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“Many roads lead to Rome and the Artificial Intelligence only shows me one road”: an interview study on physician attitudes regarding the implementation of computerised clinical decision support systems


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Research regarding the drivers of acceptance of clinical decision support systems (CDSS) by physicians is still rather limited. The literature that does exist, however, tends to focus on problems regarding the user-friendliness of CDSS. We have performed a thematic analysis of 24 interviews with physicians concerning specific clinical case vignettes, in order to explore their underlying opinions and attitudes regarding the introduction of CDSS in clinical practice, to allow a more in-depth analysis of factors underlying (non-)acceptance of CDSS. We identified three general themes from the results. First, ‘the perceived role of the AI’, including items referring to the tasks that may properly be assigned to the CDSS according to the respondents. Second, ‘the perceived role of the physician’, referring to the aspects of clinical practice that were seen as being fundamentally ‘human’ or non-automatable. Third, ‘concerns regarding AI’, including items referring to more general issues that were raised by the respondents regarding the introduction of CDSS in general and/or in clinical medicine in particular. Apart from the overall concerns expressed by the respondents regarding user-friendliness, we will explain how our results indicate that our respondents were primarily occupied by distinguishing between parts of their job that should be automated and aspects that should be kept in human hands. We refer to this distinction as ‘the division of clinical labor.’ This division is not based on knowledge regarding AI or medicine, but rather on which parts of a physician’s job were seen by the respondents as being central to who they are as physicians and as human beings. Often the respondents’ view that certain core parts of their job ought to be shielded from automation was closely linked to claims concerning the uniqueness of medicine as a domain. Finally, although almost all respondents claimed that they highly value their final responsibility, a closer investigation of this concept suggests that their view of ‘final responsibility’ was not that demanding after all.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethics (2022) 23:50
“Many roads lead toRome andtheArticial
Intelligence onlyshows me one road”:
aninterview study onphysician attitudes
regardingtheimplementation ofcomputerised
clinical decision support systems
Daan Van Cauwenberge1,2, Wim Van Biesen2,3, Johan Decruyenaere2,4, Tamara Leune2,3 and Sigrid Sterckx1,2*
Research regarding the drivers of acceptance of clinical decision support systems (CDSS) by physicians is still rather
limited. The literature that does exist, however, tends to focus on problems regarding the user-friendliness of CDSS.
We have performed a thematic analysis of 24 interviews with physicians concerning specific clinical case vignettes,
in order to explore their underlying opinions and attitudes regarding the introduction of CDSS in clinical practice, to
allow a more in-depth analysis of factors underlying (non-)acceptance of CDSS. We identified three general themes
from the results. First, ‘the perceived role of the AI’, including items referring to the tasks that may properly be assigned
to the CDSS according to the respondents. Second, ‘the perceived role of the physician’, referring to the aspects
of clinical practice that were seen as being fundamentally ‘human’ or non-automatable. Third, ‘concerns regarding
AI’, including items referring to more general issues that were raised by the respondents regarding the introduc-
tion of CDSS in general and/or in clinical medicine in particular. Apart from the overall concerns expressed by the
respondents regarding user-friendliness, we will explain how our results indicate that our respondents were primarily
occupied by distinguishing between parts of their job that should be automated and aspects that should be kept
in human hands. We refer to this distinction as ‘the division of clinical labor. This division is not based on knowledge
regarding AI or medicine, but rather on which parts of a physician’s job were seen by the respondents as being central
to who they are as physicians and as human beings. Often the respondents’ view that certain core parts of their job
ought to be shielded from automation was closely linked to claims concerning the uniqueness of medicine as a
domain. Finally, although almost all respondents claimed that they highly value their final responsibility, a closer inves-
tigation of this concept suggests that their view of ‘final responsibility was not that demanding after all.
Keywords: Clinical decision support systems, AI, Medicine, Automation, Division of clinical labour, Responsibility
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Over the last decade, automated clinical decision support
(CDS) using artificial intelligence (AI) has gained increas-
ing interest. A CDS system (CDSS) is usually defined
as a computer-based information system that supports
decision making in patient care by integrating clinically
relevant patient information and presenting it to the
Open Access
1 Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Bioethics Institute Ghent,
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
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Page 2 of 14
VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
healthcare worker. e more widespread introduction
of electronic health records (EHRs) facilitates the emer-
gence of CDSS as it allows incorporation of clinical deci-
sion support at different levels and for different purposes.
It is frequently assumed that AI-based CDSS will improve
health care [1], although studies proving this hypothesis
are scarce [24]. Moreover, the few cases where such AI-
based CDSS have been incorporated in EHRs failed to
improve clinically relevant outcomes [5].
More specifically, the introduction of EHR has also
been associated with increased burnout in healthcare
workers and decreased patient satisfaction. It has been
argued that EHRs add administrative burden (the “death
by a thousand clicks” [6]), and that they stand in the way
of true involvement between healthcare worker and
patient [7]. e implementation of CDSS into everyday
care is thus considered a major step forward by some [1],
and a major challenge to health care and the medical pro-
fession by others [810].
A lot of research has identified factors associated with
acceptance of CDSS by physicians [11, 12]. Technical
characteristics of the software, such as user interface
and transparency, the clinical aspects of the task at hand,
and the expertise of the physician with the CDS device
have been reported as important factors. However, next
to these engineering and technical issues, a substantial
human factor remains, as the human operator’s interac-
tion with the system is the necessary step for enacting the
recommendation of the device [13]. For example, 49–96%
of interruptive medication alerts are simply ignored by
the operator [14]. Little evidence is available on the true
underlying motivations, emotions and argumentations or
their modulating factors driving the acceptance of and
reaction of physicians to the incorporation of CDSS in
to EHRs. Most EHRs available on the market today are
designed from an administrative and informatics back-
ground perspective [7]. Consequently, they rarely con-
sider the specific requirements of clinical tasks and the
typical reasoning process of healthcare workers [15].
erefore, we designed a mixed methods qualitative
study to thematically explore the reactions and under-
lying reasoning of physicians when confronted with
vignettes in which hypothetical CDSS incorporated in
an EHR were presented. We hypothesized that many
of the factors for the acceptance of CDSS by physicians
reported in the literature, such as transparency, alert
fatigue, and user friendliness, may have some more
fundamental underlying drivers in common. Uncov-
ering these might help to better understand, and thus
potentially avoid, the sometimes ambiguous behavior
of physicians when confronted with CDSS in order to
enable proper development and implementation of
such systems. While most researchers have focused
on these more common factors, our analysis aims to
uncover these more hidden underlying drivers.
Setting andparticipants
is thematic analysis is part of a larger study per-
formed in a university hospital in a transition to select-
ing, customizing and implementing a new electronic
health record (EHR) system. While the existing EHR
was considered to be “fit for the task”, it does not have a
clinical decision support system (CDSS). A decision to
upgrade to a more modern EHR incorporating such a
CDSS was approved. All participants were thus famil-
iar with the use of an EHR, however, their exposure to
CDSS actually incorporated in an EHR was low.
Following recommendations on Q-sort methodology,
we intended to interview 30 physicians, with purposive
sampling to achieve a mix of gender and level of exper-
tise (trainee, junior staff, senior staff ) [16, 17]. Respond-
ents were interviewed in a silent room, and all sources
of distraction were avoided as much as possible.
Methodological approach
We used a mixed methods approach with a Q-sort
based classification of pre-defined reactions to clinical
case vignettes (see Additional file 1: Qsort vignettes),
in combination with a thinking-aloud approach in
which reasoning and attitudes of the participant dur-
ing the classification task were solicited. All sessions
were done by the same interviewer (blinded for review)
with expertise in the field of computerized CDSS. All
sessions were audiotaped and typed out verbatim
afterwards by another member of the research team
(blinded for review). Q-sort techniques can be used to
explore subjectivity and attitudes in a more systematic
way, and to provide insights into potential patterns and
concepts within this subjectivity [16]. e audiotaping
of the thinking aloud during the actual completion of
the Qsort allowed to not only gain insights in the per-
ceptions of the participants, but also in their underlying
reasoning, emotions and motivations.
irty statements describing potential actions of a
(hypothetical) CDSS in four well defined clinical set-
tings (for the vignettes describing the potential actions
see Additional file1: Qsort vignettes) were constructed.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
Statements represented variations of different factors
already associated with uptake of CDSS by physicians:
(1) transparency of the system; (2) the degree of cer-
tainty regarding the correctness of the advice provided
by the device; (3) the interruption of workflow with or
without obstructiveness1; and (4) the type of problem
at hand. In a pilot, statements were evaluated for clar-
ity and lack of ambiguity. In the first two vignettes, the
focus was on decision support for medication orders,
covering formulary alerts, drug-drug interaction alerts
and drug-condition alerts [18]. In the third vignette, a
diagnostic problem was raised, assessing automated
CDS for order entry as well as for presenting and inter-
preting results of the ordered diagnostic radiology
tests. In the last vignette, more advanced CDS for han-
dling a complex clinical problem was presented.
Thematic analysis
A thematic extraction of underlying opinions, attitudes
and arguments of the participants was performed based
on the audiotapes of the thinking-aloud during the inter-
views [19].
emes and concepts issued by the participants were
grouped and re-grouped by two members of the research
team (blinded for review) until all concepts were placed
under a non-overlapping header. Two different triangu-
lation session with all team members were performed to
reach a consensus on the thematic analysis. Quantitative
results of the Qsort will be published separately.
Our findings are based on an analysis of the audio
recordings of twenty-four interviews. e respondents
all worked at Ghent University Hospital. Fifteen respond-
ents identified as female and all were at different stages of
their career.
Based on our analysis we identified three overarching
themes, which can be further divided into smaller themes
and subthemes: (1) Perceived role of the AI; (2) Perceived
role of the physician; and (3) Concerns regarding AI.
e first two themes focus on the roles that were
ascribed to either AI or the physician, respectively.
Regardless of their general opinion towards the introduc-
tion of AI in the context of medicine, respondents were
in favour of assigning certain tasks to the AI. When argu-
ing in favour or against certain positions, the respond-
ents almost never consciously or explicitly formulated
ethical arguments, or referred to ethical principles such
as justice, fairness, beneficence, or even patient auton-
omy.2 Of course this is not to say that their arguments
did not reflect ethical beliefs, but rather that they did
not explicitly formulate them as such. e respondents’
mostly used a two-step argumentation. First, it was, often
implicitly, assumed that either the AI or the physician
had a certain role to play in the medical practice. Second,
it was argued that a given position was either good or
bad in relation to this presupposed role. Some respond-
ents limited the number of tasks the AI was allowed to
perform by emphasizing the unique and indispensable
role of the physician in clinical practice. roughout this
paper we will refer to the allocation of clinical tasks to
certain actors as the division of clinical labour.
e third theme consists of concerns regarding AI
that cannot be reduced to a discussion on the division of
clinical labour, but that instead relates to other issues of
concern. Importantly, in this last category respondents
sometimes did use negative ethical statements such as
‘bad’ or ‘evil.
Overarching theme 1: perceived role oftheAI
e first overarching theme concerns all roles that were
assigned to the AI. ese vary from very concrete tasks,
for example all administrative tasks, to more general
Fig. 1 Overarching theme 1 (above), themes (below)
1 By ‘obstructiveness’ we refer to the extent to which the direct control of the
operator is obstructed by the system. Obstructiveness does not necessarily
mean that the operator is in no way able to override the system, but rather
that their workflow is being interrupted.
2 An important exception was the use of the words ‘evil,’ ‘bad’ or ‘horrible.
Unlike their positive counterparts, these negative statements were sometimes
used by respondents. We will return to this subject when discussing the third
overarching theme that emerged from our analysis.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
goals, such as increasing safety or efficiency. is first
theme can be divided into six smaller themes: (1) safety;
(2) efficiency; (3) learning from the system; (4) adminis-
tration; (5) organisation of data; (6) and the ePhysician
Several respondents indicated that they believed the inte-
gration of AI in clinical practice would increase safety.
ere were two ways in which the respondents believed
AI would increase safety. First, they argued that the AI
would broaden their knowledge by suggesting illnesses or
therapies they would not have thought of otherwise.
AI will not replace us, but it will certainly help us. …
It will increase our performance by reminding us of
rare illnesses and combining all relevant data. (R9)
Second, they argued that the AI would force physi-
cians to better reflect on their choices by implement-
ing obstructive messages and rendering certain actions
impossible. For example:
is [obstructing certain actions] could be a good
thing when you are dealing with cowboys, people
who think they know it best. [Obstructing them]
could be a good thing to protect people against
themselves. (R20)
It is dangerous when you are able to just close a pop-
up without changing anything. e pop-ups should
ensure that the behaviour has changed. (R4)
Almost all respondents indicated they believed AI would
make clinical practice more efficient. is emphasis on
efficiency was especially prevalent in their judgement of
the many ways in which a CDSS could be implemented.
ey always preferred the version that emphasized effi-
ciency and speed in general.
I want the system to increase my efficiency and pro-
ductivity. (R3)
One respondent suggested that the implementation of
AI would not increase efficiency. Although the respond-
ent initially argued that AI would make clinical practice
more efficient, she later corrected her earlier statement.
I fear that our work is never done. [Even after imple-
menting AI] I think there will be new inefficiencies.
But now I am being philosophical (laughs). (R23)
Learning fromthesystem
Many respondents stated that they did not simply
want to hand over certain tasks to the AI, but that they
themselves wanted to learn from and improve their skills
through the system. Most often this view was expressed
by negative statements presented in the vignettes.
Respondents regularly disliked certain statements,
because they felt they would not ‘learn’ anything from
them. For example:
I find it strange that it does not tell us why it is pro-
moting a certain course of action. What is the origin
of the decision? is way you do not learn anything
[from the system]. (R9)
Generally, the respondents thought it was important
that they should not just take the backseat and let the AI
do the work. Some of the respondents argued that not
only their job performance, but also their reasoning pro-
cess should be improved by the AI.
Many of the respondents created a dichotomy between
administrative tasks on the one hand and the core medi-
cal tasks of the physician on the other. None of the
respondents was very clear about the kind of tasks that
belonged to these categories. Yet, almost all of them
characterised the administrative tasks as being simpler
and therefore easier to automate.
[Administrative tasks] are banal, they are trivial.
ey are very easy and should, obviously, be inte-
grated [in the system]. If I were in charge of [ICT],
this would be the first step I would take. (R6)
Indeed, most respondents had no issue with automat-
ing administrative tasks. ey only expressed doubts
about the automation of the tasks they perceived as being
essential to their job, such as diagnosis or the prescrip-
tion of therapy. Sometimes, this distinction was made
very clearly:
[Unlike with medical decisions] I do trust the AI
when it takes administrative decisions. ose do not
look difficult to me. (R14)
Organisation ofdata
Some respondents suggested that the AI would be espe-
cially useful as an organiser of data.3 ey mostly pre-
ferred the AI to collect, organise and present data to the
3 e organisation of data differs from the previous subtheme. Administrative
tasks are already existing tasks that the physician would like to be automated.
For instance, notifying the physician when the hospital does not have a certain
medicine. ‘Organising data’ on the other hand, refers to a set of tasks that did
not exist before the introduction of AI and data analysis, more specifically the
acquisition, organisation, and analysis of data on a scale that was not possible
before the introduction of AI.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
physician. For example, when asked which job he would
most like the AI to perform, respondent 3 answered:
e best [job the AI could perform] would be the
organisation of my data based on their relevance
and importance. (R3)
The ePhysician
Crucially, all the roles taken on by AI mentioned so far
are merely supportive. All of the previous themes sug-
gested that the AI and the physician should become col-
leagues of sorts, but they disagreed about exactly what
kind of jobs the AI should perform. Moreover, some
respondents indicated that they believed the AI would
come to perform every task of the physician, essentially
becoming an electronic physician or ePhysician:
If the system would really have all of the necessary
information, I believe they would often be more reli-
able [than a human]. (R16)
Almost all respondents at a given point in the inter-
view considered the prospect of their job becoming fully
Overarching theme 2: perceived role ofthephysician
e second overarching theme is the counterpart of the
first. It concerns all roles that are assigned to the physi-
cian. ese roles are almost always framed as a reaction
to the perceived encroachment of the AI. erefore the
first two themes can be seen as a confrontation of view-
points regarding the division of clinical labour. is over-
arching theme can be divided into three subthemes (see
Clinical skills
Earlier we alluded to the fact that many respondents
introduced a dichotomy between tasks they considered
to be easier administrative tasks and those they perceived
to be more difficult clinical tasks. Some respondents
attempted to delineate exactly what differentiates those
administrative tasks from medical ones by emphasizing
certain clinical skills one needs in order to be able to per-
form these clinical tasks. Crucially, it was always assumed
by the respondents that only humans can master these
clinical skills. ey identified two main clinical skills as
being both crucial to the medical profession and unpos-
sessable by the AI.
First, it was argued that it is impossible to automate
clinical reasoning, but no clear reasons were provided for
why this is so:
So far, I do not believe that a system exists which can
fully replace the clinical reasoning process. (R16)
Fig. 2 Overarching theme 2 (above), themes (middle), subthemes (below)
4 However, most of them reacted very negatively towards this idea. We will
return to these negative reactions when reporting on the third overarching
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
Some respondents, however, tried to explain which
aspects of clinical reasoning process render it difficult to
be automated. ose respondents expressed the view that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to reduce medical reason-
ing to a set of rules. All of them emphasized the unique
nature of every consultation. We will return to this view
when discussing the third overarching theme.
Others compared the AI to one of their colleagues.
Unlike the colleague, the AI is unable to explain how it
came to its decision. It is at most able to give additional
information, but this does not come close to a real dis-
cussion, as the respondents indicated they would have
with their human colleagues. ey all said that it was
necessary to understand the reasoning behind a sug-
gestion in order to accept it, but that the AI is unable to
explain its position:
[With people] you are able to ask why they suggested
something, they are able to give arguments for their
position and I am able to react to those arguments.
But here [with the AI] it ends with a suggestion. (R1)
Second, some respondents focused on certain practical
skills that are essential to the medical profession. Some,
for example, pointed out that interventional therapy, e.g.
surgery, still has to be administered by a human physi-
cian. Of interest, they recognized that also for human
physicians, differences in skills might determine which
type of intervention will lead to the best result, as some
physicians might have more experience with a particular
technique than with others:
Many roads lead to Rome. e AI only shows me one
road, but both me and my patient benefit from the
road that I know best. (R20)
It was perceived by some respondents that AI does
not know which therapies the physician is most familiar
with. ey argued the AI will sometimes suggest certain
therapies, which it believes to be most efficient or well-
researched, but which the physician on call does not
know or is not able to administer.
Final responsibility
Many respondents argued that the physician should have
the final responsibility in clinical practice. We use the
words ‘final responsibility,’ because the respondents were
willing to delegate many of the physician’s tasks to the AI.
Yet, the physician should always have a supervising role
and, at least, every important decision should be made by
e reasons mentioned as to why the final responsibil-
ity should stay with the physician differed widely. None-
theless, they can be broadly divided into three main
categories. First, many respondents wanted to have final
responsibility for psychological reasons. By ‘psychologi-
cal’ we mean that the respondent did not mention any
objective reasons, but simply wanted to stay in control:
I do not think the computer system should be
allowed to block you. I have my reasons to do what I
do and maybe I will think about its suggestions, but
I do not want [the] IT [department] to block me at
those moments. … I always want to do what I want.
Second, some respondents indicate that it is episte-
mologically important to stay in charge. e physician
should always know what is going on. is is closely
linked to the demand for more transparency because that
extra information would allow the physician to stay in
charge [20]:
e more information they get [from the AI], the
more willing the physician will be to follow [the AI’s
suggestion]. (R15)
is view differs from the previous view, in which it
was stated that under no circumstance should the AI
override the physician’s own opinion. If the AI is able to
give adequate information on why a certain course of
action has to be taken, the respondent indicates she will
follow the suggestion.
Finally, some respondents emphasized that they
wanted to maintain their autonomy. ey wanted to be
the one to take the decision, because they felt otherwise
the AI would ignore their autonomy as medical profes-
sionals. Again, this is different from the two previous,
because an objective reason is mentioned as to why the
physician should stay in charge:
e final choice should always stay with the physi-
cian. (R11)
It is important to emphasize that these categories are
not mutually exclusive. A good example of this is the fol-
lowing statement:
I do not want [the system] to order me around. (R1)
Respondent 1 clearly phrased his view in a way that
most clearly aligns with the psychological category, but
the subject matter most closely aligns with the autonomy
category. is may indicate that to some respondents the
lines between these different motivations are less clear.
Enjoyable work
Finally, many respondents argued that their profession
should be ‘enjoyable’. ey often saw the AI as a poten-
tial negative influence on their day-to-day satisfaction at
the job. Generally they all wanted to avoid unnecessary
annoyance by the AI.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
A recurring theme with regard to frustration was the
respondents’ fear of alert fatigue. Alert fatigue refers to
a situation in which people are bombarded by so many
pop-ups and notifications that they become numb to
their effect [9]. is results in a lot of frustration. Typi-
cal expressions of this belief are: “Do not bother me with
unimportant news” (R5) or “I do not want 199 notifica-
tions” (R1).
Finally, many respondents also made clear that they
worried that the introduction of AI in the workplace
would further obfuscate the separation of work and pri-
vate life. It was not simply that they thought the many
notifications would be frustrating, but that they believed
a clear separation of work and private life is a necessary
precondition for an enjoyable work environment:
e border between work and private life should not
become even more fluid. (R23)
Overarching theme 3: concerns regardingAI
e first two overarching themes concerned the role of
the AI and the physician in clinical practice. e third
overarching theme, however, focuses on criticisms of
AI that do not have anything to do with the division of
clinical labour.5 Importantly, some of these general con-
cerns relate to questions regarding the division of clini-
cal labour that we identified in relation to the first and
second overarching themes. However, with regard to
this third main theme we will focus on the issues our
respondents had with the CDSS regardless of the tasks it
would be performing.
We have subdivided these criticisms according to
three perspectives. First, a purely technical perspective.
Second, a perspective that focuses on the relationship
between the user of the AI, in this case a physician, and
the AI. ird, the perspective of the relationship between
the AI and the kind of task it is being used for, in this case
medical tasks. (see Fig.3).
Respondents were often sceptical about a variety of
strictly technical aspects of the AI. We can divide these
concerns into four main themes: (1) data quality; (2)
accuracy of CDSS; (3) the interface of CDSS; and (4)
rigidity. First, many respondents expressed doubts about
the robustness of the data:
e statement [of the AI] is only as strong as the
data [used by the AI] (R2)
Some respondents were more specific about why the
data used by the AI could be inaccurate. It was argued
that the AI would only work if it possessed all the nec-
essary information regarding the patient, but that his-
torically physicians have not recorded all relevant pieces
of information and therefore their data would create an
inaccurate picture of reality.
In order for the AI to work, you have to feed it data.
But a file [on a patient made by a human physician]
never contains all [of the necessary] data (R16)
A second theme concerned many respondents’ wor-
ries regarding the AI’s accuracy in general. ey indi-
cated that they did not have any problem with using the
AI, as long as they could be sure the AI would not make
any mistakes. A more extreme version of this argument
was offered by respondent 1. He argued that medicine, as
a domain of research, is unable to guarantee the level of
accuracy necessary for the AI to function properly.
Not only the system, but also medicine [as a field
of study] has to have a certain level of accuracy [in
order for these AI to function properly]. (R1)
A third issue concerned the interface of the AI and the
way in which this interface could have a negative impact
on clinical practice. is was one of the most common
Fig. 3 Overarching theme 3 (above), themes (middle), subthemes
(below, ordered vertically)
5 In the second overarching theme we already anticipated some of these
criticisms, because claims that a role should be performed by a human often
rested on an assumption that the AI lacked the capability to perform this task.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
kinds of arguments given by the respondents. ese con-
cerns with the design varied widely from individual to
individual. Respondent 22 said, for example, that she pre-
fers a small amount of text, because otherwise she would
not read the notification, whereas respondent 18 told us
that she prefers it when the suggestions of the AI always
ends with a question mark and respondent 14 told us that
when she sees a button, she wants to press it. e only
recurring view was that almost all respondents had a dis-
like for the use of red crosses to indicate that the physi-
cian had made a mistake:
e red [crosses] seem to make fun of you. I like the
other [options], [because] they present you with an
alternative (R5)
Finally, many respondents said they had concerns
regarding the perceived ‘rigidity’ of the AI. Because this
concern has to do both with the technical aspects of the
AI and the way in which it relates to medicine, we will
explain it below when discussing the latter.
Interaction betweenAI andhumans
is theme deals with concerns respondents had with the
interaction between AI and human users. ey broadly
had two concerns: (1) reinforcement of certain attitudes;
(2) habits of the human user and a fear of replacement by
the AI.
First, many respondents argued that the AI could have
a reinforcing effect. By reinforcement we understand a
process in which pre-existing human traits are encour-
aged and thus made more prominent by the AI. e
respondents referred to a variety of characteristics that
could be encouraged by the AI. Many respondents men-
tioned laziness in this regard:
I mostly believe the AI will have beneficial effects,
but it should not go too far. For example, alarms
and help with diagnosis seem like good things, but
it would be problematic if we would become too
dependent on them. e danger is that we would all
become very lazy and dependent. (R20)
Importantly, it is argued here that the AI would play
upon pre-existing laziness. By offering quick diagnoses
and alerting physicians when to act, many respondents
fear that physicians would start to follow the AI unques-
tioningly, because that is the easy thing to do. Other
respondents argued that the AI could reinforce the physi-
cian’s pre-existing intuitions or beliefs and thereby create
a ‘tunnel vision’:
I find it dangerous when the system would only give
you information about the illness you were already
thinking about. at way the system would rein-
force your first thought instead of encouraging wider
reflection. … e AI must fight against tunnel vision.
We already pointed out that some respondents believed
the AI would be able to completely replace the physician
and that most physicians were not enthusiastic about
this prospect. e second most common problem the
respondents identified with AI in relation to humans was
the belief that the AI would replace the human. Many
respondents at some point entertained the thought of the
AI, at some point, being able to completely automate the
tasks of the physicians, but always immediately observed
that this would be a very bad evolution.
When wondering about a future in which AI would be
able to fully automate the physician’s tasks, respondent
1 said: “In that case we [physicians] should just go home.”
When talking about a similar future, respondent 5 said:
It is just like you [the physician] are a robot who needs
to press on some buttons.” Talking about the future of the
role of AI in medicine, respondent 20 argued: “You see
that they are trying to take the decisions out of our hands.”
ese reactions were often more emotional than their
other responses during the interview and they often used
less formal language.
Other respondents explicitly said that they do not want
a future in which the AI would fully take over their job.
Importantly, this refusal was not based on any criticism
on performance of the AI. Rather, they argued that even
if the AI was able to fully automate every aspect of the
physician’s job, they still would not want it to do so:
I think it would be very dangerous when the AI
would both conduct the diagnosis and prescribe the
therapy all by itself. is would bypass the knowl-
edge of the physician. We do not want the AI to do
everything, otherwise the physicians could just go
home. (R22)
Of note, ‘dangerous,’ at first glance seems to indicate a
criticism of certain consequences of the AI, but the next
sentence clarifies the respondent only criticizes the way
in which the AI would replace the physician, and that it
is this replacement in itself which is seen as dangerous.
Most respondents experienced the automation of diagno-
sis and therapy as being ‘a step too far.6 An exception to
this rule was respondent 19, a surgeon, who believed that
6 Notice how these boundaries related to the distinction made by most
respondents between easy administrative and more complex clinical tasks.
From this we can conclude that there is a correlation between viewing a task
as being ‘automatable’ and believing a task to be fundamental to one’s job. We
will return to this topic in the Discussion.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
both diagnosis and therapy would become automated,
but the automation of surgery would be “impossible.”
Interaction betweenAI andmedicine
Some people also expressed concerns regarding AI spe-
cifically because of the way it relates to the domain of
medicine. is theme can be subdivided into two main
concerns: (1) rigidity; (2) the idea that medicine is a
‘unique domain.
It is believed by some that AI is too rigid, because it has
to work with well-defined concepts that are measurable
and mutually exclusive. is is a technical issue, because
the respondents assumed this rigidity is the result of the
way in which AI functions on a technical level. Yet it is
also a problem in relation to clinical medicine, because
the respondents believed this rigidity was a problem spe-
cifically in the context of the medical profession:
e algorithm should always leave room for doubt.
In medicine it is always important to doubt. …
Our domain [medicine] is very hard to automate,
because it is difficult to reduce it to well-defined pat-
terns. With us there are way too many dimensions to
take into account. (R23)
is criticism closely resembles some of the views
expressed by the respondents in relation to the second
overarching theme, more specifically the argument that
AI would not be able to automate the clinical reasoning
process. ese respondents seem to imply that that clini-
cal reasoning is fundamentally non-rigid and needs to
leave room for doubt.
e last issue of concern is the idea that medicine is
difficult, if not impossible, to automate, because it is a
‘unique domain.’ Some respondents just seemed to take
it as an assumption that medicine is fundamentally ‘dif-
ferent’ when it comes to automatability, but they do not
substantiate this claim:
In general I am a technological optimist, but not
when it comes to medicine. (R1)
e respondent does not make clear why medicine dif-
fers from other domains. It could be, because medicine is
hard to reduce to a set of rules, because the data used by
medical AI is rather bad or because medical AI generally
makes the job of the physician less enjoyable. Yet none of
these arguments are mentioned.
In general, whether the respondent saw a domain as
being ‘unique’ depended on whether they were familiar
with the domain. For instance, respondent 17, was more
lenient towards AI that would be used to automate jobs
she indicated she did not herself perform, and respond-
ent 19, a surgeon, often emphasized the extent to which
surgery is a ‘unique’ domain.
e results show that overall the respondents were will-
ing to let the CDSS take over many tasks that were tra-
ditionally seen as part of the physician’s repertoire. ey
believed that the CDSS will make their work safer, more
efficient, that they will improve their own skills by learn-
ing from the system, and that the CDSS will automate
administrative and data processing tasks.
ey did, however, believe that there are limits to the
CDSS’ involvement in clinical practice. ese limits seem
to fall into three categories. First, the respondents men-
tioned some technical issues that need to be fixed in
order for the CDSS to be ready for implementation: the
data need to be robust; the system needs to be accurate;
and the CDSS needs to be user-friendly. Second, they
believed that some aspects of clinical practice are inher-
ently unsusceptible to being automated. ey argued that
the CDSS is overly rigid or lacks certain clinical skills that
are necessary in order to perform the physician’s tasks.
ird, they indicated that they simply did not want spe-
cific tasks to be automated. In general, they did not give
any reasons for this.
Much of the literature has focused on the technical
issues with AI [20]. Based on our results we would argue,
however, that these issues were not considered to be of
fundamental importance by our respondents. Even if
the AI would be easy to use and as accurate as possible,
they indicated that they would still dislike certain parts
of the physician’s job to be automated via AI. Our the-
matic analysis of a vignette based interview study reveals
that, next to concerns that have been identified in previ-
ous research, particularly regarding user-friendliness [21,
22] and transparency [23], more in-depth psychologi-
cal, epistemological and philosophical issues are at stake
when physicians reflect on the introduction of CDSS. In
this discussion, we would like to primarily focus on these
more fundamental issues, as it is impossible to explore
in-depth every theme we mentioned in the ‘Results’ sec-
tion above.
The importance ofuser‑friendliness
Many arguments used by the respondents had some-
thing to do with the user-friendliness of the CDSS. e
respondents were mostly concerned with how the system
would affect their general work experience. ey wanted
to avoid frustration and wanted the CDSS that was best
suited to complement their pre-existing work routines
and habits.
Earlier research has already shown that one of the most
common complaints of physicians regarding CDSS is that
it is not made to suit their existing habits [24, 25]. Too
often the architecture of the CDSS is such that it causes
disruption of the clinical workflow, which results in it
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
being disliked by many physicians. We believe that our
respondents’ emphasis on user-friendliness should be
viewed in a similar vein.
The division ofclinical labour
Respondents mostly did not use any purely ethical state-
ments. In general, they assigned a role either to them-
selves or to the AI and, based on this assumption, they
assessed which option best suited these preconceived
roles. e respondents were not directly concerned with
the ethical implications of the use itself of AI, but were
mostly preoccupied with questions concerning the role
of the AI in the medical profession and its relation to the
physician.7 Central to the respondents’ argumentation
was thus often a discussion on the division of medical
From the results it is also apparent that most respond-
ents adopted a dichotomy between easy, automatable
‘administrative tasks’ and difficult, non-automatable
‘clinical tasks.’ Based on our interviews it is not possible
to clearly differentiate between these two categories, yet
we can make some general observations about the way in
which they were used.
First, the ‘medical tasks’ were implicitly assumed to
be the ‘core’ of the physician’s job, while the ‘administra-
tive tasks’ were seen as non-core tasks. Put differently,
the ‘clinical tasks’ are what makes a physician a physi-
cian, according to the respondents, while the ‘adminis-
trative tasks’ were assumed to be neither necessary nor
important elements of the definition of the physician’s
job. Furthermore, the kinds of tasks that were assigned
to each of the two categories depended on the specific
job performed by the respondent (i.e. their area of medi-
cine) and the respondent’s opinion of their job. Surgeons,
for example, assigned some tasks to the non-essential
category that non-surgeon respondents believed to be
essential to the physician’s job. Moreover, whether or not
psycho-social tasks were seen as ‘clinical’ or ‘administra-
tive’ varied between respondents.
is dichotomy is also very important with regard
to the fear of replacement expressed by most of the
respondents. Generally, the respondents only felt threat-
ened by the CDSS when it would start to be used to auto-
mate core tasks, whereas they were more positive and
even enthusiastic about the automation of non-essential
tasks. is supports our hypothesis that the division
between clinical and administrative tasks is based mostly
on personal experience of one’s job rather than on clear
criteria based or their knowledge of AI. is also implies
that simply taking care of some of the technical issues
with the CDSS will not necessarily improve acceptance
of it by physicians, because some core tasks are consid-
ered to be fundamentally off-limits when it comes to
Based on this we would argue that the introduction
of CDSS in the medical profession has a lot in common
with the introduction of automation in other professions.
Just like a factory worker has felt threatened by the exist-
ence of robots since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, doctors feel worried by the introduction of AI. We
would like to hypothesize that the medical profession and
‘intellectual professions’ in general will experience a fear
of replacement similar to the fears experienced by work-
ers in manufacturing professions since the introduction
of automation. [26] erefore, when engaging in ethical
reflection about the implementation of CDSS, we should
not just consider the technical aspects of the systems in
question, but also understand this as a modern labour
dispute in which the physician could be seen as a threat-
ened economic actor.
Furthermore, we would submit that automation dis-
rupts the idea of what it means to be a physician. To
many physicians medicine is not simply a job they do to
earn money, but a vocation. [27] erefore, the encroach-
ment of AI does not just threaten the physician’s eco-
nomic status, but also their self-image and the way they
have chosen to spend a substantial part of their life. It is
an existential issue as much as an economic issue. ese
existential issues should not be treated lightly as bumps
on the road of progress, but should be taken seriously
when contemplating whether or not to automate certain
Claims concerningtheuniqueness ofmedicine
Related to the previous topic is the claim that medicine
is a ‘unique domain.’ For many respondents, this alleged
‘uniqueness’ of medicine was the main reason why it
is impossible to completely automate the job of the
As we have seen, many respondents simply stated this
uniqueness as a given fact. Some respondents, however,
argued that medicine is a special domain because it is
fundamentally flexible, diverse or non-rigid. Put dif-
ferently, they were conveying that it is not possible to
reduce the practice of medicine to a certain set of ‘rules’
or to completely eradicate doubt and uncertainty. Many
respondents emphasized that every case is fundamen-
tally different and that this is crucial to understanding the
complexities involved in clinical reasoning in general.
Further research should further explore and criti-
cally investigate the reasons underlying the respond-
ents’ claims about the uniqueness of medicine [28]. For
7 is may explain why the respondents were not that interested in notions
that are central to ethical debates concerning AI, such as privacy.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
example, we believe there are certain important unique
aspects of medicine that were not mentioned explic-
itly by the respondents and that would merit in-depth
ethical, epistemological and political analysis. In their
paper ‘“Just Do Your Job”: Technology, Bureaucracy, and
the Eclipse of Conscience in Contemporary Medicine’,
physicians Blythe and Curlin argue that contemporary
medicine is too often understood according to a market
metaphor. Hospitals are seen as businesses that provide
a ‘service’ to customers. erefore, the physicians have
to become clogs in a large, anonymous, and bureaucratic
machine that produces indistinguishable medical prod-
ucts in accordance with the will of the ‘customer.’ [27].
Building on the seminal analysis of modernity and
modernisation by sociologist Max Weber in his essay
Science as a Vocation’ [29] and its interpretation by
Berger, Berger and Keller [30], Blythe and Curlin con-
sider this new understanding of medicine to be a result
of the larger phenomenon of modernity spilling-over into
different domains. Modernity is characterized by a ‘com-
ponential’ worldview, meaning that the world is under-
stood as a combination of atomised components. All of
these components are or should be interchangeable. In
modernity people understand the world according to the
principles of science and bureaucracy. Medicine too, they
argue, is now often understood as a science. However,
this is problematic, for:
[W]hile medicine is a practice that depends upon
scientific modes of reasoning and certain features
of the scientific consciousness, it is decidedly “not a
science”. Rather, “it is a rational, science-using, inter-
level, interpretive activity undertaken for the care of
a sick person. [26]. pp. 439–440
One could argue that medicine is ‘unique’ in the sense
that it is a domain that heavily depends on science and
technology, but fundamentally is not a science. It is, first
and foremost, a form of care. e introduction of CDSS
could be seen as the next step in the ‘modernization’ of
medicine and as a threat to medicine’s unique status as a
heavily science-using form of ‘care’.
The “nal responsibility ofthephysician
Almost all respondents argued that the final responsi-
bility8 for clinical actions should stay with the (human)
physician after the introduction of the CDSS in clinical
practice. Earlier research has shown that this freedom
or control is highly valued by users of CDSS. [24] Our
analysis suggests that taking on this final responsibility is
seen as one of the core roles of the human physician. is
could be argued to be the main characteristic that sepa-
rates a human from an electronic physician.9
In order to qualify as ‘having final responsibility’ the
physician needs to be able to do three different things,
according to our respondents. First, the physician should
have the perception that (s)he is still in charge. Interest-
ingly, the physician’s perception of control is more impor-
tant than their actual control. Second, the physician
should have an idea of what (s)he is doing. By this we do
not mean that the physician must truly understand how
the CDSS came to a recommendation, but rather that
they want some general information about the CDSS’s
suggestion. ird and finally, the physician wants to be
able to overrule the system’s decision at all times. While
the first and second criteria seem manageable to inte-
grate into the CDSS, the third criterion is highly demand-
ing. When implemented, the latter criterion would truly
ensure that the physician would stay in charge.
However, even this last criterion should be further
nuanced. Many respondents indicated that they preferred
a version of the CDSS that would only let people overrule
suggestions if they were able to provide a good reason for
why they were doing so. A good example of this view was
expressed by respondent 2:
My preferred option would be one in which the phy-
sician is able to overrule a suggestion by the AI, but
only when they give the reason why they did so in
order to avoid physicians making unsafe decisions.
e fact that this option was suggested by multiple
respondents indicates that even this proposed ‘right to
overrule’ is not as demanding as it might seem. e phy-
sician is willing to let the CDSS take over a lot of their
traditional tasks. When given the chance to overrule the
CDSS without any questions, they prefer the option in
which the physician is obliged to substantiate a reason
for wanting to overrule the CDSS. erefore, we can con-
clude that the respondents actually wanted a very limited
version of control to be guaranteed by the CDSS.
8 We have opted to use the words ‘final responsibility’ instead of more com-
mon terms such as ‘autonomy’ or ‘control’ for multiple reasons. We believe
that both ‘control’ and ‘autonomy’ indicate that one wants a great level of free-
dom in relation to the AI. We want to emphasise, however, that the demands
of the respondents were actually rather limited. ey want a level of ‘respon-
sibility’, which we believe is not the same as control or autonomy, but only in
the final stages of the decision process.
9 Although this emphasis on final responsibility may reflect views regarding
legal liability [31], none of our respondents explicitly referred to legal issues
and therefore we do not want to make any general claims regarding this
issue. Although we consider ethical and legal questions concerning liability
in contexts involving the use of AI systems to be extremely important, these
questions lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Footnote 9 (continued)
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
Furthermore, recent research has suggested that direct
human supervision, as suggested by our respondents, is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for being
meaningfully in control. In a ground-breaking paper by
Filippo Santoni de Sio and Jeroen van den Hoven, it is
argued that we need to abandon the notion that humans
will remain in direct control of autonomous systems in
the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, they emphasise,
it is important that the abandonment of direct supervi-
sion should not result in an indifference towards ques-
tions surrounding responsibility and control. Rather,
they argue that we should strive towards “meaningful
human control” over (semi-)autonomous AI systems,
for reduced control may give rise to responsibility gaps
or accountability vacuums [32]. In short, this principle of
meaningful human control implies that humans, rather
than computers and their algorithms, should ultimately
remain in control of and thus morally responsible for rel-
evant decisions.
ey explain that the notion of meaningful human
control implies that “simple human presence” or “being
in the loop” is not sufficient, because “one can be present
and perfectly able to influence some parts of the system
by causal intervention, while (a) not being able to influ-
ence other parts of the causal chains that could come
to be seen as even more relevant from a moral point of
view than the parts one can in fact influence, [and] (b)
not having enough information or options to influence
the process”. Moreover, according to this framework of
meaningful human control, “controlling in the sense
of being in the position of making a substantive causal
contribution to [an] activity through one’s intentional
actions might not be a sufficient condition for meaning-
ful control either, for instance, if one does not have the
psychological capacity to respond appropriately under
the circumstances and/or [one is] not in the position
to appreciate the real capabilities of the system [one is]
interacting with”. [32], p. 3.
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven base their theory of
meaningful human control on a compatibilist account of
responsibility. Compatibilism refers to the philosophi-
cal belief that an actor can be in control of and responsi-
ble for an action even if she has not directly caused that
action. Compatibilists believe that it is sufficient to show
that the action was the result of a mental act by the actor
and that the actor would have been able to act differently.
An interesting way to understand responsibility within
this compatibilist framework is the concept of ‘guidance
control’ proposed by John Fisher and Mark Ravizza [33].
Fisher and Ravizza claim that two conditions have to be
met within a compatibilist theory in order for an actor to
be morally responsible for an action. First, the decisional
mechanism10 leading up to an action must be respon-
sive to moral or factual input. It must be possible for the
decision-making mechanism to adapt the behaviour of
the actor to the relevant moral features of the situation
at hand. If the actor was unable to avert the action, one
cannot convincingly argue that the actor is responsible
for the action in any meaningful way. Second, the actor
needs to take responsibility for the decisional mecha-
nism, meaning that the actor must be aware of the fac-
tual and moral impact of their actions.
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven suggest that this
framework is interesting to understand what would be
required in order to talk of meaningful human control in
the context of (semi-)autonomous systems. ey identify
two conditions, similar to those proposed by Fisher and
Ravizza, which need to be met in order to have meaning-
ful human control over (semi-)autonomous systems.
e first condition, tracking, refers to the idea that “a
decision-making system should demonstrably and verifi-
ably be responsive to the human moral reasons relevant
in the circumstances… decision-making systems should
track (relevant) human moral reasons.” [32], p. 7. In prac-
tice, this would mean that autonomous systems would
have to be able to adjust their behaviour based on moral
or factual input. Moreover, establishing whose moral rea-
sons and which moral reasons are relevant in particular
circumstances means establishing which normative prin-
ciples, norms, and values the (semi-) autonomous system
is supposed to follow or reflect.
e second condition, tracing, implies that “in order
for a system to be under meaningful human control,
its actions/states should be traceable to a proper moral
understanding on the part of one or more relevant
human persons who design or interact with the system.
[32], p. 9. us, as with the second condition of Fisher
and Ravizza, it is important that at least one person in the
design history or use context of the (semi-)autonomous
system is aware of the possible impact of the system and
the moral consequences of this impact. Otherwise, no
one can guarantee or make sure that the system will act
in accordance with moral principles.
If a (semi-)autonomous system acts in a context where
both requirements are not fulfilled the system cannot be
said to be under meaningful human control, according to
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven. Crucially, according
to their framework, the direct supervision of a human, as
proposed by our respondents, is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient requirement for meaningful human control [34].
10 Decisional mechanism refers to the set of causal reactions by which an
action comes about. is mechanism can be mental, physical or digital. Com-
patibilists use this concept in order to highlight their view that free will is not
a necessary precondition for holding someone responsible for an action.
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VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
We can conclude that there is a clear divergence
between this framework and the moral intuitions of our
respondents regarding responsibility and control. Indeed,
our respondents suggest a much less demanding view of
what counts as responsibility and control. Neither the
tracking nor the tracing-requirement have to be fulfilled
in our respondents’ view.
First, rather than programming the system to comply
with factual, ethical and legal concerns, our respondents
prefer the end-user, i.e. the physician, to have the right
to overrule the CDSS’ decisions. Furthermore, as we
have pointed out, many respondents argued that physi-
cians should not be allowed to overrule the AI when they
have good reasons to do so and provided that they inform
the AI of those reasons. Second, although our respond-
ents indicated that they value the ability of an AI system
to ‘explain’ its decisions to the physician, they did not
indicate that someone in the design history of the CDSS
needs to be aware of the potential factual and moral
implications of the system. Rather, they emphasized that
they want the end-user, i.e. the physician, to have the
final responsibility for medical decisions.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have reported the results of a thematic
analysis of twenty-four interviews with physicians. e
results of this analysis were categorised into three over-
arching themes: the perceived role of the AI; the per-
ceived role of the physician; and concerns regarding the
AI. Each of these three main themes was divided into
smaller subthemes.
Based on these themes we elaborated four impor-
tant interpretations of the results. First, we argued that
the respondents focussed on the way in which the AI
would impact their everyday life and happiness. Second,
we discussed the way in which the respondents all cre-
ated a dichotomy between non-essential and core tasks
of a physician. We argued that this dichotomy was linked
to the likelihood of the physician in question being opti-
mistic or not towards the automation of a given task.
ird, we discussed the way in which many respondents
expressed the view that medicine is a ‘unique domain’.
Fourth, we explained how the desire for final responsi-
bility was a central concern to many respondents. is
demand, however, should not be understood in a strongly
demanding sense.
As hypothesized, these factors were the underlying driv-
ers of much of the discontent with the introduction of
CDSS, while more common factors took a backseat or were
seen as more trivial by the respondents. Although most of
these common factors could be addressed by technically
tweaking the CDSS, we believe that the underlying driv-
ers that we have identified show that our respondents have
fundamental issues with the automation of certain core
parts of their job—regardless of how well the CDSS may
perform, both from a technical and an ethical perspective.
erefore the acceptance of CDSS is not just a matter of
technical improvements, but would require genuine engage-
ment with and exploration of these underlying factors.
Based on our analysis we should like to make two rec-
ommendations for further research. First, we believe that
the introduction of AI in clinical medicine should not
just be studied from an ethical or a technical perspective.
Indeed, our research has shown that there are important
economic, social, and existential aspects to this techni-
cal transition. ‘Economic’ in the sense that a physician is
an economic actor who feels threatened by the prospect
of automation and whose economic interests should be
taken seriously. ‘Social’ in the sense that physicians do
not work in a vacuum and the social aspects of their job
are important to them. ‘Existential’ in the sense that phy-
sicians are human beings who value the job they do and
who want to do meaningful work.
Second, further research is needed regarding the
‘unique status’ that most respondents ascribed to the
medical field. It would be interesting to explore and
critically investigate the reasons underlying the respond-
ents’ claims about the uniqueness of medicine, not only
through the lens of ethics but also from an epistemo-
logical and political perspective. Such explorations could
shed more light on the question as to whether or not clin-
ical medicine really is ‘uniquely unsuited’ to being auto-
mated. We believe that both the highly variable nature of
clinical problems, as emphasised by most of our respond-
ents, and the reconceptualization of medicine as a form
of ‘rational care’ in line with Blythe and Curlin [27] could
be interesting perspectives to these avenues of research.
Supplementary Information
The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1186/ s12910- 022- 00787-8.
Additional le1. Qsort vignettes.
Not applicable.
Author contributions
DVC performed the first thematic analysis together with SS, took part in the
triangulation sessions, and re-analysed the categorisation of the themes in
the second round. He also produced the first draft, and integrated comments
of other authors in several rounds of revision of the draft paper. WVB has con-
ceived the concept of the study, helped design the vignettes, and performed
all the interviews. He took part in the triangulation sessions and has written
the first draft of the introduction and methods sections. JDC contributed to
the conceptualisation of the project, helped design the vignettes, took part in
the triangulation sessions and reviewed and commented on the different con-
secutive draft versions of the paper. TL assisted with the first thematic analysis,
took part in the triangulation sessions, designed the figures, and reviewed
and commented on different consecutive versions of the draft paper. She also
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
Page 14 of 14
VanCauwenbergeetal. BMC Medical Ethic s (2022) 23:50
organized the logistics of the interviews. SS contributed to the concept of the
study, helped design the vignettes. She contributed to the thematic analysis
with DVC, and re-analysed the categorisation of the themes in the second
round. She took part in the triangulation sessions. She provided several rounds
of comments and suggestions on the different consecutive draft versions of
the paper. All authors read and approved the final version of the manuscript.
This work is part of a larger project funded by Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onder-
zoek (FWO): FWO.OPR.2019.0045.01.
Availability of data and materials
All data are supplied as Additional file 1. The precise content of the vignettes is
available as Additional file 1: Qsort vignettes.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
This study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Ghent University
Hospital (number BC 08294). All participants provided written informed con-
sent. All research and work was performed in accordance with the relevant
guidelines and regulations. We adhered to the Consolidated criteria for report-
ing qualitative research (COREQ) regulations throughout the process.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
None of the authors has competing interests with regard to the content of
this publication. The Authors therefore declare no competing financial or
non-financial interests.
Author details
1 Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Bioethics Institute Ghent,
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium. 2 Consortium for Justifiable Digital Health-
care, Ghent University Hospital, Ghent, Belgium. 3 Department of Nephrology,
Ghent University Hospital, Ghent, Belgium. 4 Department of Intensive Care
Medicine, Ghent University Hospital, Ghent, Belgium.
Received: 2 February 2022 Accepted: 20 April 2022
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Full-text available
This paper documents how an ethically aligned co-design methodology ensures trustworthiness in the early design phase of an artificial intelligence (AI) system component for healthcare. The system explains decisions made by deep learning networks analyzing images of skin lesions. The co-design of trustworthy AI developed here used a holistic approach rather than a static ethical checklist and required a multidisciplinary team of experts working with the AI designers and their managers. Ethical, legal, and technical issues potentially arising from the future use of the AI system were investigated. This paper is a first report on co-designing in the early design phase. Our results can also serve as guidance for other early-phase AI-similar tool developments.
Full-text available
Background Well-established electronic data capture in UK general practice means that algorithms, developed on patient data, can be used for automated clinical decision support systems (CDSSs). These can predict patient risk, help with prescribing safety, improve diagnosis and prompt clinicians to record extra data. However, there is persistent evidence of low uptake of CDSSs in the clinic. We interviewed UK General Practitioners (GPs) to understand what features of CDSSs, and the contexts of their use, facilitate or present barriers to their use. Methods We interviewed 11 practicing GPs in London and South England using a semi-structured interview schedule and discussed a hypothetical CDSS that could detect early signs of dementia. We applied thematic analysis to the anonymised interview transcripts. Results We identified three overarching themes: trust in individual CDSSs; usability of individual CDSSs; and usability of CDSSs in the broader practice context, to which nine subthemes contributed. Trust was affected by CDSS provenance, perceived threat to autonomy and clear management guidance. Usability was influenced by sensitivity to the patient context, CDSS flexibility, ease of control, and non-intrusiveness. CDSSs were more likely to be used by GPs if they did not contribute to alert proliferation and subsequent fatigue, or if GPs were provided with training in their use. Conclusions Building on these findings we make a number of recommendations for CDSS developers to consider when bringing a new CDSS into GP patient records systems. These include co-producing CDSS with GPs to improve fit within clinic workflow and wider practice systems, ensuring a high level of accuracy and a clear clinical pathway, and providing CDSS training for practice staff. These recommendations may reduce the proliferation of unhelpful alerts that can result in important decision-support being ignored.
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