Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample

Abstract

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.

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https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01319-5
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Moral dilemmas can be portrayed as decisions between two
main conflicting moral principles: utilitarian and deon-
tological. Utilitarian (also referred to as consequentialist)
philosophies1 hold that an action is morally acceptable if it maxi-
mizes well-being for the greatest number of people (in terms of saved
lives, for example). On the other hand, deontological philosophy2
evaluates the morality of the action based on the intrinsic nature
of the action (that is, often reflecting greater concern for individ-
ual rights and duties3). The dilemma between these two principles
plays a prominent role in law and policy-making decisions, ranging
from decisions of health budget allocations4 to dilemmas related to
self-driving vehicles5. This inherent conflict is well illustrated by the
so-called trolley problem, which has long interested both philoso-
phers and psychologists. One version of the dilemma is presented
as follows:6
You are a railway controller. There is a runaway trolley barrelling
down the railway tracks. Ahead, on the tracks, there are five work-
men. The trolley is headed straight for them, and they will be killed
if nothing is done. You are standing some distance off in the train
yard, next to a lever. If you pull this lever, the trolley will switch to a
side track and you can save the five workmen on the main track. You
notice that there are two workmen on the side track. So there will
be two workmen who will be killed if you pull the lever and change
the tracks, but the five workmen on the main track will be saved. Is
it morally acceptable for you to pull the lever?
A deontological decision-maker would argue that pulling the
lever is morally unacceptable, as it would be murder. (Note that
deontological principles are often more complicated than this.
Some of the deontological rules would allow for killing in this situ-
ation. The terms ‘deontological’ and ‘utilitarian/consequentialist’
are labels we use to refer to certain responses.) On the other hand,
utilitarianism would suggest that it is morally acceptable to pull the
lever, as it would maximize the number of lives saved.
In an alternative version of the dilemma, one has to push a man
off a footbridge in front of the trolley (the ‘footbridge’ scenario).
This man will die but will stop the trolley, and the five people in the
way of the trolley will be saved. Interestingly, people are less likely to
make a decision consistent with utilitarian perspectives in the foot-
bridge scenario compared with the standard switch scenario. (We
call these ‘utilitarian’ responses, but the fact that these decisions are
consistent with utilitarianism does not indicate that people gave
them out of utilitarian principles. The same is true for ‘deontologi-
cal’ responses7,8.) The difference between the utilitarian response
rate in those scenarios became the basis of investigations of many
influential cognitive theories in the field of moral judgement3,7–13.
The fact that people respond differently to the two trolley dilemmas
was proposed to be explained by people’s adherence to the so-called
doctrine of double effect6,9. A simple version of this doctrine is that
harm is permissible as an unintentional side-effect of a good result.
This doctrine is the basis of many policies in several countries all
around the world concerning issues such as abortion6, euthanasia14,
international armed conflict regulations15,16 and even international
business ethics17. According to this doctrine, it is morally impermis-
sible to bomb civilians to win a war, even if ending the war would
eventually save more lives. However, if civilians die in a bombing of
a nearby weapons factory as a side-effect, the bombing is morally
acceptable. The way people perceive or act on these moral rules can
influence the policies that are accepted or even followed, as we can
already see in the case of driverless cars, which sometimes have to
decide between sacrificing their own passengers and saving one or
more pedestrians5.
However, Greene et al.18 and Cushman et al.9 argued that the dif-
ference in utilitarian response rates cannot simply be explained by
the doctrine of double effect. Greene et al. presented evidence for
the interaction of the intention of harm (that is, harm as means or
side-effect, referring to the doctrine of double effect) and personal
Situational factors shape moral judgements in the
trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western
countries in a culturally diverse sample
The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives
(that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements
(that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational
factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an
important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the
universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors
affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral
dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found
that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clus-
ters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters,
suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the
Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/
individualism and moral dilemma judgements.
NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOUR | VOL 6 | JUNE 2022 | 880–895 | www.nature.com/nathumbehav
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