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Indonesia Law Review Indonesia Law Review
Volume 7 Number 2 Article 2
8-31-2017
THE TOTAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE AND SECURITY SYSTEM: THE TOTAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE AND SECURITY SYSTEM:
PROBLEMS OF THE STATE-SPONSORED MILITIA IN INDONESIA PROBLEMS OF THE STATE-SPONSORED MILITIA IN INDONESIA
Bhatara Ibnu Reza
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Australia
, bhatara.reza@gmail.com
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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
Reza, Bhatara Ibnu (2017) "THE TOTAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE AND SECURITY SYSTEM: PROBLEMS OF THE
STATE-SPONSORED MILITIA IN INDONESIA,"
Indonesia Law Review
: Vol. 7 : No. 2 , Article 2.
DOI: 10.15742/ilrev.v7n2.319
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Indonesia Law Review (2017) 2: 155 - 177
ISSN: 2088-8430 | e-ISSN: 2356-2129
DOI : http://dx.doi.org/10.15742/ilrev.v7n2.319,3
THE TOTAL PEOPLE’S DEFENSE AND SECURITY SYSTEM:
PROBLEMS OF STATE-SPONSORED MILITIA IN INDONESIA
Bhatara Ibnu Reza*
* Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Australia
Article Info
Received : 14 September 2016 | Received in revised form : 12 June 2016 | Accepted : 12 April 2017
Corresponding author’s e-mail: bhatara.reza@gmail.com
Abstract
The establishment of state-sponsored militia has raised concerns of human rights violations in non-
Keywords
Abstrak
telah meningkatkan perhatian terhadap pelanggaran
dibentuk
Kata kunci
konstitusi
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I. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is one of the newly emerging democratic countries in the world.
After Soeharto had stepped down in May 1998, Indonesia entered a critical phase
of profound political-legal reform, including in the military. Reform of the security
regime was seen as necessary to suit a more democratic and human rights-oriented
environment, and the reform of the Indonesian National Defense Forces (Tentara
or)1 and the Indonesian National Police (
or Polri)2 has been amongst the most contentious issues. In
particular, the military seems reluctant to fully embrace the reform movement which
would change its relationship with civilian politicians and its role in civil society.
The Indonesian military came to be known as notorious for its human rights
violations during the Soeharto era, and such behavior continued during the ‘reformasi’
era. It is a far-reaching problem whereby the military had formerly played a dominant
role in politics during the authoritarian regime known to have produced extreme
human rights abuses, and it has been reluctant ever since to give up such role. It was
also among the primary reasons for establishing programs aimed at depoliticizing the
military and professionalization of the military.
One of the emerging problems can be demonstrated in the establishment of proxy
army from among the ranks of civilians, a state-sponsored militia, commonly used
violations and humanitarian problems. As a practical matter, this concept of total
warfare provided the foundation for military dominance during the authoritarian
civil liberties constantly at risk. This militia is a civilian group recruited, trained and
supported by state armed forces for doing ‘the dirty work’ of the military. The military
System ( ). The said
Total People’s Defense and Security System has been based on experiences gained
from the struggle for independence in 1945-1949 through the strategy of guerilla
warfare.3
1 The name of [hereinafter TNI] was used on June 3, 1947. On June 21,
1962, the name TNI was changed and became (Armed Forces of
the Republic of Indonesia--ABRI) with POLRI included as part of the armed forces. Since separation of
the National Police (POLRI) on April 1, 1999, the Commander in Chief of the TNI and Minister of Defense,
General Wiranto reinstated the name TNI. , ABRI Commander in Chief Proposed to
Change the name of the ABRI to become the TNI (), April 3, 1999.
2 [hereinafter POLRI]. As from April 11999 with the Stipultion
of the People’s Consultative Assembly ( ) No. VII/MPR/2000
concerning the Role of the TNI and POLRI, the operational management of the POLRI was handed over from
ABRI Headquarters to the Department of Defense and Security ( )
and then changed their position to be directly under the President of the Republic following the promul-
gation of Law No.2/2002 concerning the Republic of Indonesia State Police (
).
Resmi Pisah dari ABRI: Stop Gaya Militer), April 3, 1999.
3 See A.H. Nasution, (Ja-
karta: Penerbit Angkasa, 1978). See also Indonesia,
,
UU No. 20 tahun 1982, LN No. 51 Tahun 1982, TLN No. 3234 (Law No. 20 of 1982, SG No. 51 of 1982), here-
inafter referred as State Defense and Security Law, Article 1 (5): “The people’s defense and security system
is the total, integrated and directed structure of State defense and security which is composed of all power
components of State defense and security, namely the people trained as the basic component; armed forces
and the reserves as the principal component; civil defense as the particular component; and national and
-
tion by author).
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Based on such conception, military and civilian elites formed the said paramilitary
groups or civilian-armed groups or militias, involving them in their operations. It is
said to be the duty of the people as a kind of popular participation in state defense.4
Under the Total People’s Defense and Security System doctrine it has resulted in
territorial command5 supporting militias, a strategy that poses grave risks to human
rights. The Total People’s Defense and Security System doctrine emphasizes the unity
of the people and military in combat alert against military threats.6
The recent defense policy on State Defense Program () is an
example of civilian involvement in defense matters. According to the 2015 Defense
White Paper –released in June 2016-, the (Defending the Country)
program will be targeted at 100 million militant cadres across the nation within ten
years.7 The problem arises when the said program does not make clear as to whether
to position the people would be as part of the National Defense Reserve Component
or another form of defense component as promulgated in Law No. 3/2002.
This article is an attempt to explain the problem which arises from the
implementation of the Total People’s Defense and Security System as the national
defense strategy which is recognized by the Second Amendment of the 1945
Constitution. Secondly, this article also discusses the problem of civil participation in
the area of defense in relation to the existence of State-sponsored militia in Indonesia.
Furthermore, it will also explain the ideology behind the Total People’s Defense and
Security System.
In this article, I use the term state-sponsored militia introduced by Ariel Ahram8
Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). PGMD studies started at the University
of Mannheim and University College London sponsored by the Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC).9
distributed around the world between 1981 and 2007.10
security forces; (3) is armed and; (4) has some level of organization.11 Its characteristics
4 See Article 30(2) of the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution in Chapter XII on State Defense
and Security, as stated as follows, ‘The state’s defense and security efforts shall be conducted through a
system of total people’s defense and security by the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and State Police of the
Republic of Indonesia, as the main component, and the people, as the supporting components.’
5 Territorial Command (or Koter) is an abbreviation which stands for the structure
of command from the provincial level down to the village level. For instance, this includes the Military
Regional Command (-Kodam) at the provincial level down to Non-Commissioned
- [hereinafter Babinsa) at the village level.
6
Analysis, December 2004), p. 14. The ‘unity with the People’ ( ), ‘the people’s
soldiers’ ( ) concepts were very much the core
identity of the TNI (ABRI at that time) construed from its roles as People’s Security Army ( -
/TKR) during the physical revolution () against colonialism. Throughout time,
these core concepts contributed to an understanding that the Indonesian military was developed ‘by the
Indonesian people and for the Indonesian people’ ().
7 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, ( Jakarta: Ministry of
Defense, 2015), p. 98.
8 Ariel I Ahram, (PhD
Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2008).
9 http://www.sowi.uni-
mannheim.de/militias/, accessed June, 12 2016.
10 Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell and Will Lowe, “States, the Security, Sector, and the Monopoly of
50, no. 2 (2013), p. 250.
11
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include the following: it is linked to the government; sources of support for the
groups concerned; characteristics of membership; and coded alleged targets such as
intimidating civilians or gathering intelligence.12
Regarding the methodology in this article, I emphasize that this article will not
be using only legal methodology but also an inter-disciplinary approach of legal-
political and analysis, especially when I discuss the historical background leading
to the adoption of the Total People’s Defense in the Constitution. By combining
legal and political analysis, the paper is aimed at answering the overall problem
in understanding the relation between the military and civilian people in the area
of defense through the implementation of the Total People’s Defense and Security
System.
II. THE TOTAL PEOPLE’S DEFENSE AND SECURITY SYSTEM: HISTORICAL BACK-
GROUND AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
As I have mentioned previously, the Total People’s Defense and Security System
was based on experiences gained from the struggle for independence in 1945-1949
through guerilla warfare strategy.13 During the said period, General Abdul Haris
Nasution, former Army Chief of Staff and then Chief of the Armed Forces formulated
the Total People’s War ( ) or also known as the Total
People’s Resistance () which was adopted as the basis of
national defense.
In his handbook, where he was involved as a major
player in implementing the doctrine as one of the Deputy Commanders of TNI during
the guerrilla war, Nasution applies the term ‘Total People’s War’ where according to
him, the people were the essential element for the succecc of guerilla warfare and
winning the war against the Dutch, as he declared:
-
The Total People’s War was subsequently implemented in 1946 when the Council
of State Defense () initiated it through Regulation of the
Council of State Defense No. 19/1946 on (Militia and Front).
12 p 252.
13 Nasution, , note 3.
14 A.H Nasution, (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1970). This book was writ-
ten around 1952-1953 when Nasution was dismissed as Army Chief of Staff over his role in October 17,
1952, when dissident army units demonstrated in front of the presidential palace and demanded dissolu-
tion of parliament.
15 p.13.
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16 and barisan, 17 the purpose was part of the
preparation for resistance against Dutch military aggression and the implementation
of ‘total defense and well regulated’ resistance as indicated in the consideration of the
said regulation.18 Furthermore, the Council of State Defense issued another regulation,
namely Decision of the Council of State Defense No. 85/1947 on People’s Defense
which clearly articulates total people’s defense ( ) under the
leadership of the Indonesian National Defense Forces with all rights to use any force
with either military characteristics or others. According to the elucidation forming
part of this decision, total people’s defense intends to mean that any citizen including
civil servants, either individuals or legal bodies in Indonesia’s entire territory must
participate in the resistance with all efforts.19
as the Indonesian defense doctrine after promulgation of Law No. 29/1954 on State
of Indonesia has the characteristic of people’s defense which is provided for and
Also, in the elucidation on the law, besides the armed forces as the primary component
of State defense, the law also allows for the implementation of conscript in the
military and other components referred to as militia (trained populace) as a reserve
component of State defense.20
Under Soeharto’s New Order, the position of the Total People’s Defense was
strengthened during the 2nd Army Seminar at the Staff and Command School conducted
in Bandung from August 25-31, 1966 which resulted in the Doctrine.21
This doctrine contains three basic components, namely the National Land Defense
Doctrine ( -Hanratnas); the Functional Doctrine
( ); Doctrine of Guidance (
Doctrine of Total People’s War (-Perata).22
The subsequent step was the recognition of the Total People’s Defense and Security
System in the Broad Outlines of State Policy (-GBHN)
by virtue of Decision of the People’s Consultative Assembly (
-MPR) No. IV/MPR/1973. It clearly states the doctrine’s position in Indonesia’s
defense-security policy:23
16 Indonesia, -
Peraturan No. 19 tahun 1946 (Regulation No. 19 of 1946), Article 1; it provides the
: “ in this regulation shall be the people’s organization which has
military character and which is established outside the regular armed forces and receives endorsement
17 barisan : “Any citizen, either man or woman, of the
age above 16 years and below 50 years can be required to defend the homeland in reserve front (barisan
cadangan), therefore hereinafter referred to as ‘barisan
18 , Consideration B as follows: “The purpose is to organize the total and regular defense therefore
it is important to establish a regulation on and barisan
19 Elucidation on the Decision of the Council of State Defense No.85/1947.
20 Indonesia, -
UU No. 29 tahun 1954 (Law No. 29 of 1954), Chapter VI on the Defense Characteristics in Elucida-
tion.
21 Salim Said, (Jakarta:
Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2006), p. 67.
22
23 Indonesia,
( ), Ketetapan No.
IV/MPR/1973 (Stipulation No. IV/MPR/1973).
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The process of legalization of the doctrine continued in 1982 when the Total
People’s Defense and Security System was adopted under the Decree of Minister of
Defense/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI)
No.Skep/820/VII/1982 dated July 21, 1982 and was followed by the promulgation of
Law No. 20/1982 on the Main Stipulations of the Republic of Indonesia’s National
Defense and Security where the doctrine relies on the involvement of the population in
implementing the state defense strategy. As stated in Article 4(1) of Law No. 20/1982:
According to Article 9(a) of Law No, 20/1982, the embodiment of the total people’s
resistance is by ‘psychologically arming individuals with the ideology of Pancasila and
physically with the skills to defend the state administered by the Government.’
Promulgation of Law No. 20/1982 was followed by the 1967
(CADEK) and was further altered and adjusted by Decision of the Commander
in Chief of ABRI No.KEP/04/II/1988. This time, the concept of state defense and
security was embodied in the Total People’s Defense and Security System empowering
the entire national sources and national infrastructures in an integrated and directed
manner.24 Under the primary ABRI doctrine of CADEK, the Total People’s Defense and
Security System became one of the operational doctrines.
From 1966 up to 1967 and 1988 respectively CADEK and its
derivations positioned the people as part of the implementation of the defense
doctrine. The following is to illustrate how the concept of the 1967 Total People’s
Defense was incorporated into the 1982 Total People’s Defense and Security System.
According to Law No. 20/1982, ABRI is the primary component of national defense;
the major element not only in combat operations but also in intelligence and territorial
operations. Needless to say, the Total People’s Defense has thus become a backbone of
Indonesia’s national defense strategy.
Finally, after Soeharto stepped down and the reformasi era began, the Constitution
addresses a vision of the role of the citizen in national defense and security by adopting
the Total People’s Defense and Security System. In Chapter XII on State Defense and
Security, Article 30(2) of the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution provides
states as follows:
24 Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan Republik Indonesia,
(Jakarta: Dephankam, 1988),
p. 48.
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This article shows how all citizens, whether military or civilians, have the right and
responsibility to take part in national defense and security. The Constitution adopts
the concept of citizenship as the fundamental legal basis, also as the highest law in
the country. Therefore, the Constitution also envisages defense as constitutional
right of a citizen. As stated in Article 27(3) of the Second Amendment to the 1945
Constitution, ‘Every citizen shall have the right and duty to participate in state defense
1945 Constitution prior to amendment.
However, the said article forms part of Chapter X on Citizens and Population
whereby the term ‘pembelaan’, which in the Indonesian language means ‘defense’,
used in this article has a different meaning and interpretation. The purpose of the said
chapter is to provide that citizens are entitled to and are obligated to participate in
Since it is also an obligation, the state can ‘enforce’ it against the population requiring
it to participate in state defense. According to Article 9(2) of Law No. 3/2002 on State
Defense, citizens participate in endeavors for State defense through the following four
activities:
1. Civic education;
2. Compulsory basic military training;
3. Service as member of the Indonesian National Defense Forces either
voluntary or compulsory;
4. Service based on profession.
up to the present time, no laws have been promulgated to accommodate the foregoing
activities, with the exception of civic education which is provided for under Law No.
20/2003 concerning National Education System. At the same time, in Chapter XII on
State Defense and Security, the relevant article uses the term ‘pertahanan’, which in
can also be found in Article 1 Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense stating as follows:
-
Based on the interpretation of this article it can be implied that defense is not
only about using and strengthening the force of the state; rather than that, it also
includes all efforts considered as acts to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity
of the State. In fact, the State Defense Law changes of the term Total People’s Defense
and Security System to Total Defense which is stated Article 2 of the Law as follows:
“The essence of state defense includes all endeavors of total defense the implementa-
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in total defense describing it as inclusion of all citizens, the use of all national resources,
and the entire territory of the country in national defense endeavors. Such new
the previous practices of involving the population and their international obligations
as party to the 1949 Geneva Convention. It is indicated under the said Law that there
component as regulated in Law No. 20/1982 implementing Total People’s Defense.
In Article 7(2) of Law No. 3/2002 it is stated that “TNI is a main component of the
national defense system in facing military threat supported by reserve and supporting
25 The said article limits the TNI’s role in preventing military threat
and26, and in the event of any non-military threats government institutions outside
the defense sector are to be the main components.
To sum up, the changing of the term Total People’s Defense and Security System
to the term Total Defense has not altered the essence of Indonesia’s national defense.
However, such new interpretation of ‘defense’ has led to fundamental change in
the essence and position of the people in State defense which previously caused
problems related to Indonesia obligation under International Humanitarian Law. At
Constitution as the highest law of the land.
III. THE LEGAL BASES OF MILITIA IN INDONESIA
In this part, I elaborate on the relevant legal basis with the aim of identifying
the link between the implementation of the Total People’s Defense and Security
System and the establishment of the militia. I have taken into consideration certain
laws to explain how militia groups are recognized under Indonesian law although
On the other hand, the military have denied their relations with these militia groups
including their acts of violence given the fact that these militias in East Timor and Aceh
were civilian groups recruited, trained and supported by the state’s armed forces.
Law No 20/1982 recognizes four components of Total People’s Defense and
komponen dasar) where the
Trained Populace was regulated and had multi-functions consisting of the preservation
of public order (ketertiban umum-tibum); protection of the people (perlindungan
-linmas); ensuring the people’s security (
the people’s resistance (-wanra). Secondly, the primary component
(komponen utama) was the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI); thirdly,
Community Protection ( - Linmas) was provided with the
function of assisting people in situations of disaster including war, rebellion, natural
infrastructures as the ‘supporting component’ (komponen pendukung). Law No
20/1982 also served as an umbrella law for several ensuing regulations on security
and defense at the time.
25 Compare with Article 1 of the State Defense and Security Law (Law No. 20/1982), which in its
complete form reads as follows: The total people’s defense and security is an order of the components
of defense and security forces, consisting of the basic component of Trained People ( or
ratih); the main component of the ABRI and TNI reserves; the special component of Community Protection
( or linmas
resources and national infrastructure, as comprehensively, integrated and directed.
26 Indonesia, ), UU No. 3 tahun
2002, LN No. 3 tahun 2002, TLN No. 4169 (Law No. 3 of 2002, SG No. 3 of 2002), Art. 7 (3); hereinafter
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However, in the case of East Timor when western press media described the
as ‘militia,’ from the Indonesian military’s perspective it was not an
appropriate term as they had emerged long before the announcement of the second
option for East Timor.27 It was argued that the establishment of was self-
initiated by society which subsequently came under the government’s management
sets out Civil Organization Defense [sic].28 In fact, there was no legal ground for
the existence of under Indonesian law, including Law No.20/1982
Concerning the Main Stipulations of the Republic of Indonesia’s National Defense
and Security and Law No.56/ 1999 on Trained Populace. Eventually, the military
recognized the existence of , which was later united under the Force of
Integration Fighters ( -PPI).29
On the other hand, Law No.3/2002 on State Defense based on the Total Defense
Indonesian National Defense Forces ( –TNI) as the
primary component (komponen utama); 30 secondly, the reserve components
consisting of citizens, natural resources, man-made resources and national means
and infrastructures which are ready to mobilize and to enlarge and strengthen the
primary component;31
natural resources, man-made resources as well as national means and infrastructures
which directly and indirectly enhance the force and the capability of the primary and
reserve components.32
Moreover, in the Elucidation on Law No.3/2002 there is a substantial change
whereby the law draws a clear distinction between the status of the Indonesian
National Defense Forces (–TNI) as the primary component
(komponen utama) and the TNI reserves. Again, according to the Elucidation, the
purpose of such distinction is consistent with international humanitarian law,
particularly the distinction principle.33 It is an indication of the lawmakers’ realization
that they needed to adopt a special law in order for civilian citizens to be involved
in State defense. They realized that the implementation of the previous law had
human rights in general. Therefore, the law had to regulate the eradication of Trained
Populace and the functions thereof.
At the same time, in the case of Aceh, there is a difference in view of the time
of Law No.3/2002 on State Defense. The said law replaced Law No.20/1982 on
the Main Stipulations of the Republic of Indonesia’s National Defense and Security,
under which
27 Zacky Makarim,
(Jakarta: Enka Parahyangan, 2003), p. 157.
28
29 Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in East Timor (
- KPP HAM TIMTIM), Full Report of the Inquiry Commission into Human Rights Viola-
tions in East Timor (), January 31, 2000, p.30. The Commander in Chief
such recognition in his Contingency Plan: “The armed force is about 1,100 people with 546 weapons of
various kinds, including homemade weapons; they are joined pro-integration organizations. The mass of
militant supporters is 11,950 people joined in resistance organizations like Besi merah Putih, Aitarak, Ma-
hidi, Laksaur Merah Putih, Sakunar, AHI, Jati Merah Putih, Darah Integrasi, Dadurus Merah Putih, Guntur
30 State Defense Law, Article 7(2)
31 Article 8(1)
32 Article 8(2)
33 General Elucidation.
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Terlatih –
and implementation of the Total People’s Defense and Security System into the Total
Defense System ( ) with due respect for civil-military
relations and the supervision of military under the ministry of defense.
In the above case, the existence of in Aceh during the DOM as well as prior
to the military emergency in 2003, particularly during the CoHA, was under the
implementation of Law No.20/1982. However, which was established during
the military emergency was never regulated under a new law except for military
uses under Law No.56/1999 concerning Trained Populace. Indeed, Article 26 of Law
No.3/2002 on transitional provisions states that the previously existing regulations
remain valid until replaced under the new Law on State Defense. It may be concluded
that the existence of during martial law was considered to be legal.
components. Since the promulgation of the said law, the government through the
Department of Defense (currently Ministry of Defense) was trying to use the National
Defense Reserve Component as another conscript program which was being planned
since 2003, but the law was only introduced in 2006. The problem of national defense
reserve component failed to answer the very basic question concerning the la raîson
d’être of Indonesia’s need to have a program based on threat assessment. The ministry
failed to answer the question as to what kind of threat would be faced by Indonesia,
and hijacking, smuggling, narcotics, illegal immigrants and transnational crimes.34
Moreover, the 2003 Defense White Paper underlines that there is a small possibility
that Indonesia would face invasion or military aggression by another country.35
Similar types of threats also appeared in the 2008 Defense White Paper although
primary program of the Department of Defense. Moreover, it outlined the plan to form
a battalion reserve component in each regency/city up to the year 2029 in three stag-
es.36
Military Command (), then two companies in the second stage. Finally, a re-
serve battalion would be held by territorial command.37 In addition, the paper never
to be facing similar threats as those described in the previous defense white paper.
The civil society led a campaign objecting to the substance of the Law, particularly
on the issue of conscript and criminalizing people who refused to become member
of the reserve component. This was despite the fact that the ministry had repeatedly
denied that the Law would impose the conscript program on the people, as Article
42(1) of the Law (October 9, 2006 version) clearly states as follows:
-
-
34 Department of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia ( ),
st
(Departemen Pertahanan RI, 2003), p.7.
35 , p.45.
36 Department of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia ( ),
(Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan RI, 2008),
p.136.
37 , p.136.
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This article violated certain rights, some of them being categorized as non-
derogable rights such as freedom of thought, conscience and religion as well as
the right to be treated equally before the law. Moreover, the UN High Commission
on Human Rights passed a resolution regarding Conscientious Objection (CO) by an
be conscripted due to his/her belief.
The 2015 Defense White Paper is straightforward in stating stated that the
National Defense Reserve Component would be arranged from mobilization to face
military threat and moreover it is to be organized by paying due attention to balancing
between the civil rights and obligations of citizens in state defense endeavors
formulated based on planning, in a gradual and proportional manner appropriate to
each branch’s needs. Also, the program is to be continued pending the adoption of a
38 In other words, the said
program would be established in the future.
However, the current failure of the National Defense Reserve Component started
out with the program. Prior to its establishment, President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono issued Presidential Decree No.28/2006 on State Defense Day
() to commemorate the spirit of resistance against the Second Dutch
aggression on December 19, 1946. Subsequently, in the new administration under
President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, he issued Presidential Regulation No.97/2014 on
General Policy of National Defense 2014-2019 determining as a national
defense program. The said presidential regulation adopts Article 27(3), 30(1) and (2)
providing that the program is the implementation of the Total People’s
Defense and Security System. As I mentioned above, the 2015 Defense White Paper
states that it would target 100 million militant cadres across the nation within a
period of ten years. At the same time, the term ‘militant’ is not recognized in Law
No.3/2000 on State Defense and there is also unclear legal position as to whether
Another problem which emerged after implementation of the
program had started in the shade of violence against human rights during the training
and also appeared in the selection process of cadres. For example, the involvement
of members and Islamic groups became evident as they marched
to the Presidential Palace condemning the resurgence of communism in recent
situations after the national symposium as part of the reconciliation stage related
to the 1965 tragedy in the context of the government’s program to uphold human
rights under President Jokowi’s administration.39 Another example of problematic
cadre recruitment occurred in Bali where Kodam IX/Udayana was going to provide
training to members of thug mass organization.40 According to ’s
Spokesperson, Lt.Col. J. Hotman Hutahaean, training materials would include
introduction to weaponry, marching, and other physical training and would prepare
them to become good citizens.41 However, according to Coordinating Minister for
Political and Security Affairs, Luhut Panjaitan, such step is an excessive one.42
38 Ministry of Defense, above n 7, p.112.
39 Kompas, “Massa Pendukung Rizieq berencana Demo Istana, kendaraan antihuru-hara ditu-
http://megapolitan.
kompas.com/read/2016/06/03/10482911/massa.pendukung.rizieq.berencana.demo.istana.kendaraan.
antihuru-hara.diturunkan, acccessed June 3, 2016.
40 Deutsche Welle, “Bela Negara: Militer akan latih preman di Bali [Bela Negara: Military will
http://www.dw.com/id/bela-negara-militer-akan-latih-preman-di-bali-sebagai-
kader/a-19321338, accessed June 7, 2016.
41
42 Tempo, “Preman Bali dilatih Semi Militer itu Berlebihan [Bali thugs trained semi-miilitary is
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2016/06/13/078779382/preman-bali-dilatih-semi-
militer-luhut-itu-berlebihan, accessed June 13, 2016.
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It would appear that the program has been created based on the
is militarization of the civilian population which opens up the possibility for other
43 People are educated to
accept militarism and blindly obey in following the order of a military superior.44 Such
unquestioning discipline had been coincidently embedded in the civilian population;
hence, the military has created its proxy army as they supported it during Indonesia’s
occupation of East Timor and the martial law in Aceh.
as not being part of the regular security forces; (3) is armed and; (4) has some level of
organization. Based on the above explanation, in Indonesia’s case, the previous Law
No. 20/1982 recognized the militia in the framework of whereby they were
part of the armed forces, however in practice some of these groups, namely the so-
called and , were not recognized by law or even legally mobilized.
In fact, some of the groups were established and created by the local elites.45
Albeit, the East Timor’s and Acehnese militias were examples
where the military claimed their existence but denied their links with the groups as
part of their forces. I describe such situation as ‘Establish, Support, Deny,’ given the
fact that the military were the primary actors in establishing, supporting but at the
same time denying the militias. Moreover, it is proof that militia groups in Indonesia
IV. STATE-SPONSORED MILITIA AS SURROGATE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SEP-
ARATISM: FOR THE SAKE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
Why does Indonesia still require citizen or civilian participation in the defense
the phenomenon of militia in Indonesia’s armed struggle for independence.46 Cribb
recounts that during the revolution, the
been released after the Japanese surrender, including Dutch collaborators who wanted
to restore law and order. According to Cribb, the leaders of these militia groups were
gangsters in Jakarta’s underworld.47
After gaining independence, only on two occasions had Indonesia decided to
namely the liberation of West Irian and the Confrontation with Malaysia. It means
that almost all other military operations were conducted in facing internal armed
threats. It occurred when Indonesia faced the forces in West Java, when
43http://in-
donesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bela-negara-thinly-veiled-militarisation-of-the-civilian-population/,
accessed July 12, 2016.
44
45 Damien Kingsbury, (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.
117; Matthew N. Davies, (New York: Routledge,
2006).
46 Robert Cribb, -
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991). Robert Cribb, “Military Strategy in
19 (2001).
47
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the military applied the ‘fence of legs’ (pagar betis) tactic involving the police, civil
defense (pertahanan sipil), as well as members of the Village Security Organization
(-OKD).48
It is compatible with the above description of the existence of the Total People’s
Defense and Security System and the continued development of the same after
Indonesia’s independence. Due to such continuity, militia groups reappeared when
Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975. Then, right after the occupation, Indonesia
established militia groups which were recruited, trained and supported by the state
armed forces against separatist elements led by
(Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor-Fretilin).
Poltak Nainggolan argues that the establishment of state-sponsored militia in East
Timor was a form of military response and expression of secessionist movement which
the principle of national unity and considers it necessary to use repressive measures
by aggressive approach to maintaining loyalty.49 Moreover, Damien Kingsbury50 and
Mieztner51 both consider militia in East Timor as a culture of violence practiced by
TNI. Subsequently, Mieztner shows further that the state-sponsored militia in East
Timor used the method of terror as the strategy to win the referendum.52 However,
due to certain acts such as terror, intimidation, and other human rights violations
during Indonesia’s occupation the majority of East Timorese decided to cast their
votes in the 1999 Popular Consultation to separate from Indonesia and to restore
their independence they had achieved in 1975.
For the Indonesian military in particular, the loss of East Timor was a complete
betrayal of their value and virtue as the guardian of sovereignty by the decision of
President Habibie. For years, the Indonesian military had maintained East Timor
as military zone and a place for improvement of their military career. Soeharto’s
policy towards East Timor was that the armed forces were on the mission of saving
the people of East Timor from the threat of communism and Indonesia’s territory
53 Furthermore, the Indonesian military
invasion in 1975 was believed to be a form to save the people of East Timor from civil
war and they were convinced the war would start again if they withdrew from the
territory.54
Habibie’s proposal for the second option by giving East Timorese an opportunity to
consider their fate, either integrate with Indonesia or refuse and opt for independence,
was a hard blow to the military. On the other hand, their staunch supporters - the
integrationists - mostly the elite class and local leaders in East Timor demanded the
military not to abandon them. For this purpose, tacit military support was provided to
against the pro-independence movement. Nainggolan also argues that the triggering
of such military approach was due to President Habibie’s proposal for a referendum in
48
Thesis, the University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2000), p.65.
49 Poltak Partogi Nainggolan, “The Indonesian Military Response to Reform in Democratic Tran-
Universität, Freiburg, 2011), p.112.
50 Kingsbury, pp.111-128.
51 Marcus Mietzner, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009),
pp.208-209.
52
53
eds. James J Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (Goolwa: Crawford House Publishing: 2000), p.151.
54 p.152.
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East Timor, which the military saw as endangering the nation-state’s integrity.55 Since
then, TNI felt East Timor was their nightmare, especially when several of their high-
Human
Rights Tribunal for Cases of the Gross Violations of Human Rights in East Timor.
However, again, the aggressive attitude and view did not change when Indonesia
faced a similar situation in Aceh. Although Aceh has a different background from
East Timor, due to the existence of the Free Aceh Movement (-
GAM) the military treated this province similarly to East Timor. Aceh presented an
opportunity for military career advancement through tacit military operations from
1989 until 1998 or also known as the Military Operation Zone (
– DOM). During this time, the military also created militia groups as part of their
combat force as well as support operational forces. During the martial law in 2003-
2004, the existence of state-sponsored militia in Aceh was also backed by the military
and elite groups in Aceh mostly consisting of entrepreneurs and local politicians.
These groups also used terror and intimidation as their method and moreover, in some
districts, they also used sectarian issues to stigmatize Acehnese as GAM supporters
and sympathizers.
Safeguarding the State’s sovereignty and territorial integrity has been one of
the policies of the State since Indonesia’s independence. The trauma of separatist
movements and regional insurgencies in some parts of the country have frequently
left Indonesia vulnerable to the threat of disintegration. Moreover, after losing East
Timor, the said policy became a kind of sacred mantra and has been used effectively
by the military. It has become a very well-known phrase that ‘Indonesia’s unity is
harga mati’ (non-negotiable)’.56 This phrase has been constantly employed by the
military on numerous occasions, particularly in the face of issues of separatism, to
generate public support.
During Soeharto’s New Order regime, the military always claimed themselves
as the unity of the nation and the primary actor during the national revolution
struggling for independence. Therefore, they should be heard and involved in every
state decision-making process. In fact, the position of the military was not only that of
guardian of the state, but also interpreted Soeharto being at the level of the state and
considered that any acts of opposition whatsoever would have to be crushed severely.
As a result, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) became an actor of
human rights violations in Indonesia at the time.
Even during the reformasi era, there was no fundamental transformation of
the military perspective using the security approach other than respecting human
rights as part of the constitutional rights of citizens. In fact, the military has used
the approach of creating and supporting militia groups for the sake of the State’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity to breach human rights. As a result, human rights
violations occurred in the State to their security apparatus –police and military-
crushed any acts of separatism even though they were conducted in the form of non-
as East Timor and Aceh, the military utilized their proxy groups to provide political
support to legitimize military presence or acts of violence against separatist groups
and their sympathizers. After all, militia groups were able to act more excessively than
government security apparatus. Therefore, mostly the military but also the police
turned a blind eye and tacitly encouraged it.
There is a similarity between East Timor and Aceh militia groups in their activity to
55
56 Detik, “Jenderal Gatot: Saya tak kenal kompromi, NKRI Harga Mati [General Gatot: I Never Compro-
http://news.detik.com/berita/2957736/jenderal-gatot-
saya-tak-kenal-kompromi-nkri-harga-mati, accessed June 1, 2015.
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demonstrate their willingness to defend territorial integrity by holding rallies, giving
pledges of loyalty ( ) to the State and attending ceremonies held by
high ranking local commanders and local government elites. After such ceremonies
and upon hearing provoking statements by the military and militia leaders, members
of militia groups held a parade around the city by intimidating, terrorizing or even
attacking people who were considered to be their enemies.
For example, a rally in Dili organized by militia groups in East Timor where they
heard the speeches of their leaders regarding their combat readiness against anti-
Indonesia.57
58 Another example occurred in Aceh during
martial law where the local government decided to make the rallies compulsory
and was participated in by all elements such as civil servants, students, and mass
organizations.59 Anybody who did not take part in the rallies was consequently
considered to be GAM supporter.60 As the next step, the military used the rallies to
groups were dramatically formed in all districts in Aceh.61
Besides rallies, another method used by the military and the militia has been
recruiting people by force. In East Timor, right after Indonesian occupation, people
were compelled to join combat support operations units.62 Similar practices has
also occurred prior to the referendum in 1999 when the military had targeted to
recruit ten people from each village and as incentive they were given Rp200,000 (the
equivalent of USD 26.66 at the time)63 allocated from the local budget and the social
safety net fund.64 Meanwhile in Aceh, recruitment was also conducted by the military
during DOM65 and repeatedly during the martial law when the military sent people
who were mostly GAM sympathizers to re-education camps. For periods of three to
six months, they aimed to persuade these people to support the Republic as the only
guarantee for their personal security.66
Based on the foregoing, there is a link between the relation of the State’s policies in
safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand, and the manner
in which the military interprets it by implementing the Total People’s Defense and
Security System on the other hand. By implementing such policies, the military sees
recruit them as their proxy through militia groups. By applying methods such as terror,
intimidation, and stigmatization against the people, the military is being successful in
On the other hand, the safety of the population is vulnerable and is becoming a
57 Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in East Timor, para 109.
58 para 110-112
59 KontraS,
(Jakarta: KontraS, 2006), p. 127.
60
61
62 The Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) of Timor Leste, “Part 4: Regime of
(Secretary
of CAVR, 2006), para 103
63 , para 126.
64 Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in East Timor Above, para 41.
65 KontraS, , p. 40.
66 Eye on Aceh Report,
(Aceh: Eye on Aceh, 2004), p.12.
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It may be concluded that there are militia groups which are proxy groups and an
extension of the arms of the military, as the military’s hands are tied by law. However,
militia groups might be considered as a scapegoat and can be disbanded by the same
laws at any time. In reality, however, members who committed crimes might escape
prosecution through a process which was since the beginning intended to fail to bring
justice67 or for the sake of peace.68
V. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TOTAL PEOPLE’S DEFENSE AND SECURITY SYSTEM
Ideology comes from ideas and principles on how the society lives and works, and
it also becomes an order in social life. Based on the above description of the historical
background and political-cultural aspects, it is evident that the Total People’s Defense
has become part of Indonesia’s social life order. Up to the present time, the people’s
other nations, Indonesia gained its national independence through armed struggle
rather than negotiation. Moreover, it would appear that the said ideology has been the
legacy of the guerilla warfare giving too much weight to the Army’s role rather than
the two other branches –the Navy and the Air Force- which have bases at locations
that are remote from the population.
During Soeharto’s administration, militarism shaped society by showing that
becoming a member of the armed forces was crème de la crème of Indonesia’s society.
to heads of local governments. In short, the military played an important role for
a long period of time in Indonesian politics and was considered one of the three
pillars (, Bureaucracy, and the Armed Forces)69 of the Soeharto dictatorship.70
It demonstrated a Praetorian character by claiming its role as the vanguard of the
nation and its dual functions role in the area of politics and security.71 Previously, the
dual functions of the military were legitimized in TAP MPRS No. XXIV/MPRS/1966 on
the New Policy on Defense and Security.
However, in order to secure ABRI’s role in security and defense forces along
with their function in social and political matters, the regime needed another legal
instrument explicitly regulating it such as Law No.20/1982 providing for ABRI’s duties
as the state’s defense and security forces and social function forces. In Article 28(1)
of Law No. 20/1982, the social-political functions means that the military acts as a
dinamisator and stabilisator and along with other social forces assumes the duty and
responsibility of securing and bringing to fruition the struggle of the nation based on
freedom and raising the welfare of the entire Indonesian population. Ian MacFarling
explaines that the words dinamisator and stabilisator are Indonesianized English. The
dinamisator can be translated as ‘dynamic driving force’ behind Indonesian society,
67 David Cohen,
(New York: ICTJ, 2003).
68http://www.thejakarta-
post.com/news/2015/08/21/don-t-force-aceh-victims-shake-hands-with-devil.html, accessed August 21,
2015.
69 In Indonesian language these three pillars of relations are abbreviated as ABG (ABRI, Birokrasi, Gol-
kar). It intends to mean that ABRI and bureaucracy were part of the functionalism group (Golongan Karya).
70 Leo Suryadinata, (Athens, OH:
Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1989).
71 honoratiores meaning honorable
person or noble-person and in the Indonesian military recognized themselves as the knight or ksatria
which is adopted from Javanese culture. Amos Perlmutter,
(New Haven: Yale University press, 1977), p.90.
also Peter Britton, “Military Professionalism in Indonesia: Javanese and Western Military Tradition in Army
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and the stabilisator can be interpreted as ‘the stabilizing force’ that tries to control
any tension that may be present in the population by Law No. 20/1982.72
Drawing inspiration from the guerilla warfare experience against the Dutch,
the military has always claimed themselves as the people’s army and such claim is
crystallized in TNI soldiers’ (seven-fold path) oath73 which bestows the
military the guardianship of the State.74 According to RJ Vatikiotis, by claiming to
be the people’s army, the military are using a strategy of close cooperation with the
people and further by using the Total People’s Defense and Security System based on
which theoretically positions the military with the people and above the
state.75
According to Andi Widjajanto, the problem arises when the military using
the Total People’s Defense and Security System is based on the thinking that TNI
is originally from the people. Thus, the military is identifying their interest with
the people’s interest, hence it can act independently beyond the government’s
oversight.76 Furthermore, Widjajanto goes even further to show that the military uses
such expression to undermine civilian government such as ‘TNI never recognizes
civilian supremacy, but it recognizes the people’s supremacy.’77 Therefore, according
to Geoffrey Robinson, the Total People’s Defense and Security System does not only
obscure the distinction between legitimate defense against external and internal
threats, it also creates an ever-deepening encroachment of military authorities into
political, social, and economic affairs.78
There was an attempt to promote such stance further at the time Law No. 34/2004
on TNI was adopted. However, such attempt failed since as it faced profound criticism
from experts and the civil society. One of the criticisms was that the relationship
relationship is limited with the existence of political parties.79 Thus, TNI cannot be
considered as political authority and neither can it act like a political party where they
72 Ian MacFarling,
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Center, 1996), p.143.
73 Army Headquarter-Staff Personnel ( -),
(Jakarta: Staf Personil TNI-AD, 2012). in its complete form reads as follows:
1. We, citizens of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesian based on Pancasila.
2. We, Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology, who are responsible and
never surrender.
3. We, Indonesian knights, who are devoted to God and who defend honesty, truth and justice.
4. We, soldiers of the Indonesian National Defense Forces, are guardians of the Indonesian state
and nation.
5. We, soldiers of the Indonesian National Defense Forces, uphold discipline, are obedient and
observant to our leadership and uphold the soldier’s attitude and honor.
6. We, soldiers of the Indonesian National Defense Forces, give our priority to set ourselves to
perform our task will courage and are always ready to devote ourselves to state and nation.
7. We, soldiers of the Indonesian National Defense Forces, are loyal and persistent and commit-We, soldiers of the Indonesian National Defense Forces, are loyal and persistent and commit-
ted to the soldier’s oath.
74 -
, eds. R. J. May and Viberto Selochan (Goolwa: Crawford House Publishing, 1998),
p. 31.
75
76 -
donesia 64 (2001), pp. 10-5.
77
78-
, eds. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 233.
79 Rusdi Marpaung,
(Jakarta: Imparsial, 2004), p. 19.
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can have direct relations with the people.80 As a tool of State defense, the relationship
between TNI and the people in defending the State should be determined based
merely on political decision by a civilian political authority.81 Moreover, it would put
the people in a subordinate position as they are sharing the same struggle with TNI
while it is impossible for the people to adjust their spiritual and struggle with the
military.82 Although Law No.3/2002 on State Defense and Law No.34/2004 on TNI
do not mention or even omit the jargonish expression on manunggal, the Army is still
practicing it as one of the three subjects of territorial management.83
Based on the above explanation, the recent challenge for the security sector
reform in Indonesia regarding this issue is leaving behind the old perspective and
identifying a new strict interpretation of the Total People’s Defense and Security
System. Although the law related to national defense already incorporates the spirit
to respect human rights and humanitarian law, it must be admitted that civilian
lawmakers in parliament have failed to uphold their interpretation against the old
interpretation as the only game in town.
The only reason why Law No.3/2002 positions the TNI as the main component is
that the TNI is guided to become a professional military since they are only focusing
on state defense and not on political matters. It is the government’s duty to regulate in
the law the people’s participation in the defense sector. The TNI can no longer use the
people directly as an army or militia to defend the country. Moreover, Law No.3/2002
on State Defense has brought fundamental change in the meaning of total people’s
defense, which had been adopted from the people’s war method and has had an effect
on the implementation of the related Territorial Warfare doctrine. In theory, the
people became the last resort, and the system has become a system of total defense.84
The fact is that the total defense system still needs people as a supporting
component against enemies on Indonesian land territory. However, the involvement of
individuals or civilian population cannot naturally fall under the provision of the right
and duty to defend the country against the enemy as stated by the Constitution. The
right articulated in Article 30(1) of the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution
out in that section should not be treated as a negative right in the context of civil and
political rights. In other words, the position of the State should not interfere with
right to defend the country. Such provisions on limited conditions should adopt the
principle of non-discrimination based on either gender or ethnicity.
In other words, the right to defend the State should be treated as a positive right in
the context of civil and political rights where the presence of the State is the primary
80
81
82 People’s Representative Assembly, Minutes on Public Hearing Meeting on Bill of TNI, August 2, 2004,
p.19.
83 The third of subject of territorial management, reads in full: Each soldier, as individuals can and
should organize territorial management in its simplest form is the behavior as outlined in the Mandatory
Eight TNI. Through this behavior expected realization of the unity between TNI – People. Markas Be-
sar TNI Angkatan Darat Staf Umum Teritorial (Army’s Headquarter-Territorial General Staff ),
(Jakarta: Mabesad Staf Umum Teritorial,
2007), pp.16-7.
84 Kusnanto Anggoro, “Organisasi dan Postur Pertahanan Indonesia Masa Depan [The Organization
eds. M. Riefqi Muna (Jakarta: The Ridep
Institute, 2002), p. 72.
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political rights such as police protection for individuals and property, and the right to
counsel; including economic, social and cultural rights such as right to food, housing,
education, employment, public housing, social security, and the like.
Meanwhile, the duty to defend the country should not be interpreted as a blank
check for the State to breach citizens’ civil rights. Such duty should not derogate civil
rights such as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion which are guaranteed
by the Constitution and international law. Accordingly, the State should consider
refraining from any acts to punish or to prosecute people who object to performing
military service especially under the conscript program or another similar program.
It is also in line with Resolution 1998/77 of the UN High Commission on Human
Rights on Conscious Objection to Military Service.85
Based on such interpretations, the position of the people has to change the ideology
of the Total People’s Defense and Security System. The word ‘people’ has a limited
interpretation which does not include the ‘entire population’ or the ‘entire people’ but
embraces the right of citizens recognized under the Constitution and international
law. In fact, it does not breach the principle of distinction under humanitarian law
including its customary applications. Therefore, the deployment of the people should
Indonesia’s national defense strategy.
In summary, the recent ideology of Total People’s Defense and Security System is
still using an old perspective which is based on the unity between the military and the
people or the population in facing a threat from the enemy, either external or internal,
of the State. The roots of such ideology are derived from the experience of Indonesia’s
armed struggle for independence. As a result, the military identify themselves as the
people thus their position is independent and above the State. Moreover, as a national
defense strategy, the distinction principle is breached since the line between the
either outside or inside the State.
VI. CONCLUSION
It may be concluded that there is a clear connection between the Total People’s
Defense and Security System on the one hand and the existence of State-sponsored
militia on the other. In other words, Indonesia’s law recognizes such form of militia
groups although there has been political resistance against using the term to describe
such groups. In contrast, the establishment of defense components according to
the law has indeed been conducted through the creation of State-sponsored militia.
Moreover, the way of establishing the groups was not in the framework of the law.
Law No.20/1982 categorized four components of the Total People’s Defense and
Security, with three of them involving civilians. Each of these three elements had
functions both as military and civilian roles, given the fact that some of the duties
gave them the role as combatants. Nevertheless, in practice, the process of recruiting,
training and arming was hardly ever based on military interest; rather, it has been
such as was part of the armed forces, the military was trying to avoid and
deny that the groups supported by them acted brutally. In fact, in the case of East
Timor the military and militia groups used the term which was not
even recognized in the law as one of the defense components.
85 UN Commission on Human Rights, , April 22, 1998, E/
CN.4/RES/1998/77.
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Although, unlike the previous law, the recent defense law does not strictly
participation of civilians or population in the area of defense continues to raise the
issue as to how to recruit, train and arm the population legally and, more importantly,
the Ministry of Defense controversially interpreted and planned to form the National
Defense Reserve Component resembling the conscript program. It failed due to public
rejection as a result of extensive civil society campaign against the program. The
second attempt was the recent program expressly using three articles in
the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, without referring to articles of Law
No.3/2002 on State Defense. However, the legal status of members of is
armed.
It is true that the Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution is granting citizens
the constitutional right and also duty to defend the state, which is easily interpreted
their proxy groups to provide political support to legitimize the military’s presence
or acts of violence against separatist groups as well as their sympathizers. By creating
such groups, the military believe that they can also minimize or even remove the
elements of separatist groups within the community. On the other hand, they do not
consider that the people may become a potential target for armed separatist groups
and that both –military and separatist groups- potentially create human rights
violations.
Although the right and duty provided for in Article 30 (1) of the Second Amendment
to the 1945 Constitution should be interpreted in the human rights area, it would
seem that the State applies a single interpretation and use of the term ‘right and duty
to defend the State’ without any clear explanation regarding which right and duty are
referred to in terms of Constitution or human rights law regimes. Therefore, the State
Finally, the historical background of the Total People’s Defense and Security System
contributes to the political ideology of the military and its relation with the existence
of militia groups. The ideology which embraces State sovereignty and territorial
armed struggle has become a center of Indonesian nationalism. Subsequently, such
ideology has transformed into military politics in viewing that there is a unity between
the military and civilians in facing threats from the enemy. However, this kind of
practice is blurring the distinction between the combatant and civilian which is such
a cardinal principle in International Humanitarian Law. Thus, as I mention above,
Indonesia should consider re-interpretation by using the human rights approach to
and Security System. Moreover, it needs to be regulated in a legal framework in order
to ensure that there are no further violations of laws. Law No.3/2002 has already
set out the boundaries and has introduced the spirit to respect human rights and
humanitarian law including customary laws thereof.
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