Any Port in a Storm? Climate, Mobility, and Choice in Pacific Small Island Developing States

Abstract

The Pacific Small Island Developing States are low-lying and located near the equator, where changes in mean temperature, rainfall, and hazards such as floods and storms will be most severe. As developing countries, their populations are often classed as vulnerable with their ability to adapt constrained. This chapter identifies current mobility flows in Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Marshall Islands to show that movements are largely from outer islands towards urban centres which can create new risks in overcrowded, exposed towns, and cities. While flows of people into urban areas are increasing, flows out are less dynamic. People may want to move, but their agency may be limited.
The chapter then considers existing and potential frameworks and innovative ways to facilitate more adaptive and dignified forms of migration. It outlines opportunities for addressing climate-related mobility for the Pacific Small Island Developing States at the global, regional, and national level. It considers global frameworks such as the UNFCCC and then analyses the constraints to regional agreements which would enable ‘Migration with Dignity’. The chapter concludes that new efforts at all levels are essential to boost the agency of Islanders to be able to decide whether to move, and under what circumstances.

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Oakes, R., van der Geest, K., Corendea, C. (2022). Any Port in a Storm? Climate, Mobility, and Choice
in Pacific Small Island Developing States. In: Kent, A. & Behrman, S. (eds). Climate Refugees: Global,
Local and Critical Approaches. London & New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 249-260.
Any port in a storm? Climate, mobility and choice in Pacific SIDS
Robert Oakes, Kees van der Geest, Cosmin Corendea (2022)
Abstract
The Pacific Small Island Developing States are often represented as living in a perfect storm
of climate change. They are low-lying and located near the equator where changes in mean
temperature, rainfall and hazards such as floods and storms will be most severe. Their young
populations are increasing, exposing ever greater numbers to risk. As developing countries,
their populations are often classed as vulnerable with their ability to adapt constrained. Human
mobility has long been a normal activity in these regions, and under climate change this is
already accelerating. This chapter identifies current mobility flows in Kiribati, Tuvalu and
Marshall Islands to show that such movements are largely from outer islands towards the urban
centres which can create new risks in overcrowded, exposed towns and cities. While flows of
people into urban areas are increasing, flows out are less dynamic. People may want to move,
but the agency of affected people to move is limited, by a lack of money, opportunities and
their governments’ political weakness in securing access to visas for international mobility.
The chapter then considers existing and potential frameworks and innovative ways to facilitate
more adaptive and dignified forms of migration while reducing the risks of loss and damage
and displacement. It outlines a range of opportunities for addressing climate-related mobility
for the Pacific Small Island Developing States at the global, regional and national level. It
considers the strengths and limitations of global frameworks such as through the UNFCCC and
then analyses the constraints to regional agreements which would enable “Migration with
Dignity”. The chapter then highlights Fiji’s role in leading with national frameworks with a
discussion of its new guidelines on planned relocation and displacement. The chapter concludes
that new efforts at all levels are essential to boost the agency of Islanders to be able to decide
whether to move, and under what circumstances.
Key Words: Pacific SIDS; Climate Change; Migration; Displacement; Policy

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1. Introduction
Climate change and migration are two of the most pressing global challenges of the 21st
century. People are already moving as a result of environmental change and media framings
often represent the issue as a threat to sovereignty.
1
This creates a strong desire both within
affected states and the international community to better understand the drivers of climate-
related migration, its impacts and to develop policies to protect affected people.
2
The Small
Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Pacific are at the forefront of climate change and
migration. Due to their location and topography, they are exposed to climate change-related
hazards. As developing countries, they have comparatively low economic and technical ability
to adapt and respond. This means there is an urgent need for innovative pathways for
facilitating more adaptive forms of migration which can minimise loss and damage.
3
Alarmist framings of climate change have sometimes been supported by SIDS; witness the
cabinet meeting of the Maldives held under water to raise awareness of the existential threat
which climate poses.
4
As existential questions concerning the survival of lands and territory
emerge, leaders and states have considered the concept of the nation ex situ
5
. However,
representatives of these nations are unwilling to consider themselves as helpless victims. In
fact, the Kiribati government recently refused to support a citizen’s attempt to claim
environmental refugee status.
6
Instead the Pacific SIDS community has recently sought to
move the discourse from that of climate refugees and narratives of extinction to more agential
understandings and the concept of migration with dignity; whereby through training and the
development of diaspora networks, migrants are empowered.
As a result, the leaders of the Pacific SIDS tread a precarious and narrowing path. On the one
hand they need to facilitate resilient futures in the short and medium term through adaptation
1
J. Barnett, ‘The dilemmas of normalising losses from climate change: Towards hope for Pacific atoll
countries’ (2017) 58(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 3-13; P. Tschakert, N.R. Ellis, C. Anderson, A. Kelly, and J.
Obeng, J..‘One thousand ways to experience loss: A systematic analysis of climate-related intangible harm from
around the world’ (2019) 55 Global Environmental Change 58.
2
D. Ionesco, D. Mokhnacheva and F. Gemenne, The atlas of environmental migration (Routledge 2016).
3
R. Mechler et al. ‘Science for loss and damage. Findings and propositions’ in Loss and damage from climate
change (Springer, Cham 2016) 3.
4
‘Maldives cabinet makes a splash’ (BBC, 2009) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8311838.stm .
5
M. Burkett, ‘The nation ex-situ: on climate change, deterritorialized nationhood and the post-climate era’
[2011] 2(3) Climate Law 345.
6
C.Voigt-Graf and S. Kagan, Migration and labour mobility from Kiribati. (Development Policy Centre
Discussion Paper No. 56. 2017) Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2937416 or
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2937416.

3
and synergies through the Sustainable Development Goals. On the other hand, it would be a
dereliction of duty to fail to plan for longer term survival. The latter is the focus of this chapter;
while we acknowledge the importance and necessity of building resilience in place, it is vital
to look at how forms of mobility can enable the people, nations and states of the Pacific SIDS
to have a viable future.
2. Increased risk but few options in Kiribati and Tuvalu
The situation for Kiribati and Tuvalu is particularly acute; their low-lying land is exposed to
sea level rise and they are recognised by the United Nations as least developed countries
(LDCs) with limited resources. They also have limited opportunities to move internationally.
As a result, dominant discourses in the Global North explicitly or implicitly suggest such
Pacific SIDS governments and their residents are inherently lacking the agency to help
themselves and are dependent on aid to adapt to climate change or move.
It is in this context that one of the authors recently worked on the Pacific Climate Change and
Migration (PCCM) project. One of the most alarming findings from the study is that in the
period 2005 to 2015, over 90 per cent of households in Kiribati and Tuvalu were affected by
environmental conditions such as floods, storms and irregular rain. Many households are
already using migration as a way of coping with the increased risk, with 12 per cent of
movements in the same period mainly attributed to environmental change
7
. While it can be
problematic to ascribe a particular discrete trigger to any motivation or action including
migration, on the other hand it is not unreasonable to speculate that it can work both ways.
Movements for work and education can also be influenced by the environment when
livelihoods are affected by drought and floods, or schools are decommissioned as the physical
integrity of islands and their infrastructure is deemed not worthy of investment by governments
or funders. As a result, while it may be difficult to ascertain the precise proportion of
movements triggered by the environment, we can state with some confidence that such
movements are happening and are likely to intensify under projected climate change.
The same study found that many people stated that they would have liked to have moved in the
same period but were unable to do so. This was mainly due to a lack of either the money or the
paperwork to migrate. This is particularly true for international migration. Under projected
7
R. Oakes, A. Milan and J. Campbell, ‘Kiribati: Climate change and Relationships between household
vulnerability, human mobility and climate change (UNU-EHS 2016); A. Milan, R. Oakes and J. Campbell,
‘Tuvalu: Climate change and migration’ Relationships between household vulnerability, human mobility and
climate change (UNU-EHS 2016).

4
climate change scenarios this lack of options is likely to intensify trends of urbanisation with
more movements from the outer islands to the capitals, increasing populations in South Tarawa
in Kiribati
8
and Funafuti in Tuvalu.
9
This ‘triple jeopardy’ of climate change, economics and
demography
10
therefore suggests that areas within Pacific SIDS could be in a state of increased
risk with implications for loss and damage.
11
Structural factors are not the only barrier to migration. We used in-depth qualitative methods
to try to better understand the processes affecting migration decision-making and found that
views on climate-related migration in Pacific SIDS are multifaceted and can be contradictory.
12
On the one hand, people seem to feel that migration offers opportunities – particularly for
younger people. But on the other hand, we also found that islanders have a strong desire to stay
on their islands and in their countries. People seemingly tolerate a degree of climate-related
impacts in order to avoid losses to culture and home. Of course, these barriers can have limits
and each person or household may have a threshold, after which the desire to leave overcomes
the anchoring power of home. If and when this occurs depends on objective realities such as
the financial and legal ability to move but also subjective understandings of home, as well as
hopes and fears of life in a new location.
3. Diverse responses in The Marshall Islands
As one of the lowest-lying island nation-states in the world, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands (RMI) is acutely vulnerable to climate change. The country’s 29 coral atolls and 5 coral
islands, standing at six feet above sea level on average, are exposed to sea-level rise, storm
surges and the associated impacts on freshwater supplies and habitable land. Persistent drought
is further affecting ecosystem services, such as food production and access to drinking water,
and heat waves are increasingly common.
13
The Marshall Islands have a long history of
8
R. Oakes, A. Milan and J. Campbell, ‘Kiribati: Climate change and migration’ Relationships between
household vulnerability, human mobility and climate change (UNU-EHS 2016).
9
A. Milan, R. Oakes and J. Campbell, ‘Tuvalu: Climate change and migration’ Relationships between
household vulnerability, human mobility and climate change (UNU-EHS 2016).
10
G. Hugo, ‘Future demographic change and its interactions with migration and climate change’ (2011) 21
Global Environmental Change S21.
11
A. Heslin, N.D. Deckard, R. Oakes and A. Montero-Colbert, ‘Displacement and resettlement: understanding
the role of climate change in contemporary migration’ in R. Mechler et al (eds), Loss and Damage from Climate
Change (Springer, Cham 2019) 237.
12
R. Oakes, ‘Culture, climate change and mobility decisions in Pacific Small Island Developing States’ (2019)
Population and Environment 1.
13
V. Keener, Climate change and pacific islands: indicators and impacts: report for the 2012 pacific islands
regional climate assessment. (Island press, 2013); J.J Marra, State of environmental conditions in Hawaii and
the US affiliated Pacific Islands under a changing climate: 2017 (NOAA NCEI 2017).

5
migration and displacement. Oceanic voyaging, U.S. nuclear testing–induced relocation,
migration from the remote outer islands to the capital Majuro and urban Kwajalein
14
, and recent
increased emigration to the United States
15
, have created a distinctive context for research
around contemporary climate-induced migration.
The Marshall Islands Climate and Migration Project (MICMP) aimed to clarify the extent to
which Marshallese people are already migrating because of climate change. The situation for
people in the RMI differs from that of their counterparts in Kiribati and Tuvalu because they
have visa-free entry in the United States through the Compact of Free Association (COFA).
16
The project worked with communities in both the RMI (in the capital of Majuro, and on Mejit
and Maleolap), and in destination states in the USA (Hawaiʻi, Oregon, and Washington),
utilising a household survey, qualitative methods, Participatory Research Appraisal tools and
Geographical Information Systems to determine migration drivers and impacts.
The research found that respondents in both the RMI and the USA primarily cite education,
work, health care, and family connections as motivators of migration, and only a few mention
climate impacts or environmental change. However, the picture is more complex than this.
Respondents in the RMI do identify severe impacts of climate change on their livelihoods,
health and safety. In a problem-ranking exercise, the three climate-related problems in the list
of twelve were ranked second, third and fourth after lack of employment. However, when asked
directly, they did not link these climate impacts to migration decisions. Interestingly, the study
does find significant correlations between climate impacts and migration propensities at
household level. Households that report more severe climate impacts also have higher
migration rates even though they themselves do not attribute their migration decisions to
climate risk. The research also found a divergence in environmental migration rationales
between the RMI and the USA Many more respondents in the USA cited environmental
problems in the RMI as a driver for moving than those who are presently living in the RMI.
14
In 2011, more than half (52.3%) the population of the RMI resided on Majuro, against only 24.1% at the time
of the first population census (in 1958).
15
The number of Marshallese residing in the US have increased from 6,650 in the year 2000 to approximately
22,000 in 2010 and an estimated 30,000 in 2020. To put these numbers in perspective, the total population
residing in the RMI was 53,158 at the time of the last population census in 2011.
16
K. Morris, M. Burkett and B. Wheeler, Climate-induced migration and the compact of free association
(COFA): limitations and opportunities for the citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. (2019) Policy
Brief of the Marshall Islands Climate and Migration Project. University of Hawaii at Mānoa.

6
Furthermore, 62% of Marshallese respondents in the USA indicated that climate change affects
their decision to return to Marshall Islands in the future.
17
When considering the impacts of migration, the Marshallese in the RMI saw migration
positively in regard to improved education, employment opportunities, health care, and the
reduction of pressure on resources, but negatively in regard to outcomes like “brain drain,”
familial separation and broken social and cultural cohesion.
18
In addition, they also mentioned
the damaging effects of undesirable experiences in migrant destinations. Respondents in the
USA were, on average, more positive than negative about the impacts of migration on the
economic situation and well-being of their households, though they also noted that migration
comes with significant non-economic losses, such as weakened conservation of language and
cultural ties.
The project used Q method
19
to assess the degree to which there were shared views about
climate and migration within respondent groups in the RMI. This resulted in three groups with
distinct views: the migration critics (43.6%), the adaptation optimists (25.5%), and the island
pessimists (14.9%).
20
The largest group, the migration critics, are satisfied with the quality of
life, development, governance, and security in the RMI. They are clear about not wanting to
move, and are very critical about the impacts of migration, both in the RMI and for migrants
themselves. Although they are happy with life as it is now, they do worry about the future of
their islands. The group of adaptation optimists is more critical about the quality of life in the
RMI, and especially the lack of employment. However, they are quite optimistic about the
future of their islands and they trust that their government and the international community will
come to their aid. They do not perceive the problems and risks as strongly as the other groups
do, and were more optimistic about future habitability, climate risk preparedness, and the level
of adaptive capacity. They do not oppose migration and think it can be part of the solution, but
17
K. Van der Geest, M. Burkett, J. Fitzpatrick, M. Stege and B. Wheeler, ‘Climate change, ecosystem services
and migration in the Marshall Islands: are they related?’ (2020) 161 (1) Climatic Change 109.
18
A, Heslin, ‘Climate migration and cultural preservation: the case of the Marshallese diaspora’ in Loss and
Damage from Climate Change (Springer, Cham 2019) 383.
19
Q Method is a research tool from the social sciences designed to unveil subjective opinions on a particular
issue. See Oakes (n 12).
20
The percentages do not total 100% because some (16%) of the 200 respondents in the RMI did not
belong to any of the three groups. Van der Geest et al. Marshallese migration: The role of climate change
and ecosystem services (University of Hawaii 2019). Available at: https://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:7571
.

7
they are critical about the impact of migration on Marshallese culture. The smallest group, the
island pessimists are clearly dissatisfied with life in the RMI, and have a strong desire to move
to a different place, preferably the USA Members of this group are very critical about changes
in the quality of life, governance, development, and livelihood security in the RMI, and they
question the future habitability of their islands. They see migration to the USA as the best or
the only option, and are very positive about the impacts of migration, emphasising its benefits
and downplaying adverse effects.
21
The research in the RMI shows that there are quite distinct views on migration and future
habitability in the context of climate change within the population of the Marshall Islands. This
is important for policy-makers as people in these groups may respond differently to migration
and climate change adaptation policy. The findings also show that the sinking islands and
climate refugees narratives in the media is shared with only a minority of the respondents
(14.9%). Most people in the Marshall Islands perceive that they are not yet well-prepared for
future impacts of climate change, but they also resist the idea that their islands would become
uninhabitable due to sea level rise and other stressors in the future and that they will be forced
to leave. They believe that between now and a future in which climate change poses a more
existential threat to them, there will be solutions to keep their islands habitable. However, they
also think that some forms of human mobility (other than abandoning the islands) can be part
of the solution. In that sense, it is important for them to keep the door to U.S. open for voluntary
migration that enhances their resilience.
4. The weaknesses of global frameworks
The situation for people living in Tuvalu, Kiribati, RMI and other Pacific Islanders others
affected by climate change is brought into sharp relief when the lack of international
frameworks for protecting migrants is considered. Global frameworks require buy in from all
states. This is incredibly difficult as climate change and especially migration are contested
themes within both national politics and international relations. Their combination within
climate migration is therefore even more contentious. There are three broad framings of
environmental migrants around which views and actions coalesce.
22
Migrants can be seen as
a threat to national security – the enemy at the gate, adaptive agents who can contribute to both
21
K. Van der Geest, M. Burkett, J. Fitzpatrick, M. Stege and B. Wheeler, ‘Marshallese perspectives on
migration in the context of climate change’ (2019), IOM Policy Brief 5(1).
22
R. Oakes, S. Banerjee and K. Warner, Human Mobility and Adaptation to Environmental Change in World
Migration Report 2020 (IOM 2019).

8
sending and receiving communities or as innocent people who have suffered loss and require
protection.
Through the securitisation prism, migrants are represented as “other” and as such a threat to
national security, cultures or purse strings. A security framing has close ties with the populism
movement which has emerged in recent times whereby states have withdrawn from globalised
processes. This framing emphasises the rights and desires of the host communities as opposed
to the sending communities or migrants. In contrast, the migration as adaptation framing
represents mobility as of potential benefit to each of these groups. Through migration,
unsustainable demands on natural resources can be reduced and financial and social
remittances can be remitted to aid adaptation efforts. It follows that steps should be taken to
facilitate such flows and link with diaspora and networks and attempt to create sustainable
opportunities for migrants. The protection framing tends to understand mobility as an unwanted
and undeserved phenomenon and therefore raises questions about the agency of migration.
Approaches centred on Loss and Damage, Health and Human Rights would all fit into
protection framings as they focus on recognising and limiting the impacts of mobility.
Of the three, the first is the most powerful in the current era of the relative increase in populism
and nationalism. Global agreements will inevitably take the form of the lowest common
denominator as the most powerful states will only sign up for articles within frameworks they
believe are in their interest, or at least will not be disadvantageous. A too common consequence
is a watering down of elements expressly written to protect people and their rights. Most
international environmental regimes are soft law.
23
This is true of the Agenda for Sustainable
Development, which is the umbrella under which the environmental risk related Paris Climate
Agreement, New Urban Agenda and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, were
created and also the context for the subsequent Global Compacts on Migration (UNGA) and
Refugees. This means that targets, goals and even broad pathways can be altered, or ignored if
they are deemed politically expedient.
Nonetheless there are a range of processes and frameworks which are relevant for
environmental migration. The most important is through the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Climate mobility and the terminology of
migration, displacement and planned relocation entered the UNFCCC through the Cancun
23
M.S. Wanner, ‘The effectiveness of soft law in international environmental regimes: participation and
compliance in the Hyogo Framework for Action’ (2020) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law
and Economics 1.

9
Adaptation Framework at COP16 in 2010. The Paris Agreement of 2015 at COP21 established
the Task Force on Displacement
24
which published its recommendations for integrated
approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement at COP24 in Katowice in 2018.
25
Despite the nomenclature, the Task Force actually covers the entire mobility spectrum and
encourages states to mainstream risks and opportunities related to climate and migration into
their planning and policies and United Nations agencies and other relevant groups to provide
finance, consider best practices and work towards building regional cooperation. The
Taskforce’s mandate was extended at COP24 and it is currently in its second phase of
implementation.
However, until now there is no overarching international framework to protect climate
migrants. In this vacuum, the state-led Platform on Disaster Displacement
26
plays a vital role
in guiding governments on how they can best protect citizens displaced cross-border
27
. In the
absence of overarching global level protection, it is necessary to consider different levels of
polities.
5. Existing regional solutions
The logical step is to consider how regional approaches do, and could facilitate adaptive, or
protective pathways. One avenue to explore is the expansion of existing arrangements with
regional superpowers. The COFA includes the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic
of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau. Citizens of the three states may live and
work in the USA and the respective governments may avail themselves of a range of
financial and other support. In return the three states grant access to airspace, territorial
waters and in the case of RMI, a military base as the USA struggles against China for
24
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Adoption of the Paris Agreement.
21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, 13 December 2015) Available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf.
25
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Decision -/CP.24. Report of the
Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate
Change Impacts. (Advanced unedited edition 2018).
Available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp24_auv_ec%20wim.pdf.
26
Platform on Disaster Displacement. Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) Strategy 2019-2022. PDD.
(2019) Available at https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/26062019-PDD-Strategy-
2019-2022-FINAL_to_post_on_website.pdf.
27
It should be noted that key United Nations bodies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and its dedicated Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division and the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) have played prominent roles in driving the political agenda through
international frameworks.

10
hegemony in the Pacific.
28
Other Pacific SIDS such as the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau
are part of the Realm of New Zealand and, as such, their citizens have New Zealand
passports. On the one hand, it may be problematic to recommend such a treaty as a model for
migration or development as it involves a loss of sovereignty, but it should be noted that any
form of multilateralism will involve compromise
29
.
Migration with dignity is one concept which has been promoted in the Pacific. The term has
not been officially defined, even by its creator Anote Tong the former President of Kiribati, but
it is widely acknowledged to consist of upskilling potential migrants through academic,
technical and soft skills education to make them competitive on the global labour market,
30
or
perhaps to be more precise, more attractive to host states. At present Islanders have routes to
work in nursing, fruit picking and seafaring although these jobs may be badly paid or bring
poor working conditions or exploitation. In addition, the idea is to develop and use networks
to ameliorate cultural shock and contribute to making mobility a success. Such an idea is
consistent with labour migration schemes (and the expansion thereof). For example, the Pacific
Access Category resident visa enables 75 people each from Kiribati and Tuvalu and 250 people
from Tonga and Fiji (at time of press the process is suspended due to COVID-19) to live and
work in New Zealand. A recent paper argues for the expansion of the existing seasonal worker
programme and Pacific labour scheme as well as the establishment of a new route in the mould
of the New Zealand’s access category.
31
6. A regional framework for the Pacific
As the impacts and challenges of climate change are different from one place to another, the
solutions should also be unique and region specific.
32
The solution based approach can
therefore be more efficiently implemented at the regional level, than at global or national level.
Regional cooperation and arrangements can provide political, economic, and environmental
gains which may not exist in local, national and global contexts. They can be based on shared
28
G. Wyeth, ‘Why the Compacts of Free Association Matter to Washington’ The Diplomat (June 9th 2020)
https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/why-the-compacts-of-free-association-matter-to-washington/.
29
For further discussion of this area see Susin Park, ‘Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The
Situation of Low-lying Island States’ (UNHCR 2011) https://www.unhcr.org/4df9cb0c9.pdf.
30
K. E. McNamara, ‘Cross-border migration with dignity in Kiribati’ (2015) Forced Migration Review 49, 62.
31
J. McAdam and J. Pryke, ‘Climate Change, Disasters and Mobility: A Roadmap for Australian Action’
(2020) Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, Policy Brief 10.
32
A. K. Snover, L. C. Whitely Binder, J. Lopez, E. Willmott, J. E. Kay, D. Howell and J. Simmonds, Preparing
for climate change: a guidebook for local, regional, and state governments (ICLEI – Local Governments for
Sustainability 2007).

11
levels of economic and social development or common cultural identity.
33
The implementation
of climate change policies for global agreements is often carried out by regional polities
34
and
state actors can feel more connected and heard at regional level, than at international level, due
to the commonalities in cultures, identities, geography and politics. These commonalities can
be a powerful tool in driving commitments and actions for resilience.
Based on the fact that regional frameworks have been instruments in economic and regional
development in the past,
35
they can drive bottom- up approaches and action within international
law “filling legal gaps at the international level”,
36
particularity within climate change.
Regional frameworks therefore have the capacity to bridge implementation gaps that exist in
national or global climate change frameworks contributing to a resilience at all levels.
37
Through the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security (PCCMHS) programme,
states in the Pacific have been engaging in a series of policy dialogues with the eventual goal
of providing protection for climate migrants. In a recent meeting, the goal was outlined to
“inform a regional framework that respects national policies, strategies and narratives while
promoting recognition and the legal protection of migrants and displaced persons particularly
in the context of climate change”.
38
In addition to providing a safety net for affected peoples,
a regional framework could have co-benefits such as supporting regional climate and migration
advocacy, strengthening the Pacific’s leadership in addressing the issue and acting as a catalyst
for other states to take the necessary steps to combat climate change.
7. Innovative national policies
An emphasis on regional frameworks can only be effective and implemented through national
action plans or policies. There has recently been an increase in national and sub-national plans
33
H. Selin and S. D. VanDeveer, ‘Climate change regionalism in North America’ (2011) 28(3) Review of
Policy Research 295.
34
I. Galarraga, M. Gonzalez‐Eguino and A. Markandya, ‘The role of regional governments in climate change
policy’ (2011) 21(3) Environmental Policy and Governance 164-182.
35
A. R Puntigliano and J. Briceño-Ruiz (eds), Resilience of regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Development and autonomy (Springer 2013).
36
C. Corendea, ‘Migration and human rights in the wake of climate change: A policy perspective over the
Pacific’ (2017) UNU-EHS Publication Series, Policy report No.2, 23.
37
See also Avidan Kent and Simon Behrman, Facilitating the resettlement and the rights of climate refugees:
an argument for developing existing principles and practices (Routledge 2018).
38
UNESCAP, ‘Pacific Governments Conclude Regional Policy Dialogue on Climate Related Mobility’ (Press
Release. Suva, 25 November 2020) https://www.unescap.org/news/pacific-governments-conclude-regional-
policy-dialogue-climate-related-mobility.

12
and policies related to mitigation
39
and such a level of approach is also suited to vulnerability
and impacts.
40
National policies can create immediate responses in the region, based on good
practices and durable solutions. Many Pacific Island Countries including Fiji, have devised
national policies to protect people from the adverse impacts of climate change
41
. The Fijian
Displacement Guidelines in the context of climate change and disasters, is a unique policy
initiative that aims at protecting the displaced individuals, families and groups from
vulnerabilities and other negative impacts.
42
These guidelines are solutions-oriented and are
devised by following a “hybrid-legal approach”- i.e. drawing from environmental, migration
and human rights policy frameworks. These guidelines exemplify a proactive approach by the
island nations community.
The recent Fijian Standard Operations Procedure for Planned Relocation is supported by the
Fijian Planned Relocation Guidelines to undertake the implementation and practicability of
climate change related relocation.
43
The collective impact of both the national guidelines is to
allow the development of Fiji to be as resilient as possible to climate change and disasters. The
Planned Relocation Guidelines are “inclusive, gender responsive, consultative” and facilitates
“use of clear, inclusive and comprehensive procedures” to preserve “the richness of the
indigenous knowledge, multi-cultural and interfaith composition of Fijian population”.
44
It is often reflected that national governments do not take into consideration cultural
sensitivities in their climate change policies.
45
The Fijian Planned Relocation Guidelines, The
Fijian Displacement Guidelines and Vanuatu’s Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction
Policy 2016-2030
46
all facilitate stakeholder participation for ensuring national policy action
to mitigate and adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change. These policies are based on the
belief that the engagement of stakeholders can lead to exchange of knowledge of needs,
39
E. Somanathan et al (eds), ‘Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working
Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (CUP 2014).
40
V. Keener, Climate change and pacific islands: indicators and impacts: report for the 2012 pacific islands
regional climate assessment (Island press 2013).
41
In this sense Pacific SIDS can learn from other developing states. See for example, Bangladesh, National
Strategy on the Management of Disaster and Climate Induced Internal Displacement (2015), available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b2b99f74.html.
42
Government of the Republic of Fiji, Displacement Guidelines: In the context of climate change and disaster
(2018).
43
Government of the Republic of Fiji, Planned Relocation Guidelines (2018).
44
ibid.
45
N. Perumal, ‘The place where I live is where I belong: community perspectives on climate change and
climate-related migration in the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu’ (2018) 13(1) Island Studies Journal.
46
Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016-
2030 (2015) https://www.preventionweb.net/files/46449_vanuatuccdrrpolicy2015.pdf.

13
circumstances and situations of communities impacted by climate change and therefore
facilitate improved policy planning and implementation.
8. Conclusion
Within the Pacific SIDS, migration tends to be from the periphery to the (relative) metropolis;
it is a form of urbanisation characterised by movements for work, education and the social and
cultural attraction of larger settlements. These flows are now also motivated by environmental
change. Concerted efforts are required at all levels to facilitate environmentally, socially and
economically sustainable adaptation and migration. This will encourage disaster resilient
livelihoods, in addition to dignified lives for all communities, including those who choose not
to migrate.
As figure 1 shows, policies and plans need to be enacted at all scales and at each level, people-
centred research and adaptation has a role to play. While global frameworks have their
limitations, they can provide the context for innovative regional and national approaches.
Existing models and future innovations at regional and national levels provide the most reason
for optimism. The utilisation, or expansion of existing visa schemes have great potential, if
severe political obstacles. A regional framework is perhaps more achievable and socially and
culturally viable, but more work is required on how provisions for migrants would be
sustainable in the context of a changing climate. Domestic policy is powerful due to the
advantages of legitimacy and jurisdiction and the examples shown have the potential to ensure
the protection of Islanders. There are however, funding constraints for most SIDS, in addition
to likely physical limits to adaptation for some of the more exposed SIDS.
Vertical integration will be key to building sustainable futures for the Pacific SIDS. The
development of domestic policies sometimes with global level funding, based on a regional
approach are proving effective in the Pacific Island nations. This allows both climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies to create a stronger regional approach to influence the global
level. This can contribute to the conservation of identity, building resilience and stronger
protection of communities, particularly the most vulnerable groups.

14
Figure 1: Global, regional and national policies related to climate migration in the
Pacific. Source: authors
As our people-centered research shows, if climate risks, mobility and decisions are perceived
differently, then they should also be addressed through approaches which are mindful of these
differences and through processes which involve participation. If not, there is a danger that
false assumptions about people’s desires and responses will result in ineffective policy, whether
it is to promote adaptation at home, or to facilitate successful and dignified forms of migration.
For those opting to migrate, increasing the range and bandwidth of pathways can relieve the
strain on Pacific SIDS through reducing demands on natural resources and potentially bringing
financial and social remittances to aid adaptation. On the other hand, adaptive processes can
also increase the likelihood of successful or dignified migration through a better educated
workforce able to migrate from a position of strength.
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