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Towards a Business and Human Rights Binding Treaty: Opportunities and Challenges

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Abstract

Since the adoption of the so-called ‘Ecuador Resolution’ of 2014, negotiations have been ongoing at the UN Human Rights Council for a binding treaty on business and human rights. The process led to the adoption of the ‘Zero Draft’ in 2018, but was characterized since the beginning by the opposition of several key states, as well as by the wait-and-see approach of the EU. In 2021, the Third Revised Draft of the treaty was tabled, serving as the basis for negotiations at the 7th session of the ‘Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (OEIGWG). The current draft treaty builds on internationally recognised human rights to clarify the precise obligations of states in relation to the impacts of business activities, but its negotiation is still faced with political and conceptual hurdles. This chapter retraces the treaty’s main negotiation stages and examines the main elements of the Third Revised Draft of the treaty, highlighting the strengths and limitations of the text currently being negotiated.Keywordsbinding treatyEcuador ResolutionOpen-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rightsThird Revised DraftHuman Rights Councilframework convention

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