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БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
26
Образец цитирования:
Довгань ЕФ. Односторонние принудительные меры:
понятие и квалификация. Журнал Белорусского государ-
ственного университета. Международные отношения.
2021;2:26–48 (на англ.).
For citation:
Douhan AF. Unilateral coercive measures: notion and qua-
lication. Journal of the Belarusian State University. Interna-
tional Relations. 2021;2:26–48.
Автор:
Елена Федоровна Довгань – доктор юридических наук,
профессор; профессор кафедры международного част-
ного и европейского права факультета международных
отношений.
Author:
Alena F. Douhan, doctor of science (law), full professor;
professor at the department of international private law
and European law, faculty of international relations.
alena.f.douhan@gmail.com
Довгань Е. Ф. Односторонние принудитель-
ные меры: понятие и квалификация 26
Douhan A. F. Unilateral coercive measures:
notion and qualication 48
ÌÅÆÄÓÍÀÐÎÄÍÎÅ ÏÐÀÂÎ
INTERNATIONAL LAW
UDC 341.018
UNILATERAL COERCIVE MEASURES: NOTION AND QUALIFICATION
A. F. DOUHAN
a
aBelarusian State University, 4 Niezaležnasci Avenue, Minsk 220030, Belarus
The present article addresses the issue of terminology used to identify unilateral means of pressure: unilateral coercive
measures, sanctions, unilateral sanctions, bilateral sanctions, international sanctions, autonomous sanctions, sectoral or
territorial sanctions, etc. It assesses the legality of various forms of sanctions imposed by states and international organisa-
tions without or beyond the authorisation of the UNSecurity Council, inter alia, as concerns general international law, in-
ternational economic law, the law of international responsibility, human rights law and international humanitarian law. The
article also focuses on extraterritoriality and overcompliance as integral elements of the application of unilateral sanctions
and on characteristics of unilateral coercive measures and presents a denition of the latter.
Keywords: unilateral sanctions; unilateral coercive measures; secondary sanctions; sectoral sanctions; extraterritoriali-
ty; overcompliance.
ОДНОСТОРОННИЕ ПРИНУДИТЕЛЬНЫЕ МЕРЫ:
ПОНЯТИЕ И КВАЛИФИКАЦИЯ
Е. Ф. ДОВГАНЬ1)
1)Белорусский государственный университет, пр. Независимости, 4, 220030, г. Минск, Беларусь
Изучается проблема терминологии, используемой для обозначения односторонних мер давления (односторон-
ние принудительные меры, односторонние санкции, двусторонние санкции, международные санкции, автоном-
ные санкции, секторальные и территориальные санкции и др.). Дается оценка правомерности различных форм санк-
27
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
Международное право
International Law
ций, налагаемых государствами и международными организациями либо за пределами полномочий от Совета Безо-
пасности ООН, либо без них, в контексте общего международного права, международного экономического права,
права международной безопасности, права вобласти прав человека и международного гуманитарного права. Поми-
мо этого, автор статьи рассматривает проблему экстратерриториальности и чрезмерного исполнения как неотъем-
лемый элемент применения односторонних санкций, выявляет характеристики односторонних принудительных
мер иформулирует определение последнего понятия.
Ключевые слова: односторонние санкции; односторонние принудительные меры; вторичные санкции; секто-
ральные санкции; экстратерриториальность; чрезмерное применение.
1Нештаева Т. Н. Международно-правовые санкции специализированных учреждений ООН : автореф. дис. ... канд. юрид.
наук : 12.00.10. М. : Моск. гос. ун-т, 1985. 24 с.
2 EU sells medical goods via INSTEX [Electronic resource]. URL: https://financialtribune.com/articles/business-and-markets/
102669/eu-sells-medical-goods-via-instex (date of access: 17.08.2021).
3Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 6 Oct. 2010. A/HRC/
RES/15/24. Para 1–3 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 18 Apr.
2012. A/HRC/RES/19/32. Para 1–3 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council
on 8 Oct. 2013. A/HRC/RES/24/14. Para 1–3 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights
Council on 12 Oct. 2015. A/HRC/RES/30/2. Para 1, 2, 4 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the
Human Rights Council on 24 March 2017. A/HRC/RES/34/13 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by
the Human Rights Council on 6 Oct. 2020. A/HRC/RES/45/5. Preamble.
4Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the United Nations General Assembly on 18 Dec. 2014.
A/RES/69/180. Para 5, 6 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the United Nations General As -
sembly. A/RES/70/151. Para 5, 6 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the United Nations General
Assembly. A/RES/71/193. Para 5, 6.
5 Guidelines on the implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU common
foreign and security policy [Electronic resource]. URL: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5664-2018-INIT/en/
pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Adding to the evidence: the impact of sanctions and restrictive measures on humanitarian aid
[Electronic resource]. P. 6. URL: https://www.alnap.org/help-library/adding-to-the-evidence-the-impact-of-sanctions-and-restric
tive-measures-on-humanitarian (date of access: 17.08.2021).
The world is facing the expansion of the application
of new and different forms and types of unilateral sanc-
tions. The terminology used to identify unilateral means
of pressure has expanded correspondingly: unilateral
coercive measures, sanctions, unilateral sanctions, bi-
lateral sanctions, international sanctions, autonomous
sanctions, sectoral or territorial sanctions, etc. The un-
certainty and ambiguity in the terminology impede the
possibility to identify a legal framework and standards
applicable to every specic type of unilateral sanctions.
The existing academic works focus on the notion of
sanctions (G.Sparrow[1], T.N.Neshataeva1, R.Nep-
hew[2]), identify specic aspects of extraterritoriality
or overcompliance (T.Ruys[3]) or focus on the assess-
ment of specic cases only (G.Puma[4]) but do not pre-
sentanotion of unilateral coercive measures and do not
provide a comprehensive overview and assessment of
the notion, characteristics and legal status of unilateral
sanctions. As a result, the topic of the research is timely
and current today.
This article addresses the issue of the terminology
used to identify unilateral means of pressure. It pro-
vides an overview and assesses the legality of various
forms of sanctions imposed by states and international
organisations without or beyond the authorisation of
the UNSecurity Council, inter alia, as concerns general
international law, international economic law, the law
of international responsibility, human rights law and
international humanitarian law. The article also focuses
on extraterritoriality and overcompliance as integral
elements of the application of unilateral sanctions and
on characteristics of unilateral coercive measures and
presents a denition of the latter.
Notion and types of unilateral sanctions. The
world community is facing today the expansion of
the number, scope and grounds of unilateral sanctions
taken without or beyond the authorisation of the UNSe-
curity Council. The contemporary practice involves also
the issue of extraterritoriality of unilateral sanctions, the
application of secondary sanctions, the development of
national civil and criminal penalties for violations
of sanctions regimes, compliance and overcompliance
strategies, the application of countersanctions (e.g.Be-
larus, China, Russian Federation) and the development
of mechanisms to resist extraterritorial consequences of
sanctions (Russian Federation, European Union), inclu-
ding the drafting of relevant national legislation and the
establishment of e.g.the instrument in support of trade
exchanges (INSTEX)2. Various forms of unilateral sanc-
tions are imposed in pursuit of a common good, thereby
transforming exceptions in international relations into
the ordinary practice of many states. Due to the exis-
ting terminological discrepancies, the term “unilateral
sanctions” is used in the present article without any
prejudice as to the legality or illegality of such sanctions
and to refer to any means of pressure applied by states
or international organisations without or beyond the
authorisation of the UNSecurity Council.
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that due to
the absence of a universally recognised denition of
unilateral coercive measures and their illegal character,
announced in a number of resolutions of the Human
Rights Council3 and the UNGeneral Assembly4, states
prefer to present their unilateral activities as not consti-
tuting unilateral coercive measures and to use therefore
other terms, like “sanctions”, “restrictive measures”5,
28
Журнал Белорусского государственного университета. Международные отношения. 2021;2:26–48
Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations. 2021;2:26–48
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
“unilateral measures not in accordance with internatio-
nal law”6, “security measures”, “economic sanctions”7,
“economic, nancial, political restrictive measures”,
“special economic measures”, “enforcement measures”8,
“autono mous sanctions”
9
, “autonomous” nancial tar-
geted sanctions and “travel bans”10. Compliance com-
panies classify sanctions as unilateral, multilateral and
global
11
. One also speaks about international sanctions,
sectoral sanctions, targeted sanctions, countersanc-
tions, direct or indirect sanctions, primary or secondary
sanctions[4, p. 12], and intended or unintended sanc-
tions. Some other institutions refer to counter-terrorism
cases against their nationals as sanctions cases
12
. States
involved are also identied in various ways, including as
sanctioning or sanctioned, targeting or targeted, sender
or source states13.
It shall also be mentioned that there is even no clear
denition of the general notion of “sanctions” in inter-
national law today. In the international legal doctrine,
sanctions have been viewed as a power (possibility) to
ensure the law[1, p. 11–12], an analog of responsibi-
lity for internationally wrongful acts[5, p. 237–238],
punishment14[6, p. 49; 7, p. 135; 8, p. 19], a complex of
enforcement measures applied to a delinquent state
6Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 Dec. 2015.
A/RES/70/151. Para1; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the United Nations General Assembly on
22 Dec. 2016. A/RES/71/193. Para 2.
7Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries : resolution adopt.
by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 Feb. 1998. A/RES/52/181 ; The adverse consequences of economic sanctions: review
of further developments in fields with which the subcommission has been or may be concerned [Electronic resource]. URL: https://
www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/42501-the-adverse-consequences-of-economic-sanctions.html (date of access: 17.08.2021).
8О специальных экономических мерах и принудительных мерах : Федер. закон Рос. Федерации от 30 дек. 2006 г.
№ 281-ФЗ [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102111154 (дата
обращения: 17.08.2021).
9Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of amity, economic relations and consular relations (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United
States of America) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/175/175-20190823-WRI-01-00-EN.
pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
10Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions [Electronic
resource]. URL: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/HRC48-report.aspx (date of access: 17.08.2021).
11Piatetsky P., Vasilkoski J. When sanctions violate human rights [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GeoEcon-Sanctions-report-v4.pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
12Ibid.
13See: Report of the special rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human
rights of 26 July 2017. A/HRC/36/44 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/224/28/
pdf/G1722428.pdf?OpenElement (date of access: 18.08.2021).
14This approach is, however, disputed by the UNSecretary-General in the United Nations. See: Supplement to an agenda for
peace. Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. Para 66 [Elec-
tronic resource]. URL: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%
20S1995%201.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021). Although the punitive nature of sanctions has been rejected by most states. See:
United Nations Security Council report of 17 April 2000. S/PV.4128 [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_4128.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
15Ronzitti N. The report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change on the use of force and the reform of the
United Nations. Leiden, Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005. P. 11 ; Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, charac-
teristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
16Нештаева Т. Н. Международно-правовые санкции специализированных учреждений ООН : автореф. дис. ... канд. юрид.
наук : 12.00.10. М. : Моск. гос. ун-т, 1985. С. 17.
17Supplement to an agenda for peace. Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of
the United Nations. Supra note 22 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20S1995%201.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021). The same approach was taken by states that
participated in the discussion of the problem in the UNSecurity Council (UNSecurity Council report. S/PV.4128).
18The same approach is supported by G. I. Tunkin, N. A. Ushakov, P. Kuris and cited in the publication “The notion of sanctions
of international organisations” in the journal “Jurisprudence” (1984) by T. N. Neshataeva.
19Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries) // Yearbook of the Internatl. Law
Commis. 2001. Vol. II. Part 2. P. 128.
[9, p. 202; 10, p. 182; 11, p. 214–224; 12, p. 115], ame-
thod to make someone comply15[8, с. 19], negative
consequen ces of aviolation[2, p. 9, 12, 14; 14, p. 309],
measures to protect the international legal order16
[14, p. 13], mea sures not involving the use of armed
force to maintain or restore international peace and
security17, a means of implementation of international
responsibility18[6, p. 49, 51; 13, p. 306, 308], counter-
measures or retorsions[3], “equivalent to action taken
against a state by a group of states or mandated by an
international organisation”19, enforcement measures of
the UNSecurity Council acting under chapter VII of the
UNCharter or measures taken by international organi-
sations toward its member states under and in accor-
dance with their constituent documents[3]. R. Nephew
puts an emphasis on national legislation and identies
sanctions as a“constellation of laws, authorities, and
obligations laid out in a piece of legislation, government
decree, UNresolution, or similar document that restrict
or prohibit what is normally permissible conduct and
against which performance will be assessed and com-
pliance judged”[2, p. 8].
It is also notable that the grounds for and purposes
of sanctions have changed. According to the develo-
29
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
Международное право
International Law
pers of the Global sanctions data base, more than 40%
of sanctions are introduced today to pursue the en-
hancement of democracy, human rights protection and
other similar purposes[15, p. 60] rather than to address
threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression,
or in response to violations of erga omnes obligations
as viewed by the International Court of Justice in the
Barcelona traction case20[16, p. 126–127] as well as in
the General comment No. 31 of International сovenant
on civil and political rights of 199621 (ICCPR).
The EU, in particular, announces the possibility to ap-
ply restrictive measures as among the union’s tools to
promote its common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
objectives, including peace, democracy and the respect
for the rule of law, human rights and international law
22
,
and further advancing universal values for all
23
. The
same approach (to view sanctions as a tool to achieve
foreign policy goals) is taken by the United States
[17, p.463]. The UK Global human rights act aims “to
deter, and provide accountability for an activity which,
if carried out by or on behalf of a state within the terri-
tory of that state, would amount to a serious violation
by that state of an individual’s right to life, right not to
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, or right to be free from sla-
very, not to be held in servitude or required to perform
forced or compulsory labour, whether or not the acti-
vity is carried out by or on behalf of a state”24. The EU
20Barcelona traction, light and power company (Belgium v. Spain) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/cases,
ICJ,4040aec74.html (date of access: 03.01.2021).
21General comment No. 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the covenant of 26 May 2004.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/478b26ae2.html (date of access: 06.01.2021).
22Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
23Council approves conclusions on the EU action plan on human rights and democracy 2020–2024 [Electronic resource]. URL:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/19/council-approves-conclusions-on-the-eu-action-plan-on-
human-rights-and-democracy-2020-2024/ (date of access: 17.08.2021)
24The global human rights sanctions regulations 2020 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/680/
made (date of access: 17.08.2021).
25Council regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights vio-
lations and abuses [Electronic resource]. P.1–13. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2020:410I:
FULL&from=EN (date of access: 17.08.2021).
26Executive order 13405 of 16 June 2006 blocking property of certain persons undermining democratic processes or institu-
tions in Belarus [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2006-06-20/pdf/06-5592.pdf (date of access:
17.08.2021) ; Belarus sanctions regulations 75 FR 73958-10 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/
fr75_73958.pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021) ; New regulations to implement Executive order 75 FR 5502-10 [Electronic resource].
URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/fr75_5502.pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
27Executive order 13742 of 7 October 2016 “Termination of emergency with respect to the actions and policies of the govern-
ment of Burma” [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-10-12/pdf/2016-24847.pdf (date of ac-
cess: 18.08.2021).
28Executive order 13712 of 23 November 2015 blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Burundi
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/23/executive-order-blocking-proper
ty-certain-persons-contributing-situation (date of access: 18.08.2021).
29A rule by the Treasury department 79 FR 38248 of 7 Jule 2014 on Central African Republic sanctions [Electronic resource]. URL:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2014-07-07/pdf/2014-15763.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
30Executive order 13959 of 12 November 2020 addressing the threat from securities investments that finance communist
Chinese military companies [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-17/pdf/2020-25459.pdf
(date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Executive order 13974 of 13 January 2021 amending Executive order 13959 addressing the threat from
securities investments that finance communist Chinese military companies [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2021-01-19/pdf/2021-01228.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Council implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/478 of
22 March 2021 implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations
and abuses [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0478&from=EN
(date of access: 18.08.2021).
31Executive order 12854 of 4 July 1993 “Implementation of the Cuban democracy act” [Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.
treasury.gov/system/files/126/12854.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
adopted the Global human rights act to “address serious
human rights violations and abuses worldwide”25.
All the above clearly shows that the “behavioural
change paradigm” justifying the use of coercion for the
legitimate (proper) purpose or motive, being traditional
in the early legal doctrine[18, p. 366; 19, p. 3–7], has
changed a lot today. The academic approach identies
ve types of purposes for sanctions: compliance, sub-
version, deterrence, and international and domestic
symbolism; others differentiate between denial instru-
ments (to deny goods or benets to targets), symbolic
instruments, and punitive measures[2, p. 9; 20, p. 40] to
constrain, coerce, signal or stigmatise[20, p. 22]. Some
speak about the main purpose as “ensuring compliance
with the command”[21, p. 35] or changing a behaviour
of the target of sanctions by making the status quo too
uncomfortable by causing pain[2, p. 10–12].
Another characteristic of the last decade is the ex-
panding variability of forms of unilateral sanctions:
political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, trade, nan-
cial, cyber and many others. In particular, the United
States imposes sanctions on Belarus (economic and
targeted sanctions)
26
, Burma (economic sanctions)
27
,
Burundi (targeted sanctions, visa bans)28, Central Af-
rican Republic (economic, targeted sanctions)29, China
(economic and targeted sanctions, arms embargo)
30
,
Cuba (economic, trade, targeted sanctions, travel and
visa bans, state-sponsor of terrorism)31, North Korea
30
Журнал Белорусского государственного университета. Международные отношения. 2021;2:26–48
Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations. 2021;2:26–48
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
(nancial sanctions, general trade embargo)32, Congo
(targeted sanctions)33, Iran (economic, sectoral, targe-
ted sanctions)
34
, Iraq (nancial and targeted sanctions,
trade embargo)
35
, Lebanon (targeted sanctions, free-
zing assets)
36
, Libya (nancial, targeted sanctions)
37
,
Mali (targeted sanctions, freezing assets)38, Nicaragua
(targeted, nancial sanctions)39, Russian Federation (sec-
toral, targeted sanctions)
40
, Somalia (targeted, economic
sanctions)
41
, Sudan (economic, targeted sanctions)
42
,
South Sudan (targeted, economic sanctions)
43
, Syria
(targe ted, economic sanctions)
44
, Venezuela (economic,
trade, sectoral, targeted sanctions)
45
, Yemen (econo-
mic, targeted sanctions)
46
and Zimbabwe (targeted sanc-
tions)
47
. The UK imposes unilateral measures, sanctions
32Proclamation 8271 of 26 June 2008 on termination of the exercise of authorities under the trading with the Enemy act with
respect to North Korea [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-06-27/pdf/08-1398.pdf (date of
access: 18.08.2021).
33Executive order 13671 of 8 July 2014 taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to the conflict
in the Democratic Republic of Congo [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2014-07-10/pdf/2014-
16360.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
34Executive order 13949 of 21 September 2020 blocking property of certain persons with respect to the conventional arms activi-
ties of Iran [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-23/pdf/2020-21160.pdf (date of access:
18.08.2021).
35Executive order 13668 of 27 May 2014 ending immunities granted to the development fund for Iraq and certain other Iraqi
property and interests in property pursuant to Executive order 13303, as amended [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201400403/pdf/DCPD-201400403.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
36Executive order 13441 of 1 August 2007 blocking property of persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic
processes and institutions [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-08-03/pdf/07-3835.pdf (date
of access: 18.08.2021).
37Executive order 13726 of 19 April 2016 blocking property and suspending entry into the United States of persons contributing
to the situation in Libya [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-04-19/pdf/2017-07837.pdf (date
of access: 18.08.2021).
38Executive order 13882 of 26 July 2019 blocking property and suspending entry of certain persons contributing to the situa-
tion in Mali [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-07-30/pdf/2019-16383.pdf (date of access:
18.08.2021).
39Executive order 13851 of 27 November 2018 blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Nicaragua
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-11-29/pdf/2018-26156.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
40Executive order 14024 of 15 April 2021 blocking property with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the government
of the Russian Federation [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-04-19/pdf/2021-08098.pdf
(date of access: 18.08.2021).
41Executive order 13620 of 20 July 2012 taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to Somalia
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-07-24/pdf/2012-18237.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
42Executive order 13804 of 11 July 2017 allowing additional time for recognising positive actions by the government of Sudan and
amending Executive order 13671 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13804.pdf (date of access:
18.08.2021).
43Executive order 13664 of 3 April 2014 blocking property of certain persons with respect to South Sudan [Electronic resource].
URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2014-04-07/pdf/2014-07895.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
44Executive order 13608 of 1 May 2012 prohibiting certain transactions with and suspending entry into the United States of
foreign sanctions evaders with respect to Iran and Syria [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-
05-03/pdf/2012-10884.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
45Executive order 13884 of 5 August 2019 blocking property of the government of Venezuela [Electronic resource]. URL: https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-08-07/pdf/2019-17052.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Executive order 13857 of 25 January
2019 taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to Venezuela [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-30/pdf/2019-00615.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
46Executive order 13611 of 16 May 2012 blocking property of persons threatening the peace, security, or stability of Yemen
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2013-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2013-title3-vol1-eo13611.pdf
(date of access: 18.08.2021).
47Executive order 13469 of 25 July 2008 blocking property of additional persons undermining democratic processes or institutions
in Zimbabwe [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-07-29/pdf/08-1480.pdf (date of access:
18.08.2021).
48UK sanctions regimes. Information on UK sanctions regimes currently in force [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.gov.
uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-regimes-under-the-sanctions-act (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; UK sanctions. Information
on UK sanctions currently in place and how to apply for the appropriate licences [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.gov.uk/
guidance/uk-sanctions (date of access: 18.08.2021).
49
Sanctions [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/fr/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusam-
menarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos.html (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Sanctions
internationales et mesures de blocage unilatérales [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.finma.ch/fr/documentation/sanctions-inter
nationales-et-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme/sanctions-internationales-et-mesures-de-blocage-unilatérales/ (date of access: 18.08.2021).
or nancial sanctions against Afghanistan, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi,
Central African Republic, China and Hong Kong, North
Korea, Congo, Guinea, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Rus-
sian Federation, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria,
Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe48.
Switzerland applies targeted or smart sanctions,
economic measures, targeted nancial sanctions or
coercive measures to Belarus, Burundi, Central African
Republic, North Korea, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua,
Somalia, Soudan, Syria, South Sudan, Ukraine (Crimea),
Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe49.
31
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
Международное право
International Law
The European Union imposes restrictive measures,
sanctions, economic and nancial sanctions or sec-
toral sanctions against Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic,
China, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Moldova, Montenegro, Myanmar,
Nicaragua, North Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe as well as
within some horizontal regimes50.
Sanctioning documents also provide for secondary
sanctions towards third country nationals (North Korea,
Cuba, Venezuela, Iran and Syria), as well as civil and
criminal penalties to the nationals of sanctioning states
to prevent them from interactions with designated in-
dividuals and companies (Global human rights act
51
, US
sanctions against Belarus, Burundi, China, North Korea,
Cuba, Congo, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Russian Fede-
ration, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen
and Zimbabwe).
To be able to provide a legal qualication of unilate-
ral sanctions, the article further focuses on the specics
of sanctions’ main categories.
Economic, trade and sectoral sanctions. Econo
mic or trade sanctions have a long history[22, p. 12; 24,
p.1063]. In the 1990s they constituted the most frequent
instrument of the UNSecurity Council but today they
are mostly used unilaterally by states or regional organi-
sations in the international arena and take a variety of
forms. In particular, Cuba in its response to the ques-
tionnaire forwarded by the UNspecial rapporteur on
the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures
on the enjoyment of human rights (hereinafter– spe-
cial rapporteur) refers to “economic, commercial and
nancial blockades and embargoes; the interruption
of nancial ows and investment ows between the
country imposing the measure and the country to which
that measure applies; the use of nes to third parties
in order to discourage investment or trade with the
affected country; asset freeze; the creation of unila-
teral lists”52. Alluding to an observation by the Inter-
national Court of Justice as concerns the US sanctions
50European Union sanctions [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp/
423/european-union-sanctions_en (date of access: 18.08.2021).
51Council regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights vio-
lations and abuses. Preamble, art. 16 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A32020R1998 (date of access: 18.08.2021).
52Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
53Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of amity, economic relations and consular relations (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United
States of America). Para 80 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/175/175-20190823-WRI-01-
00-EN.pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
54Country visit of the special rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human
rights to Venezuela (1 to 12 February 2021) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/VisitVenezuela.
aspx (date of access: 18.08.2021).
55Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
56In the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom on appeal from the Court of Appeal (civil division) [Electronic resource]. URL:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1003665/20210818_Foreign_
Secretary_s_Case_18_June_2021.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
against Iran case, it is noted that “autonomous sanctions
(are) precisely to weaken the target state’s econo-
my”53[4, p. 12].
The freezing of assets of state and private banks is
being actively used to put pressure on states (Syria,
Venezuela, etc.) too, thereby preventing them from pro-
curing their citizens’ basic needs, including food and
medicines, despite COVID-19.
For example, the Bank of Englandrefused to unfreeze
any part of the 1 bln US dollars in gold held from the
Central Bank of Venezuela, to demonstrate non-recog-
nition of N.Maduro as president of the country[24], not
even, as reported by the United Nations Development
programme (UNDP), for procuring medicines, other hu-
manitarian goods and COVID-19 vaccines (including for
participation in the COVAX programme). At the initial
stage, the UK government referred to the private cha-
racter of the bank, thus rejecting any responsibility for
this action54 that could be qualied as an attempt of
sanctioning states and regional organisations to “shift
responsibility” from the legal point of view, whereas
it was correctly noted by professor J.Gordon that “the
sanctioner creates conditions that, in effect, force pri-
vate actors to sever their ties with the sanctioned entity;
then in the face of extensive economic disruption, the
sanctioner disclaims responsibility for these acts and
from their consequences”
55
. It is notable that the UK
courts changed their approach later. In particular, as
of August 2021 the UK Supreme Court considers the
case of access to the Central Bank of Venezuela gold as
a case between the “Guaido board” and “Maduro board”
of the Central Bank of Venezuela with the UK secreta-
ry of state for foreign, commonwealth and development
affairs as an intervener56.
It is believed here that this approach seeks to provide
the UK with the authority for jurisdiction in the case,
making the decision dependent on the recognition of
the government that contradicts customary standards
on the recognition of states and governments. It is gene-
rally recognised that non-recognition of a government
or of results of elections does not eliminate the perso-
nality of a state. States may decide to lower the level of
32
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БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
cooperation with a non-recognised government, how-
ever, any stronger measures are not welcomed as they
may constitute intervention into the domestic affairs of
states. Traditionally, the possibility of the effective go-
vernment, which controls the territory of a state, to rep-
resent a state is not disputed[25, p. 151; 26, p. 253–256].
Moreover, in accordance with customary norms on the
immunity of state property, assets of the central bank
and property used for public functions belong to the
state of Venezuela rather than to its government or any
individual (art.21(1c) of the United Nations Convention
on jurisdictional immunities of states and their property
of 2004 (not in force))57. Therefore, freezing assets of
the Central Bank of Venezuela in this specic case
on the ground of non-recognition of its government as
well as the adoption of relevant sanctions violates the
sovereign rights of the country and impedes its effective
government to exercise its duty to guarantee the needs
of the population.
It is also remarkable that the very notion of trade
sanctions has changed. It may include today restrictions
on trade with all sorts of goods, including software[27].
At the same time, some trade sanctions have become
transformed into so-called sectoral sanctions, which
apply non-selectively to individuals and organisations
acting in a particular sphere of the economy without
any identiable reason or violation from their side that
differs signicantly from those that have prompted
traditional targeted sanctions. In particular, the United
States applies non-selective sanctions in the nancial,
energy, defence, railway, metals and mining sectors
of the Russian Federation58[28] “to impose costs...
for its aggression in Ukraine”59. Sectoral sanctions are
also imposed by the United States in the gold60, oil
and nancial sectors of the Venezuelan economy, and
against the state-owned airline and TV industries
61
.
The same approach has been taken by the European
Union in relation to the Russian energy, defence, nan-
cial and dual-use goods sectors in general. Moreover,
the European Union has introduced an import ban on
57United Nations Convention on jurisdictional immunities of states and their property [Electronic resource]. URL: https://trea-
ties.un.org/doc/source/recenttexts/english_3_13.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
58 See: Executive order 13663 of 20 March 2014 establishing an emergency board to investigate disputes between the Long Island
rail road company and certain of its employees represented by certain labour organisations [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2015-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2015-title3-vol1-eo13663.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
59Russia fact sheet [Electronic resource]. URL: https://2017-2021.state.gov/russia-fact-sheet/index.html (date of access: 18.08.2021).
60 Executive order 13850 of 1 November 2018 blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Venezuela
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-11-02/pdf/2018-24254.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
61Venezuela sanctions regulations [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2015-title31-vol3/pdf/
CFR-2015-title31-vol3-part591.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
62EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine [Electronic resource]. URL: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/
sanctions/ukraine-crisis (date of access: 04.01.2021).
63Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU common foreign
and security policy. Para 13–24 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5664-2018-INIT/en/
pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
64Consolidated financial sanctions list [Electronic resource]. URL: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/fsd/fsf/public/files/
pdfFullSanctionsList/content?token=dG9rZW4tMjAxNw (date of access: 04.01.2021).
65Specially designated nationals and blocked persons list [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/
sdnlist.pdf (date of access: 04.01.2021).
66Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
goods from and a ban on tourism services in Crimea
and Sevastopol62.
A special form of sectoral sanctions can be seen in
closing the airspace for ights of air companies regis-
tered in a designated state (Qatar (2017–2020), Vene-
zuela, Belarus, etc.) and prohibiting their air companies
to enter the airspace of the same country, affecting,
therefore, the travel industry of the designated state.
Similar situations exist as concerns trade with Cuba,
Syria, Iran and Venezuela.
Financial sanctions include various impediments
to money transfers to and from sanctioned states. In
the existing nancial system, this type of sanctions
becomes extremely damaging due to the fact that the
majority of mechanisms enabling trade are either within
the United States or the European Union; this inclu-
des the possibility to cut off access to Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Telecommunications as part
of sanctions against Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation,
Belarus and China[29–31]. This jurisdiction provides
the United States in particular with the possibility to
control and block payments in US dollars via Visa, Mas-
terCard, American Express, Western Union and PayPal
[32,p.20]. A limited number of service providers as well
as the interdependence or dependence on a specic
nancial system, currency, etc., make both non-con-
trolling countries and end users vulnerable[33,p.451].
Economic sanctions also include measures aimed
not only against states but also those of a targeted cha-
racter – affecting the designated individuals or compa-
nies63. At the same time, the use of targeted sanctions
is expanding (in particular, the EU’s nancial sanctions
include several thousand individuals and companies64,
and far more are listed by the United States
65
). Imposing
additional sanctions may theoretically be rather tar-
geted but, as has been repeatedly reported, it worsens
a country’s risk prole in the nancial sphere; in the
situation of Nicaragua, in particular, it resulted in
the withdrawals and stopping operations of a number
of US banks and their correspondent banks66.
33
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
Международное право
International Law
It shall be taken into account that art.24, 25 and
chapter VII of the UNCharter provide for unique po-
wers of the UNSecurity Council to impose enforcement
measures for the maintenance of international peace
and security. It is also generally agreed that interna-
tional organisations are entitled to impose sanctions
on their member states under and in accordance with
their constituent documents[3] as long as they comply
with peremptory norms of international law.
It is maintained here that the majority of the above-
mentioned unilateral sanctions taken by states or re-
gional organisations without or beyond the authori-
sation of the UNSecurity Council have no grounds in
international law. Naturally, not every unfriendly act or
means of pressure by a state is illegal. Customary inter-
national law provides for the possibility of “unfriendly
acts”, which is not inconsistent with any international
obligation of the state engaging in it (retorsion)67, and
for proportionate countermeasures in response to the
violation of international obligations, as long as they
abide by the limitations set out in the Draft articles on
responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts
(DARS)68[21,p.38]. International law also recognises
the possibility to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction
as concerns international crimes.
Customary international law provides for the pos-
sibility of “unfriendly acts” which can be qualied as
retorsions depending on the scope of legal obligations of
specic states[3] and can in certain situations include
“acts of retorsion... the prohibition of or limitations
upon normal diplomatic relations or other contacts,
embargoes of various kinds or withdrawal of voluntary
aid programmes” if these acts are compatible with legal
67Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries) // Yearbook of the Internatl. Law
Commis. 2001. Vol II. Part 2. P. 128.
68Official records of the General Assembly. Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 and corrigendum (A/56/10 and Corr.1).
Chap.IV [Electronic resource]. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/665/27/PDF/N0166527.pdf?OpenEle
ment (date of access: 17.08.2021) ; Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of uni-
lateral sanctions...
69Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries) // Yearbook of the Internatl. Law
Commis. 2001. Vol II. Part 2. P. 128. See: Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of
unilateral sanctions...
70Extraterritorial sanctions on trade and investments and European responses [Electronic resource]. P. 55–60. URL: https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653618/EXPO_STU(2020)653618_EN.pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
71Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures (sanctions). Para 1, 4 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://data.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10198-2004-REV-1/en/pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Guidelines on the implementation and eva-
luation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU common foreign and security policy Supra note 10, para9–11
[Electro nic resource]. URL: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf ; Council decision (CFSP)
2020/1999 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses [Electronic re-
source]. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D1999&from=EN (date of access: 18.08.2021).
72Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Art. 275 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN (date of access: 18.08.2021).
73Guidelines on the implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU common
foreign and security policy. Supra note 10, para 6 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
74Ibid. Para 25–27, 68–69.
75Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries) // Yearbook of the Internatl. Law
Commis. 2001. Vol II. Part 2 ; Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral
sanctions...
76Art. 48 (1b) of Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries).
77Ibid. Art. 40.
obligations of sanctioning states”
69
. It is maintained
here that assessing their legality shall concern all in-
ternational obligations that are in force between states:
multilateral, bilateral and unilateral, including treaties
on amity, navigation, commerce, investment70, human
rights and fundamental freedoms71, including the pos-
sibility of appeal72, regular review73 and humanitarian
exceptions74.
In accordance with DARS, countermeasures can only
be taken by the directly affected states in response to
violations of international obligations in order to restore
fullment of that obligation; they shall be temporary
and proportionate to the violation, and shall not vio-
late human rights, peremptory norms of international
law, or humanitarian law75. Naturally, countermeasures
can also be taken by states other than directly affected
states in response to the violation of erga omnes obli-
gations like aggression, genocide, apartheid or a mass
gross violation of fundamental human rights shocking
the conscience of mankind. Countermeasures can thus
help to restore violated international obligations but in
a legal way and without a negative humanitarian effect.
As a result, DARS provides for the possibility of
non-directly injured states to invoke responsibility only
if “the obligation breached is owed to the international
community as a whole”76, i.e., in response to the “se-
rious breach by a state of an obligation arising under
a peremptory norm of general international law” if it
“involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsi-
ble state to full the obligation”77 with the purpose to
cease the internationally wrongful act and to guarantee
its non-repetition[16, p. 126–127]. The International
Court of Justice concluded in a number of cases that such
34
Журнал Белорусского государственного университета. Международные отношения. 2021;2:26–48
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БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
violations can include acts of aggression, genocide,
apartheid, impediments to the right to self-determina-
tion, slavery, slave trade, racial discrimination, torture,
and serious violations of international humanitarian
law of a“systematic, gross or egregious nature”78. Tra-
ditionally, these situations are qualied by the UNSe-
curity Council as constituting a threat to, or breach of,
international peace and security.
Even in the case of a breach of erga omnes obliga-
tions, countermeasures shall generally be restricted to
addressing the “non-performance for the time being of
international obligations of the state taking the mea-
sures towards the responsible state” 79[34, S. 65], pro-
portionate with the injury suffered80, with due account
for the requirements of humanity and the rules of good
faith81, and implemented in accordance with the rules
of art. 52 of DARS82 and art. 54 of the Draft articles on
the responsibility of international organisations83.
The proportionality of countermeasures appears to
be another actively discussed element in the politi-
cal and academic discourse. In particular, references
to proportionality to the objective or motive rather
than to the injury suffered, cited by some politicians84,
have no grounds in international law. As reafrmed by
the International Court of Justice in numerous cases,
disproportionate countermeasures are prohibited by
international law85.
It is maintained here with regret that the interpre-
tation of legal provisions is often rather malicious. In
particular, due to the extreme sensitivity of economic
relations, there is an extensive practice of interpretating
“security clauses” of art. XXI(b)(iii) of General agree-
ment on tariffs and trade (GATT) as a justication for
applying economic sanctions, which provides states with
the possibility to take “any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security in-
78Barcelona traction, light and power company (Belgium v. Spain). Supra note 34, para 33 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://
www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4040aec74.html (date of access: 03.01.2021) ; Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia).
Para29. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,40239bff4.html(date of access: 06.01.2021) ; Draft articles
on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries) // Yearbook of the Internatl. Law Commis. 2001.
Vol II. Part 2. P. 1–113, 127.
79Art. 49 of Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries). Even so, B. Geyrhalter,
e.g., claims it is possible that economic sanctions may be applied to states responsible for mass violations of fundamental human
rights.
80Art. 51 of Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries).
81See: The Naulilaa case (Portugal v. Germany) [Electronic resource]. P. 1026. URL: https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1371-
1386.pdf (date of access: 06.01.2021) ; Commentaries to art. 50, para 6 of Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally
wrongful acts (with commentaries).
82Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries) // Yearbook of the Internatl. Law
Commis. 2001. Vol II. Part 2. P. 94–95, 135.
83Draft articles on responsibility of international organisations // Yearbook of the Internatl. Law Commis. 2001. Vol II. Part 2.
84Position of Germany (Arria formula meeting) [Electronic resource]. URL: http://webtv.un.org/live/watch/part-12-virtual-
arria-meeting-on-“end-unilateral-coercive-measures-now”/6212373519001/?term= (date of access: 18.08.2021).
85Portuguese colonies case (Naulilaa incident) // Reports of Internatl. Arbitral Awards. 1933. Vol. III. P. 1371–1386 ; para 83 of
Ir service agreement ; para 85, 87 of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project ; Case relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the Internatio nal
Commission of the River Oder [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/permanent-court-of-internatio nal-
justice/serie_A/A_23/74_Commission_internationale_de_l_Oder_Arret.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Extraterritorial sanctions on
trade and investments and European responses. Supra note 99 [Electronic resource]. P. 55. URL: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653618/EXPO_STU(2020)653618_EN.pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
86General agreement on tariffs and trade. Art. XXI [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXI (date of access: 18.08.2021).
87Art. 50 (1) of Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries).
terests, when taken in the time of war or their emergency
in international relations”86. It is also notable that the
rst attempts to refer to security exemption measures
were made by the League of Arab States as regards the
boycott towards Israel[35].
Security exemption clauses are applied in practice
“to use economic measures for political means in a way
which would be considered illegal under the regular
regime of GATT”[36, p. 560] in the absence of consent
about the notion and scope of “essential security in-
terests”. The practice of consultations and the dispute
settlement body as well as GATT preparatory materials
interpret security clauses including “other emergencies
in international relations” narrowly as an emergency
being close to a state of war including the use of mi-
litary force[36, p. 588–590]. Some respondent states
(Belarus, Cuba) maintain that any trade restrictions,
including on security grounds, can only be taken in full
compliance with GATT regulations and other interna-
tional agreements.
Another criteria which shall be taken into account
while deciding on the legality of unilateral activity is
a prohibition to violate either peremptory norms of
international law or obligations to protect fundamental
human rights and those prohibiting reprisals towards any
individual
87
. Therefore, the observance of human rights
obligations, as well as assessments of the humanitarian
impact, are vital in the course of any unilateral activity.
The humanitarian impact of sanctions started to
be assessed already in early 2000s as regards compre-
hensive and economic sanctions of the UNSecurity
Council. In particular, the report by 13 humanitarian
non-governmental organisations on the effects of the
UNSecurity Council sanctions against Iraq under Reso-
lution 687(1991) of 3 April 1991, prepared for the Global
policy forum in 2002, noted chronic child malnutrition,
35
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Международное право
International Law
poor food basket composition, increased child mortality,
economic crisis, the destruction of electricity supplies
and medical care, and many other factors88. UNorgans,
reaching the same conclusions, also reported on the
low efcacy and high negative humanitarian impact of
sanctions89[37].
Academic works of that period also referred to the
enormous potential destructiveness of economic sanc-
tions[38, p. 89, 94; 39], being a “deadly remedy” demon-
strating a “comfortable astigmatism”[38, p. 89], and
cited their enormous humanitarian effects in South
Rhodesia, Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia and Haiti, affecting
economic rights and the rights to health, water, educa-
tion and life, and the prohibition of physical and moral
suffering because of economic collapse, malnutrition,
epidemics, absence of food, medicine, vaccines, medi-
cal equipment, operations without anesthesia, suicides
and forced migration, with a special impact on chil-
dren, mothers, migrants, economic refugees and the
poor[38, p. 100, 103–104, 110–111, 114–116, 120–121;
39, p.207–210].
It is notable that the UNSecretary-General admitted
already in 2000 that “the existence of a sanctions re-
gime almost inevitably transforms an entire society for
the worse”90 with a high potential for corruption91 and
reportedly prevents governments from exercising the
responsibility to protect. As a result, targeted or smart
sanctions imposed by the UNSecurity Council have been
intended to minimise the negative humanitarian effects
of sanctions against states92. The Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, in General comment
No. 8, referred to the negative impact of sanctions on
economic, social and cultural rights already in 199793.
Unfortunately, unlike sanctions of the UNSecurity
Council, the expanding practice of unilateral sanctions
88Iraq sanctions: humanitarian implications and options for the future [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.globalpolicy.org/
component/content/article/170-sanctions/41947-iraq-sanctions.html (date of access: 18.08.2021).
89UNsanctions: humanitarian aspects and emerging challenges: chairperson’s report [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.
hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_report_final.19.1.15.pdf (date of access: 04.01.2021).
90Secretary-General, in address to International Rescue Committee, reflects on humanitarian impact of economic sanctions
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20001115.sgsm7625.doc.html (date of access: 04.01.2021).
91Ibid.
92Ibid.
93General Comment No. 8: the relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights.
Para 10–14 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079e0.html (date of access: 06.01.2021).
94See: UNexpert issues sanctions guidance amid COVID-19 aid concerns [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26589&LangID=E (date of access: 18.08.2021).
95Reports submitted to the Human Rights Council on human rights and unilateral coercive measures [Electronic resource]. URL:
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/Reports.aspx (date of access: 18.08.2021).
96IAPD report [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/Reports.aspx (date of access: 18.08.2021).
97Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 6 Oct. 2010. A/HRC/
RES/15/24 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 18 April 2012. A/
HRC/RES/19/32. Preamble, para 12 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council
on 8 Oct. 2013. A/HRC/RES/24/14. Para 1–3 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights
Council on 12 Oct. 2015. A/HRC/RES/30/2. Preamble, para 4, 5 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by
the Human Rights Council on 24 March 2017. A/HRC/RES/34/13. Preamble, para 12 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures:
resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 6 Oct. 2020. A/HRC/RES/45/5. Preamble.
98Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 6 Oct. 2010. A/HRC/
RES/15/24. Para 8 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 18 April
2012. A/HRC/RES/19/32. Para 11 ; Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council
on 24 March 2017. A/HRC/RES/34/13. Preamble, para 11.
99Human rights and unilateral coercive measures : resolution adopt. by the Human Rights Council on 24 March 2017. A/HRC/
RES/34/13. Para 4.
does not provide any mechanisms for humanitarian
assessment, and mechanisms of humanitarian exemp-
tions and redress are generally insufcient, complicated,
confusing, lengthy, costly and ineffective94. Thematic
and country visit reports of the special rapporteur illus-
trate the devastating humanitarian impact of unilateral
sanctions
95
, which are sometimes called a peaceful tool
that substitutes for military action and wars96.
Consequently, numerous UNHuman Rights Council
resolutions refer to the negative impact of unilateral
coercive measures (UCMs) on fundamental human rights
including the rights to life, health and medical care,
an adequate standard of living, food, education, work,
housing and development, with a special impact on
women, children, the poorest, adolescents, the elderly,
persons with disabilities and other persons in vulnerable
situations
97
. These resolutions afrm that people should
not be deprived of their means of subsistence, and that
the extraterritorial application of laws is inadmissible
98
.
I would also like to recall the special danger of so-
called maximum pressure campaigns when imposing
sanctions, in particular on Cuba or Venezuela. Relevant
resolutions of UNorgans condemn the use of UCMs
“as tools of political or economic pressure against any
country<...>, with a view to preventing these countries
from exercising their right to decide, of their own free
will, their own political, economic and social systems”99.
It is also remarkable that the listing of state-owned or
state-controlled enterprises resulting in the applica-
tion of sectoral sanctions is based on the unjustied
re cognition of state property, which as mentioned above
enjoys immunity under international law, as personal
property of the head of the state.
As a result, contemporary unilateral economic, trade
and nancial sanctions do not t the criteria applied
36
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to countermeasures to exclude their wrongfulness in
accordance with the law of international responsibility.
The announced purpose of the “maximum pressure”
campaigns of the US administration aimed at chan-
ging the governments of Venezuela, Cuba, Syria or other
states violates the principle of sovereign equality
of states and constitutes an undue intervention in their
domestic affairs; for Venezuela, it also affects its re-
gional relations100.
Cyber sanctions. The development of cyber tech-
nologies has impacted the development of unilateral
sanctions regimes considerably. In particular, malicious
cyber activity is referred to as a ground for implementing
unilateral sanctions
101
[40]. It is believed here, however,
that while states are obliged to take measures to sup-
press cyber crimes against the state, its nationals and
legal entities, such measures shall remain within the
recognised international intercourse: joining treaties,
developing legislation, starting criminal investigations
and prosecutions, and judicial cooperation102, which
unfortunately does not often take place.
In particular, blocking online commerce has become
a frequent means of implementing unilateral economic
and nancial sanctions. It usually results in prolonging
the time necessary to complete transactions, increasing
bank costs and entrepreneurial risks, shutting down
investments and making it impossible to buy or order
even essential goods103.
Besides limiting trade in software, some sanctions
refer to software traditionally used for regular admini-
stration, public and private purposes, in particular for
100The United States imposes maximum pressure on former maduro regime [Electronic resource]. URL: https://ve.usembassy.
gov/the-united-states-imposes-maximum-pressure-on-former-maduro-regime/ (date of access: 18.08.2021).
101Executive order 13694 of 1 April 2015 blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enab-
led activities [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-04-02/pdf/2015-07788.pdf (date of access:
18.08.2021) ; Council regulation (EU) 2019/796 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the
union or its member states regime [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
32019R0796&from=GA (date of access: 18.08.2021).
102Countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/docu-
ments/d/3/23078.pdf (date of access: 04.01.2021) ; Regional workshop on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes
for judges, prosecutors and investigators from South Eastern Europe [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/docu-
ments/7/e/299091.pdf (date of access: 04.01.2021).
103Negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.
undocs.org/en/A/75/209 (date of access: 18.08.2021). See: Joint communiqué on UCMs and their impacts [Electronic resource]. URL:
https://viennaun.mfa.ir/en/newsview/619102/Joint-Communiqu%C3%A9-on-UCMs-and-their-Impacts (date of access: 18.08.2021).
104Executive order 13685 of 19 December 2014 blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with
respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine [Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ukraine_eo4.pdf
(date of access: 18.08.2021) ; General license No. 9. Para (d) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/
ukraine_gl_9.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
105Zoom terms of service [Electronic resource]. URL: https://Zoom.us/terms (date of access: 18.08.2021).
106Bloqueo de EE.UU. impide a Cuba participar en foro multilateral; Capturados en Venezuela 57 mercenarios; Protestas por
racismo en EE. UU.; Bolsonaro bloquea fondos para lucha contra la COVID-19 [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.granma.cu/
hilo-directo/2020-06-05/hilo-05-06-2020-00-06-14 (date of access: 18.08.2021).
107Responses and comments from the Islamic Republic of Iran [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/UCM/submissions/states/Iran.docx (date of access: 04.01.2021).
108Ibid.
109Submission by the Coalition of Sudanese Doctors Abroad for SR UCM-Study on the impact of unilateral sanctions on human
rights during the state of emergency in the context of COVID-19 pandemic [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/Docu
ments/Issues/UCM/submissions/privates/SudaneseDoctorsAbroad.docx (date of access: 04.01.2021).
110Note 100/20 of the Permanent mission of Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations office and other organisations in Geneva
of 15 June 2020.
111On humanitarian impact during the pandemic see: Douhan A. Negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoy-
ment of human rights in the coronavirus disease pandemic [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.undocs.org/en/A/75/209 (date
of access: 04.01.2021).
commercial Internet services or connectivity
104
and even
for non-commercial activity. In particular, the terms of
service for Zoom as of 20 August 2020 precluded use
of the platform by those living in Cuba, the North Ko-
rea, Iran, Syria and Crimea, or through legislation of
the United States
105
, even for contacts and coordina-
tion among doctors to exchange their experiences on
symptoms, diagnostics and means of treatment. Con-
sequently, it was impossible to use Zoom for all states
for ofcial communication within the UNsystem, as
initially planned. Cuba could not participate in a sum-
mit meeting on Zoom of leaders of the Organisation of
African, Caribbean and Pacic States on 3 June 2020
to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic106. Iranian citizens
cannot access information on COVID-19 and its symp-
toms, even from the Iranian government, due to Google’s
censoring of AC19, an Iran-developed app
107
, and Iranian
doctors cannot access a medical database (PubMed)
after its server was transferred to Google108. Citizens of
Iran, Sudan and Venezuela cannot use online platforms
for educational purposes, potentially affecting school
enrolment and the dropout rate109.
Venezuela is reported to be unable to conclude agree-
ments on the rent of a satellite, which resulted in shrin-
king Internet coverage, preventing the exercise of human
rights on the Internet, including access to educational
and medical platforms, access to information and free-
dom of expression. Syria appeared to have been unable
to buy software for CT scanners and ventilators pro-
duced only by US companies
110
for ghting COVID-19
111
.
All of these facts illustrate examples of limitations im-
37
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International Law
posed with the use of cyber means, affecting a broad
scope of human rights including the rights to access
information, to access the Internet, to freedom of ex-
pression, to health and in some cases even the right to
life with discrimination taken on the ground of natio-
nality of residence.
It shall also be taken into account that there are some
other international law aspects affected by sanctions in
the digital age. One can name the expanding practice
of blocking social media accounts to comply with sanc-
tions, as is done in particular by US-registered compa-
nies as part of the Magnitsky sanctions regime[41; 42].
Some authors even speak about cyber censorship taking
place overall to prevent the distribution of information
which may be considered harmful to the government
for one or another purpose[32, p. 19].
It is also believed here that online announcements
of listings of individuals and companies or proclaiming
them as suspected terrorists or criminals, as it is done
e.g.through the web page and Twitter of the US Rewards
for justice programme
112
, increase reputational risks,
affecting inter alia the right to reputation. Such activity
may endanger inter alia the lives of such individuals
and impede their enjoyment of labour rights, and con-
tradicts provisions of General comment No. 16, which
refers to the obligations of states not to infringe the
honour and reputation of individuals and to provide
adequate legislation to guarantee their protection
113
, as
well as of General comment No. 32, elaborating on the
presumption of innocence and requesting governments
to not make public statements afrming the guilt of
the accused114.
Targeted sanctions. Targeted sanctions can be qua-
lied today as an integral feature of the contemporary
system of unilateral sanctions. They started to be ap-
112See: Mandates of the special rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human
rights; and the Working group on Arbitrary detention [Electronic resource]. URL: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/
DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26324 (date of access: 18.08.2021).
113CCPR General comment No. 16: article 17 (right to privacy). The right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence,
and protection of honour and reputation [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html (date of ac-
cess: 06.01.2021).
114General comment No. 32: article 14. Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to fair trial. Para 30 [Electronic resource].
URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/478b2b2f2.html (date of access: 06.01.2021).
115See: EU sanctions map [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main (date of access: 18.08.2021).
116EU restrictive measures.
117Mandates of the special rapрorteur on the negative impact of unilateral соеrcive measures on the enjoyment of human rights;
the special rapporteur on the right to food; the special rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health; and the independent еxpert on human rights and international solidarity report [Electronic
resource]. URL: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25785 (date of access:
18.08.2021).
118Preliminary ndings, Venezuela country visit report [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/
VisitVenezuela.aspx (date of access: 18.08.2021).
119Executive order 13928 of 11 June 2020 blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13928.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Joint communication
from special procedures. AL USA 15/2020 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoad-
PublicCommunicationFile?gId=25379 (date of access: 04.01.2021) ; Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a press availability with secre-
tary of defense Mark Esper, attorney general William Barr, and national security advisor Robert O’Brien [Electronic resource]. URL:
www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-with-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-attorney-general-
william-barr-and-national-security-advisor-robert-obrien/ (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; ASP president O-Gon Kwon rejects mea-
sures taken against ICC [Electronic resource]. URL: www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1527 (date of access: 18.08.2021) ;
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00828.
PDF (date of access: 18.08.2021).
plied to individuals and companies in order to minimise
the negative humanitarian impact of comprehensive or
economic sanctions. International law does not regulate
this type of sanction specically. They traditionally in-
clude travel and visa bans, freezing assets, prohibition to
satisfy claims related to the introduction of sanctions;
prohibition of export of and assistance in setting up
hardware and software; prohibition to buy hardware;
limitations on dual-use goods and equipment; and re-
strictions on the purchase of goods originating from
aparticular state (including petroleum products, textiles
or cultural property)115.
It shall be noted that grounds for the listing of indi-
viduals and companies have also expanded considerably.
Such listings occur either to implement resolutions of
the UNSecurity Council acting under chapter VII
of the UNCharter, often when going beyond the autho-
risation of the Council; or autonomously to maintain
international peace and security; to suppress interna-
tional, transnational or national crimes; to promote and
protect human rights, democracy, the rule of law
and good governance
116
; or to protect national security
or other interests, often via the announcement of astate
of emergency
117
. Another tendency demonstrates the
expanding policy of designating individuals ex ofcio
often without accusing them of committing any
wrongful act with reference to the non-recognition of
ago vernment or results of elections (Venezuela
118
, jud-
ges of the International Criminal Court (ICC))119.
It is believed here that the application of targeted
sanctions to individuals and companies raises serious
concerns about their legality as well as the validity
of grounds for their introduction. From the point of
international law, targeted sanctions, as well as any
other sanctions in the absence of UNSecurity Council
38
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authori sation, can only be applied if they do not breach
any international obligation of states, including – espe-
cially as they are directed against specic indivi duals–
obligations in the sphere of human rights, or if their
wrongfulness is excluded in accordance with interna-
tional law in the course of countermeasures.
Targeting states usually acknowledge the need to
adopt and implement sanctions in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
obligations under the UNCharter, human rights and
fundamental freedoms120, to provide the possibility of
appeal
121
, regular review
122
, and to develop mechanisms
for humanitarian exceptions123; these unfortunately
often do not happen in reality.
Academic works and humanitarian actors assert, in
particular, that targeted sanctions do affect a number
of human rights. In particular, bans on admission vio-
late the right to freedom of movement,124 the rights to
privacy and family life, the right to life[43, p. 184–185]
and the right to work when one’s work involves cross-
ing borders125. Financial sanctions are viewed as viola-
ting the rights to privacy, family life, health and pro-
perty126, an arms embargo affects property rights [44,
p.185–186], sanctions against journalists concerning
anything they write or say violate the rights to hold
opinions and freedom of expression. Targeted sanctions
in general violate the rights to a fair trial, effective re-
medy, protection by law, procedural guarantees127, and
to be informed promptly on the nature and cause of
the accusation, to defend oneself and to protection
of reputation[44,p.186]. References to the adminis-
120Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures (sanctions). Para 1, 4 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://data.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10198-2004-REV-1/en/pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Guidelines on the implementation and evalu-
ation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU common foreign and security policy. Supra note 10, para 9–11
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/251268/files/A_RES_52_181-EN.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021);
Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations
and abuses [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020D1999&from=EN
(date of access: 18.08.2021).
121Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Supra note 101, art. 275 // Official Journ. of the
Europ. Union. 2012. P. 47–390.
122Guidelines on the implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU common
fo reign and security policy. Supra note 10, para 6 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/42501-the-
adverse-consequences-of-economic-sanctions.html (date of access: 18.08.2021).
123Ibid. Para 25–27, 68, 69.
124It is believed here that provisions of art. 13 of ICCPR (“An alien lawfully in the territory of a state party to the present Covenant
may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling rea-
sons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by,
and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent
authority”) may analogously be applied.
125Mandate of the special rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/SRCoerciveMeasures.aspx (date of access: 18.08.2021).
126See: Scheinin M. Report of the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism. Para 38–41 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/593068/files/A_HRC_4_26-
EN.pdf (date of access: 04.01.2021).
127Obligation to observe these rights is stressed in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe documents, e.g., para 5.1.
128Art. 43–59 of Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (with commentaries) ; The protection
of human rights and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of states [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.idi-iil.
org/app/uploads/2017/06/1989_comp_03_en.pdf (date of access: 04.01.2021). See: [34, S. 66].
129Executive order 13928 of 11 June 2020 blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13928.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; USA removes sanc-
tions on ICC officials [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20210629/usa-removes-sanctions-icc-of-
ficials (date of access: 18.08.2021).
130Joint communication from special procedures. AL USA 15/2020 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/
TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25379 (date of access: 04.01.2021).
trative character of sanctions regimes are not properly
grounded as in the majority of cases sanctions are im-
posed “for ...[something]”, clearly demonstrating apuni-
tive purpose and turning it into punishment[14, p. 905;
45, p. 798]. This violates the presumption of innocence
as well as other procedural guarantees.
Contemporary practice of targeted sanctions ignores
the fact that targeted sanctions listing individuals and
companies generally cannot be justied as countermea-
sures, which, in accordance with art. 49(1) of DARS,
may only be applied against individuals immediately
responsible for the policy or activity of a state in breach
of an international obligation, in order to change that
policy or activity128 when all other requirements of
countermeasures are observed. Countermeasures are
thus not applicable to other categories of persons or
entities. Moreover, the listing of state ofcials exofcio
contradicts the prohibition on punishment for the acti-
vity that does not constitute a criminal offence prevents
the ofcials from the possibility to represent the interests
of states in international courts and other international
institutions, and undermines the principle of sovereign
equality of states.
The US sanctions against judges and ofcials of the
International Criminal Court on the ground of Exe-
cutive order 13928 of 11 June 2020129 doubly affected
procedural rights. Besides general concerns about ap-
plying targeted sanctions to judges and court ofcials,
these sanctions constituted a clear violation of their
privileges and immunities granted to guarantee their ro-
le in international adjudication
130
. Moreover, it under-
39
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International Law
mined the ICC’s efforts to investigate, prosecute and
sanction international crimes and thwarted victims’
access to justice.
Some other concerns arise about sanctions imposed
on individuals and companies for alleged involvement
in committing international crimes. In accordance with
international law, such cases could be brought to In-
ternational Criminal Court or started domestically on
the basis of universal jurisdiction[46, S. 114–123]. The
use of a judicial mechanism guarantees that those who
commit international crimes do not enjoy impunity, but
at the same time it provides due process guarantees as
well as prevents any violation of human rights. Unfortu-
nately, states prefer to impose sanctions today instead
of starting criminal cases in international or national
courts as it is easier, faster and the standards of proof
are nearly non-existent. As a result, if international
crimes really take place, their perpetrators do not face
any criminal charge; however, a huge group of people
suffer from economic and travel limitations and are
publicly announced to be international criminals with-
out any court verdict, in violation of the presumption
of innocence and with very limited possibility to access
court institutions.
A larger group of individuals and companies are di-
rectly designated for alleged wrongful activity which
cannot be qualied as an international crime, and there-
fore no grounds for the exercise of universal jurisdiction
exists. This clearly demonstrates attempts to expand na-
tional or regional jurisdiction beyond national borders.
At the same time, practice demonstrates no attempt to
start criminal processes, even when grounds for national
jurisdiction exist.
Moreover, unilateral targeted sanctions are imposed
today by the executive bodies of the United States and
the European Union in the absence of court hearings
131Executive order 13894 of 14 October 2019 blocking property and suspending entry of certain persons contributing to the
situa tion in Syria [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-17/pdf/2019-22849.pdf (date of ac-
cess: 18.08.2021) ; International emergency economic powers act [Electronic resource]. URL: https://home.treasury.gov/system/
files/126/ieepa.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
132International covenant on civil and political rights. Art. 15(1) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/en/profes
sionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx (date of access: 18.08.2021).
133Ibid. Supra note 175, art. 14 (2–7).
134Ibid. Art. 15(1).
135General comment No. 29: article 4: derogations during a state of emergency. Para 16 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.
refworld.org/docid/453883fd1f.html (date of access: 06.01.2021).
136 Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
137Principles of international law recognised in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the tribunal Prin-
ciple V [Electronic resource]. URL: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_1_1950.pdf (date of access:
18.08.2021) ; Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (Fourth Geneva convention). Art. 72, 73,
46(4) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf (date
of access: 18.08.2021) ; Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (Third Geneva convention). Art.105–108,
129(4) [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Protocol additional
to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (ProtocolI).
Art. 75 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html (date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Protocol additional
to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Pro-
tocolII). Art. 76 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html (date of access: 18.08.2021).
138Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (Fourth Geneva convention). Supra note 181.
Art. 147 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf
(date of access: 18.08.2021) ; Art. 85(4е) of the Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I). Supra note 181 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.refworld.
org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html (date of access: 18.08.2021).
or due process guarantees. US declarations of national
emergencies131 cannot be used as an excuse as they do
not conform to art.4 of the ICCPR, which allows a party
to derogate on the basis of declaring a public emer-
gency only if there is a threat to the life of the nation
(temporary character; prohibition of derogations from
non-derogable human rights, such as the right to life,
freedom from torture, punishment for offenses that are
not crimes at the moment of their commission, and the
right to recognition of personality132).
Some authors (T. Ruys) raise additional concerns
that long-term asset freezing, without due process, can
be qualied as an expropriation or conscation[3], not
providing, as does a criminal process, the possibility to
apply to the court for a release of asserted property and
compensation of losses in a reasonable time. Therefore,
targeted individuals appear to be in a worse situation
in comparison to those facing criminal charges at the
national level.
It shall also be taken into account that the right of
individuals to judicial protection of their rights is gua-
ranteed both in international practice and legal doctrine.
All procedural guarantees – in particular the right to
due process
133
and the right not to be held guilty for
any offense that was not an offense at the moment of
its commission
134
are considered inalienable by human
rights institutions
135
, legal scholars
136
[47, p. 305] and in-
ternational treaties
137
. Violating these rights is qualied
even in time of war as a serious breach of international
humanitarian law
138
. Unfortunately, existing interna-
tional mechanisms do not provide for the possibility
to guarantee corresponding rights for those targeted
by unilateral sanctions. Art. 275 of the Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union, authorising the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to review the legality of
decisions involving restrictive measures against natural
40
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or legal persons
139
, guarantees only limited access to
justice rather than a fair trial mechanism. No possibi-
lity for due process or judicial review is provided by US
legislation.
Secondary sanctions, extraterritoriality and over-
compliance. It shall also be noted that the effects of
economic, nancial, sectoral and targeted sanctions are
exacerbated by the application of criminal prosecution
and civil tort liability towards third-country nationals
in foreign countries who are accused of sanctions vio-
lations via the introduction of so-called long arm juris-
diction, simultaneously with freezing assets and travel
bans[14, p. 21–22], and by the introduction of civil and
criminal penalties for the sanctioning country’s own
nationals for circumvention of sanctions regimes. The
above tendency is supplemented by the expansion of so-
called secondary sanctions used in the implementation
of various sanctions regimes against states, sectors of
the economy, and individuals to “put pressure on third
parties to stop their activities with the sanctioned coun-
try by threatening to cut off the third party’s access to
the sanctioning country”140.
Academic assessments of the abovementioned mea-
sures vary a lot. Secondary sanctions are traditionally
viewed as measures taken extraterritorially to third
states, third-state nationals or entities for their trade,
cooperation or association with those affected by pri-
mary sanctions, or those helping to circumvent the
effects of primary sanctions
141
[48, p. 4, 7–8]. The US
doctrine refers to secondary sanctions as “retaliatory”
sanctions that “do not impose monetary penalties, but
rather seek to cut off foreign parties from access to the
US nancial and commercial markets if these entities
conduct business in a manner considered detrimental
to US foreign policy”[23, p. 1055, 1112–1113]. Ano-
ther approach in secondary sanctions includes civil and
criminal penalties imposed by countries against their
own nationals. In particular, any transactions, including
online transactions made by United States persons or
involving the United States relating to the property
or interests in property of sanctioned individuals are
prohibited unless authorised or exempted142.
139Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union // Official Journ. of the Europ. Union. 2012.
P. 47–390.
140Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions... ; Council
Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abu-
ses. Art. 10, 11, 15 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020R1998 (date
of access: 19.08.2021).
141Ibid.
142 Cyber-related sanctions programme [Electronic resource]. URL: www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Doc-
uments/cyber.pdf (date of access: 19.08.2021).
143Council regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights viola-
tions and abuses [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020R1998 (date of
access: 19.08.2021).
144Mandates of the special rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights;
and the the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and funfamental freedoms while countering terro-
rism [Electronic resource]. URL: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25985
(date of access: 19.08.2021).
145Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
In particular, appendix A to part 501 of the Eco-
nomic sanctions enforcement guidelines of the Uni-
ted States provides for civil monetary penalties of up
to 289.239USdollars or criminal penalties of up to
1000000USdollars, imprisonment for up to 20years or
both upon conviction. A similar approach may be found
in a number of other US documents regarding Iraq, the
Russian Federarion, Lebanon, Somalia and many others.
Art.15 of the EU Global human rights regulation impo-
ses over the EU member states the obligation to provide
for civil or military penalties for those who may circum-
vent the application of sanctions143.
A few examples of secondary sanctions clearly
demonstrate their “fear” effect. A number of enter-
prises, entities, individuals and ships involved in the
delivery of essential goods cargoes have been subject
to these sanctions. In particular, around 35 Venezue
-
lan vessels have been reportedly listed for delivering
oil to Cuba[49,p. 27]. Five Iranian captains bringing
cargoes of gasoline from Iran to Venezuela have been
listed and announced as international terrorists144. At
the national level, the US Treasury department’s ofce
of foreign assets control (OFAC) has imposed harsh pe-
nalties on banks, shipping companies, tech companies
and others. In the case of BNP Paribas in 2014, the US
penalties totalled some 9blnUS dollars, and included
a partial suspension of access to the US Federal reserve
system[50]. Exclusion from the US nancial system is
viewed as the “death penalty” for Western banks en-
gaged in facilitating US dollar transactions, pretending
to establish jurisdiction on the basis of US dollars being
used in the payments145. As a result, Iran was not to be
able to use foreign currency for humanitarian imports
such as grains and medicine, including insulin for the
survival and well-being of millions of diabetics [51],
as well as other sorts of medicine, medical equipment
and spare parts.
It is maintained here that states are not entitled to
extend their jurisdiction beyond the national borders
or develop punitive civil and criminal jurisdiction to
prevent any transactions with sanctioned individuals,
states or companies, as this activity constitutes an abuse
41
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
Международное право
International Law
of rights and establishes the atmosphere of “fear” of
secondary sanctions and civil and criminal penalties,
especially as the legality of primary sanctions is often
questioned.
Extraterritoriality used to be a recognised charac
-
teristic of economic and other types of sanctions since
late 1980s. Some criticism of the extraterritorial appli-
cation of unilateral measures has been expressed by
the UNalready in 1948 towards the Arab League, which
sought to implement a secondary boycott of Israel and
conditioned trade with third-state companies on their
rejection to do any business with Israel[3]. Since 1996,
starting with the Helms-Burton act, the United States
actively prevents foreign partners from accessing US
markets when they are doing business with governments
and companies subject to primary sanctions
146
. The Cae-
sar act can be cited as a clear example of extraterritorial
application, threatening to sanction third countries,
companies, or individuals dealing with the government
of Syria, its Central bank or listed persons, preventing
inter alia reconstruction projects in the country already
severely affected by military conict147.
The expansion of jurisdiction on the ground of pay-
ment in US dollars has been repeatedly cited for Chi-
na as regards Huawei’s economic and trade exchanges
with Iran148; for Venezuela as for the reported threats
to private business and third-country donors, partners
and humanitarian organisations
149
or designation of
owners of ships, vessels and captains delivering oil and
gasoline cargos to and from Venezuela; for humanita-
rian non-government organisations (NGOs) as for the
designation of banks and prevention of payments in
146Helms-Burton act, Iran and Lybia sanctions acts, etc.
147Mandates of the special rapрorteur on the negative impact of unilateral соеrcive measures on the enjoyment of human rights;
the special rapporteur on the right to food; the special rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health; and the independent еxpert on human rights and international solidarity report [Electronic
resource]. URL: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25785 (date of access:
18.08.2021).
148Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
149Preliminary findings of the visit to the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela by the special rapporteur on the negative impact of
unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26747&LangID=E (date of access: 18.08.2021).
150Virtual arria meeting, end unilateral coercive measures now [Electronic resource]. URL: http://webtv.un.org/live/watch/part-12-
virtual-arria-meeting-on-%E2%80%9Cend-unilateral-coercive-measures-now%E2%80%9D/6212373519001/?term= (date of access:
18.08.2021) ; Call for submissions: UCM-Study on impact of unilateral sanctions on human rights during the state of emergency
amid COVID-19 pandemic [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/call-covid.aspx (date of access:
27.01.2021).
151Call for submissions: UCM-Study on impact of unilateral sanctions on human rights during the state of emergency amid
COVID-19 pandemic... ; Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral
sanctions...
152Ibid.
153Key action 7 of communication: the European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience
[Electronic resource]. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/policy/210119-economic-financial-system-communication_en.pdf
(date of access: 27.01.2021).
154Extraterritorial sanctions on trade and investments and European responses [Electronic resource]. P. 51. URL: https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653618/EXPO_STU(2020)653618_EN.pdf (date of access: 17.08.2021).
155Ibid. Supra note 206, p. 52–54.
156Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
157Ibid.
US dollars that makes impossible nancial transfers to
(from) states targeted by sanctions
150
and many others.
General consent about the illegality of applying ex-
traterritorial sanctions exists today both in the legal
doctrine151 and political discourse of the directly tar-
geted states (Iran, Belarus, Gayana152, China, etc.) and
countries which traditionally are viewed as imposing
sanctions153. In particular, the European Union reports
that it has been affected among others by extraterri-
torial measures applied by the United States against
Cuba, Russian Federation and Iran while building Nord
Stream 2. It refers to the incompatibility of extraterri-
torial sanctions with international law as affecting the
sovereignty of the EU member states154[52].
It has been generally agreed that any measures can
only be taken by states with sufcient jurisdictional
ties. The following jurisdictional grounds have been
identied in particular in the EU parliament study: when
conduct produces substantial effects within the territory
of the legislating state; when a state needs to legislate
to remedy harm done to its nationals abroad; to protect
the security of the state against conduct by foreigners
or non-residents; and on the basis of universal juris-
diction to remedy international crimes155. Therefore,
the EU member states and their partners emphasise
that their sanctions are non-extraterritorial and are to
be applied within their respected jurisdictions only156.
The EU insists that its sanctions are not extraterritorial
and believes that extraterritoriality is against interna-
tional law157.
Extraterritorial application is reported to result
in overcompliance and to affect all foreign partners, in
42
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trade, health, education, culture etc.158[49, p. 19–20].
They also result in the expansion of direct and indirect
targets of sanctions, including specially designated indi-
viduals and companies, populations in whole or in part,
refugees, counter-partners of designated individuals
and companies, nationals of sanctioning states, third
country nationals, humanitarian organisations and their
constituent parts, and employees and beneciaries in
third countries159.
The same approach is taken in relevant resolutions
of the UNHuman Rights Council and the General As-
sembly as an exacerbating characteristic, “creating ob-
stacles to trade relations among states, thus impeding
the full realisation of the rights set forth in the Universal
declara tion of human rights and other international
human rights instruments, in particular the right of
individuals and peoples to development”, with member
states being called upon “to take effective administrati-
ve or legislative measures, as appropriate, to counteract
the extraterritorial application or effects of unilateral
coercive measures”160.
This has resulted in the development of blocking
documents by states to protect their economic interests
as well as interests of their companies, including the EU
regulation 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the
extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by
a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting
therefrom
161
; the Federal law of the Russian Federation
of 30 December 2006 No. 281-ФЗ “On special economic
measures and enforcement measures”; and Venezuela’s
anti-blockade constitutional law.
The application of primary sanctions and secondary
extraterritorial sanctions and the introduction of civil
and criminal penalties in national legislation to natio-
nals and residents of sanctioning states for violations
of sanctions regimes results in growing overcompliance
with sanctions, the effect of which can hardly be over-
come even after the adoption of anti-sanctions laws. The
use of the above means results in the development of
158Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions... ; Call for sub-
missions: UCM-Study on impact of unilateral sanctions on human rights during the state of emergency amid COVID-19 pandemic...
159Douhan A. COVID-19 pandemic: humanitarian concerns and negative impact of unilateral sanctions and their exemptions,
COVID-19 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/UCM/UCMCOVID19GuidanceNote.docx (date of
access: 27.01.2021).
160Resolution 34/13 of the Human Rights Council of 24 March 2017 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/086/62/PDF/G1708662.pdf?OpenElement (date of access: 10.09.2021).
161Council regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of
legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (as for 07.08.2018) [Electronic resource].
URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996R2271&from=EN (date of access: 19.08.2021).
162Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
163Commission guidance note on the provision of humanitarian aid to fight the COVID-19 pandemic in certain environments
subject to EU restrictive measures [Electronic resource]. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/
banking_and_finance/documents/201116-humanitarian-aid-guidance-note_en.pdf (date of access: 18.08.2021).
164Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions... ; Дело
№А40-171207/17-111-1562 от 17января 2018г. [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://sudact.ru/arbitral/doc/bTjH2q2wmrNV/
(дата обращения: 18.08.2021).
165See: Detrimental impacts: how counter-terror measures impedes humanitarian action [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.
interaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Detrimental-Impacts-CT-Measures-Humanitarian-Action-InterAction-April-2021.pdf
(date of access: 19.08.2021).
a culture of fear despite the reported attempts of some
sanctioning states to avoid it162. The EU Guidance note
on the provision of humanitarian aid can serve as a good
example in this regard from the point of the special rap-
porteur. It expressly prohibits EU member state actors
to comply with certain US sanctions163[53,p.8]; how-
ever, in reality, the majority of them will prefer to take
de-risking or a zero-risk approach. Russian legislation
also follows a zero-compliance approach, prohibiting
Russian nationals and entities to comply with foreign
sanctions164, and private businesses are reported to
be extremely concerned about the possibility of new
sanctions.
As noted above, the nancial sector (banks) are the
rst to be affected (ned) for violating US unilateral
sanctions[54, p. 81], especially taking into account that
the banking system is entirely inter-related and the
majority of banks in most countries have correspon-
ding banks in the countries which impose one or more
type of sanctions. Therefore, these banks prefer either
to refrain from any bank transfers or consider it a long
cumbersome process. It has been reported, for example,
concerning bank transfers to severely targeted socie-
ties like Syria or Venezuela, that the duration of bank
transfers has moved from 2 days to up to 45–60 days,
while the costs for bank transfers have increased from
0.25–0.5% up to 5–10% for one bank transfer.
Due to enormous nes and the possibility of criminal
prosecution, bank de-risking policies result in freezing
funds and impeding transactions of any partners that
may relate to a specic individual, company or state,
including private business, hospitals[55, p. 101–103],
scholars, nationals or targeted countries, humanitarian
organisations or donors of humanitarian aid165.
Humanitarian organisations, in particular, report
about the complexity and inconsistency of humanitari-
an exemptions policies, such that even when humanita-
rian licenses can be received by NGOs from the authori-
ties of one EU member state, there are high chances that
43
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International Law
they won’t be accepted by banks of another one[56];
while delivery companies166[57] and trade partners167
will prefer not to risk facing civil liability or criminal
charges even when shipments involve medicine, medical
equipment, food, components or raw materials neces-
sary for vaccine production[49, p. 20], especially when
it comes to shipments to Venezuela, Syria, Cuba, Iran
[53, p. 6–7, 11–13; 58, p. 15; 59]. Some NGOs report
that they lose 1/10 of the aid money they try to use for
humanitarian activity within the banking sector only
because of the rising costs of bank transfers or rejections
to make transfers by banks. Furthermore, signicant
de-risking by banks is increasingly driving humanitarian
actors to work through informal payment channels or
to use cash. This not only creates security risks for the
humanitarian actors, it also makes the money harder
to trace and increases the risk of extortion and misuse
or diversion of funds to nance terrorism, undermining
one of the central aims of sanctions measures[60,p.3].
Private businesses resident in targeted countries,
which usually do not fall under primary sanctions them-
selves, face similar problems. They face the unwilling-
ness of producers and trade partners to cooperate with
them directly because they are from targeted societies.
As a result, they have to act via several agents, inclu-
ding several delivery or transportation companies, and
they have to nd ways to do several bank transfers via
several banks, and as a result, they say that that is very
lengthy, costly, and results in prices that are two, three
or four times higher from the point of view of the end
consumer168.
Qualication of unilateral coercive measures.
The illegal nature of unilateral coercive measures has
been repeatedly afrmed in numerous resolutions of the
Human Rights Council (para 1–3 of Resolution 15/24;
para 1–3 of Resolution 19/32; para 1–3 of Resolution
24/14; para 1–3 of Resolution 27/21; para 1–2, 4, 34/13
of Resolution 30/2) and the General Assembly (para 5,
6 of Resolution 69/180; para 5–6 of Resolution 70/151,
para5–6 of Resolution 71/193). The Security Council and
the General Assembly have referred to the negative im-
pact of UCM on human rights, the right to development,
solidarity and cooperation, and have also afrmed that
people should not be deprived of their own means of
subsistence, especially as concerns food and medicine,
and that the extraterritorial application of laws affec-
ting international humanitarian and human rights is
inadmissible. It shall be concluded thus that unilateral
measures, which violate international obligations of
states and therefore cannot be qualied as retorsion,
166See: US must lift its Cuba embargo to save lives amid COVID-19 crisis, say UNexperts [Electronic resource]. URL: www.ohchr.
org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25848&LangID=E (date of access: 19.08.2021).
167Call for submissions: UCM-Study on impact of unilateral sanctions on human rights during the state of emergency amid
COVID-19 pandemic... ; Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanc-
tions...
168See: Report of the special rapporteur Alena Douhan on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoy-
ment of human rights [Electronic resource] . URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/195/98/pdf/N2119598.
pdf?OpenElement (date of access: 18.08.2021).
169Call for submissions: UCM-Study on the notion, characteristics, legal status and targets of unilateral sanctions...
countermeasures or implementation of resolutions of
the UNSecurity Council constitute unilateral coercive
measures.
In accordance with the UNHuman Rights Council
resolutions, unilateral coercive measures are viewed as
“any type of measures including but not limited to eco-
nomic or political measures, to coerce another state in
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise
of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages
of any kind” (preamble of Resolution 34/13). The special
rapporteur, however, notes the absence of generally
agreed consent on the elements of UCMs.
Denitions proposed by states, NGOs and academic
institutions vary and identify the following elements of
UCMs: activity or threat to use the activity; of a single
state or group of states or international organisation
(excluding the UN); adopted by major states; without
authorisation of the UNSecurity Council; aimed at
changing the target’s (individual, legal entity, state,
group of states, international organisation) beha-
viour, promoting the regime or governmental struc-
ture change; with the aim of preventing threats to
international peace and security, or punishing certain
governments for human rights violations they have
committed and trying to minimise them or alleged
pursuit of common goods; by exerting pressure or co-
ercion on targets (economic, political, nancial, legal
measures) or freezing assets of central banks, targeted
measures against people with political importance;
while using their nancial, trade, technological and
other advantages; in satisfaction of their own interests;
without respecting the right to self-determination of
that country, while limiting its economic capacity and
violating the human rights of its inhabitants; in vio-
lation of its international obligations towards other
states or international organisations; falling outside
the realm of permissible “unfriendly” acts under cus-
tomary international law and countermeasures as part
of state responsibility; interfere in their internal and
external affairs, and infringe upon their inalienable
rights of choosing and developing political, economic
and cultural systems out of their own will; it violates the
principles of sovereign equality and non-interference
in internal affairs; violating principles of internatio-
nal law; to obtain subordination in the exercise of its
sovereign rights169.
Due to the recent expansion of the application of
unilateral sanctions, growing extraterritoriality and
overcompliance, it can be concluded that the majority
of unilateral sanctions adopted without or beyond the
44
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authorisation of the UNSecurity Council do not corre-
spond to the criteria of retortions or countermeasures,
and can therefore be qualied as unilateral coercive
measures.
The latter thus are any type of measure or activity ap-
plied by states, groups of states or regional organisations
without or beyond the authorisation of the UNSecurity
Council, not in conformity with international obliga-
tions of the sanctioning actor or the illegality of which
is not excluded on the ground of the law of international
responsibility, regardless of the announced purpose
or objective, including but not limited to economic,
nancial, political or any other sort of state-oriented
or targeted measures applied to other states, indivi-
duals, companies or other non-governmental entities,
to change their policy or behaviour, to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights, se-
cure advantages of any kind, to signal, coerce or punish.
Conclusion
This detailed analysis of the types and legality of
unilateral sanctions applied without or beyond the
authorisation of the UNSecurity Council brings me to
the following conclusions.
The types, means, grounds, purposes, and targets of
unilateral sanctions have expanded so much that they
are often viewed as a traditional means of international
intercourse aimed to protect “common goods”, inclu-
ding international peace and security, national secu-
rity, promotion of democracy or protection of human
rights, and as a softer and publicly acceptable alterna-
tive to the use of force[38; 63, p. 36] in the absence of
authorisation of the UNSecurity Council. Contempo-
rary developments are characterised by complicated
and confusing legislation, insufcient transparency, the
expansion of secondary sanctions, extraterritoriality,
and overcompliance.
Any unilateral measures can only be taken by states
or regional organisations in compliance with inter-
national legal standards: with authorisation of the
UNSecurity Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter in response to a breach of peace, a threat to
peace or an act of aggression; if they do not violate
any international treaty or customary norm in force
between corresponding states or if their wrongfulness
is excluded in accordance with international law in the
course of countermeasures, in full compliance with
the rules of law of international responsibility.
Economic sanctions encompass an extremely broad
scope of unilateral measures, such as freezing assets of
central banks or government-owned companies, intro-
ducing trade or economic embargoes, impeding bank
transfers, and freezing bank accounts and transactions
of private individuals and companies.
The goals of any measures taken by states and regio-
nal organisations without authorisation of the UNSecu-
rity Council must be legal and legitimate, but this fact is
without any prejudice to the legality of the measures ta-
ken. Any unilateral measure must be taken in conformi ty
with the principles of international law, including the
prohibition of the use of force, non-intervention in
the domestic affairs of states, non-discri mination, sove-
reign equality, promotion and protection of human rights
as well as other relevant treaty law and customary norms
of international law. Any references to “common goods”
purposes, states of emergency and “security clauses” can
only be used in strict conformity with international law
with the narrowest interpretation of the terms used.
The legality of unilateral measures shall be assessed
within various aspects of international law: the law of
international security, international criminal law, in-
ternational humanitarian law, international trade law,
international human rights law, and the law of interna-
tional responsibility. Spheres of international law that
are more specic, such as international maritime law
and international air law, shall also be considered when
they are relevant. Any action that states take must be
in conformity with the 1969 Vienna convention on the
law of treaties.
Countermeasures are to be considered as an impor-
tant mechanism to guarantee international responsibi-
lity. All countermeasures must comply with interna-
tional law with due account to proportionality (to the
breaches of international law by a delinquent state),
necessity (no other means are available), goal (to restore
the observance of international law), and limitations
(prohibition to violate peremptory norms of interna-
tional law, including the obligation to refrain from the
threat or use of force, obligations for the protection of
fundamental human rights and obligations of a huma-
nitarian character, prohibiting reprisals).
The application of unilateral sanctions ex ofcio and
freezing assets on the ground of non-recognition of
election results do not correspond to customary rules
of international law on the recognition of governments
and judicial immunities of states and their property,
affecting thus the whole populations of targeted coun-
tries. Targeted unilateral sanctions shall not be used as
a supplement to already existing mechanisms, including
criminal jurisdiction in the absence of grounds of ju-
risdiction, a much lower (nearly-non-existent) burden
of proof, and the unavailability of fair trial, procedural,
and access to justice guarantees.
Secondary sanctions include today measures im-
posed on third states and third-country nationals and
entities for the violation of primary sanctions or cir-
cumvention of sanctions regimes. States are not free to
adopt civil and criminal penalties for its nationals and
resident companies for implementation of unilateral
sanctions. The extraterritorial application of primary
45
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
Международное право
International Law
and secondary sanctions and the implementation of civil
and criminal penalties are illegal under international
law. These measures result in growing overcompliance
with sanctions regimes, exacerbating drastically nega-
tive humanitarian effect of unilateral sanctions.
As a result, a majority of unilateral sanctions adopted
without or beyond the authorisation of the UNSecurity
Council today have no grounds in international law as
they do not correspond to the criteria of retortions or
countermeasures, and shall be qualied thus as unila-
teral coercive measures.
Unilateral coercive measures are any type of mea-
sures or activity applied by states, groups of states or
regional organisations without or beyond the autho-
risation of the UNSecurity Council, not in conformity
with international obligations of the sanctioning actor
or the illegality of which is not excluded on the ground
of the law of international responsibility, regardless of
the announced purpose or objective including but not
limited to economic, nancial, political or any other
sort of state-oriented or targeted measures applied to
other states, individuals, companies or other non-go-
vernmental entities, to change their policy or behaviour,
to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of
its sovereign rights, secure advantages of any kind, to
signal, coerce or punish.
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gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-mid-year-sanctions-and-export-controls-update.pdf.
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Available from: https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2014/07/new-sanctions-targeting-russian-nancial-and-energy-sectors/.
46
Журнал Белорусского государственного университета. Международные отношения. 2021;2:26–48
Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations. 2021;2:26–48
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
29. O’Toole B. Don’t believe the SWIFT China sanctions hype [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dont-believe-the-swift-china-sanctions-hype/.
30. SWIFT says it “has no authority” to unplug Russia or Israel [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://
www.pymnts.com/in-depth/2014/swift-says-it-has-no-authority-to-unplug-russia-or-israel/.
31. Economist: disconnecting from SWIFT will be a bomb for the regime [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from:
https://charter97.org/en/news/2020/11/25/401835/.
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33. Gotlieb AE. Extraterritoriality: a Canadian perspective. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business. 1983;5(3):
449–461.
34. Geyrhalter B. Friedenssicherung durch Regionalorganisationen ohne Beschluß des Sicherheitsrates. Cologne: LIT; 2001.
239 S.
35. Malkawi BH. Collective sanctions through the lenses of international economics law: the case of the League of Arab
States trade boycott of Israel [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:cu9D2kXfbDMJ:https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/UCM/ReportHRC48/Academia/submission-
malkawi-bashar-h.doc+&cd=1&hl=ru&ct=clnk&gl=by.
36. Hahn MJ. Vital interests and the law of GATT: an analysis of GATT’s security exception [Internet; cited 2021
August18]. Available from: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1653&context=mjil.
37. Bruderlein C. Coping with the humanitarian impact of sanctions: an OCHA perspective [Internet; cited 2021 Janu-
ary 4]. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/les/resources/677CE646930621C7C1256C22002C7B7F-OC
HA_dec1998.pdf.
38. Reisman WM, Stevick DL. The applicability of international law standards to United Nations economic sanctions pro-
grammes. European Journal of International Law. 1998;9(1):86–141.
39. Petrescu IM. The humanitarian impact of economic sanctions. Europolity – Continuity and Change in European Gover
nance. New Series. 2016;10(2):205–246.
40. Romano SM. Guerra psicológica recargada: cibersanciones, Venezuela y geopolítica. Revista Internacional de Pensa
miento Politico. 2017;12:105–124.
41. O’Sullivan D, Moshtaghian A. Instagram says it’s removing posts supporting Soleimani to comply with US sanctions
[Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/10/tech/instagram-iran-soleimani-posts/
index.html.
42. Tickle J. Chechen leader Kadyrov banned from Instagram again, loses account with 1.4 million followers [Internet;
cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://www.rt.com/russia/488533-kadyrov-banned-instagram-again/.
43. Cameron I. Protecting legal rights: on the (in)security of targeted sanctions. In: Wallensteen P, Staibano C, editors.
International sanctions: between words and wars in the global system. London: Frank Cass; 2005. p. 181–206.
44. Bianchi A. Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s anti-terrorism measures. European Journal of In-
ternational Law. 2006;17(5):881–919.
45. van den Herik L. The Security Council’s targeted sanctions regimes: in need of better protection of the individual.
Leiden Journal of International Law. 2007;20(4):797–807.
46. Arnold R. Human rights in times of terrorism. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht.
2006;66:297–321.
47. Dandurand Y. Handbook on criminal justice and responses to terrorism, criminal justice. New York: United Nations; 2009.
136 p.
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amazonaws.com/lac.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/le_attachments/bp-cuba-blockade-women-250521-en.pdf.
49. BNP Paribas to pay $9bn to settle sanctions violations [Internet; cited 2021 August 19]. Available from: https://www.
bbc.com/news/business-28099694.
50. Faghihi R. Millions of Iranians at risk as US sanctions choke insulin supplies [Internet; cited 2021 January 27]. Avail-
able from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-insulin-medicine-us-sanctions-millions-risk.
51. Stoll T, Blockmans S, Hagemejer J, Hartwell CA, Gött H, Karunska K, Maurer A. Extraterritorial sanctions on trade and
investments and European responses policy department for external relations [Internet; cited 2021 January 4]. Available
from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_STU(2020)653618.
52. Mallard G, Sabet F, Sun J. The humanitarian gap in the global sanctions regime. Global Governance: a Review of Multi-
lateralism and International Organisations. 2020;6(1):121–153.
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com/opinions/2020/5/12/sanctions-in-the-era-of-pandemic.
56. MilánY. R.La historia no contada de cómo un avión con suministros médicos desde China no ha podido entrar a Cuba
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47
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
Международное право
International Law
Библиографические ссылки
1. Sparrow G. Sanctions. London: Knightly Vernon; 1972. 58 p.
2. Nephew R. The art of sanctions. A view from the eld. New York: Columbia University Press; 2018. 216 p.
3. Ruys T. Sanctions, retorsions and countermeasures: concepts and international legal framework. In: Herrik L, editor.
Research handbook on UN sanctions and international law. Cheltentam: Edward Elgar Publishing; 2017. p. 19–51.
4. Puma G. The principle of non-intervention in the face of the Venezuelan crisis. Questions of International Law.
2021;79:5–26.
5. Ковалев AА, Черниченко СВ, редакторы. Международное право. Москва: Проспект; 2008. 824 с.
6. Abass A. Regional organisations and the development of collective security. London: Hart Publishing; 2004. 272 p.
7. Thakur R. The United Nations, peace and security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2016. 428 p.
8. Nincic M, Wallensteen P, editors. Dilemmas of economic coercion: sanctions in world politics. New York: Praeger Pub-
lishers; 1983. 250 p.
9. Игнатенко ГВ, Тиунов ОИ, редакторы. Международное право. Москва: Норма; 2013. 752 с.
10. Каламкарян РА, Мигачев ЮИ. Международное право. Москва: Эксмо; 2004. 688 с.
11. Шибаева EA. Международные организации в системе международно-правового регулирования международ-
ных отношений. Советский ежегодник международного права. 1980;21:214–224.
12. Grünfeld F. The effectiveness of United Nations economic sanctions. In: van Genugten WJM, de Groot GA, editors.
United Nations sanctions: effectiveness and effects, especially in the eld of human rights. A multidisciplinary approach. Antwer-
pen: Intersentia; 1999. p. 113–134.
13. Лукашук ИИ. Право международной ответственности. Москва: Волтерс Клувер; 2004. 404 c.
14. Barnhizer D, editor. Effective strategies for protecting human rights: economic sanctions, use of national courts, and inter-
national fora and coercive power. New York: Routledge; 2001. 294 p.
15. Felbermayr G, Kirilakha A, Syropoulos C, Yalcin E, Yotov VY. The global sanctions data base [Internet; cited 2021 Ja-
nuary 3]. Available from: https://drive.google.com/le/d/11djwEIr96SFt6YpMzo9gaB6ZJrOer8AX/view.
16. Simma B. Does the UN Charter provide an adequate legal basis for individual or collective responses to violations of
obligations erga omnes? In: Delbruck J, editor. The future of international law enforcement: new scenarios – new law? Berlin:
Duncker and Humblot; 1993. p. 126–127.
17. Nyun TM. Feeling good or doing good: inefcacy of the US unilateral sanctions against the military government of
Burma/Myanmar. Washington University Global Studies Law Review. 2008;7(3):455–518.
18. Lillich RB. Economic coercion and the international legal order. International Affairs. 1975;51:358–372.
19. Bowett DB. Reprisals involving recourse to armed force. American Journal of International Law. 1972;66:3–7.
20. Giumelli F. The purposes of targeted sanctions. In: Biersteker TJ, Eckert SE, Tourino M, editors. Targeted sanctions: the
impacts and effectiveness of United Nations action. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2016. p. 38–59.
21. Tzanakopoulos A. We who are not as others: sanctions and (global) security governance. In: Geiß R, Melzer N. The
Oxford handbook on the international law of global security. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2020. p. 32–48.
22. Kern A. Economic sanctions. Law and public policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2009. 359 p.
23. Rathbone M, Jeydel P, Lentz A. Sanctions, sanctions everywhere: forging a path through complex transnational sanc-
tions’ laws. Georgetown Journal of International Law. 2013;44(3):1071–1074.
24. Exclusive: Venezuela asks Bank of England to sell its gold to UN for coronavirus relief [Internet; cited 2021 August 18].
Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-venezuela-gold-exc-idUSKBN22B30X.
25. Crawford J. Brownlie’s principles of public international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2012. 803 p.
26. Warbrick C. States and recognition in international law. In: Evans MD, editor. International law. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press; 2006. p. 253–256.
27. Dunn G. Mid-year sanctions and export controls update [Internet; cited 2021 January 4]. Available from: https://www.
gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-mid-year-sanctions-and-export-controls-update.pdf.
28. Strosnider K, Addis D. New sanctions targeting Russian nancial and energy sectors [Internet; cited 2021 August 18].
Available from: https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2014/07/new-sanctions-targeting-russian-nancial-and-energy-sectors/.
29. O’Toole B. Don’t believe the SWIFT China sanctions hype [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dont-believe-the-swift-china-sanctions-hype/.
30. SWIFT says it “has no authority” to unplug Russia or Israel [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://
www.pymnts.com/in-depth/2014/swift-says-it-has-no-authority-to-unplug-russia-or-israel/.
31. Economist: disconnecting from SWIFT will be a bomb for the regime [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from:
https://charter97.org/en/news/2020/11/25/401835/.
32. Pinto RA. Digital sovereignty or digital colonialsim? Sur – International Journal on Human Rights. 2018;27:15–27.
33. Gotlieb AE. Extraterritoriality: a Canadian perspective. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business. 1983;5(3):
449–461.
34. Geyrhalter B. Friedenssicherung durch Regionalorganisationen ohne Beschluß des Sicherheitsrates. Cologne: LIT; 2001.
239 S.
35. Malkawi BH. Collective sanctions through the lenses of international economics law: the case of the League of Arab
States trade boycott of Israel [Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:cu9D2kXfbDMJ:https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/UCM/ReportHRC48/Academia/submission-
malkawi-bashar-h.doc+&cd=1&hl=ru&ct=clnk&gl=by.
36. Hahn MJ. Vital interests and the law of GATT: an analysis of GATT’s security exception [Internet; cited 2021
August18]. Available from: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1653&context=mjil.
37. Bruderlein C. Coping with the humanitarian impact of sanctions: an OCHA perspective [Internet; cited 2021 Ja-
nuary4]. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/les/resources/677CE646930621C7C1256C22002C7B7F-O
CHA_dec1998.pdf.
48
Журнал Белорусского государственного университета. Международные отношения. 2021;2:26–48
Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations. 2021;2:26–48
БГУ – стетняя истор успеха
38. Reisman WM, Stevick DL. The applicability of international law standards to United Nations economic sanctions pro-
grammes. European Journal of International Law. 1998;9(1):86–141.
39. Petrescu IM. The humanitarian impact of economic sanctions. Europolity – Continuity and Change in European Gover
nance. New Series. 2016;10(2):205–246.
40. Romano SM. Guerra psicológica recargada: cibersanciones, Venezuela y geopolítica. Revista Internacional de Pensa
miento Politico. 2017;12:105–124.
41. O’Sullivan D, Moshtaghian A. Instagram says it’s removing posts supporting Soleimani to comply with US sanctions
[Internet; cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/10/tech/instagram-iran-soleimani-posts/
index.html.
42. Tickle J. Chechen leader Kadyrov banned from Instagram again, loses account with 1.4 million followers [Internet;
cited 2021 August 18]. Available from: https://www.rt.com/russia/488533-kadyrov-banned-instagram-again/.
43. Cameron I. Protecting legal rights: on the (in)security of targeted sanctions. In: Wallensteen P, Staibano C, editors.
International sanctions: between words and wars in the global system. London: Frank Cass; 2005. p. 181–206.
44. Bianchi A. Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s anti-terrorism measures. European Journal of In-
ternational Law. 2006;17(5):881–919.
45. van den Herik L. The Security Council’s targeted sanctions regimes: in need of better protection of the individual.
Leiden Journal of International Law. 2007;20(4):797–807.
46. Arnold R. Human rights in times of terrorism. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht.
2006;66:297–321.
47. Dandurand Y. Handbook on criminal justice and responses to terrorism, criminal justice. New York: United Nations; 2009.
136 p.
48. Right to live without a blockade [Internet; cited 2021 August 19]. Available from: https://oi-les-cng-prod.s3.
amazonaws.com/lac.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/le_attachments/bp-cuba-blockade-women-250521-en.pdf.
49. BNP Paribas to pay $9bn to settle sanctions violations [Internet; cited 2021 August 19]. Available from: https://www.
bbc.com/news/business-28099694.
50. Faghihi R. Millions of Iranians at risk as US sanctions choke insulin supplies [Internet; cited 2021 January 27]. Avail-
able from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-insulin-medicine-us-sanctions-millions-risk.
51. Stoll T, Blockmans S, Hagemejer J, Hartwell CA, Gött H, Karunska K, Maurer A. Extraterritorial sanctions on trade and
investments and European responses policy department for external relations [Internet; cited 2021 January 4]. Available
from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_STU(2020)653618.
52. Mallard G, Sabet F, Sun J. The humanitarian gap in the global sanctions regime. Global Governance: A Review of Multi-
lateralism and International Organisations. 2020;6(1):121–153.
53. Тимофеев ИН. “Санкции за нарушение санкций”: принудительные меры Министерства финансов США против
компаний финансового сектора. Полис. Политические исследования. 2020;6:73–90. DOI: 10.17976/jpps/2020.06.06.
54. Boyle D. Extra-territoriality and US economic sanctions. International Enforcement Law Reporter. 2020;36(3):101–103.
55. Bennis Ph. Sanctions in the era of pandemic [Internet; cited 2021 August 19]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.
com/opinions/2020/5/12/sanctions-in-the-era-of-pandemic.
56. MilánY. R.La historia no contada de cómo un avión con suministros médicos desde China no ha podido entrar a Cuba
[Internet; cited 2021 August 19]. Available from: http://www.granma.cu/cuba-covid-19/2020-04-01/por-que-las-cosas-para-
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Received by editorial board 29.09.2021.
