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A Neural Dynamic Model for the Perceptual Grounding of Combinatorial Concepts

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The ability to combine concepts to model the world in intricate ways underlies most of the higher cognitive competences like thought and language. It has motivated the stance that cognition is purely syntax-driven computation on systems of amodal symbols - a view widely referred to as the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CCTM). Grounded Cognition (GC) rejects this view and emphasizes the importance of being able to ground concepts in perception, i.e., to establish a connection between concepts and objects in the perceptual input. This master thesis is part of a research program to provide a neural processing account for GC based on neural principles formalized in Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) . It introduces a neural architecture for the grounding of combinatorial concepts, i.e., concepts that are built by combining other concepts. The architecture receives an arbitrary input image or video and an arbitrary combinatorial concept, which describes an object in terms of its attributes and relationships to other objects – e.g., “a red triangle which is to the right of a red circle that is below a green diagonal rectangle and above a blue object”. Its task is to ground the concept in the perceptual input, i.e., to bring the described object into the attentional foreground. The components of a combinatorial concept are grounded in a sequence of grounding steps, while the output of each grounding step is passed on to the next grounding step through self-sustained neural fields. This way, semantic compositionality is an emergent property of the neural dynamics and does not require any form of amodal symbolic computation. The capabilities of the architecture are demonstrated in a set of 6 qualitatively different simulations that vary with the complexity of the combinatorial concept and the perceptual input. The architecture is able to successfully ground the given combinatorial concept in all test cases. Another contribution of this thesis is a clear interface between the grounding system and language, and an embedding in the literature of psychological theories of concepts.
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