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ФКД СКОПУС 2021. 227774-Article Text-518398-1-10-20210327

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ФІНАНСОВО-КРЕДИТНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ: ПРОБЛЕМИ ТЕОРІЇ І ПРАКТИКИ 2021 № 1 (36)
250 ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
ɍȾɄ 33.330.332; 33.338.22(477)
Ʌɢɯɨɥɚɬ ɋ. Ɇ.
ɤɚɧɞɢɞɚɬ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɧɚɭɤ, ɞɨɰɟɧɬ,
ɇɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɣ ɭɧɿɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ «Ʌɶɜɿɜɫɶɤɚ ɩɨɥɿɬɟɯɧɿɤɚ», ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ;
e-mail: s1925p@i.ua; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-0517-6852
ȼɿɧɿɱɭɤ Ɇ. ȼ.
ɤɚɧɞɢɞɚɬ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɧɚɭɤ, ɞɨɰɟɧɬ,
Ʌɶɜɿɜɫɶɤɢɣ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɢɣ ɭɧɿɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ ɜɧɭɬɪɿɲɧɿɯ ɫɩɪɚɜ, ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ;
e-mail: vinichukm@i.ua; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6588-1254
Ɋɭɳɢɲɢɧ ɇ. Ɇ.
ɤɚɧɞɢɞɚɬ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɧɚɭɤ, ɞɨɰɟɧɬ,
Ʌɶɜɿɜɫɶɤɢɣ ɬɨɪɝɨɜɟɥɶɧɨ-ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɣ ɭɧɿɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ, ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ;
e-mail: nadiya_r@i.ua; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-1198-8582
Ɇɟɞɢɧɫɶɤɚ Ɍ. ȼ.
ɤɚɧɞɢɞɚɬ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɧɚɭɤ, ɞɨɰɟɧɬ,
Ʌɶɜɿɜɫɶɤɢɣ ɬɨɪɝɨɜɟɥɶɧɨ-ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɣ ɭɧɿɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ, ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ;
e-mail: tetyanamed16@gmail.com; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7998-4107
ɋɚɩɿɧɫɶɤɢɣ Ɉ.
Ȼɽɥɶɫɶɤɨ-Ȼɹɥɚ ɲɤɨɥɚ ɮɿɧɚɧɫɿɜ ɬɚ ɩɪɚɜɚ, ɉɨɥɶɳɚ;
e-mail: Okek.sapinski@interia.pl; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3326-2387
ȼɉɅɂȼ ȾȿɋɌɊɍɄɌɂȼɇɂɏ ɑɂɇɇɂɄȱȼ ɇȺ ȱɇȼȿɋɌɂɐȱɃɇɍ
ɌȺ ȱɇɇɈȼȺɐȱɃɇɍ ɉɊɂȼȺȻɅɂȼȱɋɌɖ ɍɄɊȺȲɇɂ
Ⱥɧɨɬɚɰɿɹ. Ɋɨɡɝɥɹɧɭɬɨ ɞɟɫɬɪɭɤɬɢɜɧɿ ɮɚɤɬɨɪɢ, ɬɚɤɿ ɹɤ ɤɨɪɭɩɰɿɹ, ɬɿɧɶɨɜɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɤɚ, ɹɤɿ
ɫɩɨɜɿɥɶɧɹɸɬɶ ɩɪɨɰɟɫ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɬɚ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɩɪɢɜɚɛɥɢɜɨɫɬɿ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɚ
ɬɚɤɨɠ ɫɩɨɜɿɥɶɧɸɸɬɶ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɜɿɬɱɢɡɧɹɧɨɝɨ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɿ ɡɚɜɟɪɲɟɧɧɸ ɪɟɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɸ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨʀ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɢ, ɳɨ ɨɫɨɛɥɢɜɨ ɜɿɞɱɭɬɧɨ ɭ ɩɟɪɟɞɜɢɛɨɪɧɿ ɬɚ ɩɨɫɬɜɢɛɨɪɧɿ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɢ.
Ɉɤɪɟɫɥɟɧɨ ɪɨɥɶ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɞɟɩɪɟɫɿʀ ɬɚ ɬɿɧɶɨɜɨʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ. Ɋɨɡɤɪɢɬɨ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ
ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɧɚ ɨɛɫɹɝ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɭ ɜɿɬɱɢɡɧɹɧɢɣ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ɫɬɜɨɪɸɸɬɶ ɪɢɡɢɤɢ ɧɟ
ɥɢɲɟ ɞɥɹ ɭɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ, ɚ ɣ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɦ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɚɦ. ȼɨɞɧɨɱɚɫ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɟɧɿ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɢ
ɦɨɠɭɬɶ ɿ ɩɪɢɜɚɛɥɸɜɚɬɢ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɿɜ ɦɨɠɥɢɜɿɫɬɸ ɡɚɫɬɨɫɭɜɚɧɧɹ «ɪɟɰɢɤɥɿɧɝɭ»
ɤɚɩɿɬɚɥɭ ɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɿɜ. ȼɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɨɜɭɸɱɢ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɨ-ɦɚɬɟɦɚɬɢɱɧɿ ɦɟɬɨɞɢ ɬɚ ɦɨɞɟɥɿ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɚɧɚɥɿɡɭ, ɡɞɿɣɫɧɟɧɨ ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɭ ɨɰɿɧɤɭ ɭɦɨɜ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɿ ɜɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɧɹ
ɜɡɚɽɦɨɡɚɥɟɠɧɨɫɬɟɣ ɨɛɽɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɿ ɫɭɛɽɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɿɜɮɚɤɬɨɪɿɜ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɭɜɚɧɨɝɨ ɹɜɢɳɚ ɬɚ
ɮɭɧɤɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɡɚɥɟɠɧɨɫɬɟɣ ɦɿɠ ɧɢɦɢ. Ɂɪɨɛɥɟɧɨ ɜɢɫɧɨɜɤɢ ɩɪɨ ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪ ɡɦɿɧɧɨʀ «ɬɿɧɶɨɜɨʀ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ» ɿ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɨɝɨ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɭ ɤɪɚʀɧɿ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ʀɯɧɸ ɡɚɥɟɠɧɿɫɬɶ ɜɿɞ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ
ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɿ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɩɨɬɪɹɫɿɧɶ. Ɂɪɨɛɥɟɧɨ ɜɢɫɧɨɜɤɢ ɳɨɞɨ ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪɭ ɜɩɥɢɜɭ ɪɿɜɧɹ ɬɿɧɶɨɜɨʀ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɧɚ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɨɝɨ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɜ ɤɪɚʀɧɿ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ʀɯ ɡɚɥɟɠɧɿɫɬɶ ɜɿɞ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ
ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɬɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɩɨɬɪɹɫɿɧɶ. ɋɮɨɪɦɨɜɚɧɨ ɨɫɧɨɜɭ ɞɥɹ ɿɞɟɧɬɢɮɿɤɚɰɿʀ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ ɡɧɢɠɟɧɧɹ
ɞɿɥɨɜɨʀ ɚɤɬɢɜɧɨɫɬɿ, ɹɤɚ ɩɨɜɹɡɚɧɚ ɡ ɧɟɫɬɚɛɿɥɶɧɨɸ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɨɸ ɫɢɬɭɚɰɿɽɸ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɬɚ ɜɢɧɢɤɥɚ
ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɮɿɧɚɧɫɨɜɨ-ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨʀ ɤɪɢɡɢ, ɜɨɽɧɧɢɯ ɞɿɣ ɭɫɟɪɟɞɢɧɿ ɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɫɢɫɬɟɦɚɬɢɱɧɨɝɨ
ɩɟɪɟɮɨɪɦɚɬɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɜɥɚɞɢ, ɡɦɿɧɢ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɜɟɤɬɨɪɿɜ. Ⱦɨɜɟɞɟɧɨ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɞɟɫɬɪɭɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ
ɱɢɧɧɢɤɿɜ ɧɚ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɭ ɜɿɬɱɢɡɧɹɧɢɣ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ, ɳɨ ɫɜɿɞɱɢɬɶ ɩɪɨ
ɧɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɧɿɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ ɧɚ ɪɟɝɭɥɸɜɚɧɧɹ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɶɤɢɯ ɜɡɚɽɦɨɜɿɞɧɨɫɢɧ ɿ ɜɢɦɚɝɚɽ
ɩɪɨɞɭɦɚɧɢɯ ɧɟɜɿɞɤɥɚɞɧɢɯ ɪɟɮɨɪɦ.
Ʉɥɸɱɨɜɿ ɫɥɨɜɚ: ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣɧɚ ɬɚ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɚ ɩɪɢɜɚɛɥɢɜɿɫɬɶ, ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ, cɭɛɽɤɬɢ
ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ, ɿɧɞɟɤɫ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ, ɤɨɪɭɩɰɿɹ, ɬɿɧɶɨɜɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɚ.
Ɏɨɪɦɭɥ: 1; ɪɢɫ.: 5; ɬɚɛɥ.: 0; ɛɿɛɥ.: 26.
Lykholat S.
Ph. D. in Economics, Associate Professor,
National University «Lviv Polytechnic», Ukraine;
e-mail: s1925p@i.ua; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-0517-6852
FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ACTIVITIES: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 2021 № 1 (36)
251
ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
Vinichuk M.
Ph. D. in Economics, Associate Professor,
Lviv State University of Internal Affairs, Ukraine
e-mail: vinichukm@i.ua ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6588-1254
Rushchyshyn N.
Ph. D. in Economics, Associate Professor,
Lviv University of Trade and Economics, Ukraine;
e-mail: nadiya_r@ i.ua; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-1198-8582
Medynska T.
Ph. D. in Economics, Associate Professor,
Lviv University of Trade and Economics, Ukraine;
e-mail: tetyanamed16@gmail.com; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7998-4107
Sapi۪ski A.
Bielsko-Biala School of Finance and Law, Poland;
e-mail: Okek.sapinski@interia.pl; ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3326-2387
THE INFLUENCE OF DESTRUCTIVE FACTORS ON INVESTMENT
AND INNOVATION ATTRACTIVENESS OF UKRAINE
Abstract. There have been examined the destructive factors such as corruption, shadow
economy, which slow down the process of formation of investment and innovation attractiveness in
Ukraine, as well as slow down the development of domestic business and the completion of
economic system reform, which is especially noticeable in the pre-election and post-election
periods. The role of global depression and shadow economy is outlined. The impact of political
cycles on the volume of investment in domestic business is revealed, as well as creating risks not
only for Ukrainian business but also for foreign investors. At the same time, such processes may
attract foreign investors with the possibility of using «recycling» of residents’ capital. Using
economic-mathematical methods and models of economic analysis, a comprehensive assessment of
the conditions of doing business and establishing the interdependence of objective and subjective
indicators-factors of the studied phenomenon and the functional relationships between them was
made. We have made the conclusions about the nature of the variable «shadow economy» and the
development of private business in the country, as well as their dependence on political cycles and
economic shocks. A basis has been formed to identify the problems of declining business activity
associated with the unstable political situation in Ukraine caused by the financial and economic
crisis, hostilities inside the country, systematic reformatting of power, changes in political vectors,
as evidenced by the index of state instability. The influence of destructive factors on the attraction
of foreign investments in domestic business is proved, which testifies the insufficient impact of the
state on the regulation of business relations and requires considered urgent reforms.
Keywords: investment and innovation attractiveness, political cycles, business entities,
business index, corruption, shadow economy.
JEL Classification D72, D73, ȿ3, G11
Formulas: 1; fig.: 5; tabl.: 0; bibl.: 26.
ȼɫɬɭɩ. ȼ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ ɞɟɫɬɚɛɿɥɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɪɚɧɡɢɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɭ ɬɚ ɨɛɦɟɠɟɧɨɫɬɿ
ɮɿɧɚɧɫɨɜɢɯ ɪɟɫɭɪɫɿɜ ɫɭɛɽɤɬɢ ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɨɝɨ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɡɞɚɬɧɿ ɪɨɡɜɹɡɭɜɚɬɢ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ
ɤɪɢɡɨɜɨʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɿ ɫɩɪɢɹɬɢ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨɦɭ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɨɜɿ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ. Ɉɞɧɚɤ ɧɚɹɜɧɿɫɬɶ
ɩɟɜɧɢɯ ɪɢɡɢɤɿɜ ɿ ɞɢɫɩɪɨɩɨɪɰɿɣ, ɩɨɜɹɡɚɧɢɯ ɿɡ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɦɢ ɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɿɹɦɢ, ɫɭɬɬɽɜɨ
ɭɩɨɜɿɥɶɧɸɸɬɶ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ, ɨɫɨɛɥɢɜɨ ɦɚɥɨɝɨ ɿ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ɫɭɬɬɽɜɨ
ɫɩɨɜɿɥɶɧɸɽɬɶɫɹ ɚɞɚɩɬɚɰɿɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɞɨ ɤɪɢɡɨɜɢɯ ɭɦɨɜ ɿ ɡɧɢɠɭɽɬɶɫɹ ɪɿɜɟɧɶ
ɤɨɧɤɭɪɟɧɬɨɫɩɪɨɦɨɠɧɨɫɬɿ ɫɭɛɽɤɬɿɜ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɸɜɚɧɧɹ.
ɉɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɚ ɤɨɦɩɨɧɟɧɬɚ, ɧɚ ɞɭɦɤɭ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɧɢɤɿɜ ȼ. ɒɟɜɱɭɤɚ [1] ɿ ȱ. Ƚɪɚɛɢɧɫɶɤɨʀ [2], ɽ
ɜɚɝɨɦɨɸ ɩɟɪɟɲɤɨɞɨɸ ɞɥɹ ɪɟɚɥɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɪɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ, ɨɞɧɚɤ ɩɪɢɬɚɦɚɧɧɚ
ɛɚɝɚɬɶɨɦ ɤɪɚʀɧɚɦ ɬɚ ɨɬɪɢɦɚɥɚ ɧɚɡɜɭ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ. Ɍɚɤɚ ɫɢɬɭɚɰɿɹ ɽ ɰɿɤɚɜɨɸ ɬɢɦ, ɳɨ
ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ ɮɨɪɦɭɸɬɶɫɹ ɡɚ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɚɦɢ ɨɬɪɢɦɚɧɧɹ ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɨʀ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿʀ ɳɨɞɨ
ФІНАНСОВО-КРЕДИТНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ: ПРОБЛЕМИ ТЕОРІЇ І ПРАКТИКИ 2021 № 1 (36)
252 ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
ɣɦɨɜɿɪɧɨɫɬɿ ɧɚɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɩɟɜɧɢɯ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɡɦɿɧ, ɹɤɿ ɜ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɨɦɭ ɞɟɮɨɪɦɭɸɬɶ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ-
ɩɪɨɰɟɫɢ ɿ ɧɟ ɡɧɢɤɚɸɬɶ ɭ ɞɨɜɝɨɬɪɢɜɚɥɨɦɭ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɿ, ɳɨ ɡɭɦɨɜɥɟɧɨ ɜɡɚɽɦɨɞɿɽɸ ɨɛɦɟɠɟɧɨʀ
ɩɪɢɯɢɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɬɚ ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɨʀ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿʀ ɡ ɩɨɡɢɰɿɣ ɪɨɡɪɨɛɧɢɤɚ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɨɝɨ ɰɢɤɥɭ.
ɍ ɪɨɤɢ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɫɶɤɢɯ ɜɢɛɨɪɿɜ (2010-ɣ, 2014 ɿ 2019 ɪɨɤɢ) ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɢ ɧɟɫɥɢ
ɪɢɡɢɤɢ ɧɟ ɥɢɲɟ ɜɿɬɱɢɡɧɹɧɨɦɭ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɚ ɣ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɦ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɚɦ ɧɚ ɬɥɿ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨʀ ɬɚ
ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɧɟɫɬɚɛɿɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ. ȼɨɞɧɨɱɚɫ ɩɟɪɟɞɜɢɛɨɪɧɚ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɚ ɦɨɠɟ ɣ ɩɪɢɜɚɛɥɸɜɚɬɢ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ
ɿɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɿɜ ɚɛɨ ɫɩɨɧɭɤɚɬɢ ʀɯ ɞɨ «ɪɟɰɢɤɥɿɧɝɭ» ɤɚɩɿɬɚɥɭ ɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɿɜ ɭɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɧɚɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɩɟɜɧɢɯ
ɦɨɬɢɜɿɜ, ɧɚɩɪɢɤɥɚɞ ɮɿɧɚɧɫɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɫɢɥ.
Ⱥɧɚɥɿɡ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɶ ɿ ɩɨɫɬɚɧɨɜɤɚ ɡɚɜɞɚɧɧɹ. Ⱥɧɚɥɿɡ ɩɭɛɥɿɤɚɰɿɣ ɇ. ɉɨɬɪɚɮɤɟ [3]
ɩɨɤɚɡɚɜ, ɳɨ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɧɢɤɢ ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɨɜɭɸɬɶ ɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɨɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɿ ɞɚɧɿ, ɳɨɛ ɜɢɜɱɢɬɢ ɜɩɥɢɜ
ɜɢɛɨɪɱɢɯ ɦɨɬɢɜɿɜ ɬɚ ɿɞɟɨɥɨɝɿɸ ɧɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɭɪɹɞɿɜ ɹɤ ɧɚ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨɦɭ, ɬɚɤ ɿ ɧɚ ɦɿɫɰɟɜɨɦɭ
ɪɿɜɧɹɯ ɳɨɞɨ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɱɟɪɟɡ ɩɪɢɡɦɭ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɛɸɞɠɟɬɭ ɡ ɜɢɡɧɚɱɟɧɧɹɦ
ɿɞɟɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɯ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɿɜ.
Ɏ. Ȼɨɧ [4], A. ɐɭɤɟɪɦɚɧ ɿ Ⱥ. Ɇɟɥɶɰɟɪ [5], T. ɉɟɪɫɫɨɧ ɿ Ƚ. Ɍɚɛɟɥɥɿɧɿ [6] ɩɨɜɹɡɭɸɬɶ
ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ ɿɡ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɦɢ ɛɸɞɠɟɬɧɢɦɢ ɦɚɧɿɩɭɥɹɰɿɹɦɢ, ɹɤɿ ɭɬɜɨɪɸɸɬɶɫɹ ɜɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ
ɧɟɨɛɿɡɧɚɧɨɫɬɿ ɜɢɛɨɪɰɿɜ ɳɨɞɨ ʀɯ ɿɫɧɭɜɚɧɧɹ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ɧɟɡɞɚɬɧɨɫɬɿ ɩɟɪɟɞɛɚɱɢɬɢ ɧɢɦɢ
ɨɩɬɢɦɚɥɶɧɭ ɩɨɜɟɞɿɧɤɭ ɿɧɲɢɯ ɚɝɟɧɬɿɜ, ɭɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ ɱɨɝɨ ɪɭɣɧɭɽɬɶɫɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ ɿ ɜɢɧɢɤɚɽ ɛɟɡɪɨɛɿɬɬɹ.
Ɍɚɤɚ ɡɚɥɟɠɧɿɫɬɶ ɡɞɚɬɧɚ ɜɩɥɢɜɚɬɢ ɧɚ ɰɢɤɥɿɱɧɭ ɩɨɡɢɰɿɸ ɪɟɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɫɟɤɬɨɪɭ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ, ɨɫɤɿɥɶɤɢ
ɩɟɪɟɞɛɚɱɚɽ ɪɟɚɥɿɡɚɰɿɸ ɟɤɫɩɚɧɫɿɣɧɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ ɩɟɪɟɞ ɜɢɛɨɪɚɦɢ ɬɚ ʀʀ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɭ ɪɟɫɬɪɢɤɚɰɿɣɧɭ
ɤɨɪɟɤɰɿɸ ɩɿɫɥɹ ɜɢɛɨɪɿɜ. Ɍɚɤɨʀ ɠ ɞɭɦɤɢ ɞɨɬɪɢɦɭɸɬɶɫɹ Ⱦ. ɏɿɛɛɫ [7] ɿ A. Ⱥɥɽɫɿɧɚ [8],
ɡɚɡɧɚɱɚɸɱɢ, ɳɨ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ ɧɚɣɛɿɥɶɲ ɜɿɞɱɭɬɧɿ ɩɪɢ ɜɢɡɧɚɱɟɧɿ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɯ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɿɜ
ɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɪɨɡɪɿɡɿ ɦɚɤɪɨɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨʀ ɤɨɧɮɿɝɭɪɚɰɿʀ ɛɟɡɪɨɛɿɬɬɹ ɬɚ ɪɿɜɧɹ ɿɧɮɥɹɰɿʀ ɜ ɩɨɽɞɧɚɧɧɿ ɡ
ɩɟɜɧɢɦɢ ɝɪɭɩɚɦɢ ɩɪɨɮɟɫɿɣ.
Ʉɟɧɧɟɬ Ⱥ. ɒɭɥɶɰ [9], ɉ. Ɇɚɧɞɨɧ ɿ Ⱥ. Ʉɚɡɚɥɶɫ [10] ɡɚɡɧɚɱɚɸɬɶ, ɳɨ ɜ ɟɦɩɿɪɢɱɧɢɯ
ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹɯ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ ɦɚɸɬɶ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɧɚ ɪɟɩɭɬɚɰɿɸ ɭɪɹɞɭ ɬɚ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɿ
ɦɚɤɪɨɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɿ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɢ, ɡɚɥɟɠɚɬɶ ɜɿɞ ɪɿɜɧɹ ɦɚɧɿɩɭɥɹɰɿʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɨɸ ɡɚɞɥɹ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ
ɩɟɪɟɞɜɢɛɨɪɱɢɯ ɨɱɿɤɭɜɚɧɶ.
Ɋ. ɑɚɣɤɚ [11] ɪɨɡɲɢɪɢɜ ɰɟ ɬɜɟɪɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɬɢɦ, ɳɨ ɭ ɩɪɨɦɢɫɥɨɜɨ ɪɨɡɜɢɧɟɧɢɯ ɤɪɚʀɧɚɯ
ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ ɦɚɸɬɶ ɧɟɡɧɚɱɧɢɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɧɚ ɡɦɿɧɭ ȼȼɉ, ɬɨɞɿ ɹɤ ɜ ɿɧɲɢɯ ɤɪɚʀɧɚɯ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɢ
ɛɿɥɶɲ ɫɟɪɣɨɡɧɿ (ɧɚɩɪɢɤɥɚɞ, ɱɟɪɝɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɮɚɡ «ɚɤɬɢɜɧɿɫɬɶ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢɫɩɚɞ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ» ɚɛɨ
«ɿɧɮɥɹɰɿɹɞɟɡɿɧɮɥɹɰɿɹ»), ɨɫɤɿɥɶɤɢ ɧɚɰɿɥɟɧɿ ɧɚ ɡɦɿɧɭ ɜ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɿɣ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɰɿ (ɧɚɩɪɢɤɥɚɞ
ɤɨɧɫɟɪɜɚɰɿɹ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɧɢɯ ɬɪɚɧɫɮɨɪɦɚɰɿɣ) ɿ ɧɚ ɩɿɞɩɨɪɹɞɤɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɥɨɝɿɤɢ ɟɥɟɤɬɨɪɚɥɶɧɨʀ
ɩɿɞɬɪɢɦɤɢ, ɹɤɚ ɮɨɪɦɭɽɬɶɫɹ ɧɚ ɨɫɧɨɜɿ ɫɩɨɫɬɟɪɟɠɟɧɧɹ ɡɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɦɢ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɚɦɢ,
ɩɪɢɡɜɨɞɢɬɶ ɞɨ «ɪɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɪɟɬɪɨɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ» ɝɨɥɨɫɭɜɚɧɧɹ.
ȼɨɞɧɨɱɚɫ A. Ⱥɥɽɫɿɧɚ [8] ɧɚɞɿɥɹɽ ɜɢɛɨɪɰɿɜ ɪɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɦɢ ɨɱɿɤɭɜɚɧɧɹɦɢ ɿ ɦɨɠɥɢɜɿɫɬɸ
ɜɢɪɚɡɢɬɢ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɜɩɨɞɨɛɚɧɧɹ ɡɚ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɚɦɢ ɨɱɿɤɭɜɚɧɨʀ ɤɨɪɢɫɧɨɫɬɿ. Ɉɞɧɚɤ ɿɫɧɭɽ ɩɨɬɪɟɛɚ
ɞɨɫɥɿɞɢɬɢ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɢ ɧɚɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ. Ⱦɨ ɩɪɢɤɥɚɞɭ, ɞɨɫɥɿɞɧɢɤɢ ɧɟ ɪɨɡɤɪɢɜɚɸɬɶ
ɡɚɥɟɠɧɨɫɬɿ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɿ ɜɩɪɨɜɚɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣ ɜɿɞ ɧɚɹɜɧɨɫɬɿ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɨɝɨ ɰɢɤɥɭ ɭ
ɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɬɚ ʀɯɧɿɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɧɚ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ.
ȼɢɡɧɚɱɟɧɨ ɩɭɛɥɿɤɚɰɿʀ, ɳɨ ɪɨɡɤɪɢɜɚɸɬɶ ɜɡɚɽɦɨɡɜɹɡɨɤ ɦɿɠ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɶɤɨɸ
ɞɿɹɥɶɧɿɫɬɸ ɬɚ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɢɦɢ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɚɦɢ. Ɍɚɤ, ə. Ƚɨɪɚɱɤɨɜɫɶɤɚ [12] ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɭɜɚɥɚ ɜɩɥɢɜ
ɩɨɫɥɭɝ BSO (business support organizations) ɧɚ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɭ ɞɿɹɥɶɧɿɫɬɶ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɶɤɢɯ
ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪ ɿ ɧɚɦɚɝɚɥɚɫɹ ɜɫɬɚɧɨɜɢɬɢ ɪɿɜɟɧɶ ɿɦɨɜɿɪɧɨɫɬɿ ʀɯ ɪɨɡɲɢɪɟɧɧɹ, ɜɢɯɨɞɹɱɢ ɡ
ɩɨɩɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ ɞɨɫɜɿɞɭ ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɩɨɫɥɭɝ BSO. ȼɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɨɜɭɸɱɢ ɛɚɝɚɬɨɮɚɤɬɨɪɧɭ
ɪɟɝɪɟɫɿɣɧɭ ɦɨɞɟɥɶ, ɞɨɜɨɞɢɬɶ, ɳɨ ɛɿɥɶɲ ɞɿɽɜɨɸ ɽ ɫɩɿɜɩɪɚɰɹ ɡ ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɦɢ ɩɚɪɤɚɦɢ,
ɬɟɯɧɨɥɨɝɿɱɧɢɦɢ ɿɧɤɭɛɚɬɨɪɚɦɢ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ɤɪɟɞɢɬɧɢɦɢ ɿ ɝɚɪɚɧɬɿɣɧɢɦɢ ɮɨɧɞɚɦɢ. Ɉɞɧɚɤ ɜɨɧɚ ɧɟ
ɩɪɢɞɿɥɹɽ ɭɜɚɝɢ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɦ ɰɢɤɥɚɦ ɬɚ ʀɯɧɶɨɦɭ ɜɩɥɢɜɭ ɧɚ ɹɤɿɫɬɶ ɡɚɫɬɨɫɨɜɭɜɚɧɢɯ ɩɨɫɥɭɝ BSO.
Ⱥ. ɋɜɹɞɟɤ [13] ɭ ɫɜɨʀɯ ɟɦɩɿɪɢɱɧɢɯ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹɯ ɡɜɟɪɬɚɽ ɭɜɚɝɭ ɧɚ ɬɟ, ɳɨ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɚ
ɚɤɬɢɜɧɿɫɬɶ, ɡɚɡɜɢɱɚɣ, ɽ ɛɿɥɶɲ ɪɨɡɜɢɧɟɧɚ ɜ ɬɢɯ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɶɤɢɯ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚɯ, ɹɤɿ ɩɪɚɰɸɸɬɶ ɧɚ
ɦɿɠɧɚɪɨɞɧɢɯ ɪɢɧɤɚɯ, ɳɨ ɩɨɜɹɡɚɧɨ ɡ ɧɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɧɿɦ ɪɿɜɧɟɦ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɦɨɬɢɜɚɰɿʀ ɡ ɛɨɤɭ
ɦɿɫɰɟɜɢɯ ɿ ɪɟɝɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪ ɧɚ ɩɪɨɬɢɜɚɝɭ ɜɿɞ ɧɚɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɯ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ
ɜɿɞɩɨɜɿɞɧɢɦ ɪɿɜɧɟɦ ɝɚɪɚɧɬɿɣ.
FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ACTIVITIES: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 2021 № 1 (36)
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ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
K. Ƚɚɜɥɿɱɟɤ, ȿ. Ɍɚɥɚɫɫɿɧɨɫ ɿ Ʌ. Ȼɟɪɟɠɤɿɧɨɜɚ [14] ɪɨɡɝɥɹɞɚɸɱɢ ɦɟɧɟɞɠɦɟɧɬ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɢɯ
ɩɪɨɰɟɫɿɜ, ɜɜɚɠɚɸɬɶ, ɳɨ ɫɬɭɩɿɧɶ ɧɚɫɬɚɧɧɹ ɪɢɡɢɤɿɜ ɡɪɨɫɬɚɽ ɭ ɡɜɹɡɤɭ ɡ ɜɿɞɫɭɬɧɿɫɬɸ ɤɨɧɬɪɨɥɸ ɡɚ
ɪɟɚɥɿɡɚɰɿɽɸ ɩɪɨɝɨɥɨɲɟɧɢɯ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɩɥɚɧɿɜ ɿ ɡɚ ɞɨɫɹɝɧɟɧɧɹ ɧɢɦɢ ɫɮɨɪɦɨɜɚɧɢɯ ɰɿɥɟɣ.
M. ɏɭɞɚɤɨɜɚ ɿ Ⱦɠ. Ⱦɜɨɪɫɶɤɢɣ [15] ɜɜɚɠɚɸɬɶ, ɳɨ ɪɨɥɶ ɦɟɧɟɞɠɟɪɿɜ ɿ ʀɯɧɽ ɜɦɿɧɧɹ
ɭɯɜɚɥɸɜɚɬɢ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɿɧɫɶɤɿ ɪɿɲɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ ɧɚɣɦɟɧɲ ɡɚɯɢɳɟɧɢɯ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɫɬɜ ɦɚɥɨɝɨ ɿ
ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɋɥɨɜɟɧɿɹ ɫɩɪɢɹɸɬɶ ɭɧɢɤɧɟɧɧɸ ɭɯɜɚɥɟɧɧɹ ɯɢɛɧɢɯ ɪɿɲɟɧɶ ɳɨɞɨ ɦɨɠɥɢɜɢɯ
ɪɢɡɢɤɿɜ ɿ ɞɠɟɪɟɥ ʀɯ ɜɢɧɢɤɧɟɧɧɹ, ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɨɜɭɸɱɢ ɿɧɫɬɪɭɦɟɧɬɢ ɦɚɬɟɦɚɬɢɱɧɨʀ ɫɬɚɬɢɫɬɢɤɢ ɡ
ɭɪɚɯɭɜɚɧɧɹɦ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɿɜ. ɋ. Ƚɪɢɦɚ ɬɚ ɿɧɲɿ [16] ɫɬɜɟɪɞɠɭɸɬɶ, ɳɨ ɟɮɟɤɬɢɜɧɿɫɬɶ
ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɫɬɜɚ ɡɚɥɟɠɢɬɶ ɜɿɞ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɿɧɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɪɿɲɟɧɧɹ ɜɿɞɩɨɜɿɞɧɨ ɞɨ ɧɚɹɜɧɢɯ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ
ɩɪɨɰɟɫɿɜ ɡɚ ɭɦɨɜɢ ɜɨɥɨɞɿɧɧɹ ɦɟɧɟɞɠɟɪɨɦ ɞɨɫɬɨɜɿɪɧɢɦɢ ɞɚɧɢɦɢ ɳɨɞɨ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɿɜ ɞɿɹɥɶɧɨɫɬɿ
ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɫɬɜɚ ɬɚ ʀɯɧɶɨʀ ɜɿɞɩɨɜɿɞɧɨɫɬɿ ɛɭɯɝɚɥɬɟɪɫɶɤɨɦɭ ɨɛɥɿɤɭ. Ɍɨɛɬɨ ɭɯɜɚɥɟɧɧɹ ɪɿɲɟɧɧɹ
ɡɚɥɟɠɚɬɢɦɟ ɜɿɞ ɧɚɹɜɧɢɯ ɚɥɶɬɟɪɧɚɬɢɜ ɿ ɫɮɨɪɦɨɜɚɧɢɯ ɰɿɥɟɣ ɿɡ ɭɪɚɯɭɜɚɧɧɹɦ ɪɿɜɧɹ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɚ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ.
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɫɶɤɿ ɜɱɟɧɿ ɋ. Ƚɪɢɧɤɟɜɢɱ ɿ Ɍ. ȼɚɫɢɥɶɰɿɜ [17] ɭ ɫɜɨʀɯ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹɯ ɚɤɰɟɧɬɭɸɬɶ
ɭɜɚɝɭ ɧɚ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɤɚɯ ɧɟɟɮɟɤɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨɝɨ ɜɩɥɢɜɭ ɹɤ ɮɚɤɬɨɪɭ ɞɟɡɚɤɬɢɜɚɰɿʀ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ. Ɍɨɞɿ
ɹɤ ɿɧɲɿ ɜɿɬɱɢɡɧɹɧɿ ɜɱɟɧɿ ɚɤɰɟɧɬɭɸɬɶ ɭɜɚɝɭ ɧɚ ɜɩɥɢɜɿ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɧɚ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨ-
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɣ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ.
ȼ. ɒɟɜɱɭɤ [18] ɞɨɜɿɜ ɩɪɹɦɢɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɧɚ ɫɚɥɶɞɨ ɛɸɞɠɟɬɭ ɿ
ɡɛɿɥɶɲɟɧɧɹ ɩɪɨɩɨɡɢɰɿʀ ɝɪɨɲɨɜɨʀ ɦɚɫɢ, ɚ ɬɚɤɨɠ ɪɨɡɤɪɢɜ ɩɨɬɪɟɛɭ ɜ ɩɿɞɬɪɢɦɚɧɧɿ ɨɛɦɿɧɧɨɝɨ
ɤɭɪɫɭ ɜɚɥɸɬɢ. Ɉɞɧɚɤ, ɹɤ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɢɜ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɧɢɤ, ɜɿɞɫɭɬɧɿɫɬɶ ɩɿɫɥɹɜɢɛɨɪɱɨɝɨ ɩɟɪɟɯɨɞɭ ɞɨ
ɪɟɫɬɪɢɤɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ ɝɨɜɨɪɢɬɶ ɩɪɨ ɡɚɥɟɠɧɿɫɬɶ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɜɿɞ ɨɥɿɝɚɪɯɿɱɧɨ-ɮɿɧɚɧɫɨɜɢɯ ɝɪɭɩ.
Ɍɨɞɿ ɹɤ Ɇ. Ɏɥɟɣɱɭɤ [19] ɩɨɽɞɧɭɽ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɿɡ ɡɛɿɥɶɲɟɧɧɹɦ ɪɿɜɧɹ
ɿɥɥɟɝɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɚ ɨɤɪɟɫɥɸɽ ʀɯɧɿɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɧɚ ɿɧɞɟɤɫ ɥɸɞɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ, ɡɚɫɬɨɫɨɜɭɸɱɢ
ɦɟɬɨɞ Ʉɪɟɣɝɚ, ɚɤɰɟɧɬɭɽ ɭɜɚɝɭ ɫɚɦɟ ɧɚ ɣɨɝɨ ɧɚɣɛɿɥɶɲɿɣ ɜɿɞɱɭɬɧɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɩɟɪɟɞɜɢɛɨɪɧɿ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɢ.
ɉɨɩɪɢ ɧɚɹɜɧɢɣ ɦɚɫɢɜ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɶ, ɧɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɧɶɨ ɨɛʉɪɭɧɬɨɜɚɧɢɦɢ ɡɚɥɢɲɚɸɬɶɫɹ ɩɢɬɚɧɧɹ
ɜɩɥɢɜɭ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɧɚ ɮɨɪɦɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɬɚ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɩɪɢɜɚɛɥɢɜɨɫɬɿ
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ.
Ɋɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹ. ɉɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɳɨɞɨ ɜɩɥɢɜɭ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ
ɧɚ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ, ɧɚ ɧɚɲɭ ɞɭɦɤɭ, ɜɚɪɬɨ ɪɨɡɩɨɱɚɬɢ ɡ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɚɧɚɥɿɡɭ
ɞɢɧɚɦɿɤɢ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɿɜ ɿ ɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɭɜɚɧɧɹ ʀɯ ɡɧɚɱɟɧɧɹ ɜ ɦɚɣɛɭɬɧɿɯ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɚɯ.
Ɂɚɫɬɨɫɭɜɚɜɲɢ ɨɮɿɰɿɣɧɿ ɫɬɚɬɢɫɬɢɱɧɿ ɞɚɧɿ, ɹɤɿ ɝɨɜɨɪɹɬɶ ɩɪɨ ɡɧɢɠɟɧɧɹ ɤɿɥɶɤɨɫɬɿ
ɧɨɜɨɫɬɜɨɪɟɧɢɯ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɫɬɜ ɡɚ ɚɧɚɥɿɡɨɜɚɧɿ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɢ, ɦɚɽɦɨ ɦɨɠɥɢɜɿɫɬɶ ɩɪɨɞɟɦɨɧɫɬɪɭɜɚɬɢ
ɞɢɧɚɦɿɤɭ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɤɿɥɶɤɨɫɬɿ cɭɛɽɤɬɿɜ ɜɟɥɢɤɨɝɨ, ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ, ɦɚɥɨɝɨ ɿ ɦɿɤɪɨɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɜ
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɭ 2010—2019 ɪɪ. (ɪɢɫ. 1).
Ɋɢɫ. 1. Ⱦɢɧɚɦɿɤɚ ɤɿɥɶɤɨɫɬɿ cɭɛɽɤɬɿɜ ɜɟɥɢɤɨɝɨ, ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ, ɦɚɥɨɝɨ
ɿ ɦɿɤɪɨɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ, 2010—2017 ɪɪ.
ɉɪɢɦɿɬɤɚ. ɉɨɛɭɞɨɜɚɧɨ ɡɚ [21].
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
ɋɭɛ'ɽɤɬɢ ɦɚɥɨɝɨ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ (ɡ
ɭɪɚɯɭɜɚɧɧɹɦ
ɦɿɤɪɨɩɿɞɩɪɢɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ), ɨɞɢɧɢɰɶ 2162004 1679902 1578879 1702201 1915046 1958385 1050034 1789406 1822671 1922978
ɋɭɛɽɤɬɢ ɦɿɤɪɨɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ, ɨɞɢɧɢɰɶ 2093688 1608819 1510776 1637180 1859887 1910830 1800736 1737082 1764737 1864013
ɋɭɛ'ɽɤɬɢ ɜɟɥɢɤɨɝɨ
ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ, ɨɞɢɧɢɰɶ 586 659 698 659 497 423 383 399 446 518
ɋɭɛɽɤɬɢ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ
ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ, ɨɞɢɧɢɰɶ 21338 21059 20550 19210 16618 15510 15113 15254 16476 18129
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ФІНАНСОВО-КРЕДИТНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ: ПРОБЛЕМИ ТЕОРІЇ І ПРАКТИКИ 2021 № 1 (36)
254 ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
ɉɨɪɹɞ ɿɡ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɟɧɢɦɢ ɡɦɿɧɚɦ, ɩɨɡɢɬɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɟɮɟɤɬɭ ɜɞɚɥɨɫɹ ɞɨɫɹɝɧɭɬɢ ɭ
ɫɮɟɪɿ ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣ ɳɨɞɨ ɩɨɡɢɰɿɨɧɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ ɜ ɳɨɪɿɱɧɨɦɭ ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɭ ɥɟɝɤɨɫɬɿ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ
ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ (Doing Business — 2019) [21], ɹɤɢɣ ɨɩɪɢɥɸɞɧɢɜ ɋɜɿɬɨɜɢɣ ɛɚɧɤ. Ɂɝɿɞɧɨ ɡ ɰɢɦ
ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɨɦ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ ɩɨɫɿɥɚ 2016 ɪɨɤɭ 83-ɬɟ ɦɿɫɰɟ ɿɡ 190 ɤɪɚʀɧ, ɚ 2019-ɝɨ — 71-ɲɟ ɦɿɫɰɟ,
ɩɨɤɚɡɚɜɲɢ ɩɨɡɢɬɢɜɧɭ ɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɿɸ (ɪɢɫ. 2).
Ɋɢɫ. 2. Ɇɿɫɰɟ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜ ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɭ ɥɟɝɤɨɫɬɿ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ (Doing Business),
2006—2021 ɪɪ. (2020—2021 ɪɪ. — ɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɧɿ ɨɰɿɧɤɢ)
ɉɪɢɦɿɬɤɚ. ɉɨɛɭɞɨɜɚɧɨ ɡɚ [22].
Ɋɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɨɝɨ ɚɧɚɥɿɡɭ ɡɚ ɦɚɬɟɪɿɚɥɚɦɢ Doing business — 2019 ɞɚɸɬɶ ɩɿɞɫɬɚɜɭ
ɞɥɹ ɫɬɜɟɪɞɠɟɧɧɹ, ɳɨ ɫɟɪɟɞ ɨɫɧɨɜɧɢɯ ɤɪɚʀɧ-ɫɭɫɿɞɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ ɡɚɣɦɚɽ ɧɚɣɝɿɪɲɭ ɩɨɡɢɰɿɸ,
ɩɿɞɧɹɜɲɢɫɶ ɧɚ 16-ɬɭ ɩɨɡɢɰɿɸ ɩɨɪɿɜɧɹɧɨ ɡ 2015 ɪɨɤɨɦ. ȼɢɧɢɤɚɽ ɞɢɫɤɭɫɿɹ ɳɨɞɨ ɞɨɫɬɨɜɿɪɧɨɫɬɿ
ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɢɯ ɪɨɡɪɚɯɭɧɤɿɜ ɭ ɪɨɡɪɿɡɿ ɬɨɝɨ, ɱɢ ɰɟ ɛɭɥɨ ɥɢɲɟ ɦɟɯɚɧɿɱɧɢɦ ɩɨɥɿɩɲɟɧɧɹɦ ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɭ,
ɱɢ ɞɿɣɫɧɨ ɜɿɞɛɭɥɢɫɹ ɫɭɬɬɽɜɿ ɡɦɿɧɢ ɜ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɿ, ɹɤ ɧɚɫɥɿɞɨɤ, ɩɨɬɪɟɛɭɽ
ɞɨɞɚɬɤɨɜɢɯ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɶ ɬɚ ɞɨɜɟɞɟɧɶ. Ɉɬɪɢɦɚɧɿ ɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɧɿ ɨɰɿɧɤɢ ɥɟɝɤɨɫɬɿ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɜ
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɧɚ 2020—2021 ɪɪ. ɧɚ ɨɫɧɨɜɿ ɚɧɚɥɿɡɭ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɿɜ ɩɨɩɟɪɟɞɧɿɯ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɿɜ ɞɨɡɜɨɥɹɸɬɶ
ɫɬɜɟɪɞɠɭɜɚɬɢ ɩɪɨ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɟ ɩɨɫɬɿɣɧɟ ɩɿɞɜɢɳɟɧɧɹ ɩɨɡɢɰɿʀ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɟɧɨɦɭ ɫɜɿɬɨɜɨɦɭ
ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɭ.
ɍ ɫɭɱɚɫɧɢɯ ɭɦɨɜɚɯ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɸɜɚɧɧɹ ɿɫɧɭɽ ɞɨɫɬɚɬɧɶɨ ɜɟɥɢɤɚ ɤɿɥɶɤɿɫɬɶ ɹɤ ɡɨɜɧɿɲɧɿɯ, ɬɚɤ
ɿ ɜɧɭɬɪɿɲɧɿɯ ɮɚɤɬɨɪɿɜ, ɹɤɿ ɜɩɥɢɜɚɸɬɶ ɧɚ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ. ɇɚɣɛɿɥɶɲ ɜɚɝɨɦɢɦɢ ɽ: ɬɢɫɤ ɡ ɛɨɤɭ
ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ ɧɚ ɦɚɥɢɣ ɿ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɿɣ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ; ɧɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɧɶɨ ɫɩɪɢɹɬɥɢɜɢɣ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɤɥɿɦɚɬ;
ɩɨɞɚɬɤɨɜɟ ɧɚɜɚɧɬɚɠɟɧɧɹ; ɡɛɿɥɶɲɟɧɧɹ ɤɿɥɶɤɨɫɬɿ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɫɬɜ-ɦɨɧɨɩɨɥɿɫɬɿɜ; ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ,
ɤɨɪɭɩɰɿɹ ɿ ɬɿɧɶɨɜɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɚ; ɬɪɭɞɧɨɳɿ ɡ ɜɿɞɤɪɢɬɬɹɦ ɿ ɡɚɩɨɱɚɬɤɭɜɚɧɧɹɦ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ. Ɍɚɤɚ
ɫɢɬɭɚɰɿɹ ɫɜɿɞɱɢɬɶ ɩɪɨ ɧɟɞɨɫɬɚɬɧɽ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɟ ɪɟɝɭɥɸɜɚɧɧɹ ɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɶɤɢɯ ɜɡɚɽɦɨɜɿɞɧɨɫɢɧ ɿ
ɩɨɬɪɟɛɭɽ ɩɪɨɞɭɦɚɧɢɯ ɧɟɜɿɞɤɥɚɞɧɢɯ ɪɟɮɨɪɦ.
Ⱦɥɹ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɧɨʀ ɨɰɿɧɤɢ ɭɦɨɜ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɞɨɰɿɥɶɧɨ
ɩɪɨɚɧɚɥɿɡɭɜɚɬɢ ɨɫɧɨɜɧɿ ɱɢɧɧɢɤɢ, ɹɤɿ ɜɩɥɢɜɚɸɬɶ ɧɚ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ ɿ ɪɢɡɢɤɢ ɝɥɨɛɚɥɶɧɨʀ ɞɟɩɪɟɫɿʀ. əɤ
ɡɚɡɧɚɱɚɥɨɫɹ ɜɢɳɟ, ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ ɫɭɩɪɨɜɨɞɠɭɸɬɶɫɹ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɦɢ ɩɨɬɪɹɫɿɧɧɹɦɢ, ɱɟɪɟɡ ɳɨ
ɱɚɫɬɢɧɚ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɩɟɪɟɛɭɜɚɽ ɜ «ɬɿɧɿ», ɬɨɦɭ ɨɛʉɪɭɧɬɨɜɚɧɢɦ ɜɢɹɜɥɹɽɬɶɫɹ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɪɿɜɧɹ
ɬɿɧɶɨɜɨʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɚ ɫɬɭɩɟɧɹ ʀʀ ɜɩɥɢɜɭ ɧɚ ɿɧɞɟɤɫ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ. Ɋɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ
ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɨɝɨ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɚɧɧɹɦ ɨɮɿɰɿɣɧɢɯ ɞɚɧɢɯ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ, ɬɨɪɝɿɜɥɿ ɬɚ ɫɿɥɶɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ [23] ɿ Doing business — 2019 [21] (ɪɢɫ. 3)
ɫɜɿɞɱɚɬɶ ɩɪɨ ɜɿɞɱɭɬɧɢɣ ɧɟɝɚɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɬɿɧɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɧɚ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ.
124
138 144 146 142 145 152
137
112
96
83 80 76 71
y = 0,155x3- 4,378x2+ 28,89x + 95,75
R² = 0,950
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Ɇɿɫɰɟ ɭ ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɭ
Ɋɨɤɢ
2020 2021
FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ACTIVITIES: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 2021 № 1 (36)
255
ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
Рис. 3. Взаємозвязок між рівнем тіньової економіки (Х) та індексом ведення бізнесу (Y)
в Україні, 2010—2018 рр. (Y = -0,01 562,09х + 44,63х2 1,17х3 + 0,01х4)
Примітка. Розраховано за [22; 23].
Високий ступінь взаємозалежності між досліджуваними показниками доводить прямо
пропорційний вплив рівня тіньової економіки на індекс легкості ведення бізнесу. При цьому
зниження показника тінізації економіки вплине на підвищення позицій України у світовому
рейтингу.
За прогнозними даними, якщо рівень тінізації економіки знизиться до 10 %, то в
рейтингу легкості ведення бізнесу Україна посяде 23-тє місце 2021 року.
За останні роки в економіці України відбуваються зміни, що знижують інвестиційну
привабливість нашої держави та чинять безпосередній вплив на рівень запровадження
інновацій. За даними Державної служби статистики [23] і Міністерства фінансів України
[24], за 2006—2019 рр. в економіку України іноземні інвестори щороку вкладали понад
40 млрд дол. США прямих інвестицій (акціонерного капіталу) (рис. 4).
Рис. 4. Динаміка обсягу прямих іноземних інвестицій в економіку України
та індексу легкості ведення бізнесу, 2006—2019 рр.
Примітка. Розраховано за [24; 25].
S = 31.79294006
r = 0.85862672
X Axis (units)
Y Axis (units)
0.0 7.9 15.8 23.6 31.5 39.4 47.3
0.00
27.87
55.73
83.60
111.47
139.33
167.20
5604
9891
10913
4816
6495
7207
8401
4499
410
2961
3284
2202
2355
484
124
138
144
146
145
152
137
112
96
83
80
76
71
y = -19,851x2 - 318,81x + 8796,1
R² = 0,619
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Млн дол. США
Роки
Обсяг прямих іноземних інвестицій в економіку України
Індекс легкості ведення бізнесу
Поліноміальна (Обсяг прямих іноземних інвестицій в економіку України)
ФІНАНСОВО-КРЕДИТНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ: ПРОБЛЕМИ ТЕОРІЇ І ПРАКТИКИ 2021 № 1 (36)
256 ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
Ɂɝɿɞɧɨ ɡ ɨɬɪɢɦɚɧɢɦɢ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɚɦɢ, ɥɢɲɟ 2010 ɪɨɤɭ ɫɩɨɫɬɟɪɿɝɚɥɨɫɹ ɡɪɨɫɬɚɧɧɹ
ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɭ ɩɟɪɿɨɞ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɫɶɤɢɯ ɜɢɛɨɪɿɜ, ɳɨ ɦɨɠɧɚ ɩɨɜɹɡɚɬɢ ɡ ɨɱɿɤɭɜɚɧɧɹɦɢ
ɿɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɿɜ ɳɨɞɨ ɪɟɚɥɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɜɥɚɫɧɢɯ ɦɨɠɥɢɜɨɫɬɟɣ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɬɚ ɨɬɪɢɦɚɧɧɹ ɜɿɞɩɨɜɿɞɧɢɯ
ɝɚɪɚɧɬɿɣ ɡ ɛɨɤɭ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɢ. Ⱥ 2010 ɪɨɤɭ ɭɯɜɚɥɟɧɨ Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ «ɉɪɨ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɧɨ-ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɟ
ɩɚɪɬɧɟɪɫɬɜɨ», ɹɤɢɣ ɛɭɜ ɧɚɰɿɥɟɧɢɣ ɧɚ ɩɨɛɭɞɨɜɭ ɩɪɨɝɪɟɫɢɜɧɨɝɨ ɦɟɯɚɧɿɡɦɭ ɫɩɿɜɪɨɛɿɬɧɢɰɬɜɚ
ɦɿɠ ɞɟɪɠɚɜɨɸ ɿ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɨɦ, ɹɤɢɣ ɽ ɩɨɩɭɥɹɪɧɢɦ ɭ ɤɪɚʀɧɚɯ ȯɜɪɨɩɢ ɿ ɋɒȺ, ɿ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ
ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ. Ɉɞɧɚɤ ɰɟɣ Ɂɚɤɨɧ ɛɭɜ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɥɟɧɢɣ ɥɢɲɟ ɧɚɛɨɪɨɦ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɫɬɚɬɟɣ, ɹɤɿ ɧɟ
ɩɿɞɤɪɿɩɥɸɜɚɥɢɫɹ ɪɟɚɥɶɧɢɦ ɦɟɯɚɧɿɡɦɨɦ ɞɿɣ. ȼɿɞɩɨɜɿɞɧɨ, ɭ 2014 ɿ 2019 ɪɨɤɚɯ ɭ ɩɟɪɿɨɞ
ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɫɶɤɢɯ ɜɢɛɨɪɿɜ ɫɩɨɫɬɟɪɿɝɚɽɬɶɫɹ ɡɧɚɱɧɟ ɫɤɨɪɨɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ. Ʉɪɿɦ ɬɨɝɨ,
ɥɨɝɿɱɧɟ ɩɚɞɿɧɧɹ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɩɨɜɹɡɚɧɨ ɡ ɩɨɱɚɬɤɨɦ ɜɿɣɧɢ ɧɚ Ⱦɨɧɛɚɫɿ 2014 ɪɨɤɭ.
ȼɚɪɬɨ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɢɬɢ, ɳɨ ɨɛɫɹɝ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɢɯ ɩɪɹɦɢɯ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɜ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɭ
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɦɭ ɜ ɪɨɡɪɚɯɭɧɤɭ ɧɚ ɨɞɧɭ ɨɫɨɛɭ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɢɬɶ ɥɢɲɟ 1 000,5 ɞɨɥ. ɋɒȺ. Ⱦɥɹ
ɩɨɪɿɜɧɹɧɧɹ: ɰɟɣ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤ ɭ ȼɟɥɢɤɿɣ Ȼɪɢɬɚɧɿʀ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɢɬɶ 30,88 ɬɢɫ. ɞɨɥ. ɋɒȺ, ɜ ȿɫɬɨɧɿʀ
19,04 ɬɢɫ. ɞɨɥ. ɋɒȺ, ɭ ɋɿɧɝɚɩɭɪɿ — 196,6 ɬɢɫ. ɞɨɥ. ɋɒȺ, ɭ Ƚɪɭɡɿʀ — 3,29 ɬɢɫ. ɞɨɥ. ɋɒȺ
[25]. ɉɨɩɪɢ ɰɟ, ɜɿɞɫɥɿɞɤɨɜɭɽɬɶɫɹ ɫɬɿɣɤɚ ɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɿɹ ɞɨ ɫɤɨɪɨɱɟɧɧɹ ɨɛɫɹɝɿɜ ɡɨɜɧɿɲɧɶɨɝɨ
ɿɧɜɟɫɬɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɜ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɭ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ, ɩɪɨ ɳɨ ɫɜɿɞɱɢɬɶ ɧɢɡɯɿɞɧɢɣ ɬɪɟɧɞ.
ɉɪɨɫɬɟɠɭɽɬɶɫɹ ɨɛɟɪɧɟɧɨ ɩɪɨɩɨɪɰɿɣɧɚ ɡɚɥɟɠɧɿɫɬɶ ɿ ɦɿɠ ɿɧɞɟɤɫɨɦ ɥɟɝɤɨɫɬɿ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ
ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɬɚ ɨɛɫɹɝɨɦ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ: ɩɪɢ ɡɧɢɠɟɧɧɿ ɨɛɫɹɝɿɜ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɭɜɚɧɧɹ ɩɨɥɿɩɲɭɸɬɶɫɹ
ɩɨɡɢɰɿʀ ɤɪɚʀɧɢ ɜ ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɭ ɥɟɝɤɨɫɬɿ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ.
ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ ɡɚɜɠɞɢ ɪɨɡɝɥɹɞɚɥɚɫɶ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɚɦɢ ɹɤ ɞɨɜɨɥɿ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɧɚ ɤɪɚʀɧɚ, ɡɜɚɠɚɸɱɢ ɧɚ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨ-ɜɢɝɿɞɧɟ ɝɟɨɝɪɚɮɿɱɧɟ ɩɨɥɨɠɟɧɧɹ, ɜɨɥɨɞɿɧɧɹ ɦɚɣɠɟ ɬɪɟɬɢɧɨɸ ɫɜɿɬɨɜɨɝɨ
ɱɨɪɧɨɡɟɦɭ. ɉɪɨɬɟ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɨɪɢ ɡɿɲɬɨɜɯɭɸɬɶɫɹ ɡ ɜɟɥɢɤɨɸ ɤɿɥɶɤɿɫɬɸ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ ɩɪɢ ɨɮɨɪɦɥɟɧɧɹ
ɭɫɿɯ ɩɨɬɪɿɛɧɢɯ ɞɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɿɜ, ɞɨɡɜɨɥɿɜ, ɥɿɰɟɧɡɿɣ, ɩɨɞɚɬɤɨɜɢɯ ɿ ɮɿɧɚɧɫɨɜɢɯ ɡɜɿɬɿɜ.
Ɂɜɚɠɚɸɱɢ ɧɚ ɬɚɤɭ ɫɢɬɭɚɰɿɸ, ɜɚɪɬɨ ɜɢɹɜɢɬɢ ɿɧɲɿ ɱɢɧɧɢɤɢ, ɹɤɿ ɩɪɹɦɨ ɬɚ
ɨɩɨɫɟɪɟɞɤɨɜɚɧɨ ɜɩɥɢɜɚɸɬɶ ɧɚ ɬɚɤɟ ɫɬɚɧɨɜɢɳɟ ɤɪɚʀɧɢ.
ɇɚ ɨɫɧɨɜɿ ɞɚɧɢɯ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɮɿɧɚɧɫɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ [24], Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ
ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ, ɬɨɪɝɿɜɥɿ ɬɚ ɫɿɥɶɫɶɤɨɝɨ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɚɪɫɬɜɚ [22] ɿ Corruption Perceptions Index — 2018
[26], ɜɜɚɠɚɽɦɨ ɡɚ ɞɨɰɿɥɶɧɟ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɜɡɚɽɦɨɡɜɹɡɤɿɜ ɿ ɜɫɬɚɧɨɜɥɟɧɧɹ
ɜɡɚɽɦɨɡɚɥɟɠɧɨɫɬɟɣ ɨɛɽɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɿ ɫɭɛɽɤɬɢɜɧɢɯ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɿɜɮɚɤɬɨɪɿɜ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɬɚ
ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɨʀ ɩɪɢɜɚɛɥɢɜɨɫɬɿ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. ɇɟ ɦɟɧɲ ɜɚɠɥɢɜɢɦ ɽ ɨɤɪɟɫɥɟɧɧɹ ɮɭɧɤɰɿɨɧɚɥɶɧɢɯ
ɡɚɥɟɠɧɨɫɬɟɣ ɦɿɠ ɨɛɪɚɧɢɦɢ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɚɦɢ-ɮɚɤɬɨɪɚɦɢ, ɬɚɤɢɦɢ ɹɤ ɨɛɫɹɝ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ,
ɨɛɫɹɝ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɭ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɿɣ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ, ɨɛɫɹɝ ɡɚɥɭɱɟɧɧɹ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɭ ɜɟɥɢɤɢɣ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ ɿ
ɫɬɭɩɟɧɹ ɜɩɥɢɜɭ ɧɚ ɧɢɯ ɤɨɪɭɩɰɿʀ, ɬɿɧɶɨɜɨʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɚ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ. Ɂɚɭɜɚɠɢɦɨ, ɳɨ ɞɥɹ
ɪɨɡɪɚɯɭɧɤɿɜ ɛɭɥɨ ɜɤɥɸɱɟɧɨ ɡɧɚɱɟɧɧɹ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɟɧɢɯ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɿɜ ɭɩɪɨɞɨɜɠ 2010—2019 ɪɪ.
Ɋɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɨɝɨ ɚɧɚɥɿɡɭ ɡ ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɚɧɧɹɦ ɜɟɤɬɨɪɧɨʀ ɚɜɬɨɪɟɝɪɟɫɿʀ
ɩɿɞɬɜɟɪɞɠɭɸɬɶ ɱɚɫɬɤɨɜɨ ɩɨɡɢɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɬɿɧɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɚ ɤɨɪɭɩɰɿʀ ɥɢɲɟ ɜ
ɤɨɪɨɬɤɨɫɬɪɨɤɨɜɨɦɭ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɿ ɬɚ ɧɟɝɚɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɡ ɛɨɤɭ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ (ɪɿɜɧɹɧɧɹ 1).
Ɉȱȱɦ = 11,45 + 2,84 Ɉȱȱɦ
(
t-1
)
-2,39Policy -3,82Corr +0,39Shadow
(17,89)** (9,01)** (26,92)*** (22,35)** (5,32)*
Ɉȱȱ = 25,26 + 2,22 Ɉȱȱ
(
t-1
)
-5,01Policy -2,48Corr -2,14Shadow
(21,94)** (13,52)* (15,74)** (33,09)*** (10,41)*
R = 0,84; R2 = 0,79; F (21,96) = 6,22; DW = 1,99,
ɞɟ Ɉȱȱɦɨɛɫɹɝ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɭ ɦɚɥɢɣ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ (%); Ɉȱȱɨɛɫɹɝ ɿɧɨɡɟɦɧɢɯ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣ ɭ ɜɟɥɢɤɢɣ ɛɿɡɧɟɫ
(%); Corrɪɿɜɟɧɶ ɫɩɪɢɣɧɹɬɬɹ ɤɨɪɭɩɰɿʀ (ɡɚ Transparency International); Policy ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ; Shadow
ɪɿɜɟɧɶ ɬɿɧɿɡɚɰɿʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ (% ɜɿɞ ȼȼɉ); t ɱɚɫɨɜɢɣ ɩɟɪɿɨɞ.
Ⱦɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɞɚɽ ɩɿɞɫɬɚɜɢ ɫɬɜɟɪɞɠɭɜɚɬɢ, ɳɨ ɜɟɤɬɨɪɧɚ ɚɜɬɨɪɟɝɪɟɫɿɣɧɚ ɦɨɞɟɥɶ ɽ
ɫɬɚɬɢɫɬɢɱɧɨ ɡɧɚɱɭɳɨɸ. ɉɿɞɫɬɚɜɨɸ ɞɥɹ ɬɚɤɨɝɨ ɬɜɟɪɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɽ ɩɨɤɚɡɧɢɤɢ ɤɨɪɟɥɹɰɿʀ (R = 0,84);
ɫɤɨɪɟɝɨɜɚɧɢɣ ɤɨɟɮɿɰɿɽɧɬ ɞɟɬɟɪɦɿɧɚɰɿʀ R2 = 0,79; F-ɤɪɢɬɟɪɿɣ Ɏɿɲɟɪɚ F(21,96) = 6,22 ɿ
(1)
FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ACTIVITIES: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 2021 № 1 (36)
257
ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
і коефіцієнт Дарбіна Уотсона (засвідчує наявність автокореляції залишків першого
порядку) (1,99).
У результаті аналізу доведено, що зростання рівня корупції має однаково негативний
вплив (обернено пропорційний) як на обсяг іноземних інвестицій у великий бізнес, так і на
обсяг залучених іноземних інвестицій у малий бізнес. Аналогічна ситуація простежується
й щодо негативного впливу на процес інвестування в малий і середній бізнес політичних
циклів (до уваги взято факт проведення чергових і позачергових виборів у державі).
Контраверсійна ситуація спостерігається щодо незалежної змінної «рівень тіньової
економіки». Якщо щодо інвестування в середній бізнес вплив є однозначно негативним
(коефіцієнт регресії -2,14), то щодо інвестування у середній бізнес спостерігається
незначний прямо пропорційний звязок (0,39). Така ситуація може бути обґрунтована
частково позитивним впливом тінізації економіки лише в короткостроковому періоді
(зважаючи на спрощену систему оподаткування і пільги для малого бізнесу та через часткову
зайнятість населення у тіньовому секторі), проте у стратегічній перспективі тінізація
економіки веде до значних диспропорцій у її структурі.
Водночас нестабільна політична ситуація у країні, зумовлена впливом фінансово-
економічної кризи, воєнними діями на Сході країни, що проявляється в систематичному
переформатуванні влади на найвищих щаблях управління, призводить до зниження індексу
державної нестабільності (рис. 5).
Рис. 5. Динаміка індексів державної нестабільності, легкості ведення бізнесу
та рівня тіньової економіки, 2006—2019 рр.
Примітка. Розраховано за [23; 25].
Зазначені фактори не можуть сприяти позитивному соціально-економічному
розвиткові і збалансуванню макроекономічної рівноваги, що, своєю чергою, відображається
на приватному бізнесі через часті зміни політичних векторів, які мали місце в різні часові
періоди.
Висновки. Результати проведеного дослідження показали, що такі деструктивні
чинники, як корупція і тіньова економіка, мають негативний вплив як на розвиток бізнесу в
Україні, так і на процес залучення інвестицій. Щоб збалансувати економічний розвиток
бізнесу в передвиборні та поствиборні періоди, потрібно залучати додатковий капітал у
формі іноземних інвестицій, що можливо за умов реформування української економічної
системи та розроблення комплексу заходів для поліпшення інвестиційного середовища,
наприклад, шляхом надання гарантій іноземним інвесторам щодо стабільності умов ведення
бізнесу.
72,9
71,4
70,8
69,7
69,5
69
67,2
65,9
67,2
76,2
75,5
74
72,6
71
124
138
144
146
142
145
152
137
112
96
83
80
76
71
29,9
29,9
33,9
36,3
38
34
34
35
43
40
35
32
30
31
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Роки
%
Показник
Індекс державної нестабільності
Індекс легкості ведення бізнесу
Рівень тіньової економіки, % до обсягу офіційного ВВП
Поліноміальна (Рівень тіньової економіки, % до обсягу офіційного ВВП)
ФІНАНСОВО-КРЕДИТНА ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ: ПРОБЛЕМИ ТЕОРІЇ І ПРАКТИКИ 2021 № 1 (36)
258 ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
Ⱥɧɚɥɿɡ ɥɿɬɟɪɚɬɭɪɧɢɯ ɞɠɟɪɟɥ ɞɚɽ ɩɿɞʉɪɭɧɬɹ ɫɬɜɟɪɞɠɭɜɚɬɢ, ɳɨ ɚɧɚɥɨɝɿɱɧɿ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ ɽ ɣ
ɜ ɿɧɲɢɯ ɤɪɚʀɧɚɯ, ɨɞɧɚɤ ɲɥɹɯɢ ʀɯ ɪɨɡɜɹɡɚɧɧɹ ɪɿɡɧɿ. ȼɚɪɬɨ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɢɬɢ, ɳɨ ɛɿɥɶɲɿɫɬɶ ɧɚɭɤɨɜɰɿɜ
ɪɨɡɝɥɹɞɚɸɬɶ ɭ ɫɜɨʀɯ ɩɪɚɰɹɯ ɥɢɲɟ ɨɤɪɟɦɿ ɟɥɟɦɟɧɬɢ ɨɡɧɚɱɟɧɨʀ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ, ɭɧɢɤɚɸɱɢ ɩɨɛɭɞɨɜɢ
ɩɪɨɝɧɨɡɧɢɯ ɦɨɞɟɥɟɣ.
ɇɟ ɦɟɧɲ ɜɚɝɨɦɢɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɧɚ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɨɤ ɦɚɥɨɝɨ ɿ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɦɚɸɬɶ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ
ɰɢɤɥɢ, ɨɫɨɛɥɢɜɨ ɜ ɩɟɪɟɞɜɢɛɨɪɧɿ ɬɚ ɩɨɫɬɜɢɛɨɪɧɿ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɢ. əɤ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɚɥɨɫɹ, ɹɤɳɨ ɞɢɫɩɟɪɫɿɹ
ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɨʀ ɿɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɿʀ ɛɭɞɟ ɜɚɝɨɦɨɸ, ɬɨ ɜ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɿ ɫɩɨɬɟɪɿɝɚɬɢɦɟɬɶɫɹ ɪɿɜɧɨɜɚɠɧɢɣ ɨɛɨɪɨɬ
ɡ ɦɟɬɨɸ, ɳɨɛ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɿ ɰɢɤɥɢ, ɹɤɿ ɦɚɸɬɶ ɦɿɫɰɟ, ɧɟ ɡɧɢɤɚɥɢ.
Ɉɩɢɪɚɸɱɢɫɶ ɧɚ ɪɟɡɭɥɶɬɚɬɢ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɧɹ ɡ ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɚɧɧɹɦ ɜɟɤɬɨɪɧɨʀ ɚɜɬɨɪɟɝɪɟɫɿʀ,
ɦɨɠɧɚ ɡɚɡɧɚɱɢɬɢ, ɳɨ ɩɪɨɜɟɞɟɧɿ ɡɚɯɨɞɢ ɳɨɞɨ ɩɨɥɟɝɲɟɧɧɹ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɿ ɦɚɸɬɶ
ɤɨɧɬɪɚɜɟɪɫɿɣɧɢɣ ɯɚɪɚɤɬɟɪ ɭ ɪɨɡɪɿɡɿ ɜɢɡɧɚɱɟɧɧɹ ɪɿɜɧɹ ɬɿɧɶɨɜɨʀ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ. ȼɿɞɡɧɚɱɚɽɬɶɫɹ ʀʀ
ɩɨɡɢɬɢɜɧɢɣ ɜɩɥɢɜ ɭ ɤɨɪɨɬɤɨɫɬɪɨɤɨɜɨɦɭ ɩɟɪɿɨɞɿ ɡɚ ɪɚɯɭɧɨɤ ɡɧɢɠɟɧɧɹ ɫɨɰɿɚɥɶɧɨʀ
ɧɚɩɪɭɠɟɧɨɫɬɿ ɜ ɫɭɫɩɿɥɶɫɬɜɿ ɱɟɪɟɡ ɱɚɫɬɤɨɜɭ ɡɚɣɧɹɬɿɫɬɶ ɭ ɧɟɨɮɿɰɿɣɧɨɦɭ ɫɟɤɬɨɪɿ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɚ
ɨɞɟɪɠɚɧɧɹ ɞɨɞɚɬɤɨɜɢɯ ɧɟɥɟɝɚɥɶɧɢɯ ɞɨɯɨɞɿɜ. Ɍɨɞɿ ɹɤ ɭ ɞɨɜɝɨɫɬɪɨɤɨɜɿɣ ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɿ ɨɱɿɤɭɽɬɶɫɹ
ɫɭɬɬɽɜɚ ɞɢɫɩɪɨɩɨɪɰɿɹ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɩɪɢɜɚɬɧɨɝɨ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ, ɨɫɨɛɥɢɜɨ ɦɚɥɨɝɨ ɬɚ ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ,
ɿ ɡɚɥɟɠɧɿɫɬɶ ɜɿɞ ɚɞɚɩɬɚɰɿʀ ɞɨ ɧɚɹɜɧɢɯ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɱɧɢɯ ɰɢɤɥɿɜ ɬɚ ɪɢɡɢɤɿɜ, ɩɨɜɹɡɚɧɢɯ
ɡ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɦɢ ɩɨɬɪɹɫɿɧɧɹɦɢ.
ɉɪɟɞɦɟɬɨɦ ɩɨɞɚɥɶɲɢɯ ɞɨɫɥɿɞɠɟɧɶ ɫɬɚɧɭɬɶ ɪɨɡɪɨɛɤɚ ɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɚɰɿɣ ɳɨɞɨ ɩɨɥɿɬɢɤɢ
ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ ɜ ɤɪɚʀɧɿ, ɹɤɿ ɫɩɪɢɹɬɢɦɭɬɶ ɧɟ ɥɢɲɟ ɧɚɩɨɜɧɟɧɧɸ ɛɸɞɠɟɬɭ, ɚ ɣ ɚɤɬɢɜɿɡɚɰɿʀ
ɿɧɧɨɜɚɰɿɣɧɢɯ ɬɚ ɿɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɿɣɧɢɯ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɿɜ.
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20. Ⱦɿɹɥɶɧɿɫɬɶ ɫɭɛɽɤɬɿɜ ɜɟɥɢɤɨɝɨ, ɫɟɪɟɞɧɶɨɝɨ, ɦɚɥɨɝɨ ɬɚ ɦɿɤɪɨɩɿɞɩɪɢɽɦɧɢɰɬɜɚ : ɫɬɚɬɢɫɬɢɱɧɢɣ ɡɛɿɪɧɢɤ ɡɚ 2017 ɪɿɤ. Ʉɢʀɜ,
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21. Doing business — 2019. ɍɤɪɚʀɧɚ ɜ ɪɟɣɬɢɧɝɭ ɫɜɿɬɨɜɨɝɨ ɛɚɧɤɭ ɥɟɝɤɨɫɬɿ ɜɟɞɟɧɧɹ ɛɿɡɧɟɫɭ / ȿɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɢɣ ɞɢɫɤɭɫɿɣɧɢɣ ɤɥɭɛ.
URL : https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/u/ukraine/UKR.pdf.
22. Ɉɮɿɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɫɚɣɬ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɤɢ ɬɚ ɟɤɨɧɨɦɿɱɧɨɝɨ ɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭ ɿ ɬɨɪɝɿɜɥɿ. URL : http://www.me.gov.ua.
FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ACTIVITIES: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 2021 № 1 (36)
259
ISSN 2306-4994 (print); ISSN 2310-8770 (online)
23. Ɉɮɿɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɫɚɣɬ Ⱦɟɪɠɚɜɧɨʀ ɫɥɭɠɛɢ ɫɬɚɬɢɫɬɢɤɢ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. URL : http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua.
24. Ɉɮɿɰɿɣɧɢɣ ɫɚɣɬ Ɇɿɧɿɫɬɟɪɫɬɜɚ ɮɿɧɚɧɫɿɜ ɍɤɪɚʀɧɢ. URL : http://www.minfin.gov.ua.
25. The World Factbook. URL : https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html.
26. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. Corruption remains a global threat. URL : http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2018/results.
ɋɬɚɬɬɸ ɪɟɤɨɦɟɧɞɨɜɚɧɨ ɞɨ ɞɪɭɤɭ 25.01.2021 © Ʌɢɯɨɥɚɬ ɋ. Ɇ., ȼɿɧɿɱɭɤ Ɇ. ȼ., Ɋɭɳɢɲɢɧ ɇ. Ɇ.,
Ɇɟɞɢɧɫɶɤɚ Ɍ. ȼ., ɋɚɩɿɧɫɶɤɢɣ Ɉ.
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