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... MUS-IAD members agreed that errant companies would not use Islamic symbols in their commercials and promotion activities, and they also would contact the Capital Market Board regularly to explain their problems and needs. Two well-known, fraud-stricken companies, Jet-Pa and GAP Holdings, were expelled from membership while End€ u ustri Holding was forced to resign because of their reluctance to comply with the association ( € O Ozler, 2000). We identify three interlinked factors that hindered the genesis and the development of a viable capital market reform and regulatory institutions in Turkey. ...
Since the late 1960s, alternative forms of capitalization have emerged in the absence of an effective capital markets regime in Turkey. We can see these alternative forms in the failed attempts to create Anatolian holding companies through the direct investment of small savings. This article shows how Anatolian holding companies became victims of poor institutional and regulatory regimes, and how the lack of institutions to promote impersonal trust in the economy in turn, permitted widespread abuses. We identify populist politics, lax oversight, and social norms that incorporated gambling as three interlinked reasons which hindered the genesis and development of viable capital market reform and regulatory institutions in Turkey.
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