War in Ukraine: Propaganda and disinformation

Full text

War in
Ukraine:
Propaganda
and
disinformation

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War in Ukraine: Propaganda and disinformation
Authors: Shkelzen Osmani, Alban Zeneli
Publisher: ADS/hibrid.info, Department of Journalism/ Faculty of Philology /University of
Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”
Prishtina, March 2022
© All rights reserved by ADS ADS/hibrid.info and Department of Journalism/ Faculty of
Philology /University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”. The Law No 04/L-065 on Copyright and
Related Rights and the Law No 05/L-047 on Amending and Supplementing the Law No.04/L-
065 on Copyright and Related Rights protect intellectual property rights.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a electronic systems or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior
permission of the publisher.

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Contents
Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Disinforming media content in Kosovo............................................................................................... 5
1.2 Context of news, published in Kosovo and for Albanian speaking audience in general ..................... 6
2. World: Misinforming media content .................................................................................................. 7
2. Falsified narratives .......................................................................................................................... 10
4. Methodology and data .................................................................................................................... 11
5. Recommendations........................................................................................................................... 12
5.1. Recommendations for editorial boards ......................................................................................... 12
5.2.Recommendations for the general public ...................................................................................... 13

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Summary
This report presents the number, type and format of fake news and other ways of disinformation in
relation to and for the period of Russian invasion on Ukraine. The research was initiated by the fact
checking platform “hibrid.info” and was conducted in cooperation with “Hasan Prishtina”
University/Department of Journalism. The report bases its findings on data acquired from the
database of debunked disinformation and fake news, compiled by fact checkers around the world,
verified members of “International Fact Checking Network” (IFCN). IFCN granted “hibrid.info”
access to its database for the purposes of this report. The idea to establish the database emerged
from the Spanish fact-checking platform “Maldita.es” which later launched its online version titled
“ukrainefacts.org”. The database contains denunciations and debunks of information related to war
in Ukraine, starting from 24 February 2022, when Russia launched its invasion.
The report will summarize, in both narration and graphs, the number, types and forms of
disinformation and channels used for such a purpose. The main section of the report contains
findings related to dissemination of disinformation in the form of articles/posts (written content)
and photo/video/audio content, published in Kosovo and the region. The main section will also
discuss the context of misinforming content. Further, the report will discuss the phenomenon of
fictional narratives on Ukraine, created by pro-Kremlin media. Recommendations, presented at the
last section of the report, are divided into two categories: recommendations addressed to the news
editorial offices in Kosovo and recommendations addressed to the general audience of Albanian
language media.

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1. Disinforming media content in Kosovo
Kosovo data were obtained from two fact-
checking platforms, members of IFCN:
“hibrid.info” and “kallxo.com”
Between 24 February and 11 March, when the
last data were processed, the number of
debunks from these two platforms reached 38.
This figure does not represent the total
number of misinforming and inaccurate
information disseminated for the period,
which is obviously much higher.
The number of misinformation may be much
higher than the one presented in this report,
but the methodology of the two fact checkers
from Kosovo has made it impossible to debunk
them all. Considering that there are no
accurate data/inputs, the report only
discusses those entries that were available on
the IFCN database.
Online media disseminated most of
misinforming and inaccurate information
content. This includes all types of media that
are present in the digital space.
Most of articles published in Kosovo media,
that were considered disinformation, were
created outside the country and in other
languages (non-Albanian). This implies that
they were first translated and then
disseminated. The format of disinforming or
inaccurate information content, in most of
cases, was a media article, containing
text/video or text/photo. To a fewer extent,
there were cases when the format was just a
photo, or a single video, that would have been
published by a social media profile, page or
group.
Figure 1. Main forms of disinformation disseminated in Kosovo, according denunciations of IFCN.
Types of denunciations in Kosovo
Kosovë
11%
0%
20%
46%
3%
20%
Audio Photo Photo/text Photo/video Text Video Video/Text

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The most frequently used channel for
dissemination of these articles was social
media, dominated by Facebook, which
remains the most used social network in
Kosovo
1
. A percentage of misinformation
content on Facebook is published only as posts
created by private profiles, public pages and
groups, while the rest as media articles, shared
by media Facebook pages.
Figure 2. Main channels for dissemination of disinformation in Kosovo, based on IFCN denunciations
1.2 Context of news, published in Kosovo and for Albanian
speaking audience in general
A significant number of articles/posts claimed
to present events or actions that took place
during fighting in Ukraine.
In some instances, events taking place in
Ukraine were correlated to developments in
the region and Kosovo. This was mainly
because of statements of political and
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STIKK-Internet Penetration and Usage in Kosovo
institutional leaders of Russia, including
President Vladimir Putin, who have
mentioned Kosovo, in an attempt to draw
similarities and compare the Russian decision
to invade Ukraine, initially of separatist
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and later of
the whole country, with NATO intervention in
Kosovo, in 1999.
Dissemination channels of disinformation in Kosovo
5%0%
10%
45%
40%
Online media
Facebook and online media
Facebook posts only
Doubtful media
Instant communication platforms

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Figure 3. Context of disinformation published in Albanian language media, based on IFCN denunciations.
In some cases, media used entirely
fabricated/faked content to make such
correlation/comparison between two
contexts. This context correlation was
constructed mainly by fabricated headlines,
claiming that Serbia is preparing a military
invasion in Kosovo, following the Russian
invasion in Ukraine. Such content was
created by webpages that claim to be media,
but that according to fact controlling
methodology are identified as doubtful
media/portals.
Monitoring of such webpages was difficult
because of the enormous number and
constant changes in their domain address.
For efficiency purposes, “hibrid.info” established
a list of fake webpages and social media pages,
which is updated regularly
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. In relation to
denunciations in this platform. Kosovo
ranked 12 globally. In the region, only
Montenegro ranks higher, with 40
denunciations in total.
2. World: Misinforming media content
War in Ukraine was an interesting topic
also for audiences in distant countries.
This is confirmed by a large number of
publications/posts with disinforming
content in countries such as India and
Brazil, which are very far geographically
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Hibrid.info – Doubtful media
from Ukraine.
It should be highlighted that the number of
denunciations in a certain country is
related to the number of inhabitants and
fact checkers that operate in that country.
Language is also a major factor.
Disinformation and context
11%
89%
Disinformation with
Kosovo/ Albania context
Disinformation from war in
Ukraine

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For example, Hindu language is spoken by
342 million people and ranks as the fourth
most spoken language in the world.
Hispanic languages are spoken by 471
million people
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(which includes most of
countries in Latin America). Consequently,
the number of debunks/denunciations
analyzed in India and Spain was high.
In the graph below, we see that debunks
from India and Spain are at the top of the
list, followed by countries that have been
affected economically or had security
concerns, such as Turkey and Balkan
countries.
This percentage could be representative in
terms of number of disinformation
debunks/denunciations. This is related to
the fact that in Russia and China, but also
in some countries of Central Asia and
Caucasus that have good relation with
current regime in Moscow, there are no
fact checkers, members of IFCN, that
operate normally.
Figure 4. P er c e nt ag e o f d e n un c i a ti o n o f di s i n fo rma ti on i n IF C N , per country.
Misinforming video content remains the
most shared content worldwide. Video
content is disseminated as standalone
product, but often appears in combination
with text.
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Babbel Magazine- The 10 Most Spoken Languages In
Standalone photos and photos combined
with text follow as the next most shared
content. Text as standalone product is the
least shared content while audio was
never shared during the research period.
The World
Country ranking
shteteve
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%
20%
12%
6%
3%
4% 4% 4%
5%
5%
India
Spain
Turkey
Italy
Brazil
Bangladesh
USA
Georgia
Montenegro
Poland
Syria
Kosovo
Greece
UK
Taiwan
Bosnia and Hercegovina
Columbia
Portugal

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Figure 5. According to IFCN data, video and photo dominated the denounced disinforming media content
Social media, dominated by Facebook
(with over 50 %) and followed by Twitter,
Instagram and YouTube were the most
used channels for dissemination of
misinforming content. Communication
platforms known as
“Instant Messaging”, such as WhatsApp
and Telegram were also used for
disseminating disinforming content.
Online media have their considerable
share of disinforming content, but they
mostly used abovementioned channels for
dissemination.
Figure 6. Number of disinformation denounced at IFCN, and channel of dissemination
Forms of denounced disinformation
17%
1% 10%
25%
36%
0%
11%
Audio Photo Photo & text Photo & video Text Video Video & text
Media type/Number of denunciations
Facebook
Twitter
6% 0
1
%
1
%
%
2%
11
%
%
4%
1%
4%
53%
Instagram
Youtube
TikTok
WhatApp
Telegram
Online media
26%
Blogs
Local media
Weibo
Other media

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Dates/Number of denunciations
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
23 Feb 24 Feb 25 Feb 26 Feb 27 Feb 28 Feb 1 March 2March 3 March 4 March
The number of news and information with
misinforming content started to grow
exponentially (as reported by fact
checkers) on 24 February, which is the
date of Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the
following graph, we can see that the
increase was evident during the first two
days of the invasion (24 and 25 Feb) and
then there is a decrease. The curve of
denunciations increases again in the
following days, but not at the same
intensity as with the beginning of invasion
Figure 7. The number of denounced disinformation showed a steady increase in the first days of
Russian invasion of Ukraine.
2. Falsified narratives
Disinformation on and around Ukraine has
started years ago and long before the invasion.
According to west organization reports, this
disinformation was mostly conducted by
Russian, pro-regime media, known as pro-
Kremlin media and affiliated actors.
Credible western media raised concerns about
how Russian audiences are being served with a
parallel reality by state controlled media, a
reality that differs to the one on the ground
4
.
Weeks before the invasion, Russian state
controlled media disinformation intensified,
especially in the separatist regions of Donetsk
4
BBC- Ukraine: Watching the war on Russian TV - a
whole different story
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EUvsDisinformation- The Kremlin’s Playbook:
and Lugansk, by depicting the military
intervention as humanitarian
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mission aiming at
supporting local Russian speaking population
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.
This phenomena was identified as worrisome by
western countries, European Union, Great
Britain and United States of America.
Fabricating Pretext To Invade Ukraine - More Myths
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EUvsDisinformation - Forcefully Relocating 700,000
People, All To Spin More Disinformation

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Illustrating photo /Propaganda
In an attempt to seriously tackle Russian
disinformation, EU member countries have
requested from prominent digital platforms
known as Big Tech (Alphabet-Google, Amazon,
Apple, Meta-Facebook and Microsoft) to
reduce and ban content produced by two main
Russian state controlled media Sputnik and
Russia Today
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.
State Department exposed what it identified as
falsified or manipulated Russian narratives
aiming to depict Russia as a victim of an
intended western aggression
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4. Methodology and data
This report analysed only content of media
that have digital presence and that use online
platforms for dissemination. Such media can
be newspapers, TV, radio and online media
(portals). In addition to media, the report
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Politico - Europe seeks a legal route to switch off
Russian TV
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U.S. Department of State - Russia’s Top Five
analysed content disseminated by social
media and online communication platforms
(Instant Messaging). The sample for Kosovo, in
this report, is made of 35 denunciations from
“hibrid.info” and “kallxo.com” platforms, made
Persistent Disinformation Narratives

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to IFCN database (from 24 February to 11
March). In the countries of the region, such as
Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, Bulgaria and Croatia there were
156 denunciations. No denunciation was made
for North Macedonia. Globally, there were
1403 denunciations made worldwide, in just
two weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
(24 February – 9 March). Drafters obtained
data from IFCN, following an official request
for access. “IBM SPPS Statistics” program. The
report examined statistical data with relevant
quantitative methods, comparative data with
data variables and scrutinized content and
context with content analysis.
5. Recommendations
5.1. Recommendations for editorial boards
 Considering the high level of
disinformation that erupted with
war in Ukraine, it is recommended to
apply vigorously all steps of source
verification, by giving more
relevance to news accuracy then to
speed of dissemination.
 Information sources in a war zone
often aim to disseminate propaganda
on purpose. Therefore, it is very
important to balance information
sources within news. When content
is based on a single source, caution
should be exerted and publication
should be postponed until new facts,
that depict a clearer picture, are
acquired.
 Often the context of videos and other
materials displayed on internet by
ordinary citizens or institutions of
countries at war could be
manipulated. Therefore, when
reporting from these zones, it is
recommended to analyze the content
of events before publication.
 When reporting for such crisis,
editorial boards should use
informative headlines, connecting
them to the content of news. It is
recommended to avoid
sensationalist headlines, considering
that some readers get the news only
by reading headlines, not managing
to read the whole content.
 Even with the most rigorous control
measures of editorial boards,
inaccurate information may find its
way to publication. It is recommended
that whenever mistakes happen,
corrections should be made and media
should notify on corrections, as this
increases their credibility.

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5.2.Recommendations for the general public
• Considering that disinforming content
about Ukraine war on social media platforms
is high, it is recommended to limit the usage
and time spent on these platforms.
• Doubtful media, especially those that
have no address and no public editorial
boards are more prone to disseminate
disinforming content.
It is recommended to read/view/listen only
to those media that are considered credible.
• Before sharing content, develop a
critical judgment on that content, otherwise
you may be turning yourself into a
disseminator of disinformation, without
knowing.