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Adolescents’ and young adults’ practical moral judgments on typical everyday-life moral dilemmas: Gender differences in approach to resolution
Abstract
Adolescents’ and young adults’ practical moral judgments about two interpersonal moral dilemmas, which differed in their moral complexity, were examined using two philosophical frameworks (deontological and consequentialist principles) as tools for psychological analysis. A sample of 234 participants (ages 14–16, 18–19, and 20–21) reasoned about two moral dilemmas, which had been experienced by a subset of adolescents in a pilot study, in two forms: Participants 1) provided open-ended decisions and justification from the perspective of an imagined moral agent and 2) selected a choice from nine fixed reasoning alternatives (half advocating one course and other half advocating the other course of action, plus a relativistic reasoning). The participants’ open-ended responses served as a foundation of coding systems and were analyzed using log-linear analyses, chi-square tests, and a binominal logistic regression. The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods uncovered unexpected but nuanced young people’s moral thinking. Results indicated that female participants were more likely than males to show a unique decision style: “restructuring” of the moral dilemmas/situations , and moral relativism emerged only when asked to select a choice from nine reasoning alternatives and was primarily evidenced among the younger (aged 18–19) female college students.
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This study presents a meta-analysis of research on gender differences in perceptions of ethical decision making. Data from more than 20, 000 respondents in 66 samples show that women are more likely than men to perceive specific hypothetical business practices as unethical. As suggested by social role theory (A. H. Eagly, 1987), the gender difference observed in precareer (student) samples declines as the work experience of samples increases. Social role theory also accounts for greater gender differences in nonmonetary issues than in monetary issues. T. M. Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent model of moral intensity helps explain why gender differences vary across types of behavior. Contrary to expectations, differences are not influenced by the sex of the actor or the target of the behavior and do not depend on whether the behavior involves personal relationships or action vs. inaction.
Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for additional nuance in dual process theorists’ claims about the link between reflection and dilemma judgments.
As a mechanism for social participation and integration and for the purpose of building their identity, teens make and share videos on platforms such as YouTube of which they are also content consumers. The vulnerability conditions that occur and the risks to which adolescents are exposed, both as creators and consumers of videos, are the focus of this study. The methodology used is content analysis, applied to 400 videos. This research has worked with manifest variables (such as the scene) and latent variables (such as genre or structure). The results show that there are notable differences in style among the videos according to the producer of the message, and indicate that the most consumed videos are located around four thematic axes (sex, bullying, pregnancy and drugs) and that the referents as audiovisual content creators are the YouTubers. Everything points to problems in using the same language, including audiovisual language, as adolescents. This paper provides evidences of the convenience of using their codes so that this sector of the population see risks and conditions of vulnerability that they seem not to perceive according to their audiovisual creations in which they do not protect their identity, among other features.
Recently it has been argued that there are genuine moral dilemmas and that any theory which does not account for this fact is an unrealistic one. This represents a challenge to an assumption that most moral theorists have held: an adequate ethical theory must not allow for genuine moral quandaries. John Stuart Mill, for example, in the last paragraph of the second chapter of Utilitarianism, seems to be committed to such an assumption. Many others have also assented to this view. The consensus among those who hold this view seems to be that if a theory allows for moral dilemmas then there is some sense in which it is incoherent or inconsistent. Yet, oddly enough, the sense in which such a view would be incoherent is rarely, if ever, spelled out. Put another way, there seem to be no arguments for the belief that genuine moral dilemmas must be ruled out. W. D. Ross does suggest that if the same action were both morally required and forbidden, then "this would be to put an end to all ethical judgment."3 But how this would put an end to all ethical judgment, Ross does not explain. Once one sees that few, if any, arguments have been advanced to support the commonly held assumption, one realizes that the recent challenges must be taken seriously.
Thus the main questions to which this paper is addressed are these: Must an adequate ethical theory allow for genuine moral dilemmas? Or must an adequate theory rule out such cases in order to avoid incoherence? I shall approach these questions by first spelling out two different senses in which our ethical reasoning might be thought to be inconsistent if there are genuine moral dilemmas. Discussing these two senses of inconsistency will cast light on the original questions. The conclusion that I shall eventually argue for is that we have good grounds for supposing that an adequate moral theory must rule out genuine dilemmas.
The principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms; the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action depends on its consequences. Previous research suggests that deontological judgments are shaped by affective processes, whereas utilitarian judgments are guided by cognitive processes. The current research used process dissociation (PD) to independently assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations in women and men. A meta-analytic re-analysis of 40 studies with 6,100 participants indicated that men showed a stronger preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments than women when the two principles implied conflicting decisions (d = 0.52). PD further revealed that women exhibited stronger deontological inclinations than men (d = 0.57), while men exhibited only slightly stronger utilitarian inclinations than women (d = 0.10). The findings suggest that gender differences in moral dilemma judgments are due to differences in affective responses to harm rather than cognitive evaluations of outcomes.
© 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
A growing body of research has focused on so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such ‘utilitarian’ judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between ‘utilitarian’ judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that ‘utilitarian’ judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in ‘utilitarian’ judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics.
Recently, scholars have argued that divisions have emerged within many countries between tendencies toward orthodoxy or fundamentalism on the one hand, and progressivism or modernism on the other hand. In the present study, interviews assessing moral evaluation and reasoning were carried out with individuals in India and the United States who might be expected to tend toward orthodoxy and progressivism (N = 80, ages 35-55). In both countries, progressivists reasoned more in terms of Shweder's (1990) Ethic of Autonomy than orthodox participants, whereas orthodox participants reasoned more in terms of the Ethic of Divinity than progressivists. However, cross-cultural differences were also found. Progressivist Americans more than progressivist Indians tended toward hyperindividualism.
Context
Health plan utilization review rules are intended to enforce insurance
contracts and can alter and constrain the services that physicians provide
to their patients. Physicians can manipulate these rules, but how often they
do so is unknown.Objective
To determine the frequency with which physicians manipulate reimbursement
rules to obtain coverage for services they perceive as necessary, and the
physician attitudes and personal and practice characteristics associated with
these manipulations.Design, Setting, and Participants
A random national sample of 1124 practicing physicians was surveyed
by mail in 1998; the response rate was 64% (n = 720).Main Outcome Measure
Use of 3 different tactics "sometimes" or more often in the last year:
(1) exaggerating the severity of patients' conditions; (2) changing patients'
billing diagnoses; and/or (3) reporting signs or symptoms that patients did
not have to help the patients secure coverage for needed care.Results
Thirty-nine percent of physicians reported using at least 1 tactic "sometimes"
or more often in the last year. In multivariate models comparing these physicians
with physicians who "never" or "rarely" used any of these tactics, physicians
using these tactics were more likely to (1) believe that "gaming the system"
is necessary to provide high-quality care today (odds ratio [OR], 3.67; 95%
confidence interval [CI], 2.54-5.29); (2) have received requests from patients
to deceive insurers (OR, 2.44; 95% CI, 1.72-3.45); (3) feel pressed for time
during patient visits (OR, 1.69; 95% CI, 1.21-2.37); and (4) have more than
25% of their patients covered by Medicaid (OR, 1.60; 95% CI, 1.08-2.38). Notably,
greater worry about prosecution for fraud did not affect physicians' use of
these tactics (P = .34). Of those reporting using
these tactics, 54% reported doing so more often now than 5 years ago.Conclusions
A sizable minority of physicians report manipulating reimbursement rules
so patients can receive care that physicians perceive is necessary. Unless
novel strategies are developed to address this, greater utilization restrictions
in the health care system are likely to increase physicians' use of such manipulative
"covert advocacy" tactics.
Figures in this Article
Physicians' decisions about what services to offer their patients affect
almost 80% of all health care expenditures and have an enormous influence
on health care quality.1- 2 To
control cost and quality and ensure adherence to their contracts, health care
delivery organizations and payers frequently review physician recommendations
and pay for services (eg, diagnostic tests, drugs, or hospitalization for
treatment) only in predefined circumstances. This utilization review may occur
prospectively, in the form of preauthorization; concurrently, requiring immediate
approval over the telephone; or retrospectively, with payment decisions being
made after services have been delivered. Specific utilization review criteria
are rarely spelled out in advance; what physicians agree to when they sign
health plan contracts varies greatly and may both alter and constrain physicians'
decisions regarding their patients' use of services.
Although utilization review may be intended to improve quality and save
money, many physicians and patients dislike conforming to its rules. Utilization
review is often viewed as overly time consuming, a hassle, and an undue questioning
of professional authority.3- 4
Appealing adverse coverage decisions may seem inconvenient, unproductive,
or even risky for physicians. In some cases, physicians may feel trapped between
professional obligations to advocate for their patients and conflicting contractual
obligations to follow coverage rules. Furthermore, it has been suggested that
some insurers are "gaming" patients and physicians—tricking them into
paying for covered services by routinely denying coverage but then approving
services that are subsequently appealed, knowing that time and other constraints
will prevent some appeals.4- 6
To retaliate, physicians may be tempted to turn the tables.
Physicians could manipulate reimbursement rules to help their patients
obtain coverage for care that the physicians perceive to be necessary, for
example, through ambiguous documentation or by exaggerating the severity of
patients' conditions.7- 9
This sort of deception of third-party payers has been called "gaming the system"
for patients5 and it is not a new idea, nor
is it limited to managed care. Fee-for-service payment often provides a greater
financial incentive for physicians to manipulate reimbursement rules since
they directly profit from increased services. Yet recent data suggest that
physicians in regions with higher managed care penetration are more likely
to condone manipulating reimbursement rules.9
Some may believe that it is necessary to manipulate reimbursement rules in
the course of patient advocacy today—even in the face of well-publicized
crackdowns on fraud and abuse.10- 12
These physicians may see manipulation of reimbursement rules as an indirect,
or covert, form of patient advocacy and even a professional obligation.
Previous studies have posed hypothetical coverage dilemmas to physicians
and offered deception of insurers as potential solutions.9,13- 14
These studies demonstrate that many physicians believe there are scenarios
in which manipulating reimbursement rules would be justifiable in theory.
Anecdotes suggest that using such tactics is not merely hypothetical but occurs
in practice.15 This study sought to determine
how many physicians are manipulating reimbursement rules to get coverage for
their patients' needed care, and what factors might affect how frequently
physicians circumvent utilization review in practice.
What does it take to argue well? The goal of this series of studies was to better understand the cognitive skills entailed in argument, and their course of development, isolated from the verbal and social demands that argumentive discourse also entails. Findings indicated that young adolescents are less able than adults to coordinate attention to both positions in an argument, an age-related pattern that parallels one found in discourse. Contributing to this weakness was inattention to the opposing position (in both constrained and unconstrained formats), but not ability to address the opposing position when explicitly asked to do so. In addition to implementing the necessary dual focus, results point to the importance of developing epistemological understanding of the relevance of the opposing position to argument, as well as of the goals of argument more generally. The results also reflect the close parallels between dialogic and non-dialogic argument. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Completed a descriptive study to examine the nature of moral dilemmas written by adolescents. 149 7th, 9th, and 12th graders wrote stories involving a moral conflict. As in L. Kohlberg's (1969) stories, Ss depicted a central protagonist involved in one salient conflict. Unlike Kohlberg's stories, however, the Ss did not always identify a significant subsidiary character. They wrote about both male and female protagonists, constructed dilemmas involving the social relationship of friend between protagonist and subsidiary character, and dealt with issues other than civil rights and life and death. Several age trends and sex differences were also observed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This paper explores possible connections between gender and the willingness to tolerate unethical academic behavior. Data from a sample of 285 accounting majors at four public institutions reveal that females are less tolerant than males when questioned about academic misconduct. Statistically significant differences were found for 17 of 23 questionable activities. Furthermore, females were found to be less cynical and less often involved in academic dishonesty. Overall, the results support the finding of Betz et al. (1989) that the gender socialization approach dominates the structural approach.
Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or
normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are
or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This
research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful,
is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism.
First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism,
and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology
that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot
be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on
the topic of moral relativism in the future.
KeywordsMoral relativism–Moral psychology–Experimental ethics–Normative ethics–Tolerance
We propose the coordination of the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing as the essence of what develops in the attainment of mature epistemological understanding. Initially, the objective dimension dominates, to the exclusion of subjectivity; subsequently, the subjective dimension assumes an ascendant position and the objective is abandoned, and, finally, the two are coordinated. This progression, we further postulate, tends to occur in a systematic order across different judgment domains (personal taste, aesthetic, value, and truth), with the orders the reverse of one another in the two major transitions that constitute this progression. These predictions are supported among a sample of seven groups of children, adolescents, and adults varying in age, education, and life experience. Subjectivity is most readily acknowledged in personal taste and aesthetic judgments and least readily in truth judgments. Once subjectivity is accepted and becomes dominant, objectivity is reintegrated in the reverse order, i.e., most readily with respect to truth judgments. Not predicted, however, was the finding that for a number of individuals, both transitions proved most difficult in the values domain.
Sixty-nine Midwestern middle-class children and adolescents were tested on justice and care orientations when reasoning abstract and interpersonal moral dilemmas. Nona Lyons' (“Two Perspectives on Self, Relationships and Morality,” Harvard Educational Review, 1983, 53, 125–145) scoring method was used to score subjects' responses. A 2(sex)×2(age) analysis of variance run on the total justice and care scores, as well as each individual dilemma, supported Carol Gilligan's ( In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) theory that two distinct ways of thinking about moral problems exist — justice and care — and are differentially related to gender. Girls emphasized the morality of care significantly more than justice. Contrary to Gilligan (1982) and Lyons (1983), however, boys in both age groups emphasized the morality of justice and care equally. Data from the interpersonal dilemmas using Lyons's (1983) coding scheme are consistent with J. Piaget ( The Moral Judgement of the Child, New York: Free Press, 1966) and Lawrence Kohlberg [“The Cognitive-Developmental Approach,” in D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969]: older subjects became more justice oriented and younger subjects emphasized the morality of care. Sex differences on Kohlberg's stage theory were not significant and the protagonist's gender in the Heinz dilemma had no effect on moral reasoning. Peer Reviewed http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45582/1/11199_2004_Article_BF00288055.pdf
The authors conducted 5 studies to test the idea that both thinking about and having power affects the way in which people resolve moral dilemmas. It is shown that high power increases the use of rule-based (deontological) moral thinking styles, whereas low power increases reliance on outcome-based (consequentialist) moral thinking. Stated differently, in determining whether an act is right or wrong, the powerful focus on whether rules and principles are violated, whereas the powerless focus on the consequences. For this reason, the powerful are also more inclined to stick to the rules, irrespective of whether this has positive or negative effects, whereas the powerless are more inclined to make exceptions. The first 3 experiments show that thinking about power increases rule-based thinking and decreases outcome-based thinking in participants' moral decision making. A 4th experiment shows the mediating role of moral orientation in the effect of power on moral decisions. The 5th experiment demonstrates the role of self-interest by showing that the power-moral link is reversed when rule-based decisions threaten participants' own self-interests.
Ethics research in athletic training is lacking. Teaching students technical skills is important, but teaching them how to reason and to behave in a manner that befits responsible health care professionals is equally important.
To expand ethics research in athletic training by (1) describing undergraduate athletic training students' and educators' individual moral philosophies and ethical decision-making abilities and (2) investigating the effects of sex and level of education on mean composite individual moral philosophies and ethical decision-making scores.
Stratified, multistage, cluster-sample correlational study.
Mailed survey instruments were distributed in classroom settings at 30 institutions having Commission on Accreditation of Allied Health Education Programs (CAAHEP)-accredited athletic training programs.
Undergraduate students and educators (n = 598: 373 women, 225 men; mean age = 23.5 +/- 6.3 years) from 25 CAAHEP-accredited athletic training programs.
We used the Ethics Position Questionnaire and the Dilemmas in Athletic Training Questionnaire to compute participants' mean composite individual moral philosophies (idealism and relativism) and ethical decision-making scores, respectively. Three separate 2 (sex: male, female) x 3 (education level: underclass, upper class, educator) between-subjects factorial analyses of variance using idealism, relativism, and ethical decision-making scores as dependent measures were performed.
Respondents reported higher idealism scores (37.57 +/- 4.91) than relativism scores (31.70 +/- 4.80) (response rate = 83%). The mean ethical decision-making score for all respondents was 80.76 +/- 7.88. No significant interactions were revealed. The main effect for sex illustrated that men reported significantly higher relativism scores ( P = .0014, eta (2) = .015) than did women. The main effect for education level revealed significant differences between students' and educators' idealism ( P = .0190, eta (2) = .013), relativism ( P < .001, eta (2) = .050), and ethical decision-making scores ( P < .001, eta (2) = .027). Tukey honestly significant difference post hoc analysis indicated that educators possessed lower idealism scores (36.90 +/- 5.70) and relativism scores (29.92 +/- 4.86) and higher ethical decision-making scores (82.98 +/- 7.62) than did students.
Our findings do not support changes in athletic training ethics education practices to address sex-specific needs. However, when opportunities occur for students to reason using different ethical perspectives, educators should be aware of their students' and their own moral philosophies in order to optimally facilitate professional growth.
We describe why we wrote "False-Positive Psychology," analyze how it has been cited, and explain why the integrity of experimental psychology hinges on the full disclosure of methods, the sharing of materials and data, and, especially, the preregistration of analyses.
As theories of developmental psychology continue to define educational goals and practice, it has become imperative for educators and researchers to scrutinize not only the underlying assumptions of such theories but also the model of adulthood toward which they point. Carol Gilligan examines the limitations of several theories, most notably Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development, and concludes that developmental theory has not given adequate expression to the concerns and experience of women. Through a review of psychological and literary sources, she illustrates the feminine construction of reality. From her own research data, interviews with women contemplating abortion, she then derives an alternative sequence for the development of women's moral judgments. Finally, she argues for an expanded conception of adulthood that would result from the integration of the "feminine voice" into developmental theory.
This study investigated the extent to which people interpret real-life moral dilemmas in terms of an internal moral orientation, as Gilligan (1982, 1988) has suggested, or in terms of the content of the dilemma, as Wark and Krebs (1996, 1997) have reported. Thirty women and 30 men listed the issues they saw in descriptions of real-life prosocial, antisocial and social pressure types of moral dilemma. Results revealed that Gilligan's model underestimates the influence of dilemma content. Moral dilemmas differed in the extent to which they were viewed in terms of the same issues by different participants. There was relatively little within-person consistency in moral orientation. There were four gender differences. Compared to men, women rated social pressure dilemmas as involving more care-orientated issues, and prosocial dilemmas as more significant. Compared to women, men viewed all dilemmas as involving more justice-based issues, and reported experiencing more antisocial dilemmas.
In this article the bases for recent allegations of sex bias in Kohlberg's theory of moral development are discussed. Studies comparing the development of moral reasoning between the sexes are then reviewed. Only a few inconsistent sex differences have been found in childhood and adolescence. Some studies indicate that, in adulthood, males evidence higher moral development than females, but in these studies sex differences are confounded with differences in level of education and occupation. A metaanalysis (a statistical procedure for combining findings) supported the conclusion that the overall pattern is one of nonsignificant sex differences in moral reasoning. Discussion focused on implications for moral development theory and research.
Considerable controversy focuses on the ages at which adolescents are permitted to make legally regulated decisions-for example, consent to medical treatment, consent to experimentation, choice of custodial parent. The decision advice of 108 adolescents at three grade levels (grades 7-8, 10, and 12) was investigated in a simulated peer-counseling situation. In adolescents' advice to their "peers," there is a significant increase, with grade level, in mention of the potential risks and potential future consequences of decisions; in recognition and cautious treatment of "vested interests"; and in advice to solicit independent professional opinions. No differences between grade levels are found in the incorporation of negative information about a trusted adult or in recommendations that peers or parents be consulted about the decisions.
In previous research the process of change from 1 stage to the next was examined. Characteristics of disequilibrium were specified through analysis of stage transition in the moral judgments of adolescent subjects. In the present study, the same subjects were reinterviewed after a period of 1.5-2 years. The hypothesis that the conflicts and contradictions evident on the first testing would be resolved through structural reorganization was confirmed.
This study examines similarities and differences between adolescents' and adults' decision-making competence when asked to help peers solve three hypothetical dilemmas. Data were obtained from interviews with 223 6th-, 8th-, 10th-, and 12th-grade students as well as young adults (X age=23.36, S.D.=6.37). Results of this study indicate that adolescents' and adults' decision-making competence differs, with adults outperforming the adolescents. Specifically, compared to the adolescents, adults were more likely to consider risks and benefits associated with the decisions and suggest advice seeking. Fewer participants at all ages mentioned options, risks, and benefits than expected. Decision-making competence varied across the three decision-making dilemmas, but no age by decision scenario interactions were found. The results have implications for policies of informed consent and the age at which adolescents' rights to make certain decisions should be restricted by law.
Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrasting phenomena-moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to the phenomenon whereby behaving ethically or unethically decreases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behavior again later. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern-engaging in ethical or unethical behavior increases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behavior later on. The three studies reported here supported the hypothesis that individuals' ethical mind-set (i.e., outcome-based vs. rule-based) moderates the impact of an initial ethical or unethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically on a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mind-set facilitated moral balancing, and a rule-based mind-set facilitated moral consistency.
In this study gender-related differences in moral imagination were examined. Data were obtained from 241 employees at a bank in Ankara, Turkey. The participants were lower- and middle-level managers, head economist, and workers at the head office. According to t test results, there were differences between females and males in the moral imagination scale and subscales (Yurtsever, 2006). The mean of moral imagination and its subscales for females was higher than that for males. Implications for business practice are discussed.
Two hundred and one adults completed two questionnaires: the first estimating their scores and that of their partner on nine scales from the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB); the second on beliefs about IQ tests. There was overall no sex difference between participants on self- and partner- ratings though there was an expected difference on numerical ability. Factor analysis revealed two factors labeled cognitive ability and dexterity. Regressing the eight specific abilities onto the overall score showed five abilities with significant beta weights (particularly verbal and numerical abilities) accounting for nearly three-quarters of the variance. Regressing seven demographic factors onto the overall score showed the participants' wealth, education and political beliefs to be the best predictors: richer, longer educated, more right-wing people thought they had higher IQ scores.
Provided an alternative conception of postconventional moral development that fits existing data on late adolescent and adult moral judgment better than L. Kohlberg's (1969) higher stage descriptions. Moral judgment data from a longitudinal study of 26 undergraduates were scored by L. Kohlberg et al's (1978) manual and replicated his original finding that a significant percentage of Ss regress from adolescence to adulthood. The persistence of relativistic regression in these data suggests the need to revise the theory. The same hypothetical moral dilemmas were also scored according to an alternative coding scheme based on the hypothesis of an adult form of cognitive development. Results indicate that Kohlberg regressors are progressors when evaluated against a standard of commitment in relativism instead of absolute principles of justice. Real-life data on the same Ss suggest that this progression is related to actual experiences of moral conflict and choice which lead to the restructuring of moral judgment to a more dialectical mode. It is suggested that this alternative notion of postconventional development is necessary for understanding and scoring adult moral judgment. (37 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Lawrence Kohlberg first published details of his research on the development of moral judgments in Vita Humana (later titled Human Development). Along with a series of other articles and essays, he greatly influenced research on moral development. He was instrumental in moving the field out of the narrow confines of analyses of psychological mechanisms to inclusion of substantive philosophical definitions of the domain. He persuaded many researchers to take morality seriously as a realm pertaining to people’s thinking about how they ought to relate to each other and how social systems should be organized. Although several aspects of Kohlberg’s theoretical formulations are now not widely accepted, most researchers (though not all) are concerned with combining epistemological considerations with psychological analyses and view children as possessing moral capacities not solely imposed by adults. One of these theoretical perspectives, discussed in this essay, is based on distinctions among social domains. Problems in current research, especially on morality and neuroscience, that fails to attend to epistemological considerations are discussed.
discusses the empirical evidence regarding the contentious issue of sex differences in moral reasoning and sex bias in theories of morality / two claims regarding this issue have been raised: (a) that there are two sex-related orientations for moral decision-making, and (b) that Kohlberg's moral stage theory down-scores the moral reasoning of females / discussion focuses on the appropriate definition of mature moral reasoning (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Even young children show considerable cultural competence in their accusations and excuses, and can differentiate among various types of rules.
Taking the lead from Susan Wolf's and Linda Emanuel's work on systems thinking, and developing ideas from Moberg's, Seabright's and my work on mental models and moral imagination, in this paper I shall argue that what is often missing in management decision-making is a systems approach. Systems thinking requires conceiving of management dilemmas as arising from within a system with interdependent elements, subsystems, and networks of relationships and patterns of interaction. Taking a systems approach and coupling it with moral imagination, now engaged on the organizational and systemic as well as individual levels of decision-making, I shall conclude, is a methodology that encourages managers and companies to think more imaginatively and to engage in integrating moral decision-making into ordinary business decisions. More importantly this sort of thinking is a means to circumvent what often appear to be intractable problems created by systemic constraints for which no individual appears to be responsible.
Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One
person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible.
But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in
particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively
unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals
differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be
more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that
differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart
from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral
objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy.
This article reveals a discrepancy between the actual and stated motives for punishment. Two studies conducted with nationally
representative samples reveal that people support laws designed on the utilitarian principle of deterrence in the abstract,
yet reject the consequences of the same when they are applied. Study 1 (N=133) found that participants assigned punishment to criminals in a manner consistent with a retributive theory of justice
rather than deterrence. The verbal justifications for punishment given by these same respondents, however, failed to correlate
with their actual retributive behavior. Study 2 (N=125) again found that people have favorable attitudes towards utilitarian laws and rate them as “fair” in the abstract,
but frequently reject them when they are instantiated in ways that support utilitarian theories. These studies reveal people’s
inability to know their own motivations, and show that one consequence of this ignorance is to generate support for laws that
they ultimately find unjust.
This study examines similarities and differences between adolescents' and adults' decision-making competence when asked to help peers solve three hypothetical dilemmas. Data were obtained from interviews with 223 6th-, 8th-, 10th-, and 12th-grade students as well as young adults (X age=23.36, S.D.=6.37). Results of this study indicate that adolescents' and adults' decision-making competence differs, with adults outperforming the adolescents. Specifically, compared to the adolescents, adults were more likely to consider risks and benefits associated with the decisions and suggest advice seeking. Fewer participants at all ages mentioned options, risks, and benefits than expected. Decision-making competence varied across the three decision-making dilemmas, but no age by decision scenario interactions were found. The results have implications for policies of informed consent and the age at which adolescents' rights to make certain decisions should be restricted by law.
Do demographic and socioeconomic variables have an impact on moral philosophies consumers adopt? Although researchers have examined this question to some extent, findings tend to be inconsistent. This discordance may be a function that prior work has examined the foregoing issue in an ad hoc fashion rather than selecting personal characteristics predicated on some underlying theory. The present study seeks to address this shortcoming by investigating three demographic and three socioeconomic variables that are intricately associated with cognitive moral development (CMD). Using Chi Square Automatic Interaction Detection (CHAID), the results highlight the importance of considering the interactive effects of these variables on consumers' moral philosophy. Implications for retailers, educators, and researchers are provided.
Age differences in future orientation are examined in a sample of 935 individuals between 10 and 30 years using a delay discounting task as well as a new self-report measure. Younger adolescents consistently demonstrate a weaker orientation to the future than do individuals aged 16 and older, as reflected in their greater willingness to accept a smaller reward delivered sooner than a larger one that is delayed, and in their characterizations of themselves as less concerned about the future and less likely to anticipate the consequences of their decisions. Planning ahead, in contrast, continues to develop into young adulthood. Future studies should distinguish between future orientation and impulse control, which may have different neural underpinnings and follow different developmental timetables.
Some physicians may resort to deception to secure third-party payer approval for patient procedures. Related physician attitudes, including willingness to use deception, are not well understood.
To determine physician willingness to deceive a third-party payer and physician attitudes toward deception of third-party payers.
A cross-sectional mailed survey was used to evaluate physician willingness to use deception in 6 vignettes of varying clinical severity: coronary bypass surgery, arterial revascularization, intravenous pain medication and nutrition, screening mammography, emergent psychiatric referral, and cosmetic rhinoplasty. We evaluated 169 board-certified internists randomly selected from 4 high- and 4 low-managed care penetration metropolitan markets nationwide for willingness to use deception in each vignette.
Physicians were willing to use deception in the coronary bypass surgery (57.7%), arterial revascularization (56.2%), intravenous pain medication and nutrition (47.5%), screening mammography (34.8%), and emergent psychiatric referral (32.1%) vignettes. There was little willingness to use deception for cosmetic rhinoplasty (2.5%). Rates were highest for physicians practicing in predominantly managed care markets, for clinically severe vignettes, and for physicians spending less time in clinical practice. Physician ratings of the justifiability of deception varied by perspective and vignette.
Many physicians sanction the use of deception to secure third-party payers' approval of medically indicated care. Such deception may reflect a tension between the traditional ethic of patient advocacy and the new ethic of cost control that restricts patient and physician choice in the use of limited resources.
This research examined adolescents' judgments about lying to circumvent directives from parents or friends in the moral, personal, and prudential domains. One hundred and twenty-eight adolescents (12.1-17.3 years) were presented with situations in which an adolescent avoids a directive through deception. The majority of adolescents judged some acts as acceptable, including deception regarding parental directives to engage in moral violations and to restrict personal activities. Other acts of deception were judged as unacceptable, including deception of parents regarding prudential acts, as well as deception of friends in each domain. In addition, lying to conceal a misdeed was negatively evaluated. Most adolescents thought that directives from parents and friends to engage in moral violations or to restrict personal acts were not legitimate, whereas parental directives concerning prudential acts were seen as legitimate. Results indicate that adolescents value honesty, but sometimes subordinate it to moral and personal concerns in relationships of inequality.
- Ruck M. D.
Characteristics of the most viewed YouTubeTM videos related to bullying
- C H Basch
- K V Ruggles
- A Berdnik
- C Basch