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Vol:.(1234567890)
Comparative European Politics (2022) 20:314–335
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-022-00272-x
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Conflicts ofsovereignty overEU trade policy: anew
constitutional settlement?
AmandineCrespy1· JuliaRone2
Accepted: 18 January 2022 / Published online: 28 March 2022
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2022
Abstract
This paper investigates whether the politicization of a new generation of trade agree-
ments has led to the transformation of EU trade policy. It provides a qualitative study
of multilevel contention based on sources from civil society and the parliamentary
archives in Belgium, Germany, and the European Union concerning the EU-Can-
ada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and three subsequent
agreements concluded by the EU with Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore. We argue
that, far beyond mere institutional disputes, the contention surrounding CETA has
epitomized two conflicting visions of sovereignty: on the one hand, a vision where
national executives qua states share sovereignty under the auspices of the European
Commission, and on the other hand, a claim to reassert popular sovereignty (and
the channelling thereof by parliaments) in a multilevel fashion. We demonstrate that
the strengthening of the latter vision has been limited as the empowerment of par-
liaments was not sustained when civil society’s mobilization waned. The EU insti-
tutions have successfully curtailed the category of mixed agreements thus limiting
the involvement of national and regional parliaments. CETA was a climax in the
politicization of trade yet failed to bring about a new constitutional settlement that
enhances the popular component of sovereignty in the EU.
Keywords Sovereignty· Trade· CETA· Politicization· Parliament· People
Introduction
European trade was never uncontentious, and there were always dissenting voices
(della Porta 2007). To a large extent, EU trade policy is known as an area of
intense lobbying as decision makers seek to satisfy demands stemming from key
* Amandine Crespy
Amandine.Crespy@ulb.be
1 Cevipol andInstitut d’Etudes Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
2 CRASSH, University ofCambridge, Cambridge, England
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