Content uploaded by Jiahe Wang Xu
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Jiahe Wang Xu on May 04, 2022
Content may be subject to copyright.
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
The Philosophy and Social Science of Agape Love
Robert D. Enright
University of Wisconsin-Madison
International Forgiveness Institute, Inc.
renright@wisc.edu
Jiahe Wang Xu
wangxu@wisc.edu
Hannah Rapp
oury@wisc.edu
Moon Evans
yjevans@wisc.edu
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Jacqueline Y. Song
International Forgiveness Institute, Inc.
jacqsong@gmail.com
© 2022, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not
exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not copy or cite without
authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon publication, via its DOI: 10.1037/
teo0000202
Enright, R.D., Wang Xu, J., Rapp, H., Evans, M., & Song, J. (in press, 2022). The philosophy
and social science of agape love. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000202
1
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Author note
Robert D. Enright https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6996-683X
Jiahe Wang Xu https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5757-4537
Hannah Rapp https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8036-3044
Moon Evans https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0481-4779
Jacqueline Y. Song https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5620-1192
We wish to thank the John Templeton Foundation for supporting this work. We have no
conflicts of interests to disclose. There has been no prior dissemination of the ideas expressed in
this manuscript, either at conferences or in publications.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert D. Enright,
Department of Educational Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1025 West Johnson
St., Madison, Wisconsin, 53706 United States. Email: robertenright1@gmail.com.
Public Significance of the Work
Agape love is a moral virtue in which a person willingly and unconditionally offers goodness, at
a cost to the giver, to another or others in need. Because this under-researched ancient concept
has implications for harmonious relationships and for good mental health, accurate measures of
agape are needed to assess the degree to which a person understands and practices it.
Abstract
The moral virtues have had prominence in social scientific research ever since Piaget’s
(1932/1965) and Kohlberg’s (1969) pioneering work on the cognitive developmental stages of
justice reasoning. A less explored moral virtue is the ancient idea of agape, or love that is in
2
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
service to others which includes effort and even pain on the part of the one expressing the virtue.
In this work, we attempt a precise definition of agape using Aristotelian philosophical views of
virtue ethics and his principles of analyzing constructs for their essences and their specific
differences with related but distinct constructs. From this Aristotelian philosophical framework,
we then critique existing social scientific measures of love and of agape in particular. We then
provide guidelines for the development of construct-valid measures of agape that are
philosophically coherent. Possible research questions to expand the scientific study of agape are
presented as a way forward with this important construct that could bring psychological health to
individuals and peace and unity to families and communities.
Keywords: agape, love, Aristotle, Essence and Specific Difference, psychological test
construction
The Philosophy and Social Science of Agape Love
The purpose of this article is to explore what agape love is and what it is not, toward the
goal of outlining the possibility of accurate measures of agape for social scientific exploration.
We are not the pioneers in this effort to scientifically study agape. That distinction in the social
sciences belongs to Lee (1973) and Hendricks and Hendricks (1986) who focused on agape
exclusively within the context of romantic relationships. In this work, we attempt a precise
definition of agape beyond the context of romantic relationships, using Aristotelian philosophical
views of virtue ethics and his principles of analyzing constructs as our theoretical framework.
Aristotle’s virtue ethics framework is guided by an objectivist epistemology. Objectivism is the
belief that there is truth, which can be discovered, to a given question about an entity. When
3
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
exploring the universal essence of agape, which is the goal of this analysis, we assume that there
is a truth about how all humans throughout time and culture experience agape. At the same time,
Aristotle makes room for nuances of individuality and culture.
Agape love is worth studying because, as a moral virtue, it challenges people to strive for
betterment in their humanity. Virtue ethicists make a distinction between all people being equal
in the sense that all have inherent worth (see, for example, Kant, 1785/1993) and all people not
being equal in terms of their growth in becoming fully developed as persons (see Kreeft, 1992,
particularly page 45 and Boethius. 524/1999). As we will see, agape requires heroic
commitment to the betterment of others. As such, agape may aid humanity in reaching its highest
level when people begin to deliberately, consciously, and willingly cultivate this moral virtue
toward one another.
It is important to examine in detail the meaning of agape because there are wide differences
in understanding what it is. For example, Post, Underwood, Schloss, and Hurlbut (2002) define
agape as altruistic love that is offered universally to all people. In contrast, Kreeft (1988) sees
agape as concretely and specifically given, with considerable effort, to particular people, without
excluding or being cruel to others. Andolsen (1981), in contrast to both Post et al. (2002) and
Kreeft (1988), argues that agape is too other-focused with too much cost and calls for a
reciprocity that is mutually uplifting rather than agape as a central theme of love. Is agape a
form of altruism? Is agape so other-focused that it leads to burnout and a lack of self-regard? A
deep philosophical analysis of the term agape may shed light on the answers to these questions.
We have chosen the Aristotelian framework to analyze the agape construct and then to offer
4
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
ways of constructing psychometrically-sound psychological scales of agape. We have chosen
Aristotle because of his thorough exposition of what constitutes a moral virtue. We have yet to
find another philosopher who offers a more accurate and comprehensive approach to
understanding morals.
Our first step in the examination of agape, then, is to define the construct and eventually,
but not in this work, to develop a psychometrically-sound measure of agape for children and
adults that can be used in applied work.
Virtue Ethics within Aristotelian Realism
Understanding love as a virtue leads to three important assumptions based on Aristotelian
realism (see Kreeft, 1990, chapter 3):
1. There is an objective understanding of love that is real and outside any given person’s
understanding of what love is. The challenge is to find the truth about love that transcends the
subjective mind of any given person. In other words, we discover the meaning of love, we do not
each invent it within ourselves. There is a subjective aspect to love in that each scholar may have
somewhat different views, but these differences in thought are not central to the definition of
what love is.
2. There is an absolute nature to the moral virtue of love in that its meaning does not vary
by one’s current circumstance. There can be relativity in when and how to offer love to certain
people at certain times, but this does not alter the essence of love, what it is by definition.
5
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
3. There is a universal quality to what love is that transcends culture. At the same time, there
can be wide cultural nuances in the norms of how love is expressed or in the value placed on this
virtue, but these do not alter the essence of what love is.
Virtue Ethics from the Ancient Greeks
As a central author of what virtue ethics are, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, upon
beginning his dialogues, usually asked this question: What is it? His key point was to first define
the term of interest. Aristotle (2013, 2016), in following Plato, distinguished five categories
when explicating a construct: a) Species or what the essence of the construct is; b) Genus, or
what it has in common with other related concepts; c) Specific Difference, or how the construct
of interest differs from all other, related ideas; d) Accident, or that which is atypical of the
Essence or Species but still is part of the Species; and e) Property, or something that the
construct possesses that is not essential to the essence of the construct. As an example, consider
the human person. The Species or Essence is that a person is a rational animal according to
Aristotle. The Genus is that a person shares animality with other primates. Specific Difference is
that humans are rational, and possess free will, as added by the medieval philosophers,
particularly Aquinas (1948). Accident would include a person born with no legs. This is atypical,
but does not take away from the fact of human personhood for this particular person. Property
would include humanity’s sense of humor. Humor is part of the Essence or Species, but not
essential to its definition as a rational animal with free will.
More on the Qualities of All Moral Virtues
Before defining agape, let us take a more detailed look at the qualities of all moral
virtues, such as justice, courage, temperance, forgiveness, and agape itself. Yves Simon (1986),
6
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
following Aristotle, identifies seven qualities to any moral virtue. These seven characteristics are
as follows:
1. All moral virtues are good. They originate within the person and then are brought forth to
others for good. This suggests that people grow, perhaps slowly, in their perfection of the virtues.
One implication is that training in the virtues, including education, may be important.
2. The person expressing the virtue is motivated to deliberately effect moral goodness. This
characteristic points to the inner quality of the virtue, including motivation (I want to do this),
free will (I will do this), and affect (the moral emotions, such as compassion or an emotional
suffering along with hurting people).
3. At least to a degree, the one expressing the virtue knows that it is good, even though the
person may not be able to articulate a precise rule or principle about why it is good. This
characteristic points to the cognitive quality of the virtue.
4. The expression of the moral virtue requires practice for greater proficiency in the
development of that virtue. This characteristic points to the behavioral quality of the virtue. It
also, as with the first point above, suggests the importance of education in the growth of the
virtues within people.
5. The person need not be perfect in the expression of the virtue. This probably includes the
inner and behavioral (outward) expression of the virtue.
6. The one who is practicing the virtue tries to do so as consistently as possible.
7. Different people demonstrate different degrees of the virtue.
Agape Love Examined Philosophically
7
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
We now propose a philosophically-defensible definition of agape love, based on
virtue-ethics, with the eventual goal of building a psychological scale or scales to accurately
reflect that construct, showing scientific reliability and validity.
What is agape? From a virtue-ethics position, the Essence or Species is this: Agape love
is a moral virtue in which a person willingly and unconditionally offers goodness, at a cost to the
giver, to another or others in need. There is a giving of the self to the other(s) that is: a)
understood (conscious awareness of what this is and so agape can occur toward many across
time), b) motivated (I want to do this and for the good of the other), c) willed (I will do this,
again for the good of the other), and d) acted upon (behavior) toward other people in such a way
that the actions cost the one expressing that love. Because so much is given in agape, it follows
that something is taken away from the one who engages in this form of love and such taking
away might be needed energy, needed material possessions, needed comfort, and/or even needed
safety. Yet, there is a paradox to agape: In the giving, there is psychological gain for the giver,
including a sense of joy in the giving.
This definition is not meant to imply that the “cost” to the one practicing agape is only of a
material nature, such as losing possessions, time, or energy. Instead, the agape-practitioner might
risk rebuke when taking an opposing position in a religious argument. The agape-practitioner
might experience rejection by one’s support group by going against unjust laws, as likely
happened when abolitionists went against laws of slavery for the sake of the enslaved. Further,
the definition is not meant to imply that the service is centered only on material needs of the
receiver (such as receiving money, having a wounded leg disinfected, or being offered shelter).
The receiver might obtain emotional support when grieving or kind understanding when
8
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
depressed. As one more clarification, the joy may not derive principally from achieving a
material goal (binding the wounded leg of the other), but instead because the agape-practitioner
realizes that exercising this virtue as an end in and of itself, regardless of consequences, is
worthwhile and satisfying. It also may give joy for those whose agape aligns with transcendent
religious or philosophical beliefs.
The philosopher Peter Kreeft (1988, n.d.) further clarifies that it is not just the giving of
energy or material possessions to the other, but instead is the giving of the self to the other for
that person’s good. This is a giving of the whole self and not just possessions or a part of the self.
The Genus is that agape is a moral virtue, in the same class as the concepts of justice, courage,
temperance, and forgiveness. Agape also shares common characteristics with all of the other
qualities of love defined in ancient Greece (eros, storge, philia):
1.storge, or the natural love between a parent and child;
2. philia, or brotherly love, from which we get the name of the city, Philadelphia. It also
implies the mutuality of friendship;
3. eros, or romantic love. This is a love of desire. As with the other two loves, eros is
mutually satisfying when two people are involved and committed to the other’s good.
The similarities across the four aspects of love (including agape) are these: a) all of the
loves are concerned for the good of the other; b) all have the quality of affection (as we will see
below, this is as a Property, not the Essence in agape); c) there is a certain delight in the other
as a person who is special, unique, and irreplaceable; and d) there is an investment of time given
to the other.
9
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
The Specific Difference is this: No other form of love is as deliberately self-giving and
deliberately costly in terms of consciously, willingly, and actively giving up energy, material
possessions, comfort, and/or safety for the good of another or others. Agape does not necessarily
share the mutuality that is embedded in the other forms of love, although it certainly can be
mutual as in a partnering relationship in which each gives to the other. Agape is not mutual when
a person gives of the self to aid a person without a home, who is unconscious and therefore
cannot give agape mutually. Agape, thus, is the unconditional form of love in which others are
not necessarily loving back, as in storge, philia, and eros. In agape, the one who loves does so
out of the other’s need and not out of self-interest or selfishness. Agape is deliberate and concrete
in that it is not focused on a general or abstract feeling of love toward all of humanity, as is the
case with the psychological construct of compassionate love (Sprecher & Fehr 2005). Instead,
agape occurs in concrete action toward specific other persons.
To summarize the important differences, agape: a) is focused specifically on those in
need; b) with a disinterest in whether or not mutuality of interests are achieved; c) at a cost to the
one who is loving in this way; and d) with a giving of self to the other. Accident in agape would
be a person who dies in service to others. Not all who exhibit agape give their lives to those
served. Property is a feeling of softness toward the one who is the recipient of agape, or what
the philosopher North (1987) calls a softened heart. While a softened heart is part of agape, the
essence of agape does not have to include such affect, but instead the cognition, motivation, will,
and action to serve. This is the case because we are not necessarily in full control of our emotions
and so if, for example, deep feelings of compassion toward another are not forthcoming, a person
10
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
still can offer agape out of a decision to do so, a motivation to move forward, a free will to act,
and behaviors flowing from these characteristics.
The Moral Virtue Quality of Agape:
What Kind of Characteristics Does Agape Have?
Based on Simon’s (1986) exposition of Aristotle discussed above, we can identify seven
important qualities to the moral virtue of agape as follows:
1. People who are more highly developed in agape know it is good. In other words, they do
not adhere to philosophically incorrect views that are critical of this virtue.
2. More highly developed people in this virtue will be motivated to exercise agape, have
plans to appropriate it (free will) and, as a Property of agape, will experience the moral
emotions of compassion and empathy specifically toward those who need help.
3. People highly developed in agape will have a deeper cognitive insight into what it
actually is: a) a moral virtue, b) in service to others, c) for the other’s own good, d) at a cost to
the one so serving, and e) the one serving gives of the self to the other.
4. People highly developed in agape will deliberately practice it in different situations with
different people over a longer period of their life.
5. The more highly developed people will exhibit the qualities in #1-4 above to a more
accurate and deeper degree across different situations and persons than the less developed
people.
6. The more highly developed people will deliberately strive for consistency in
understanding what agape is and in the practice of it across situations, persons, and time. In other
words, agape will become part of the person’s identity.
11
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
7. From a scientific viewpoint, we will see individual differences in the development of
agape. It remains to be seen which social scientific variables support the growth in this virtue.
As a final point not in Simon (1986), in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (340BC/2013)
talks about what has come to be labeled as “the doctrine of the mean.” Each moral virtue is
bounded by two vices, one of which is an under-representation of the virtue and the other is an
excess of the virtue. For example, justice is the mean between acquiescence and excessive
demand. Agape love’s vices seem to be passivity as the under-representation of the virtue and
exhaustion, both physical and psychological, as its excessive representation.
What Agape Is Not
From a philosophical perspective it is vital not only to address what agape is but also to
explore what it is not. We do so in this section to further sharpen our understanding of agape,
with a focus on the Aristotelian category of Specific Difference.
Compassion or Love Burnout. In the popular literature there is an expression: compassion
or love burnout. It implies that as a person gives of the self to others, then eventually the giver
becomes exhausted, damaging the self (Corrigan, 2019). Often this occurs because the person is
not willingly engaged in the effort. There is no sense of the endpoint of the work. In agape, the
person advanced in this moral virtue sees the endpoint of the activity (the Final Cause in
Aristotle) as service to others. The paradox, then, emerges: The self is revitalized rather than torn
down by the actions.
Abandoning Temperance. Temperance is one of the Cardinal Virtues discussed by Plato
(2015) and accepted by Aristotle (2013). Temperance is balance and the deliberate avoidance of
extremes. As Aristotle instructed, a person does not practice any moral virtue in the absence of
12
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
other moral virtues. Thus, as one engages in agape, it is important to take breaks, refresh, and
start again by incorporating the moral virtue of temperance into the activity.
Abandoning Justice. As in the above case with temperance, a person does not isolate agape.
Instead, a person can and should ask for fairness when giving of the self in agape to others.
Abandoning Wisdom. One does not abandon wisdom, but utilizes it when practicing agape.
Wisdom is the insight of when to act and to what degree one should act in a given situation.
Wisdom, then, helps people know the extent of offering agape and when to do so.
Abandoning Self-Care. This is another issue of temperance and wisdom. Those practicing
agape need to take time to care for the self as a way of persevering in offering agape without
burnout. This is in contrast to Hilkert Andolsen (1981) who referred to agape as a “denigration
of self-love” (p. 69). This view is philosophical reductionism in that it sees the traditional
meaning of agape in an “either/or” sense of serving others or the self, without a consideration of
both the paradox of agape (as one serves others, the self can be refreshed) and the Aristotelian
doctrine of the mean in which unnecessary extremes need to be avoided.
Agape is not naive self-abuse. A critique of agape is that it involves a certain
pathological naivete because of the element of self-sacrifice (Levy and Davis, 1988). Yet,
according to Aristotle, one should never practice any of the virtues in isolation. Therefore, as one
practices agape, one should practice wisdom so as not to harm the self from the actions and
should also practice justice so that the other does not take advantage of the self-sacrificial actions
(see also Outka,1972, especially chapter 8 on this point). Similar to Levy and Davis (1988),
Nietzsche (1887/2009) saw agape as going against what he considered to be our natural will to
power. If Nietzsche is correct that our nature is to exert power over others, then wars and family
13
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
discord are inevitable. After all, to continually exert power over others is not necessarily to see
their dignity and worth. Yet, if our highest Essence is to love, as Enright (2012) argues, then
Nietzsche has chosen a lower part of human nature on which to focus.
Agape contrasted with compassionate love. Compassionate love is a general tenderness
(including affective, cognitive, and behavioral attitudes) toward all people (Sprecher & Fehr,
2005). According to Fehr, Harasymchuk, and Sprecher (2014), compassionate love is more
broad-based than agape love because, in their view, agape is only within romantic relationships.
However, other philosophers argue that agape can apply to all persons (see, for example, Lewis,
1960; Outka, 1972). Agape love differs from compassionate love in two ways: first, it is more
costly in that the one offering it is willing to suffer for the good of others; second, agape is
focused on particular persons. Thus, it must be expressed within a specific person-to-person(s)
context (not on humanity in some abstract or general way). An example is an extremely
exhausted mother, who is up all night with a sick child for that child’s sake, and she is feeling the
pain of fatigue. Agape comes from a free will (we choose it), a good will (we are concerned for
others’ needs and welfare), and a strong will (we carry on despite the difficulty). See Enright
(2012) on these points. Agape is a character virtue because it is concerned about the other’s
welfare as an end in and of itself, not a strategy of self-reward. Agape acknowledges all people’s
inherent worth and transforms into actions of serving particular others.
Agape contrasted with altruism. Altruism is commonly defined as "social behavior that
achieves positive outcomes for another” (Krebs, 1982, p. 449). Agape goes beyond altruism
because altruism does not necessarily involve effort and pain for the good of the other. For
example, when a millionaire, who has no current struggles, gives $100 to someone who currently
14
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
is without a home, this act of altruism is not a self-sacrificial issue because it does not cost the
giver in terms of time, effort, or funds. As another example, a child, who has many toys, gives
one of those toys to another child. This is a display of altruism. In contrast, when a child
willingly gives an infant, for the baby’s sake, the child’s favorite teddy bear, this is an act
of agape because it involves both emotional effort as well the giving up of a prized physical
object. Giving (altruism) and giving through cost to oneself (agape) are not the same. Yet, there
is a counter-argument in a philosophical thought-experiment called the Trolley Problem in which
a run-away trolley might kill five people or one, and in a newer variant, the one sacrificed would
be the self. If participants in this thought-experiment show altruism by sacrificing the self rather
than the five others, this is labelled as altruistic self-sacrifice (Huebner & Hauser, 2011).
Although such an experiment might equate agape and altruism, we disagree for this reason: A
hypothetical thought-experiment done in the safety of a laboratory is far different than a real-life,
painful encounter with others for their own good.
Agape contrasted with kindness. Kindness is a desire to remove suffering from others
(Kreeft, 2011) . Yet, sometimes people grow in their suffering. Thus, those who exhibit agape as
a gift to another will not necessarily take away the other’s suffering if it is seen as necessary, at
least temporarily, for that person’s growth as a person (Kreeft, 1988, n.d).
Agape contrasted with respect. One can show respect to others out of a sense of duty.
Kant (1785/1993) argued that duty is the key to ethics. Yet, a person can be dutiful, showing
respect, to an abusive father because he is the parent. This duty and respect, then, can be offered
with more resentment than love. See also, Ramsey (1965) for his ideas that agape might be a
form of deontology or duty, which to us would contradict the Essence of agape as a free-will
15
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
motivation to assist others for their good. In other words, people are drawn to agape, not
compelled into it by duty.
Agape contrasted with gratitude. One can feel very grateful to a boss who offers a raise,
but there is not necessarily a sense of philia, eros, storge, or agape associated with the
thankfulness. The person can feel thankful and then move on without another thought about the
boss.
Agape contrasted with helpfulness. As C.S. Lewis points out, agape has a certain
indifference with regard to the outcome for oneself when assisting others. Yet, helpfulness, at
least in some cases, can be motivated by an expected payback.
Agape contrasted with empathy. Empathy is the ability to understand another’s
emotional state and feel with that person or respond emotionally in a similar way. Unlike agape
which involves an other-focused behavioral response, empathy, as an interior psychological
response, does not necessarily lead to prosocial behavior. When empathizing with another person
leads to personal distress, people may focus on their own needs rather than the needs of the other
person. Agape, on the other hand, involves focus on the other’s needs for the other’s sake.
Agape contrasted with unconditional positive regard. The psychotherapist Carl Rogers
(1951) used the term unconditional positive regard as his response to clients. This is a form of
seeing and acknowledging the inherent worth of the client despite current challenges faced by the
client. This is not agape precisely because the psychotherapist is not, in the therapeutic session,
engaging in suffering directly for the client. The therapist needs a certain detachment from the
pain in order to reflect back as accurately as possible the client’s own feelings and struggles.
16
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
A Possible Philosophical Concern
A potential problem with such detailed analyses of agape is this: A new definition of
agape might draw too hard a distinction between agape and other forms of love and related
constructs as we have examined above. This is an important challenge because, if we did not put
agape under the Aristotelian microscope, then we might so rigidly define agape that it would end
up sharing nothing with the other loves and similar constructs discussed above. In doing so, we
then would distort the definition of agape. Yet, with the Aristotelian perspective, we are aware
not only of the Species or Essence of the construct but also of the Genus in which agape is
situated: sharing important commonalities with all other concepts of love and even with all other
moral virtues. What is the shared commonality with the other forms of love. It is this: a deep
concern for the other as person. What is the shared commonality with all other moral virtues? It
is this: an awareness of and expression of goodness (such as fairness in the moral virtue of
justice or being slow to anger in the moral virtue of patience) toward others. At the same time,
because we also seek out the Specific Difference, we can be more clear on what, exactly, agape
is and is not relative to these other forms of love and the other moral virtues. Those differences
already have been discussed above.
Our seeing the similarities with and the differences among agape and all other forms of
love and the other moral virtues aids us in more clearly understanding agape and preparing us for
accurate social scientific assessments of this construct. We further avoid the relativism of
accepting as equally true a host of definitions of agape that could emerge in the published
literature in the future. We now turn to a deeper discussion of agape across historical time. As we
17
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
will see, there has been consistency in ascertaining what agape is from medieval times to the
present.
Philosophical History of Agape Love
Ancient Greece
We already have discussed the delineation of love into four different constructs by the
ancient Greek philosophers. The other three forms of love (storge, eros, and philia) are natural in
that they can come to most people under the circumstance that the other person, who is the
recipient of the love, also loves. These forms of love are not particularly challenging. Agape, in
contrast, was a rather vague concept for the ancient Greeks. The noun agape does not appear in
Plato’s or Aristotle’s writings, although the verb agapeo and its variants does appear about 100
times across the Platonic and Aristotelian writings. Two representative examples are: 1) In
Plato’s Phaedrus (233e) we read, "...at private entertainments you ought not to invite your
friends, but beggars and those who need a meal; for they will love you (ἀγαπήσουσιν/
agapesousi) and attend you and come to your doors and be most pleased and grateful, and will
call down many blessings upon your head.” The “beggars” show an intense enthusiasm for those
who did the inviting. This is not a mutual intense love as occurs in eros when eros is centered on
another person (eros also can be centered on virtue, for example, on wisdom as its object of
beauty); 2) In contrast, we see this quotation from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1095b17) that
is not focused on a person, but instead shows this intense enthusiasm for a lifestyle, which the
philosopher does not even see as honorable: “...to judge from men's lives, the more or less
reasoned conceptions of the Good or Happiness that seem to prevail are the following. On the
one hand the generality of men and the most vulgar identify the Good with pleasure, and
18
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
accordingly are content [the verb here is agaposi, meaning “they loved”] with the Life of
Enjoyment—for there are three specially prominent Lives, the one just mentioned, the Life of
Politics, and thirdly, the Life of Contemplation.” Here the love as intense enthusiasm is not
centered on the pursuit of beauty, as eros is (when focused either on a virtue or another person).
Instead, agaposi in this case is centered on a lower issue of pleasure as an end in itself.
The lack of much dialogue concerning agape and a lack of precise definition gives the
impression that their wisdom led them to realize that there is another form of love waiting to be
discovered, but as yet not well understood. It took the medieval philosophers to explicate this
other form of love, agape.
Aquinas and Subsequent Christian Thinkers
One of the first detailed discussions of agape as a moral virtue is in Aquinas (1948), who
used the word charity. Charity is to will the good of the other person (ST I-II 26.4). Thus, as
Silverman (2019) clarifies, the Thomistic project emphasizes first the interior issue of motivation
(willing the good of the other) and then comes the emphasis on the emotions and actions. Again,
as Silverman (2019) clarifies, actions, as part of agape, are so important that they can lead to a
revision of Aristotle’s idea of humanity’s Essence as rational animals. Instead, humans are
rational relational animals.
Aquinas distinguishes between the natural virtues, open to all persons, and the theological
virtues, which can be understood and willed only by the grace of God. Charity or agape is one of
the theological or infused virtues. Charity starts with love of God, which is self-giving, toward
the person. The person who now possesses this theological virtue, then gives the love to God and
subsequently to others. As God is self-giving even to the point of suffering for others in Christ,
19
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
persons who develop charity or agape do the same (Aquinas, 1948). This idea of self-giving
sacrificial love has been developed in many Christian writings. As one example, Pope John Paul
II, following the assassination attempt on his life, wrote Salvifici Doloris (1984), discussing how
love in its highest sense is to suffer with Christ for the good of others. Such suffering can be
redemptive or soul-saving for those others. Agape, in other words, is self-sacrificial for the
ultimate good of the other, sharing in the beatific vision.
C.S. Lewis
In his book, The Four Loves, C.S. Lewis (1960) makes the compelling distinction between
what he calls Gift-Love and Need-Love, the former being a higher form of love than the latter.
An example of Gift-Love is a father who toils to work hard and denies himself pleasures so that
he can save enough money for a secure future for his children even though he will not live long
enough to see them prosper or to share in that prosperity. An example of Need-Love is a child
who falls down, hurts his knee, and runs to his mother for comfort. This is not at all a selfish act,
but one of mutual love. Gift-Love may be mutual, but on its highest level it is entirely self-giving
for the sake of others. This is agape or what he calls charity. This agape love is more than
altruism, as already discussed. In altruism, when the sympathetic millionaire, who is not
suffering nor has any major concerns right now, gives $100 to the poor, this may be done out of
selfless love, but it does not actually cost the giver, who does not struggle in such an act. As C.S.
Lewis explains, the highest form of Gift-Love willingly offers service to enemies, criminals, and
those who even sneer at the gift-giver. Forgiveness, he says, on its highest level is a form of Gift-
Love as the forgiver struggles to offer goodness to those who have been cruel. As an example,
after deep conflict with a mother-in-law, a son-in-law who answers the phone, offers kindness
20
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
and help to his mother-in-law by taking the call although it can be emotionally painful for him.
From the Aristotelian perspective, even the idea of struggling to offer goodness can lessen with
practice, as the gift-giver becomes more proficient in the virtue (Kim & Enright, 2016). Gift-
Love is a deliberately willed action. It also is a specific, concrete form of love toward particular
others. After all, we do not just throw monetary gifts up in the air and say, “There you go,
humanity.” Gifts are tangible and given to particular persons. Agape as the highest form of Gift-
Love, thus, is willingly directed toward specific persons in a concrete way and for the receiver’s
benefit.
Gene Outka
Perhaps the leading modern philosopher on the topic of agape is Gene Outka (1972),
with his philosophy book, Agape: An Ethical Analysis. He has identified three features of agape
as follows:
1. equal regard for all persons regardless of certain personal characteristics (attractiveness,
wealth, and so forth);
2. self-sacrifice in that the ones who love give of their own resources (such as time, energy, and
even material goods) to meet the needs of others. This giving of resources costs the giver. For
example, if someone is hungry and gives her left-overs from dinner to a homeless person on the
street, this is different from the person who is hungry, has only one sandwich, and shares half of
it with the person without a home. The latter is an the example of agape;
3. concern for the other without necessarily expecting reciprocity.
Peter Kreeft
21
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Because we are not in full control of our emotions, then it follows that agape is not centered
in our feelings. Instead, following Aquinas, Kreeft (1988) reasons that agape is a willed response
to others. Even if we do not feel like it, we seek the good of the other. This comes from both
motivation (the will) and understanding this as important (reason). Agape is focused on specific
others. A general love of humanity is much easier because humanity in general does not surprise
us or betray us. Gifts have particular names of people, the recipients of the gift, associated with
the gift-giving and so agape is concrete, specific, and focused on specific persons. The paradox
is this: The more of yourself you give away, the more you get back. As an analogy, in a game of
catch, as you give up the ball, it is only then that you get the ball back. Keep the ball to yourself
and the game ends at that point.
Modern Views of Love from the Social Sciences
Sternberg (1986), in his classic work on what he calls the Triangle of Love, offers three
components to love: intimacy, commitment, and passion. Intimacy is equated with the affect of
being close to another. Passion is the feeling that leads to romance. Commitment can involve
staying with another either short-term or long-term. These three components, Sternberg instructs,
can occur in friendships, casual dating, and the long-term commitment of marriage. In every
case, he is describing either philia (friendship love) or eros in its varied forms of short-term
passion and/or long-term commitment. In none of his discussions does he bring in agape as part
of the triangle.
Elliott (2012) finds it dangerous to dichotomize rationality and feelings in our attempt to
understand agape because feelings then might be pushed to the background. As Elliott warns,
some people conclude that their feelings just do not matter as agape is equated with the will to
22
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
action and rationality. Elliott is correct if agape is not seen as a moral virtue, but only a
command from God. Feelings do not then guide our response or duty to this command because
we are not always in full control of our affect, especially when people are being cruel to us or
asking us to suffer for them. Yet, when we take a full virtue-ethics look at agape, we see that this
dichotomizing of cognition and affect is to engage in reductionism. Affect, as seen above in the
five ways to define a construct from Greek philosophy, makes room for Property and feelings
are part of, though not essential to, agape. Further, as explained by Simon (1986), all moral
virtues, according to Aristotle, have an affective or motivational dimension. Thus, affect does
have a proper place within agape, although as a Property only, it does not define what agape is.
To illustrate how the definition of love can become too broad, consider Oord’s (2012)
view from the Wesleyan tradition. He first admits that John Wesley, in using the word love, does
not actually define it. Oord, in then trying to fill that void, defines love as an intentional act, done
with sympathy and empathy, toward others for overall wellbeing. Because the Aristotelian
categories (Species, Genus, Specific Difference, and so forth) are not applied to the definitional
analysis, this definition could encompass eros, storge, philia, compassionate love, and agape. It
could encompass altruism and even pity, but without the philosophical challenge to make
important distinctions, we are not sure which of these love categories precisely fit the definition.
In his most recent work, Oord (2022) more directly specifies agape as seeking good despite
obstacles and difficulties.
Both Batson, Early & Salvarini (1997) and Preston and Simpson (2012) equate love with
altruism, or a focus on the other, with a de-emphasis on the self. This self-giving, then, is coming
closer to a fuller definition of agape than an emotion-focused approach does, but it still is
23
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
incomplete because no Specific Difference between agape and altruism is forthcoming. In other
words, and to use our earlier example, this kind of love might be easy for the sympathetic
millionaire, not under any pressure or suffering right now, who gives $100 to charity. There must
be more to agape than this, otherwise, why not just use the popular word altruism rather than
adding more to our vocabulary?
Sutton and Mittelstadt (2012) avoid the reductionism of placing agape primarily into one
central category such as the emotions or altruism. They posit six dimensions to love: spiritual,
cognitive, observable behavior, physiological, emotional, and social. Yet, in explaining these,
they fall back to the psychological construct of attachment, rendering love closer to storge than
to eros, philia, agape, or compassionate love. In other words, it now is not clear how storge and
agape differ. Johnson (2006) in using the word love in the context of romantic relationships also
equates the construct of love with attachment and thus focuses on eros rather than agape without
specifying this directly.
Titus and Scrofani (2012) agree with the above philosophical analyses by Outka and
Kreeft as they describe agape. The highest form of love, they argue, transcends the self and
attends to others, particularly those who are suffering. The greatest challenge is to love one’s
enemies, those who are not loving you in return.
As we can see, when social scientists use the term love, most do not focus on the Specific
Difference between their construct and other love constructs (eros, storge, phila, agape). Most do
not focus on the Specific Difference of any form of love and such psychological constructs as
attachment or altruism. We, thus, have myriad definitions of love that might confuse the reader
unless an Aristotelian lens is used to dissect the Specific Differences that are implicit in the
24
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
definitions. We now turn to social scientific attempts to operationalize love into psychological
measures.
A Critique of the Existing Love Scales
Agape must not be confused with The Love Scale, the SMILE inventory, or the
Compassionate Love scale, constructed in the past 15 years within psychology. There are
important Specific Differences between agape and all of these scales. To reiterate from the
section entitled, Agape Love Examined Philosophically, agape unconditionally offers
goodness, for their sake, to those in need such that this moral virtue is understood, motivated,
willed, and acted upon in a way that costs the one expressing that love.
Love Scale. McCullough, Bono, and Post (2005) proposed the Love Scale as an attempt
at a comprehensive assessment of love. They reasoned that love consists of 10 related but
independent constructs: gratitude, attentiveness, compassion, helpfulness, loyalty, respect,
creativity, humor, courage, and forgiveness. As already stated in the philosophy section above,
agape cannot be the exact same as gratitude, helpfulness, or respect if one can generate examples
of how these other constructs can be manifested with indifference or resentment toward others.
Agape further is not the same as attentiveness because I can attend to another so that I get
something from the person. Courage itself is a moral virtue independent of love, and seen as one
of the Cardinal Virtues by the ancient Greeks, who philosophically separated love and courage as
distinct. One can courageously march into battle out of a sense of duty and not out of a love for
one’s country. Humor sometimes can be sarcastic and thus not loving.
The point of this critique is that this scale has far too many constructs within it. Some of
the constructs can be seen as not involving any kind of love. Some might be related to love, but
25
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
which of the four forms of love (as described by the ancient Greeks) is involved? An analysis of
Specific Differences regarding any of the 10 constructs is absent, leaving a confusing picture of
what, exactly, is being measured in this 40-item short form scale. This may be why the scale has
not generated interest in the scientific community. It is not clear what the exact construct is
measuring.
SMILE Scale. Levin and Kaplan (2010) developed the SMILE Scale based on the
thinking of Harvard sociologist, Dr. Pitirim Sorokin’s views in the 1950’s. As with the scale
above, this is a multi-construct assessment involving six dimensions of love: Religious love
(toward God), Ethical love (“Love is always beautiful” with an emphasis on beauty and goodness
in general), Ontological love (“When I feel loved, I feel complete peace of mind,” with a focus
on what the self gets out of loving), Biological love (again with a focus on self with an emphasis
on eros, such as, “The purpose of my life is to maximize my pleasure.”), Psychological love
(again with a self-focus emphasizing affect: “Feeling loved is my greatest source of happiness.”),
and Social love (which emphasizes philia: “I have always been a devoted friend.”).
With so many different constructs involving love (theological, eros, philia, self-benefit,
and love as an emotion), it is not surprising that this instrument has not gained wide acceptance
in the social, clinical, and psychiatric literature. From a philosophical perspective, it is not clear
which love construct is the focus.
Compassionate Love Scale. Although compassionate love scales exist (see, for example,
Fehr, Harasymchuk, & Sprecher, 2014; Hatfield & Rapson 1996; Sprecher & Fehr, 2005), we
will not critique those here because the construct itself already was examined under the What
26
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Agape Is Not section. Yet, it should be noted that even this term, compassionate love, has varying
themes such as eros or altruism when researchers attempt to operationalize the construct.
An Examination of Current Agape Love Scales
Love Attitudes Scale
The most popular instrument to assess agape is the Love Attitudes Scale developed by
Hendricks and Hendricks (1986) based on Lee’s (1973) six love styles of eros (passionate love),
lupus (game-playing love), storge (although this is labeled as friendship love, this is not correct
relative to ancient Greek use. Storge is the natural love, for example, between mother and child;
philia is friendship love), pragma (practical love), mania (possessive, dependent love), and agape
(specifically described as altruistic love which is not exactly correct because, as we have seen,
one can be altruistic without the deep effort and pain of self-service). These are centered
exclusively on the romantic partner. There are seven items within each style for a total of 42
items of love. Each item is rated on a Likert scale from 1 to 5. There also is a German version of
the scale (Bierhoff, Grau, & Ludwig, 1993).
Let us examine the agape subscale from the philosophical viewpoint. First, the scale is
strong in this: It centers agape on a particular person, in this case the romantic partner. Agape, as
we saw above, always is centered on a particular person, persons, or a group. Second, this scale
cannot be seen as an assessment of the moral virtue of agape in general because it is more
reductionistic to the partner only. Third, let us now examine each of the seven agape items (from
items 36 to 42):
27
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
36. I try to always help my lover through difficult times. Critique: This does not necessarily
show the Aristotelian Specific Difference between altruistic love and agape in that the helping
may not involve deep effort and pain by the participant.
37. I would rather suffer myself than let my lover suffer. Critique: This appears to be a
philosophically-accurate agape item in that it involves the effort and pain, discussed above,
specifically toward a particular person. It may be missing the theme of Aristotle’s “doctrine of
the mean” or avoiding an extreme case in which the participant overdoes the suffering.
38. I cannot be happy unless I place my lover's happiness before my own. Critique: As with
item 37, this appears to be a philosophically-accurate item.
39. I am usually willing to sacrifice my own wishes to let my lover achieve his/hers.
Critique: As with items 37 and 38, this appears to be a philosophically-accurate item at least to a
point. The possible philosophical deficit involves Simon’s (1986) point 1 in his analysis of the
moral virtues in that agape involves goodness. What if the partner’s goals are not good? For
example, what if the partner’s goal in life is to be very wealthy which includes excessive hours at
work each day. The sacrifice of the participant, in this case, violates Simon’s theme of goodness.
That this item does not unambiguously differentiate the partner’s moral goals and non-moral
goals is a cause for concern.
40. Whatever I own is my lover's to use as he/ she chooses. Critique: This is not
philosophically-accurate because it does not distinguish altruism and agape. There is not
necessarily the needed component of suffering on the part of the respondent.
28
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
41. When my lover gets angry with me, I still love him/her fully and unconditionally.
Critique: This does not necessarily distinguish agape from patience, kindness, or compassionate
love (a general love that persists regardless of circumstance).
42. I would endure all things for the sake of my lover. Critique: This, as with items 37, 38,
and 39 seems to be philosophically-accurate in that a construct which represents a specific
difference with agape is not confounding the item. Yet, as with item 39, item 42 is not
unambiguously clear what the lover’s situation is that requires the participant to endure. Could
the endurance involve, in some cases, being complicit with non-moral goals of the partner? An
enmeshed relationship can too often lead to endurance of that which is not morally appropriate.
In summary, of the seven items only four are assessing agape toward a partner and two of
these four (items 39 and 42) might be assessing an extreme position by the participant who is
violating the “doctrine of the mean.” Thus, this scale is in need of revision if it is to more
accurately represent the construct of agape in particular, while avoiding the conflation of items
with those constructs which have Specific Differences with agape, and a scale is needed that
goes beyond only the romantic relationship.
Love Attitudes Scale Short Form
For the short form of the above scale, Hendricks and Hendricks (1998) created a three-
item agape love scale including items 37, 38, and 39 above, all of which are consistently
assessing agape rather than a related but specifically-different construct. Item 37 assesses one’s
view of behavior; item 38 assesses affect (happiness) or motivation; item 39 also assesses
motivation (willingness). Yet, in light of the seven characteristics of a moral virtue (Simon,
1986), this short form does not assess Simon’s point 1: Is the respondent consciously aware that
29
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
agape is a moral virtue centered in goodness? Is this moral virtue deliberately chosen or simply
present within the participant? The short form does not assess Simon’s point 3 or one’s
cognitions relative to agape. How is the participant thinking about the other as the agape
behavior is applied to the situation and the person? The scale does not directly assess the
participant’s consistency in applying agape: Are the responses to items 37-39 typical or variable
depending on one’s mood or the circumstances of the partner? These items do not address “the
doctrine of the mean” between genuine agape and overdoing it in love burnout (Corrigan, 2019;
Pines, 1996).
The Tension Between Philosophy, Statistics, and the Social Sciences
Given the above critique that the most popular agape scale to assess romantic
relationships is philosophically under-developed, what then do we make of findings which show
this scale to have both convergent and cross-cultural validity? For example, using the Love
Attitude Scale, Hammock & Richardson (2011) report that those high in agape tend to maintain
relationships relative to other love subscales. Salayani et al. (2020) show that those who score
high on the agape subscale have higher marital satisfaction, whereas Mandal and Latusek (2018)
report that those who abandon partners are low on this agape subscale. Others demonstrate the
cross-cultural validity of the LAS in Peru (Lascurain Wais, Lavender Liria, & Manzanares
Medina, 2017), Brazil (Cassepp-Borges & Ferrer (2019), Turkey and Great Britain (Sanri &
Goodwin, 2013), and Africa and Europe (Neto, 2000), although Cao, She, and Zhang (2007)
recommend a revision of the scale in China. Cramer et al. (2015) report that they could not
reproduce the six-factor solution of the different love subscales within the LAS, possibly because
30
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
of overlap of meaning across some of these subscales. In other words, has the philosophical
Specific Difference been taken into account in the generation of the scale?
It is unfortunate that statistics do not and cannot answer the most critical question:
Despite the statistical convergent and cross-cultural validity, for the most part, for this most-
popular agape love scale, is this an accurate reflection of the Essence of what agape actually is?
Only philosophical analysis can answer this question and it is not addressed in the current
published social science literature. In fact, researchers seem to take for granted that they are
assessing agape when they use a scale labeled as such. We, thus, need to delve more deeply into
an intersection between philosophy and the construction of accurate agape love scales for use in
future research.
As another tension between philosophy and social science, the accusation of scientism
might emerge. By “scientism” we mean this: Researchers, intent on validating agape measures as
psychometrically sound, might keep trying to find a statistically-significant relationship between
agape and any other variable that might present agape in a favorable light. In other words, and
for example, suppose that attempts to correlate agape with self-esteem fail to show a significant
relationship. What would prevent the researcher from setting aside the self-esteem variable and
trying another (the variable of hope, for example) and if that does not work, then empathy or
gratitude or altruism, all in the search of statistical victory? This argument can be countered with
one word: replication. All important and popular social scientific variables are held up to
replication by other scientists. If one social scientist hides the lack of relationship between, say,
agape and self-esteem, others are likely to take up the cause and, upon finding no relationship
between the two, would report this. Replication is a protection against scientism.
31
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
As one more point of tension between philosophy and social science, some philosophers
might ask the utilitarian question: Why do we even need the epistemology of social science to
understand and appreciate agape when we have the detailed method of Aristotelian rational
analysis, which has been useful for many investigators for thousands of years? Social science can
add to the objectivist, Classical philosophical analysis in at least three ways. First, correlations
among agape and other positive psychology variables, such as self-esteem or harmonious
relationships, might peak the interest of readers to now explore what agape is and how it
practically fits into one’s own life.
Second, there never has been a published study within clinical psychology incorporating
agape into either the diagnosis of a mental health challenge or treatment. For example, suppose
an adolescent is consistently bullying others in school. A typical approach is to punish the
adolescence (perhaps in after-school detention) and to call the parents. Yet, what if some of those
who bully are doing so because they have been bullied by others and have a loving heart that has
been damaged by the abuse toward them? Giving agape love scales to this adolescent could aid
in the diagnosis of this hidden attribute in the adolescent. This young person actually is
emotionally sensitive and so hurt that the anger developed and was displaced onto others. In this
case, detention might exacerbate the anger whereas a forgiveness intervention, that incorporates
principles of agape, might be more effective. The mental health professional could give the
adolescent insight into the fact that he is a person who loves and this can be appropriated toward
those who have hurt him. Thus, his identity, his sense of who he is as a person, can be positively
strengthened. A similar approach could be applied to adults in psychotherapy as they work to
change their identity based on their willingness to love in the face of life’s challenges.
32
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Third, and following upon point 2, the introduction of agape interventions in schools may
prove to be efficacious in restoring emotional health and preventing emotional compromise. We
stated in the introduction that the practice of agape might aid in the growth of one’s humanity. If
this is the case, then might there be, in the future, agape educational programs, as there now are
forgiveness education programs (see, for example, Rahman, et al., 2018) in which participants
learn to love more deeply? If so, then agape measures are vital as dependent variables to assess
the effectiveness of such educational programs.
As a final point, this one between philosophers, the question could be asked: Might a
phenomenological approach to understanding agape be more fruitful than the top-down analysis
of what agape is? After all, the Aristotelian approach defines agape without even asking people
for their experience with it. In other words, agape is a lived encounter among people and we
need to ascertain the description of what agape is, subjectively, for each person as well as the
hermeneutical meaning ascribed to this subjective experience for each person. We do not
disagree that qualitative social scientific research into the subjective experience and meaning of
agape for individuals is of great value. Yet, and this is our Aristotelian emphasis showing, if we
want to understand what agape is, we do not start with the general public, especially with people
who have had limited exposure to thinking about this virtue because most people likely will
misunderstand what it is in its Essence. We say this based on the analogous and difficult moral
virtue of forgiveness. When Freedman and Chang (2010) asked people what forgiveness is, the
majority reduced it to “moving on,” which cannot be what forgiveness is, given that it is a
merciful response to a particular person or persons who acted unjustly. One can “move on” with
cold indifference toward the other. It could be the same with agape in that people will lack
33
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
wisdom in giving their views on agape and this is why we need first to scrutinize, through
rational inquiry, the Species, Genus, Specific Difference, Accident, and Property attributes of
agape before building a scale to assess the degree to which people understand and demonstrate
agape. In other words, there is a substantial difference between asking the question, “Are you
understanding agape and to what degree are you practicing it?” and the related question, “What
do you say and experience what agape is from your own inner reality?”
Future Test Construction of Agape
Based on the above review of the philosophical and social scientific literature, it is
important for researchers to accurately conceptualize what agape actually is when developing
such scales for children and adults. This includes a philosophical analysis of Specific Differences
with other love constructs and related ideas such as altruism or self-pleasure seeking. We then
must be careful in item generation so that the wording reflects agape without equivocation with
other constructs.
We recommend the following in the generation of items for an agape scale (or scales)
with a focus on philosophical and psychological issues:
1. The items must reflect the first six qualities which all moral virtues possess as defined by
Aristotle and described by Simon (1986):
Being aware that one is deliberately choosing this moral virtue of agape because it is good;
Example of an item: “My actions for the other are worthy of my effort.”
Example of a reverse-scored item: “Regarding what I did for the other person, I am feeling
indifferent.”
34
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Demonstrating motivation (I want to do this); will (I have the determination to do this); and a
softened heart as Property rather than Essence;
Example of an item: "I knew that my actions would cause me pain, but I chose that helping
anyway.”
Example of a reverse-scored item: "I find no particular reason why I bore the pain.”
Cognition toward the other (I am aware of a) the other’s suffering, b) who the other is as a
person, and c) what this will cost me);
Example of an item in (b); “I understood that the other is a person who is special, unique, and
irreplaceable.”
Action (toward a particular person or persons and the action costs the giver);
Example of an item: “I acted because the person has value as a person.”
The more highly morally developed people will score higher on this scale;
The more highly morally developed people will be more consistent in their expression of
agape across different kinds of situations and persons.
2. The scale needs to assess “the doctrine of the mean” to be sure that the participants’
decisions and actions are not so extreme as to lead to “love burnout.”
Example of an item: “I completely exhausted myself by doing this.”
3. Items must be generated to reflect the construct of agape in particular that involve:
cost to the participant
Example of an item: “I endured suffering for the other person, not primarily for me.”
indifference to reward for the self
Example of an item: “My pain is less important than the outcome for the person.”
concern for the welfare of the recipient
35
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Example of an item: “I willingly endure pain if my actions will benefit the other.”
have a gift-like quality to it
Example of an item: “I wanted a good outcome for the other and so this is why I acted.”
4. The items must be generated with Specific Difference in mind and thus not be written in
such a way as to overlap with other love constructs or other similar constructs to agape:
kindness in particular (only a desire to remove another’s suffering without cost to
the one who is kind)
Example of an item: “It was important to me to help in spite of my discomfort.”
compassionate love (a general love for humanity)
Example of an item: “I did this for a specific person rather than a general concern for all.”
philia (friendship only without cost)
Example of an item: “I would bear the pain of helping in this way even if the other does not
reciprocate my assistance.”
eros (a reciprocal form of passionate love)
Example of an item: “This kind of helping for the other is different from romantic-type feelings.”
altruism (helping without necessarily suffering for the other)
Example of an item: “I willingly suffered.”
5. The scale needs to go beyond the romantic relationship to include any person toward
whom the participant is motivated and wills to assist the other.
6. The newly developed scales should be validated cross-culturally in the United States,
South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia to show generalizability for this
universal moral virtue of agape.
36
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Conclusion:
Importance of Agape within Scientific Psychology
Agape as a research topic likely will attract thousands of researchers and many thousands
of mental health professionals. Why do we say this? From both a theological and philosophical
perspective, agape seems to be one of the most important virtues because it can lead to deep
connection between and among people who willingly decide to offer this to one another. Even if
it is not mutually reciprocated, agape can uplift others so that they have a chance to thrive. The
ancient texts unambiguously present agape as vital. For example, the Hebrew Scriptures instruct
the faithful to love God with all one’s heart, soul, and strength (Deuteronomy 6:5) and to love
one’s neighbor as oneself (Leviticus 19:18). In the Christian New Testament, Jesus instructs that
the greatest commandment is to love God above all else and second is to love one’s neighbor as
oneself (Matthew 22:36-40). We can see some parallels in Islam. For example, the sacrifice of
love is seen in the poems of Rumi (1991), “Through love, all pain will turn to medicine” (p. 17).
There are also some similarities in Buddhism with the concept of absolute (the highest of three
levels) bodhicitta, which signifies the willingness to suffer so that others do not suffer
(Dipamkara,1997). Philosophically and psychologically, it is far more demanding to love those
who challenge us than to give the natural and mutual loves of storge, eros, and philia. Further, to
grow in agape is to grow in one’s humanity toward greater goodness. Confucius saw a similar
path toward a higher humanity in the concept of jen (ren), which has more of an emphasis on
harmony and compassionate love toward all than on suffering in particular for the other (Hung,
2017).
37
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
We hypothesize that a direct emphasis on agape in families, workplaces, places of
worship, and schools will make for more peaceful and healthier communities. This is because the
practice of such love: a) focuses more on assisting others than just the self, b) enhances respect
for persons and thus possibly would lessen injustices, and c) thus may lessen the deep
resentments that could possibly turn into revenge. What might happen in communities which
deliberately foster the idea and practice of agape among most members of that community? If
agape then becomes willingly chosen between and among persons, such self-giving mutuality,
we hypothesize, will enhance individuals’ psychological health and increase cooperation among
members of the society. It seems that such a social experiment, the development of the Agape
Community, has yet to be tried in any contemporary society. These are ideas in need of future
scientific investigation. Research questions that could be asked once a reliable and valid agape
scale has been constructed include these, which could be applied well beyond only romantic
partnering relationships:
Do those with a higher sense of agape in general have higher quality relationships with
fewer conflicts, including in families, workplaces, and other community settings?
Is agape associated with physical health? After all, if a person is less angry and has more
love, this may be a protection of the cardiovascular and other bodily systems.
Does agape correlate with self-actualization and self-esteem? Given that a person who is
highly developed in this virtue would be consciously aware of this choice, it could positively
impact one’s self image.
38
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Is there convergent validity of agape with the other forms of love: compassionate love,
storge, philia, and eros? If so, which of these others loves shows the stronger relationship with
agape and why?
Is there convergent validity of agape and other moral virtues such as justice, patience,
and kindness? As the expression of love requires heroism, might the quest for justice be stronger
in those who are high in agape?
Is it possible to foster an understanding, appreciation, and self-chosen practice of agape
through virtues education? If so, what are the results? Can measures of agape show
improvement, along with positive psychology characteristics (such as hope and resiliency),
following such interventions with elementary and secondary students?
In proposing these social scientific questions, requiring the construction of
philosophically-accurate scales of agape, we are not calling for a reductionism in epistemology,
with the false claim that the social scientific method is the major way of understanding agape.
Instead, we would prefer to see inclusivity among philosophy, theology, and social science,
including objective scales with quantitative analysis of agape and phenomenological scales with
qualitative analyses. The intersection of all of these disciplines may deepen our understanding of
agape.
In this work we have tried to emphasize four points: a) agape is an important moral virtue
that is under-researched; b) as researchers begin to explore agape, they first should be on a firm
philosophical foundation, knowing the Essence of agape and its Specific Differences with other
moral virtues; c) this should lead both to a coherence in the definition of agape; and d) to
accuracy in the subsequent development of research instruments which likely will be better than
39
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
if researchers strive for novelty in their definitions and measurements that are not on a firm
philosophical foundation.
40
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
References
Andolsen, B.H. (1981). Agape in feminist ethics. Journal of Religious Ethics, 9, 69-83.
Aquinas, T. (1948). Summa theologiae (English Dominicans, Trans.). Westminster, MD:
Christian Classics. (Original work composed 1265--1273).
Aristotle (340 B.C./2013). Nicomachean ethics. CreateSpace Independent
Publishing Platform, an amazon company, IV.5
Aristotle (350 B.C./2016). Ethics. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, an
amazon company.
Batson, C.D., Early, S., & Salvarini, G. (1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how
another feels versus imagining how you would feel. Personality & Social
Personality Bulletin, 23, 751-758.
Bierhoff, H. W., Grau, I., & Ludwig, A. (1993). Marburger Einstellungs-Inventar für
Liebesstile [Marburg Attitude Scales towards Love Styles]. Göttingen, Germany:
Hogrefe.
Boethius, A. (534/1999) (V. Watts, Ed.) The consolation of philosophy. New York:
Penguine.
Cao, H., Shi, Z. & Zhang, J. (2007). Revise the Love Attitude Scale in Chinese students by IRT.
Chinese Journal of Clinical Psychology, 15(5), 459-462.
Cassepp-Borges, V. & Ferrer, E. (2019). Are we missing the circumplexity? An examination of
love styles. Journal of Relationships Research,10.
Corrigan, P. (2019). How to avoid compassion burnout. NextAvenue website (https://
www.nextavenue.org/avoid-compassion-burnout/)
41
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Cramer, K., Marcus, J., Pomerleau, C. & Gillard, K. (2015). Gender invariance in the Love
Attitudes Scale based on Lee’s color theory of love. TPM-Testing, Psychometrics,
Methodology in Applied Psychology, 22(3), 403-413.
Dipamkara, A. (1997) (translated by R. Sonam). Atisha’s lamp for the path to enlightenment.
Boston: Shambhala.
Elliott, M. (2012). The emotional core of love: The centrality of emotion in Christian
psychology and ethics. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 31, 105-117.
Enright, R.D. (2012). The forgiving life. Washington, DC: APA Books.
Fehr, B., Harasymchuk, C. & Sprecher, S. (2014). Compassionate love in romantic
relationships: A review and some new findings. Journal of Social and Personal
Relationships, 31, 575-600.
Freedman, S. & Chang, W-C. R. (2010). An analysis of a sample of the general population’s
understanding of forgiveness: Implications for mental health counselors. Journal of
Mental Health Counseling, 32, 5-34.
Hammock, G. & Richardson, D. (2011). Love attitudes and relationship experience. Journal of
Social Psychology,151(5), 608-624.
Hatfield, E., & Rapson, R. (1996). Love and sex: Cross-cultural perspectives. Needham Heights,
MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Hendrick, C. & Hendrick, S. (1986). A theory and method of love. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 50, 392-402.
Hilkert Andolsen, B. (1981). Agape in feminist ethics. Journal of Religious Ethics, 9,
69-83.
42
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Huebner, B., & Hauser, M. D. (2011). Moral judgments about altruistic self-sacrifice:
When philosophical and folk intuitions clash. Philosophical Psychology, 24,
73-94.
Hung, A.T. W. (2017). Paul Tillich and classical Confucianism on religious ethics. In K.
K. Chan & Y. William Ng (Eds). Paul Tillich and Asian Religions (Tillich Research,
11) (pp. 1-9). De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110496666
Johnson, S. M. (2007). A new era for couple therapy: Theory, research, and practice
in concert. Journal of Systemic Therapies, 26, 5-16.
Kant, I. (1785/1993).(Translated by J. Wesley Ellington). Grounding for the metaphysics
of morals. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Kim, J. & Enright, R.D. (2016). “State and trait forgiveness”: A philosophical analysis and
implications for psychotherapy. Spirituality in Clinical Practice, 3, 32-44.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). State and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization.
In D.A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347-480).
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Krebs, D. (1982). Psychological approaches to altruism: An evaluation. Ethics, 92, 447-458.
Kreeft, P. (1988). Fundamentals of the faith. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.
Kreeft, P. (1990). Making choices. Cincinnati, Ohio: Servant Books.
Kreeft, P. (1992). Back to virtue. Ignatius Press.
Kreeft, P. (2011). What is love? Envoy Magazine, 9.3.
Kreeft, P. (n.d.). Love. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics/
love.htm
43
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Lascurain Wais, P., Lavandera Liria, M., & Manzanares Medina, E. (2017). Psychometric
properties of the Love Attitude Scale in Peruvian undergraduate students. Acta
Colombiana de Psicología, 20(2), 282-293.
Lee, J. (1973). Colours of love. Toronto, Canada: New Press.
Levin, J., & Kaplan, B.H. (2010). The Sorokin Multidimensional Inventory of Love Experience
(SMILE): Development, validation, and religious determinants. Review of Religious
Research, 51, 380-401.
Mandal, E. & Latusek, A. (2018). Love attitudes, psychological femininity and masculinity,
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and emotional intelligence of rejectors in close
relationships. Current Issues in Personality Psychology, 6(3), 188-199.
McCullough, M., Bono, G., & Post, S.G. (2005). The love scale project. Miami, FL:
University of Miami. https://unlimitedloveinstitute.org/downloads/RESEARCH-
SCALE-DEVELOPMENT.pdf
Neto, Félix., Mullet, E., Deschamps, J., Barros, J., Benvindo, R., Camino, L., Falconi, A.,
Kagibanga, V., & Machado, M. (2000). Cross-cultural variations in attitudes toward love.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31(5), 626-635.
Nietzsche, F. (1887/2009) (translated by D. Smith). On the genealogy of morals. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
North, J. (1987). Wrongdoing and forgiveness.Philosophy, 62, 499-508.
Oord, T.J. (2012). Love, Wesleyan theology, and psychological dimensions of
both. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 31(2), 144-156.
Oord, T. J. (2022). Pluriform love: An open and relational theology of well-being. SacraSage
44
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
Press.
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Pines, A.M. (1996). Couples burnout: Causes and cures. New York: Routledge.
Plato, translated by B. Jowett (2015/approximately 330 BC). The complete works of Plato.
Hastings, East Sussex, United Kingdom: Delphi Classics.
Post, S.G., Underwood, L.G., Schloss, J.P., & Hurlbut, W.P. (2002). Altruism and altruistic love.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Preston, A. & Simpson, D.B. (2012). Luther’s psychology of love. Journal of Psychology
and Christianity, 31, 130-143.
Ramsey, P. (1965). Deeds and rules in Christian ethics (Scottish Journal of Theology,
occasional papers no.11). Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd.
Rogers, C. (1951). Client-centered therapy. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Rumi (translated by A. Schimmel) (1991). Look! This is love: Poems of Rumi. Boston, MA:
Shambhala.
Salayani, F., Asghare Ebrahim Abad, M., Rasoolzadeh TabataBaei, K., & Abbaszadeh
Rougoushouee, R. (2020). Mediating Role of Loving Style s in the Relationship between
Personality Characteristics and Marital Satisfaction. Journal of Psychology, 24(1), 23-40.
https://www.sid.ir/en/journal/ViewPaper.aspx?id=741326
Sanrı, Ç. & Goodwin, R. (2013). Values and love styles in Turkey and Great Britain: An
intercultural and intracultural comparison. International Journal of Psychology, 48(5),
837-845.
Silverman, E.J. (2019). The supremacy of love: An agape-centered vision of Aristotelian
45
EXAMINING AGAPE LOVE
virtue ethics. Washington, DC: Lexington
Simon, Y. (1986). The definition of moral virtue. New York: Fordham University Press.
Sprecher, S., & Fehr, B. (2005). Compassionate love for close others and humanity.
Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 22, 629-651.
Sternberg, R. J. (1986). A triangular theory of love. Psychological Review, 93, 119-135.
Sutton, G.W. & Middelstat, M.W. (2012). Loving God and loving others: Learning
about love from psychological science and Pentecostal perspectives. Journal of
Psychology and Christianity, 31, 157-166.
Titus, C.S. & Scrofani, P. (2012). The art of love: A Roman Catholic psychology of
love. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 31(2), 118-129.
46
A preview of this full-text is provided by American Psychological Association.
Content available from Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
