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Environment, Development and Sustainability (2023) 25:6295–6318
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-022-02303-9
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From scenario tomounting risks: COVID‑19’s perils
fordevelopment andsupply security intheSahel
MohammadAl‑Saidi1· SuhairA.GayoumSaad2· NadirAhmedElagib3
Received: 13 May 2021 / Accepted: 16 March 2022 / Published online: 7 April 2022
© The Author(s) 2022
Abstract
The African Sahel countries are inherently fragile, environmentally insecure and eco-
nomically weak. This paper underscores the compounded impacts brought about by the
COVID-19 pandemic on resource supply security and, hence, the long-term development
of the region. It outlines the Sahel-specific COVID-19 scenario by firstly highlighting the
underlying vulnerabilities and later linking the health sector outcomes to increased politi-
cal instability and environmental insecurity, particularly the deterioration of food security.
In this sense, this paper shows from a region-wide perspective how COVID-19 in the Sahel
is associated with enlarged sociopolitical developmental perils. Lower remittance sent by
expatriates, violent conflicts, increased cross-border terrorism and migration, discrimi-
nant mobility restrictions of people and goods, weak national healthcare infrastructures,
bottlenecks in international aid, pressures on the education system and recent climate
extremes are some revealing examples of aggravators of the impacts on the supply of vital
resources, such as food. This paper also shows the importance of considering the close
interlinks between health, food and political stability in the Sahel. There is a paramount
need for more comprehensive approaches linking human health to other sectors, and for
re-considering local sustainable agriculture. To avoid prolonged or recurrent humanitarian
crises, the Sahel countries need to strengthen response capacities through public sector-led
responses. Examples of these responses include reinforced national disaster programs for
the vulnerable, support to sustainable agriculture and food markets, improved performance
and communication of public sector relief, state-based cooperation, building of regional
alliances and peacemaking efforts.
Keywords COVID-19· Risk· Security· Sustainable development· International aid·
Sahel
* Nadir Ahmed Elagib
nelagib@uni-koeln.de; elagib@hotmail.com
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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1 Introduction
For a long time, the Sahel countries (Fig.1) have faced a combination of security, envi-
ronmental and developmental problems. These problems have placed the region among
the poorest in the world. The current COVID-19 crisis has been described as a game
changer for development in Africa although COVID-19’s repercussions are still unfold-
ing (Barbier & Burgess, 2020; Brown, 2021; Sachs etal., 2020).
COVID-19 arrived in the Sahel region at the end of February 2020 after one month
of announcing it as pandemic. The first case announced in the region was in Nigeria
on February 28, 2020, then Senegal, till reaching the whole Sahel by March 26, 2020
in Mali. Until the third week of October 2021, the confirmed COVID-19 cases in the
Sahel exceeded 700 thousands, compared to 6 million in the whole Africa, with an aver-
age mortality rate of 2% which is similar to the global average rate (WHO, 2021a). It is
likely that the real number is far above these official statistics. Meanwhile, donor organi-
zations have been sounding the alarm about the impact of the COVID-19 crisis while
few academic studies have highlighted the compounded health and economic impacts
in Africa (e.g., Obayelu etal., 2021; Elebesunu et al. 2021). Although the number of
COVID-19 cases in the Sahel region has been lower than in other regions, it imposed
hard pressure on health systems (Molyneux etal., 2020; Dasgupta & Robinson, 2021),
with impacts extending to other areas such as the food sector. This situation coupled
with economic shrinkage after partial or complete lockdown could reflect desperately
on the ongoing efforts to eliminate food insecurity and other health problems in the
region, especially malnutrition (UNICEF, 2020b), malaria (WHO, 2019), tuberculo-
sis (Okeke, 2019) and children routine immunization programs (Mihigo etal., 2015).
International organizations also started to face funding problems if donating countries
reduce or stop aid (United Nations 2020b). These common impacts on the African
region necessitate a much broader analysis beyond single disturbance. For the Sahel,
Fig. 1 Map of the Sahel region and countries
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studies linking COVID-19 to common regional challenges and developmental repercus-
sions are lacking.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, there were several calls to increase the preparedness
and ramp-up responses of Africa, and specifically in vulnerable regions such as the Sahel.
The suggested measures targeted the health sector through testing and containment (Seng-
hore etal., 2020), the food sector through sustainable local agriculture (Hickey & Unwin,
2020), improved access to water (Anim & Ofori-Asenso, 2020), wastewater surveillance
and monitoring (Street etal., 2020), resilience in the tourism sector (Rogerson & Baum,
2020) or aid for the education sector (Lewin, 2020). Almost two years into the crisis, there
is a lack of systematic analyses of the success of response efforts and the compounded
effects of COVID-19 on the Sahel region.
This paper focuses on the impacts on a vital supply sector, namely food, and relates
these impacts to the developmental context of the region. It illustrates a unique Sahel sce-
nario, namely how the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated underlying vulnerabilities in
areas of health, environmental and political stability, and thus increased sociopolitical risks
and worsened supply insecurities. In fact, considering the youthful population of Africa,
COVID-19 might result in a lower rate of mortality and morbidity than in other places,
or in “manageable” effects on individual sectors due to previous experiences with disease
outbreaks (Winning, 2020). COVID-19 might, nonetheless, prove to be a more serious
stressor for the overall economic, developmental and security context of the Sahel than in
some other regions with higher COVID-19 cases. Due to the specific context of the Sahel,
which exhibits a range of long-standing vulnerabilities, the region requires more specific
and coherent analyses. The multifaceted turbulences caused by the COVID-19 have been
evident over the course of the pandemic. They can change both priorities and perceptions
of international cooperation and development (Oldekop etal., 2020). The socioeconomic
and political impacts may last for years if not decades.
Figure2 outlines the overall design and research steps of this paper. We aim at provid-
ing a structured and aggregated analysis of the COVID-19 impacts on the Sahel region
by considering its specific development and environmental context. This analysis can help
break up the storm brought about by the COVID-19 through understanding the broader
picture of the Sahel developmental context and addressing weak spots. The paper starts
by describing the Sahel’s recent context and, then, outlines the specific Sahel scenario in
facing the COVID-19 storm of health sector disruptions compounded by interaction with
environmental and sociopolitical aggravators. At the same time, we focus in the verification
of the Sahel scenario on the compounded impacts on the food sector. Using country-level
examples and conceptualizations of the COVID-19 scenarios, the Sahel case is embedded
in the specific reality and the recent vulnerabilities of this developing region, particularly
the factors related to aid dependence, political fragility, supply insecurity and susceptibility
Fig. 2 Research outline and steps
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to climatic-related disasters and extremes. The example of food security illustrates how
those underlying vulnerabilities, together with the pandemic impacts, created a perfect
storm of developmental perils. In discussing the implications of this Sahel scenario, we
emphasize the need for specific frameworks and tailored strategies for long-term resilience
in the Sahel.
2 The Sahel’s COVID‑19 case: caught inastorm
2.1 Recent developmental context: abad timing forCOVID‑19
According to the World Bank (2020), the last couple of years did not entail many upward
signs in development indicators. Economic growth has been generally lower in the last dec-
ade, averaging 4.9% for all the nine Sahel countries, except Eritrea, in 2009–2018 in com-
parison with 5.8% in 1999–2008. There has been a slight improvement in 2019 when eco-
nomic growth grew to an average of around 5% compared with only an average of around
4% in three years before (African Development Bank Group, 2020; World Bank, 2020).
Except for the strong performance of Ethiopia, economic growth has been erratic (Fig.3),
especially true for the landlocked, resource-poor and politically fragile states of Burkina
Faso, Chad, Niger and Mali. In addition, the humanitarian crisis has worsened in the Sahel
in the last decade. Migration within the Sahel countries and toward the exterior increased
due to environmental degradation and security challenges (OCHA, 2016). In seven Sahel
countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, Senegal and Chad), the num-
ber of internally displaced people due to conflicts and natural disaster has increased lately,
with the total number in these countries jumping from around 448 thousand people in
2018 to 1.4 million in 2019 (IDMC, 2020). Most recent concerns tie the rise of Jihadist
groups in the Sahel to crime and contraband (Barkindo, 2020). Shortly before the COVID-
19 outbreak, scholars have been warning of a catastrophe in the Sahel. Rapidly growing
Fig. 3 Average growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Sahel region 1999–2019 at market prices
using constant local currency. Abbreviations: BFA: Burkina Faso; TCD: Chad; ETH: Ethiopia; ERI: Eri-
trea; MLI: Mali; MRT: Mauritania; NER: Niger; NGA: Nigeria; SEN: Senegal; SDN: Sudan. Source: The
World Bank (2020) for data from 1999–2001; African Development Bank Group (2020) for GDP estima-
tions for the year 2019. Eritrea is not considered due to lack of consistent data
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population, climate extremes, food insecurities and violence meant that the Sahel was
heading toward “a perfect storm” of misery (Graves etal., 2019). COVID-19 might have
brought the storm into the heart of the Sahel.
In the Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), the number of food insecure peo-
ple rose to 4.8 million in May 2020 in comparison with 3.9 million prior to COVID-19
(WFP, 2020). In July 2021, an increase to 8.7 million was reported (WFP, 2021). This
increase was also linked to a severe lean season and massive locust swarms (Salih etal.,
2020; WFP, 2020). The lockdowns and border restrictions imposed have led to livelihood
losses in the agro-pastoral industries and severe consequences for food markets and supply
chains (Refugees International, 2020). Considering the combined use of land for agricul-
ture, fuelwood and water-related services, the impacts are probably well beyond the food
sector (Elagib & Al-Saidi, 2020). In addition, the security threat has increased with some
reports of terrorist groups exploiting the pandemic to destabilize governments (UN News,
2020b).
2.2 Underlying vulnerabilities: little prepared forapandemic
In order to face the current pandemic, the Sahel countries have responded with emergency
plans while taking measures for ensuring basic supply. However, the responses require a
level of preparedness and resource endowment, both of which have been lacking in the
Sahel despite some country-level differences (Collier, 2007). In fact, all the Sahel coun-
tries rank very low on development and environmental indices, with relatively better scores
for Ethiopia, Nigeria and partly Senegal (Table1). All the Sahel countries are considered
prone to climate/water-related disasters, such as droughts and floods (Elagib & Elhag,
2011; Elagib etal., 2021; Hulme, 2001; Kerr, 1985; Tarhule, 2005; Tschakert etal., 2010).
They also rank rather low on the achievement of food and energy securities, and are among
the world’s most fragile states (Parry et al., 1999; World Bank, 2013). These compound
economic and environmental problems in the Sahel mean that certain communities depend
on international aid (Somerville, 2018). Environmental vulnerability and aid politics led
to the political marginalization of some ethnic groups and remote communities (Raleigh,
2010). In addition, the Sahel region exhibits strong migratory flows. Firstly, the pastoral
and subsistence-based livelihoods in the Sahel mean that mobility and labor migration
(across states) are high. Secondly, environmental degradation and climate change can
increase migration in disaster-prone areas (Hummel, 2016). Thirdly, long-standing migra-
tion toward Europe has received more attention lately, leading to more controls, border
restrictions and aid (Raineri & Rossi, 2017). Even without COVID-19, there have been
massive pressures on Sahel governments to address insecurities and provide opportunities
for their young and rapidly growing populations.
The health systems in the Sahel region, similar to all African countries, are very frag-
ile with challenges of poor workforce, financial problems and poor management practices
(Oleribe etal., 2019). In Africa, the average density of healthcare workers per 10,000 peo-
ple is 57 compared to 583 for higher income countries (WHO, 2018). During the pan-
demic, stressed health systems in many countries have increased deaths from other diseases
or worsened communities’ health. For example, people are avoiding going to hospitals
even after having sever health problems, such as heart attacks and normal chronic diseases
(Hafner, 2020; Kaufman, 2020). Despite the weak health situation, some analysts predict
that, due to its different demographic characteristics, the health impact of COVID-19 for
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Table 1 Performance of the Sahel countries in relation to key global indices of health, development and environmental security
a The GFSI covers affordability, availability and quality of food: https:// foods ecuri tyind ex. eiu. com/. The GHSI assesses health security and capabilities across the categories
of prevention, detection and reporting, rapid responses, health system, compliance with international norms and risk environment: https:// www. ghsin dex. org/. The GESI is
a comprehensive energy index proposed by Azzuni & Breyer (2020), and includes several energy, environmental and political economic dimensions. The SFI measures the
vulnerability to conflict or state collapse through the categories of cohesion (security apparatus, fractionalization and group grievances) as well as other socioeconomic and
political categories: https:// fragi lesta tesin dex. org/. The HDI is a common United Nations developmental index using income, health and educational indicators: http:// hdr.
undp. org/. The WorldRiskReport 2019 measures the risk to disaster caused by extreme natural events with a focus on water-related disasters, including categories of risk, haz-
ard, exposure, susceptibility, coping and adaptation: https:// weltr isiko beric ht. de/. The SDGI tracks country performance on the 17 Sustainable development Goals (SDGs), as
agreed by the international community in 2015 with equal weight to all 17 goals (Sachs etal., 2020)
b A higher rank indicates a worse scoring (e.g., 113 from 113 means the worst performing country). The ranking order in some indices was reversed, namely in the State Fra-
gility Index (now, rank 178 = most fragile) and the WorldRiskReport (now rank 189 = highest risk)
BFA Burkina Faso; TCD Chad; ETH Ethiopia; ERI Eritrea; MLI Mali; MRT Mauritania; NER Niger; NGA Nigeria; SEN Senegal; SDN Sudan
Global Index (year of the index version; total number of ranks)a,b BFA TCD ETH ERI MLI MRT NER NGA SEN SDN
GFSI: Global Food Security Index (2019; 113) 87 109 91 – 80 - 89 94 81 99
GHSI: Global Health Security Index (2019; 195) 145 150 84 178 147 157 132 96 95 163
GESI: Global Energy Security Index (2020; 229) 129 160 81 145 139 144 108 102 73 125
SFI: State Fragility Index (2020; 178) 142 172 158 161 163 146 160 165 107 171
HDI: Human Development Index (2019; 189) 182 187 173 182 184 161 189 158 166 168
WorldRiskReport (Focus: Water) (2019; 180) 147 150 116 99 145 114 159 157 137 122
SDGI: Sustainable development Goals Score Index, SDGI (2020; 166) 137 164 136 – 156 130 157 160 127 159
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the Sahel region could actually be lower than in other world regions. The share of popula-
tion above the age of 50 is only 10% for sub-Saharan Africa compared to 40% in Europe
(OECD, 2020a).
3 Methods: assessing andoutlining theCOVID‑19 scenarios
3.1 Conceptual framework andscenario descriptions
The high vulnerability of basic care, supply and security systems in the Sahel suggests seri-
ous impacts of COVID-19. The pandemic trajectory has been quite specific in the region,
and is explained in this paper using a conceptual framework depicted in Fig.4. This frame-
work seeks to organize the analysis in this paper by providing some expected impacts and
ancillary effects that we outline in three scenarios. The first scenario represents the basic
or universal course of COVID-19 impacts. The second scenario is built by adding general
ancillary effects (probable and additional events) specific for developing countries. The
third scenario extends developing countries scenario by adding another layer of aggravat-
ing factors specific to the Sahel region. These three scenarios can lead to different lev-
els of sociopolitical risks, i.e., tangible disruptions of functioning of societies in terms of
socioeconomic order and political systems. The focus of this paper is on synthesizing cur-
rent evidence on COVID-19 in the Sahel in order to explain and discuss the third scenario
(Sects.4 and 5). However, the three scenarios are introduced briefly here. First, the core or
common scenario is valid worldwide where COVID-19 causes a stress on the health sector,
leading to lockdowns, a slowdown of economic and production activities and, eventually,
supply securities. This phase meant that the Sahel countries were imposing lockdowns and
restrictions on economic activities. The Sahel countries have requested increased funding
from multilateral donors, cancelled upcoming elections, introduced some national sup-
port funds and utilized existing health monitoring systems supported by the World Health
Organization (WHO) during the Ebola outbreaks (Gandhi etal., 2020).
Second, developing countries might experience more severe disruptions. Under this sce-
nario, the basic health care system can face collapse while social and ethnic distress, pov-
erty, inequalities and shortages in basic supply are expected to increase. There is already
some evidence of these effects in the Sahel such as the earlier-mentioned increase of food
insecurity. In June 2020, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres
warned of a dire humanitarian crisis caused by economic decline, shortages of food supply,
Fig. 4 COVID-19 scenarios in the context of developing countries in general and the Sahel region in par-
ticular. The different frame/color combinations distinguish the scenarios of negative pressures caused by
COVID-19 that can be enlarged due to additional aggravating factors
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lower remittances from workers abroad and security risks (Lederer, 2020). There have been
some outcries against the economic hardships of the lockdown measures. The lockdown
can undermine civil liberties and increase marginalization of groups in peripheral areas
(Bisson etal., 2020).
Third, a longer-term scenario includes Sahel-specific aggravating factors. This sce-
nario can lead to a perfect storm of humanitarian jeopardy. Some of these factors have
already started to materialize. We already explained how climate variability and natural
disasters, such as changes in rainfall and locust swarms, increased the humanitarian sit-
uation in the Sahel in recent years. Recently, the UN has asked for emergency funds to
face the locust swarms in the Sahel during the COVID-19 crisis (Parkin, 2020; Salih etal.,
2020). Furthermore, the security situation has been tense in the region with recent ter-
rorist attacks and an escalation of the Libyan conflict that can affect the Sahel. Another
unknown but important factor in the Sahel scenario is international aid. Aid agencies have
called for increased funding for the Sahel, with the UN appealing for $2.8 billion to reach
17 million people in need, out of which only 18% were received as of May 2020 (Schlein,
2020). The European Union and other donors have pledged further aid. Some reports sug-
gested a mobilization of $57 billion by official creditors (including IMF and the World
Bank) and $13 billion by private creditors for Africa in 2020 (Modern Diplomacy, 2020).
However, considering the increasing fiscal problems of states worldwide, it is not sure how
much aid is going to reach the Sahel or be dedicated to the immediate COVID-19 impacts.
Donors might decide to provide debt relief instead of additional aid or to direct more aid
toward improving the access of Africa and the Sahel to COVID-19 vaccines. In fact, the
access of Sahel countries to COVID-19 therapeutics and potential vaccines is a key factor
in this crisis. The UN hasadvocated equal and quick access for the group of underdevel-
oped countries. Furthermore, during the course of the COVID-19 crisis, Sahel countries
can face significant discriminations with regard to mobility of people and goods. For exam-
ple, the conditioning of COVID-19 testing for international travel and the rise in air ticket
and freight costs are bound to be more hurtful to low-income countries.
3.2 Data collection andlimitations
This paper uses the above-described framework to investigate the COVID-19 scenario in
the Sahel and its repercussions on development and supply security in the context of the
pre-crisis vulnerability of the region. Data collected for this analysis can be divided in two
parts. First, to depict the early stage of the crisis, data were collected continuously upon the
onset of COVID-19 crisis. Here, secondary data mainly from international organizations
were used to depict the Sahel’s vulnerability (see Sect.2). Besides, data on COVID-19’s
early impacts were collected from secondary resources and the scarce academic literature
during the period March 2020 until October 2021. Second, a systematic literature review
was conducted in October 2021 to complement and validate the scenarios’ analysis. A Sco-
pus research using the keywords “Sahel” and “COVID-19″ only results in 9 documents,
indicating the scarce knowledge using a regional viewpoint. However, adding the names
of the Sahel countries, more than 1400 entries are found in Scopus (stand mid October
2021), with 804 entries from medicine, and 287 in social sciences. Since this paper focuses
on aspects relating to development, supply security and sociopolitical risks, we limited the
literature selection by seeking studies (between 2020 until October 2021) with the follow-
ing keyterms in the title, abstract or keywords: COVID-19, the Sahel or any Sahel coun-
try name, as well as any of theterms "security,” “supply,” “development,” “food,” “risk.”
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The resulting dataset of 572 that included a large portion of social sciences studies (174
papers) was sorted out by including only original research or review papers as well as
excluding papers with a too-specific focus (e.g., COVID-19-related diseases or sectors not
related to resource supply, wider developmental impacts or sociopolitical risks). Besides,
the final dataset (28 studies), which was closely studied, resulted in several publications
indicating similar country-level insights (e.g., on increased food insecurity). Therefore, and
considering the limited scope of this paper, we used representative papers for a common
argument, and later added the ones with complementary insights. The paper’s analysis of
COVID-19’s developmental perils is placed within a growing body of literature, and we
therefore focused on key sectors such as health (as the baseline impact), water, food and
security. Education, water security and climate change also feature in this analysis in rela-
tion to compounded impacts on (resource supply) security, e.g., educational disruptions
or climate-related events causing food impasses and security concerns. Future studies can
relate to other impacts or seek to quantify them across the Sahel.
4 Results: assessing andoutlining thedistinctive COVID‑19 case
oftheSahel
4.1 Health sector: pandemics mitigation andaid bottlenecks
In fighting COVID-19 pandemic, the Sahel countries adopted several containment and mit-
igation measures recommended by WHO, e.g., quarantines, confinements, travel restric-
tions and closing of education institutions and public places. Mandating masks in public
places has become a main action to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in Burkina Faso, Mau-
ritania, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria and Chad (OECD, 2020b). Imposing of COVID-19 contain-
ment measures in the Sahel has been very difficult as authorities complained about citi-
zens’ non-compliance with directives and recommendations. This attitude results from the
fact that a large part of the population in this region is comprised of irregular workers who
can lose their income if they stay home. Besides, access to COVID-19 testing has been lim-
ited in the region. Evidence shows that the majority of population in Sahel and low-income
countries have experienced some form of income loss due to COVID-19 (Josephson etal.,
2021). Some governments provided cash funds or food supplies received from interna-
tional organizations or from own resources. The Nigerian government, for instance, created
coronavirus intervention fund of $1.39 billion to fight COVID-19 (Africa News, 2020).
Although such funds have been intended to help vulnerable groups abide by the lockdown,
they have been limited and only covered the need of a small part of the population.
With regard to the progression of the pandemic, COVID-19 cases increased rap-
idly, reached a peak in July, August and September 2020 in most of the Sahel countries
(Fig.5a). As of October 2021, the total number of cases were spectacularly varying in the
region with confirmed cases exceeded 700 thousands (Fig.5b) compared to 6 million in the
whole Africa, and with an average mortality rate of 2% that is similar to the global aver-
age. The highest number was recorded in Ethiopia (> 360,000 cases and 6316 deaths) and
the lowest was in Chad (5000 cases and 174 deaths) according to WHO (2021a). However,
these figures might still not be the real figures due to the weak national healthcare infra-
structures in detecting all cases and also due to many people abandoning reporting in fear
of being stigmatized by their infection. In fact, COVID-19 has amplified problems of the
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fragile health care systems in Africa—a continent that has been found unprepared to deal
with this pandemic (Elebesunu etal., 2021).
The ability of the Sahel countries to mitigate COVID-19 impacts has also been rely-
ing on international aid; however, the aid commitments and delivery havefaced some
bottlenecks. After declaring COVID-19 as a pandemic, the WHO called for a COVID-
19 Solidarity Response Fund aiming at providing funding from action partners of at
least US$ 675 million to effect crucial responses in most vulnerable countries. Until
November 9, 2020, only around US$ 250 million was collected. The solidarity fund
Fig. 5 Number of cases of COVID-19 in the Sahel countries. a Monthly and b total till October 2021. Data
source: WHO (2020a). See Fig.1 or Table1 for abbreviations
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was created at the request of WHO by the United Nations Foundation in Partnership
jointly with the Swiss Philanthropy Foundation. In April 2020, the first United Nations
“Solidarity Flight” left Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in order to transport vital medical cargo
to all countries in Africa and to contain the spread of COVID-19 (WHO, 2021b). In
June 2020, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) appealed for urgent $186 million to facili-
tate its humanitarian assistance intended to prevent the acceleration of existing conflicts
in the Sahel region as a result of COVID-19 (UN News, 2020a). In 2021, the WHO
launched an appeal for US$ 1.96 billion to fulfil the requirements of the 2021 Strategic
Preparedness and Response plan (WHO, 2021b). Funding needs are likely to increase as
this outbreak evolves.
It is quite difficult to track funding flows in the Sahel region due to lack of data and/
or discrepancy between funding pledges and reality. As shown in Table 2, the main
funding parties and aid programs for the region are the World Bank group (WB), Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Food Programme (WFP). Other partners also
financially supported some countries in the region through the United Nations Interna-
tional Children’s Fund (UNICEF, 2021), e.g., funding from the UK (£19 million) and
from the European Union (€10 million) to Ethiopia and lifesaving supplies to Chad
(UNICEF, 2020a). In October 2020, the UN Secretary-General appealed for $2.4 Bil-
lion to cover humanitarian needs in the Sahel region through the next year, warning
that the region is at ‘a breaking point’ (United Nations, 2020a). In fact, COVID-19 has
aggravated the health and humanitarian situation in the region while some of the newly
rising pressures are transboundary. In November 2020 for example, Sudan received
more than 40,000 Ethiopian refugees who fled across the border to eastern Sudan fol-
lowing the eruption of conflict in the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia, and the influx
was expected to increase to 100,000 refugees over the next six months due to continued
fighting (OCHA, 2020b). The Sudanese health officials called for health aid to the refu-
gees in the refugee camps against COVID-19, AIDS, hepatitis, tuberculosis and other
illnesses (Sudan Tribune, 2020).
Additionally, there existed several bottlenecks with regard the COVID-19 vaccine.
As a new disease, COVID-19 had no ready drug, but the only possible control of this
pandemic was through the prescribed precaution measures and later through immuniza-
tion. With several vaccines deployed in late 2020 and early 2021, rich countries have
already vaccinated millions of their population. Arrival and administration of vaccines
to poor countries, including the Sahel region, show poor performance. Until Novem-
ber 2021, only 42 million doses of different approved types of vaccines were received
in all Sahel countries with average administration percentage of 33% (WHO Regional
Office for Africa, 2021). The very limited capacity of manufacturing the vaccine locally
in the Sahel is compounded by financial and logistic constraints as well as a lack of
adequate supply chains of vaccine doses. For example, difficulties might arise with
regard to maintaining a cold chain for a proper distribution of the vaccines, especially
to rural areas. This situation resembles that of the HIV drugs as Africa has been lagging
years behind the world in controlling the spread of diseases (Nkengasong etal., 2020).
Meanwhile, the WHO and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) had submitted
the Vaccine Readiness Assessment Tool to all 47 African countries with a roadmap to
plan for the introduction of COVID 19 vaccines (WHO, 2020). In summary, the long-
standing vulnerabilities and negative impacts related to fragile health systems, a sudden
COVID-19 outbreak and a lack of access to the vaccines and therapeutics have created
fertile ground for regional instability, which has worsen the resource supply security
and safety as to be discussed in next chapters.
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Table 2 COVID-19 response funding to the Sahel region
1 In March 2020, the World Bank announced the COVID-19 Fast Track Facility to support countries’ response to the pandemic. It addresses both emergency containment and
mitigation needs for COVID-19, including strengthening countries’ health systems to treat severe cases and save lives. Source: https:// www. world bank. org/ en/ news/ facts heet/
2020/ 06/ 02/ world- banks- respo nse- to- covid- 19- coron avirus- in- africa
2 On December 15, 2020—The World Bank approved three projects to support the economic recovery and improve access to and the quality of basic social services in Burkina
Faso and Chad. These projects will help both countries respond to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the humanitarian crisis. The World Bank also confirmed Bur-
kina Faso’s eligibility for the Prevention and Resilience Allocation. (PRA)
Source: The World Bank Boosts Support to the Sahel for a Resilient Recovery from the Security and Economic Crisis
3 IMF granted Emergency Financing and Debt Service Relief for Sub-Saharan Africa in total amount of $14,597 Million or 32 Countries in this region. Source: https:// www.
imf. org/ en/ Topics/ imf- and- covid 19
4 In order to respond to COVID-19, WFP has ramped up support to fight against hunger by giving food assistance and cash money in some areas to support poor families.
WFP provided support to other organizations through expert knowledge (e.g., in data collection and analysis, policy and advocacy support) and logistics capacity in order to
insure the reach of humanitarian aid and health supplies to the target areas. Source: https:// www. wfp. org/ emerg encies/ covid- 19- pande mic
5 The OIC through the Islamic Development Bank Group (IsDB) has launched a $2.3 billion Strategic Preparedness and Response Programme to help cushion the adverse
health, social and economic effects of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in the OIC Member States. Source: https:// anba. com. br/ en/ mauri tania- gets- finan cial-
grant- to- fight- coron avirus/
6 The COVID-19 response of MSF focuses on three main priorities: supporting authorities to provide care for COVID-19 patients; protecting people who are vulnerable and at
risk; and keeping essential medical services running. Source: https:// www. msf. org/ covid- 19
BFA Burkina Faso; TCD Chad; ETH Ethiopia; ERI Eritrea; MLI Mali; MRT Mauritania; NER Niger; NGA Nigeria; SEN Senegal; SDN Sudan; N/A not-applicable or non-
available
Funds and aid programs (April 2020 till April 2021) BFA TCD ETH ERI MLI MRT NER NGA SEN SDN
WB: World Bank Group (funds in millions of US$)121.15 16.9 347.5 0 25.8 75.2 13.9 0 20 0
WB: World Bank Group (Boosting funds in millions of US$)2800 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IMF: International Monetary Fund (funds in millions of US$)3115.3 183 411 0 $200 130 114.5 0 442 0
WFP: World Food Programme4Yes Ye s Ye s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OIC: Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)5N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Ye s N/A N/A Yes N/A
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (patient treatment)6N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Ye s N/A N/A N/A
United Arab Emirates (tons of healthcare supplies) 8 N/A 33 N/A 6 18 6 N/A N/A 11
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4.2 Water andfood: climate risk, conflicts andresource supply security
Over the course of the pandemic, sub-Saharan countries ranking low on food security
performance (e.g., suffering from malnutrition) had also witnessed increased rates of
fatal COVID-19 cases (Mertens & Peñalvo, 2021). The pillars of attaining food secu-
rity are availability, accessibility, utilization and stability (FAO, 2006), and recently
extended to agency and sustainability (HLPE, 2020). The agricultural systems, particu-
larly the rainfed, in the Sahel region are notorious for erratic rainfall conditions, drought
risks, aridity and land degradation (Elagib, 2014; Elagib etal., 2019, 2020) and desert
locust outbreaks. Driven by hydro-climatic constraints and fueled by population growth,
a risk spiral increases the need for water security for domestic, agricultural and indus-
trial use, thus increasing the stress on the water availability (Falkenmark, 1989). On
the one hand, it is widely accepted that the water scarcity in the region is economic in
nature, but on the other hand, mismanagement aggravates physical scarcity and jeop-
ardizes the access to clean and adequate water supply (Naik, 2017). Water security in
the region does not only concern health, agricultural, educational and economic devel-
opment, but also relates to peacemaking and political stability (Graves etal., 2019).
Water-, food- and climate-related risks will interact with the pandemic-related issues,
and can ultimately cause a rise in water and food insecurities as well as malnutrition.
The Sahel is a region of developing and under-developed countries with the above-
mentioned constraints inherent in their systems. Therefore, the likely long-lasting
COVID-19-related impacts will present challenges related to the increasing demand for
water in all the sectors and to the accessibility to safe water quality even for most basic
needs, such as drinking and sanitation (Sivakumar, 2020). Through food insecurity and
inadequate nutrition of people in extreme poverty, the impacts could be long lasting
(Laborde etal., 2020). Just before the pandemic has stricken the region, a desert locust
outbreak occurred across the eastern part of the Sahel, plagued the agro-pastoral areas
and posed a threat to crop, food security and livelihoods on already vulnerable com-
munities (Salih etal., 2020). In the pastoral context, for example, Griffith etal. (2020)
enumerated a number of COVID-19-related impacts, namely direct mortality and mor-
bidity, constrained grazing mobility and restricted access to pastoral areas and markets.
Griffith et al. (2020) argued that movement restrictions as a measure of limiting the
spread of COVID-19 would restrain the desert locust control. COVID-19 and associated
lockdown measures are likely to affect international and local rice trade disruptions in
the western part of the Sahel in the short, medium and long terms (Arouna etal., 2020).
Arouna etal. (2020) proposed several categories of impacts of COVID-19 on funda-
mental value chain operations: access to agricultural inputs; procurement of paddy for
traditional and upgraded mills; logistics; financing rice growing; a trade-off between
increasing the human resources productivity and efficiency and the application of social
distancing in operating the mills; impacts on marketing and sales due to massive loss of
jobs. Without appropriate actions, switching crop types by some farmers or completely
abandoning farming by young farmers are expected consequences (Ayanlade & Radeny,
2020).
Stemming from the lockdown measures and the associated effects in terms of a
rise in food prices, an increase in unemployment, a decrease in nominal households’
incomes and a decrease in remittances in Burkina Faso, several scenarios and ramifica-
tions for food security are highlighted, viz., widening deficit of food for poor house-
holds and drop in the consumption of food, fruits, vegetables, meat and fish below the
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drought control standard (Zidouemba et al., 2020). Research on sub-Saharan Africa
showed the most vulnerable (e.g., women, the poor and the uneducated) to be suffering
most from COVID-19-related food insecurities in Sub-Sahara Africa (Dasgupta & Rob-
inson, 2021). In 2020, Sudan suffered from a complex humanitarian crisis character-
ized by political instability and protracted civil conflicts leading to 1.8 million internally
displaced people, sharp economic decline with an inflation rate increased by 214%,
unprecedented severe flood affecting more than 875,000 people associated with disease
outbreaks, endemic diseases and 1.1 million refugees hosted from South Sudan, all of
which resulting in an estimated 9.6 million severely food-insecure people (ACAPS,
2020; IPC, 2020). As the country’s disability to import vital commodities such as wheat
escalated, people queuing in front of bakeries for hours to buy bread had become a com-
mon scene in Sudan, a situation that called some countries to assist in, and the WFP
to facilitate delivery of, wheat relief (OCHA, 2020a). Containment measures were re-
introduced later due to rising number of confirmed COVID-19, thereby aggravating
this humanitarian situation (ACAPS, 2020). On top of this critical situation, and upon
the conflict that is taking place in the Tigray region in Northern Ethiopia, comes the
arrival of the large number of Ethiopian refugees to the Sudanese territory in the eastern
region. The UN Refugee Agency has launched an emergency relief plan to provide the
refuges with basic services, including shelters, water and food supply (UNHCR, 2020).
The agency also appealed for urgent access to the needy civilian, Eritrean refugees in
the Tigray region in fear of running out of food supplies (UNHCR, 2020). These com-
plexities arise synchronized with a politically-sensitive issue of water resources avail-
ability and management in the Eastern Nile Basin related to the filling of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), involving Ethiopia and Sudan in the Sahel and
Egypt (Basheer etal., 2020). The GERD is also expected to pose negative environmen-
tal impacts in Sudan and Ethiopia, implying risks to the agricultural activities, food
security, ecosystems and health despite some intended benefits to both countries (Elagib
& Basheer, 2021).
4.3 Security‑related concerns: public order, stability andterrorism
Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, several concerns have been expressed with
regard to potential spillovers on peace and security in the Sahel region. In early May 2020,
the UN Secretary-General warned of Jihadist groups in the Sahel exploiting pandemic to
increase attacks (France24, 2020). These terrorist groups have in fact actively sought to
exploit the overburdened security forces during the pandemic by increasing attacks (Cole-
man, 2020). So far, there has been an upsurge of terrorist activity in the Sahel and West
African regions in 2020, with increased attacks reported in Mali, Burkina Faso and Nige-
ria (Kishor, 2020; Mednick, 2020). On the one hand, it might be too early to establish a
direct link to the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, COVID-19 seems to acceler-
ate the trend of escalated violence which started well before the pandemic, resulting in
1463 armed clashes and 4623 civilians killed from 2012 to 2019 with the highest uptick
in violence reported in 2019 (Raleigh etal., 2020). Despite the associated mobility restric-
tions, the COVID-19 crisis provides a strategic opportunity for terrorist groups to step
up attacks, increase propaganda and recruitment against national governments and uti-
lize emerging technologies (Basit, 2020; Norlen, 2020; Raleigh etal., 2020). COVID-19
can create an environment susceptible to exploitation by terrorist groups, e.g., anti-gov-
ernment sentiments, increased radicalization, emergence of new forms of attacks (bio- or
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cyber-terrorism) or cuts in funds for international security cooperation (Ackerman & Peter-
son, 2020).
Since the pandemic is already emerging as an accelerator of instability, the conse-
quences of COVID-19 on security and public order in the Sahel will become more evident
in the next couple of years. For example, the pandemic has caused economic devastation in
Mali, while the parliamentary elections were held in March 2020 under severe restrictions
and, thus, a low turnout of 24%. These factors might have had speeded up the coup d’etat
against President Keïta in August 2020, as one of the first overthrown governments in the
coronavirus era (Taylor, 2020). In May 2021, another coup d’etat took place. Burkina Faso
has now become one of the most unstable countries in the region due to reasons such as
insurgency, abuses by security forces, floods and economic hardship caused by COVID-19
(International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2020; Turse, 2020). Increased violence
across the region and the COVID-19 crisis have resulted in around 12 million children in
Burkina Fasco, Mali and Niger temporarily (up to four months) out of school, and 776,000
missing the entire year, with some schools making place for displaced people from vio-
lence (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2020). In January 2022, a successful coup d’etat was
launched in Burkina Faso following some attempts in 2021. In Nigeria, and despite lock-
down measures, a significant increase in crimes has been recorded in comparison with pre-
COVID-19 situation (Okolie-Osemene, 2021). COVID-19 has also resulted in grievances
against national governments that were seen as restricting civil liberties during the pan-
demics and losing control over (peripheral) state territories (Bisson etal., 2020). Political
distrust to the government has also undermined compliance to COVID-19 in Nigeria, thus
facilitating the spread of the virus (Ezeibe etal., 2020). Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic
has increased instabilities, aggravated the development and supply insecurities and slowed
down political transitions, e.g., in countries such as Ethiopia or Sudan (Verjee, 2021). Elec-
tions were conducted in 2020 in Niger and Burkina Fasco despite COVID-19. Sudan’s
political turmoil continued with no roadmap agreed on until now—March 2022. Ethiopia
postponed its 2020 national elections until 2021 due the pandemic. This postponement was
held, at least partly, as one trigger for the ongoing conflict in the Tigray Region, causing
serious concerns about food security in this region. Ethiopia has also suffered from the
consequences of returned labor migrants from the Middle East (up to 25,000 migrants until
mid-August 2020), thus jeopardizing livelihoods of some population groups (Murzakulova
etal., 2021).
5 Discussion
5.1 COVID‑19’s long‑term implications: anticipating agame changer
fordevelopment
The progression of the COVID-19 crisis in the Sahel region elicits the accumulating vul-
nerabilities of the recent decades, e.g., growing populations and associated poverty or
food insecurities, increasing climate variability as well as deteriorating security. Together
with the direct health- and economic-related impacts of the pandemic, a perfect storm of
humanitarian and economic perils is ensuing. In this context, we highlight in this section
some important implications for the Sahel region from the compounded effects of resource
supply insecurities, economic jeopardy and increased political instability in the aftermath
of the COVID-19 crisis.
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First, it has become evident that the COVID-19 crisis derails the development agenda
in the Sahel on important parts such as poverty reduction, food security, health and well-
being. This is not surprising since the COVID-19 crisis is expected to affect the long-term
outlook for achieving key parts of the global development agenda such as the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), both in the Sahel and globally (Barbier & Burgess, 2020;
Sachs etal., 2020). The Sahel region has had some tangible improvements with regard to
the SDGs (see Sect.2), which can be wiped out in the next years. For the Sahel countries
to return to track, a great effort and funds are needed. The pandemic’s indirect effects stem-
ming from strained health systems, household income loss, and disruptions to care-seeking
and preventative interventions, such as vaccination, may be substantial and widespread.
Other sectors, such as education, are hit hard, thus aggravating the earlier mentioned sup-
ply insecurities since school feeding is an important service in Sahel countries (Abay etal.,
2021).
Second, the COVID-19 pandemic clearly shows that health sector outcomes are linked
to food security performance. This conclusion might be only applicable to vulnerable and
low-income countries such as the Sahel countries. In this paper, we have argued that the
weak health systems in the Sahel and disturbances of health services during the COVID-19
crisis haveaffected food security. At the same time, evidence shows that malnutrition and
lack of food access haveaggravated the health crisis (Mertens & Peñalvo, 2021). There-
fore, more efforts and rigid preliminary healthcare plans are important to save citizens’ life,
especially the vulnerable groups like children, pregnant women, old people and patients
with chronic diseases (Dasgupta & Robinson, 2021; Elebesunu etal., 2021). COVID-19
has also shown that these efforts need to incorporate sustainable and more comprehensive
approaches such as One Health strategies addressing multi-sectoral and multidisciplinary
health issues, i.e., linking human health to environmental and animal healths (Ayobami
etal., 2021).
Third and finally, the Sahel case reiterates the need for comprehensive approaches
toward food security to stand against sudden disturbances. While such approaches have
to incorporate access to food, political stability and long-term resilience of supply, crisis
response through (international) cooperation has emerged as an essential element of these
approaches. For example, on the regional scale, governments are required to prepare coop-
erated and coordinated post-pandemic food crisis emergency responses. Recovery plans
are indispensable region-wide through UN agencies while on the country scale, farmers
need to adjust the growing calendar by integrating science (early warning systems, sea-
sonal forecasting and crop science) and indigenous knowledge (Ayanlade & Radeny,
2020). Improved synergies, coordination and utilization of resources within (food) aid
agencies is needed while aid agencies focus on emergency supply toward food security.
International aid will remain important, particularly for disaster-prone areas. While large
international aid would not ease water scarcity in the region without effective governments
for better democracy and governance (Naik, 2017), short-, medium- and long-term policy
options need be designed to help governments of the Sahel countries mitigate the COVID-
19 impacts on food security (Arouna etal., 2020).
5.2 Lessons learned? Way forward forapublic sector led resilience
The COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated underlying vulnerabilities in the Sahel with
regard to development, supply security and weak public sectors. On the short term,
responses to COVID-19 had to prioritize action that seeks to avoid a worst-case
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scenario of a highly aggravated crisis. To ensure long-term resilience and adequate
responses to future shocks, the analysis in this paper highlighted some specific les-
sons that emphasize the role of public leadership. These lessons are summarized in the
following:
• Strengthening response capacities through state-based cooperation: COVID-19
mitigation efforts highlighted the importance of building alliances (e.g., through
African Union or UN) to improve access to vital COVID-19 supplies. Therefore,
the Sahel countries need to assess joint positions and interstate cooperation toward
improving their access to vital supplies during crises, e.g., food, therapeutics and
vaccines. The region got most of its vaccine doses through the COVID-19 Vaccines
Global Access (COVAX) initiative, backed by the World Health Organization, the
European Commission, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, alongside key delivery partner
UNICEF (WHO, 2021c).
• Rethinking long-term food security and the role of international aid: The pandemic
has shown the importance of investing in national disaster relief programs and
empowering the associated institutions to ensure access to basic supplies. Within
this notion, the reliance on international humanitarian aid in crisis might not be
sustainable since COVID-19 has raised concerns about self-interested aid distribu-
tion and ability of rich countries to finance their aid commitments (Brown, 2021;
Kobayashi etal., 2021). With regard to food security, one of the main insights from
the COVID-19 crisis is that a long-term reorientation toward sustainable local agri-
culture is worth considering (Al-Saidi & Hussein, 2021). Alongside sustainable
local agriculture, and in order to ensure a smooth operation of agricultural input
markets and food supply chain, there are many necessary public support measures
during the COVID-19 crisis such as social safety programs, accessible household
loans, extensions of payment deadlines and tax exemptions for food companies
(Ayanlade & Radeny, 2020; Griffith etal., 2020; Laborde etal., 2020; Zidouemba
etal., 2020). Households in the agro-pastoral sector who adhere to public health
measures related to COVID-19 should be prioritized to food, income and nutrition
security (Griffith etal., 2020).
• Improving monitoring, communication and public sector performance: Exchang-
ing information, improving awareness and transparency can increase legitimacy of
action by governments/donors and hinder exploitation. Ramping up pro-poor pro-
grams and social safety nets for the most vulnerable is highly relevant during the
pandemic, with a focus on peripheral areas and marginalized groups (Zidouemba
etal., 2020). COVID-19 can be seen as an opportunity for improving public sector
performance in general, but those agencies related to risk management and disaster
relief in particular. Such effort can pre-empt security deteriorations or the exploita-
tion of vulnerable population groups by non-state and violent actors.
• Investing in peace and public order during crisis: We have highlighted in this
paper how security concerns have been important ancillary impact in the Sahel,
thus enlarging supply problems and sociopolitical risks. During crises, and as long-
term priorities, peace and political reconciliation are probably the most urgent
concerns. The African Union’s declaration for 2020 as the year for “Silencing the
Guns” came at a very difficult time for the region. Peace is key to save people, open
roads for humanitarian aids and encourage large groups of farmers and workers to
revert to production.
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6 Conclusions
The COVID-19 pandemic was an unwelcome pressure resulting in multi-facetted impacts
for health, economic and environmental securities for the already fragile developmental
context of the Sahel region. This paper contributes to the scarce literature using systematic
analyses of the compounded effects of the pandemic at hand. Besides, the consequences of
the Sahel COVID-19 case are poorly understood in terms of the interplay of impacts and
their ramifications on resource supply security. We therefore contextualized this case by
highlighting environmental and sociopolitical aggravators, and by presenting evidence on
the progression of the specific Sahel scenario. As the Sahel region is largely underprepared
and recently more vulnerable, the COVID-19 presents a perfect storm of humanitarian
jeopardy due to the cross-sectoral nature of this impactful pressure. Moreover, this paper
contextualized the COVID-19 impacts within the underlying vulnerabilities in the Sahel
and the bad timing of this event. The economic growth has slowed down in the last decade
while the humanitarian crisis has worsened due to environmental degradation, natural dis-
asters and security-related challenges. Food insecurity has become an even higher concern
in the time before the pandemic due to climate variability, disasters such as locust swarms
or floods, and migration pressures. The Sahel region is prone to disasters, but it has so
far been an underperformer in global indices that measure food, health, energy and politi-
cal securities. International aid has been crucial for increasing readiness and improving
responses for pressures such as COVID-19.
We have shown in this paper how the COVID-19 trajectory in the Sahel region has been
quite specific, with several ancillary effects have led to an enlarged sociopolitical risk.
Such effects include unequal access to therapeutics and vaccines, discriminatory mobility
restrictions, aid bottlenecks, displacements and security-related disruptions. We presented
evidence for demarcating the unique Sahel scenario and provided examples from the sec-
tors of health, food and basic supply as well as security and public order. With regard to
health, we found out that the COVID-19 mitigation efforts have become prevalently reliant
on international aid. We tracked some of the funding flows for COVID-19 mitigation, and
identified some bottlenecks and constrains for health and vaccine-related aid flow. These
constraints include delays in delivering committed aid, providing vaccines and logistics in
addition to supply chain limitations. On the scale of food security, COVID-19 has already
resulted in several food production disruptions or price effects, and has come after or syn-
chronized with the recent increase of climate-related disasters and of the needs for disaster
relief. During the COVID-19 progression, additional pressures of livelihood loss and dis-
placements have materialized due to, for example, severe floods in Sudan or violence in
Ethiopia. In this sense, food security was found out to be closely interlinked with health
sector outcomes in the Sahel. Finally, in the security realm, increased tensions have been
witnessed in the form of exploitation by terrorist groups, rise of anti-government senti-
ments, delays of elections and restrictions of civil liberties. Such an instability has aggra-
vated the resource supply security in the Sahel.
In the long term, the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis are expected to aggravate underly-
ing vulnerabilities of the Sahel in terms of developmental shortcomings, security concerns
and accumulating climatic risks. In this regard, this paper provided a valuable regional
view attesting to COVID-19’s potential to derail important parts of the development agenda
in low-income countries. It also showed that close interlinks existbetween health sector
performance, public order and food security, and therefore called for more comprehensive
approaches to health (e.g., linking human health to environmental or other health issues)
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and to food (e.g., more long-term views incorporating local sustainable agriculture). In the
Sahel, COVID-19 relating responses sought to avert a worst-case scenario of widespread
humanitarian and economic perils. Some lessons from this pandemic include the value
of public sector-led responses, such as increasing regional andstate-based cooperation,
strengthening of healthcare capacities, prioritizing food access, securing and facilitating
international aid (while not relying on aid and reinforcing national relief programs), and
improving pandemic communication. These responses can mitigate the additional impacts
of COVID-19 on the Sahel, but the baseline impacts related to economic difficulties and a
temporary setback of the key parts of the development agenda in the region might remain
for years to come. Here, this paper did not examine single local disruptions but rather the
compounded impacts (with resource supply, particularly food, as a main focus) of the first
years of the pandemic in the Sahel. Future research can thereforeexamine action to tackle
long-term impacts as, for example, efforts to enhancing sustainable production and self-
sufficiency or rethinking and enhancing resilience plans and programs. Ultimately, the suc-
cess of the recovery from COVID-19 will vary from one state to another, depending on
larger issues such as the capacity to reorganize and readapt development policies, as well
as the will to prioritize peace and political reconciliation in a post-COVID-19 world.
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Eng. Mohammed Basheer for creating the map of
Fig.1.
Author Contributions MAS conceived the study and contributed to conceptualization, methodology, writ-
ing the original draft, review and editing. SAGS contributed to conceptualization, methodology, writing the
original draft, review and editing. NAE contributed to conceptualization, methodology, writing the original
draft and substantial review, editing and enhancing the direction of discussion.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Data availability Figure3 data that support the findings of this study have been deposited in the World Bank
Data repository (data.worldbank.com) and African Development Bank countries data (https:// www. afdb.
org/ en/ count ries). The source of Fig.4 data is World Health Organization (WHO). Coronavirus (COVID-
19) Dashboard. Geneva, Switzerland. https:// covid 19. who. int. Sources of data in Tables1 and 2 are indi-
cated in the footnotes. Data supporting discussion and analysis in different parts of the paper are taken from:
World Health Organization Data Platform (World Health Data Platform—WHO: https:// www. who. int/ data#
repor ts); UNICEF Data: UNICEF DATA—Child Statistics (https:// data. unicef. org/); UNESCO Institute for
Statistics: Data for Sustainable Development Goals: UIS Statistics (http:// data. uis. unesco. org/); ReliefWeb
(https:// relie fweb. int).
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
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Authors and Aliations
MohammadAl‑Saidi1· SuhairA.GayoumSaad2· NadirAhmedElagib3
Mohammad Al-Saidi
malsaidi@qu.edu.qa
Suhair A. Gayoum Saad
suhairag@yahoo.com
1 Policy, Planning andDevelopment Program, Center forSustainable Development & Department
ofInternational Affairs, College ofArts andScience, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
2 Al Rawabi Dairy Company, P.O. Box50368, Dubai, UnitedArabEmirates
3 Institute ofGeography, Faculty ofMathematics andNatural Sciences, University ofCologne,
Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923Cologne, Germany
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