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Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar
Abstract
Myanmar has experienced significant changes since the 2010s. It ended long military rule and undertook reforms under the quasi-civilian government as a result of the 2010 general elections. Although the military's seizure of power in 2021 set back the positive image that the country has obtained since 2010, if we understand the nature of the state, Myanmar, the event in early 2021 was not astonishing. This chapter reveals the nature of the state, Myanmar, and examines the effect of globalization in post-reform Myanmar. ‘Disciplined’ democracy is a symbolic term to represent the reforms. Nevertheless, the country suffers from more nationalist movements and extremism under democratization movements, thereby generating increased violence and local conflicts, particularly in the borderlands. While such international norms as democracy and the rule of law have been embedded in the country's reforms, careful investigations reveal that the pretense of democracy and the rule of law enhances marginalization, discrimination and exclusion vis-à-vis hegemonic state-building. A new dynamism of political economy developed since 2011 has significantly changed power relations of the state, military, entrepreneurs, foreign investors and local people.KeywordsMyanmarDemocracyReformsPolitical economyState-building
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Myanmar’s path to democracy, freedom and development has been marred by emerging Buddhist religious extremism targeted against the Rohingya Muslims. This article examines the rise of Buddhist religious extremism in Myanmar. Its core focus is on the political economy of state-building and development, and the structural and social conditions that have produced violence. We argue that contested state-society relations, negotiated by the discourse of state-building and development rather than religion and religious ideologies alone, can better explain the current dynamics of extremist violence in Myanmar. We show that hegemonic state-building processes (that have been ongoing since Myanmar became independent in 1948) and exploitative development serve as a site for inequalities and discriminatory policies. These policies and their manipulation for political and developmental gains have had multiple social effects: they have radicalised a section of Buddhists, resulting in the rise of violent religious extremism, and marginalisation and double victimisation of the Rohingya Muslims, targeted by the State security forces as well as Buddhist extremist groups.
This paper argues that a key factor in Myanmar’s new approach towards China since 2011 has been the Myanmar government’s foreign policy goal to reintegrate itself into the international community. The success of this approach is dependent on Myanmar’s rapprochement with the United States, which requires both domestic political reforms and a foreign policy realignment – a need to reduce Myanmar’s dependence on China, particularly in the context of US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. In the context of China–Myanmar relations, the factors that have influenced Myanmar’s China policy since 2011 are growing anti-China sentiment in Myanmar, growing concern over China’s interference in Myanmar affairs, and the rapprochement with the United States. Myanmar’s China policy shift, in terms of direction, is by no means to seek to be independent of China, but rather for there to be an increased interdependence between the two countries. © 2015, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. All rights reserved.
The dominant issue in Myanmar throughout 2010 was the elections finally held on November 7. These were the culmination of the ruling junta's roadmap toward "disciplined democracy" but were neither free nor fair. A major development the same month was the release from house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, which drew worldwide attention. Myanmar's economy continued to underperform.
In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22 years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian “regime breakdown” and “regime maintenance”. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalize once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar's always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalizing in 2010, the regime sought to create a “disciplined democracy” to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via “ceasefire capitalism”, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total “victory” for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace.
While India may not traditionally be considered to be a significant actor in the Asia-Pacific region, over the past 18 years, New Delhi has undertaken a concerted effort to direct its foreign, economic, and military policies eastward. What began as economic cooperation with the nations of Southeast Asia has expanded into full-spectrum engagement with the major powers of East Asia. This article explores India's emergence in the Asia-Pacific, concluding that, while in the near term India's presence and influence will be felt most strongly in Southeast Asia, a steadily expanding economy, paired with a growing partnership with key regional actors and an increasingly capable Navy, positions the South Asian giant to have an impact on the emerging security architecture of the region.
A nation is a society united by a delusion about its ancestry and by a common hatred for its neighbors.
Over the past sixty years, successive regimes in Myanmar have faced the challenge of building a nation-state amidst ethnic diversity and political contention.1 In addition to the material aspects of building the institutions and infrastructure that allow a state to function, nation-building refers to the process of constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. It thus entails the discursive construction of an “imagined community” toward which citizens are supposed to feel belonging, loyalty, and patriotism (Anderson 1983). In this endeavor, military regimes in Myanmar have both built on the ideological groundwork laid in the dynastic, colonial, and independence eras, and developed innovative new strategies to convince Myanmar’s inhabitants to overlook what divides them and prioritize what they have in common. In this article, we will trace the evolution of state discourse on the nation in Myanmar with a focus on post-socialist shifts, and provide counter-vailing perspectives from some non-state ethnic minority organizations.
Our sources are ones that have been largely neglected in Burma Studies: schoolbooks. While scholars have productively explored the construction of national identity using state media or public spectacle (Houtman 1999), educational texts provide a relatively unexplored source of insight into state ideology.2 Theorists have long pointed out that curricula are inherently ideological and that schooling promotes state and elites interests (Apple 1979; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). A rich literature has developed on the construction of national identity in curricula worldwide (Adam 2005; Lall and Vickers 2009). This article extends these insights to Myanmar.
In particular, states have used history education to transmit their self-legitimizing vision and encourage students to adopt the subject position of citizen (Hein and Selden 2000). Our research shows in Myanmar, history (together with the teaching of languages) has had the most dramatic implications for national identity, and is the most contentious.3
Like other media, history curricula transmit ideological messages on a discursive as well as explicit level (Fairclough 2003). Cultural theorist Sara Ahmed examines how texts generate the nation “as a shared object of feeling” by “sticking signs to bodies,” inviting readers to become a “you” addressed by the text while placing other bodies outside the nation’s limits (2004: 12). In this way, “we” (citizens) are divided from “they” (foreigners), notably by the selection of collective traumas and triumphs that come to symbolize national identity (Volkan 2001). This identity can shift over time, both through deliberate deployment or suppression of information and unintentional slippages that often reveal more or less conscious priorities (Trouillot 1995).4
We therefore take a diachronic approach, attempting to illustrate the continuities, shift s, and ruptures in textbook discourse during the period of military rule. First, we sketch the evolution of history curricula from the colonial era to the present to provide some context for the production and use of history textbooks today. Next, we trace the evolution of three themes that elucidate shifts in the discourse on national identity between the end of socialist period and the SLORC/SPDC era: the substitution of the great kings for Aung San as national hero, the increased marginalization of minorities in the narrative of the nation’s history, and the identification of Thais (along with British and other [neo]colonialists) as national enemies. Finally, we compare the SPDC’s curriculum with some of those produced by non-state groups, including the Karen National Union and Shan State Army, in order to provide alternative readings of the nation(s), and to illustrate the discursive similarities that cross political lines.
While we offer some historical and historiographical context, our primary aim is neither to evaluate the historical truth of these textbooks nor to provide an exhaustive historiography of a particular era. Rather, we provide an argument for how and why their contents have changed or remained the same over time. Our respective backgrounds (education and geography) led us to an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to draw insights on nation-building and education from political science (Anderson 1983), history and geography (Thongchai...
This article outlines a human rights framework for analyzing violent internal conflict, "translating" social-scientific findings on conflict risk factors into human rights language. It is argued that discrimination and violations of social and economic rights function as underlying causes of conflict, creating the deep grievances and group identities that may, under some circumstances, motivate collective violence. Violations of civil and political rights, by contrast, are more clearly identifiable as direct conflict triggers. Abuse of personal integrity rights is associated with escalation, and intermediately repressive regimes appear to be most at risk. Denial of political participation rights is associated with internal conflict because full democracies experience less conflict. Yet democratization itself is dangerous, since regime transition is also a major conflict risk factor.
Against the background of closer diplomatic, political and security ties between Myanmar and China since 1988, their economic relations have also grown stronger throughout the 1990s and up to 2005. China is now a major supplier of consumer and capital goods to Myanmar, in particular through border trade. China also provides a large amount of economic cooperation in the areas of infrastructure, energy and state-owned economic enterprises. Nevertheless, Myanmar’s trade with China has failed to have a substantial impact on its broad-based economic and industrial development. China’s economic cooperation apparently supports the present regime, but its effects on the whole economy will be limited with an unfavorable macroeconomic environment and distorted incentives structure. As a conclusion, strengthened economic ties with China will be instrumental in regime survival, but will not be a powerful force affecting the process of economic development in Myanmar.
Throughout the 1990s and up to 2005, the adoption of an open-door policy substantially increased the volume of Myanmar's external trade. Imports grew more rapidly than exports in the 1990s owing to the release of pent-up consumer demand during the transition to a market economy. Accordingly, trade deficits expanded. Confronted by a shortage of foreign currency, the government after the late 1990s resorted to rigid controls over the private sector's trade activities. Despite this tightening of policy, Myanmar's external sector has improved since 2000 largely because of the emergence of new export commodities, namely garments and natural gas. Foreign direct investments in Myanmar significantly contributed to the exploration and development of new gas fields. As trade volume grew, Myanmar strengthened its trade relations with neighboring countries such as China, Thailand and India. Although the development of external trade and foreign investment inflows exerted a considerable impact on the Myanmar economy, the external sector has not yet begun to function as a vigorous engine for broad-based and sustainable development.
The regions of Asia and Oceania, with their many diverse peoples, massive size, and vast cultural history, have birthed some of the most critical conflicts of the modern era. From border disputes to current nuclear threats to regions still shattered by the effects of past wars, this volatile region is a key player on the world stage of global conflict. This exciting volume provides up-to-the minute coverage of the most critical situations and explosive events in the region, including internal strife in Indonesia, insurgency in southern Thailand, nuclear issues in India and Pakistan, the Tibetan revolt, the Spratly Islands dispute, and terrorist organizations such as Abu Sayeff. The conflicts are explored against the backdrop of major conflicts like the Vietnam War, the Korean War, and the Cold War. Maps, a timeline, an index, and an annotated bibliography supplement the chapters for a greater understanding of the material. With ties to several curricular areas, including Asian studies, political science, global studies, military history, international relations, regional history and politics, this is an essential source for students of world history and global conflict.
Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction approaches its subject from a political perspective, to address the complexities behind the major topical issues and to examine the main models of citizenship that exist today. Interest in citizenship has never been higher. It has become a buzz-word for politicians of all varieties, moral leaders, and every kind of campaigning group from the global to the local level. But what does it mean to be a citizen of a modern, complex community? How have ideas of citizenship changed through time from ancient Greece to the present? Why is citizenship important? Can we create citizenship, and can we test for it?
This article explores the applicability of the notion of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in reference to the crisis faced by the Rohingya in Myanmar, and it discusses why the R2P has limited usefulness in certain cases. Since R2P came to be recognized by ASEAN, ongoing community-building activities within the ASEAN led to optimism that member countries would give increased attention to human rights, despite the organization’s historic practice of non-intervention in individual states’ internal affairs. However, the ASEAN’s stance regarding the Rohingya crisis can be described as all talk and no action. While recognizing the value of the R2P in protecting people from mass atrocities in certain contexts, the article points out the critical flaw that R2P rests on a particular discourse of sovereignty. Thus, it argues that the R2P not only has limited usefulness in the case of the Rohingya (whom Myanmar treats as stateless non-citizens) but could even exacerbate the situation.
Are human rights really a building block of global constitutionalism? Does global constitutionalism have any future in the theory and practice of international law and global governance? This book critically examines these key questions by focusing on the mechanisms utilised by global constitutionalism whilst comparing the historical functioning of constitutional rights in national systems. Yahyaoui Krivenko provides new insights into the workings of human rights and associated notions, such as the state, the political, and the individual, by demonstrating that human rights are antithetical to global constitutionalism and encouraging new discussions on the meaning of global constitutionalism and human rights. Drawing on the interdisciplinary works of such thinkers as Agamben, Luhmann, Bourdieu, Deleuze and Guattari, this book also considers practical examples from historical experience of ancient Greek and early Islamic societies. It will appeal to scholars interested in human rights, international law and critical legal theory.
This article focuses on peace-building efforts in Myanmar implemented under the Nation Wide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2013. It assesses the ways in which the recently elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) has dealt with the NCA, and highlights opportunities and challenges. I argue that while the NLD government and Myanmar military remain crucial to the success of peace efforts, implementation of the NCA is impossible without the support of the eight current NCA signatories, in particularly the Karen National Union (KNU). Neglecting the importance of these actors not only provides an incomplete picture of ongoing peace-building efforts, but could also undermine efforts to promote national reconciliation that have thus far focused exclusively on the Myanmar government and the military. These signs of life emanating from the NCA signatories, however, have increasingly been undermined by an official failure to implement the agreement and to adhere to the agreed process and by ongoing hostilities between the military and four of the country’s ethnic armed groups.
Located at the junction of East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia, Myanmar is one of the most important countries in the world's geopolitical landscape. Its ongoing political and economic reforms arouse growing concern from the international community, especially great powers like the US, Japan, India and China. Will the demostic reform bring Myanmar back to the international community? How and to which extent does the demostic reform change Myanmar's relations with other countries? This book is based on papers presented at an international conference on Myanmar held at the Institute of Myanmar Studies in Yunnan University, China in 2014. Based on their long-term observation and studies, experts from China, Laos, Myanmar, Germany, Singapore and the US share their opinions on Myanmar's domestic reform and foreign relations, as well as the current situation and future prospect. This book contributes to better understanding of Myanmar in its dramatic political and social transition. © 2016 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.
The idea of “national races” or taingyintha has animated brutal conflict in Myanmar over who or what is “Rohingya.” But because the term is translated from Burmese inconsistently, and because its usage is contingent, its peculiar significance for political speech and action has been lost in work on Myanmar by scholars writing in English. Out of concern that Myanmar’s contemporary politics cannot be understood without reckoning with taingyintha, in this article I give national races their due. Adopting a genealogical method, I trace the episodic emergence of taingyintha from colonial times to the present. I examine attempts to order national races taxonomically, and to marry the taxonomy with a juridical project to dominate some people and elide others through a citizenship regime in which membership in a national race has surpassed other conditions for membership in the political community “Myanmar.” Consequently, people who reside in Myanmar but are collectively denied citizenship – like anyone identifying or identified as Rohingya – pursue claims to be taingyintha so as to rejoin the community. Ironically, the surpassing symbolic and juridical power of national races is for people denied civil and political rights at once their problem and their solution.
The general election held on 8 November 2015 marked a significant turning point in Myanmar’s ongoing regime transition. Under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy (NLD) overwhelmingly dominated the polls. Although the huge electoral mandate for the NLD suggests that further political liberalization in Myanmar is likely, the country is not yet undergoing a genuine democratization. Under the current constitutional framework, the military will remain a key actor within the government, thus a new power-sharing arrangement between the NLD and the military is inevitable. This article examines how Myanmar has transformed from a military regime into the military’s version of a ‘disciplined democracy’ and argues that the 2015 general election was not a precursor to a democratic government per se, but rather a re-affirmation of the military’s version of democracy, in which popularly elected civilian political parties are allowed to co-govern the country with the military.
The locus of Democratization Studies was for a long time squarely within comparative politics. Scholars of comparative politics tended to adopt agency-centred theories in which democratization was treated essentially as a function of the political behaviour, coalition-building and pact-making of actors from inside nation-states.1 Until the end of the 1990s, scholarship that paid attention to the role of international factors in democratization was relatively scarce. More recently, the international dimension in democratization has merited sustained and considered attention and a broad range of scholars now recognize that the international matters in a very fundamental way (Grugel, 2003). Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the circumstances under which it is salient or how the international and domestic link together. There is not even a clear consensus as to what, precisely, is meant when we talk of ‘the international’ in processes of democratization.
Since the 1950s, China and India have been locked in a monumental battle for geopolitical supremacy. Chinese interest in the ethnic insurgencies in northeastern India, the still unresolved issue of the McMahon Line, the border established by the British imperial government, and competition for strategic access to the Indian Ocean have given rise to tense gamesmanship, political intrigue, and rivalry between the two Asian giants. Former Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Bertil Lintner has drawn from his extensive personal interviews with insurgency leaders and civilians in remote tribal areas in northeastern India, newly declassified intelligence reports, and his many years of firsthand experience in Asia to chronicle this ongoing struggle. His history of the “Great Game East” is the first significant account of a regional conflict which has led to open warfare on several occasions, most notably the Sino-India border war of 1962, and will have a major impact on global affairs in the decades ahead.
In this study of politics in capitalist society Bryan Turner explores the development of citizenship as a way of demonstrating the effective use of political institutions by the working class and other subordinate groups to promote their interests. Marxist criticisms of reformism are rejected; it is shown that subordinate groups can achieve significant advances in social and economic rights, and that democracy is not a sham but a necessary mechanism for the pursuit of interests.
The rule of law is a political ideal today endorsed and promoted worldwide. Or is it? In a significant contribution to the field, Nick Cheesman argues that Myanmar is a country in which the rule of law is 'lexically present but semantically absent'. Charting ideas and practices from British colonial rule through military dictatorship to the present day, Cheesman calls upon political and legal theory to explain how and why institutions animated by a concern for law and order oppose the rule of law. Empirically grounded in both Burmese and English sources, including criminal trial records and wide ranging official documents, Opposing the Rule of Law offers the first significant study of courts in contemporary Myanmar. It sheds new light on the politics of courts during dark times and sharply illuminates the tension between the demand for law and the imperatives of order.
This book argues that the colonial confrontation was central to the formation of international law and, in particular, its founding concept, sovereignty. Traditional histories of the discipline present colonialism and non-European peoples as peripheral concerns. By contrast, Anghie argues that international law has always been animated by the ‘civilizing mission’ - the project of governing non-European peoples, and that the economic exploitation and cultural subordination that resulted were constitutively significant for the discipline. In developing these arguments, the book examines different phases of the colonial encounter, ranging from the sixteenth century to the League of Nations period and the current ‘war on terror’. Anghie provides a new approach to the history of international law, illuminating the enduring imperial character of the discipline and its continuing importance for peoples of the Third World. This book will be of interest to students of international law and relations, history, post-colonial studies and development studies.
Privatisation is often contentious yet in Myanmar it has not so much been its merits or drawbacks that have attracted attention as questions around implementation. In Myanmar, the implementation of privatisation has broad significance for the political economy. A first phase of privatisation was focused on small and medium-sized enterprises and did not have a significant economic impact. A second phase, commenced in 2008, consolidated the interests of a business elite with personal connections to the military regime. The impact of this second phase of privatisation was such that some elements of this elite strengthened to the extent that they no longer relied entirely on patronage, creating opportunities for diversification in their strategies of wealth creation and defence. For this reason, it is argued, the wealthiest strata of Myanmar’s business elite is now best conceived as not simply consisting of cronies but rather as a nascent form of oligarchy. In theoretical terms, this suggests that greater attention to the qualitative difference between cronyism and oligarchy is warranted, as is close study of processes – like privatisation and political reform – that enable or require a wider range of strategies of wealth defence.
China and India have always been separated not only by the Himalayas, but also by the impenetrable jungle and remote areas that once stretched across Burma. Now this last great frontier will likely vanish - forests cut down, dirt roads replaced by superhighways, insurgencies ended - leaving China and India exposed to each other as never before. This basic shift in geography is as profound as the opening of the Suez Canal and is taking place just as the centre of the world's economy moves to the East. Thant Myint-U has travelled extensively across this vast territory, where high-speed trains and gleaming shopping malls now sit alongside the last remaining forests and impoverished mountain communities. In Where China Meets India he explores the new strategic centrality of Burma, the country of his ancestry, where Asia's two rising giant powers - China and India - appear to be vying for supremacy. Part travelogue, part history, part investigation, Where China Meets India takes us across the fast-changing Asian frontier, giving us a masterful account of the region's long and rich history and its sudden significance for the rest of the world. Thant Myint-U is the author of The River of Lost Footsteps and has written articles for the New York Times, the Washington Post and the New Statesman. He has worked alongside Kofi Annan at the UN's Department of Political Affairs and currently works as a special consultant to the Burmese government.
The recent reforms in Myanmar were not brought about by Western sanctions or some contingent event, but rather planned well in advance,. For there is more continuity than change in Myanmar's political system, which is dominated by the practitioners of national power-the army and the bureaucracy. Of course there are new actors, principally Aung San Suu Kyi and the party she leads, the NLD. Yet the reality remains: state security has to be maintained. Rebalancing with ASEAN, India and now the West is helpful in terms of independence vis a vis China. This is not an invitation to the West to attempt to subvert the existing order.
Among many problematic issues surfacing in reformist Myanmar is a citizenship crisis with four main dimensions. First, in a state with fragile civil liberties, skewed political rights and limited social rights, there is a broad curtailment of citizenship. Second, Rohingya Muslims living mainly in Rakhine State are denied citizenship, and other Muslims throughout the country are increasingly affected by this denial. Third, designated ethnic minorities clustered in peripheral areas face targeted restrictions of citizenship. Fourth, the dominant Bamar majority concentrated in the national heartland tends to arrogate or appropriate citizenship. The result is growing social tension that threatens to undermine the wider reform process. To examine this crisis, the article sets Myanmar in a comparative context. In particular, it considers how multicultural states in the developed world have sought to manage a political switch from racial or ethnic hierarchy to democratic citizenship. Drawing on global experience with multiculturalism and enabling civic integration, it advances a series of policy options focused on rights, duties and identity. It argues for domestic political leadership, backed by global political support, to address Myanmar’s citizenship crisis.
Although the study of citizenship has been an important development in contemporary sociology, the nature of rights has been largely ignored. The analysis of human rights presents a problem for sociology, in which cultural relativism and the fact-value distinction have largely destroyed the classical tradition of the natural-law basis for rights discourse. This critique of the idea of universal rights was prominent in the work of Marx, Durkheim and Weber. However, recent developments in the organisation of nation states, the globalisation of political issues, the transformation of family life, and changes in medical technology in relation to human reproduction have brought the question of human rights to the forefront of social and political debate. The paper argues that a sociology of rights is important, because there are obvious limitations to the idea of citizenship, which is based on membership of a nation state. Existing conceptualisations of citizenship require the supplement of rights theory. It is argued that sociology can ground the analysis of human rights in a concept of human frailty, especially the vulnerability of the body, in the idea of the precariousness of social institutions, and in a theory of moral sympathy. These three analytical supports - ontological frailty, social precariousness, and moral sympathy - are partly derived from the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Gehlen, from Ulrich Beck's concept of the risk society, and Max Scheler's phenomenology of sympathy. Emodied frailty is a human universal condition, which is compounded by the risky and precarious nature of social institutions. Human vulnerability can be contained or ameliorated by the institution of rights which protect human beings from this ontological uncertainty. From a sociological perspective, rights are social claims for institutionalised protection. However, it is because of collective sympathy for the plight of others that moral communities are created which support the institution of rights. This thesis not only offers a sociological version of traditional notions of natural or inalienable rights, but also attempts to provide a sociological alternative to enlightenment theories of social contract and individual rights.
Ever since their emergence as modern states in the middle of the twentieth century, relations between India and China have been exceedingly complex in nature and, for the most part, fraught with tension. This article reviews aspects of the Sino-Indian relationship over the past decade from a realist perspective, showing that despite surface improvements, bilateral ties are still marred by strong feelings of mistrust. It is argued that China has engaged in a policy of containment of India, challenging its regional pre-eminence in South Asia and stymieing its neighbor's emergence as a major world power. A careful study of India's newly assertive foreign policy, both in Asia and beyond, reveals that New Delhi has chosen to back its policy of engagement of Beijing with a form of counter-containment.
Regardless of its growing unpopularity, the ruling military junta in Burma remains far stronger than any of its foes in the country. This article probes how the junta managed to remain in power for such a long time. The answer lies in the informal procedures that governed the way leading members of the junta dealt with their differences and disagreements with their colleagues. Deriving from the rules of engagement within the military established by former military dictator Ne Win, two features came to epitomize the organizational culture of the Tatmadaw (armed forces). The first of these is the maintenance of incriminating evidence against senior members of the military in the event that they fall out of favour or need to be disciplined. The second feature of this culture that has now taken root is the observance of discrete domains of operation. This latter feature allows for the dissipation of tension between officers who are unable to get along well with each other. Importantly, it also prevents a senior officer from acquiring sufficient power to challenge more senior officers within the Tatmadaw hierarchy. Once certain rules became established norms of the Tatmadaw, they came to influence the actions and strategies taken by military officers. The rules that governed the ways military officers interacted with the colleagues they did not get along with and the incentives the Tatmadaw as an organization has created for its members have kept it together. Therefore, regardless of external and internal pressures, the army remains the most organized institution in Burma and appears to be more unified now than ever before.
Despite the global spread of autocratic elections, formal modeling has been lacking on regime transitions to and from electoral authoritarianism. Building on the formal literature on democratization, this paper introduces a model in which a dictator chooses between closed authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, and democracy in the shadow of violent revolt and class conflict over redistribution. Under autocracy, the dictator controls policy but lacks information on the policy demands of citizens and thus the likelihood of popular revolt. The distinguishing feature of electoral authoritarianism is that the dictator can tie policy choice to an electoral signal from citizens, which may be advantageous even if elections make revolt more likely to succeed. Implications are drawn for how economic inequality, regime strength, and uncertainty predict regime choice, policy concessions, and political violence.
Today the most common form of political regime in the developing world is electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular multiparty elections for parliament and the chief executive. Yet they violate liberal-democratic minimum standards of freedom, fairness, and integrity in so systematic and profound ways as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule, rather then instruments of democracy. This volume presents cutting-edge empirical research into the internal dynamics of electoral authoritarian regimes. The methodological chapters (1–3) discuss issues of conceptualization and measurement in fresh and innovate ways. The empirical chapters (4–12) focus on the conflictive interaction between rulers and opposition parties in the central arena of struggle under electoral authoritarianism: the electoral battlefield. Each contribution addresses one particular analytical puzzle on the basis of careful cross-national comparison, with a focus either on a specific region or a cross-regional subset of cases. The concluding chapter (13) offers a critical review of the debate and outlines the contours of a future agenda of research.
Myanmar's Natural Resources: Blessing or Curse?
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State-owned economic enterprise reform in Myanmar: the case of natural resource enterprises, Renaissance Institute and the Natural Resource Governance Institute
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Making enemies: war and state building in Burma
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Re-examining ethnic identity in Myanmar. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
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