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1 Relational Autonomy: State of the Art Debate
... By focusing on the para-rational strength of affectivity, a fully relational account of autonomy allows for a transformation of the perceived binary of rationality/affectivity. Although relational autonomy theorists have underscored how key capacities for autonomy such as self-determination and self-governance are co-constituted by individuals and the people, institutions, and social norms in which they are embedded and with which they relate, they admit that the relation between autonomy and emotions or affectivity has been underdeveloped in the literature (Mackenzie 2019;Nedelsky 2012). Expanding on this ongoing conversation, I propose that treating autonomy as a 'virtue', or power of acting, the habitual practice of nurturing and developing one's essential striving to live, poses a more effective challenge to paternalism than the principle of respect for autonomy (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). ...
... To this end, most accounts of relational autonomy have emphasised that co-constituted rational and reflexive capacities are anchored in a strong individual self. These capacities include, but are not limited to, self-determination, self-governance, and selfauthorisation, all activities that involve reflecting on our needs and desires in light of our socially-conditioned selves (Mackenzie 2019). Yet, relational theorists such as Mackenzie have also expressed the need to pay attention to the supportive aspects of pararational capacities: [Relational] theorists argue that autonomy competence and capacities for critical reflection encompass a range of agential skills, including emotional and imaginative skills, not just reasoning skills. ...
Despite extensive theoretical debate, concrete efforts to overcome paternalism and unbalanced power relations between patients and doctors have produced limited results. In this article, I examine and build on the concept of relational autonomy to reframe the patient-doctor relationship. Specifically, I argue for an alternate form of autonomy anchored in Spinozism that recognises the relation between rationality and affectivity and moves away from the model of Cartesian dualism. I then use Filipino conceptions of individuality to explore treating autonomy as a systemic virtue, where ‘virtue’ is understood as a strength that requires support from systems of agency. In other words, autonomy as a systemic virtue is a practice of focusing on one’s power of acting that is sustained by supportive relationships between individuals and social institutions.
... I'll start, then, from feminist approaches to vulnerability. These are strongly critical of the the modern ideal of autonomous subjectivity, for overstating the capacity for transcendence, independence and self-determination, and for denigrating various contrary properties like corporeality, emotionality, passivity, dependency, vulnerability (Keller and Kittay 2017;Lloyd 2004;Mackenzie 2021). Critics instead propose that dependency or vulnerability are ubiquitous, even fundamental, aspects of human experience, with various sources: bodily needs, illness, and disability; social and psychological injuries like humiliation or shame; or political harms like exploitation and oppression (Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds 2014). ...
Disability is a consistent topic of concern within philosophical ethics (including medical and applied ethics, and bioethics). In many cases, however, it is viewed as a misfortune, and an impediment to well-being. This is because matters of the good human life turn on some criterion—rational autonomy, say, or personhood—that distinguishes good from bad lives. These are based in the possession of certain properties or capacities that are purported to be essential to humans.[@HughesSocialModel1997; @PatersonDisabilityStudies1999] Disability here figures not only as an impediment to the capacity to realise the goods that attend a fully human life, but as a lack of some capacity that is fundamentally human. There is no shortage of arguments by influential thinkers concerning the moral permissibility of eliminating disabled people, based on the idea that the latter are not fully human in some meaningful respect.[@ShildrickVisceralPhenomenology2015; @ShildrickWhyShould2014]
I aim to develop some aspects of a critical orientation that does not rely upon definitively human capacities, and that, as such, does not exclude atypical bodies and minds from the outset. To explore such ideas, I consider feminist theories that understand vulnerability to be a ubiquitous or even universal aspect of life, and as such, a more appropriate basis for ethics. I suggest that instead of understanding vulnerability in either universalistic or particularistic terms, these two aspects can fruitfully be integrated. Vulnerability is an ineluctable dimension of embodied existence; however, it is always and everywhere realised and experienced in concrete conditions. Significantly, vulnerability is uniquely distributed: the vulnerability of some lives is safeguarded while that of others is exposed. I suggest that this provides a fruitful way to understand disability, without appealing to essentialist notions of the human: the potential vulnerabilities of some bodies are neglected in social and material situations, such that disability is actualised as a result. I finally suggest an approach for identifying and responding to vulnerability that is not grounded on any specific criterion of the human, and that involves a collective commitment to continually compose better relations.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
Social work policy in the UK, and public discourse informed by this policy, insists that children need permanent and secure homes. In finding homes for children, preserving and nourishing their identities is prioritised. Faith can be a key aspect of children’s identities, yet there is limited research on faith considerations in the decisions and processes of finding permanent homes for vulnerable children. Focusing on the experiences of Muslim children in the care system, this chapter will begin a discussion about filling this gap in academic literature. There are approximately 4500 children of Muslim heritage in the care system in England and Wales, and this number is increasing. Through interviews with 41 social workers, foster carers, adoptive parents, prospective adoptive parents, and care leavers, this study presents a research-informed narrative of the layered and intersectional ways in which Muslim-heritage children experience and articulate their faith identities. The research findings presented in this chapter indicate that to ensure children’s well-being, social work practitioners and carers need to consider children’s identities in their entirety, including the dynamics influencing decision-making about their lives.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
This chapter begins by looking at the changing landscape of social action and engagement, social capital and the role of faith groups and congregations in engaging socially. It then considers the ways in which Muslim communities are beginning to articulate a vision for social engagement based on the ideas of maṣlaḥa and maqāṣid. As we have seen in other chapters in this volume, these concepts have been regarded by many as an important theological foundation for social and ethical work in the public sphere. This chapter will dwell further on the origins of maṣlaḥa and look at different approaches towards it. While acknowledging the value of maṣlaḥa, the chapter will also assess some of its limitations and examine approaches that are being articulated by modern Muslim intellectuals to advance more egalitarian and inclusive social ethics. It will then suggest additional ways of grounding concerns around needs, social action and engagement in a way that can reflect a notion of the ‘common good’ – through the idea of human flourishing which is equated here to the Islamic notion of iḥsān, in order to move away from parochial outlooks and develop inclusive, universal visions that could nurture a more sophisticated conversation around our shared values and our shared future in Western contexts.Keywords
Maṣlaḥa
Maqāṣid
Iḥsan
Common goodSocial capitalIslamic social ethicsShared valuesWestern Muslims
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
For interventions to succeed in social work, practitioners need to be familiar with clients’ religious worldviews and value systems; by understanding these dimensions in a client’s life, appropriate coping behaviour in the context of their lived experiences can be enhanced. In working with Muslim clients, such intervention requires knowledge and awareness of Islam and of the concepts that Muslims rely on to deal with problems or to bring about change in their lives. These concepts provide a reference and motivation for change to occur and can be integrated into social work to ensure services are culturally sensitive for them. Tawba (repentance) is one such concept that is fundamental in Islam; it is considered a starting point for personal change and a means to achieve a new way of being in relation to others and to God. Tawba is defined religiously and spiritually; as religious doctrine, sin and transgression are emphasised, while spiritually, inner transformation is the focus. This paper examines the concept of tawba and its use in social work to enhance intervention outcomes with Muslim clients.KeywordsIslamic social workIslamRepentance
tawba
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
This final chapter attempts to associate, structure and summarise the principal insights of the contributions to “Exploring Islamic Social Work. Between Community and the Common Good”. Despite differences in their topics and the contexts they treat, the methods applied and angles adopted, all the chapters have a common focus on Muslims as protagonists, both in the field of Islamic social work, and the Islamic thinking around it. The volume’s topic itself is embedded in a new social work scholarly debate, stimulated by the re-emergence of social work’s religious roots in the context of post-secular society. This chapter reviews Islamic social work as an empirical phenomenon, discusses various theological and ethical approaches, again takes up the debate on the common good and examines Islamic social work as alternative social work. Finally, the question of what exactly Islamic social work consists of and the challenges which arise in connection with the ‘Islamic’ attribution are addressed. In this way, both insights and open questions, as well as directions for further research on Islamic social work, are identified within the framework of different research discourses.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
The religious community can play an important role in providing tangible and intangible support for offenders to help them reintegrate into society after serving a prison sentence. Using data drawn from life story interviews with 17 Muslim male offenders in England and Wales, this chapter outlines the different ways in which the religious community plays a crucial role in the reintegration journey after release from prison. Tangible support provided by a religious community can include help with housing and employment, two key concerns for offenders upon release from prison. Furthermore, the religious community provides important intangible support, which is crucial for reintegration after the degradation and stigma associated with imprisonment. This intangible support includes strong social bonds within the community which are based on reciprocal relationships. Acceptance by spiritual and community leaders can act as a redemption ritual which allows offenders to break from their negative past and develop a new positive identity. The community can also support the move away from crime by providing a moral environment which engenders a respect for the law. Along with this, civic engagement and contributing positively within a community fulfils important generative impulses which are part of identity development. Tangible, as well as intangible, support plays an important role in helping offenders manage the delicate transition back into society, which is usually fraught with challenges, as well as possibilities.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
In considering the important contribution of Islamic principles and perspectives to social work, which has encompassed to-date both the etic (outsider) and an emic (insider) positionality, a dialectical stance is offered in this chapter. This takes a fused ‘etemic’ approach, where Islamic religious and cultural concepts are critically examined in a dialogical application towards and excursus of an adaptive understanding of how these abstracted notions can play out within a social work context. To this end, the following concepts: ʾumma, zakat, ʿizza and al-insān al-kāmil, which are Islamic beliefs or Muslim cultural practices, are discussed as offering powerful and evocative socio-cultural-religious constructs that can serve to illuminate professional social work. Such insights, however, are subject to caveats and qualifications regarding the contentious appropriateness of this kind of abstracted, discursive application as well as whether such concepts can or should be adopted in some fashion within social work. However, the International Federation of Social Work’s (IFSW) global definition of social work provides a useful porous framework for such a legitimate exercise in the IFSW’s attempts to depart from narrow ethnocentricism to both recognise and embrace the cultural diversity that constitutes this global profession.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
Islamic practical theology represents a conceptual framework for Islamic social work as well as other fields of practice, such as pastoral care. In these fields, it is necessary to meet professional standards but theological reflection is also required. Islamic faith is intrinsically linked to social justice, good deeds and helping mankind, while material greed is strongly criticised by the Qurʾan. This chapter focuses on two terms and concepts which can play a major role in such a reflection: the first is waqf (endowment) which, going back to the practice of the Prophet and the first caliphs, binds property to charitable intentions and to God, as a receiver and possessor of all things. Manifold examples from the history of social welfare in Islam express how waqf has been implemented in different contexts. The second concept is zakāt (compulsory alms) which, as a central religious duty of solidarity, is intended to guarantee social peace and the dignity of the poor and needy. According to the Qurʾan, there are eight groups of recipients of zakāt. Looking at parallels between the historical context and the current context of establishing Muslim welfare care in modern societies demonstrates how zakāt can potentially be put into practice. For this purpose, classical and modern positions are brought into conversation. Contrary to some interpretations, the Qurʾan’s open-minded hermeneutics do not address a particular religious affiliation, so zakāt in fact goes beyond religious categories and can be applied in multicultural and plural societies. Consequently, the aim should be to integrate Muslim activities and reflections into the framework of modern welfare states. Openly understood in this way, Muslim welfare can enrich society without dividing it.KeywordsIslamic practical theologyWelfare stateSolidarity
waqf
zakāt
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
The development possibilities for Islamic social work are closely linked to the respective state’s welfare framework. The German system provides an insightful example, as it is characterised by a significant incorporation of religious welfare providers. In the sense of an “affirmative genealogy” (Hans Joas), the German welfare system can be understood as open to religious pluralism and social change. This chapter analyses interactions between the state, existing welfare organisations and Muslim providers, focusing on their respective legitimation strategies. Inclusive and more exclusive interpretations are presented by different parties. The openness towards all beneficiaries demanded of Muslim welfare providers could perhaps lead to a secularisation of Islamic social work. However, theological reflection enables an Islamic profile to be reconciled with general social responsibility.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
In various European countries, Islamic social services have specifically targeted disadvantaged groups, including a high proportion of Muslims. This situation gives rise to a paradox: while Islamic organisations insist on impartiality and aim to benefit people regardless of their religious belonging, most of their investment addresses de facto Muslim communities. This paradox could firstly be explained by the overrepresentation of Muslims within excluded groups. While Islamic NGOs justify the delivery of most of their aid to Muslim countries by emergencies linked to geopolitical contexts, grassroots Islamic associations explain their focus on Muslim beneficiaries as being due to their underprivileged situation. In parallel, local authorities and statutory agencies, including those working in prisons, have begun to consider the need for Muslim protagonists to be involved in addressing specific issues and reaching particular groups. In this process, both individual Muslim social workers and Islamic organisations are increasingly expected to contribute their presumed cultural skills. This positioning causes tension within the authorities and statutory agencies, as they promote a neutral vision of social work while paradoxically fostering religious and cultural approaches for pragmatic reasons. Based on case studies of Islamic welfare organisations in Switzerland and France, this chapter aims to address the paradox of Muslims claiming to contribute to the common good while essentially providing their own ‘community’ with aid. It discusses the current challenges for Islamic bodies who try to position themselves in a ‘universalist’ social work approach, while they concretely implement community-based social services which seem to prioritise Muslims.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
Islam’s increased visibility in France over the past 20 years has challenged social workers, confronted with new practices that often provoke consternation and cause professional difficulties. Social workers’ relationships with members of society who are motivated by faith, and also with their colleagues, some of whom openly express their Muslim identity, force them to adapt to new religious frames of reference. Social workers are also occasionally compelled to revisit the Christian roots of social work that many of them felt had been left behind by the profession. These patterns also explain the prevalence of reminders about the secular basis of social work, in a sector where radicalisation among the young tends to be perceived as a regressive influence on freedom of expression and, above all, on women’s rights.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
Religious beliefs are central to the identity of many people, often signalled by their physical appearance, for example, clothing, hair or jewellery. If prevented from such a form of self-expression, some take action against what they consider a contravention of their human rights. The predominance of this discourse can obscure the possibility that there are others who are forced to signal a religious viewpoint which they may not subscribe to. This chapter explores the wearing of hijab by Afghan women who have lived in Australia less than 10 years. While some choose to wear hijab, there were others who spoke of being forced to wear hijab as a form of domestic violence. Furthermore, whereas for some, not wearing hijab represents a freedom to dress in accordance with their understandings of Australia as a secular society, a few felt that wearing clothes which marked them as Islamic increased the likelihood of attracting xenophobia and discrimination. Hence, for many women, decisions around hijab represented compromise between the demands of their family, the Afghan community and the wider Australian society, rather than a free choice. Consequently, if social workers assume women’s religious beliefs and identity are congruent with their appearance they may inadvertently be contributing to women’s oppression. As such, this chapter explores notions of anti-oppressive practice when working with Muslim women living in non-Muslim majority countries, particularly in respect of dress codes which are associated with Islam.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
Since social work protects the interests and benefits of people, one of the first conceptual terms which might guarantee the theological foundation of Islamic social work is maṣlaḥa. In modern times, maṣlaḥa is used interchangeably with the overall objectives (maqāṣid) of Sharʿia. The use of maṣlaḥa in its broader sense of maqāṣid enables scholars to link their understanding of social work to the Islamic tradition of sciences, especially to Islamic legal thinking. However, if we look back at the Islamic tradition of legal thinking, we discover a totally different approach to maṣlaḥa and especially maqāṣid: it becomes a source of knowledge, whereas in the tradition of the classical ʾuṣūl, it was a tool for legal hermeneutics. Although the search for the theological foundation of Islamic social work in the realm of Islamic legal theory and Islamic law is comprehensible, the lack of critical reflection on the discrepancy of the modern understanding of maṣlaḥa and maqāṣid, in contrast to the classical understanding, leads to theological dead ends and contradictions. Some scholars have already drawn attention to this but have remained vague concerning a solution to this specific problem. This paper will highlight and compare the specifics of the classical approach of maṣlaḥa in classical Islamic legal thinking and the modern maqāṣid approach. Additionally, I will highlight the Qurʾanic concept of maʿrūf in the three-fold division of K. Reinhart, and reflect on it as a possible theological basis for modern Islamic social work attempts.KeywordsIslamic social workObjectives of the SharʿiaPublic interest
Maṣlaḥa
Maqāṣid
Maʿrūf
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
Social work has been characterised in recent years by a growing sensitivity to religious and spiritual issues, both leading back to its historical roots and responding to the challenges of contemporary post-secular society. This sensitivity also requires more knowledge about and attention to the specific needs of Muslims as service users, without neglecting their great diversity. The topic of ‘Islamic social work’, situated within this context, does not only concern Muslim beneficiaries in the field of mainstream social work, but also the central, active role that Muslim communities play: it therefore calls into question a merely individual focus. For Muslim faith-based organisations, Islamically-motivated social ideas and thought are also important. In Western contexts, which are often characterised by mistrust shown to Islam and Muslims, reflection on what contribution can be made to the common good within the framework of pluralistic societies is required. Finally, Islamic social work can be considered in relation to the broader development of social work, which is characterised by a critical approach to power-relations and domination, a sensitivity to diversity and an openness to alternative forms of social work. This chapter introduces the book “Exploring Islamic Social Work. Between Community and the Common Good” by analysing the state of research, identifying guiding questions and then developing and presenting the structure of the volume. Its focus is on contexts of Islamic social work and its target groups, its theological and ethical foundations, as well as its inclusion into general social work discourse.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
Religion, religiosity and spirituality are gaining importance for social work in Germany as a discipline and as a profession, especially in the context of Muslim people seeking advice. Most Muslims regard Islam as a social religion which helps in different life situations. For them, the central elements of their belief, such as mercy, charity, solidarity and assisting each other, are core elements of help in society. The purpose of this chapter is to show the importance of the real life experiences of people who seek advice in social work. In this context, the chapter shows that counselling is subject-, task- and context-related. Counselling deals with life realities and can address and solve specific problems, support individuals in making decisions and coping effectively with crises. At the least, a sensitive attitude towards religious questions provides an ability to deal constructively with the reality of life. Within this perspective, the practice model, the Meeting and Further Training Centre for Muslim Women, shows how it is possible to gain access to welfare issues in the context of religion and social work.
... (Neo)liberal accounts of self misrepresent the ways in which identities are shaped within relations, accreting, unfolding and emerging within socio-cultural contexts over time, and in relation to intersections of gender, class, ethnicity, and dis/ability. In a relational model of self, the development and exercising of individuality and agency is a complex competence, requiring ongoing interpersonal, social and institutional scaffolding (Mackenzie, 2019). From this perspective, the aspiration of 'independence' (understood as being autonomous) -long central to the personalisation reform of social care (Care Act, 2014) -is arguably misconceived, diverting our attention away from the relational 'resources' that could enable many more people to 'activate' their autonomy (Davy, 2015). ...
Social care provision across high-income countries has been transformed over the last ten years by personalisation – a policy agenda to give people with eligible support needs more choice and control over their support. Yet the ideological underpinnings of this transformation remain highly mutable, particularly in the context of reduced welfare provision that has unfolded in many nations advancing personalisation. How the policy has manifested itself has led to an expectation for people to self-build a life as individual consumers within a care market. This article draws on a study exploring how people with learning disabilities in England and Scotland are responding to the everyday realities of personalisation as it is enacted where they live and show the relationality inherent in their practices. We propose that the personalisation agenda as it currently stands (as an individualising movement involving an increasing responsibilisation of individuals and their families) ignores the inherently relational nature of care and support. We propose that social care policy needs to recognise the relational ways in which people build their lives and to advocate a redistribution of responsibility to reduce inequalities in the allocation of care.
... The perception of autonomy as the rational capacity of self-mastery, symbolised by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, is often criticised as a male-coded concept shaped by the atomistic, rights-bearing privileged "white" European individuals (Oshana, 2006). The notion of relational autonomy has been proposed (Mackenzie, 2019) as an alternative, stressing that persons are socially-embedded beings with intersecting identity markers of gender, ethnicity, class and religion. In phenomenological tradition, human autonomy is perceived as an embodied agency articulated out of a world of relatedness to a body and a contextual, intersubjective processes of unfolding. ...
This chapter explores the interface between Islam, social work and the common good within the Muslim minority context of Europe. The ethics-law nexus in Muslim tradition is examined to argue for a transformative Islamic engagement with the secular public space. Literature on Islam and social work is limited to providing basic information about Islam to frontline practitioners. The current inquiry intends to develop an Islamic perspective on social work and wellbeing. Increasing association of Muslims with extremism form negative public perceptions of Islam in Europe. Within this discourse of suspicion, Islam is coded as a cause of public harm and ‘Shariʿa law’ is often associated with human rights violations. This study argues that a critical dialogue among the faith-embedded and secular traditions of social ethics in Europe remains vital to fostering a shared sense of common good. Contemporary discussions on social ethics in Islam are dominated by maqāṣid ash-sharī ʿa (objectives of Islamic law) and fiqh al-ʿaqalliyyāt (Muslim minority law). Whilst the former is purported to be a metaethical discourse and the latter implying a contextualising intent, both operate within strict juristic hermeneutics. Alternatively, this inquiry rethinks Shariʿa as relational ethics and practical wisdom ( ḥikma ), closer to the concept of phronesis in ancient Greek philosophy, guiding human relations as imagined in Qurʾanic anthropology and its vision of a just society. Shariʿa is framed within Islam’s transformative view of human flourishing, tarbiyya . The notion of relational ethics is further grounded in dialogue with phenomenology-informed discussions on ethics, particularly in the work of Levinas, and Habermas’s ‘theory of communicative action’.
In this chapter, I describe the contemporary debate on the nature of individuals and the contributions that feminist theorists have brought. Criticising the atomic, isolated notion of individual self, feminist theorists have been looking for alternative conceptions that do not exclude the relationships individuals bear among themselves and that recognise social dynamics as constitutive of individuality. Within this context, Spinoza appears as a “noble ancestor” of relational accounts of individuality and individual autonomy (Armstrong et al., 2019). Feminist historians and Spinoza scholars such as Armstrong (2009) and Tucker (2019) have shown that readings of Spinoza as a partisan of individual egoism are wrong. One reason lies in what Ravven (1998), for example, defends: according to Spinoza's metaphysics, the bounds of individuals are always wider in body and in mind than the bounds that are visible through the shapes of a person. Conway also offers a similar account of individuals (Duran, 1989; Pugliese, 2019), but her relational theory is still not yet read by feminist theorists in the context of the disputes over the metaphysics of individuality. Given Spinoza and Conway’s common philosophical interests, I will compare their theory of individuals so as to show how Conway offers an original contribution to the feminist debate by using gender analogies to characterise her metaphysical claims.KeywordsConwaySpinozaFeminist metaphysicsIndividuals
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