities, rising fascism movements also mentioned). Several

articles claimed the collapse of the USSR led to the great tragedy,

discrimination of Russian minority in Baltic states, people became

much more unhappy, diminished global peace and stability.

The analysis of pro-Kremlin media message in the context of the

anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrates how

inaccurate versions of history can be used by regime to justify current

geopolitical stances in a highly damaging way.

Expert article • 3235

Inga Zaksauskiene

Dr., Assistant Professor

Faculty of History, University of Vilnius

Lithuania

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3236

On March 5, Russia passed a law imposing a jail term of

up to 15 years for spreading intentionally “fake” news

about the military, stepping up the information war over

the military campaign in Ukraine (a link). Simultaneously,

when the Kremlin aims at restricting the free distribution

of information in Russia, the Kremlin itself is guilty of deliberately

spreading absurd justications for the escalation of the Ukraine war.

I will mention ve of these justications below.

1. On February 22, President Vladimir Putin ordered his defense

ministry to dispatch Russian forces to “perform peacekeeping

functions” in eastern Ukraine’s two breakaway regions (a link). More

than 10,000 soldiers and civilians have already died during the rst

four weeks of Putin’s two-day operation. If this campaign represents

Russia’s peacekeeping operation, who even needs the word “war”?

2. On February 24, President Putin declared Russia could not feel

safe, develop and exist because of what he claimed was a constant

threat from modern Ukraine (a link). This argument is absurd as well.

Ukraine did not threaten Russia militarily and Ukraine did not attack

Russia – the situation was vice versa. Even Ukraine’s objective of

NATO membership was more of a long-term desire rather than a

concrete goal since Russia’s leadership must have been aware of

the fact that the NATO does not accept any new members which are

involved in a war and the war in eastern Ukraine has been going

on since 2014 because of Russia. The most signicant threat from

Ukraine was that Ukraine’s integration towards the West would have

signaled the Kremlin’s shrinking sphere of inuence, and the Kremlin’s

total value defeat. In other words, if one of Russia’s brotherly nations

chooses to integrate towards the West rather than towards the

Kremlin, it signals that there is something fundamentally wrong with

the values of the Putin regime.

3. On February 24, President Putin argued that Ukraine is run by “a

gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis” (a link). Putin’s reference to neo-

Nazis is absurd since Ukraine’s President Volodomyr Zelenskyi is a

Russian-speaking Jew (a link). In the eyes of the global community,

Russia’s President Putin meets the denition of a Nazi – that is, “a

harshly domineering, dictatorial or intolerant person” – not Ukraine’s

President Zelenskyi (a link). A Jewish neo-Nazi is simply an absurd

accusation. I am condent that Ukraine’s President Zelenskyi would

be civilized enough not to call his Russian counterpart as a neo-

Bolshevik. Bolsheviks invaded Ukraine a century ago.

4. On March 4, Defense Ministry Spokesman Igor Konashenkov said

that “the Kiev nationalist regime attempted to implement a monstrous

provocation on the territory adjacent to the [Zaporozhskaya nuclear]

power plant” (a link). It is impossible to believe that any Ukrainian

group would be ready to cause a nuclear disaster in its own country

(a link). Moreover, one should not forget that Ukraine has 15 nuclear

reactors and the six nuclear power reactors in Zaporizhzhia produce

a great part of Ukraine’s electricity. The Ukrainian nationalists would

not shoot themselves in the foot by destroying the single main source

of electricity in their country (a link).

5. On March 10, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that

Russia did not attack Ukraine (a link). Understandably, it is dicult to

nd a diplomatic solution in a situation where the parties’ views on

events are fundamentally dierent, or to put it dierently, it is hard to

believe that there is any possibility of nding a diplomatic solution if

Russia denies the facts. The most frightening thing is if the Russian

leadership truly believes in its own distorted reality.

More than a century ago, US Senator Hiram Warren Johnson stated

that “the rst casualty when war comes is truth” (a link). In fact, Russia

sacriced the truth even before the war in Ukraine began in 2014. The

sacrice of the truth in Russia began when some media oligarchs,

such as Boris Berezovski and Vladimir Gusinski, were put aside

when Putin was lifted to power. Despite the liquidation of the media

oligarchs of that time, Putin must have understood the signicance

of free media as he stated the following in the nation of state speech

more than two decades ago (a link): “But without a truly free media,

Russian democracy cannot survive and a civil society cannot be

created”. Everyone can form his or her own opinion on the state of

the free media in Russia and thus predict the future development of

Russia.

If truth is the rst victim of war, in this war, the ordinary Russians

are victims of the war as well. I do not think that the Russians in a

democratic Russia would have allowed their president to start a military

campaign against Ukraine. As a consequence of the escalation of the

Ukraine war, a new iron curtain is falling over Russia and its allies.

Moreover, Russia will take another step towards a dictatorship by

increasing control in the country. Russia’s economy and its citizens’

well-being will ultimately suer. It remains to be seen whether the

Ukraine war will stop in Ukraine or whether the war will escalate in

Europe or even beyond.

All in all, the people of Ukraine are the greatest victims of this

irrational, brutal and unprovoked war. The majority of the Ukrainian

and Western analysts did not expect that Putin’s Russia would be

ready to a start a full-scale war against Ukraine in the twenty-rst

century. At this stage, it impossible to predict what will be the future

development of Ukraine. What is certain, however, is that this war

will leave a permanent wound in Ukraine–Russia relations and in

Russia’s relations with the West and the European security system.

The healing process may only start when Putin is no longer the

president of Russia.

Kari Liuhto

A paranoid war with absurd

justications

Baltic Rim Economies

28.4.2022 ISSUE # 2

www.utu.fi/pei

Expert article • 3236

I end this article with the words of Martin Luther King, Jr. (a link): “If

you fail to act now, history will have to record that the greatest tragedy

of this period of social transition was not the strident clamor of the bad

people, but the appalling silence of the good people.” Now, it is time

for the good people to step forward – particularly in Russia. Ignorance

or fear are not acceptable excuses for inaction. If you fear now, you

will have to carry the shame for the rest of your lives.

Kari Liuhto

Professor

Turku School of Economics

University of Turku

Finland

Kari.Liuhto@utu.

The University of Turku, the Pan-European Institute or the sponsors of this review are not responsible for the opinions expressed in the expert articles.

To receive a free copy,

Pan-European Institute

Co-funded by

the Centrum Balticum Foundation, the City of Turku,

the Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries RT,

the John Nurminen Foundation and the Port of Turku

Pan-European Institute

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