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Ukraine and the Civilizational Choice of the Shared Neighbourhood
Abstract
The Ukrainian conflict is a consequence of the failure to establish a mutually acceptable settlement in Europe after the Cold War. The efforts to move rather than remove the dividing lines in Europe are fragmenting the deeply divided societies in the shared neighbourhood between NATO and Russia, which is exacerbated by making them objects in a proxy war. The zero-sum conflict is sold by NATO as a conflict between democracy and authoritarianism, and between European integration or Russian imperialism. Propaganda is required to conceal that constructing a Europe without Russia undermines democracy due to the need to support divisive ethno-nationalist groups and suppress the Russophone population.KeywordsUkraineMaidanCrimeaDonbasNation-buildingDemocratic revolution
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This study examines evidence revealed by the ongoing trial and government investigations concerning the Maidan massacre in Ukraine. The massacre of the protesters and the police during the “Euromaidan” mass protests in February 2014 contributed to the overthrow of the Ukrainian government and ultimately to a start of the civil war in Donbas, Russian military interventions in Crimea and Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea and an international conflict between the West and Russia. The research question is as follows: What does evidence made public by the Maidan massacre trials and Ukrainian government investigations reveal about which of the parties of the conflict was involved in this mass killing? This paper analyzes several hundred hours of video recordings of the Maidan massacre trials and information concerning investigations of this massacre in over 2,500 court decisions from the official court decisions database in Ukraine. It examines trial and investigation testimonies of wounded protesters, relatives of the killed protesters, prosecution and defense witnesses, and top officials of the Yanukovych government. The study also analyzes results of forensic ballistic and medical examinations and investigative experiments, and videos and photos of the Maidan massacre made public during the trial. It includes several online video appendixes. They contain testimonies of wounded protesters and witnesses concerning snipers in Maidan-controlled locations and content analyses of synchronized segments of American, Belgian, Belarusian, British, Finish, French, Dutch, German, Polish, Russian, Spanish, and Ukrainian TV videos, recordings of live online broadcasts, and social media videos of this crucial massacre.
The Maidan massacre trials and investigations have revealed various evidence that four killed and several dozen wounded policemen and at least the absolute majority of 49 killed and 157 wounded Maidan protesters were massacred on February 20, 2014 by snipers in Maidan-controlled buildings and areas. Such evidence includes testimonies of the absolute majority of wounded protesters, several dozens of prosecution witnesses, dozens of defense witnesses, and 14 self-admitted members of Maidan snipers groups. Videos presented at the trial showed that times of shooting of the absolute majority of protesters did not coincide with times of shooting by the Berkut policemen, who were charged with their massacre. Forensic medical examinations determined that the overwhelming majority of the protesters were shot from steep directions from the sides or the back. Initial ballistic examinations did not match bullets extracted from the bodies of killed and wounded protesters to the Berkut Kalashnikovs. Forensic examinations of the bullet holes by the government experts for the Maidan massacre trial suggested that Berkut policemen were shooting in the Hotel Ukraina snipers above the Maidan protesters and in trees and poles. The analysis shows cover-up and stonewalling of the investigations and trials by the Maidan governments and the far right. The prosecution denied that there were any snipers in the Maidan-controlled buildings. Not a single person is convicted or under arrest for the massacre of the protesters and the police almost 8 years after one of the most documented mass killings in history.
The massacre of the protesters and the police in Ukraine during the “Euromaidan” mass protests on February 18-20, 2014 contributed to the overthrow of the Ukrainian government and ultimately to a start of the civil war in Donbas, Russian military interventions in Crimea and Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea and an international conflict between the West and Russia. The research question is as follows: What does evidence made public by the Maidan massacre trials and the Ukrainian government investigations reveal about which of the parties of the conflict was involved in this mass killing? This paper analyzes several hundred hours of video recordings of the Maidan massacre trials, over 2,500 court decisions, testimonies of wounded protesters, relatives of the killed protesters, prosecution and defense witnesses, and top officials of the Yanukovych and Maidan governments, results of forensic ballistic and medical examinations and investigative experiments, and videos and photos of the Maidan massacre made public during the trial. It includes several online video appendixes containing the data.
The Maidan massacre trials and investigations have revealed various evidence that four killed and several dozen wounded policemen and at least the absolute majority of 49 killed and 157 wounded Maidan protesters were massacred on February 20, 2014 by snipers in Maidan-controlled buildings and areas. Such evidence includes testimonies of the absolute majority of wounded protesters, several dozen prosecution witnesses, and dozens of defense witnesses. Videos presented at the trial showed that times of shooting of the absolute majority of protesters did not coincide with times of shooting by the Berkut policemen, who were charged with their massacre. Forensic medical examinations determined that the overwhelming majority of the protesters were shot from steep directions from the sides or the back. Initial ballistic examinations did not match bullets extracted from the bodies of killed and wounded protesters to the Berkut Kalashnikovs. Forensic examinations of the bullet holes by the government experts for the Maidan massacre trial suggested that Berkut policemen were shooting in the Hotel Ukraina snipers above the Maidan protesters. The analysis shows cover-up and stonewalling of the investigations and trials by the Maidan governments and the far right. The prosecution denied that there were any snipers in the Maidan-controlled buildings. Not a single person is convicted or under arrest for the massacre of the protesters and the police almost seven years after one of the most documented mass killings in history.
This chapter presents a summary of analysis, evidence, and findings of a study of the “snipers’ massacre” of “Euromaidan” protesters and policemen on the Maidan in Ukraine on February 20, 2014. This mass killing was a turning point in the Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in a conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This massacre led to an overthrow of the government of Viktor Yanukovych and a Russian annexation in Crimea, a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, and Russian military intervention in support of separatists in these regions. The question is which side was involved in the “snipers’ massacre.” This study relies on rational choice and Weberian theories of rational action. It employs interpretative and content analyses of a large number of different sources. The analysis shows that armed groups of concealed Maidan shooters first killed and wounded policemen on the Maidan and then protesters. Armed groups of “snipers” and parts of leadership of the far right organizations, such as the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland, were involved in various capacities in the massacre. This mass killing was misrepresented by the media and the governments in Ukraine and the West.
The article surveys Tsarist, Soviet and Western historiography of Russia and how this affected the national identities and inter-ethnic relations among the three eastern Slavs. Western historiography of Russia largely utilised an imperialist and statist historiographical framework created within the Tsarist empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although this framework was imperialist it was gradually accepted as 'objective' by the Western scholarly community. Yet, this historiography was far from being 'objective'. After 1934 Soviet historiography also reverted to the majority of the tenets found in Tsarist historiography. Within Tsarist, Western and Soviet historiographies of 'Russia' eastern Slavic history was nationalised on behalf of the Russian nation which served to either ignore or deny a separate history and identity for Ukrainians and Belarusians. In the post-Soviet era all 15 Soviet successor states are undertaking nation and state building projects which utilise history and myths to inculcate new national identities. The continued utilisation of the Tsarist, Western and Soviet imperial and statist historiographical schema is no longer tenable and serves to undermine civic nation building in the Russian Federation. This article argues in favour of a new, non-imperial framework for histories of 'Russia' territorially based upon the Russian Federation and inclusive of all of its citizens.
Conceptualizing the EU as a postmodern cooperative power that “transcends realism” provides ideological scaffolding for an exclusive conception of “Europe” and veils a zero-sum geopolitical project as “European integration”. Neoclassical realism considers assigning morally opposite political identities to the EU and Russia to be “rational” to the extent it strengthens internal cohesion and mobilizes resources to enhance security in accordance with the balance of power logic. Yet, the artificial binary construction can also produce a Manichean Trap when compromises required to enhance security are depicted as a betrayal of indispensable virtues and “Europe”. The ability to harmonize competing security interests diminishes as the conceptual space for comparing the EU and Russia is de-constructed. Competition is framed in uncompromising terms as “European integration” versus Russian “spheres of influence” and democracy versus authoritarianism.
In the literature of diplomacy and military strategy, there has long been a gulf between the concepts of deterrence and defense. Glenn Snyder bridges this gulf, offering a systematic analysis of the two ideas, with the aim of integrating them in a framework of theory. He proposes criteria for making rational decisions in national security policy and deals with the critical issue of the balance between deterrence of, and defense against, military attacks. The author augments the scattered literature on the subject with original contributions on this increasingly important facet of international relations.
Do the EU and NATO threaten Russian security? The book explores the rise of these exclusive ‘inter-democratic’ security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing effects on relations with Russia. Two competing theories are tested to explore whether these institutions aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma with Russia. These institutions can be theorised to promote security as a positive-sum game through European integration and democracy promotion, or pursue collective hegemony with ideologically uncompromising bloc-politics. Glenn Diesen argues that a European security architecture that demotes the largest state on the continent to an object of security inevitably results in ‘European integration’ becoming a zero-sum geopolitical project that has set the West on a collision course with Russia.
In 1989, when archival discoveries were about to revolutionize the history of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis published a pathbreaking article entitled “Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins.” While Gaddis expressed serious doubts as to whether anyone had ever established that espionage had positively affected larger historical developments, he did render one sober and perceptive conclusion that did not rely on unencumbered access to Soviet, American, or British archives: espionage had heightened the atmosphere of distrust on all sides, and probably did more to escalate tensions than to abate them. “Was it all worth it, from the Russians’ own standpoint? There is good reason to doubt whether the benefi ts Stalin gained from spying on his allies during and after the war counterbalanced the problems created for him once his indulgence in espionage became known.”
Eurasianism is a popular creed in post-Soviet Russia. Its supporters believe Russia is a unique blend of Slavic and non-Slavic, mostly Muslim Turkic people. With the rise of Russian nationalism, Muslims were transformed into enemies. It has been a different story in Ukraine, where Russians – ‘the old brothers’ – became an alien force and Turkic people an acceptable minority. This trend has held for the last 20 years regardless of all vacillations in Ukrainian political/cultural development.
In supporting democratic norms in third countries the European Union (EU) uses network more than hierarchical modes of governance. The exception is where the adoption of internal modes is set as a condition for countries to join the Union. In other cases, limited bargaining power and complex domestic political structures in third countries militate against the use of hierarchy in democracy support policies. Geostrategic concerns over stability represent part of the causal dynamics of these two variables. There is some correlation between governance mode and effectiveness, but this is less strong than the role played by domestic politics in determining impact. The latter help to explain a breach between rule selection and application: EU governance rules are often transferred without significant impact on third country political dynamics.
More than a decade after acquiring statehood, Ukraine is still struggling to define the qualitative content of its national identity. To what extent is the Ukrainian nation to be conceived in political and territorial terms? To what extent is the Ukrainian nation to be grounded in ethnicity and culture? These are central topics of debate in contemporary Ukraine. A related issue is obscured by the civic/ethnic dichotomy, which directs attention toward the contest between civic and ethnic identities, and away from the conflict over which type of civic or ethnic identity the nation should pursue. Indeed, in the Ukrainian case the question of which, or rather, whose, ethnicity and culture should be at the core of the Ukrainian nation is more salient than the one over the relative priority of civic and ethnic identity. This article proposes that two versions of ethnic national identity are prominent today and compete for supremacy: an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity and an Eastern Slavic national identity. The goal of this article is to discover the degree of support among the masses in Ukraine for a civic national identity and for these two variants of ethnic national identity. It argues that the two ethnic national identities are embedded in a broader set of beliefs and policy preferences, forming what are labeled here 'national identity complexes'. Using survey data, the article shows that civic national identity is stronger than ethnic national identity, and that on most measures the Eastern Slavic national identity complex is stronger than the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex.
What impact have Eurasia's 2003e2005 ''colored revolutions'' had on the state of democ-racy and autocracy in the region? The logic of patronal presidentialism, a set of institutions common to post-Soviet countries, suggests that the revolutions are at root succession struggles more than democratic breakthroughs generated by civic activists and foreign democratizing activity. This helps explain why Georgia is experiencing a new retreat from ideal-type democ-racy while only Ukraine, whose revolution weakened the patronal presidency, has sustained high political contestation after its revolution. This means that autocratic leaders clamping down on non-governmental organizations, free media, and their foreign supporters may have learned the wrong lessons, perhaps making their countries more susceptible to violent revolution than they were before.
To succeed in foreign policy, U.S. presidents have to sell their versions or framings of political events to the news media and to the public. But since the end of the Cold War, journalists have increasingly resisted presidential views, even offering their own spin on events. What, then, determines whether the media will accept or reject the White House perspective? And what consequences does this new media environment have for policymaking and public opinion? To answer these questions, Robert M. Entman develops a powerful new model of how media framing worksâa model that allows him to explain why the media cheered American victories over small-time dictators in Grenada and Panama but barely noticed the success of far more difficult missions in Haiti and Kosovo. Discussing the practical implications of his model, Entman also suggests ways to more effectively encourage the exchange of ideas between the government and the media and between the media and the public. His book will be an essential guide for political scientists, students of the media, and anyone interested in the increasingly influential role of the media in foreign policy.
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