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Digest of state practice: 1 July – 31 December 2021
Patrick M. Butchard & Jasmin Johurun Nessa
To cite this article: Patrick M. Butchard & Jasmin Johurun Nessa (2022) Digest of state practice:
1 July – 31 December 2021, Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 9:1, 171-228, DOI:
10.1080/20531702.2022.2066347
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2022.2066347
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa
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Digest of state practice: 1 July –31 December 2021
Patrick M. Butchard
a
and Jasmin Johurun Nessa
b
*
a
Senior Lecturer in Law, International Justice and Human Rights Research Unit, Edge Hill
University, Ormskirk, United Kingdom;
b
PhD Candidate, University of Liverpool, Liverpool,
United Kingdom
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 11 April 2022; Accepted
Regional coordinators
Europe: Ralph Janik
Sub-Saharan Africa: Michael J Pollard
Middle East and North Africa: Sina Etezazian, Hoshman Ismail, and Danielle
Reeder
Asia Pacific: Imdad Ullah
Americas: Francisco Lobo and Felipe Rodríguez Silvestre
Non-Regional Issues: Arjun Sahni
Digest contents
1. Europe
-Russia–Ukraine: Russian troops amass on Ukraine’s border and prepare
to invade
-Greece–France-Turkey: New defence agreement between France and Greece
2. Africa
-Mozambique: International military assistance widens
-Sahel Region–Central African Republic: International military assistance,
while Russian Wagner Group is sanctioned
-Eritrea–Ethiopia: Tigray crisis continues amid Eritrean presence in
Ethiopia
-Somalia–US: US airstrikes after withdrawal
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer-
ivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Patrick M Butchard patrick.butchard@edgehill.ac.uk Senior Lecturer in Law, Inter-
national Justice and Human Rights Research Unit, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, United Kingdom
*Suggestions and input for future Digests of State Practice can be sent to patrick.butchard@edgehill.ac.
uk or J.Nessa@liverpool.ac.uk at any time. All websites accessed 1 April 2022.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
2022, VOL. 9, NO. 1, 171–228
https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2022.2066347
3. Middle East
-Syria: Refuting the United States’Article 51 claim
-Syria: Third states’involvement
-Israel–Syria: Alleged attacks and dispute over the Golan Heights
-United States’military strikes in Syria and Iraq against ‘Iran-backed
militia’on 27 June 2021
-Israel–Iran: Reports of alleged attacks and threats
-Yemen–Saudi Arabia: alleged attacks by ‘Iranian-backed terrorist Houthi
militias’
-Israel–Palestine: Escalation of cross-border incidents
-Lebanon–Israel: Exchange of allegations of violations
4. Asia
-Afghanistan: Taliban takes control
-Armenia–Azerbaijan: Developments following 2020 conflict and peace
deal
-China–Taiwan: Continued tensions between China and others over
support for Taiwan
-South China Sea: Tensions between the US and China continue
5. Americas
-Venezuela: The alleged use of mercenary operations by the United States
and Colombia
-Venezuela: Alleged Strategy of armed aggression by Colombia and the
United States
6. Non-regional issues
-UNSC open debate: ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security:
Cybersecurity’
-Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible
State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security
(GGE)
-UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization
1. Europe
1.1. Russia–Ukraine: Russian troops amass on Ukraine’s border and
prepare to invade
At the time of writing, and as outlined and examined in this issue’s introduc-
tion and editorial, Russia had invaded Ukraine. This invasion began on 24
172 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
February 2022, and, as such, does not form part of this Digest of State Prac-
tice’s reporting period. However, during this reporting period (1 July –31
December 2021), Russia had started to build up its troops on Ukraine’s
border. This, and other notable developments in the lead up to the invasion,
are covered here.
Most western states continued to condemn Russia’s 2014 annexation of
Crimea. For example, in July, in the Organisation for Security Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), the UK expressed its ‘significant concerns about the
heightened tensions caused by the increased Russian military activity on
Ukraine’s border and in illegally annexed Crimea in April.’
1
The UK said
that it would ‘continue to call on Russia to engage with the OSCE processes
and mechanisms available to provide necessary transparency regarding this
activity.’
2
Similar statements were made in other special meetings of the
OSCE’s Permanent Council.
3
The UK was referring to Russia’s earlier troop movements in April 2021,
4
where Russia had positioned thousands of troops near Ukraine’s border at
the same time as both states conducted military drills.
5
Ukraine claimed at
the time that Russia was amassing up to 110,000 troops near Ukraine’s
border,
6
afigure repeated by EU officials.
7
1
United Kingdom, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Russian aggression against
Ukraine: UK response to OSCE’(8 July 2021) www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russian-aggression-
against-ukraine-uk-response-to-osce.
2
Ibid.
3
See, e.g. OSCE, ‘1342nd Plenary Meeting of the Permanent Council’(28 October 2021) www.osce.org/
permanent-council/503365; United States Mission to the OSCE, ‘Ongoing Violations of International
Law and Defiance of OSCE Principles and Commitments by the Russian Federation in Ukraine’(16
December 2021) www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/a/510059.pdf; Permanent Mission of Ukraine to
the International Organisations in Vienna, ‘Statement on Russia’s ongoing aggression against
Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea’, OSCE Permanent Council (15 July 2021) www.osce.org/
files/f/documents/7/a/494050.pdf; EU, ‘EU Statement on ‘Russia’s Ongoing Aggression against
Ukraine and Illegal Occupation of Crimea’, OSCE Permanent Council (15 July 2021) www.osce.org/
files/f/documents/e/4/494053.pdf. See also responses by Russia, for example: Russia, ‘Statement by
Mr Alexander Lukashevich, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the 1324th
Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council: On the deteriorating situation in Ukraine and continued
non-implementation by the Ukrainian authorities of the Minsk agreements’, OSCE Permanent
Council (15 July 2021) www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/e/494065.pdf.
4
Military exercises or troop movements are generally not reported in the Digest of State Practice as a ‘use
of force’, and so were not covered in full in the previous Digest. Given the significant developments
that have taken place since these troop movements, recent developments in this regard have been
included here for completeness. For further background on other political developments prior to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, see for example: Claire Mills, ‘Ukraine: Russia’s“red line”’, UK House of
Commons Library: Briefing Paper Number 9401 (18 February 2022) https://commonslibrary.
parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9401/.
5
See, e.g. Maxim Rodionov and Tom Balmforth, ‘Russia stages show of force near Ukraine with launch of
Crimean exercises’,Reuters (22 April 2021) www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-defence-minister-
oversees-large-scale-military-drills-crimea-ria-2021-04-22/.
6
Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber and Robin Emmott, ‘Russia, Ukraine hold military drills, NATO criticises Russian
troop build-up’,Reuters (14 April 2021) www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-ukraine-
hold-military-drills-nato-criticises-russian-troop-build-up-2021-04-14/.
7
Robin Emmott and Sabine Siebold, ‘OFFICIAL Russian military build-up near Ukraine numbers more than
100,000 troops, EU says’,Reuters (19 April 2021) www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-
build-up-near-ukraine-numbers-more-than-150000-troops-eus-2021-04-19/.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173
Ukraine sought international support at the time, warning that it believed
Russia was considering further military action against Ukraine,
8
while states
supporting Ukraine threatened further sanctions against Russia should that
transpire.
9
Meanwhile, Russian President Putin gave a speech to the Russian
Parliament,
10
in which he said that states should not cross Russia’s‘red lines’,
stating:
We want good relations …and really don’t want to burn bridges.
…
But if someone mistakes our good intentions for indifference or weakness and
intends to burn down or even blow up these bridges, they should know that
Russia’s response will be asymmetrical, swift and harsh.
11
The build-up of tensions in April seemed to pass, however, after Russian
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered the military units near Ukrainian’s
border to return to their bases.
12
In July 2021, President Putin wrote an essay titled ‘The Historical Unity of
Russians and Ukrainians’, in which he detailed what he believed to be the
historical connections between the Russian and Ukrainian people. Although
Putin stated that ‘Russia has never been and will never be “anti-Ukraine”’,
and concluded that the future of Ukraine ‘is up to its citizens to decide’,
Putin also argued that:
…true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Our
spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their
origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials,
achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation
to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern
Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families.
Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more suc-
cessful. For we are one people.
13
Putin’s essay also made reference to what he perceived as Western influence
in Ukraine, and made veiled threats when he said:
All the subterfuges associated with the anti-Russia project are clear to us. And
we will never allow our historical territories and people close to us living there
8
Matthias Williams, ‘Ukraine to allies: West must act now to ensure no new Russia military offensive’,
Reuters (21 April 2021) www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-allies-west-must-act-now-ensure-no-
new-russia-military-offensive-2021-04-21/.
9
Ibid.
10
Gleb Stolyarov, Andrew Osborn, Vladimir Soldatkin, Anton Kolodyazhnyy and Anton Zverev, ‘Putin
warns West of harsh response if it crosses Russia’s“red lines”’,Reuters (20 April 2021) www.reuters.
com/world/europe/navalny-supporters-seek-drown-out-putin-speech-with-mass-protests-2021-04-20/.
11
Ibid.
12
‘Russia to pull troops back from near Ukraine’,BBC News (22 April 2021) www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-56842763.
13
Ibid.
174 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
to be used against Russia. And to those who will undertake such an attempt, I
would like to say that this way they will destroy their own country.
14
In October, Ukraine used a Bayraktar TB2 drone, made and supplied by
Turkey, in the conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Particularly
notable about this incident was Ukraine’s justification and Russia’s response
to the use of this particular weaponry, and the fact that Ukraine was making
use of Turkish military equipment. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelens-
kyy said that the use of the drones was defensive, used in self-defence, and
did not violate any agreements on ceasefires or the foundations of any
peace process in the Donbass.
15
Russia, on the other hand, argued that
Turkey’s decision to sell these drones to Ukraine risked undermining and
destabilising the situation in the east of Ukraine:
We have really good ties with Turkey, but in this situation our fears are unfor-
tunately being realised that the deliveries of these types of weapons to the
Ukrainian military can potentially destabilise the situation on the line of
contact.
16
Soon after this development, President Zelenskyy publicly revealed intelli-
gence that Russia had started to build up troops on Ukraine’s border
again, at first reporting 90,000 troops at the beginning of November, and
then increasing that estimate to 100,000 troops by mid-November.
17
On 15 November, France and Germany released a joint statement refer-
encing the troop movements at the border, stating:
Against the backdrop of renewed concerns about Russian movements of
troops and hardware near Ukraine, we call on Russia to adopt a posture of
restraint and provide transparent information about its military activities.
Any new attempt to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity would have
serious consequences.
We called on Ukraine to maintain a posture of restraint. Already in Spring
2021, Ukraine contributed significantly to the de-escalation of the situation,
despite Russian aggressive rhetoric and failure to provide transparent infor-
mation in line with its international obligations.
18
14
Ibid.
15
Natalia Zinets and Matthias Williams, ‘Ukraine using Turkish drones in Donbass conflict in self-defence,
Zelenskiy says’,Reuters (29 October 2021) www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-using-turkish-drones-
donbass-conflict-self-defence-zelenskiy-says-2021-10-29/.
16
Dmitry Antonov and Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, ‘Kremlin says Turkish drones risk destabilising situation
in east Ukraine’,Reuters (27 October 2021) www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kremlin-says-turkish-
drones-risk-destabilising-situation-east-ukraine-2021-10-27/.
17
Natalia Zinets and Tom Balmforth, ‘Ukraine says Russia has nearly 100,000 troops near its border’,
Reuters (13 November 2021) www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-has-nearly-100000-
troops-near-its-border-2021-11-13/.
18
Germany, Federal Foreign Office, ‘Joint Statement by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany and
France on Support for Ukraine’(15 November 2021) www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/
news/-/2496138.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 175
Russia, meanwhile, blamed the US and NATO’s support for states in eastern
Europe as a cause for a deterioration in security in Europe. Russia argued, for
example, that Ukraine was building up its own forces and was being supplied
with a ‘significant number of weapons, including modern high-tech
weapons.’
19
During a debate at the UN General Assembly’s disarmament
committee, the Russian representative argued that:
Global trends towards the deterioration of the security situation have a nega-
tive impact on Europe as well. The root cause is the adoption by the United
States and its NATO allies of a policy of confrontation with Russia, undermin-
ing the basis of European security and the arms control system.
The countries of the Alliance are building up their military capabilities along
the Russian borders, increasing the speed of the transfer of forces to the
Eastern flank. In response to the alleged Russian ‘threat’, multinational bat-
talion tactical groups have been deployed in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and
Poland, a multinational brigade has been formed in Romania. Moreover,
an armoured brigade and helicopter units of the U.S. Armed Forces have
been transferred to the European territory. The total length of stay of ships
of the NATO countries in the Black Sea waters during the year has
increased.
20
Against this backdrop, on 10 November 2021, the US and Ukraine signed a
‘Charter on Strategic Partnership’.
21
The Preamble of the Charter emphasises
‘unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and ter-
ritorial integrity’and refers to ‘ongoing Russian aggression, which threatens
regional peace and stability and undermines the global rules-based order.’
22
Section II of the Charter is titled ‘Security and Countering Russian Aggres-
sion’, where it states in full:
1. The United States and Ukraine intend to continue a range of substantive
measures to prevent external direct and hybrid aggression against
Ukraine and hold Russia accountable for such aggression and violations
of international law, including the seizure and attempted annexation of
Crimea and the Russia-led armed conflict in parts of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions of Ukraine, as well as its continuing malign behaviour.
19
Jamie Dettmer, ‘Western policymakers weigh options for Ukraine, responses to Russian aggression’,
VOA News (24 November 2021) www.voanews.com/a/western-policymakers-weigh-options-for-
ukraine-responses-to-russian-aggression-/6327196.html.
20
Russia, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, ‘Statement by Represen-
tative of the Russian Federation Mr. Andrey Belousov in the First Committee of the 76th session of the
UN General Assembly at the Thematic Debate on “Regional Disarmament and Security”’ (18 October
2021) https://russiaun.ru/en/news/1com6_181021.
21
US, Department of State, ‘U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership’(10 November 2021) www.
state.gov/u-s-ukraine-charter-on-strategic-partnership/. For background, see US, White House, ‘Joint
Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership’(1 September 2021) www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-
partnership/.
22
Ibid, Preamble, para 4.
176 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
The United States intends to support Ukraine’sefforts to counter armed
aggression, economic and energy disruptions, and malicious cyber
activity by Russia, including by maintaining sanctions against or related
to Russia and applying other relevant measures until restoration of the
territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised
borders.
2. The United States does not and will never recognise Russia’s attempted
annexation of Crimea and reaffirms its full support for international
efforts, including in the Normandy Format, aimed at negotiating a diplo-
matic resolution to the Russia-led armed conflict in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions of Ukraine on the basis of respect for international
law, including the UN Charter. The United States supports Ukraine’s
efforts to use the Crimea Platform to coordinate international efforts to
address the humanitarian and security costs of Russia’s occupation of
Crimea, consistent with the Platform’s Joint Declaration.
At the G7 meeting in Liverpool in December 2021, the G7 Foreign Ministers
and EU High Representative released a joint statement declaring that these
parties were ‘united in [their] condemnation of Russia’s military build-up
and aggressive rhetoric towards Ukraine.’
23
The statement called on Russia
to ‘de-escalate, pursue diplomatic channels, and abide by its international
commitments on transparency of military activities’.
24
The statement also
reiterated their support for France and Germany’s ongoing role of brokering
peace in the co-called ‘Normandy Format’and the need to ‘achieve full
implementation of the Minsk Agreements in order to resolve the conflict
in eastern Ukraine.’
25
Finally, the statement declared:
Any use of force to change borders is strictly prohibited under international
law. Russia should be in no doubt that further military aggression against
Ukraine would have massive consequences and severe cost in response.
26
Similarly, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told journalists that
‘[t]here will be a high price to pay for Russia if they once again use force
against the independence of the nation Ukraine.’
27
This was echoed by US
Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, who said, ‘[a]ny escalatory actions by
Russia would be a great concern to the United States …and any renewed
aggression would trigger serious consequences.’
23
See, e.g. UK, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘Russia and Ukraine: G7 Foreign Min-
isters’statement’(12 December 2021) www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-foreign-ministers-
statement-on-russia-and-ukraine.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Humeyra Pamuk, Sabine Siebold, Robin Emmott and Vladimir Soldatkin, ‘Putin hits back as NATO warns
Moscow against attacking Ukraine’,Reuters (1 December 2021) www.reuters.com/world/europe/with-
us-intelligence-nato-discuss-russian-intent-near-ukraine-2021-11-30/.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177
Reacting to this, Russian President Putin warned against NATO placing
any missile systems on Ukrainian territory, suggesting that in such a scenario
Russia ‘will have to then create something similar in relation to those who
threaten us in that way. And we can do that now.’
28
As the rhetoric
started to focus on the more direct tensions between the US and Russia,
US President Biden and Russian President Putin held a virtual summit at
the beginning of December where President Biden voiced his ‘deep concerns’
about Russia’s escalation of forces surrounding Ukraine.
29
On 17 December, Russia proposed two agreements to the US, setting out
proposals for security and demands that NATO roll back its deployment in
eastern Europe.
30
The first was a draft agreement on security measures
between Russia and NATO,
31
the second was a proposed treaty between
Russia and the US on the same issues.
32
The draft Russia-NATO agreement
proposed to prohibit the deployment of military forces and weaponry on
the territory of other European states beyond those there as of May
1997,
33
and also sought to prohibit the deployment of land-based inter-
mediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the ter-
ritory of the other Parties.
34
This proposal also went further to prohibit any
further enlargement of NATO membership, including Ukraine, and
restricting military drills.
35
The draft US-Russia treaty proposed very
similar measures, applying similar restrictions to the US too, including
on the use and deployment of nuclear weapons outside of the parties
territories.
By the end of the reporting period, the US and others had not given a full
response to Russia’s proposals. The US and NATO issues coordinated responses
on 26 January 2022, and these will be covered in detail in the next Digest of State
28
Ibid.
29
US, White House, ‘Readout of President Biden’s Video Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia’(7
December 2021) www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/07/readout-of-
president-bidens-video-call-with-president-vladimir-putin-of-russia/.
30
For an overview, see, e.g. Patricia Lewis, ‘Russian treaty proposals hark back to post-Cold War era’,
Chatham House (19 December 2021) www.chathamhouse.org/2021/12/russian-treaty-proposals-
hark-back-post-cold-war-era. See also Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber and Tom Balmforth, ‘Russia demands
NATO roll back from East Europe and stay out of Ukraine’,Reuters (17 December 2021) www.
reuters.com/world/russia-unveils-security-guarantees-says-western-response-not-encouraging-2021-
12-17/.
31
Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Fed-
eration and member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’(17 December 2021) https://mid.
ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en.
32
Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Fed-
eration on security guarantees’(17 December 2021) https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/
1790818/?lang=en.
33
Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Fed-
eration and member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’(17 December 2021) https://mid.
ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en, Article 4
34
Ibid, Article 5.
35
Ibid, Article 6.
178 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
Practice.
36
The US and NATO sought to keep the responses confidential
because, according to the US, ‘diplomacy has the best chance to succeed if we
provide space for confidential talks.’But the documents were later leaked on
the Spanish news website El Pais,
37
and comparisons of the Russian, US and
NATO positions have been made by the Arms Control Association.
38
1.2. Greece–France–Turkey: new defence agreement between France
and Greece
In October, the Greek parliament ratified a defence agreement between
Greece and France.
39
The agreement contains a provision for collective
self-defence and guarantees the security of both states where there is an
‘armed aggression’.
40
On 28 September, at a news conference with Greek
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, French President Emmanuel Macron
said that Europe should stop being ‘naïve’about European security, and
referred to Europe being under pressure from ‘powers’hardening their
stance, and argued that Europe needs to ‘react and show that we have the
power and capacity to defend’itself.
41
Macron insisted that this new
defence pact was, ‘[n]ot escalating things, but protecting ourselves.’
42
Turkey’s Foreign Ministry criticised Greece in response to the deal in a
statement that said:
Greece’s maximalist maritime jurisdiction area and national airspace claims
are in contravention of international law. It is a vain dream for Greece to
36
See US, Department of State, ‘Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability’(26 January 2022)
www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-13/; NATO, ‘Press conference by
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’(26 January 2022) www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_
191254.htm.
37
Hibai Arbide Aza and Miguel González, ‘US offered disarmament measures to Russia in exchange for
deescalation of military threat in Ukraine’,El Pais (2 February 2022) https://english.elpais.com/usa/
2022-02-02/us-offers-disarmament-measures-to-russia-in-exchange-for-a-deescalation-of-military-
threat-in-ukraine.html.
38
Arms Control Association, ‘Russia, U.S., NATO Security Proposals’(March 2022) www.armscontrol.org/
act/2022-03/news/russia-us-nato-security-proposals. See also Claire Mills, ‘Ukraine: Russia’s“red line”’,
UK House of Commons Library: Briefing Paper Number 9401 (18 February 2022) https://
commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9401/.
39
Greece, Parliament, ‘Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic
and the Government of the French Republic establishing a strategic partnership for cooperation in
defence and security’(8 October 2021) www.hellenicparliament.gr/Nomothetiko-Ergo/Anazitisi-
Nomothetikou-Ergou?law_id=50f9990e-73f6-4015-b706-adb4013e7514.
40
For analysis of the agreement, see, e.g. Nicholas Tsagourias and Constantine Antonopoulos, ‘An inter-
national law assessment of the collective self-defence clause of the 2021 treaty on the “establishment
of strategic partnership of cooperation in matters of defence and security”between Greece and
France’,EJIL: Talk! (28 October 2021) www.ejiltalk.org/an-international-law-assessment-of-the-
collective-self-defence-clause-of-the-2021-treaty-on-the-establishment-of-strategic-partnership-of-
cooperation-in-matters-of-defence-and-security/.
41
John Irish, ‘Macron tells Europe to “stop being naïve”after France signs defence deal with Greece’,
Reuters (28 September 2021) www.reuters.com/world/europe/greece-buys-three-new-french-
frigates-boost-european-defence-2021-09-28/.
42
Ibid.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 179
think that they can impose upon Turkey these claims, which are also ques-
tioned by the international community, by forming bilateral military alliances
against Turkey, undermining NATO Alliance itself. Such futile attempts will
further strengthen our determination to protect the rights of both our own
and those of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Aegean and the Med-
iterranean Seas.
Greece’s policy of armament as well as isolation and alienation of Turkey,
instead of cooperation, is a problematic policy, which will threaten regional
peace and stability and undermine not only itself but also the EU, which
Greece is a member of.
43
France insisted that the deal was not aimed at Turkey, and officials told
reporters in September that the agreement was not aimed at any particular
state but was in line with Greece and France’s common goal of strengthening
European sovereignty.
44
But prior to the Greek Parliamentary vote, Prime
Minister Kyraikos Mitsotakis made a veiled reference to Turkey when he
said that ‘[f]or the first time it is clearly stipulated that there be military
assistance in the event of a third party attacking one of the two states. And
we all know who is threatening whom with a casus belli [cause for war] in
the Mediterranean.’
45
2. Africa
2.1. Mozambique: international military assistance widens
The previous two Digests have covered the deteriorating situation in
Mozambique involving militants known as Ansar al-Sunna from Mozambi-
que that had pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State.
46
Previously,
states from the South African Development Community (SADC) had
expressed willingness to assist Mozambique in their military operations,
but reports in August 2020 suggested that the Mozambican government
did not want to consent to a SADC intervention, and instead preferred bilat-
eral military assistance from Zimbabwe.
47
43
Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Tanju Bilgiç, in Response to a Question Regarding the Statement of Greek Defence Min-
ister Concerning the Inclusion of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas to the Defence Agreement Signed with
France’(1 October 2021) www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-42_-yunanistan-savunma-bakani-nin-aciklamasi-hk-sc.
en.mfa.
44
Lefteris Papadimas, Michele Kambas and George Georgiopoulos, ‘Greek parliament approves defence
pact with France’,Reuters (7 October 2021) www.reuters.com/world/europe/greece-france-defence-
pact-protects-against-third-party-aggression-greek-pm-2021-10-07/.
45
Ibid.
46
See, e.g. Patrick M Butchard and Jasmin J Nessa (eds), ‘Digest of State Practice: 1 January –30 June
2021’(2021) 8(2) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 343, 353–5.
47
Ibid. See also Andrew Kunambura, ‘Mozambican govt begs Zim for military rescue’,Zimbabwe Indepen-
dent (7 August 2020) www.theindependent.co.zw/2020/08/07/mozambican-govt-begs-zim-for-
military-rescue/.
180 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
As detailed previously, on 23 June 2021, the Executive Secretary of
SADC, Stergomena Tax, told reporters that the African states had
agreed the deployment of a Standby Force ‘in support of Mozambique
to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado’.
48
At the beginning of July, Stergomena Tax wrote to the United Nations
to inform the Security Council of the deployment, stating that the deploy-
ment was to take effect by 15 July 2021, for an initial period of three
months.
49
There were no details at that time on troop numbers or contri-
butions, but SADC said that the mission ‘aims to support Mozambique in
combating acts of terrorism and violent extremism, and to support
Mozambique in restoring law and order in affected areas of Cabo
Delgado Province.’
50
The letter to the UN also argued that the deployment
was ‘[c]onsistent with the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Secur-
ity Cooperation, and in recognition of the principle of subsidiarity as
espoused in the Charter of the United Nations (Chapter VIII, regional
arrangements, Article 52).’
51
Reports suggest the SADC publicly launched at a ceremony on 9 August
2021.
52
Then, Mozambique television news reported that Tanzania would
contribute 274 troops to the force, South Africa would send 270, Botswana
108, Lesotho 70, while Angola would send 16. But Janes Defence news
reported that South Africa had put their troop contributions at 1,495,
while Botswana was at 296 and Zimbabwe would provide 303 soldiers for
training purposes.
53
In November, SADC provided further details on the progress of the
deployment, stating that this new SADC Mission in Mozambique
(SAMIM) had achieved a number of milestones, including:
…recapturing villages, dislodging terrorists from their bases and seizing
weapons and warfare material, which has contributed to create a relatively
secure environment for safer passage of humanitarian support. Additionally,
members of the community have developed confidence in SAMIM forces,
48
‘Southern African nations agree to deploy forces to Mozambique’,Al-Jazeera (23 June 2021) www.
aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/23/southern-african-nations-agree-to-deploy-forces-to-mozambique;
Mozambique reportedly sent its formal request in July, see ‘Mozambique formally seeks help from
neighbors to stem insurgency’,The Defence Post (16 July 2021) www.thedefensepost.com/2021/07/
16/mozambique-neighbors-insurgents/; SADC, ‘SADC Executive Secretary presents instruments of
authority for Standby Force Deployment Mission to Mozambique’(17 July 2021) www.sadc.int/
news-events/news/sadc-executive-secretary-presents-instruments-authority-standby-force-deployment-
mission-mozambique/.
49
Letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc S/2021/658 (21 July 2021) Annex.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
See Helmoed-Römer Heitman & Jeremy Binnie, ‘SADC mission in Mozambique launched’,Janes (12
August 2021) www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/sadc-mission-in-mozambique-launched.
53
Ibid. See also ‘South Africa to send 1,495 troops to Mozambique to fight jihadists’,The Defence Post (28
July 2021) www.thedefensepost.com/2021/07/28/south-africa-troops-mozambique/.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 181
feeling more secure and allowing internally displaced persons to return to their
normal lives.
54
Other states have also continued to offer international assistance to Mozam-
bique to combat terrorism. Rwanda, for example, announced that it was
deploying a 1,000-strong force of soldiers and police to Mozambique.
55
In
its announcement, the Rwandan government said that the deployment was
‘at the request of the Government of Mozambique’and that:
The Rwandan contingent will support efforts to restore Mozambican state
authority by conducting combat and security operations, as well as stabilis-
ation and security-sector reform (SSR).
This deployment is based on the good bilateral relations between the Republic
of Rwanda and the Republic of Mozambique, following the signing of several
agreements between the two countries in 2018, and is grounded in Rwanda’s
commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and the 2015
Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians.
56
As reported previously, at the end of June, the EU also established an EU
Training Mission in Mozambique,
57
and formalised the mission as EUTM
Mozambique in early July.
58
The EU mission’s mandate mission will initially
last two years, and the EU announced:
During this period, its strategic objective will be to support the capacity build-
ing of the units of the Mozambican armed forces that will be part of a future
Quick Reaction Force. In particular, the mission will provide military training
including operational preparation, specialised training on counter-terrorism,
and training and education on the protection of civilians and compliance
with international humanitarian law and human rights law.
59
In August, Rwandan forces claimed that they had made significant progress,
claiming to have regained small towns such as Awasse,
60
as well as helping
Mozambique recapture the key port town of Mocimboa da Praia.
61
54
Southern African Development Community, ‘SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in Brief’(10
November 2021) www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief/.
55
Helmoed-Römer Heitman, ‘Rwandan troops deploy to Mozambique’,Janes (12 July 2021) www.janes.
com/defence-news/news-detail/rwandan-troops-deploy-to-mozambique.
56
Rwanda, Government of Rwanda, ‘Rwanda Deploys Joint Force to Mozambique’(9 July 2021) www.
gov.rw/blog-detail/rwanda-deploys-joint-force-to-mozambique.
57
‘EU agrees military training mission for Mozambique’,The Defence Post (30 June 2021) www.
thedefensepost.com/2021/06/30/eu-mozambique-military-training/.
58
Council of the EU, ‘Mozambique: EU sets up a military training mission to help address the crisis in Cabo
Delgado’(12 July 2021) www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/12/mozambique-
eu-launches-a-military-training-mission-to-help-address-the-crisis-in-cabo-delgado/.
59
Ibid. See also ‘EU launches military mission to train Mozambique army’,The Defence Post (12 July 2021)
www.thedefensepost.com/2021/07/12/eu-military-mission-mozambique/.
60
See, e.g. ‘Rwanda troops in Mozambique claim progress against jihadists’,The Defence Post (6 August
2021) www.thedefensepost.com/2021/08/06/rwanda-troops-progress-mozambique/.
61
‘Mozambique insurgency: Key port retaken from insurgents –Rwanda’,BBC News (8 August 2021)
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58138507.
182 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
SADC states met at a summit in October to consider the progress made by
the regional deployment.
62
The summit thanked this mission’s contributors
for ‘the remarkable achievements made since the deployment’, and further:
…approved the extension of the SAMIM to continue with offensive oper-
ations against terrorists and violent extremists to consolidate stability of secur-
ity and create a conducive environment for resettlement of the population and
facilitate humanitarian assistance operations and sustainable development.
63
While the initial authorisation of the deployment was due to end in October
2021, this extension did not set an end date.
64
2.2. Sahel region–Central African Republic: international military
assistance, while Russian Wagner Group is sanctioned
In the previous Digest,
65
it was reported that France planned to draw Oper-
ation Barkhane to a close by early 2022. In a press conference with Niger’s
President Mohamed Bazoum, French President Emmanuel Macron
announced that France would start closing its military bases in northern
Mali in the second half of 2021, with an aim to complete this by early
2022.
66
Macron repeated that France would continue to be a partner for
the G5 Sahel, and justified the drawdown by suggesting: ‘Our enemies
have abandoned their territorial ambitions in favour of spreading their
threat not only across the Sahel, but across all of West Africa.’
67
Mali’s Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maiga, gave an interview to
French newspaper Le Monde in October,
68
where he repeated claims that
France was ‘abandoning’Mali in the fight against terrorism.
69
In the Inter-
view, Maiga was also asked whether Mali was in discussions with the
Russian Wagner mercenary group, but Maiga dismissed this as ‘rumours’
while suggesting that Mali was still in discussions with Russia about provid-
ing military equipment and possibly other assistance, suggesting that Mali
62
South Africa, Government of South Africa, ‘Communiqué of Extra-ordinary Summit of organ Troika of
Southern African Development Community (SADC) plus the Republic of Mozambique’(5 October 2021)
www.gov.za/speeches/communiqu%C3%A9-extra-ordinary-summit-organ-troika-southern-african-
development-community-sadc.
63
Ibid, para 8.
64
Wendell Roelf and Alexander Winning, ‘Southern African bloc extends troop deployment in Mozambi-
que to fight insurgency -communique’,Reuters (5 October 2021) www.reuters.com/world/africa/
southern-african-bloc-extends-troop-deployment-mozambique-fight-insurgency-2021-10-05/.
65
Butchard and Nessa (eds) (n 46) 351–5.
66
‘France to start closing military bases in Mali by year-end: Macron’,The Defence Post (9 July 2021) www.
thedefensepost.com/2021/07/09/france-mali-bases/.
67
Ibid.
68
Morgane Le Cam, ‘Choguel Maïga : « Notre gouvernement a compris que s’il ne compte que sur un seul
partenaire, il pourra à tout moment être abandonné »’,Le Monde (18 October 2021) www.lemonde.fr/
afrique/article/2021/10/18/choguel-maiga-notre-gouvernement-a-compris-que-s-il-ne-compte-que-
sur-un-seul-partenaire-il-pourra-a-tout-moment-etre-abandonne_6098822_3212.html.
69
See also, ‘Mali doubles down on French “abandonment”with troop drawdown’,The Defence Post (18
October 2021) www.thedefensepost.com/2021/10/18/mali-france-abandonment/.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 183
seeks ‘all the means and the assistance of all the States which could help us to
secure our people.’
70
Despite this, in December, the US State Department expressed concern
over a rumoured deal between Mali and the Wagner Group, reportedly
costing $10 million per month.
71
The US, which had already sanctioned
the Wagner Group, said that the Group ‘will not bring peace to Mali, but
rather will destabilise the country further.’
72
The US also addressed Mali’s
rejection of a UN peacekeeping contingent:
The United States laments that Mali’s transitional government has refused to
accept more than 2,000 additional MINUSMA military and police peace-
keepers —again, at no cost to Mali —that would have contributed to civilian
protection. The United States also regrets that the transitional government has
delayed efforts by international partners to deploy additional troops and trai-
ners and to bolster security operations. We call on the transitional government
to take action to facilitate responsible and accountable security assistance
efforts aimed at protecting and empowering the Malian people.
73
A number of experts at the UN, part of the UN Human Rights Council’s
Special Procedures, released a statement in October 2021 expressing their
concerns over activities of the Russian mercenary Wagner Group in the
Central African Republic.
74
The statement said:
We are extremely concerned about intimidation and recent reports of violent
harassment by private military and security contractors against individuals
and communities.
…
We call on the CAR government to end all relationships with private military
and security personnel, particularly the Wagner Group …We urge the auth-
orities to comply with their obligations under international law to hold
accountable all perpetrators of grave violations and abuses of human rights
and international humanitarian law committed on their territory. They must
ensure unhindered access to justice and redress to all victims of violations,
including abuses committed by Russian private military and security
personnel.
75
The Wagner Group, according to the statement, are Russian instructors
operating as military and security personnel working closely with the
70
Le Monde Interview (n 68).
71
US, Department of State, ‘Potential Deployment of the Wagner Group in Mali’(15 December 2021)
www.state.gov/potential-deployment-of-the-wagner-group-in-mali/.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council, Special Procedures,
‘CAR: Russian Wagner Group harassing and intimidating civilians –UN experts’(27 October) www.
ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/11/car-russian-wagner-group-harassing-and-intimidating-civilians-
un-experts.
75
Ibid.
184 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
armed forces of the Central African Republic and police, and engage in the
arrest and detention of individuals.
76
In response to the allegations of human
rights abuses, the European Union imposed sanctions and restrictions on the
Wagner Group in December 2021.
77
The EU said when imposing sanctions:
The Wagner Group has recruited, trained and sent private military operatives
to conflict zones around the world to fuel violence, loot natural resources and
intimidate civilians in violation of international law, including international
human rights law.
…
The individuals listed by the EU are involved in serious human rights abuses,
including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and kill-
ings, or in destabilising activities in some of the countries they operate in,
including Libya, Syria, Ukraine (Donbas) and the Central African Republic.
The group is also spreading its malign influence elsewhere, notably in the
Sahel region. For these reasons the group constitutes a threat for the people
in the countries were they are present, the wider region and for the European
Union.
78
2.3. Eritrea–Ethiopia: Tigray crisis continues amid Eritrean presence
in Ethiopia
As detailed in the previous Digests,
79
Eritrea had deployed forces within the
Tigray region of Ethiopia, during hostilities between the Tigray People’s Lib-
eration Front (TPLF)
80
and the Ethiopian Federal Government.
81
Ethiopia
has previously declared a state of emergency in the Tigray region,
82
and
Ethiopia’s Cabinet and Parliament branded the TPLF a terrorist organis-
ation.
83
By the end of June, the TPLF had taken the Tigray region capital,
Mekelle,
84
and some reports at the beginning of this reporting period
76
For background on the group, see also ‘Wagner Group: Why the EU is alarmed by Russian mercenaries
in Central Africa’,BBC News (19 December 2021) www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59699350.
77
European Union, ‘EU imposes restrictive measures against the Wagner Group’(13 December 2021)
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/13/eu-imposes-restrictive-measures-
against-the-wagner-group/.
78
Ibid.
79
See Butchard and Nessa (eds) (n 46) 348–51; Patrick M Butchard and Jasmin J Nessa (eds), ‘Digest of
State Practice: 1 July –31 December 2020’(2021) 8(1) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law
357, 183–4.
80
Some reports suggest that rebels have rebranded as the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF).
81
Ibid.
82
Louisa Brooke-Holland, ‘Ethiopia: Warnings of “full-scale humanitarian crisis”in Tigray region’, House of
Commons Library, UK Parliament (18 November 2020) https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/ethiopia-
fears-of-civil-war-in-tigray-region/; more recently, see Louisa Brooke-Holland, ‘Ethiopia: Situation in
Tigray’, House of Commons Library, UK Parliament (18 June 2021) https://commonslibrary.
parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9147/.
83
‘Tigray conflict: Ethiopia lists TPLF as a terrorist group’,Africa News (6 May 2021) www.africanews.com/
2021/05/06/tigray-conflict-ethiopia-lists-tplf-as-a-terrorist-group/.
84
‘Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict: Street celebrations as rebels seize capital’,BBC News (29 June 2021) www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-57645282.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 185
suggested that forces were continuing to push to recapture towns in the
south of the region.
85
As the conflict continued, Ramesh Rajasingham, UN
Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
Relief Coordinator, warned of an imminent humanitarian crisis and
people falling into famine in Tigray,
86
a situation made worse after two
key bridges allowing aid into Tigray were destroyed.
87
Meanwhile, Ethiopian
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won the rescheduled election in June-July 2021,
but voting did not take place in Tigray.
88
Eritrea had admitted it had a presence in Tigray in a letter to the UN in
April, but denied any illegal conduct, while also suggesting that Eritrea
and Ethiopia had agreed ‘on the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and the sim-
ultaneous redeployment of Ethiopian contingent along the international
boundary.’
89
However, during the current reporting period US Secretary of
State, Antony Blinken, revealed that Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) had
re-entered Ethiopian territory. He said in August that ‘large numbers
of EDF have re-entered Ethiopia, after withdrawing in June.’
90
Blinken
said:
Prolonged, intensified and expanded conflict increases the risks of violence
against civilians and rights violations. We call upon the Eritrean government
to withdraw its military forces immediately and permanently from Ethiopia.
At the same time, the United States continues to urge all parties to the
conflict, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, to end abuses
against civilians, take steps to de-escalate the conflict, allow for unimpeded
humanitarian access, and commit to a negotiated ceasefire.
91
This came as the US sanctioned Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) Chief of Staff
General Filipos Woldeyohannes ‘for his connection with serious human
85
Dawit Endeshaw and Maggie Fick, ‘Forces from Ethiopia’s Tigray region say they are pushing south’,
Reuters (12 July 2021) www.reuters.com/world/africa/forces-ethiopias-tigray-region-say-they-are-say-
pushing-south-2021-07-12/.
86
‘400,000 in Tigray cross “threshold into famine”, with nearly 2 million on the brink, Security Council
told’,UN News (2 July 2021) https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1095282. See also Giulia Paravicini
and Katharine Houreld, ‘Exclusive: UN official accuses Eritrean forces of deliberately starving Tigray’,
Reuters (14 June 2021) www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-un-official-accuses-eritrean-forces-
deliberately-starving-tigray-2021-06-11/.
87
See, e.g. ‘Ethiopia says won’t“suffocate”Tigray as UN clamors for access,’The Defence Post (2 July 2021)
www.thedefensepost.com/2021/07/02/ethiopia-will-not-suffocate-tigray/.
88
‘Ethiopia election: Abiy Ahmed wins with huge majority’,BBC News (11 July 2021) www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-57791868.
89
Letter Dated 16 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2021/378 (19 April 2021).
90
US, Department of State, ‘Sanctioning Eritrean Military Leader in Connection with Human Rights Abuse
in Ethiopia’(23 August 2021) www.state.gov/sanctioning-eritrean-military-leader-in-connection-with-
human-rights-abuse-in-ethiopia/.
91
Ibid. See also US, Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions Eritrean Military Leader in Connec-
tion with Serious Human Rights Abuse in Tigray’(23 August 2021) https://home.treasury.gov/news/
press-releases/jy0329.
186 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
rights abuse committed during the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia.’The US
claimed:
Under Filipos’command, EDF troops have raped, tortured, and executed civi-
lians in Ethiopia. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have described a sys-
tematic effort by the EDF to inflict as much harm on the ethnic Tigrayan
population as possible in the areas the EDF controls. Eritrean troops have for-
cibly displaced civilians and ransacked businesses; IDPs spoke of a ‘scorched
earth’policy intended to prevent civilians from returning home.
92
On 13 July, the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 47/13, on the
situation of human rights in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.
93
The Resolution
expressed that the Council was:
Deeply concerned also by reports indicating the participation of Eritrean
troops exacerbating the conflict in the Tigray region and by allegations of
their involvement in cases of serious human rights violations and violations
of international humanitarian and refugee law.
94
As well as expressing concern for ‘the deteriorating humanitarian situation
in the Tigray region, the food crisis and the serious conditions of famine,
and also about the insecurity that continues to hamper humanitarian
access’,
95
the Council also called for ‘the swift and verifiable withdrawal of
Eritrean troops from the Tigray region’.
96
Meanwhile, there were continued reports of violations of human rights,
international humanitarian law, and the deliberate targeting of civilians by
Tigray forces as the crisis continued, with some allegations also made
against Eritrean and Ethiopian forces.
97
On 17 December 2021, the
Human Rights Council adopted Resolution S-33/1 at its thirty-third
special session, which established an international commission of human
rights experts on Ethiopia.
98
The mandate of this investigation included
investigating ‘allegations of violations and abuses of international human
rights law and violations of international humanitarian law and international
refugee law in Ethiopia committed since 3 November 2020 by all parties to
the conflict, including the possible gender dimensions of such violations
and abuses …’
99
92
Ibid
93
UN Human Rights Council Resolution 47/13 (2021), UN Doc A/HRC/RES/47/13 (26 July 2021).
94
Ibid, preambular para 7.
95
Ibid, preambular para 8.
96
Ibid, operative para 3.
97
See, e.g. ‘Ethiopia’s Tigray rebels accused of shelling, shooting civilians’,The Defence Post (22 Septem-
ber 2021) www.thedefensepost.com/2021/09/22/tigray-rebels-shooting-civilians/; Human Rights
Watch, ‘Ethiopia: Tigray Forces Summarily Execute Civilians’,HRW (9 December 2021) www.hrw.org/
news/2021/12/10/ethiopia-tigray-forces-summarily-execute-civilians.
98
UN Human Rights Council Resolution S-33/1, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-33/1 (21 December 2021).
99
Ibid, para 9.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187
Regarding the developments in the hostilities during this reporting
period, the Ethiopian government had announced a unilateral ceasefire at
the end of June 2021.
100
But reports as early as July suggested the Ethiopian
government was preparing another offensive in the region as the Tigray
rebels captured more territory in the north.
101
By November, reports
suggested that fighting had resumed in the region,
102
and by December
Ethiopia claimed the recapturing of key towns.
103
The Tigray rebels then
announced a retreat out of two regions, and back into the main strongholds
in Tigray.
104
Fighting also crossed the border into Sudan at one point –the Sudanese
government stated that several soldiers had been killed in the cross-border
clash, but Ethiopia blamed the incident on the instability and fighting in
Tigray.
105
2.4. Somalia–US: US airstrikes after withdrawal
The US troop withdrawal from Somalia, covered in the previous Digest, was
completed in January 2021.
106
In July, the US undertook its first airstrike in
Somalia since President Joe Biden took office. In a statement, US Marine
Corps Brig. Gen. Thomas Savage, the US Africa Command deputy director
of operations, said that ‘[t]his strike was conducted under collective self-
defence authority and targeted al-Shabaab fighters engaged in active
combat with our Somali partners. …We are committed to supporting our
Somali partners as they fight against these terrorists.’
107
The US undertook a second strike less than two weeks later, with it repeat-
ing the justification that ‘US forces are authorised to conduct strikes in
100
Daphne Psaledakis and Humeyra Pamuk, ‘Blinken calls for indefinite ceasefire in call with Ethiopia’s
Abiy’,Reuters (7 July 2021) www.reuters.com/world/africa/blinken-calls-negotiated-indefinite-
ceasefire-call-with-ethiopias-abiy-2021-07-06/.
101
See, e.g. ‘Ethiopia leaders threaten new offensive against Tigray rebels’,The Defence Post (15 July
2021) www.thedefensepost.com/2021/07/15/ethiopia-leaders-offensive-tigray/.
102
‘Ethiopia forces, Tigrayan rebels battle over key town of Kombolcha’,The Defence Post (1 November
2021) www.thedefensepost.com/2021/11/01/ethiopia-battle-kombolcha/; Declan Walsh, ‘Ethiopia
launches new offensive on Tigray rebels as famine looms’,The New York Times (12 October 2021)
www.nytimes.com/2021/10/12/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-offensive.html.
103
Maggie Fick, ‘Ethiopian forces have recaptured two strategic towns, government says’,Reuters
(6 December 2021) www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ethiopian-forces-have-recaptured-two-
strategic-towns-government-says-2021-12-06/.
104
‘Ethiopia’s rebels announce retreat to Tigray’,The Defence Post (21 December 2021) www.
thedefensepost.com/2021/12/21/ethiopia-rebels-retreat-tigray/.
105
‘Ethiopia denies attack on Sudan, blames rebels for violence’,Al-Jazeera (29 November 2021) www.
aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/29/ethiopia-denies-attack-on-sudan-blames-rebels-for-unrest.
106
See Butchard and Nessa (eds) (n 46) 355–6; Cara Anna, ‘US military says its troop removal from
Somalia is complete’,AP News (17 January 2021) https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-troop-
withdrawals-national-elections-elections-africaa5c53d5c7cb0fa3473e7df98ee66ece1.
107
US Africa Command, ‘U.S. Africa Command conducts strike against al-Shabaab’(20 July 2021) www.
africom.mil/pressrelease/33893/us-africa-command-conducts-strike-against-al-shabaab. See also ‘US
launches air strike targeting Al Shabaab in Somalia’,The Defence Post (21 July 2021) www.
thedefensepost.com/2021/07/21/us-air-strike-somalia/.
188 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
support of combatant commander designated partner forces under collective
self-defence.’
108
3. Middle East
3.1. Syria: refuting the United States’Article 51 claim
During the previous reporting period, the United States reported to the
Security Council, in a letter dated 29 June 2021, that it had conducted
strikes against facilities in Syria and Iraq in the exercise of its inherent
right of self-defence, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter.
109
The
United States added:
This letter supplements prior letters provided to the Council, including on 27
February 2021, which further explain the basis for such actions in self-defense
against these ongoing attacks. These militia attacks have escalated in recent
months.
110
Syria responded, through its letter dated 1 July 2021, condemning the
attack and accusing the United States of attempting ‘to invoke the pro-
visions of the Charter to justify its aggression’.
111
Syria recalled its
message from its previous letter, dated 4 March 2021,
112
that Article 51
had been drafted with deliberate care to include restrictions to ensure
that its provisions were not ‘manipulated, misconstrued and exploited
to carry out acts of aggression and spread chaos and destruction’.
113
Syria emphasised the importance of the principle of refraining from the
use of force:
…and the need to steer clear of misinterpreting or arbitrarily applying Article
51 and transforming it from a provision concerning self-defence into a basis
for aggression and occupation, as well as a threat to international peace and
security.
114
108
Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, ‘US military carries out second strike in Somalia this week’,Reuters (23 July
2021) www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-military-carries-out-second-strike-somalia-this-week-2021-07-
23/.
109
United States, Letter dated 29 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2021/614
(30 June 2021).
110
Ibid.
111
Identical letters dated 1 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/620 (2 July 2021).
112
Identical letters dated 4 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/223 (15 March 2021).
113
UN Doc S/2021/620 (n 111).
114
Ibid.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 189
Syria repeatedly called upon the United Nations, including in letters dated 8
July 2021
115
and 23 August 2021,
116
to demand an end to the United States’
aggression and illegal occupation of parts of Syrian territory.
3.2. Syria: third states’involvement
During this reporting period,Syria wrote to the Security Council on numerous
occasions concerning allegations against Turkey, including the alleged
obstruction of humanitarian operations,
117
Turkey’s renewal of its mandate
to send military forces into Iraq and Syria,
118
Turkey’s alleged funding of ter-
rorist organisations in Syria
119
and the occupation of Turkish forces in
Syria.
120
During the 8866th meeting of the Security Council on 28 September,
the representative of Syria complained about the alleged ‘aggressive and
destructive practices’carried out by Turkey on Syrian territories.
121
Syria
called upon the Security Council and the Secretariat to put an end to the
alleged crimes of the Turkish occupation and to end the presence of
Turkish military forces on Syrian territory.
122
Turkey responded to all these
allegations, in its letter dated 8 December 2021, by categorically rejecting
‘the lies and delusional allegations’made by Syria.
123
During the 8888th meeting of the Security Council on 27 October 2021,
the representative of Syria reiterated its demand for an end to the ‘illegal
presence’of the United States and Turkish forces on Syrian territory and
for stopping ‘their aggressive practices.
124
115
Identical letters dated 8 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/643 (14 July 2021).
116
Note verbale dated 23 August 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the
United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the secretariat of the Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/
HRC/48/G/1 (27 September 2021).
117
Identical letters dated 29 November 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc S/2021/983 (29 November 2021).
118
Identical letters dated 1 November 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc S/2021/916 (2 November 2021).
119
Letter dated 7 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2021/781 (13 September 2021).
120
Identical letters dated 21 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/670 (22 July 2021); Identical letters dated 20 August 2021 from the Permanent Represen-
tative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2021/744 (25 August 2021); Identical letters dated 26
October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2021/897 (2 November 2021).
121
UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8866 (28 September 2021) 17 (Syria).
122
Ibid.
123
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Organisation United Nations of 8 Decem-
ber 2021 to President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2021/1024 (9 December 2021).
124
UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8888 (27 October 2021) 22–3 (Syria).
190 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
3.3. Response to Syrian accusations of third states’involvement
On 2 July 2021, the Russian Foreign Minister explained that Russia was in
Syria on an ‘invitation from the legitimate government’and that Russia
was helping the Syrian security forces and the army to eradicate the remain-
ing hotbeds of terrorism from Syrian territory.
125
Further, the Russian
Foreign Minister accused the United States of occupying ‘significant portions
of Syria’and illegally exploiting Syria’s natural resources.
126
On 9 September
2021, the Russian Foreign Minister repeated the claim that a significant part
of Syrian territory was under the illegal occupation of the United States.
127
During a General Assembly meeting on 27 September 2021, the represen-
tative of Nicaragua reiterated its solidarity with the Government and people
of Syria as ‘they defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity and struggle
against foreign aggression and international terrorism’.
128
The representative of Iran, during a Security Council meeting on 24
August 2021, cautioned that ‘all uninvited foreign forces must leave the
country without any precondition or delay’if grounds to end the conflict
in Syria were to be created.
129
Further, during the 8937th meeting of the
Council, held on 20 December 2021, the representative of Iran warned
that the ‘continued occupation of parts of the Syrian territory by foreign
forces constituted a flagrant violation of international law and the Charter
of the United Nations, must come to an end’and, again, warned that ‘all
occupying and uninvited foreign forces must leave that country without
any precondition or further delay’.
130
3.4. Israel–Syria: alleged attacks and dispute over the Golan Heights
3.4.1. Alleged attacks
During this reporting period, Israel sent a fifty-six page document to the
Security Council listing alleged breaches of Israeli sovereignty and violations
of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement by Syria for the period of January
–March 2021.
131
Similarly, a seventy-two page document listing further
125
Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media
questions at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Bahrain
Abdullatif bin Rashid Alzayani, Moscow, July 2, 2021’(2 July 2021) www.mid.ru/en/press_service/
minister_speeches/1767185/.
126
Ibid.
127
Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media
questions at a joint news conference with Foreign Minister of the State of Israel Yair Lapid, Moscow,
September 9, 2021’(9 September 2021) www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1775210/.
128
UNGA Verbatim Record, UN Doc A/76/PV.17 (27 September 2021) 14 (Nicaragua).
129
UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8841 (24 August 2021) 27 (Iran).
130
UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8937 (20 December 2021) 27 (Iran).
131
Identical letters dated 9 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2021/638 (9
July 2021).
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 191
Syrian breaches and violations for the period of April –June 2021 was sent to
the Council by Israel.
132
Syria also wrote to the Security Council on a number of occasions to
report alleged attacks by Israel against Syria. In response to an alleged
attack by Israel on 19 July 2021, Syria accused Israel of ‘engaging in State ter-
rorism and providing ongoing support to armed terrorist groups’, whilst
warning Israel that carrying out further attacks would have ‘serious repercus-
sions, and for which Israel will bear full responsibility’.
133
Following a further alleged attack by Israel on 22 July 2021, Syria alleged
that continued acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Israel ‘would not be poss-
ible without the protection and cover provided by successive American
administrations and certain Western States’and reiterated that Syria
would not hesitate to ‘exercise its right to defend its land, people and sover-
eignty’.
134
In additional letters, concerning further alleged attacks against
Syria by Israel, Syria reiterated ‘the unrestrained and constant support’
given by the United States to Israel
135
and warned Israel ‘of the serious reper-
cussions of its attacks under false pretexts’.
136
At the 8888th meeting of the
Security Council on 27 October 2021, the representative of Syria called upon
the Security Council to stop Israeli acts of aggression against Syria.
137
During the 8866th meeting of the Security Council on 28 September, the
representative of Iran stated that the Security Council must live up to its
responsibility and ‘compel the Israeli regime to put an immediate end to
its acts of aggression’against Syria, arguing that such ‘adventuristic practices’
threaten regional and international peace and security.
138
At the 8937th
meeting of the Council, held on 20 December 2021, the representative of
Iran reaffirmed ‘Syria’s inherent right to self-defence and to respond at a
time and place of its choosing’.
139
On 29 December 2021, Iranian Foreign
Ministry Spokesman condemned the alleged frequent attacks by Israel
against Syria and labelled them as ‘acts of aggression’. The spokesman
132
Identical letters dated 4 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/
2021/837 (5 October 2021).
133
Identical letters dated 21 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/670 (22 July 2021).
134
Identical letters dated 22 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/673 (26 July 2021).
135
Identical letters dated 20 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/744 (19 August 2021).
136
Identical letters dated 3 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, UN doc S/2021/775 (8 September 2021).
137
UN Doc S/PV.8888 (n 124) 22 (Syria).
138
UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8866 (28 September 2021) 18 (Iran).
139
UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8937 (20 December 2021) 26 (Iran).
192 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
added that Syria had a legitimate right to defend itself ‘against the actions of
the aggressors’.
140
3.4.2. Dispute over the Golan Heights
On 26 December 2021, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett announced that
Israel’s goal was to double the population of the Golan Heights:
141
[T]he Golan Heights are Israeli; this is self-evident. Israeli law has been applied
to them since 1981 and they are beyond all debate
…
And to the Israelis who are looking for a place to build their home, I say –the
Heights are waiting for you; come to the Golan.
142
Syria wrote to the Security Council, in a letter dated 27 December 2021, con-
cerning Israel’s settlement policy in the Golan Heights, which Syria described
as a ‘dangerous and unprecedented escalation’.
143
The letter explained that
the occupied Syrian Golan was an integral part of the territory of Syria:
The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will work to regain the Golan in
its entirety and by all available means guaranteed under international law. That
is its eternal right that cannot be extinguished by the passage of time and is a
constitutional duty of the Syrian State.
144
Syria claimed that Israel’s‘provocative and reckless behaviour and aggressive
policies’have been possible because of the alleged protection provided by
successive United States administrations, who have provided ‘cover for
repeated acts of aggression’against Syria.
145
3.5. United States’military strikes in Syria and Iraq against ‘Iran-
backed militia’on 27 June 2021
It was detailed in the previous Digest
146
that the United States had reported
to the Security Council that it had conducted strikes against facilities in Syria
and Iraq, on 27 June 2021, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defence,
140
Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry’s reaction to Israel’s attack on food and medicine
storage places in Syria’s Latakia’(29 December 2021) en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/664005.
141
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Cabinet approves special plan to develop the Golan Heights’(26
December 2021) www.gov.il/en/departments/news/cabinet-approves-special-plan-to-develop-golan-
heights-26-dec-2021.
142
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘PM Bennett’s remarks at the start of the special Cabinet meeting on
the Golan Heights’(26 December 2021) https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/pm-bennett-s-
remarks-at-the-special-cabinet-meeting-26-dec-2021.
143
Identical letters dated 27 December 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc S/2021/1096 (29 December 2021).
144
Ibid.
145
Ibid,2.
146
Butchard and Nessa (eds) (n 46) 363.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 193
as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter.
147
In the United States’report, it was
alleged that the facilities in question ‘were used by Iran-backed militia
groups’that had been involved in a series of attacks against the United
States personnel and facilities in Iraq.
148
In a letter dated 2 July 2021 addressed to the Security Council, Iran refuted
the United States’accusations that Iran was ‘supporting the so-called “militia
groups”in Iraq’:
I have made it crystal clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been
involved, directly or indirectly, in any armed attack by any entity or individual
against United States personnel or facilities in Iraq.
Any claim to attribute to Iran, explicitly or implicitly, any attack carried out
against American personnel or facilities in Iraq is factually wrong and void
of the minimum requirements of authenticity and reliability, and thus comple-
tely baseless. Accordingly, we firmly reject such allegations and consider them
legally null and void.
149
Further, Iran categorically rejected ‘the extremely arbitrary interpretation of
Article 51’by the United States in justifying its ‘unlawful military strike’on
27 June 2021’and labelled the strike as a flagrant violation of Article 2(4) of
the Charter.
150
The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Iran of being ‘the world’s
number one exporter of terror’:
Israel will not sit quietly by, while Iran builds terror bases on our northern
border. Or while Iran supplies advanced weapons to terror organizations.
Weapons intended to be used against us. We will maintain our ability to
defend ourselves in the face of threats from Syria and elsewhere.
151
During the 8910th meeting of the Security Council, held on 23 November
2021, on ‘The Situation Concerning Iraq’, the representative of Mexico
reiterated its concerns of the invocation of Article 51 of the Charter:
Mexico reiterates once again its deep concern over the abuse of the invocation
of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in the context of the fight
against terrorism. This practice runs the risk of de facto broadening the excep-
tions to the general prohibition of the use of force, as enshrined in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter and in the unwavering jurisprudence of the
147
Letter dated 29 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2021/614 (30 June 2021).
148
Ibid.
149
Letter dated 2 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc S/2021/623 (6 July 2021).
150
Ibid.
151
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘FM Lapid and Russian FM Lavrov hold joint press conference in
Moscow’(9 September 2021) www.gov.il/en/departments/news/fm-lapid-and-russian-fm-lavrov-
hold-joint-press-conference-in-moscow-9-september-2021.
194 P. M. BUTCHARD AND J. J. NESSA
International Court of Justice. This is an aberration that we cannot accept and
one that undermines Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
152
3.6. Israel–Iran: reports of alleged attacks and threats
3.6.1. Israel and the United States’accusations against Iran’s nuclear
activities
During a meeting between the Israeli President and the German President on
1 July 2021, both agreed that Iran’s plan to acquire nuclear weapons would
‘threaten the stability of the region and of the whole world’.
153
Israel accused
Iran of openly declaring that Iran was working towards Israel’s destruc-
tion.
154
Further, Israel accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons and
warned that Israel will do everything to prevent Iran from attaining
nuclear weapons.
155
Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, met at the White House with the
United States’President, Joe Biden, 27 August 2021 for their first diplomatic
meeting.
156
President Biden stated that they were ‘going to discuss the threat
from Iran and our commitment to ensure Iran never develops a nuclear
weapon’by putting diplomacy first.
157
However, Biden cautioned that ‘if
diplomacy fails, we’re ready to turn to other options’.
158
During the
meeting, Bennett stated that ‘the Iranians are spinning their centrifuges in
Natanz and Fordow. We have got to stop them, and we both agree about
that’.
159
Iran responded to these specific statements, in its letter dated 14 Sep-
tember 2021 addressed to the Security Council, declaring that these state-
ments constituted ‘clear manifestations of explicit threats to conduct
nuclear terrorism’against Iran and that they also constituted a ‘gross viola-
tion of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, particularly
152
UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8910 (23 November 2021) 18 (Mexico).
153
Israel, Prime Minister’sOffice, ‘President Rivlin hosts official reception for German President Steinme-
ier’(1 July 2021) www.gov.il/en/departments/news/president-rivlin-hosts-official-reception-for-
german-president-steinmeier-1-july-2021.
154
Israel, Prime Minister’sOffice, ‘PM Bennett meets with German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’
(1 July 2021) www.gov.il/en/departments/news/pm-bennett-meets-with-german-president-frank-
walter-steinmeier-1-july-2021.
155
Israel, Prime Minister’sOffice, ‘PM Bennett comments on this week’s IAEA Report on Iran’(10 Septem-
ber 2021) www.gov.il/en/departments/news/spoke_iaea100921. See also Israel, Prime Minister’s
Office, ‘PM Bennett’s remarks at the start of the weekly Cabinet meeting’(22 August 2021) www.
gov.il/en/departments/news/pm-bennett-s-remarks-at-the-start-of-the-weekly-cabinet-meeting-22-
august-2021; Israel, Prime Minister’sOffice, ‘Prime Minister Naftali Bennett: “Do not give in to Iran’s
nuclear blackmail”’ (29 November 2021) www.gov.il/en/departments/news/spoke_iran291121.
156
United States, White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of
Israel Before Expanded Bilateral Meeting’(27 August 2021) www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
speeches-remarks/2021/08/27/remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-bennett-of-the-state-
of-israel-before-expanded-bilateral-meeting/.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid.
159
Israel, Prime Minister’sOffice, ‘PM Bennett’s Statement at the White House’(28 August 2021) www.
gov.il/en/departments/news/spoke280821.
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 195