Frontline Informality: Paramilitary Forces and Pro-government Militias in Thailand's Deep South Counter-insurgency

Abstract

Deep South counterinsurgency in Thailand

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“This fascinating collection focuses on irregular forces – militias, private armed
groups, youth gangs and martial arts groups – in Southeast Asian cases that
include the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Indonesia. Rather than
examining these forces from the perspective of states, the individual essays
as the volume as a whole suggest looking at them as phenomena rooted into
local circumstances, as entities that are not simply informal or illegal entities
but have communal roles. The essays are thus devoted to their organizational
structure and dynamics to show how they adapt to changing social and political
conditions and proceed along evolutionary paths; towards less use of armed force
and intimidation, weakening and dissolution or transformation into other social
and political forms. Of especial significance are five general essays that frame the
case studies by offering general comparative and theoretical directions as well as
suggestions for reform. This book will be indispensable for any scholar interested
in irregular forces both in the region and outside it.”
Eyal Ben-Ari, Kinneret Academic College, Center for Security,
Society and Peace
“This is an important book that goes beyond the binary of state and anti-state
forces to consider the political, economic, and sociological details of irregular
armed groups. Overgeneralization and a military lens have impaired our
understanding of armed groups. Western military forays into anthropology in
the service of counter-insurgency ‘human terrain analysis’ have been unhelpful.
Yasutomi et al. have pioneered a much more promising approach toward
respectful and inclusive peace processes, disarmament, and reform of security
sector governance.
The micro-sociological approach by Yasutomi et al. demonstrates that armed
irregular forces can play positive roles in peace processes, despite typically being
portrayed as spoilers. These roles are linked to the governance and security needs
of differentiated communities.
In addition to rebel groups, Southeast Asia sees irregular forces engaged by
governments, veterans’ groups, martial arts groups, and ritual arts groups. Clan,
family, and criminal networks add to the complexity of managing human needs
for security, reliable governance, and trust in local decision-making.
Yasutomi and colleagues identify three pathways for demobilization and SSR:
continued violence, dissolution, and adaptation to new circumstances. All three
offer interesting possibilities for demobilization, security sector governance and
reform.
Readable, well-documented, building on fieldwork and deep first-hand
knowledge, this book has implications far beyond Southeast Asia with its
fundamental insights about irregular forces and their connections to society.”
David Last, CD, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of
Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada

Pathways for Irregular Forces in
Southeast Asia
An exploration of the roles that pro- and anti-government militias, private armed
groups, vigilantes, and gangs play in local communities in the new democracies
of Southeast Asia.
Scholars have typically characterized irregular forces as spoilers and infiltrators
in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. The contributors of this book
challenge this conventional understanding of irregular forces in Southeast Asia,
demonstrating that they often attract solid support from civilians and can be
major contributors to the building of local security—a process by which local
residents, in the absence of an effective police force, develop, partner, or are
at least included in the management of community crimes and other violence.
They analyze irregular forces’ dealings with political actors at the community
level, explaining why and how forces are incorporated in and collaborate with
legitimate institutions without using violence against them. Offering a new
approach to dealing with irregular forces in Southeast Asia, the contributors
explore new theoretical frameworks that are better suited for evaluating irregular
forces’ relationship to different security providers and the political environments
in the region. Specifically, they examine case studies from Indonesia, Timor-
Leste, the Philippines, and Thailand.
A valuable resource for researchers, students, and practitioners in the areas of
conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security governance, especially those with
a focus on Southeast Asia. This book will also be of great interest to scholars of
the sociology and anthropology of the region.
Atsushi Yasutomi is Associate Professor at the Department of Social System
Design, Eikei University of Hiroshima, Japan.
Rosalie Arcala Hall is Professor of Political Science at the University of the
Philippines Visayas.
Saya Kiba is Associate Professor of Political Science at Kobe City University of
Foreign Studies, Japan.

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Pathways for Irregular
Forces in Southeast Asia
Mitigating Violence with Non-State
Armed Groups
Edited by Atsushi Yasutomi,
Rosalie Arcala Hall and Saya Kiba

First published 2022
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© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Atsushi Yasutomi, Rosalie Arcala Hall
and Saya Kiba; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Atsushi Yasutomi, Rosalie Arcala Hall and Saya Kiba to be
identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their
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ISBN: 978-0-367-69958-1 (hbk)
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003143994
Typeset in Galliard
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents
List of figures ix
List of tables x
List of contributors xi
Preface xii
Acknowledgments xiv
Introduction 1
ATSUSHI YASUTOMI, ROSALIE ARCALA HALL AND SAYA KIBA
1 Characterizing irregular forces 14
ATSUSHI YASUTOMI
2 Pathways for irregular forces 31
ROSALIE ARCALA HALL
3 Non-state violence and political order in democratized Indonesia 50
MASAAKI OKAMOTO
4 Irregular forces in Timor-Leste 73
YUJI UESUGI
5 The gray zone of irregular forces: Politically sanctioned, local
defense, and organized crime groups in the Philippines 93
JENNIFER SANTIAGO ORETA

viii Contents
6 Between legal and legit: local security arrangements between
state security actors and irregular forces in Bangsamoro region,
Philippines
ROSALIE ARCALA HALL
114
7 Frontline informality: Paramilitary forces and pro-government
militias in Thailand’s Deep South counterinsurgency
PAUL CHAMBERS AND SRISOMPOB JITPIROMSRI
135
8 Security governance in Southeast Asia: Security sector reform
with non-state actors
SAYA KIBA
159
9 Conclusion
ROSALIE ARCALA HALL, SAYA KIBA, AND ATSUSHI YASUTOMI
186
Index 193

Figures
3.1 Relationship between the state and non-state forces 52
7.1 Thai Border Patrol Police and Village Scouts 139
7.2 Ministry of Defense, Rangers, and Marine Paramilitary 139
7.3 Thai Ministry of Interior’s control over VDC and PGMs 140
7.4 Troops serving in Thailand’s Deep South (2019) 152
7.5 Allocation of paramilitaries and PGMs in Thailand’s Deep
South (2021) 153
8.1 Mapping security governance 167
8.2 A comprehensive definition of the security sector 176
8.3 Narrower and broader definitions of the security sector 177

Tables
1.1 Irregular forces and their relations with the state and
community civilians 25
3.1 Elected candidates and candidates endorsed by Pancasila
Youth in the presidential elections (2004–2019) 63
4.1 Mapping of irregular forces in Timor-Leste 76
4.2 Summary of major veteran groups 77
4.3 Summary of major PSCs 86
8.1 Numbers of paramilitaries, regular forces, and reservists
in Southeast Asian countries 164

Contributors
Paul Chambers is Lecturer and Special Advisor for International Affairs at the
Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Naresuan
University, Thailand.
Rosalie Arcala Hall is Professor of Political Science at the University of the
Philippines Visayas.
Srisompob Jitpiromsri is Lecturer/Researcher, Center for Conflict Studies and
Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Institute for Peace Studies, Director Deep South
Watch (DSW), and Assistant Professor, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani
Campus, Thailand.
Saya Kiba is Associate Professor of Political Science at Kobe City University of
Foreign Studies, Japan.
Masaaki Okamoto is Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto
University, Japan.
Jennifer Santiago Oreta is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political
Science and Director of the Ateneo Initiative for Southeast Asian Studies
(AISEAS) of the Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines.
Yuji Uesugi is Professor at the Faculty of International Research and Education,
Waseda University, Japan.
Atsushi Yasutomi is Associate Professor at the Department of Social System
Design, Eikei University of Hiroshima, Japan.

Preface
Irregular forces have a misguided reputation as spoilers of peace. They are seen
as illegitimate armed actors tied with the shadow economy of drugs and crime,
whose violent acts are or result in human rights violations. They are largely
excluded by international aid agencies in peacebuilding initiatives and at the mar-
gins of scholarship. In Southeast Asia, where decades of armed conflict are inter-
twined with post-colonial state- and nation-building, there is a need to examine
their nature and dynamism beyond these stereotyped categories. Irregular forces
in the region have distinct historical moorings, enjoy legitimacies to their local
publics, and are not always or perpetually wedded to violence. They are more
than stereotypes.
This book does not deny the dangerous nature of irregular forces in Southeast
Asia but offers a more critical examination of their diversity and embeddedness in
the changing political environment of their countries. It offers conceptual recat-
egorization of these armed actors beyond the binary that privileges the state, i.e.,
that they are not statutory formations and therefore illegal. The book proceeds
from the point of view that irregular forces traverse the gray area between for-
mality and informality in their working relationship with the military and police.
They more than assist, stand proxy for, or act as subcontracted fighters against
state enemies. They are local and territorial forces with value to their communi-
ties. This book offers a micro perspective in that it describes the organizational
characteristics of irregular forces—their recruitment, resources, command struc-
tures, and relationships—and how their leadership brings these attributes forward
in the face of political changes. Irregular forces are not treated as static. Rather,
their objectives, motivation, and internal cohesion are actively shaped by external
political processes, even when these processes exclude them. Their transforma-
tion as an organization follows three distinct pathways to more or less violence,
dissolution, and evolution.
The militias, private armed groups, martial arts groups, and youth groups, in
the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste, covered in this book were
local organic formations that emerged because of state absence in the periph-
ery. Starting as loose organizations, they became more structured as they were
brought into the state’s ambit to fight opposing forces or support governing
elites. This transformation ranged from being absorbed into the state’s security

Preface xiii
apparatus (e.g., as auxiliaries) or becoming neighborhood watch associations, vil-
lage defense groups, or security guards with close ties to local military command.
In this pathway, they never totally shed their violent nature but found more prag-
matic means of dealing with the state. Some followed a decisively political track
by becoming election campaign machines, formal political parties, or pressure
groups. Coercion became less important than money, networks, and popular-
ity as instruments to obtain concrete benefits in the form of jobs, government
contracts, pensions, and symbolic recognition of their members. This political
trajectory was uneven across the cases and was highly contingent on their national
government’s policy mood, which swung between accommodations (e.g., the
Philippines, Indonesia) to crackdown (e.g., Timor-Leste). Rather than moving
away from a violent portfolio, the case of Thai militias in the Deep South goes in a
reverse direction, with them being more formally integrated into the government
counter-insurgency apparatus down to the village level.
The foregoing inventory of irregular forces in Southeast Asia portends to their
transformative potential beyond violence. There is a need to differentiate irregu-
lar forces and consider those whose organization and leadership are open and
flexible toward more accountable ways of providing security. A security sector
reform approach that is inclusive of these types of irregular forces is warranted.

Acknowledgments
The idea of this book emerged after several of the contributors had presented
papers at the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS)
Conference in Lisbon in June 2019, the International Political Science
Association-Research Committee on Security, Conflict, and Democratization
(IPSA-RC44) Conference in August 2019, and the 23rd Annual Conference
of Japan Association for Comparative Politics in 2020. The authors, therefore,
would like to thank all the participants in these conferences, particularly Dr.
Marina Caparini and Dr. David Last, for their stimulating input. We also thank
Dr. Albrecht Schnabel, Dr. Kenki Adachi, and Dr. Jun Honna for sharing their
expertise on security governance theories and practice with us.
We would like to thank Simon Bates, editor of the Routledge, for being posi-
tive and supportive of this book. Our gratitude is furthermore extended to the
two anonymous reviewers for their most helpful comments on our book proposal
and earlier drafts of some chapters.
We also thank all local counterparts for sharing their data and knowledge in
the Philippines, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and Thailand. We are grateful to Juhn
Chris P. Espia for assistance with the numerical simulations and Jackie Imamura,
Christopher Johnson, Teresita Rola, and Febrey Bless Esclares for carefully proof-
reading and formatting the manuscript.
This work was financially supported by the following grants:
1. Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI [Grant No.
JP17KT0004, JP20H04407, JP18KK0346, JP16KK0089, JP17H02239,
and JP19H00553];
2. Research Grant of the Toyota Foundation [Grant No. D16-R-0736]; and
3. International Program of Collaborative Research (IPCR) of the Center for
Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University [Grant No. H28-IV-10
and R2-IV-10].
The authors gratefully acknowledge the use of the libraries, archives, and other
research facilities provided by Komatsu University, Doshisha University, Miyazaki
International College, University of the Philippines Visayas, and the Center for
Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) of Kyoto University.
Finally, we also thank all our contributors for working with us, patiently revis-
ing their manuscripts in light of the feedback provided by readers, and comple-
menting their chapters.

Introduction
Atsushi Yasutomi, Rosalie Arcala Hall and Saya Kiba
This book analyzes irregular forces in the new democracies in Southeast Asia.
Irregular forces—pro-government militias, anti-government militias, vigilante
groups, gang groups, etc., as will be defined in the subsequent chapters—are
often understood to be nefarious actors of democratic transitions and post-
conflict peacebuilding processes. Irregular forces are thus often characterized as
spoilers. True. Even after peace negotiations are concluded in the post-conflict
settings, irregular forces manage to retain weapons and use them for extortion
to exert political influence on the political opposition. In countries undergoing
democratic transitions, irregular forces traffic weapons, humans, and drugs to
benefit from illegal businesses that use violence and illegitimate money trans-
actions. Others continue to violate human rights against the local population.
These activities by no means represent opposite directions toward the transition
to democracy. They may well be spoilers in many parts of Southeast Asia. Many
scholars and practitioners in this field agree that these malignant actions thwart
ongoing efforts to gain peace and stability.
Are irregular forces always spoilers to democratic transitions in Southeast Asia,
nonetheless? While this book acknowledges the damaging nature of their politi-
cal behaviors, it also attempts to shed light on alternate perspectives. It argues
that it is not always appropriate to regard these groups as a single-faceted actor
that haphazardly destroys the efforts of democratic transitions in this region. This
book suggests that some irregular forces have the potentials to collaborate in
democratic transition efforts.
We aim to draw the readers’ fresh attention to some of the irregular forces in
this region that exhibit internal adaptations to the changing political environ-
ment and to ones that are less violent than before. Those that experience such
transformation manage to adroitly alter their original political objectives with less
violent means to pursue them without dismantling the original structure. The
contributors to the chapters illustrate cases where different forms of irregular
forces contribute, in their own way, to maintain security in their communities
while retaining the use of violence to a lesser degree. Sure, their approach to
security at the community and state levels is often illegitimate, and they may not
fully comply with the appropriate democratic practice. Nevertheless, the authors
suggest that this alone may not be the sole reason to exclude them from ongoing
DOI: 10.4324/9781003143994-1

2 Introduction
efforts of democratic transition. Instead, they suggest that various national and
international agencies supporting these efforts have more flexible and permissible
programs that can include these illegitimate actors in the region.
The authors observe that irregular forces in Southeast Asia are undergoing a
characteristic transformation in their internal structure in response to the altered
political environment. Though some irregular forces remain as violence-based
organizations and some simply dissolve, others find themselves capable of adapt-
ing to the changing political environment and adopting objectives and the means
to pursue them. We pay particular attention to irregular forces that fall into this
latter type. Throughout the chapters that follow, the authors present cases in
which these irregular forces evolve under changing political environments. Some
provide the local populations with informal public services in the absence (and/
or the lack) of formal services that legitimate state agencies should, otherwise,
have provided. We also find cases where irregular forces adapt by utilizing their
developed nonviolent components of resources, such as network and popularity,
and transforming into a political party and non-government organization. At
the end of this book, we suggest that it is this type of irregular forces that exter-
nal assistance agencies supporting security sector reform and governance (SSRG)
should pay more attention to as they have more potential for future collabora-
tion with them. Careful studies on these irregular forces enable more extensive
SSRG operations, enhancing the political developments required for these states
in Southeast Asia.
Irregular forces in the context of post-conflict peace
processes
Irregular forces as spoilers
Studies on irregular forces have developed rapidly since the end of the Cold War,
and civil wars broke out in many parts of the world where irregular forces played
major roles during conflicts, as witnessed in states such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A number of studies were conducted about irregular
forces in relation to post-conflict peacebuilding processes. These studies largely
assume that irregular forces are peacebuilding spoilers as large parts of these force
members, particularly those excluded from the ongoing peace processes, could
ruin such processes to regain the power they once had.
Stephen Stedman’s (1997) pioneer study in his International Security piece
entitled “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes” defines spoilers as leaders who
“believe that peace threatens their powers, worldview, and interests, and use vio-
lence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (p. 5). He suggests two types of
spoilers: inside spoilers are among those already involved in peace processes and
undermine peace processes, whereas outside spoilers are excluded from peace
processes. In his article, he further characterizes three different categories accord-
ing to their distinct objectives. First, “total spoilers” are those who do not tol-
erate worldviews that would result from the peace negotiations and thus reject

Introduction 3
anything that is agreed upon in the given peace process and attempt to destroy
all efforts from the negotiations. The second kind of spoilers is characterized as
“limited spoilers” who seek limited goals such as recognition, redressing griev-
ance, and a share of power that the opposition would otherwise attain. The third
type, “greedy spoilers,” is positioned between total and limited spoilers whose
goals vary, depending on their strategic calculations.
Based on Stedman’s definitions, irregular forces excluded from peace pro-
cesses can be categorized as spoilers. Steiner and his colleagues (2019) analyze
the characteristics and behaviors of pro-government militias in post-conflict
states, such as the Interahamwe militia in Rwanda and the Arkan’s Tiger in the
former Yugoslavia, and explain that their behavior falls on the “outside spoiler”
category since they were excluded from the peace processes. For a number of
reasons—lack of alternatives, psychological satisfaction toward violent behavior,
and strong indoctrinated violence philosophy on achieving political goals, etc.—
their continued war-fighting and criminal activities contributed to undermining
the peacebuilding processes in the countries (Steiner et al., 2019). Likewise, like
the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), pro-government militia and
criminal groups can be seen as outside spoilers. The AGC split from the pro-
government militia called the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), which
had been demobilized in 2003–2006 and was rearmed to resume its drug traf-
ficking business. This led AGC members to be excluded from the 2015 peace
negotiation participants and from the subsequent state-sponsored disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes. The AGC’s continuing
drug businesses and related criminal activities have been responsible for a num-
ber of deaths among communities in Colombia during heavy combats with the
Colombian military and law enforcement units. The case of the AGC exemplifies
pro-government militias and criminal groups undermining the ongoing peace
processes in the post-conflict state.
Once left outside peace negotiations, these irregular forces hardly become
recipients of assistance from Western donors, further spurring them to commit
violence. As Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002) argue, spoilers take advan-
tage of uncontrolled positions from the Western’s eyes, allowing them further to
commit violence. Moreover, as Nilsson (2008) explains, outside actors are more
likely to engage in post-settlement violence once they are kept outside the loop
of the peacebuilding process, as it remains the only viable means for protecting
their interests for survival.
Other scholars contend that characterizing irregular forces as spoilers to peace-
building is negligent and counter-effective and instead uphold a more inclusive
approach to defining irregular forces. Greenhill and Major (2006–2007) suggest
that spoiler’s behavior is neither intentional nor personally driven and that it is
indeed difficult to make a clear-cut distinction among spoilers that are “total,”
“limited,” and “greedy” as they are not necessarily stable and static. By observ-
ing that these distinctions are rather the response to the environments, Greenhill
and Major explain that spoilers’ characteristics are shaped by the political envi-
ronment under which they operate. According to them, their behavior relies on

4 Introduction
perceptions derived from the security dilemma they face after the peace negotia-
tions. If their expected utility is to comply with the peace bargains, they would
likely surrender to peace.
In contrast, if a credible third party is absent to guarantee their survival, they
would rather find it difficult to give up their weapons. Their decision may also
have to do with how fellow members are motivated to stay combative; leaders of
armed groups may well find it hard to convince members to dissolve the group if
the motivation to remain violent stays high. However, if a drastic change in inter-
nal power distribution takes place among the armed group members, the follow-
ers would rather leave, and the organization may well lead to a collapse (Greenhill
and Major, 2006/7). Zahar (2003) similarly argues that spoilers’ behaviors are
not simply so vicious that they wish to destroy the peace processes, but that
they result from a simple calculation of cost and benefits based on their post-
negotiation economic strategies. When their perception of the “peace dividend”
after the peace process is higher, they would simply turn themselves in. But they
would rather choose to stay in combat if their peace dividend is lower than that
expected.
The discussions on spoilers to peacebuilding suggest that all irregular forces
that continue to be present after peace processes do not necessarily and auto-
matically point to the destruction of developments in the peace processes. Their
political behaviors (most notably whether or not to surrender or challenge peace
negotiations) are shaped not simply by their ideology and leadership of the armed
groups but also by their perceived political conditions and environments created
from the peace bargains that take place out of their control.
Irregular forces from a more micro perspective
Since the 2000s, studies on irregular forces have further developed by shedding
light on their behaviors at a more micro level. Scholars who pay attention to
this level of analysis agree that more detailed examinations of their behaviors are
required to restore peace and stability in post-conflict peacebuilding. Such exami-
nations on irregular forces through a magnifying lens have helped us reaffirm the
nature of irregular forces; that is, they are not simply unitary violent actors who
spoil political transitions.
Weinstein (2005) closely examined the recruitment strategies of irregular
forces by comparing those with ample financial resources and those without. He
observes that those recruited in the former type of groups exhibit little com-
mitment to their long-term goals, and those with poor resources attract new
recruits with private rewards utilizing social ties. Staniland (2014) discussed
that social networks and bonds within family and kinship play important roles in
their recruitment policy. Loyle and Bestvater (2019) observed Colombian rebel
groups’ use of Twitter during the civil war and found that they used Twitter to
publicize the legitimacy of their activities to the audience outside the country but
not to recruit new members. McQuinn (2016) analyzed the internal organiza-
tion of irregular forces by focusing on command profile and financing structure

Introduction 5
and found that those are two important core factors that determine their political
behaviors after the civil wars.
Studies on irregular forces at the micro level also extend to studies on the rela-
tions between them and the communities. In her award-winning book Extralegal
Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia, Cheng (2018) explains that irregular forces (she
refers to them as “extralegal groups”) in Liberia, in the absence of a functioning
government and without public trust, created a functioning political norm that
maximized financial rewards for their activities while providing conflict resolution
and other problem-solving mechanisms for communities. Their engineering of a
substitute political norm poses a rigorous academic challenge to the conventional
understanding of irregular forces as peacebuilding spoilers. Arjona and her collab-
orators (2017) examined rebel groups in Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia, Liberia, and
other post-conflict states and analyzed their relations to civilians in the communi-
ties from the governance perspective. Their book entitled Rebel Governance in
Civil War observed the irregular forces’ governance systems in these states. The
rebels sought to win over the population in their territories and draw them on to
collaborate and prevent civilians from turning against the rebels. Kaplan (2017)’s
work is intriguing in that he analyzes the rebel groups’ relationship vis-à-vis the
community from the community’s standpoint. He argues that communities in
post-conflict states can ensure their own security by strengthening their social
bond and creating civilian authority when confronted with violence and other
abuses posed by armed groups in the communities.
Some post-conflict studies suggest that the social bonds among former
combatants in irregular forces and their fighting skills tempt them to commit
crimes in their communities and that such criminal inclination tends to spill over
through communities. Peña and Dorussen (2021) test the so-called violent vet-
eran’s effect in post-conflict Colombia and claim that it is not always true. They
find that murders committed by former anti-government militia members who
had experienced the government-sponsored social reintegration process were not
accounted for, while the number of thefts claimed by them did increase. Based
on their observation, they debunk the common prevailing bias that Colombia’s
demobilized militia members are murderers and are cruel.
The studies by Nussio and Kaplan (2016) and by Nussio (2017) also show
that the common image of recidivism by former irregular force members is often
exaggerated. These scholars explain that irregular force members, particularly
those who had gone through the demobilization and reintegration processes in
Colombia, do not dare to risk their new life by committing particularly violent
crimes like murder, especially for those who now need to support their own
children. They simply calculate the risk and tend to resort to a more stable and
economic life. According to them, lingering joblessness in town is a quintessential
misconception toward such former combatants. Indeed, Nussio (2017) supports
his claim by indicating a study by the Colombian Agency for Reintegration in
which among the 57,907 combatants who underwent the 2003–2016 reinte-
gration processes, no less than 74% were employed and have contributed to the
economy of their local communities.

6 Introduction
These scholars have observed diverse characteristics of irregular forces and
suggest that they are not simply unitary actors that thwart peacebuilding efforts
after the conflicts. Based on this presupposition, some scholars call for a wider
approach to the DDR of ex-combatants in post-conflict peacebuilding processes.
Shibuya (2012), for instance, warns of isolating irregular forces from DDR pro-
cesses in post-conflict states. His approach to post-conflict DDR processes is
more inclusive in that external agencies responsible for DDR should reach out
to irregular forces, such as militias and rebel groups, and incorporate them in the
processes, warning that the lack of such an approach has undermined the peace-
building efforts in various post-conflict states so far. Furthermore, Berdal and
Ucko (2009) pay particular attention to the reintegration processes of irregular
forces at the local level. They stress that the conventional approaches to irregular
forces in DDR processes have stressed the mechanical and normative aspects and
have neglected various political and anthropological aspects at the local level.
Thus, they argue that analysis of dynamic interactions between irregular forces
and local institutions that accommodate them during DDR (particularly the rein-
tegration process) is vital. Particularly, Berdal and Ucko’s emphasis that they
advocate a “more permissive” and long-term approach to reintegrating irregular
forces into communities is of significant interest. They argue that Western donors
that sponsor DDR processes in post-conflict states need to prepare more lenient
policies toward irregular forces and allow for their more active participation in
decision-making at the local and community levels.
Irregular forces in the SSR context
In the field of SSRG, dealing with irregular forces has been a common topic, but,
in practice, it seems to have been long overlooked.
SSRG aims to enhance the effectiveness of security, justice, and oversight
institutions and to bring the state as well as non-state security sectors (e.g., mil-
itary, police, and private security companies) under democratic governance as
a state-building end-goal (OECD DAC, 2007). While SSRG is widely known
to be reform efforts in states in the post-conflict peacebuilding context (as was
conducted in states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leone), it is also
conducted in states undergoing democratic transitions where no civil wars are
necessarily involved.
SSRG implemented in these wider political contexts underscores the sig-
nificance of including irregular forces in its operations. The Organisation for
Economic and Development Cooperation (OECD) makes it clear in its book
entitled OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform that a successful SSRG
requires an inclusive operation policy that reaches out not only to state security
apparatus but also to non-state security providers as they often play key roles in
providing local security particularly in remote areas (OECD DAC, 2007).
Despite this principle on non-state security actors, practitioners and scholars
of SSRG are rather cautious about reaching out to irregular forces. Hendrickson
and Krakoszka (2005) warn that weak state security functions (such as the police)

Introduction 7
can easily lead to a (re-)rise of irregular forces like militias and vigilante groups
to fill in the gap and encourage illegitimate use of violence, which results in
undermining efforts for governance. For this reason, the OECD points out that
enhancing governance over irregular forces should follow careful examinations of
irregular forces and studies on their roles on the relations among various irregular
forces and those with the state security apparatus (OECD DAC, 2007).
Some observers advocate that containing and controlling irregular forces is
a vital step for a successful SSRG. Bryden and Hänggi (2005) point out that
controlling irregular forces is an important process for peacebuilding, and it
represents a minimum-security prerequisite to allow external security sector
reform (SSR) bodies and the local collaborators to proceed with under a safe
environment. Holmsqvist (2005) similarly states that close coordination between
national and external actors is critical in promoting post-conflict SSR to control
irregular forces that could spoil post-conflict reforms. Von Dyck (2016) also indi-
cates that SSRG’s first step for short- to long-term tasks includes restoring order
in the operating region by neutralizing and de-legitimizing illegal, non-statutory
armed groups such as militias, gangs, and community defense groups.
This book challenges the conventional approach of SSRG institutions (such
as international organizations and civil society organizations) that treat irregu-
lar forces as permanent spoilers of democratic transitions. Our conclusion is not
to turn a blind eye to their illicit activities but to indicate that external agen-
cies supporting SSRG reach out more to irregular forces and not isolate them
from their assistance programs. It will be inappropriate for external agencies to
assume that they are a homogeneous group erratically thwarting SSRG efforts.
The authors of this book suggest that not all undermine democratic transitions
and that they have the potential for some degree of collaboration with SSRG
agencies in Southeast Asia.
Plan of this book
Existing studies on irregular forces in Southeast Asia have mainly focused on
discourses tackling how they have been a predicament to democratic transitions
and what challenges they have posed to the stability in the region (e.g., Aceh,
Indonesia [Stange and Patock, 2010; Aspinall, 2009]; Timor-Leste [Simonsen,
2005; Sindre, 2016; de Almeida, 2017]; the Philippines [South and Joll, 2016];
and Thailand [McCargo, 2006; Ball and Farrelly, 2012]). In short, these studies
are about how irregular forces are spoilers toward democratic transition processes
in these states. Studies on irregular forces using our different angles are limited.
This book dares to challenge the conventional perspectives of observing irregular
forces in Southeast Asia from two following aspects. First, it focuses on irregular
forces that are not simply violent and combative actors disturbing democratic
transition efforts in the region. Second, it sheds light on those that have trans-
formed themselves into less violent (if not entirely nonviolent) entities and have
the potential to contributing to peace and stability at the community and state
levels. In short, this book tries to put the spotlight on less spoilers in the states.

8 Introduction
This book will proceed by examining various forms of irregular forces in the
selected states under unique political milieus: Indonesia (democratic deepening)
and Thailand (democratic reversal with ongoing conflict, especially in the case
of the Deep South), Timor-Leste (democratization through post-independence
state-building), and the Philippines (democratic transition through post-conflict
peacebuilding, specifically in the case of Mindanao). On this basis, states such as
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam are not selected as relevant case studies.
Irregular forces do exist and are active in many parts of this latter group of states.
However, none of these states suggests promising democratic transition and
there are no prospects for relevant changes within the irregular forces. Moreover,
none seems ready to accommodate any encouraging initiatives for the democratic
governance of security institutions.
This book consists of nine chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the issues and
problems through which we try to understand the behavior of irregular forces.
In Chapter 1, Yasutomi discusses that post-conflict irregular forces tend to be
treated as one loose armed group that fights against either the regular forces or
legitimate statutory forces (i.e., the military, the police, and other law enforce-
ment agencies). He points out that, to avoid existing ambiguous confusion on
irregular forces, there is a fresh need to understand these groups. In this context,
he re-grouped irregular forces into five categories—paramilitaries, pro-govern-
ment militias, anti-government militias, vigilante groups, and gang groups—and
analyzed each characteristic according to (1) the main objectives, (2) motivation
for enlistment, (3) internal cohesion within force members, (4) relations with the
state, (5) relations with the community in the territories where they control, and
(6) relations with the community in the opponent territories. His analysis pro-
vides reasons to support the idea that irregular forces tend to be misconceptual-
ized as simply spoilers and helps us better understand whether and who, among
surviving irregular forces, are transforming themselves into political entities with
altered purposes for their existence.
Hall, in Chapter 2, illustrates how irregular forces undergo any of the sug-
gested three pathways in a changing political milieu. In Pathway 1, irregular forces
have no pressing reasons to bring out drastic changes in their current objectives
and means for survival in the given political environment and thus remain violent
groups. In Pathway 2, irregular forces lose sources of their continued activities
(e.g., trust, social network, financial resources, manpower) under the changing
political environment and are unable to find alternate ways for their survival. Such
groups are eventually destined to dissolve. In Pathway 3, irregular forces do rec-
ognize changing expectations and roles to play in the new political environment
and adroitly alter their objectives and the means to preserve their organizational
structures. Hall explains that the irregular forces have undergone either of the
three pathways. She particularly highlights Pathway 3 to be most noteworthy.
Chapters 3 through 7 analyze the cases of illegitimate actions of non-state
violent groups in Southeast Asian states. These chapters present cases in the
Southeast Asian states where we observe various forms of irregular forces experi-
encing transformations through either Pathways 1, 2, or 3.

Introduction 9
Okamoto, in Chapter 3, analyzes the existing violent groups in Indonesia.
Indonesia has experienced a series of democratization reform processes since the
end of more than three decades of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998.
Okamoto’s focus on the roles of Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila) offers
intriguing examples of Pathway 3 in which pro-government militias continue to
exist after the conflict while finding altered objectives. Pancasila Youth—which
once actively assisted Indonesian army operations in dismantling the Communist
Party and the subsequent overt and covert operations to maintain the Suharto
regime—has, since democratization, successfully found ways to actively partici-
pate in national as well as local politics while maintaining violent instruments.
Okamoto illustrates that non-state violent actors such as Pancasila Youth find
their ways to continue with activities by shrewdly locating the space in which their
very presence is illegitimate, but the state tolerates their operations and businesses
involving violence and extortion.
Chapter 4 illustrates the irregular forces in Timor-Leste that survive after the
country regained its independence in May 2002. Observing that there are three
categories of armed forces remaining in the country (veteran groups, martial arts
groups, and rebel groups), Uesugi points out two major characteristics of irregu-
lar forces in post-independence Timor-Leste. First, leaders of armed groups in
the first two categories were successfully able to go into politics while keeping
their structure intact so that the groups can continue to exert influence on the
political processes of the groups. Second, some armed groups under these cat-
egories were being absorbed into private firms, mostly in private guard busi-
nesses, whereas those belonging to the third category (i.e., rebel groups) failed
to do so and were gradually destined to dissolve. In depicting the various courses
that irregular forces have taken since the end of independence battles, Uesugi
indicates that irregular forces in the country demonstrate various examples and
combinations of Pathways 2 and 3.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss irregular forces present and active in the aftermath of
separatist conflicts in the Bangsamoro region, Mindanao, in the Philippines. These
two chapters illustrate how different forms of irregular forces in the region—
e.g., anti-government militias, vigilante groups, and criminal gangs—have been
impacted by separatist conflicts in the region and the autonomous region experi-
ment in Mindanao. After gaining independence in 1946, the Philippines has been
confronted with separatist Islamic insurgencies in Mindanao. The Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) concluded a peace deal in 2014, leading to the crea-
tion of an autonomous political entity of Bangsamoro in the region. The Moro
National Liberation Front, which had separated in 1978 from the MILF, remains
a grave source of concern for the stability and security in the region (as detailed
in Chapters 5 and 6). While some demobilized former members formed a politi-
cal party and non-government organizations in the region, many remained vio-
lent in the region by morphing into illegitimate community security providers.
These chapters illustrate how the latter type of armed groups has managed to
survive after the conflict by tacitly providing alternative public security services,
albeit illegitimate, to fill the gap created by the defunct security management

10 Introduction
of the state apparatus. Chapter 5 explains this at the community level, while
Chapter 6 analyzes it from the perspective of state-local political relationships.
Oreta, in Chapter 5, carefully examines the origins, compositions, and objec-
tives of irregular forces in Mindanao after the peace accord and groups them
into four distinct categories. While describing detailed traits in each type of the
current irregular forces, she identifies key elements commonly observed across
these categories. In the absence of effective community security management
in the region, these armed groups successfully gain legitimacy from among the
community members as they play significant roles in providing local security. She
also explains that the dysfunction of the state security apparatus allows the armed
groups to tacitly maneuver the “gray” space between legal and illegal environ-
ments where they use violent as well as nonviolent methods in solving a variety of
community problems. The way Oreta characterizes their behavior in the commu-
nity seems accurate when she refers to them as a “reversible jacket.” By this, she
means these forces have double-faced functions. On the one hand, they continue
to engage in violent activities, such as extortion of political rivals and kidnapping.
On the other hand, they are virtually functioning as “private governments” as
she puts it because they perform minimum functions of local governance such
as managing community affairs and mitigating neighborhood disputes, through
which they gain informal but solid legitimacy among community members. This
is particularly seen in rural areas in central Mindanao, where the local government
finds it very difficult to provide for local security, thus allowing these informal
actors to actively engage in such “double” functions in the communities.
Chapter 6 also examines the irregular forces in the Bangsamoro region but
from a different perspective. Hall heeds attention to the relationship of mutual
benefits between the state and local politicians where irregular forces are being
used as “currencies” to win against rivals. The decentralized political power struc-
ture in the country fostered the formation of many illegal armed groups. The lack
of public good services by the state security apparatus has further allowed those
groups to fill the gap. Under these environments, the state pragmatically utilizes
irregular forces for counter-insurgency operations by either giving them virtual
legal status or turning a blind eye to their illegitimate presence and exercises.
Local politicians, on their part, are able to deploy the local military and police
forces to achieve counter-insurgencies while conveniently laying responsibili-
ties on violent actions on irregular forces and thus averting the public’s negative
image toward the military and the police.
Chapter 7 discusses the paramilitaries and pro-government militias in Thailand
as the case study on Pathway 1 as it demonstrates no sign of transformation in
their internal structures. In their chapter, Chamber and Jitpiromsri describe a
variety of paramilitary organizations and pro-government militias that exist and
continue to function as major force contributors to the state’s counter-insur-
gency operation for the Deep South in Thailand. For more than 100 years, the
Thai government has struggled with the constant insurrections by Islamic sepa-
ratists in the Deep South provinces in the country. Particularly with the exac-
erbation of armed confrontations between the government and the separatist

Introduction 11
movements in 2004, the Thai government has increasingly relied on the work of
various paramilitary groups as well as pro-government organizations. Chamber
and Jitpiromsri indicate that while the paramilitaries and militias are legally posi-
tioned under the clear state’s command lines, the reality is such that that com-
mand line has been reduced to a formality, leaving them de facto autonomous
in their operations and virtually giving a free hand to act with impunity in the
region. The Deep South case contrasts with irregular forces in other states that
have experienced transformation.
Chapter 8 turns the readers’ attention to the historical nature of security gov-
ernance and the reform process of SSRG with limited intervention by external
assistance agencies. Kiba elaborates why and how irregular forces were needed
as security governance stakeholders in Southeast Asia. Then she discusses that
there have been some efforts by the Western SSRG agencies to attempt to reach
out to irregular forces and incorporate them into programs promoting commu-
nity security. Despite some criticisms that such methodology would undermine
democratic and civilian control purported to enhance other ongoing institutional
reforms, collaborating with community security helps sensitize both state and
non-state stakeholders about their partial roles in the post-conflict peacebuilding
processes.
Our Conclusion chapter summarizes our analyses on various forms of irregu-
lar forces in Southeast Asian states. We observe many of these forces transform-
ing with their altered objectives to find ways to survive in the new political
environments. Some of these groups simply find no ways to continue; they
either dissolve or undergo state-sponsored demobilization and reintegration
processes through which members learn to adapt to civilian life. On the other
hand, some, if not many, irregular forces find alternate ways to survive the
changing political environment; they still maintain violence as a key instrument
while tacitly serving the security needs of communities that are substantially
lacking and winning legitimacy (not necessarily legal) from the public and the
state. These unique traits commonly observable in Southeast Asia are signifi-
cant, particularly for external donor institutions that promote SSRG in these
states. We conclude that contrary to conventional methods of treating irregular
forces simply as a spoiler to democratic transitions, international and domestic
agencies supporting SSRG should carefully reexamine those irregular forces that
share important roles in building and maintaining security in the community
and national levels.
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1 Characterizing irregular forces
Atsushi Yasutomi
Irregular forces: What are they like?
Enlistment incentives and cohesion within the group
The recruitment and mobilization of irregular forces can be explained in four
ways. The first factor explaining the incentive for joining irregular forces derives
from simple economics: individuals seek financial rewards (i.e., salary) from con-
tributing their manpower to the irregular forces, regardless of their political,
social, or religious attachments (Collier et al., 2003). Social networks account
for the second reason for enlisting in irregular forces. In this case, a social net-
work refers to family and clan circles. Individuals may not have either political or
economic reasons for enlisting but are recruited simply because of their ties to
their family and clan networks through which their social status can be preserved
(Peterson, 2001; Staniland, 2015; and Abrahms, 2008). The third factor is ideol-
ogy. Individuals seek membership in a particular type of irregular force to share or
realize their religious, political, or ethnic beliefs (Oppenheim, 2015). Colombia’s
Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN), an armed group based on Marxism-
Communism, may fall into this group. The ELN consisted of armed individuals
who aspired for regime change and the establishment of a new Communist gov-
ernment in Columbia. The fourth factor concerns the mobilization of irregular
forces to protect the territory and the population in the community in which
the forces reside. For example, Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force emerged as a
private security group to protect the community’s territory and the people from
constant attacks by the terrorist group Boko Haram (Jentzsch et al., 2015).
If incentives for mobilization are different, then the internal cohesion of irreg-
ular force groups—the bonds between members and the group and between each
other—will also differ accordingly. By closely observing the case in Colombia,
Oppenheim (2015) argues that cohesion among irregular force members is
strongest when they are mobilized on an ideological basis. In such armed groups,
members share a political and spiritual goal that vigorously animates each mem-
ber as they envisage their ultimate form of life and appraise the personal sacrifice
their goal may require. In contrast, cohesion in irregular forces formed based on
economic incentives is weakest (Oppenheim, 2015). Those who enlist for purely
monetary reasons are more likely to defect to other or opposite armed groups
DOI: 10.4324/9781003143994-2

Characterizing irregular forces 15
when offered better financial rewards. They are also more likely to voluntarily
disarm by making themselves part of disarmament processes (e.g., UN peace
deal) and to stop fighting with expectations of better financial and social benefits
by engaging in these processes (Oppenheim, 2015). Steinert (2019) states that
irregular forces that are ethnically or religiously homogenous are more integrated
than those that are less homogenous.
Relations with the state
Irregular forces as a threat to state sovereignty
The classical view is that irregular forces are a threat to state legitimacy. Regardless
of the type of organization, irregular forces operate outside the regular (i.e., stat-
utory) military forces that should monopolize the legitimacy of state authority
of violence (Weber, 1994). This view is shared among many scholars (Carey and
Mitchell, 2017; Geddes, 1999; Linz, 2000; Mann, 1988). In particular, Tilly
(1985) argues that irregular forces undermine the legitimacy of the monopoly of
state violence, thus posing structural threats to state sovereignty. Irregular forces,
according to him, attempt to challenge the state monopoly of violence, thereby
threatening the integrity of the state. Culleta and Cullen (2000) also indicate that
the target of irregular forces’ activities is the state and that the purpose of their
activities is regime change. Collier et al. (2003) further argue that irregular forces
are likely to emerge and become more active under a poor authoritarian regime
whose governance functions are weak.
Davis (2010) goes on to say that the relationship between irregular forces and
the state does not remain simply stationary but exhibits a more complicated col-
location. By carefully observing the relationship between various irregular forces
and the state in Latin American countries, Davis (2010) claims that irregular
forces do not attempt to replace the state’s sovereignty but seek to coexist by
arduously competing for domination or control of communities within the state.
In such cases, each power aims to strengthen its coercive influence over the citi-
zens and to garner community allegiance by offering them favorable rewards or
benefits (Davis, 2010). As a result, sovereignty in the state is divided through-
out the country, and so are the community loyalties to the guarantors of their
security.
Irregular forces as outsourced agents for counterinsurgency
Governments often utilize irregular forces to combat counterinsurgents. The para-
military (see subsection Paramilitary)—a type of irregular force that operates as
militarized security unit—is a part of the state institution and supplements the
capacity of regular forces (Eck, 2015). Pro-government militias may also supple-
ment regular forces but in an informal and illegitimate way. As the command link
between government and pro-government militia is loose and obscure, the govern-
ment may take advantage of outsourcing “dirty jobs”—i.e., operations involving

16 Atsushi Yasutomi
clear violations of human rights—to combat counterinsurgents (Carey, Colaresi
and Mitchell, 2015; Kalyvas, 1999; Kalyvas, 2006). The government may employ
irregular forces to reduce the cost of operations while benefiting from their local
intelligence on the insurgents (Sanín, 2008). Because of the loose link, the gov-
ernment may easily deny any legal responsibility if accused of abuse or violation.
Irregular forces as state-delegated agents of violence against civilians
Irregular forces can be delegated by the government to commit violence against
civilians (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; Jentzsch et al., 2015; Pilster and
Böhmelt, 2011). Paramilitary and pro-government militias are often subcon-
tracted or informally tasked to conduct special operations that cannot otherwise
be done legitimately and overtly by regular forces. Such delegated operations may
include murdering, raping, and burning the houses and villages of communities
suspected of collaborating with rebels (Campbell and Brenner, 2000; Mitchell,
Carey and Butler, 2014). They may also burn and steal crops from communities
under the control of rebel groups (Stanton, 2015). It is convenient and efficient for
governments to delegate operations to irregular forces because in doing so, they
can easily evade any accountability for direct involvement with such abuse against
civilians (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015). In their article, “Governments,
Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability,” Carey and her colleagues find that
government delegation of violence against civilians is more likely to take place in
weak democracies and in countries that receive foreign aid from democracies, as
governments in such circumstances tend to have more informal links with militias
in pursuit of various political objectives, e.g., local intelligence on rebels and eva-
sion of state responsibility for the abuse (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015).
Relations with community civilians
Irregular forces as delegated agents of violence commissioned by
the state
Irregular forces can be commissioned by the government to attack civilians to
counter rebels as part of their strategy. They do so by attacking the civilian resi-
dents of the communities under the control of rebel groups. As explained above,
such operations include “dirty jobs” involving supra-legal activities such as viola-
tions of human rights. Their behavior toward targeted civilians is likely to be left
freehand, as the informal and illegitimate form of violence enables the state to
evade responsibility for the irregular forces’ actions (Ahram, 2014; Campbell and
Brenner, 2000).
Irregular forces as predatory
Irregular forces can predate community civilians for a number of reasons. This can
include extorting community resources that they need to support their activities,

Characterizing irregular forces 17
such as food, water, and other basic survival needs. It can also include abduct-
ing youths for forced recruitment as soldiers and abducting children for human
trafficking as another means to increase their income. Kidnapping high-ranking
figures for ransom can also constitute an essential source of income, as seen in the
case of the M19 of Colombia during the 1980s through the 1990s.
Even those forces initially tasked to protect community civilians can easily be
driven to predatory acts. During the civil war in Sierra Leone, the Civil Defense
Force, a pro-government militia, was organized to protect civilians against insur-
gent attacks. However, they soon turned to perpetrate violence against their own
community members by looting and committing other acts of aggression for the
force members’ personal benefits (Jentzsch et al., 2015). Because the contrac-
tual relationship with the government is informal and illegitimate, the govern-
ment’s control over militias’ actions and behaviors remains difficult. This gives
militias ample chance to perpetrate crimes against civilians (Jentzsch et al., 2015;
Mitchell, Carrey and Butler, 2014; Wood and Waterman, 1991; Kaldor 2006;
Koonings and Kruijt, 2004).
Irregular forces as a provider of community public service
Irregular forces may provide community civilians with some degree of public
service. Such local services may include assistance in building roads and giving
school tents. Other instances include assistance in transporting the sick to local
hospitals and providing community patrols for public safety.
The incentive for these actions is based on a quid pro quo relationship where
irregular force members provide a wide range of public goods, including essential
living materials, access to energy and resources (e.g., water), and monitoring
neighborhood crimes. In return, the community members support their activi-
ties, including providing local intelligence on enemy armed groups. Irregular
forces also provide public service to attract recruits and prevent them from join-
ing enemy groups (Carey et al., 2015). Gang forces also follow this strategy.
Examples from Colombia and Brazil demonstrate that gang groups provide com-
munity services to civilians in the territories they control, including education for
children and building public facilities like public toilets and community bridges
(Grajales, 2017; Leeds, 1996). These services are provided to attract political
and economic support favorable to gang groups by exploiting the population to
maintain territorial control. In other words, the residents’ betrayal or denial of
cooperation may well result in a retaliatory assault by gang members.
Reexamining definitions of irregular forces
The term “irregular forces” is used in this book to represent armed groups
that operate either independently from or in association with statutory secu-
rity agencies (such as the military). The term does not seem to be part of the
established terminology used by students of peacebuilding and other related
studies. Terms such as “paramilitary,” “civil defense forces,” and “militias” are

18 Atsushi Yasutomi
often misconceptualized and confused and are thus often erroneously conflated.
Careful distinction and clarification are therefore necessary. This chapter catego-
rizes irregular forces into the following five large groups: paramilitaries, pro-gov-
ernment militias, anti-government militias, vigilante groups, and gang groups.
This categorization is made on the basis of their common political behaviors
concerning the following three factors: (a) reasons for mobilization and level of
internal cohesion among members, (b) relation with the state, and (c) relation
with the civilian population in the community under control.
A question may arise regarding the treatment of “terrorists “and “guerrilla
forces.” These terms may also refer to armed individuals and groups that do not
belong to regular security agencies (e.g., the military and the police force) and, in
this respect, can be categorized as “irregular.” However, both terms should indi-
cate the method of operations rather than the objective. According to Richardson
(2007), terrorists are those who “deliberately and violently target civilians for
political purposes,” whereas guerrilla forces are
small units organized along conventional military lines […] on a scale and
intensity designed to achieve operational or strategic effects over time: the
weakening of the resolve of their political adversaries and the withdrawal of
competing, occupying and/or government forces.
(Kiras, 2016)
Under these definitions, gang groups may conduct terrorist acts by, for example,
bombing a shopping mall and demanding a politician to step down. Similarly,
anti-government militias may use guerrilla tactics and combat regular forces to
replace the current government. In these cases, one can characterize the gangs as
“terrorist groups” and the anti-government militias as “guerrilla forces.”
Another issue concerning the categorization of irregular forces is the difficulty
of clearly distinguishing each group from another. This may sound paradoxical,
given my claim that various groups of irregular forces have been misconceptual-
ized and confused. Nevertheless, it is also the case that some factors and elements
that differentiate one group from another do often overlap, making clear-cut dis-
tinctions difficult. For example, the anti-government militias’ illegal and criminal
acts are difficult to distinguish from those of mafias and gang groups.
Despite these difficulties, this exercise of categorizing different groups of irreg-
ular forces helps us to understand more clearly in what way and to what degree
groups contribute to community security based on the kind of interests involved.
Paramilitary
“Paramilitary” is perhaps the most misleading term in this field of study. The
term is generally used to represent any armed groups that do not belong to regu-
lar forces. However, paramilitary here is defined as “militarized security units,
equipped with military weapons and vehicles, trained and organized under the
central government to support or replace regular military forces” (Stanton,

Characterizing irregular forces 19
2015). The clear difference from other forms of irregular forces is its statutory
nature. The principal function of the paramilitary is to supplement the (regular)
military in complex operations that cannot be otherwise conducted (due to tacti-
cal and sometimes political reasons) by providing their specially trained soldiers
to solve domestic security problems (Böhmelt and Clayton, 2018). According
to this definition, terms such as “illegal paramilitary” and “non-government
paramilitary” are self-contradictory and incorrect in that they are not statutory
institutions and should thus be grouped into other categories such as pro-gov-
ernment militias and vigilante groups. An example of a paramilitary is the Nigeria
Security and Civil Defence Corps, which the Nigerian government first estab-
lished in 1967 and incorporated into the Nigerian police force in 2003 as a statu-
tory organization to supplement their counter-crisis measures. Special attention
must be paid to the United Self-Defenders of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia or AUC). While the AUC is often referred to as paramilitares or
“paramilitary” in English, it was staffed by private soldiers, former police, and
military personnel and formed to supplement the weakened police forces’ com-
bat capabilities to protect against attacks by leftist armed groups such as Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), ELN, and M19. The legality of
the AUC’s operation was somewhat ambiguous and inconsistent. It often con-
ducted large and heavy assaults against forces and civilians without the govern-
ment’s consent, the cruelty of which was the subject of harsh criticism from the
international community and worldwide human rights non-government organi-
zations (NGOs) (e.g., Arnson, 2005). Given such loose and unclear contractual
relations with the state, there is much room for debates over the AUC’s statutory
nature. Thus, the AUC might as well be categorized as pro-government militia
rather than paramilitary.
Paramilitaries in many post-conflict states are often better equipped and
trained than the regular forces for undertaking internal security measures. They
are delegated by the government to conduct difficult assault missions—includ-
ing those involving extreme and supra-legal measures—against rebel groups and
other anti-government forces (Böhmelt and Clayton, 2018). Because of their
statutory nature, it is less difficult for a government to monitor the actions of
paramilitaries than those of other irregular forces that are contracted by the gov-
ernment on an informal basis (such as pro-government militias). Nevertheless,
the legitimate link with paramilitaries encourages governments to deny their abu-
sive operations against civilians when their offensive conduct is exposed to the
public (Stanton, 2015).
Pro-government militias
Pro-government militias operate to counterinsurgents and rebels when com-
missioned by the state. Unlike paramilitary, pro-government militias are not a
legitimate part of the regular military and do not have statutory status. Staffed
by illegitimate armed soldiers, they are loosely and informally linked to the state.
There are no formal, legitimate contractual relationships with the government

20 Atsushi Yasutomi
concerning their operations and methods of countering insurgencies. They are
mobilized mainly based on monetary benefit and material gain (Eck, 2015), but
some are also organized on an ideological basis, particularly if they are formed
based on ethnic, religious, or a particular political ideology such as Marxism
(Wood, 2008).
Pro-government militias are conveniently deployed by governments requiring
counterinsurgent operations that are more effective, quicker, and more inexpen-
sive. Carey and others had analyzed that pro-government militias collaborated
with the state in more than 80 percent of the armed conflicts between 1981
and 2007 and that more than 90 percent of the enemy targets of pro-govern-
ment militias were insurgents and rebels (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013).
Pro-government militias are mobilized to counter attacks by anti-government
militias. Members of pro-government militias find themselves in need of protec-
tion from assault by anti-government militias with a strong sense of vengeance
and fear of retaliation (Sanín, 2008).
The pro-government militias’ loose and illegitimate relation with the state
allows them to carry out a violent offensive against rebel soldiers and civilians
residing in the communities under the enemy insurgents’ and rebel groups’ con-
trol, often involving abuses such as killing civilians, burning their houses, rap-
ing, and looting (Steinert, 2019; Campbell and Brenner, 2000). For example,
Indonesia’s Death Squads in Aceh killed civilians sympathizing with insurgents
while the government denied responsibility for their extreme actions (Böhmelt
et al., 2015, p. 205). Nevertheless, pro-government militias’ predatory activities
are not always carried out in an organized way. Stanton (2015) carefully studied
cases in Sudan and found that pro-government militias were not as highly organ-
ized and controlled as previously believed and were not able indeed to conduct
organized assaults against community populations. Moreover, the state’s political
reputation and the punitive consequences it faced—if involvement in delegating
illegal civilian attacks was disclosed—were previously underestimated; modern
information technology such as the social network service (SNS) can easily be
used to reveal the government’s “dirty work” subcontracting with militias, mak-
ing them almost impossible to disavow involvement. Stanton also found that
pro-government militias are less likely to attack civilians from the same place of
origin or share the same ethnic or religious identity; rather, they are more likely
to commit violence against civilians from different backgrounds (Stanton, 2015).
Moreover, they are more likely to attack civilians when pro-government militias
are composed of people from mixed backgrounds (Stanton, 2015).
Pro-government militias, which are by nature illegitimate armed organizations
with no legal relations with the state, are often excluded from post-conflict dis-
armament processes. This provides them with a favorable legal vacuum, allowing
them to continue holding weapons and looting from civilians in the community,
further impairing peace deals. Even when they are included in a peace deal, pro-
government militias, compared to other types of irregular forces, are more likely
to give up their weapons and terminate violence after post-conflict peace deals.
Steinert (2019) analyzes that the political environment during armed conflict

Characterizing irregular forces 21
offers better conditions for the survival of pro-government militias, leading them
to easily damage existing peace deals. During armed conflicts, pro-government
militias could otherwise continue to benefit from looting civilians and gain mate-
rial benefits by predating civilian properties. Accepting a peace deal means an end
to such privileges and is thus an unfavorable economic position. Such behaviors
were frequently observed among the Bosnian Serbs and Sudan’s pro-government
militias, such as Janjaweed (Steinert, 2019). Furthermore, some pro-government
militias are mobilized with a strong sense of belonging by sharing a common
political objective, such as Interahamwe in Rwanda and Janjaweed in Sudan,
whose major recruitment incentive is based on retaliation against opponent eth-
nic groups. Peace deals may well make it difficult or impossible to continue such
actions.
Anti-government militias
Anti-government militias are groups formed by illegitimate soldiers armed with
illegal weapons to fight against government forces. Rebel groups and insurgents
can be synonymously treated as anti-government militia.
Anti-government militias are formed to counter the state’s regular forces to
topple the incumbent government and establish a new government (Colleta and
Cullen, 2000). The members of these groups are often bound together by a
strong political, religious, and/or ethnic belief in the expectation of realizing their
ultimate society (Eck, 2015; Wood, 2008). Examples are commonly observed
in the activities of Marxist insurgents in Nepal and of the Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) during the civil war in Liberia. Forces
such as FARC and the ELN of Colombia may also fall into this category. Members
of anti-government militias are often compelled to join because of pressing eco-
nomic needs. As observed in Peru and Colombia, for example, the reasons for
entry into anti-government militias are manifold. First, many impoverished farm-
ers may be incentivized to join by financial and economic support (salary and
other material benefits). Ideology, such as Marxism, also often constitutes an
important factor for recruitment. Once recruited, members are granted oppor-
tunities for basic education (e.g., writing and mathematics apart from combat
training) and a basic living environment (e.g., tents, food). Militia members may
also be motivated by psychological reasons, such as the excitement and bonding
they experience in the militia instead of the boring routine of agricultural labor
(Sanín, 2008). Members also typically feel a sense of status and strength with the
weapons and rank granted by their armed group, which provides recruits with an
escape from their otherwise mundane lifestyles (Sanín, 2008). Mobilization in
anti-government militias can also derive from members’ strong desire for retali-
ation against organized assaults committed by the state military and associated
irregular forces (i.e., paramilitaries and pro-government militias) targeting civil-
ians in members’ communities (Kalyvas, 2006).
By examining cases in Colombia after the civil war, Oppenheim (2015) found
that anti-government militia members are more likely to defect (i.e., switch sides

22 Atsushi Yasutomi
and join the opponent’s armed groups) or demobilize (i.e., engage in a disarma-
ment process and return to civilian life) if members are organized on a financial
basis. On the other hand, those mobilized on an ideological basis are less likely
to defect or demobilize. Gould (1995) discusses how the geography of a militia’s
operation also influences the internal cohesion of the group’s membership. He
observed that militia members who fought away from their homes are more likely
to demobilize after the civil war as they tend to be demotivated to commit to
fighting (Gould, 1995).
Providing community civilians with assistance similar to that of “public ser-
vice” is a strong instrument for securing support from anti-government militias
(Jentzsch et al., 2015). In the absence of the state’s legitimate provision of public
services, militias often provide citizens with alternative functional equivalents to
state services like employment and security services (e.g., night patrol and crime
control) (Davis, 2010). Such practice has been commonly observed in Colombia,
Guatemala, and Mozambique, where community public services are furnished
by anti-government militias, generating a strong sense of local and catholic alle-
giance among the population (Wood, 2008).
Vigilante groups
Defining vigilante groups appears difficult due to the abstract nature of their
presence. Johnston (1996) explains that vigilante groups emerge in reaction to
threats to their community and are formed by the private armed citizens who
gather on a voluntary basis. Vigilante groups are extra-legal citizen groups formed
to protect established patterns of local communal life from social deviants in the
absence of adequate official law enforcement (Brown, 1975). Autodefensas or
vigilante organizations in Mexico have emerged among community members
to protect their citizens against the threats posed by narcotic gangs and other
criminal groups in the absence of functioning law enforcement. Blocq (2014)
observed vigilante groups in South Sudan that emerged in response to indiscrimi-
nate violence perpetrated by neighboring tribes, out of a strong sense of the need
to protect their population and form their own armed group to counter enemy
forces.
The relationship between vigilante groups and the state is primarily confron-
tational. Vigilante groups consider themselves an imperative replacement of the
incompetent and mistrustful law enforcement agencies for community protec-
tion. On the other hand, the government perceives them to be merely armed
groups that are subject to disarmament.1 This has rendered the relationship
between the two one of rivalry, competition, or mutual distrust.
Another aspect of state-vigilante relationships is reciprocity. By examining
cases in Uganda, Omach (2010) analyzes the state’s scheming relationship with
vigilante groups.2 In the absence of security provided by statutory institutions,
vigilantes need to protect their community’s civilians from assaults by insurgents
and rebel groups. States tacitly support vigilante activities as doing so is beneficial
to their counterinsurgency policies. Furthermore, vigilante groups pay the police

Characterizing irregular forces 23
for maintaining control over the community members and for police weapons.
This quid pro quo relationship amplifies the police’s monetary benefits, thus ren-
dering a favorable condition for the government to let vigilante groups fight
for the government. This situation has further eroded the reciprocal relationship
between the police and vigilantes. Government efforts to maintain the regime
(not state) security eschew democratic transitions, further weakening police func-
tions. This further increases the vigilantes’ sense of necessity in establishing and
maintaining self-protection against assaults by the state forces and/or attacks by
insurgents and rebel groups, thus weakening the state security function. Omach
(2010) observes that this relationship is commonly seen in many parts of Africa,
such as with Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the vigilante
groups in Uganda operating against the Lord Resistance Army rebels.
Because vigilante groups are formed by community members to protect their
own people against external threats such as state and non-state armed groups,
their relationship with their communities tends to be correlative and reciprocal.
During the long transition periods after the civil wars, vigilante group members
typically feel compelled to provide the community with collective goods in the
absence of functioning state services. Arjona (2014) explains that this vigilante
trait is observable in many post-conflict communities. By employing the concept
of “wartime social order,” any given community caught in the crossfire of civil
war and conflict can find among its members those willing to organize to provide
public goods to the community. Other scholars like Boege et al. (2015) also
agree that vigilantes do tend to play a kind of governance function within their
community of control, providing residents with collective services that are similar
to those of the police, such as safety patrolling and public awareness for children’s
safety. For example, vigilante groups in Guatemala that emerged during the civil
war (1960–1996) but remained active since the end of the war were active in civil
patrolling, resulting in the effective prevention of drug trafficking cartels from
reaching community members (Bateson, 2017).
It is not surprising that the bond between vigilante groups and the community
becomes mutually supportive as the former provides safety and the latter supports
their informal services for collective goods.
During the civil war in Colombia, Governor Uribe of Medellín (later
President) encouraged the residents to form vigilante groups named Convivir
to counter rebel groups. These groups spread throughout the country and later
became legitimized by the Samper Administration (1994–1998). The Colombian
government encouraged the citizens to collaborate with Convivir and become
“informants” so that Convivir could counter insurgent attacks and provide com-
munity security. Soon, Convivir found itself a useful and beneficial informal
organization that could broker between the state regular forces and the FARC
forces. In this process, Convivir began to receive higher positions in FARC and,
in one case, a managerial position at a plantation firm that was under FARC’s
control. Convivir, in return, passed on information from the regular forces while
receiving similar economic and political benefits from the state (Grajales, 2017).
In this way, Convivir turned into a highly bureaucratized local organization that

24 Atsushi Yasutomi
the state regular forces and FARC depended on for co-existence, while com-
munity residents’ economic as well as political activities remained grounded on
the bureaucratic system that Convivir established (Grajales, 2017). Under such
circumstances, the reciprocal relationship between the community and vigilante
group has become so solidified that they are heavily embedded in the outer triad
relationship among Convivir, the state, and insurgent armed groups.
Gang groups
Similar to vigilante groups, gang groups’ relationship with the state is mixed;
gang groups offer protection to the communities under their control in the
absence of (and to the benefit of) statutory security institutions.
As in the case of vigilante groups, such relationships with the state can be fun-
damentally not only confrontational but also reciprocal. In principle, gang groups
benefit from anti-social business activities involving drugs, prostitution, human
trafficking, and illegal firearms, which naturally are antithetical to the objectives
of state security institutions such as the police and paramilitaries. However, in
many states where democratic control over state security institutions is weak,
corruption within those institutions serves to foment these gangs’ criminal activi-
ties while providing state security agents with an important source of monetary
benefit. Drug cartels such as the Medellín Cartel and Cali Cartel in Colombia,
two of the biggest drug cartels until the early 2000s, can fit into this category.
While the violence committed by these gangs caused tremendous and various
damage to citizens in Colombia, it is also true that community citizens were often
grateful for their economic provisions since their financial contribution eventually
transformed many impoverished villages into more prosperous and dignified liv-
ing environments.3 A prime example is a case in which the infamous Colombian
cartel leader Escobar donated a huge sum of money for the community’s local
economic development, which secured local support among community mem-
bers in the area.4
A similar phenomenon is observed in gang groups in Cape Town, South
Africa. Rival gang groups were forced into a truce during the 2020 Coronavirus
crisis and started to assist in delivering humanitarian goods like food packages to
community families in their areas of control. The gang members are familiar with
the community residents’ family setups and, using the trafficking network they
use for drug smuggling, were able to effectively deliver humanitarian goods to
each family.5
Drug gangs in favelas (slums) in Brazil demonstrate an intriguing example
of a reciprocal relationship with community members. In the grave absence of
police functions, drug group members in many favelas, particularly in Rio de
Janeiro, provide community members with a virtual welfare system and vari-
ous degrees of alternative security, including house patrols against robbery,
rape, and other kinds of interpersonal violence. In some cases, drug groups pro-
vide a kind of housing service and even offer a virtual traditional intermediary
local justice system for intercommunity conflicts. In return for these benefits,

Table 1.1 Irregular forces and their relations with the state and community civilians
Main objectives Enlistment Internal cohesion Relations with the Relations with the community in Relations with
motivation within the state their territories the community
irregular force in the opponent
territories
Paramilitaries
Pro-
government
militias
Anti-
government
militias
Counterinsur- Homeland
gency security
Counterinsur- Monetary
gency and other
benefits
Protection
from
insurgencies
Personal
vengeance
Social network
Regime change Ideology
Monetary
and other
benefits
Social network
Personal
vengeance
Legitimate
part of the
regular force
Defecting and
demobilized
when offered
benefits
Defecting when
offered benefits
Some strongly
allegiant to
ideology
Formally contractual
Allegiant
Paramilitary’s
behavior more
likely to be
accounted for
Informally
contractual
Outsourced or
delegated
Contractual relation
denied by the state
when accused of
abuse
Confrontational
Predatory and abusive when state Predatory and
control weakens abusive
when state
control
weakens
Reciprocal Predatory and
Protection from enemy assaults in abusive
return for material support and Often assaults
local intelligence motivated
by personal
vengeance
Reciprocal
Protection from enemy assaults
in return for support. The
community receives assistance
similar to public service,
e.g., road construction and
transferring the sick to a
hospital (Continued )
Characterizing irregular forces 25

Table 1.1 (Continued )
26 Atsushi Yasutomi
Main objectives Enlistment Internal cohesion Relations with the Relations with the community in Relations with
motivation within the state their territories the community
irregular force in the opponent
territories
Vigilante Community Protection
groups protection of own
community
from enemy
attacks
Gang groups Private profit Monetary
and other
benefits
Social network
Cemented as long
as reciprocal
relationships
with
community
members
continue
Cemented as long
as reciprocal
relationships
with
community
members
continue
Usually
confrontational
The state remains
connivent when
vigilantes combat
insurgencies
Usually Forced reciprocal
confrontational Assistance similar to public service
State corruption in return for support for their
allows their illegal criminal activities
activities Retaliatory against traitors

Characterizing irregular forces 27
the community members support drug groups by providing various kinds of
assistance for cocaine trafficking and dealing (Leeds, 1996). They also provide
services similar to traditional judiciary assistance to resolve problems between
neighborhood businesses and families. To some extent, gang groups and their
communities have established a solid society in which fundamental public ser-
vices needed are provided by the gang (Leeds, 1996). This also means that any
betrayal or attempt to disturb the gang’s activities may well be responded to with
severe penalties (Leeds, 1996). In this context, their relationship is characterized
as forced reciprocity.
Conclusion
The discussion on various forms of irregular forces can be summarized thus (see
Table 1.1). A task like this always entails the risk of oversimplification and errone-
ous categorization of irregular forces; nonetheless, this exercise helps us under-
stand at least the overall traits of irregular forces.
Our review of existing studies on various forms of irregular forces is useful for
analyzing irregular forces in Southeast Asia—as will be done in the subsequent
chapters—for the following two perspectives. First, they reaffirm that irregular
forces cannot be simply treated as unitary actors. These studies indicate that vari-
ous forms of irregular forces have their distinct incentives for enlistment, reasons
for members to stay, and maintain relations with the state and the community
population. Second, the reviews overturn the common preconception toward
irregular forces that they always indiscriminately assault innocent civilians in the
communities while combating opponent forces. A number of narratives on rebel
forces’ cruelty toward innocent civilians have been published, giving attention
to their grave human rights violations in all aspects. Such violence does occur,
particularly targeting civilians residing in the enemy areas where the conflicting
armed groups operate. However, some cases show that irregular force members
contribute to community public good in a variety of forms.
A number of challenges remain, however. More detailed studies on the behav-
ior of each type of irregular forces are insufficient. This study was grounded by
a limited review of some current case studies in limited states. More substantial
analysis requires a more dynamic and meticulous investigation of each type of
irregular forces. This further requires looking more specifically at how irregular
forces have contributed to the efforts of democratic transition in the Southeast
Asian context. In order to enrich the cases, these actors in Southeast Asia must be
studied thoroughly to unravel the extent or degree and the way irregular forces
have contributed to community security in these states. These issues will be inves-
tigated in the following chapters.
Notes
1 For example, Lizbeth Diaz, “Mexico’s Wild West: vigilante groups defy president
to fight cartels”, Reuters, September 13, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/arti-

28 Atsushi Yasutomi
cle/uk-mexico-violence-vigilantes-idUKKCN1VY1GP, last accessed March 31,
2020.
2 Although he uses the terms “vigilante” and “militia” interchangeably in his arti-
cle, it is clear from his context and by my definition, Omach’s focus is a vigilante.
3 For example, “Pablo Escobar, dead drug baron, is still seen by many Colombians
as a hero”, BBC World, December 2, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/
world-25158010/pablo-escobar-dead-drug-baron-is-still-seen-by-many-colom-
bians-as-a-hero, last accessed March 31, 2020.
4 For example, Arturo Wallace, “Drug Boss Pablo Escobar Still Divides Colombia,”
BBC Mundo, December 2, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin
-america-25183649, last accessed April 10, 2020.
5 “How Coronavirus Inspired a Gangland Truce”, BBC World, April 8, 2020.
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa -52205158 /how -coronavir us
-inspired-a-gangland-truce-in-south-africa last accessed April 10, 2020.
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2 Pathways for irregular forces
Rosalie Arcala Hall
Introduction
The pathways for irregular forces can be imagined within the spectrum of violent
and nonviolent outcomes. Pathway 1 lies closer to the violent end of the spec-
trum with irregular forces coexisting with local authorities as alternative security
providers to an inept police or contributing to community security through activ-
ities such as patrols and law enforcement. It has been widely acknowledged in the
literature that irregular forces do provide a semblance of governance in spaces
they control and public goods, including security substitutive of, complementary
to, or as a gap-filler for areas not reached by the state. Its relationship with the
community, the imperative of sustainability (long-term presence), and the desire
for legitimacy are factors incentivizing irregular forces toward this trajectory.
Irregular forces may enter into a pragmatic or permanent arrangement with
state security forces with respect to public security provisioning. This dyadic rela-
tionship can proceed in three routes: (1) collaboration, i.e., join government
security forces in violent action against state enemies or quelling public distur-
bance; (2) collusion, i.e., sharing information, financing, equipping, training, and
operational link; and (3) co-optation, i.e., integrating the armed group into the
regular security forces and conferring legal status. Irregular forces can be subcon-
tracted to do “dirty jobs,” i.e., providing the state plausible deniability in cases
of human rights infractions. The co-optation route could take the form of para-
military formation (legally sanctioned auxiliaries) or integration into the police
and army. Many post-conflict arrangements, endogenously negotiated or orches-
trated by the United Nations, feature the absorption, insertion, or merger of
these irregular forces into the state security apparatus. Under the aegis of security
sector reform (SSR), these groups are targeted as a short-term effort to reduce
the likelihood of violence erupting anew.
Pathway 2 under the nonviolent end of the spectrum presumes that irregular
forces will give up their arms voluntarily, adopt civilian identities, and carry on
their lives as members of society. A variation is when the irregular force goes
through an institutionalized “exit,” a reintegration program either negotiated or
unilaterally offered by the government. Formal exits from armed groups resulting
from peace settlements or negotiated conflict termination agreements through
DOI: 10.4324/9781003143994-3

32 Rosalie Arcala Hall
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) fall within this genre.
Reintegration into civilian life and their host civilian community considers how
former members of irregular forces take on livelihood or become engaged in col-
lective economic enterprises such as cooperatives.
Pathway 3 is a shift to “normal” politics where the irregular force transforms
into a political party, an interest group, or when individual members become
part of the local governing apparatus (being elected officials or as bureaucrats).
This can also be classified as a political trajectory in that the former irregular force
will choose to pursue political ends by nonviolent means.
The idea of “pathways” suggests a dynamic transformation on the character of
the irregular force, without discounting the possibility that only certain segments
or factions of the group may go in that direction. In the same vein, it is also likely
that groups retain both violent and nonviolent characters or alternate between
these two versions. Irregular forces may also undergo organizational transforma-
tions, projecting “spin-offs” or replicates. Mapping the sets of opportunities and
risks in their environment and how these push toward one pathway or another are
explored in the various case studies.
Pathway 1: Benign coexistence
Irregular forces provide security as a public good in areas where they also exer-
cise political authority and enjoy legitimacy. Rather than a category in dichot-
omous opposition to the state, many authors recognize that irregular forces
provide governance, filling in for the state’s absence (substitutive) (Bagayoko
et al., 2016, p.4) or serious gaps in providing security (Kasfir et al., 2017, p.1;
Berti, 2016, p.1), or protection against state-sponsored violence directed against
certain ethnic groups (Podder, 2013, p.5; Colletta and Muggah, 2009). These
armed groups’ relationship with civilians in territories they control draw upon
parallel playbook as the state, employing a combination of coercion, service pro-
vision, and ideological/identity anchor to exact loyalty and material support
(Kasfir et al., 2017; Podder, 2013, p.6). Many rebel groups are found to provide
a wide variety of public services— security, justice, medical, and education—
to their civilian clientele as a way to win them over. Informal and traditional
institutions, including kin-based, personal, and patronage networks underpin
the power of these armed groups (Bagayoko et al., 2016, p.5). Because they
are locally embedded and often seen as co-ethnic representatives of the civilians
under their control, their authority is more readily recognized and accepted than
those of state agents (Meagher, 2012, 1076). Urban gangs, for instance, serve
as informal defense organizations in squatter settlements populated mainly by
migrants (Colletta and Muggah, 2009). Irregular groups may originate as having
predatory character (i.e., intent on exacting profit or private gain) but also strive
for legitimacy to ensure durability over the long run (Podder, 2013, p.6). Where
they are dependent on community resources (i.e., for logistics and personnel),
irregular forces are prompted and incentivized to maintain a good relationship
with civilians.

Pathways for irregular forces 33
This situation is described in a variety of ways: plural, to indicate diversity and
value of alternative authority systems apart from the state; hybrid, acknowledging
the “multiplicity of sites of political authority and governance where security is
enacted and negotiated, to include informal societal structures which could be
used as instruments” (Bagayoko et al., 2016, pp.5 & 9; Meagher 2012, p.1075);
and multilayered, as “interplay of violent actors, both state and non-state, in
competitive, complementary, cooperative, or contradictory relationships with no
presumption that they must be engaged” (Kasfir et al., 2017, p.262). This type
of security governance is not necessarily regressive or antithetical to that provided
by the state; there are positive aspects to it. To recognize the diversity of secu-
rity governance on the ground is not the same as adjudging their effectivity and
equitability. From the point of view of communities, what matters is whether
security makes a meaningful impact on the everyday lives of people, regardless
of who provides it (Cheng 2018, p.276). Physical safety, protection of liveli-
hood, and welfare are paramount, alongside guarantees that these are available
and accessible to all, not just the elites (Bagayoko et al., 2016, p.14). A line is
drawn between armed groups with predatorial motives (profit and private gain)
and which use coercion more liberally toward these ends, although they may also
instrumentalize traditional structures to justify their presence. There is, however,
also a danger that irregular forces use their power to oppress, entrench, or ren-
der invisible forms of social injustice (i.e., gender bias, racism) (Meagher, 2012,
p.1088).
Irregular forces evolve in the way they relate to civilians under their jurisdic-
tion and with colocated armed groups and state entities (Kasfir et al., 2017).
Part of the imperative is the desire to be legitimate in the eyes of their local
publics and to the international community, especially where they derive support
and future recognition (Terpstra, 2020, p.1146). Legitimacy, whether based on
provision of benefit or morals, is a premium for irregular forces seeking longev-
ity, and they have to rely on means other than coercion to exact compliance.
One template of this transformation are the Middle Eastern variants, Hamas and
Hezbollah, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE in Sri Lanka.
Hezbollah is the most evolved, combining its military apparatus with an organi-
zation that is integrated into domestic politics (e.g., party competing for elec-
toral seats), in civil society formations like unions and universities, and extensive
provisioning of health and social services through nonprofit organizations (Berti,
2016, pp.2–3; Flanigan, 2008, p.500). Its goal is substitutive, to replace the state
with its own version of social contract with the Shi’ite population in southern
Lebanon (Grynkewich, 2008, p.355). Hamas has a similar template combining
violence directed against the Israeli-occupied territories’ grassroots electoral pres-
ence and social service provisioning (Grynkewich, 2008, p.362). In their trans-
formation into a territorially governing entity, their control over the population
relies on both coercion and co-optation as well as symbolic politics (branding).
Hamas and Hezbollah relate to their Palestinian and Lebanese state, respectively,
rather than work to undermine them. The LTTE, after consolidating control
over Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces, acted as de facto government

34 Rosalie Arcala Hall
administrative body following the ceasefire agreement in 2002. However, its level
of community support (wide acceptance and active participation of community
members into the LTTE apparatus) was not as extensive as those of Hezbollah.
This is largely because LTTE had no independent capacity to provide for social
welfare services, for which it had to rely on external NGOs (Flanigan, 2008,
p.503). In contrast to Hezbollah, whose NGO service providers are legally recog-
nized by the government, the LTTE taxed, vetted, and steered external NGOs to
meet its own needs, i.e., redirecting NGO social services to soldier families in an
effort to increase fighter recruitment or skimming off money from partner NGOs
to aid LTEE-controlled areas (Flanigan, 2008, p.512).
Formal state actors coexist alongside and often have alliances with irregular
forces, particularly where the latter form strong social intermediaries with the
local population (Kasfir et al., 2017, p.265). Often, this pragmatic cooperation
entails the state contracting out public provision of security and justice to the
indigenous irregular force in return for access to public resources (Kasfir et al.,
2017, p.272) or for gathering intelligence or surveillance. Even with limited con-
trol of these militias, governments have logistical and political incentives to del-
egate their monopoly of the use of force to militias, warlords, and civil defense
forces instead of deploying the military in conflict areas (Eck, 2015, pp.17–18).
Despite the risks of human rights abuse and the possibility of these irregular
formations turning against it, the state has potential benefits from the incor-
poration of these warlords/ militias into the government’s patronage network
and plausible deniability. Cheng (2018) and Meagher (2012) by contrast see
linkages akin to a regulatory alliance between non-state security actors, com-
mercial actors, and local government officials premised security provisioning that
will then ensure the protection of livelihood and wealth accumulation. Irregular
forces provide services such as dispute resolution mechanisms, regulations, and
contract enforcement that underpin economic activities as these are in short
supply in many conflict areas in Africa (Cheng, 2018, p.83). The presence of
actors such as the Democratic Republic of Congo militias and the Bakassi Boys
vigilante group in Nigeria is sanctioned by the state (recognized in the ceasefire
agreement) and plays an integral role in establishing “order” in the countries’
mining and trade corridors. Gangs in Central America perform a similar func-
tion as providers of order and authority in squatter migrant settlements (Colletta
and Muggah, 2009). International NGOs also have to engage irregular forces
to negotiate access when conducting humanitarian action and in undertaking
development projects in conflict-affected areas (Podder, 2013, p.10). Richmond
(2019, p.72), on the other hand, considers engagements between police pacifica-
tion units embedded in Brazilian favela neighborhoods and trafficker-controlled
militias as a dual security assemblage, characterized by mutual surveillance by the
two actors. In Medellin, Colombia, youth gangs in neighborhood development
projects liaise with state governance actors informally and manipulate elections
(Abello-Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014, p.3284).
Colletta and Muggah (2009, p.445) argue about a second-generation security
promotion as modi operandi for DDR that includes the creation of community

Pathways for irregular forces 35
security mechanisms. Rather than treating local security as being insured by the
disarming and demobilization of ex-combatants alone, the authors encourage
routine involvement and exchange between military and police on the one hand
and irregular forces with affected communities on the other hand. Mechanisms
for violence prevention (such as community patrols, dialogues) are examples.
The integration of former members of irregular forces into the state security
forces occurs as part of (1) a post-conflict package; (2) defense reforms geared
toward improving the effectiveness of the state security apparatus; and (3) a
broader set of reforms designed to make the state security apparatus symbolic of a
unified nation. Integration is defined as the amalgamation of previously opposed
military forces into a new state security force (Baaz and Verweijen, 2013) or
the absorption of ex-rebels into an existing armed force (Licklider, 2014). The
impetus for integration could be endogenous (as was the case of post-apartheid
South Africa) or externally introduced as part of a UN process after the con-
clusion of civil wars. Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) had found 34 such cases
of negotiated conflict termination with military power-sharing agreements since
1945, while Hartzell (2014) found 40% of 128 civil war termination agreements
with a proviso for integration of combatant forces. As part of the SSR portfo-
lio, military and/or police integration is seen as a short-term strategy to avoid a
security breakdown and as a long-term peacebuilding strategy. There is a wide
variety in integration programs: (1) by magnitude (token or substantial in pro-
portion to the regular force); (2) horizontal integration at the unit level (bases
for integration is to minimize dissent and foster loyalty or professionalization);
and (3) vertical integration of officer corps (whether commensurate to rank dur-
ing wartime and use of quota) (Krebs and Licklider, 2016, p.99). However, only
a fraction of these integration programs have been fully implemented (Hoddie
and Hartzell, 2005). Many authors discount the purported link between integra-
tion and long-term peace (Krebs and Licklider, 2016; Glassmyer and Sambanis,
2008). Integration does not necessarily foment a unified national identity within
newly formed armies in multi-ethnic settings (Krebs, 2004; Simonsen, 2007). In
cases such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, integration of militias
led to a surge in inter- and intracommunity violence and furthered patronage
networks, command structures, and divided loyalties within a weak army to begin
with (Baaz and Verweijen, 2013, p.575).
In Timor-Leste, militias disarmed under an UN-supervised demobilization
and disarmament scheme, but only a fraction (and mainly those from the main
group Falintil) was integrated into the newly formed army, police, and border
guards (Robinson, 2001, p.290; Reese, 2004). In the Philippines, 7,500 Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) ex-combatants (mainly their proxies) were
integrated into the army and police as part of an agreement with the government
in 1996 (Hall, 2014). Adjudged as token integration, the absorption of ex-MNLF
improved the army’s effectiveness in conducting internal security operations but
did not make a dent in improving the security situation in the theater (Hall,
2019). A parallel arrangement is made with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,
which undisclosed numbers are supposed to comprise the new Bangsamoro Police

36 Rosalie Arcala Hall
Force, as per the terms of the Comprehensive Bangsamoro Agreement with the
government in 2014. In South Africa, integration involved former South African
Defense Force (SADF), four homeland armies, three national liberation armies,
and paramilitary grouping to constitute a supposed leaner, more professional new
South African New Defense Force (Williams, 2005). However, major differences
in skills and numbers between those coming from revolutionary armies and statu-
tory forces (SADF, homeland armies) led to short-term tensions, later offset by
a pension scheme for all veterans (including those from non-statutory forces)
and a Service Corps under the defense department, which provided assistance for
reintegration (Williams, 2005). In his survey of integration experiences in seven
African countries, Burgess (2008, p.88) noted as well the different levels of pro-
fessionalism and completion between rebel groups and militias.
Pathway 2: Exit from violence
Reintegration is a pathway most commonly bundled with disarmament and
demobilization of irregular forces. International organization-supported DDR
programs see irregular forces as posing danger to the fragile post-conflict envi-
ronments. Disarmament and demobilization aim to dismantle the military struc-
ture of the irregular force, while reintegration is a form of “transitional safety net”
preventing remobilization or rearming against the post-conflict order (Subedi,
2014, p.44; De Vries and Weigink, 2011, p.8; Banholzer, 2014, p.27; Nillson,
2005, p.18). Often packaged with a negotiated peace agreement in place and
in conjunction with other peacebuilding instruments (e.g., truth commissions,
transitional justice), DDR is argued to prevent the recurrence of violent conflicts
(Banholzer, 2014, p.8).1 Reintegration is the economic and social assimilation
of ex-combatants and their families into civilian life and communities (Nillson,
2005, p.4). It is widely seen as a process whereby ex-fighters shed off their milita-
rized identities, learn how to live productive lives, eschewing violence altogether,
and establishing new social ties (Torjesen, 2013, p.4). Reintegration programs
typically include direct assistance to ex-fighters such as cash compensation, educa-
tion and vocational or entrepreneurship training, psychosocial counseling, credit
access, transportation, and health-care subsidies (Alden, 2002, p.342 in the case
of Mozambique). Most reintegration programs target those considered vulner-
able, e.g., young fighters/child soldiers, women, and disabled for special assis-
tance. Earlier reintegration programs were set up in a compressed time frame as
an interim measure to maintain security, but more recent iterations such as those
in South Sudan and Nepal had a longer time frame in which ex-combatants sign
an agreement on their preferred package (including an option to integrate into
the army or police) and area for resettlement (Munive, 2014, p.343; Luna, 2019,
p.201). Beyond the demobilized and disarmed former fighters, reintegration con-
siders the communities where they will have come home to. The characteristics of
recipient communities, that is, their receptivity or opposition to hosting returned
ex-fighters is conditioned by their previous relationship with irregular force units
and their economic situation (De Vries and Weignik, 2011, p.40; Kaplan and

Pathways for irregular forces 37
Nussio, 2015, p.135; in the case of Uganda, Annan and Aryemo (2009, p.646)
found that ex-combatant community relations revolve around conflicts arising
from the previous relationship with the rebel group and fear). DDR programs are
typically set within short time frames, but reintegration is acknowledged as entail-
ing a longer-term gestation as it involves an identity shift and is best attained
with improvements in the local economy and security in general (Knight, 2008,
p.29; Loetscher, 2016, p.9; Alden, 2002, p.353). Community-based reintegra-
tion programs involve the non-combatant population (refugees, displaced, sex
slaves, or women forced to marry guerrillas) in decision-making, participate in
collective livelihood schemes (e.g., cooperatives), and benefit from infrastructure
projects under the reintegration umbrella.
Research into reintegration programs has pointed out the diversity of the ex-
combatant population and the need for identification and need assessment for
effective targeting (Bowd and Ozerdem, 2013). Individual attributes such as age
when they joined the armed groups, gender, length of time spent or forced to
stay with the rebel group, rank and armed faction/unit they belonged to, activi-
ties done by their unit, and unit’s relationship with civilian communities (whether
abusive or not) affect the ability to socially integrate (Bowd and Ozerdem, 2013,
p.457; Nillson, 2005, p.18). Interest in combatant reintegration is nuanced
among top-level and mid-level-ranked officers in rebel units or foot soldiers,
depending on the perceived gain of influence in the process. Though economic
reintegration is easier done with an array of livelihood support, social reintegra-
tion is harder to achieve particularly in cases where ex-combatants and commu-
nities have lost family members or when ex-combatants have stayed away from
civilian settlements for a long time. Social trust and networks are harder to rebuild
in such an environment, and so careful attention is placed so that communities do
not feel aggrieved or economically burdened with the insertion of ex-fighters into
their midst. Community participation is deemed crucial to the success of rein-
tegration programs, hence the inclusion of information and sensitization cam-
paigns and infrastructure projects offering more collective benefits (Loetscher,
2016, p.10). In some places, the community requires re-integrees to undergo a
ritual reconciliation, provide communal labor, or participate in community-based
security schemes (e.g., patrol) as means to bridge trust. The latter is valued for
its symbolic importance, conferring status to ex-combatants and at the same time
contributing to the community’s safety (Nillson, 2005, p.52). Communities with
high levels of social integration, i.e., high levels of participation in community
organizations, are found to engender better social integration prospects for ex-
combatants (Kaplan and Nussio, 2015, p.133).
The underlying aim of a reintegration program is to supplant or weaken fac-
tional ties and hierarchic relationships with the rebel organization. While these
bonds ought to have disappeared alongside the dissolution of the rebel com-
mand structure with demobilization, in reality, the informal networks among
ex-combatants (those who served the same unit, are from the same region
or ethnicity) and between fighters and their immediate commanders remain
and influence the reintegration trajectory (Subedi, 2014, p.49; De Vries and

38 Rosalie Arcala Hall
Weigink, 2011, p.42). In Aceh, former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) combat-
ants were absorbed into the web of collusion and predatory economy that char-
acterize the construction industry, to which many put up businesses (Aspinall,
2009, p.3). Construction contracts became a means to sustain patronage links
between commanders and their men (Sindre, 2016b, p.200). An alternative view
considers close contacts between ground commanders and fighters as an ena-
bling asset for ex-combatants to find jobs or access resources in government.
This patronage dynamic enhances the role of ground commanders who act as
brokers, enabling ex-combatants to gain access to the elite for employment. In
Liberia, such employment includes being private guards to Big Men/warlords
or paid militias undertaking foreign missions (Thumner, 2019, p.530). In the
case of the paramilitary in Guatemala, which underwent reintegration, the ex-
combatants’ prior experience as guerrillas and stint in the pre-war cooperative
movement contributed to their ease of transition (Janzen, 2014, p.1). The way
reintegration programs are set up also bolsters these clientelistic relations. In
Timor-Leste, reintegration funds were handled by an agency controlled by the
rebel group party and were distributed directly to the ex-commander according
to the list; a plan to shift to community block grants was scuttled because of ex-
combatant opposition (Sindre, 2016b, p.204).
In reality, many gaps were identified in the implementation of reintegration
programs. Insufficient funding, particularly those without or little cash subsidy,
meant that many ex-combatants found themselves unemployed or employed in
the informal economy. Many livelihood intervention packages were designed
without careful study of the labor market or reckoning with the ravaged post-
war economies (Ozerdem, 2004, p.493). With skill sets and stature, they find
employment in private security companies, recruited into paramilitary outfits car-
rying out foreign missions for a fee, or engaged in illicit drug trade (as in Liberia,
Thumner, 2019, p.530). Women ex-combatants were excluded or rendered
invisible in many reintegration programs such as those in Nepal (Luna, 2019;
Bhandari, 2015). Reconciliation between ex-fighters and communities was not
fully attained, given the paucity in transparency and accountability in the rein-
tegration policy of the government, as in the case of Guatemala (Janzen, 2014,
p.10). In the absence of a formal reintegration policy, reintegration is shaped by
the spatial location of ex-combatants, where they are in strongholds or migrant
communities across the border (Hennings, 2017, p.8). The fate of ex-Khmer
Rouge combatants in Cambodia varied widely, depending on where they ended
up; in strongholds, they are appointed into government positions and continue
to hold authority, but in other places, they face strong suspicion. Reintegration
programs are also criticized for legitimizing an underlying narrative that ex-com-
batants are dangerous, threatening, and volatile, thereby fomenting hostile atti-
tudes against them by communities (Ozerdem, 2004, p.443; McMullin, 2013,
p.398). In the end, reintegration programs are seen as part of a liberal democratic
project that aims to socially reengineer the state and social institutions but largely
ignores important contextual factors that often are specific to each post-conflict
setting (Colletta and Muggah, 2009, p.433).

Pathways for irregular forces 39
Pathway 3: Normal politics
Rebel-to-political party transformation is a trajectory more readily observed in
cases with negotiated conflict settlements or where there is a shift toward demo-
cratic politics (Manning and Smith, 2016, p.977). Soderberg-Kovacs and Hatz
(2016, p.991) found 93 such rebel groups-turned-political parties, of which
about half have such proviso in peace agreements. These opportunity structures
provide rebel groups with a window in expanding their support base. Timing
is also key, as in cases where reintegration, security force integration, and other
peacebuilding initiatives are also being carried out concurrently or when elections
are scheduled. In Aceh, Indonesia, GAM’s political party, Partai Indonesia, was
formed after the first election in 2006, although it was able to conduct wide con-
sultations across its districts and city units, resulting in rebel leaders successfully
winning office through their rebel-group grassroots machinery (Sindre, 2016a).
Fretilin in Timor-Leste was a people’s movement with a strong mass base, distinct
from the Falintil armed wing, which transformed readily into a party contesting
elections, but the former’s internal party leadership selection was eventually cen-
tralized under Prime Minister Alkatiri.
The transformation of rebel groups into political parties is affected by the
internal characteristics of the group and the external environment. Whether the
armed group has a prior political wing (Manning and Smith, 2016, p.983), the
extent to which control is centralized or a loose coalition (Ishimaya and Batta,
2011), and its internal power configuration (cohesion or division between mili-
tary/combatant versus civilian/political wing, between those who wish to remain
armed and those who wish to transform into a political organization) (Manning,
2004; Klapdor, 2009; Curtis and De Zeeuw, 2010) affect political party trans-
formation. The managerial and bureaucratic skills gained as a rebel group organi-
zation and the extent of its support from the grassroots and societal forces also
influence such a shift (Ishimaya and Batta, 2011; Allison, 2016; Dresden, 2017,
p.241). The rebel group is incentivized by the imperative to compete under
given electoral rules and presumably aims to capture power by winning seats in
government. To be competitive, it must identify and recruit suitable candidates,
find funding sources, and build new organizational routines and procedures for
running a campaign and winning (Manning, 2007, p.256). The skill sets devel-
oped as an armed organization are not necessarily fungible; parties require a more
transparent form of leadership, accountability, and staff whose skills match the
political and administrative needs of a party (Manning, 2007, p.257). A change
in image, one that is less reliant on the organization’s violent past or credentials,
might also be necessary to obtain mass following (Manning, 2004, p.54). Rebel
groups, particularly those that have established parallel state structures or shadow
governments in territories they control, have a built-in advantage. Having a tel-
luric presence means they already have a captive base and a very good pool of
leadership among local cadres. They can comprise the local political entrepre-
neurs with organizational skills and social capital to mobilize and engage voters
(Costalli and Ruggeri, 2015, p.42). They also have built-in support in territories

40 Rosalie Arcala Hall
they previously controlled, from which, as political parties, they can expand their
support base (Lyons, 2016, p.1031). Coherent, united, and disciplined leader-
ship in the decision to enter peaceful politics, high level of popular support, and
international legitimacy shape the turn to party politics (Manning and Smith,
2016, p.922; Lyons, 2016, p.1031). By contrast, rebel organizations with decen-
tralized and fluid command-and-control make party-building difficult (as in the
case of the MNLF and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines
(South and Joll, 2016, p.186)).
The experiences of political parties formed by former rebel groups in Nepal,
Guatemala, Aceh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, and in African countries
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda point to nuancing. In Guatemala, the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unit (UNRG) trained cadres to be political or electoral
organizers during the transition but failed to account that many of its recruits
are neither committed to their program nor politically conscious. Disagreements
between its militant and reformist factions and its limited relationship with
Guatemalan civil society resulted in poor electoral performance (Allison, 2016,
pp. 1049–1050). In Nepal, the timing was everything. The Communist Party
of Nepal-Maoist announced a change in strategy from revolutionary struggle to
acceptance of a multi-party system early on in 2006, which allowed it to build coa-
litions with other societal forces in the fight against the monarchy (Hechchethu,
2008, p.58). This programmatic shift, the selective use of violence, and the built-
in trust from prolonged periods as a shadow government in many local areas were
instrumental in the people’s positive perception of its party credentials (Klapdor,
2009, pp.32–33). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, pressure from international actors to
ban those with adverse human rights records from running for office led to the
ascendance of reform-minded leadership. Competing at local and regional levels,
rebel-turned-political parties faced off with local strongmen and had to offer a
distinct political message, were debilitated by personalized leadership, and suf-
fered from the separation of military and political cadres (Manning, 2007, p.258).
While the Colombian rebel group Movimiento 19’s (M-19) easily transformed
into a political party, abetted by concurrent reforms in the National Assembly
representation (of which M-19 was guaranteed seats) and wide public support
for its political integration, demobilized paramilitaries faced higher barriers to
entry into politics as they were widely discredited within the Colombian society
and the international community for their human rights record and links to drug
trafficking (Guaqueta, 2009, p.13). M-19, however, was unable to sustain elec-
tion wins because it lacked party management skills and has lost touch with its
wartime local structures, unlike the paramilitary federation United Self Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC) whose local appeal and access to illicit funding ena-
bled it to become a political force. In the case of African countries, coherent
and disciplined rebel group leadership gave rise to authoritarian political parties.
Banking on their highly developed armed and civilian governance capacities (they
run strong shadow governments in territories they controlled), they are able to
mobilize supporters through built-trust and also coercive tactics (Lyons, 2016,
p.1035). The competitive electoral system did not produce citizen participation

Pathways for irregular forces 41
but rather power consolidation by the former rebel groups. In Aceh, the politi-
cal wing of GAM outgrew its elitist roots and was able to establish independent
and local party presence following the 2006 autonomy law. Their electoral suc-
cess, however, led to untoward outcomes as local commanders-turned-local party
leaders used their position as patronage resource for demobilized members. Local
Aceh Transition Committee (KPA) groups practiced extortion and intimidation
to raise funds and ensure favorable electoral outcomes (Stange and Patock, 2014,
pp.108, 116).
These writings on rebel-to-party transformation are critiqued for the assump-
tions that the two formations are conceptually distinct and that there is a linear
transformation from one form to the other. Rebel organizations are not depar-
tures from normal politics, which is associated with political parties and elec-
tions (Wittig, 2016, p.138). Most rebel organizations have political wings or
are embedded in political relationships with populations in areas they control.
As hybrid formations, they do not necessarily shed off their armed wing as they
develop a political party structure (e.g., Hamas in Lebanon in Berti and Gutierrez
(2016, p.1062)). In actuality, factions within the armed group alternate between
violence and nonviolent activities, even after forming a party, as in the case of
Burundi and Cote d’ Ivoire (Wittig, 2016, p.138). A shift to political parties
does not necessarily enhance democracy, as the rebel-turned-political parties are
known to exhibit authoritarian practices or become patronage vehicles (Wittig,
2016, p.153). Moreover, informal hierarchies paralleling its former military com-
mand structure and social ties between commanders and rank-and-file continue
to inform party position (Sindre, 2016a).
Why rebel groups do not form political parties is as instructive. Winning local
elections in some settings does not require a political party apparatus; instead,
the rebel group’s grassroots network and field unit reach proxy for party machin-
ery. Absent political parties, individual ex-rebels assume key government office
by election or appointment, banking on the resources of the rebel organization
(Torjesen, 2013, p.4). Resources such as the rebel group’s social grassroots capi-
tal and links to elites are key in capturing positions in government. However,
as was the case for Liberia, the rebel elites were co-opted by the president and
did not fare well in the local elections. The rebel group in Cote d’ Ivoire’s pre-
conflict ties and strong local support in territories they controlled enabled it to
be electorally competitive, while its counterpart in Burundi who lacked such ties
with social movements pre-conflict (e.g., capital city-based elites and with univer-
sity students) lost local elections (Speight and Wittig, 2017, pp.41–42).
Rebel groups mobilize and form interest groups to pressure governments
to respond to their specific demands (Nillson, 2005, p.51). Veterans associa-
tions such as the petisyonaryos in Aceh pre-figured in violent protests because of
their exclusion from the reintegration program (Sindre, 2016a; Sindre, 2016b,
p.202). Ex-combatants were also organized as conduits for community-based
reintegration assistance (De Vries and Weigink, 2011, p.43). Ex-MNLF combat-
ants were Peace and Development Community leaders in Mindanao, Philippines,
while many ex-communists formed networks of rebel cooperatives such as Grupo

42 Rosalie Arcala Hall
Paghidaet in Iloilo province, Philippines, along the same line (Rutten, 2001,
p.324; Bercilla, 2001, p.75). Namibia’s Development Brigade consisting of ex-
rebels anchored the two-year reintegration program (Preston, 1997, p.465). An
environment where there are fewer opportunities for reintegration compels vet-
erans to form associations (Kaplan and Nussio, 2015, p.148). In Timor-Leste,
veteran associations constitute a powerful constituency in that they are able to
shape reintegration policies long after the externally assisted program ceased (De
Almeida, 2017, p.93). The government-created National Council of Combatants
of National Liberation did a survey of Faintil ex-combatants and conducted con-
sultations with veterans, generating a national database used for the reinsertion
assistance. There was also a veteran social liaison officer under the president and
a policy of remembrance for which memorials were erected.
Which pathway? The irregular forces in Southeast Asia
There is a diverse universe of irregular forces in Southeast Asia. These organi-
zational pluralities include gangs, militias, civil defense forces, private armies,
martial arts groups, and rebel groups. They are mainly local formations, with
pre-colonial origins and amalgamated into the colonial security apparatus. With
one foot in the shadow economy, they were mainly used by colonial authorities
as brokers to communities (Baker, 2016). Later, they were utilized as private
security providers for local oligarchs. The evolution of irregular forces is closely
tied with state formation. Their relative autonomy rose and ebbed with the state
apparatus. On the one hand, they are associated with a predatorial state seeking
to consolidate capital accumulation (Sidel, 1999), as they are with state weakness
in peripheral areas. On the other hand, irregular forces rely on the central govern-
ment for rents (Okamoto and Hamid, 2008, p.117). The relationship between
these violent actors with the post-colonial authority is layered, driven by pragma-
tism and patron-client ties (Nordholt, 2015, p.167). Over the course of history,
irregular forces have been mainly co-opted or conferred legal status, acting as
subcontractors or proxy for the state’s coercive authority and integrated into
political party machines (Ahram, 2011, p.53; Baker, 2016, p.189; Okamoto and
Hamid, 2008). Linkages between the military and these violent groups have been
cited as responsible for conflict escalation in areas rife with ethnic tensions, as in
Ambon, Indonesia (Azca, 2006, p.450). These irregular forces seek legitimacy by
connecting to their community’s moral or ideological frame and instrumentaliz-
ing traditional structures to obtain support (Tersptra, 2020, p.36). As “informal
sovereignties,” emphasis is also placed on the performative aspect of their behav-
ior, e.g., wearing the uniform, hand weapons, martial arts skills, as the source of
their legitimacy (Baker, 2016, p.183).
Several pathways have been noted for Southeast Asian irregular forces. First
is the transformation induced by the government or an external party. These
mainly targeted rebel groups (militias, only marginally) as part of the conflict
settlement package. Timor-Leste had an UN-supervised DDR program for
Falintil and militias, and a similar one for Aceh with GAM. There also was a

Pathways for irregular forces 43
reintegration program for the Philippines’ MNLF, underwritten largely by for-
eign donors. For the militarily defeated Khmer Rouge (Cambodia), no formal
reintegration program came about, hence the differential outcomes between ex-
rebels situated in strongholds versus those outside (Hennings, 2017). There was
the integration of former and MNLF (Philippine) rebels into the military and
police as a result of an endogenous peace agreement, while the case for Falintil
(Timor-Leste) was part of a broader state-building project carried out under UN
auspices (Hall, 2010; Simonsen, 2005). Falintil and GAM eventually formed
political parties that contested local elections, while the MNLF did not. For
non-insurgent armed groups, the more common trajectory is state collaboration
and co-optation, with their organizations transformed in tandem with the politi-
cal fortunes of their leadership. The increasing trend of privatization of security
points to strong men, bosses, and warlords utilizing these armed groups often
for nefarious ends.
As observed in the case of GAM in Aceh and Falintil in Timor-Leste, the
transformation of irregular forces did not dissolve or supplant hierarchical and
command structures that link leaders and members. Rather, it solidified clien-
telistic ties, strengthened the formation of veterans as an influential interest group
(De Almeida, 2017; Sindre, 2016b), and further embedded members into the
predatorial and corrupt practices of the state (Stange and Patock, 2010; Aspinall,
2009). While rebel groups tend to have a more defined structure (incentivized by
concrete prospects for benefits in the advent of a negotiated settlement with the
government), other irregular forces exhibit fluid organizational characteristics,
allowing them to be easily recycled and repurposed with drastic consequences
(Rutten, 2001).
The overall record of irregular forces in the Southeast Asian region points
to the tenacity of these formations. Because they are products of distinct socio-
political and economic milieus, periodic efforts to formalize them or at least
bring them into the normative ambit of judicious and accountable use of force
produced varying levels of success. Regardless, there is an imperative for state
agents to recognize their existence (rather than ignore them) and acknowledge
their positive contribution from the perspective of their community publics upon
which they draw support and membership. Efforts must be directed at creating
pathways that make resorting to violence less appealing and that enhance state
capacity to provide public security.
Note
1 In the case of Indonesia, the reintegration program for the youth involved in
sectarian ethnic conflict in Poso was part of a counter-insurgency program of
the police and military deployed to pacify the area and included a one-time cash
compensation, vocational training, and livelihood assistance to integrees (McRae,
2010, p.415). While some groups were excluded (e.g., youth involved in fighting
prior to 2002; one other militia group), the process was adjudged to be success-
ful as contacts between the state security forces and ex-combatants increased and
there was overall improvement in the security situation.

44 Rosalie Arcala Hall
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3 Non-state violence and political
order in democratized Indonesia
Masaaki Okamoto
Introduction
In October 2019, almost two decades after the end of the 32-year Suharto
authoritarian regime and the beginning of democratization, reelected President
Joko Widodo addressed the national convention of a nationwide social organiza-
tion called Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila). Bearing the name of Pancasila
(the national ideology of Indonesia) reflects the organization’s nationalist and
right-wing identity. As the Suharto regime consolidated power in the mid-
1960s, Pancasila Youth was actively involved in the violent dismantling of the
Communist Party by the army, effectively laying the groundwork for its subse-
quent expansion. In the 1980s, it succeeded in expanding its membership and
activities nationwide by ensuring the political stability of the regime. The proxim-
ity of the organization to state power and its violent nature allowed its members
not only to access government projects but also to engage in illegal and illicit
business. The organization “participated in politics” in that it received seat allo-
cations in return for supporting the governing party, Golkar, by silencing and
weakening opposition groups with violence and threats during elections (Ryter,
1998; Aditjondoro, 2006, p. 20).
Since the collapse of the Suharto regime and the ushering in democratization
and decentralization in 1998, various other organizations that use violence as a
political resource have emerged at both the local and national levels. In contrast
to Suharto’s time, many of these were established on the basis of a specific iden-
tity, such as religion or ethnicity, while others were simply racketeering organiza-
tions. Most of the violent groups that have retained their influence for more than
20 years after democratization retain patronage from the central and local elites.
Among them, Pancasila Youth has succeeded in gaining candidacies of several
political parties in both central- and local-level elections. In the 2019 elections,
25 elected national MPs as well as the president of the People’s Consultative
Assembly, the president and vice president of the Regional Representative
Assembly, and the minister of Youth and Sports in the second Joko Widodo gov-
ernment were all from Pancasila Youth. Its prominent members also won three
out of six gubernatorial elections in 2020. In this sense, the organization has
succeeded in participating in politics in an unprecedented way for a group whose
DOI: 10.4324/9781003143994-4

Non-state violence & political order in Indonesia 51
resources are based on violence. As such, this chapter will focus on Pancasila
Youth to examine the relationship between violent groups and the state and to
consider the political significance of these actors.
Studies are numerous of non-state actors that use violence to gain influ-
ence and further their interests. These range from the classic study on bandits
by Hobsbawm (1969), studies of the Italian mafia (Blok, 1974; Gambetta,
1993; Lewis, 2003), and studies of violent entrepreneurs in Russia after the
collapse of the Soviet Union (Volkov, 2002; Varese, 2001) to a study of Islamic
gangs (Sato et al., 1994), Latin American gangs (Rodgers, 2004, 2006), and
the Japanese yakuza (Hill, 2003; Siniawer 2008). Global comparative studies
on gangs can also be found (see, for example, Hazen and Rodgers, 2014).
Research has often said that, from the state’s point of view, having links with
non-state forces or creating non-state forces, on the one hand, has the merit to
trance and control illicit and illegal activities done not only by themselves but
also by other underground forces and, on the other hand, is helpful to main-
tain social order without mobilizing a limited resource of policing personnel.
However, if the state becomes overly dependent on such forces, it may not be
able to stop them from getting out of control, which could fundamentally shake
the social order.
The literature on this topic in Indonesia is also rich.1 Compared with other
countries, Indonesia is characterized by a strong relationship (both formal and
informal) between the state and non-state forces, regardless of what political
regime is in power. Immediately after Indonesia’s democratization, research
flourished on the background of the emergence of non-state forces operat-
ing at both national and local levels and their rising politico-economic powers.
As democracy took hold, however, the focus shifted to non-violent resources,
such as money, popularity, and networks that became more politically salient.
The focus of research thus shifted to such aspects. A series of works by Ryter,
also cited in this chapter, analyzes the politicized members of Pancasila Youth
and other groups (Ryter, 1998, 2009, 2012, 2014). Ryter notes how Pancasila
Youth and other forces have “become an essential part of Indonesian democracy”
(Ryter, 1998, p. 73). Mulyanto (2007, 2013) examines Pancasila Youth in North
Sumatra province in detail. While these studies touch on the shrewd organiza-
tional adaptation of Pancasila Youth to democratization, they do not examine its
national political rise and the meaning of this to the political order in Indonesia.
As for the study of non-state forces after the consolidation of democracy, Wilson
(2015) does fascinatingly detail these actors’ adaptation to democratization and
their relationship with politicians and the military and police, but his study is con-
fined to the metropolitan area of Jakarta. If we are to examine the nature of the
political order and the role of non-state violence in that order since democratiza-
tion, it is essential to analyze the violent nationalist forces that have transformed
themselves to adapt to democracy and have begun to influence politics even at
the national level. Therefore, this chapter will focus on Pancasila Youth as the
most successful non-state force participating in national politics. I will first outline
the relationship between the state and non-state forces in general before turning

52 Masaaki Okamoto
to this relationship in Indonesia and then examining the political rise of Pancasila
Youth and its significance.
The relationship between non-state forces and the state
The numerous studies that discuss the modern state and violence often rely on
Weber’s (2004: loc.2113-2116 of 3589. kindle.) classic definition of the state as
their starting point: “the state is the form of human community that (success-
fully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a par-
ticular territory.” The impact of this definition is so great that, in their volume
on violence and social order, North et al. note: “virtually all models of the state
assume that the state has a monopoly on violence,” even though a little more
than two dozen states in modern society actually hold such a monopoly (North
et al., 2013, p. 273).
Weber’s definition, however, continues: “all other organizations or individuals
can assert the right to use physical violence only in so far as the state permits them
to do so” (Weber, 2004). In other words, as long as it is within the limits permit-
ted by the state, certain non-state organizations and individuals can use physical
violence without state interference. In this chapter, I refer to such organizations
and groups as non-state forces.2 According to Weber’s definition, some of these
non-state actors may be groups or individuals who are legally allowed to use
physical violence. In reality, however, many organizations and groups are allowed
to exist, even if they or their activities are not necessarily legal. Therefore, catego-
rizing organizations and groups based on whether they are legal or illegal can be
misleading, as many operate within a gray zone of permissibility.
Figure 3.1 depicts the relationships between state and non-state forces and
the gray zone within which this study focuses its attention. The x-axis represents
the permissibility of non-state forces and the y-axis represents their legality. In
the first quadrant, we find organizations that are both legal and permissible, such
Figure 3.1 Relationship between the state and non-state forces.

Non-state violence & political order in Indonesia 53
as private military companies that carry out missions alongside the military on
the battlefield, and security companies that protect their clients’ businesses and
residences during peacetime. In Japan, the petitioning officer system created by
the Meiji state in Hokkaido, which allowed for the existence of police officers
financially supported by private citizens, can also be considered an example of
the first quadrant (Inose, 2016). It could also be said that, until the mid-1960s,
the yakuza in Japan fall into this quadrant. As public safety deteriorated in urban
areas amid Japan’s postwar turmoil, the police did not eliminate the yakuza but
rather relied on them to ensure security; some politicians also benefited from
their links to the yakuza. For their part, the yakuza used violence and extortion as
weapons to expand their businesses. While organizations in the second quadrant
(operating legally and not in a permissible way) might be rare, this may apply
to the yakuza in Japan since the mid-1960s. While their existence is technically
legal, according to the Anti-Violence Law, they are categorized as “anti-social
forces,” and in order to eliminate them, the police do not tolerate their violence-
prone activities. The third quadrant includes groups that are both illegal and not
permissible, such as terrorist groups that plan to overthrow the state through
violence and Italian mafias that became illegal by the national law in 1992, even
though there are some spaces for them to engage in the illegal drug business and
human trafficking with the connection to local political and judicial actors.
The fourth quadrant (illegal and permissible) is home to organizations and
groups whose existence is illegal but who are tolerated by the state, or whose
operations and/or businesses are illegal and involve violence and/or extortion
but their organizations and business are tolerated by the state. State-sanctioned
militia groups in Myanmar, for example, fall into this quadrant. While they are
known to be involved in illegal activities such as drug trafficking and extra-judi-
cial killings, the state uses them to maintain security in border areas (Buchanan,
2016).
The chao pho or “godfathers” in Thailand also fall into the fourth quadrant.
As development benefits spread to the countryside from the 1970s onward, these
local businessmen used coercion to make their fortunes not only in legal busi-
nesses such as rice milling, construction, and transportation but also in illegal
businesses such as logging, drug trafficking, gambling, and prostitution (Tamada,
1987a, 1987b; Viengrat, 2000, 2001; Ockey, 1993, 2000). With the onset of
democratization in the mid-1980s, some chao pho succeeded in gaining influ-
ence in local and even national politics. They were non-state forces, resorting to
violence to maintain and expand their spheres of influence. The bureaucrats of
the Ministry of Home Affairs dispatched to the provinces or the police stationed
in the provinces tacitly approved of the chao pho’s illegal businesses and entrusted
them with maintaining security in the community while receiving financial
rewards (OcKey, 2000).
At this juncture, Malaysia provides a useful example. Considered one of the
most successful and secure countries in Southeast Asia, authoritarian rule by
coalition parties prevailed until 2018. The Domestic Security Act and the Law
on Security Violations and Countermeasures enacted in 2012 allowed police to

54 Masaaki Okamoto
easily detain anti-government activists and others; police control over the citizens
is tight. Nevertheless, there is room for non-state forces, commonly referred to
as gangs in Malaysia, to operate. Indeed, in August 2013, the Ministry of Home
Affairs announced that 49 illegal gang organizations (comprising 40,313 peo-
ple) were operating in the country.3 These gangs also operate within the fourth
quadrant because, although they are illegal, the Malaysian police do not aim
to eradicate them. Indeed, in 2016, Nur Jazlan, the deputy minister of Home
Affairs openly acknowledged that the police and gangs both have one goal, which
is to maintain public safety, and they, therefore, maintain a kind of cooperative
“arrangement.” According to Nur Jazlan, gangs basically use violence against
rival gangs in turf wars, helping to maintain security in their territory. As the
police see it, they can eliminate gangs whenever it becomes necessary. If they are
not the cause of a serious deterioration in security, the police may find it cheaper
and less troublesome to leave local security to them instead of interfering in their
illegal activities.4
While such explicit acknowledgment of the cooperative arrangement between
the state and non-state forces is rare, its existence is not. Non-state forces may
engage in collecting racketeering fees, forcible detention, possession of a real
estate, and coercive debt collection uninhibited by the state, but they are also
often engaged in illegal businesses such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and ille-
gal gambling, which are generally subject to a crackdown by the state. However,
allowing these actors to operate also offers benefits for the state. While these
actors fight with other violent business actors to expand their territories, they
at least try to ensure safety within their own territories. They are also a source
of information about serious crimes. Therefore, in Southeast Asia, “cooperative
arrangements” involving the exchange of money and other rewards between the
state’s violence apparatus and non-state violent business actors are not uncom-
mon, especially at the local level (Trocki, 1998). In some cases, these arrange-
ments are tacitly state-sanctioned with systematic approval, whereas in other
cases, they are tacitly approved by the particular military and/or police officers
(Okamoto, 2017).
Coexistence and co-prosperity of the state and non-state
forces in Indonesia: A brief history
Non-state forces from colonial times to independence
The very idea of the state monopolizing violence has been feeble since the time
of the Dutch East Indies, a colonial state that emerged as a modern state. In
Java, the island with the highest degree of colonial penetration among the Dutch
East Indies, the Dutch began in the early 19th century to exert control at the vil-
lage level through the development of a bureaucracy. The opium farming busi-
ness by the Chinese expanded along with the development of the bureaucracy,
and both of these were supported from behind the scenes by non-state forces
such as jago and jagabaya (Rush, 1990). These actors operated both inside and

Non-state violence & political order in Indonesia 55
outside of the formal social order and were allowed to and did use violence in
total disregard of legal norms of justice. While most of these non-state actors
became henchmen of the colonial state for their own survival and benefit, as the
colonial state stabilized and increased predatory behavior, a few of them fought
anti-colonial struggles alongside Communist Party members (Williams, 1990;
Okamoto, 2015).
The Dutch colonial regime ended with the invasion of the Japanese army in
1942, after which Japanese military occupation lasted 3 1/2 years. When Japan
surrendered to the Allies in August 1945, the Allies ordered the Japanese mili-
tary to maintain the status quo of the ex-Dutch colonial state, but it had little
legitimacy to govern. In this power vacuum, Indonesian nationalists declared the
independence of the Republic of Indonesia from the Netherlands. The Dutch
did not recognize the republic and plotted a military invasion to re-colonize it.
As a result, fighting broke out between the republic and the Netherlands, and
non-state forces such as militia and vigilante groups rapidly proliferated to fight
against the Dutch.
Adding to this political chaos, social revolutions also erupted in some of
Indonesia’s regions (Anderson, 1972; Cribb, 1991; Kahin ed. 1985; Stoler,
1988; Williams, 1990). Rejecting the rule of the Netherlands, Japan, and even
the Republic of Indonesia, some local leaders attempted to govern themselves
autonomously. Such local leaders included not only Islamic leaders but also non-
state forces who used violence as a weapon to create order. When the Republic
of Indonesia finally gained independence in 1949 and began state-building, these
forces did not disappear but rather became less visible politically.
Non-state forces under authoritarian regimes
Immediately after independence, Indonesia, like other Southeast Asian countries,
adopted a parliamentary democracy. This did not last long, and as local rebellions
broke out and as the conflict between Islamic and communist forces deepened,
political instability increased. Sukarno, the republic’s first president, established an
authoritarian regime in 1957. At the same time, the army deepened its relation-
ship with Islamic forces and intensified its confrontation with communist forces.
In this context, newly established non-state forces linked to the army began to
emerge. These included nationalistic right-wing organizations, such as Pancasila
Youth, as well as the anti-communist Indonesian Student Action League (KAMI)
and the Indonesian Youth Student Action League (KAPPI). The largest Islamic
social organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, created youth units such as
Ansor and Bansel, which brought society’s “roughnecks”—delinquents, thugs,
and hoodlums—into their ranks (Ryter, 1998).
When the conflict spun out of control and the Communist Party staged a
coup d’état in September 1965, the army, led by Suharto, actively utilized non-
state forces to dismantle the Communist Party and its allies. These actors staged
anti-communist demonstrations, killed party members, collected money for
their “struggle” from ethnic Chinese, and were involved in the confiscation of

56 Masaaki Okamoto
party-related assets. Later, as Suharto’s regime consolidated power and entrenched
itself, the state once weakened the relationship with these actors.
In Jakarta and other cities in the early 1970s, gangs led by children of mili-
tary officers who had too much free time on their hands emerged. They fought,
assaulted, murdered, raped, robbed, used illegal drugs, stole, and behaved in other
inappropriate ways, becoming a source of insecurity. In response, the Suharto
regime forced neighborhood associations and neighbor groups to carry out night
patrols under the supervision of the military and police and turned hoodlums into
neighborhood-level security guards (Barker, 1999). In addition, the national mili-
tary systematically brought together non-state forces at the local and national levels
to enforce their version of peace and order (rust en orde) and control underground
forces and their activities (Wilson, 2015, pp. 15–18). At the national level, these
actors included the Panca Marga Youth (PPM), led by children of the veterans of
the independence war, the Communication Forum for the Children of Military
and Police Officers (FKPPI), Baladi Karya, the Youth League for Indonesia
Renewal (AMPI) under Golkar, and Pancasila Youth. At the local level, locally
stationed military commanders facilitated the formation of the Siliwangi Youth
League (AMS) in West Java, the Indonesian Association of Bantenese Martial Arts
and Culture (PPSBBI) in Banten, the Diponegoro Youth League in Central Java,
the Security Core Command (Kotikam) in Yogyakarta Special Province, and the
Industrial Youth Solidarity (IPK) in North Sumatra (Ryter, 1998; Okamoto and
Rozaki, 2006; Beittinger-Lee, 2009). The rise and fall of these non-state forces
reflected the power struggles within the regime and the military. In this context,
Pancasila Youth came under the protection of President Suharto and grew rapidly
as a national organization in the 1980s, as explained in detail later.
In order for the Suharto authoritarian regime to hold elections every 5 years
in a way that ensures victory for the ruling government party, Golkar, the state
relied on non-state forces to undermine opposition parties, activists, and other
opposition forces through violence and the threat of violence. In return for this
support, these groups gained parliamentary posts. As Indonesia’s economic
growth accelerated, the cadres of these groups secured government projects and
were tacitly allowed to expand legal and illegal businesses, such as construction,
gambling, prostitution, and smuggling. These businesses provided jobs for the
groups’ ordinary members, such as collecting parking fees in markets and other
places; providing security in bars, nightclubs, and brothels; collecting rent and
debt from stores and street vendors; enforcing evictions of residents, and force-
fully providing security and construction materials for development sites. These
kinds of businesses continue to this day and are not only a source of funding
for the organizations but are also an important source of income for ordinary
members.5
Democratization and restructuring of non-state forces
When the Asian currency crisis struck in 1997 and the Suharto regime began
to collapse, Suharto’s political order buckled and insecurity became pervasive,

Non-state violence & political order in Indonesia 57
especially in urban areas. The final collapse of the regime and the appointment
of Suharto’s right-hand man Habibie as president in May 1998 further worsened
the security situation. To defend President Habibie, the national army mobilized
not only nationalist non-state forces such as Pancasila Youth, PPM, FKPPI, and
AMPI, with whom it had coexisted for a long time, but also the Islamic non-state
forces, with whom it had only developed relations since the latter half of the
Suharto regime. The Habibie government surprisingly proposed a series of dras-
tic democratization and decentralization plans, including the free and fair elec-
tion of 1999. Despite this, the government was confronted with student groups
staging demonstrations critical of the Habibie administration as a continuation
of the Suharto regime. In Jakarta, the anti-Suharto elite chose not to dislodge
Habibie from the presidency by orchestrating anti-Habibie demonstrations but
instead joined the electoral politics scheduled in 1999. On the other hand, at the
local level, there was a backlash against the coercive military and police during
the Suharto regime, and non-state and anti-state forces based on religion and
ethnicity emerged for vigilante purposes (Okamoto and Rozaki, 2006; Wilson,
2015). Similar to what happened during the war of independence, violent actors
wanting to make quick money also emerged (Okamoto, 2015). These new actors
acquired the same business interests as those of the old non-state violence actors,
such as collecting rents and playing the role of a bouncer. Conflicts among mul-
tiple actors who wish to expand their sphere of influence frequently occurred.
Democratization and decentralization also brought about a significant change
in the participation of a variety of non-state forces in formal politics. Although the
route of political participation through Golkar existed even during the Suharto
era, since democratization, non-state forces have gained access to the political
process through multiple political parties. Since direct local head elections com-
menced in 2005, not only these actors have joined campaign teams but cadres
and members also began to directly run as candidates. When elected, they are
able to use local government budgets as well as various permits and concessions
to expand their patronage.
By the time Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the first directly elected president
of Indonesia, took office in the mid-2000s, religious and ethnic conflicts had
subsided. In contrast to Thailand during the 1980s–1990s and the Philippines
by the early 2000s, where political killing was rampant in the democratization
process (Anderson, 1990; Sidel, 1999), Indonesian democracy experienced fewer
political killings and intraregional conflicts have not led to as much violence as
many Indonesians expected. The reason for this is that, as democracy began to
take hold in the 2000s and as the police began to exert their authority over inter-
nal security, the influence of non-state forces that did not have networks with the
official violent apparatus weakened, clear turfs among these actors became more
or less established, and large-scale conflicts subsided (Tirto March 5, 2019).6 In
addition, in the democratization era, violent actors have gained plenty of non-
violent political resources and are now subject to a political backlash in response
to any apparent use of violence. This is especially true at the national political
level, where such actors are more vulnerable to criticism by civil society forces.