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What Do You Expect?: Assessing Whether a Situation is "Ripe" for Collaborative Governance Negotiation and Conflict Management Research What Do You Expect?: Assessing Whether a Situation is "Ripe" for Collaborative Governance

Authors:
  • Michael Kern Consulting LLC

Abstract

Collaborative governance" has emerged as a ubiquitous term in the United States and elsewhere, in both the public and private sectors. It has recently received more specific definition from scholars as it applies to multiparty, consensus-seeking processes, often facilitated or mediated by a third party, that are intended to resolve particular public policy challenges. But both theory and practice have shown it is not appropriate in all situations. So, practitioners have identified conditions they look for in assessing the likelihood of initiating and sustaining a successful collaborative process. Borrowing from international relations, they often refer to this assessment as "ripeness." Building from experience gained during practice, we propose an additional condition for assessing ripeness-whether initiators and supporters are open to the proposed process resulting in a range of outcomes and solution sets. We provide a question that can be asked of those who are interested in initiating the process, to help practitioners assess this new condition: "Do you expect that the result of the collaborative process you are interested in initiating will be that others realize the solution you currently favor is the correct one?" We explain why this simple question about expectations can shorten lengthy lines of inquiry; make explicit the differences between partnerships, coalitions, and collaborations; and help parties better understand their priorities and process needs. The intent of this article is to encourage practitioners to experiment with this new question and condition, and researchers to formally evaluate its utility. Volume X, Number X, Pages X-XX
What Do You Expect?: Assessing Whether a Situation is “Ripe” for Collaborative Governance
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research
What Do You Expect?: Assessing Whether a
Situation is “Ripe” for Collaborative Governance
Michael A Kern1,2,3 and Amanda G. Murphy4,2
1 Michael Kern Consulting, LLC, Seattle, Washington, USA
2 Washington State University Extension, Pullman, Washington, USA
3 University of Washington Evans School of Public Policy and Governance, Seattle, Washington, USA
4 William D. Ruckelshaus Center, Seattle, Washington, USA
Keyword s
collaborative governance, public
policy, conflict resolution, practice,
observation, assessment
Correspondence
Michael. A. Kern, 900 24th Avenue,
Seattle, WA 98122. Email:
m.kern@wsu.edu; mkern@uw.edu;
michaelkernconsulting@gmail.com
xx.xxxx/ncmr.xxxxx
Abstract
Collaborative governance” has emerged as a ubiquitous term in
the United States and elsewhere, in both the public and private
sectors. It has recently received more specific definition from
scholars as it applies to multiparty, consensus-seeking
processes, often facilitated or mediated by a third party, that are
intended to resolve particular public policy challenges. But both
theory and practice have shown it is not appropriate in all
situations. So, practitioners have identified conditions they look
for in assessing the likelihood of initiating and sustaining a
successful collaborative process. Borrowing from international
relations, they often refer to this assessment as “ripeness.”
Building from experience gained during practice, we propose an
additional condition for assessing ripenesswhether initiators
and supporters are open to the proposed process resulting in a
range of outcomes and solution sets. We provide a question
that can be asked of those who are interested in initiating the
process, to help practitioners assess this new condition: “Do you
expect that the result of the collaborative process you are interested
in initiating will be that others realize the solution you currently
favor is the correct one?” We explain why this simple question
about expectations can shorten lengthy lines of inquiry; make
explicit the differences between partnerships, coalitions, and
collaborations; and help parties better understand their
priorities and process needs. The intent of this article is to
encourage practitioners to experiment with this new question
and condition, and researchers to formally evaluate its utility.
Volume X, Number X, Pages X-XX
© 2022 International Association for Conflict Management
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Considerable attention has been given in both academic literature and practice in the United States (US)
and elsewhere to the use of collaborative governance processes to prevent, manage, and resolve complex
public policy issues. Such processes seek the active engagement of all affected parties public, private, non-
governmental, and others to address public policy challenges that cannot be easily addressed by any one
entity on its own (Amsler, 2016; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Carlson, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham, 2003;
Weber, 2006).
The term “collaboration” has become ubiquitous in discussions of public policy, management, and
governance in the US. While calling for a broad range of initiatives, efforts, projects, and programs to be
conducted as a collaboration is increasingly popular in both the public and private sectors, evidence from
both research and practice has shown this is not appropriate in all situations (Agranoff, 2004; Margerum,
2008; Moore & Koontz, 2003; Weber, 2006).
Therefore, practitioners trained in collaborative policy processes often conduct a situation assessment,
to gauge whether circumstances are indeed “ripe” for collaboration (Murphy & Page, 2019; Susskind et al.,
1999). This concept of “ripeness” is borrowed from international relations, where it is described as, “a second
and equally necessary key” to settling disputes, alongside the substance of proposed solutions: “Parties
resolve their conflicts only when they are ready to do sowhen alternative, usually unilateral, means of
achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly
predicament” (Zartman, 2008, p 1). This recognition is what Zartman refers to as “a mutually hurting
stalemate and shared willingness to explore a joint way out” and is one of the necessary conditions for
parties to consider acceptance of a third-party practitioner (Zartman, 1989, 2000, 2008, 2015).
Practitioners have identified conditions to be explored in order to assess the likelihood of a successful
collaborative public policy process. This article proposes an additional condition, as well as a question that
collaborative governance practitioners, policy makers, involved parties, and academics can ask to help assess
this new condition. This condition and question can help establish whether the involved parties have in mind
collaboration in any of its more general sensessuch as a partnership, or a like-minded coalitionversus a
collaborative governance process as defined below. The intent of this article is to encourage practitioners to
experiment with this new question and condition, and researchers to formally evaluate its utility.
Collaborative Governance
Defining Collaborative Governance
Governance involves the processes of managing the delivery of public goods and services.
Historically, approaches to governance in western democracies have largely been command and control,
and regulatory (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). However, as public policy challenges have
increased in complexity, they have often exceeded the level of expertise and resources available solely within
government, and therefore, to successfully implement public policy, have required capabilities that are
outside the scope of individual agencies (Gray & Purdy, 2018). Therefore, government actors have been
increasingly turning to collaboration with other sectors to help solve public policy problems and implement
solutions (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray & Purdy, 2018; Sorensen & Torfing, 2011), which has transformed the
way policy making and implementation is done (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
There are many terms used in the literature to describe different types of collaborative processes.
These include partnerships, coalitions, and networks (Agranoff, 2006; Bidwell & Ryan, 2006; Himmelman,
2001; Leach et al., 2002; Poocharoen & Ting, 2015), collaborative rationality (Susskind, 2010), collaborative
public policy (Carlson, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2018), co-management (Borrini & Jaireth, 2007; Singleton, 2000),
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collaborative public management (Agranoff, 2004; O’Leary et al., 2006), cross-sector collaboration (Page et
al., 2015), public-private partnerships (Minow, 2003; Forrer et al., 2010), and environmental conflict
resolution (Dukes, 2004; Fisher & Sablan, 2018), to name a few. Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary (2005) say,
“Practitioners have developed a rich diversity of processes that use negotiation, mediation, facilitation,
citizen and stakeholder engagement, deliberation, collaboration, and consensus-building,” and describe
these processes as “the new governance” (p. 552). Scholars in public administration, political science, and
other fields (particularly in the US, but also elsewhere) increasingly use “collaborative governance” as a term
to describe these processes (Amsler, 2016).
Collaborative governance efforts include several different kinds of structures, the most common
being one that is predominantly led by a government agency (Gray & Purdy, 2018). Other examples include
shared leadership structure (such as a steering committee); organizing an entirely new entity, (such as a
stewardship council); public-private partnerships; and mandated collaboration (Gray & Purdy, 2018). Over
the last decade, collaborative governance has received more specific definition as it applies to multiparty,
consensus-seeking processes, facilitated or mediated by a third party, that are intended to resolve a
particular public policy challenge. This is helping to distinguish this type of collaborative governance from
the other types of collaboration mentioned above.
In 2008, collaborative governance was defined by Ansell and Gash as, “A governing arrangement
where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making
process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public
policy or manage public programs or assets” (p. 544).
In 2012, Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh defined collaborative governance more broadly, as “The
processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people
constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and
civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (p. 2). In 2015,
Emerson and Nabatchi built a conceptual framework around that definition, describing the “collaborative
governance regimes” under which parties engage in this type of governance. They borrowed the term
“regime” from international political theory, where it refers to “sustained cooperation between state and
nonstate actors” and features “explicit and implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.”
Their collaborative governance regime definition includes “different interests and/or jurisdictions (as
opposed to like-minded coalitions)” and “repeated interactions … over some period of time, usually greater
than one year.” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18-19).
In 2018, the University Network for Collaborative Governance (UNCG) added the idea that
participants engage in collaborative governance to “enhance their communities and shape sustainable public
policy decisions,” as well as to “leverage the unique attributes and resources of (the public, private and civic
sectors) for the greatest impact” (p. 2).
Justifications, Merits and Critiques of Collaborative Governance
Both research and practice have explored the benefits and drawbacks of collaborative governance.
Proponents have argued that collaborative governance processes allow participation by all interested and
affected parties (Susskind et al., 1999); are a healthy response to policy gridlock and litigation (Kemmis, 1990);
result in more informed, creative, and adaptive solutions (Susskind et al., 1999; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000);
are more democratic, transparent, and inclusive, leading to the likelihood of more effective and equitable
solutions (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Fung & Wright, 2001); can provide resources
needed to accomplish what cannot be accomplished by any one single party or smaller coalition (Dukes,
2001); and can reduce future conflict among stakeholders (Bernard & Young, 1997).
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While much of the focus in research and practice has been on the benefits of collaborative
governance processes, there is also scholarship describing potential or observed drawbacks and adverse
effects (Hileman & Bodin, 2019; Kallis et al., 2009; McGuire, 2006; Purdy, 2012; Scott & Thomas, 2017). Critics
have argued that collaborative governance processes have been shown to delegitimize conflict (Kenney,
2000); can lead to government policymaking being co-opted by special interests (Koontz, 2004); can exclude
or disempower indigenous communities and minority groups (Scott & Thomas, 2017; Singleton, 2009); can
lead to environmental outcomes that are less protective of natural resources (Coglianese, 1999); and can
lead to “lowest common denominator” solutions (Kenney, 2000). Provan and Kenis (2008) observe three
tensions that exist in collaborative governance processes: efficiency versus inclusiveness, flexibility versus
stability, and internal versus external legitimacy.
We mention both the many types of collaborative processes, and these merits and critiques, in order
to establish the importance of assessing “ripeness.” It may be that these merits rise to the fore when a
process is initiated and sustained under a favorable set of conditions, and that the critiques become
warranted when this is not the case. Therefore, it is imperative to carefully explore and evaluate current
conditions before initiating a collaborative governance process. Scholars are inclined, understandably, to
seek definitive answers to questions such as, “Do collaborative governance processes lead to better policy
outcomes?” If they must resign themselves to living in a world where the answers to those questions are
most typically, “It depends,” we at least hope to shine light upon one of the areas upon which those outcomes
may depend.
Conditions Favorable to Initiate and Sustain a Collaborative Governance Process
In general, researchers and practitioners agree there are conditions that, if present at the onset of a
collaborative governance process, will influence the success of that process. Ansell and Gash (2008)
narrowed the starting conditions down to three variables: (1) imbalances between the resources or power of
different stakeholders, (2) incentives that stakeholders have to collaborate, and (3) past history of conflict or
cooperation among stakeholders (p. 550-551). Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) identified four conditions (which
they refer to as drivers) that are necessary for a collaborative governance regime to come to fruition: (1)
uncertainty, (2) interdependence, (3) consequential incentives, and (4) initiating leadership (p. 44).
Moving beyond initiation, the literature on collaboration identifies several conditions that are
essential in determining whether the collaborative process will be successfully sustained. For example,
Mattessich et al. (2001) identify 20 factors that influence the success of a collaborative process, based on a
review of 281 studies. These factors are grouped into six categories: (1) Environment, (2) Membership
characteristics, (3) Process and structure, (4) Communication, (5) Purpose, and (6) Resources (Mattessich et al.,
2001). Ansell and Gash (2008) reviewed 137 studies of collaborative governance, identifying a number of
features necessary for successful collaborations including trust-building, participant commitment to the
process, developing shared understanding, face-to-face dialogue, and intermediate outcomes. Emerson and
Nabatchi (2015) discuss how the surrounding political, legal, socioeconomic, and environmental “system
context” influences the formation and performance of collaborative governance regimes, and identify six key
conditions: (1) public service or resource conditions, (2) policy and legal frameworks, (3) socioeconomic and
cultural characteristics, (4) network characteristics, (5) political dynamics and power relations, and (6) history of
conflict. Other commonly-cited conditions include a broad representation of stakeholders, shared and open
decision-making processes, well-defined and agreed-upon goals and objectives, and open communication
and sharing of information throughout the process (Bryson et al., 2006; Cestero, 1999; Emerson et al., 2012;
Gray, 1985; Mattessich et al., 2001).
The “ripe moment” is a crucial concept in the study of peace and conflict. Ripeness theory seeks to
explain why and when parties in a conflict will decide that an attempt at resolution (e.g., negotiation) is a
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better option than continued conflict. According to Zartman (2001), “parties resolve their conflict only when
they are ready to do so when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are
blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament” (p. 8). Specifically,
the parties in conflict must reach a point where they recognize a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and a
way out (WO) through negotiation (Zartman, 2000).
However, ripeness theory has been critiqued by several scholars and does have its limitations
(Coleman et al., 2008; Druckman, 2001; Lederach, 1997; Mooradian & Druckman, 1999; Pruitt, 2007; Walsh,
2016). According to Walsh (2016), such critiques have largely focused on three areas: (1) low predictability or
alleged tautology, (2) inability to explain why parties stay at the negotiation table, and (3) the micro-
foundations of the theory or limited consideration of non-rational factors (p. 78-79) For instance, the basic
reasoning of MHS lies in cost-benefit analysis (Zartman, 2000), which may be accurate when describing
economic forms of decision making in conflict, but does not account for other types of decisions (Coleman
et al., 2008). According to Coleman et al. (2008), “(D)ecisions related to maintaining group cohesiveness and
solidarity typically use a very different set of criteria from decisions to maximize outcomes or achieve goals
efficiently” (p. 6). In addition, the elements of ripeness theory (MHS, perceived way out, impending
catastrophe, enticing opportunity, and valid spokesperson) (Zartman, 1996) are joint states that concurrently
affect both parties. But this does not consider uneven states of ripeness amongst the parties (Pruitt, 1997).
According to Pruitt (1997), “(T)he theory is more flexible if these components are viewed as perceptions by
each party separately rather than as joint perceptions, though overall ripeness must be a joint phenomenon”
(p. 248).
Readiness theory addresses some of the limitations of ripeness theory. According to Pruitt (1997), “It
differs from ripeness theory in that it uses the language of variables rather than necessary states and focuses
on the thinking within a single party rather than on the joint thinking of both parties to a conflict” (p. 1524-
1525). This revision to ripeness theory makes it possible to examine factors that lead to changes in degrees
of readiness, and to make predictions about conflict outcomes such as third-party intervention (Coleman et
al., 2008). As Pruitt (2005) explains, “Readiness theory allows some parties to be motivated mainly by a belief
that they cannot win, others mainly by the cost of the conflict, and still others mainly by the risk of a future
catastrophe or pressure from a powerful third party. Such a model fits reality better than ripeness theory,
which requires a uniform hurting stalemate for all cases” (p. 9).
Because readiness theory allows for different parties to be driven by these different motivations,
“readiness” may actually be a better fit as a term to describe conditions favorable for initiating a collaborative
public policy process, despite the fact that “ripeness” is the term more likely to be borrowed and employed
as a metaphor by collaborative governance practitioners.
Assessing the Likelihood for Success of a Collaborative Governance Process
As the paradigm of collaborative governance has emerged, so has a field of process experts. These
practitioners (working from private, public, and non-governmental settings) serve as professional neutrals,
specializing in multi-party public policy dispute resolution, and designing collaborative processes (Susskind
et al., 1999). They often work under contract with public agencies or other sponsoring entities, serving as
third-party facilitators for collaborative governance processes (Weber, 2006).
Practitioners will often begin by assessing the situation, to determine if the requisite conditions exist
for a collaborative governance process to succeed (Susskind et al., 1999). This is referred to as a “situation
assessment” or “conflict assessment,” and derives from a standard practice in two-party mediations in which
the mediator meets with each party separately, before meeting with them together (Herrman, 2009; Keir &
Ali, 2014; Susskind, et al., 1999). The purpose is to better understand key issues, identify involved parties,
and assess the prospects for collaboration (Murphy & Page, 2019; Susskind et al., 1999). Before initiating a
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situation assessment, practitioners will often hold preliminary, informal conversations with key entities
involved in the situation (sometimes referred to as a “pre-assessment”), to gauge whether a formal situation
assessment would be productive (Murphy & Page, 2019). Together, pre-assessment and situation
assessment form a typical first stage of the collaborative governance process. Later stages include planning,
organizing, educating, negotiating, resolving, and implementing (Carlson, 2007).
Both pre-assessments and situation assessments focus on whether conditions are favorable (or “ripe”)
for a collaborative governance process. The Center for Collaborative Policy (CCP) at California State University,
Sacramento identified eleven conditions, phrased as questions, for practitioners to use to assess the
favorability for a successful collaborative process (Weber, 2006):
1) Do issues focus on fundamental legal rights or societal values?
2) Are there potential areas for agreement, preferably with multiple issues for tradeoffs?
3) Are the primary parties identifiable and willing to participate?
4) Does each party have a legitimate spokesperson?
5) Are any potential “deal-breakers” at the table?
6) Does any party have assurance of a much better deal elsewhere?
7) Do the parties anticipate future dealings with each other?
8) Is there a relative balance of power among the parties?
9) Are there external pressures to reach agreement?
10) Is there a realistic timetable for completion?
11) Are there adequate resources and funding to support the negotiation?
Note that while a “yes” is an indication of favorability for most of these questions, that is not the case for
questions one, five and six. At times, it is apparent to the practitioner during the pre-assessment that
conditions are not favorable to initiate a collaborative governance process. At other times, this only becomes
clear when a full situation assessment is completed. If that conclusion is reached at either point, the
practitioner works with the parties to discuss what other approaches can be taken to make progress on the
issues involved and/or to shift the conditions to a place where they are more favorable. But, if the conclusion
is that conditions are indeed favorable, the assessment will likely recommend proceeding with a
collaborative process, and will provide guidance on how to design and conduct that process in order to
maximize the chances for successful outcomes (Murphy & Page, 2019; Susskind et al., 1999).
An example can help illustrate how this assessment process functions in practice. In 2012, university-
based practitioners in the states of Washington and Oregon conducted a collaborative engagement
assessment at the request of the Columbia River Gorge Commission (Commission). The Commission is an
interstate compact agency authorized by the National Scenic Area Act with the dual purposes of protecting
and enhancing the scenic, natural, cultural, and recreational resources of the Columbia River Gorge, while
encouraging growth and allowing development consistent with resource protection (Oregon Consensus
National Policy Center [OCNPC] & The William D. Ruckelshaus Center [WDRC], 2012). The purpose of the
collaborative engagement assessment was to assess the potential for collaborative approaches to the
management of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area (NSA). The practitioner team conducted
interviews with individuals representing a wide range of interests, to better understand what issues needed
to be addressed in managing the NSA, the positions and interests of those affected by management
decisions, and the likelihood that collaborative approaches to managing these issues would be successful
(OCNPC & WDRC, 2012).
As described throughout the assessment report, the practitioner team considered many of the eleven
conditions (identified below via italics) in determining whether the situation and the relevant interests were
amenable to collaborative processes. For example, in relation to whether there were potential areas for
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agreement, the parties’ willingness to participate, and whether they believed they had a better alternative, the
assessment identified ten key scenic area issues (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 4-13) for which interviewees
offered support for developing a collaborative process. The assessment found that many believed a
collaborative process was either the best or only feasible option to successfully address those key issues
(OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 13). As to whether the parties anticipated future dealings with each other and the
existence of external pressures to address the issues, the assessment found that interviewees believed a
collaborative process would help parties achieve a better understanding of each other’s interests and
improve working relationships, which they, in turn, thought may help those divergent parties find solutions
that would meet their collective needs (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 14). The assessment paraphrases one
interviewee who captured a sentiment expressed by others, “As one interviewee suggested, there are 30
years of divergent and entrenched positions that might be beneficially impacted by a process to build the
trust needed to solve complex problems by providing the parties with an opportunity to meet each other as
equals, learn about each other’s points of view, and get to know each other as people, not as opponents
(OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 14).
The assessment also identified barriers to collaboration and what interviewees saw as challenges to
successful collaboration (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 16-18). For example, it was unclear whether there were
adequate resources and funding to support a collaborative process (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 16). In assessing
the condition of good faith participation and whether there were preferred alternative forums, the assessment
identified concern among interviewees that some parties would not be willing to seek compromise or had
any incentive to participate in a collaborative process because the status quo, particularly current regulations,
worked in their favor (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p .17). Other interviewees were concerned that some parties
may agree to participate in a collaborative process, but if the outcome wasn’t everything they wanted, they
would then later file lawsuits (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 17). This situation affected the relative balance of
power among the parties.
Ultimately, the assessment concluded there was potential for successful collaboration, but upfront work
was needed to address some of the identified barriers. This upfront work included the Commission first
engaging in internal development work, and then convening parties to development a common base of
information before launching into a more formal collaboration process. This phased approach is referred to
as building collaborative capacity, involving developing of a habit of collaboration and trust building among
the various interests, and working together in situations of reduced risk, prior to attempting to reach
consensus on more challenging topics (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 23). These recommendations moved the
process toward a more realistic timetable for completion of collaborative agreement-seeking.
In considering the first condition (whether issues focus on fundamental legal rights or societal values), it is
important to note that there is no such thing as a public policy challenge that in no way, shape or form affects
legal rights or societal values. That is, in fact, what makes them public policy issues. So, in applying this
condition, practitioners need to be on the lookout for situations where the impact is so large that it becomes
fundamental. In those situations, the clarity of a judicial, legislative, or executive decision may be necessary,
rather than a collaborative governance approach. For example, in this case study, the Gorge Commission’s
decisions often affect individual property rights, which are a legal right and a societal value. In many cases,
the impacts of these decisions are at a scale where a collaborative approach is appropriate. But the
Commission may be called upon to make certain decisions affecting property rights that are at a size or scale
beyond which a collaborative governance approach would be effective; what we might call fundamental
decisions, and where the Commission may be advised to seek judicial review, rather than a multiparty
negotiation.
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A Question of Expectations
The William D. Ruckelshaus Center (Ruckelshaus Center or Center), a joint effort of Washington State
University and the University of Washington, is an example of a practitioner organization working from the
public and academic settings (Hall & Kern, 2017). Its mission is to help parties involved in complex public
policy challenges in the State of Washington and the Pacific Northwest tap university expertise to develop
collaborative, durable, and effective solutions. Practitioners at the Center use the CCP conditions, as well as
the Center’s own set of project criteria (William D. Ruckelshaus Center, 2020), to help identify the
appropriateness of the Center’s involvement in a given policy situation, and the “ripeness” of the issues
involved for a collaborative governance approach (using the Ansell and Gash 2008, Emerson and Nabatchi
2015, and UNCG 2018 definitions of the term collaborative governance).
Practitioners at the Center have learned from over 15 years of practice that it is not uncommon to
determine through pre-assessments and situation assessments that, while the initiating parties have interest
in participating in a collaborative process, they have in mind the more general definitions of collaboration
mentioned earlier. They are seeking to develop a new, or strengthen an existing, advocacy-based partnership,
working together to share responsibilities and tasks. Or they wish to develop a like-minded coalition, pursuing
a common aim in the belief unity will make each member stronger, more effective, and more likely to achieve
a mutually agreed-upon solution. In either case, the goal is to gain allies for, and reduce opposition to, the
adoption and implementation of a specific policy prescription, often one they have already thought through
and adopted as their preferred outcome. Another way to think about this is in terms of the dual concerns
model, which “makes the following predictions about (strategies available to negotiators): concern about
both own and other party’s outcomes encourages a problem-solving strategy; concern about only one’s own
outcomes encourages contending.” (Pruitt, 1983, p. 172).
For these reasons, practitioners at the Center have come to believe that it is important to determine if
this is the case, and therefore propose to extend current negotiation/mediation theory by adding a twelfth
condition to the current CCP list of eleven conditions practitioners explore in assessing favorability for a
successful collaborative process. That new condition is this: whether initiators and supporters are open to the
process resulting in a range of outcomes and solution sets. To help practitioners assess this new condition, the
Center proposes a question that can be asked of those who are interested in initiating the process:
“Do you expect that the result of the collaborative process you are interested in initiating will be
that others realize the solution you currently favor is the correct one?”
This simple question about expectations can shorten potentially lengthy lines of inquiry, make
explicit the differences between partnerships, coalitions, and collaborations, and help the parties better
understand their priorities and process needs. Practitioners can get valuable information both from the
parties’ answers, and from their own inferences and interpretations of those answers. They can learn where
the parties stand in the dual concern model (Pruitt, 1983), whether they yet have concern for the other
parties’ interests and needs.
For example, if a party answers yes to the question (or if the practitioner comes to believe that there
is really a “yes” behind one or more parties’ “no,” “maybe,” or more complex/nuanced answers), it can indicate
that those parties have a set position on policy outcomes they wish to pursue, via gaining allies to “sign on”
to their view. Put another way, they are seeking a partnership or like-minded coalition, not a collaborative
governance process as defined above. In the latter, one anticipates, expects, or hopes that the result will be
a solution that meets one’s and other parties’ needs and interests. But one does not enter this type of
collaborative governance process believing one already knows what that solution will be. Rather, it emerges
from the process. This is similar to how a “ripe moment” is described by Zartman (2008): “Parties do not have
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to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching
and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too” (p. 2).
This is an extremely important point to explain to the parties because it represents the fundamental
value of this type of collaborative process. Out of the myriad possible solutions to a complex, multifaceted
public policy challenge, the participants do not remain fixed on the solutions they have developed over
weeks, months, years, or even decades of thinking about, working on and/or fighting over the issue(s) prior
to the collaborative governance process. Those solutions were likely based mostly or solely on what they, or
the interest(s) they represent, want, and need. Instead, they work not just with other like-minded parties,
but with parties whose wants and needs are often very different from their own, to identify a solution set
that harmonizes all interests and addresses all needs. It is this search for a mutually-beneficial solution set
that distinguishes the type of collaboration intended in these collaborative governance processes from
partnerships, coalitions, networks, etc.
This type of collaboration has value because there is often a collective creativity in a collaborative
governance process that exceeds what any interest, partnership or coalition is likely to achieve on its own.
There is also the advantage that all parties to a collaborative policy solution have the incentive to work
together toward its implementation, versus the “active opposition” that is created when a solution is
implemented via traditional governance processes, especially one adopted via a narrow approval margin.
(Dukes, 1993; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Imperial, 2005; Innes & Booher, 1999).
Practitioners at the Ruckelshaus Center have over the past few years asked this question about
expectations during informal pre-assessment and assessment conversations, on policy challenges ranging
from natural resource management to education. For example, they used it to frame conversations about
an expert commission that state and county officials were forming to create consensus recommendations
in the wake of a natural disaster. They employed it to help a state legislator realize he was already invested
in a specific outcome for a collaborative process he envisioned relating to education governance, and would
be better served by initially investing in a situation assessment. And they used it to help advocates of flood
prevention and fish restoration in one of the state’s largest watersheds realize that the “collaborative”
processes they had been involved in for years were not making progress because they were not focusing on
comprehensive solution sets that take into account these and other important goals.
While the Center’s practitioners have not gathered empirical data on the results of asking this
additional question, their anecdotal experience has been that answering this question has the benefit of
leading potential process sponsors, participants, and decision-makers to engage in valuable introspection
and come to one of several conclusions, each of which is useful for productively proceeding. In some cases,
respondents can authentically say no, they are not entering the potential policy process with a preconceived
sense of the “correct” solution. This bodes well for a collaborative governance approach, for the reasons
discussed above.
More often, they realize that they are in fact entering the process with a specific solution set in mind.
If they are truly wedded to that solution, the parties (and the practitioner) can know that they are unlikely to
benefit from a collaborative governance process. But it is not uncommon that this realization, and
subsequent conversations with the practitioner, help parties to understand the potential value of a
collaborative process, and the need to reset their expectations, and open themselves to other possible
solution sets, before engaging in a such a collaboration. Or that they may want to consider leading or
participating in a like-minded coalition on some (perhaps short-term) aspect of the issue, while also
supporting a (perhaps longer-term) collaboration on a larger element, or different aspect, of the issue.
The question also has the value of helping to dispel the notion that the reason others do not yet agree
with the solution one favors is that they have not yet been exposed to it (and the logic behind it) properly,
thoroughly, slowly (or even loudly) enough. As such, it is a good starting point for preparing the parties in a
collaborative governance process for the need to be open to new information (establishing a shared set of
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Kern and Murphy
facts or common information base), see the issues from other perspectives, and (while holding firm to their
underlying interests), loosen up their thinking about particular positions and solutions (Emerson & Nabatchi,
2015; Susskind et al., 1999). For these reasons, practitioners at the Center intend to add this question about
expectations to the questions they ask during formal situation assessments as well, and are proposing that
the corresponding condition be added to the set of criteria practitioners use for evaluating the “ripeness” of
a collaborative process.
As it becomes a more widespread part of the thinking among practitioners, this condition and question
should also help inform the thinking of researchers and scholars, as they explore under what circumstances
collaborative governance leads to favorable outcomes, and results in better public policy. The purpose of
authoring this article is to present the Ruckelshaus Center’s experience with and observations about
including this “question of expectations” in its practice, in order to encourage other practitioners to
experiment with this new condition, and researchers to formally evaluate its utility.
Conclusion
It is important to recognize that there is not a value judgment implied in this question about expectations
for the outcomes of a process. As mentioned before, the type of collaborative governance discussed in this
article is not inherently “better” than partnering, coalition-building, or other ways of resolving policy
challenges. It is not a failing to determine that one is seeking these other approaches. Though some of the
potential advantages of collaborative governance have been articulated above, those advantages are likely
to disappear if collaborative governance is applied to situations where it is not appropriate. So, all these
means of resolving conflicts and addressing policy challenges should be seen as different tools in the public
policy toolbox that are appropriate, and likely to be successful, under different circumstances. The goal
should be to deploy the right tool for the situation. The “twelfth condition” and “question about expectations”
presented in this article can be important additions to the standard set of conditions and questions
practitioners currently use to identify when collaborative governance is the correct tool, and that researchers
use to evaluate and understand those collaborative governance processes.
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Author Bio
Michael Kern is Principal at Michael Kern Consulting, LLC. He spent 12 years as Director of the William D.
Ruckelshaus Center at Washington State University (WSU) and the University of Washington (UW). He is an
Adjunct Associate Professor at WSU Extension, and Affiliate Associate Professor at the UW Evans School of
Public Policy & Governance (where he earned a Master of Public Administration degree). Michael has over
30 years of experience helping diverse groups reach common ground on public policy issues. He has
published on the role of universities in collaborative governance, evaluating environmental collaboration,
the public sector as mediator, hatchery reform, nuclear site cleanup, eldercare, and other topics.
Amanda Murphy is a Senior Facilitator at the William D. Ruckelshaus Center, and an Associate Professor with
Washington State University Extension. Amanda designs and leads or co-leads multi-party, collaborative
processes that help people develop shared solutions to public policy issues; the Ruckelshaus Center’s
Collaboration Governance Training Program; and the Center’s Collaborative Leaders Internship Program.
She has a Master of Marine and Environmental Affairs degree from the University of Washington; and a
Bachelor of Science degree in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology from the University of Arizona. Amanda has
published on situation assessments, and marine protected areas.
... It operates through collaborative processes which, compared to conventional participatory approaches, move from driving pre-determined interests towards jointly defined goals, problem solving, and implementation of solutions (Greenwood 30 et al. 2021;Gieseke 2020). The processes are often facilitated by a third party, are consensus-seeking, and intend to resolve public policy problems (Kern and Murphy 2022). ...
... To achieve the benefits of collaboration in complex or contested issues, the literature on collaborative governance processes emphasizes the use of consensual decision-making and tools, such as neutral facilitators, joint fact finding, and different kinds of preliminary assessments which seek to aid and structure the collaboration (Innes 2004;Susskind et al. 2018;Matsuura and Schenk 2017;Greenwood et al. 2021;Kern and Murphy 2022). Their goal is to improve the quality of the interaction and to ensure the presence of the right parties in the negotiation process. ...
... The interviews (n=25) were completed as part of the situation assessment (sometimes called collaborative governance assessment or conflict assessment) as a preparation for the potential CBA negotiations (Greenwood et al. 2021: 79-101;Kern and Murphy 2022), which mean their purpose was to assess and map the local key stakeholders and their interests, frame the central questions to be solved, and discuss the potential implementation of concrete collaborative measures. In addition to extracting information, the idea behind them was to prepare the participants for the collaboration process. ...
Thesis
Full-text available
Several significant societal developments, including new material demands for the energy transition, are placing growing challenges on local mineral governance, where the impacts of mining are keenly felt and need to be managed. These challenges, caused by the intersecting needs of society, call for new governance approaches and practical instruments to address and reconcile them effectively. This dissertation investigates the potential and preconditions of Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) for local mineral governance in the Finnish mining context, where the instrument has not previously been tested. CBA is a locally negotiated arrangement designed to increase the local benefits of mining and mitigate its negative impacts through intensive collaboration and shared commitments. However, as CBA is adapted to the needs and characteristics of the novel societal context of Finland, its content and implementation require adjustments. I approach multistakeholder problems in local mineral governance with the lens of Collaborative Governance. Collaborative governance has been promoted as a response to complex policy problems that require negotiation, joint problem-solving, and implementation. In the theoretical framework, I position CBA within broader developments in the mining sector, suggesting that a new concept of Collaborative Mineral Governance could help make sense of the emerging approaches that rely on intensive modes of collaboration. The various approaches under the concept can be viewed as attempts to address the escalating tensions with mechanisms that recognize the role of the autonomous local community, the interdependence between the key actors, and the need for continuous and adaptive collaboration in the face of complex problems. In theory, this Collaborative Mineral Governance and its practical arrangements like the CBA can respond to many challenges present in mining, including decreasing trust, uncertainties, and contested decision-making. This dissertation builds on four published articles. The first article examines the special characteristics of collaborative governance with a conceptual focus, describing its benefits and challenges in natural resource governance. It defines why and where the investigated approach to collaboration in this dissertation can be useful. The second and third empirical articles focus on CBA through case studies of Finland and the municipality of Sodankylä. The articles describe the lessons learned from a Finnish adaptation of CBA, which was developed but not realized during an action research period from 2018 to 2021, together with the municipality of Sodankylä, local community groups, and mining companies. The fourth article analyzes the role of a researcher in collaborative governance interventions. The article complements a reflexive perspective on the conducted action research and the investigated CBA process in Sodankylä. Methodologically, the dissertation combines several research strategies and methods, including action research, case study, qualitative analysis of interviews and observational data, collective reflections, function analysis, and legal dogmatics. The findings validate the relevance of CBA within the context of Finnish mining governance. The case studies demonstrate that in Finland, CBA has potential to serve as a useful platform for collaboration, enabling a wide range of initiatives, such as economic cooperation, impact mitigation, deliberation, and trust-building. In the case study of Sodankylä, the parties representing local government, mining companies, and various community groups found individual and shared functions for the CBA and identified concrete measures that could serve them, including a joint monitoring program for water impacts and new forums for deliberation. CBA was also seen to have potential in addressing challenges and opportunities arising from the unique local social and environmental characteristics, which can be difficult to address with non-local instruments, such as state regulation. In the specific context of Sodankylä, a joint CBA, including all the major mining projects in the area, could provide a communication platform and a more holistic approach to address the cumulative impacts of the industry locally. At the same time, a voluntarily negotiated CBA in the Finnish case context did not appear optimal for serving unilateral economic functions or as a tool for contractual consent integrated into formal siting decisions. New transformative societal processes and environmental challenges are likely to increase the need for intensive participatory problem-solving mechanisms in the future. Based on this dissertation, the framework of collaborative governance provides new and needed tools for the mineral sector and impacted communities to implement CBA and other initiatives that can address multistakeholder problems. However, CBA is unlikely to provide immediate alleviation to those tensions in Finland that are rooted in perceptions of unfair siting decisions, as integrating CBA into permit processes would require more legislative changes. Furthermore, both CBA and collaborative governance in general demand resources and commitment from the key stakeholders, who may harbor suspicions and express skepticism based on previous experiences in weak participatory processes. If these challenges can be addressed, CBA in Finland could serve a role in the operational stages of a mine – functioning as a mechanism to increase local benefits, mitigate negative impacts, and resolve issues that necessitate collaboration over the lifetime of a mine.
... However, these relationships are not simple or spontaneous, necessitating management and network structure to attain a certain level of success. In complex shared power arrangements, policymakers, administrators, and multiple decision-makers must engage in collaborative governance to address difficult public problems that cannot be effectively addressed by a single public organization or even a single sector (Kern & Murphy, 2022). Well-designed collaborative governance can fail, according to Klijn (2008), this is typically due to the diversity of stakeholders engaged and the lack of adequate models or methodologies to encourage collaboration to enhance strategic learning among involved actors, manage conflict, create trust, share viewpoints, and discover and assess results. ...
Article
Full-text available
Since 1997, forest and land fires have occurred in the province of Riau (Handoko et al., 2021). Despite the government’s numerous efforts, forest and land fire suppression remains ineffective. This study aims to determine the influence of culture on the implementation of collaborative governance in controlling forest and land fires in Riau Province. The Ansell and Gash (2008) collaborative governance model was modified by including cultural and output variables. This quantitative study employs structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques and SmartPLS to assess hypotheses and analyze data. Data were gathered by distributing 150 questionnaires to multi-actors from five organizations active in controlling forest and land fires in Riau Province. The results showed that culture significantly influences the implementation of collaborative governance in controlling forest and land fires in Riau Province. Culture has a significant influence on building trust in collaboration. Furthermore, trust positively affects the output of collaboration, and output also influences the outcome of collaboration. However, facilitating leadership and institutional design do not significantly affect trust in collaboration in controlling forest and land fires in Riau Province.
Article
Resilience to climate change is not a process that can be done single‐handedly. Centring the focus around building both a climate‐resilient system and well‐rounded partnerships, the Kittitas Reclamation District (KRD), Washington State, USA, as part of the Yakima River Basin Integrated Water Resource Management Plan (YBIP), has been successful in mitigating water scarcity in the Kittitas Valley and benefitting the larger Yakima River Basin. By using collaborative governance, a decision‐making process that breaks down barriers and engages people across the boundaries of public agencies, different levels of government and the public, the KRD has modified its long‐term operational goals. The priority is now to establish if a proposed project can provide benefits to other interests and their water needs throughout the Yakima River Basin. We must work together to look at the big picture of a large geographical area in an effort to solve multiple water issues through a single project. As part of YBIP, the goals come to fruition through comprehensive planning for water conservation and the established relationships the partners have with each other. We work together using trust, respect and civility to move towards action and acknowledging that achieving our goals is made possible through collaboration. Opportunities to work together are sought out and taken so that water conservation and other water resiliency projects can be funded and implemented as quickly as possible in an effort to plan for future water scarcity. Protecting the certainty of the water supply for the future of the farms and the ecosystem is of utmost importance.
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This article suggests a framework to study service delivery networks that draws on the theories of collaboration, co-production, and networks combined. We introduce four dimensions of co-production under ‘coproduction-oriented collaborations’. This framework allows us to ‘zoom in and zoom out’ when we study networks. Using the case method approach, the framework is applied to analyse four networks in Singapore. Findings suggest that network process, network structure, and characteristics of actors are crucial to a network’s performance and coproduction’s effectiveness. This article also offers implications for practice that in certain contexts the usage of these concepts is for managerial effectiveness and not for enhancing democratic values.
Article
en The growth of collaborative approaches to governance has resulted in increasingly complex policy and management landscapes, where actors are presented with ever‐increasing numbers of decision‐making venues they can participate in and actors they can collaborate with. Given that actors face constraints on their capacity to manage actor and venue relationships in such polycentric governance systems, we assume the marginal benefit of yet another relationship should begin to diminish at some level of engagement. Furthermore, we hypothesize that such capacity limitations are not static, but decrease as actors learn, develop skills, and formulate strategies for how to navigate complex polycentric systems more effectively. Drawing on the Ecology of Games framework, this article investigates two Swedish collaborative governance initiatives where a multitude of actors came together to address a range of different, but interrelated, policy issues and management tasks. The empirical findings suggest that actors’ capacities to successfully navigate polycentric governance arrangements increase as they gain experience and develop their networking skills. Our findings imply there is a need to balance increased complexity in polycentric systems with increased capacity, otherwise the overall effect of an ever‐increasing number of venues and actors could be collaborative fatigue and decreased abilities to address diverse governance challenges. Abstract zh 协同治理方法的发展带来了越加复杂的政策和管理环境,在这些环境中,行为者可以参与的决策场所以及可以合作的伙伴都越来越多。在这种多中心治理体系中,行为者管理参与者和场所关系的能力有限。由此,我们认为,增加一种关系所带来的边际效益应该会在某一参与度上开始减少。此外,我们假设这种能力的局限不是静态的,而是随着行动者学习、发展技能,以及制定更有效地驾驭复杂多中心体系的策略而降低。借助生态博弈学框架,本文对瑞典的两个协同治理计划进行了探讨。在这两个治理计划中,有众多参与者聚集在一起来解决一系列有差异但相互关联的政策问题和管理任务。我们的实证研究结果表明,随着行动者获得更多经验并提高网络技能,他们成功驾驭多中心治理安排的能力会得到增强。我们的研究结果表明,多中心体系在扩容,我们需要权衡随之增加的复杂性,否则不断增加的场地和行为者带来的总体影响将会是协作疲劳和应对各种治理挑战的能力的降低。
Book
Organizations turn to multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) to meet challenges they cannot handle alone. By tapping diverse stakeholders' resources, MSPs develop the capability to address complex issues and problems, such as health care delivery, poverty, human rights, watershed management, education, sustainability, and innovation. This book provides a comprehensive understanding of MSPs, why they are needed, the challenges partners face in working together, and how to design them effectively. Through the process of collaboration partners combine their differing strengths, vantage points, and expertise to craft innovative responses to pressing societal concerns. The book offers valuable advice for leaders about how to design and scale up effective partnerships and how to address potential obstacles partners may face, such as dealing with the conflicts and power issues likely to arise as partners negotiate with each other. Drawing on three comprehensive cases and countless shorter examples from around the world, the book offers practical advice for organizations embarking on an MSP, as well as theoretical understanding of how partnerships function. Using an institutional theory lens, it explains how partnerships can effect change in institutional fields by reducing turbulence and negotiating a common set of norms and routines to govern partners' future interactions within the field of concern. Topics covered include: the nature of working collaboratively, why partnerships are needed, types of partnerships, guidelines for partnership design, partnerships and field dynamics, how to deal with conflicts among partners, negotiating across power differences, partnerships for sustainability, collaborative governance, working across scale differences, and how partnerships transform fields.
Article
Collaborative governance regimes (CGRs) are often viewed as a means to be more inclusive of diverse actors than other forms of governance. However, collaboration can also reinforce preexisting power and resource dynamics instead of distributing resources and facilitating joint action. This article tests seven hypotheses concerning how the structural position of an actor within a policy network influences said actor's ability to access resources through participation in CGRs. We then test these hypotheses using data generated by a survey of 400 actors within a regional environmental governance network that contains 57 CGRs. Using exponential random graph models (ERGMs) designed to account for network dependencies, we test how various attributes of network structure - in terms of an actor's connections to other actors and to CGRs - influence that actor's ability to access resources through CGR participation. We find that actors who benefit from participation in one CGR are more likely to benefit from participation in other CGRs as well, speaking to the potential for CGRs to further existing imbalances rather than distribute benefits more equitably. Further, CGRs that foster principled engagement (increased face-to-face communication, development of common problem understanding, and awareness of other network actors) are strongly associated with actors' ability to access financial, human, and technical resources through participation. Although the CGRs we study do improve actors' access to network resources, this can occur in ways that further existing inequities in resource access. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research Association. All rights reserved.
Article
Environmental conflict is complex and variable, and over time, a concerted field has developed to study processes for collaboration and resolution. This article examines the evaluations of multistakeholder collaborative processes underpinning the field of Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR). Specifically, we analyze ECR evaluations from over four decades, across different approaches, geographies, and scales. We also corroborate our findings through interviews and discussions with key scholars and practitioners in the field. We highlight the valuable empirical data from evaluations and point to a three‐pronged approach for reinvigorating evaluations that support practitioners and projects and promote broader ideals of ECR collaboration.
Article
Scholars have engaged in an ongoing dialogue about the relationships among management, politics, and law in public administration. Collaborative governance presents new challenges to this dynamic. While scholars have made substantial contributions to our understanding of the design and practice of collaborative governance, others suggest that we lack theory for this emerging body of research. Law is often omitted as a variable. Scholarship generally does not explicitly include collaboration as a public value. This article addresses the dialogue on management, politics, and law with regard to collaborative governance. It provides an overview of the current legal framework for collaborative governance in the United States at the federal, state, and local levels of government and identifies gaps. The institutional analysis and development framework provides a body of theory that incorporates rules and law into research design. The article concludes that future research on collaborative governance should incorporate the legal framework as an important variable and collaboration as a public value.
Article
How can ripeness theory be extended to explain when and why parties remain at the negotiating table until an agreement is reached? Existing ripeness theory is crucial in understanding when conflicting parties consider negotiation as preferable to continued fighting. However, factors which may explain why parties stay at the negotiation table after the start of the negotiation process – that is, how the ripe moment is sustained until an agreement has been reached – are not well elaborated. This study seeks to extend ripeness theory and argues that organizationally fragmented rebel groups are less flexible to make concessions and unlikely to stay at the negotiation table until an agreement is reached, especially when there is a lack of cohesion between the military and political branches. This argument is explored through a structured focused comparison of the peace negotiations in Colombia and in the Philippines with communist rebel groups.
Article
A mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary but insufficient condition for the opening of negotiations, direct or mediated. It is subject to perception, buffered by many insulating ploys even if it seems to exist objectively. Thus, the major challenge for a mediator in most cases is to ripen the parties' perceptions. In addition to the attitudinal challenge, there are structural challenges posed by other types of stalemates and near-stalemates, which call for not only persuasion but also manipulation by the mediator. The ultimate challenge to a mediator is to move successful negotiations producing conflict management onto the consummating phase of negotiations for conflict resolution. But the first removes the incentive for the second, since it ceases the violence that is the most effective source of pain.
Article
This article proposes ways to assess the public value that cross-sector collaborations produce. It introduces a framework featuring three dimensions of public value – democratic accountability, procedural legitimacy, and substantive outcomes – that reflect distinct priorities and concerns for public administration. Utilizing examples from research on a multi-year cross-sector collaboration in the transportation field, we illustrate the framework's application and identify techniques and challenges for assessing the collaborative creation of public value. The article concludes with questions and propositions to guide future research.